Respondents Brief — United States v. Locke

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Nos. 98-1701 AND 98-1706 Supreme

In The Supreme Court NOV 1 9 1999

Of The United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS

Vv.

GARY LOCKE ET. AL., RESPONDENTS.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT TANKER

OWNERS (INTERTANKO), PETITIONER,

V.

GARY LOCKE ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF For STATE RESPONDENTS

CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE

Attorney General

WILLIAM BERGGREN COLLINS*

Sr. Assistant Attorney General

JAY D. GEcK

THOMAS C. MorRILL

Assistant Attorneys General

JERRI LYNN THOMAS

Senior Counsel, Assistant A ttorney General

P.O. Box 40100

OLYMPIA, WA 98504-0100

TELEPHONE: (360) 753-6245

*Counsel of Record for State Respondents

NOVEMBER 18, 1999

IBEST AVAILABLE COPY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SED SMN hnnterstinicnipiiieniibbethigeciiia. cng ico |

A. Washington’s Waters Are A Priceless

cpt Tee EO l

B. An Oil Spill Could Be Devastating To

Washington’s Citizens And Environment............_ 2

e Navigation In Puget Sound Is Difficult ................_. 3

D. Washington’s Rules Protect State

Waters From Oil Spills .............ccccccvesssssssesessesssssssss...... 4

l. Operations Required While In

Or Near Washington Waters...........00................ 6

a Other Spill Prevention Requirements

Directly Related To Protecting

Washington Waters ........20..ccccs:ccccesesesssss.-........ 7

E. Congress Enacted The Oil Pollution

Act To Prevent And Respond To Oil

wap sty to oe pup ay, hE OT 9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....ccccscsccccossssesssesseseesossssccs... 1]

ONE eeidnindariitisiiie cles. 13

A. There Is A Strong Presumption Against

Preemption Of State Police PoWeP....ceecccecccccoosss........ 13

B. Standards For Preemption Of State

Oil Spill Prevention LawS ...........c0cc0escsccssssseeeeoeoses...... 17

& Title II Of The Ports And Waterways

Safety Act, As Interpreted By

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Does Not

Establish Broad Field Preemption

Of State Police Power ..........:.sssccssecsesssssssseeeeeeeoooss,.,... 20

G.

Congress Expressly Preserved State

Police Powers In § 1018 Of The

Oil Pollution Act Of 1990...............cccccccceceeeeeeeeeeeneeeenees 24

Washington Laws Are Not Preempted

By International Treaties .............::sssssersesessesnensennnenrees 30

Title I Of The Ports and Waterways

Safety Act Does Not Require Preemption

Of State Police POWETS ..........:sscssscssscssersersensennenennensernees 34

Washington’s Requirements Do Not

Conflict With United States Or

Government’s Chart Are Often

Unrelated And Do Not Show Conflict............. 38

2. Some Washington Operational

Requirements Prescribe Conduct

Directly Necessitated By Local Conditions.....42

3. Spill Prevention Requirements

That Mirror Federal And

International Requirementts................--ssseeeeees 44

4. Washington Requirements That

Differ From Federal Requirements

Case No Conflict......c-cccssssserccesssosceccrcesesoneves 47

Express Statements Of Preemption By The

Coast Guard, Standing Alone, Do Not

Preempt Aspects Of Washington’s

Oil Spill Prevention Planning ................-sreereeeenenees 48

CONCLUSION .........:scccsssessssscssnsrsenresersesnneatnnnnnnncannnsannnnannnns 50

‘ iit ,

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Dredging Co. v. Miller

a 14

Askew v. American Waterways Operators

aR a 13,14

Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.

SS SIN SINR a 14

California v. ARC America Corp.

I 18

California v. Zook

IR 19, 44

Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy

Packet Co. v. Board of Trustees of the

Town of Catlettsburg

BO WB. CES CR) SIP (IBID) onan sceccesesccceccceecseseesessenees 14

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.

CE A 18

City of New York v. FCC

7 ST A 48, 49

Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of

Philadelphia

EE Co 14

English v. General Electric Co.

EE IY, ee a ee passim

iv

Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n

SOS UG. Gi Ca cree: sesececsnensscnnstntininecnnsenessiaginasie 18, 19, 22

Hillsborough Cy. v. Automated Medi-cal Lab., Inc.

yh? & ff ee een 18, 38

Hines v. Davidowitz

ing) BS) , ee 16, 17

Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit

2 FD 15

Huse v. Glover

DOU 6, 14

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon

OU 25

International Ass'n of Independent Tanker Owners v.

Locke

148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) ...........cccccceesnenenenees iene 5

Jones v. Rath Packing Co. .

Le See eee 17

Kelly v. Washington

. 2S), woe 1S

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr

te 0) err 13

Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Board of

Health of the State of Louisiana

ji jic £ |) a 14

New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino

Pe Ree ee 18

v

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

ee ES passim

Rice v. Norman Williams Co.

Ee Lee 19

Shaw y. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

ee 17, 18, 26

Silkwood vy. Kerr-McGee Corp.

| EE Ee aS 19

Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen

NE a en ne 14

United States v. Belmont

ERG REN ana eee aie 16

United States v. Pink

ESSE CS a NED 16, 17, 32

Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Rev.,

CETTE IE TA TRL 32, 33

Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.

EE a 14

v. Miller

STE ye rr ee Rae 16, 17

Statutes

Federal

Oil Pollution Act of 1990

Pub. L. No. 101-380, August 18, 1990,

1046 Stet. 4B4 ......c.ccccccrecnsccsecseessevsecessnssesesnesevosonssnosesees passim

§§ 1002-1006 ........2csecsessessnrsnsenesnssnerssennennennsnnannsnnsnnsnnennes 10

8) | ene passim

§ 1018(a)(1)-(2)...-----eesverseenernesnenessnssnsncensensensensens 11, 24, 25

§ 1018(C) .....reccecseeseesnsreesusenennsnnsnsnnsnneneensensnnennsens 11, 25, 28

§ 1016......-cssccescsssveeressrssneensensensennsensenssneensnssensnnsensnnennennes 10

§ ANOD......eccescoesssssncsnesnsensesseessensensssssnnsnnsnsennsesennensssnsnnsnnents 9

§ 4103 ......csescessseesessnnseneennsensesssennnnnsnnsnntenscsnennsensennesnsanensne 9

§ 41 14(G) .....cnsccecsvessnssnessnessesnsenncsneenennesnsensennanenanssnensessny 10

§ 41 15(8) ....-.nscseccveesvesnersesennenneensennssnssnnsnnsenssnenvennennnsnnsnnee 9

§ 41 1S(D) ....n-sseeseecvecnersrssnssnsensensannssnsnnsenssnennsnnennnanennsanesies 10

§ 41 16(D).....-.nccsecvessesneenesnsensensenennssnsensenennensensennansnnssnsnenscs 10

§ 4202......eecneccesssesressneenerneensensssnssnssnensnennennennssasenannsnnernents 29

§ 4202(C) ...-ssecveesvesvssnesnernesseensenesnssnsensnnennsnnennensenennennsnnenes 29

33 U.S.C. § 1223 ......cecesccscssersenesesnssnensnnsnsnsensnssnenenennsnensansnennes 38

33 U.S.C. § 1225(D) ...-.e-sececereeseesesnessensnnsnsnennsnenssnenensanensnnensnens 35

33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2)

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)..........--++-+- 29

33 U.S.C. § 1517(k)\))

43 U.S.C. § 1820(c)

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act............:c.cscsssssesseseseeeee 29

46 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(9)

Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act..............s0vss+«: 29

ee ee ctinteninntsninesijecbiemnviiaeionppinininanentincnetatei 37, 40

i Sb PP ciitineninnss pesiicieinsnetjiainstcalsinniiaiiliiassenss 20, 22, 40

Sap tae a teitittetinintennriecineninuicdnanininitniegmmntecitnaticial 23

Oil Terminal and Oil Tanker Environmental

Oversight and Monitoring Act of 1990

(FFE ie PE ID ccceccncccernsentscenenentsccscscenvesscsnosses 29

Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA).......... passim

Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Reform Act of 1990

(§ 8001; § 8202; § 8202(c) § B202(€))..........eccesereeeeseneeenees 30

State

Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.030(4).........cccsessscessseessesesenenseeenees 5

Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.170(2)..........cccscssscssessseserseseneneeeees 5

Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.030(1), (3) ........ccccccccssesesesseseensenenenes 5

Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.040(1), (3) ......c-ccccscsssesesssesensesenenenes 4

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 88.46.080-.090 .00........cccccccccseseeseneneenenenes 5

1991 Wash. Laws ch. 200, § 101 .....cccccccccssccesssssssssssvesereessssnsers 4

Other Authorities

41 Fed. Reg. 18766 (1976) ....cssscsssssssssesssssssssssssssnssnssssnnnnnseee 37

43 Fed. Rew, 10FFOCIGID secsscisnecicneerncsesrssinsrmnrsnsici 36

2 Waal Silk TO icici issicebics pinch nnclccaieohitons 37

Sa Weak. Cites SI a ioiosiii cece 10

Cab et TE III sisi siies dictsiininvicianion’ 10

S 686, § 310, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 11, 1989)..........0 27

S. Rep. No. 101-94, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990)......... 9, 28

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-380, 101st Cong.,

2d Sess., p. 156 (1990).......cssessresserseseesressserssssersenerensnsnees 30

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, 101st Cong.,

2d Sess., pp. 121-22 (1990), reprinted in

1990 U.S.C.C.A.N, 799-B00 .........cccssccccscrssrssesnserrseenens 26, 27

H.R. Report No. 92-563, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.,

B®. 15 (1971). .......cccscsccnsvecessvesscsosveresenssosessesononesenssssosesers 35, 36

Lord Donaldson, London:HMSO, Safer Ships,

Cleaner Seas 4 6.20 (May 1994) .......cccsccccseeserreerseenesssseneees 33

Directorate for Science, Technology and

Industry Maritime Transport Committee,

Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development, Paris, Non-Observance

Of International Rules And Standards:

Competitive Advantages 3 (January 1996) ............:.:00+0-+ 33

Treatises

Articles of Protocol Of 1978.........c:scssesssessesssesseeessessesseeesesess, 30

of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL)............ 31, 32, 33

International Convention for the Safety of

Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS).......ccccccecccsecessesosssessoseseoeess passim

International Convention on Standards of

Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping

for Seafarers, 1978 (STOW) .0......:cececcscoscosessecseseeoe.es, passim

PU ovinaphpientiiancilneipinmia ad hati aa 41, 42, 45, 46

Ge richisiteniatesinttichanstninbiintapeists ripisbeaaiiiti as 2. 41, 42, 45

Pee avininvescaiguaiisnmeniattstesedaghianuiiiaildn ies ie cis 41,42

FP iiiinictievonrenpecticiiiillaniiitdsen vialin diet aigs Ra 41,42

PIE oseniiiientasstntnilstnuimininbinniingicats sd teen 45

Ree ainincscenilinbintiitieaiicbciiniininaiealgie eae i 45

SE actacicntenisiohebitigtitandssicaihedinnucias: Tidak. metas 2 46

FOr ialeihuciatsiiitindieatiissaiihmnitaiinita ing sie the Dea 40

Ne a eA SIENA TS IIIA SRAM Me tt) 43

ate cE RE ET RAGE SNE Bete” SRR ly 39, 40, 46

International Safety Management Code

REE RS ERE i sr A ERED 31, 32, 45

i I TEESE! NOTRE Ee CREST A 45

oat 8 RRC AITESIE: LS SR TP AE Biv eM 44

sep ese EES SERNA AOI MS STS CoRR RON 46

Regulations

Federal

33 CAFR. § 155,700 cccossscssssssnsseeee Ra eRe Te 46

SOGRT OC OURIIO a iciiisitinerscdscdbacucsches 39

SOBA, 6 SABI onccrsereneinctsieiostcbvccietemaea te 6

OOM 0 OOIIIIE oo oie

SR, 0 NE nena 6

SOI, BION se ceciccienintibveiinsetheniicie chal 40, 41

| RRR ME cs ER POSES fe 2 x

RIE, ONS caacti oncicciisstickiceesicet SAE 39

pL ES 48

Pa Sh, ema es 7 39

OG CPR. § BSOS-Y SCR oacccascccernencaceonsveconsee SGA Haale? 39

46 CFR. §§ Part 112, n.b, 112.25-3, 25-5, 25-10... 40, 41

QROTI DOIG wivcsicrcitnisee dlc ih ga a eneenearonees 8

State

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-130 vcccccsssssssvsvsssssescsssessseseese 47

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(1)....ccssccssssssseesssessssesesee 6

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(1)(€) ..sceccesssssssecssseeen 6, 42

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(1)(b)........ccsscesseeseeceneeeeees 41

xi

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(2).ecccccessesesosseseoeooee.... 5

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(3).ecccceccessseeseseeeooees... 6

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(4) .ecccceccceeeccooeoooc... 6, 38

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(5).cccecceccssssseseeeoeoeec... 7

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(6).ec.ecseccceecseseeeeoeoeec.... a

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205(1) essecsecseececseoooocc...... 6,7

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205(2), (3) eeesecceeo......... 6, 41

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-210(1).eccccseseeeeeoooeocc.... 6, 40

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-210(2), (3), (4) seccecceccooo....... 7

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215 oo.ccccccsessseseseeoeoc... 7, 43

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215(1).ecccsscsseessecesooeoocc..... 4]

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215(1)-(10).ecceccccccoeeeoo........ a

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-220 ...cccccccscssesseseeeeeooecc...... 44

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-220(1) ccccsecsecseeceoeeeooocs.. 41

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-225 o..ccccscssosssssesseseeeeeocca..... 6

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230 cccccccsecsseseeeeooococe.... 8, 45

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235 ccccccccseesseeecoocc... 8,47

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235()..ccceccscssesesssseeeooeecc..... 6

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235(3)..ccceccsccssseeseseeeoooee..... 8

xii

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250 s.ccccccccssssssssssssssssssssssssee 8, 46

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250(1)ss.cccsscscscssssssssessssssssssssseee 8

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-255 ..cccccvccccsvsssssssssesseee niches 8

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-260 ..ccccccccccccscssssssssssssssssssee 8, 46

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-265 ..cccccccccsecssessssssssssssssssssssessee 5

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-540 ..cccccsvccscscsssssssssssssssseeseeeeen 43

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-550(1)s.c.csccssssssvsssssssesseeeee 5, 32

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-31-210(3)scccccsssssssssssssssssssssssssssssee 5

Constitutional Provisions

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendmente.............. 48

citizens and environment lingers to this day. Although

Washington has not suffered a similar catastrophe, its waters

present navigation hazards in excess of Prince William Sound.

JA at 124. Several near-disasters have been avoided by good

fortune. JA at 65, 126-27.

The Exxon Valdez spill focused the attention of both

Congress and the states on the risks posed by oil tankers

Congress responded by enacting the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-380, August 18, 1990, 104 Stat. 484. The Oil

Pollution Act (OPA 90) coordinates and enhances several

aspects of the federal Prevention, response, liability, and

compensation regimes that deal with vessel-caused pollution.

to determine compliance with such plans. These requirements

of Washington’s oil spill prevention plans are the subject of

this litigation. 3

A. Washington’s Waters Are A Priceless Resource

Washington’s waters contain some of the richest and

sea with habitat ranging from muddy bays to open rocky

shores. The Strait of Juan de Fuca is a transition zone between

the wave-exposed coast and the quieter Puget Sound waters.

Recreational use is extensive; there are over ninety parks

located on or adjacent to Puget Sound, with an annual

estimated visitation of over fifty-five million. JA at 180-90.

2

Washington’s citizens live and work in the cities, towns, and

rural areas around Puget Sound.

Shoreline vegetation covers 2,500 miles of Washington

coast, providing a major link in the food chain. In addition to

food, coastal habitat provides refuge from predators and a

place for reproduction and raising off-spring. JA at 153-57.

Washington waters support thousands of species of plants and

animals. JA at 137-43. At least 125 species of birds spend

some part of the year in Washington waters; sixty species

winter here and fifteen species come in the summer to breed.

JA at 162-71.

Washington is also home to five species of salmon and

many other fish species, plus shrimp, clams, oysters, and

scallops. Washington fisheries are important as both a

commercial and a recreational resource. In 1993, the

wholesale value of the commercial fishery was $354 million,

sports anglers caught 475,632 salmon, and 1,252,177 pounds of

clams were harvested. Fisheries also are significant to the

economy and culture of treaty Indian tribes. JA at 174-78.

B. An Oil Spill Could Be Devastating To Washington’s

Citizens And Environment

Washington’s waters are particularly vulnerable to

damage from a spill. In Puget Sound, the water exchange is

limited so that sediments in shallow areas would be heavily

contaminated. JA at 193. Even on the rocky coast, damage

could be extensive because it is home to long-lived,

slow-growing species, such as mussels, that do not disperse

well. JA at 142-43.

The effects of an oil spill in Washington waters will

depend on a number of factors, such as the location of the spill,

the number of gallons involved, and the type of oil. Heavy oil

can kill invertebrates and plants outright. JA at 142. Birds,

such as ducks, that live on the water are highly susceptible to

3

hypothermia after exposure to oil.' If fish and wildlife are not

killed outright, their tissues likely are tainted by oil. Some

species, such as clams, retain oil in their tissues for many

months, destroying livelihoods and endangering human health.

Animals will be constantly recontaminated by oil leaching out

of the sediment. Fisheries will be shut down entirely after a

spill. JA at 141-42. Washington’s fisheries could suffer

permanent damage through destruction of habitat and genetic

damage. JA at 198. Recreational enjoyment and the lives of

millions will be affected. JA at 141, 178, 181, 195, 201-02.

al Navigation In Puget Sound Is Difficult

Most tanker traffic in Washington is through Puget

Sound to refineries located both to the north and south.“

JA at 120, 122-23. The Puget Sound area is extremely difficult

to navigate. JA at 124. Tankers enter Puget Sound through the

Strait of Juan de Fuca. Exhibit 34 is a chart of the Strait of

Juan de Fuca and the northern part of Puget Sound. The

western end of the Strait has persistent fog, and it is heavily

fished, causing congestion problems. JA at 123.

Tankers bound for the northern refineries must

negotiate between Hein Bank and Smith Island where the

waterway is narrow and congested. The tankers continue to the

northeast and shoot the gap between Davidson Rock and

Lawson Reef with dangerous obstacles on the edge of traffic

lanes. At this point, the vessel turns north to enter Rosario

Strait. As illustrated on Exhibit 34, Rosario Strait is too

' Between 175,000 and 300,000 Common Murres were killed in

the Exxon Valdez spill. The estimates of dead eagles from the Exxon Valdez

spill range from 200 to over 900. Between 3,500 and 5,000 sea otters died

as a result of the Exxon Valdez spill. JA at 194-97.

* Although there is some tanker traffic on the Columbia River,

most oil is transported on the river by tank barge. JA at 120. This case

challenges spill prevention plans for tankers.

* Exhibit 34 (Affidavit of Stanley J. Norman, JA at 88) has been

lodged with the Court and served on the parties.

4

narrow for traffic lanes and one-way traffic for tankers is

necessary. JA at 122.

Tankers bound for the two Anacortes refineries proceed

up to the vicinity of Shannon Point, turn right, pass through the

narrow Guemes Channel, and proceed to sh: low Padilla Bay,

where the refineries are located. The currents in the Guemes

Channel are extremely strong, with frequen’ fog and a

significant range of tides. Tankers bound for the Cherry Point

and Ferndale refineries continue up Rosario Strait, past such

obstacles as Peapod Rocks and Lummi Rocks. JA at 122-23.

Exhibit 33 is a chart of southern Puget Sound.’ Tankers

southbound for Tacoma transit broader waterways, but they are

frequently more congested than the ones going north. There

are also myriad obstructions close to the western side of the

southbound traffic lane. JA at 124.

D. Washington’s Rules Protect State Waters From Oil

Spills

In 1991, the Washington Legislature acted to protect

“some of the most unique and special marine environments in

the United States”. 1991 Wash. Laws ch. 200, § 101. The

Legislature recognized that these marine environments were

threatened by “billions of gallons of crude oil and refined

petroleum products . . . transported by vessel on the navigable

waters of the state [each year]”. /d. The Legislature concluded

that “prevention is the best method to protect the unique and

special marine environments in this state”. Jd.

Under the 1991 law, all companies that operate tankers

headed into Washington waters through the Strait of Juan de

Fuca or the Columbia River are required to file oil spill

prevention plans that meet certain requirements. Wash. Rev.

Code § 88.46.040(1). These planning requirements provide

“the best achievable protection [BAP] from damages caused by

* Exhibit 33 (Affidavit of Stanley J. Norman, JA at 88) has been

lodged with the Court and served on the parties,

:

g

i agency. Code

§§ 88.46.030(4), .170(2). State inspections take place when

the vessel is in port. Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-31-210(3);

317-2:1-550(1).

It is unlawful to operate a tanker in Washington waters

without an approved prevention plan. The 1991 law provides

civil and criminal penalties against the owner or operator if

there iis a violation. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 88.46,080-.090.5

133. The Coast Guard’s maritime safety program ‘spends

eighty percent of its available resources addressing design and

technical requirements. JA at 133.

* The state's only rule regarding technological equipment, Wash.

1. Operations Required While In Or Near

Washington Waters

A number of Washington’s requirements are performed

in or near Washington waters.’ For example, Washington

requires that the navigation watch in Washington waters

consist of at least two licensed deck officers. Wash. Admin.

Code § 317-21-200(1). (The Coast Guard imposes the same

requirement for tankers. 33 C.F.R.'§ 164.13(c).) A tanker not

equipped with automatic stand-by switching gear for standby

generators must operate with stand-by generators running and

immediately available to assume the electrical load while

underway in state waters. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-

210(1). Washington requires the position of a vessel to be

recorded at fifteen minute intervals or less. Wash. Admin.

Code § 317-21-205(1). (The Coast Guard requires the position

of the vessel to be plotted on a chart of the area. 33 C-F.R.

§ 164.11(c).)

A few examples illustrate how these requirements are

appropriate measures for spill prevention in Washington.

Navigation Watch During Restricted Visibility

A navigation watch has three primary functions:

navigation, collision avoidance, and administration. When

visibility is not restricted, two officers can perform this

workload. During restricted visibility, a great deal more

attention must be paid to navigation and collision avoidance.

JA at 99. When a tanker is operating in restricted visibility, as

determined by the vessel master or officer in charge, a

Washington oil spill prevention plan requires three licensed

deck officers, one of whom may be a pilot, on the navigation

watch in pilotage waters. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-

200(1)(a). A third deck officer will significantly decrease

human-caused error during the long and stressful transit

through the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound. JA at 207.

” Examples include Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-21-200(1),

(3)-(6); -205(1)-(3); -210(1)-(4); -215(1)-(10); -225; -235(1); -245,

Anchor Watch

Washington has a history of problems with vessels

dragging anchor This is a major hazard for with

pre

existing, mechanical failure. JA at 208. A failure of critical

navigation and engineering equipment subsystems could result

in a grounding or collision and subsequent oil spill in the

confines of Puget Sound. JA at 110.

2. Other Spill Prevention Requirements

operations peri rmed exclusively in Washington waters.*

Some mirror Coast Guard requirements, while others add on to

existing Coast Guard requirements.

Training Policies

Washington requires that the oil spill prevention plan

explain how the company has provided training to its crews

and lists training criteria. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230.

Training is vital to oil spill prevention since sixty-five to eighty

percent of all vessel accidents and casualties are caused by

human error. JA at 111.

Drug And Alcohol Testing

Washington requires all companies to establish testing

programs consistent with those required by the Coast Guard in

33 C.F.R. Part 95 and 46 C.F.R. Part 4, except 46 C.F.R.

§ 16.500 . The Washington standard goes further by requiring

the company to include random alcohol tests, and by applying

the requirement to foreign flag vessels. Wash. Admin. Code

§ 317-21-235. The purpose of the testing program is to prevent

crew members from being intoxicated and unable to perform

their duties. JA at 114-15.

Language

Washington requires licensed deck officers and the

vessel’s designated person in charge to communicate in

English and a language understood and spoken by subordinate

officers and unlicensed crew. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-

250(1). English language communication is critical. For

example, in the area west of Port Angeles before a pilot boards

the vessel, deck watch officers with limited English have

trouble communicating with the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic

system, as well as other vessels, when they are required to talk

to them to arrange safe passage in collision avoidance

situations. JA at 123-24.

* Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-21-200(2), -220, -230, -235(3), -250,

-255, -260.

E. Congress Enacted The Oil Pollution Act To Prevent

And Respond To Oil Spills From Tankers

Washington required oil spill prevention plans and

compliance with BAP rules shortly after Congress enacted the

based on expressions that spill prevention was critical. In the

words of one Senate Report:

“[A]ny oil spill, no matter how quickly we respond to it

or how well we contain it, is going to harm the

environment. Consequently, preventing oil spills is

more important than containing and cleaning them up

quickly.” §. Rep. No. 101-94, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.,

pp. 2-3 (1990) (second italics ours), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 724.

on a tanker be no more than fifteen hours in any twenty-four-

hour period and no more than thirty-six hours in any seventy-

two-hour period.

In pursuit of the highest standards of prevention,

Congress departed from international standards in several

respects. Congress required tankers be constructed with double

hulls by January 1, 2015.'' This requirement applied to both

United States and foreign flag tankers. Furthermore, the

secretary of transportation (secretary) was required to adopt

rules for single hull tankers operating in United States waters to

* OPA 90 § 4101; State App. at Sla-52a.

OPA 90 § 4103; State App. at 54a-57a,

" OPA 90 § 4115(a); State App. at 72a-77a.

and feasible”. OPA 90 §

4115(b); State App. at 77a-78a. Congress departed from norms

advocated by international organizations. '?

must have at least two licensed deck officers on the bridge. '*

Although these subjects might also fall within the jurisdiction

of the flag state, the Coast Guard concluded that the rules

should “apply to foreign flag tankers and U.S. tankers sailing

on registry because these tankers pose a similar risk to the

environment”. 58 Fed. Reg. 27628 (1993).

In addition to its increased prevention measures, the Oil

Pollution Act contained new provisions imposing federal

liability for spills and damage to natural resources.’ And it

imposed new requirements for demonstrating financial

responsibility." These provisions also departed from the

international regime for oil pollution liability and

compensation.

In enacting the Oil Pollution Act, Congress considered

the question of preemption and expressly indicated its intent to

? In its 1996 rulemaking for single hull tankers, th. Coast Guard

responded to comments that it was “undermining the international process;

that competency and manning requirements fall under flag state jurisdiction:

and the [rule] goes beyond international requirements in some cases”.

61 Fed. Reg. 39771 (1996). The Coast Guard responded by stating:

“Where international standards do not address certain operations, the Coast

" OPA 90 § 4114(a); State App. at 70a.

‘OPA 90 § 4116(b); State App. at 84a.

° OPA 90 §§ 1002-1006; State App. at 8a-25a.

OPA 90 § 1016; State App. at 39a-42a,

obligations or liabilities of any person under . . . State law.

including common law”. Section 1018(c) stated that Congress

additional mM relating to the discharge, or

substantial threat of a discharge, of oil”

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

preempt.

1 4s strong presumption against preemption applies to preserve

W.-shington’s oil spill prevention laws. The presumption is not

of the fields are not carefully limited to fields where federal

law leaves no room for State oil spill prevention laws.

Petitioners have failed to show real, irreconcilable conflicts

that imply Con ional intent to displace states from fields

addressed by oil spil! prevention plans.

In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978),

this Court held that Title II of the PWSA preempted the field of

tanker design and construction. The Court's holding and its

reasoning does not extend to other subjects listed in Title Il of

the PWSA. The Court specifically distinguished manning and

12

operational requirements, such as a local pilot and a tug escort,

from design and construction. Petitioners’ argument draws an

unwarranted inference of preemption by simply labeling state

laws with subjects of rulemaking under Title II. This

expansion of Ray is inconsistent with the decision and other

preemption decisions of this Court.

By enacting § 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act, Congress

demonstrated its understanding that, except for the field of

design and construction adjudicated in Ray, other fields were

not preempted. The language of that savings provision is broad

and refers to any requirements imposed by states with respect

to the discharge and potential discharge of oil. Congress would

not enact a broad saving of state power in § 1018, if there were

no state powers to be saved.

The treaties entered into by the United States do not

conflict with Washington’s law. The standards described by

treaties are not self-executing and require the signature

governments to adopt laws for implementation. Although the

United States agrees to accept certificates issued by foreign

flag states regarding certain matters, no conflict is presented

with that system. Washington does not control ships to verify

such certificates or act in conflict with federal actions.

Washington directs its regulations to tanker companies and

implements safety audits to determine whether owners and

operators follow their oil spill prevention plans.

Nor are Washington’s requirements in conflict with

federal law. There is no claim of physical impossibility.

Washington’s law does not stand as an obstacle to achieving

the objectives of Congress. From the PWSA to the Oil

Pollution Act, the objective of Congress is to prevent oil spills

and to allow states to further that objective. Washington law

serves this core purpose and presents no conflicts with any

federal statute or rule.

Congress has not, under Title I of the PWSA,

preempted all state law that might address the same subject

matter as a Coast Guard regulation. Under normal rules of

13

preemption, a state rule should not be preempted unless it

Presents physical conflicts or obstacles to a lawful Coast Guard

rule. This may occur under Title I if the Coast Guard adopts

safety standards that are specific to Puget Sound. Only then

conflict between state and federal law.

ARGUMENT

A. There Is A Strong Presumption Against Preemption

Of State Police Power

“In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in

which Congress has ‘legislated in a field which the States have

(1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,

230 (1947)). Both Intertanko and the federal government

attempt to undermine this strong presumption.

1. Intertanko relies on the maritime context of the state

oil spill prevention plan to argue that this Court should

disregard or reorder the federalism relationship of the states

This Court has already rejected similar arguments. In Askew y.

American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S, 325 (1973), this

Court refused to

“allow federal admiralty jurisdiction to swallow most of

the police power of the States over oil spillage — an

insidious form of pollution of vast concern to every

coastal city or port and to all the estuaries on which the

14

life of the ocean and the lives of the coastal people are

greatly dependent.” Askew, 411 U.S. at 328-29.

Askew, thus, affirmed that the states’ historic police powers

extend beyond liability and include setting requirements for

preventing oil spills. State power was not preempted by

complex federal regulations affecting maritime safety and the

environment.'’

For 150 years, this Court has consistently held that the

States retain inherent sovereign powers to protect their citizens

and their environment from risks presented by maritime

activities, except to the extent that state law conflicts with

federal law or when Congress has used its power to preempt

state law from a subject. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the

Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299 (1851) (Congress had not

acted to preempt state power to require pilotage); Cincinnati,

Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Board of

Trustees of the Town of Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 559,

562 (1882) (local authorities may regulate anchoring and

wharfing); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548 (1886) (fee on

boats using locks); Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & SS. Co. vy.

Board of Health of the State of Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455, 465-

66 (1886) (states have power to impose quarantine and

inspection measures for ships arriving from international

commerce).

'” Askew explained that Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 US.

205 (1917), and its progeny “mark isolated instances” where state law was

affected by a need for uniform federal maritime law. Askew, 411 U.S. at

388; see also Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 118 (1962) (“we

must candidly acknowledge that the decisions between 1917 and 1926

produced no reliable determinant of valid state law coverage”); American

Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 458-62 (1994) (Stevens, J.,

concurring, questioning viability of Jensen). Petitioner Intertanko,

however, quotes Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924),

the progeny of Jensen, to argue that maritime commerce requires uniformity

in all regards, implying that there is no room for any state laws affecting

tankers. Intertanko Br. at 20.

15

In Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court

motor vessels for general safety Purposes in the face of “a

maze of [federal] regulation”. /d. at 4-5. The Court rejected

the broad and undefined preemption of maritime matters urged

here by Intertanko and amici:

“There is no constitutional rule which compels

Congress to occupy the whole field. . . . [T]he exercise

by the State of its police power, which would be valid if

not superseded by Federal action, is superseded only

where the repugnance or conflict is so ‘direct and

Positive’ that the two acts cannot “be reconciled or

consistently stand together.” Kelly, 302 U.S. at 10.

To be sure, Kelly recognized that Congressional action could

preempt state law, but preemption was narrowly confined.

conflict with the law of the State”. Id. at 443 (quoting Savage

v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)). Huron also notes that

Congress had recognized that air pollution caused peculiarly

local harms, which further contradicted the ship owner’s

argument that Congress impliedly displaced state power to

criminally cite a shipowner violating state air pollution laws.

Id. at 446.

In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 15] (1978),

this Court struck down Washington requirements for tanker

design and construction, while upholding state operational

requirements, such as a local pilot on registered vessels and a

presumptions against preemption of state laws applied. Ray,

16

to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear

and manifest purpose of Congress”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe

Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

2. The government seeks to connect the state’s

regulations to an area addressed in international treaties and

conventions to seek a special preemption if state regulation

“hinders” the Nation’s conduct of its foreign affairs. U.S. Br.

at 29,47. The government’s attempt to equate “preemption by

treaty” to “interference with the federal government’s

exclusive authority to conduct the foreign affairs” (U.S. Br. at

29) ignores how these two subjects present different problems.

Washington does not contend that it can violate a

lawful treaty entered into by the United States nor does it

attack any treaty entered into by the United States. Petitioners,

however, fail to identify treaty provisions that have been

violated. As shown below at Part E (Argument), pages 30-34,

Washington violates no self-executing treaty requirements.

Cases such as United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937),

and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), which involve

State actions that violated an international agreement, have

little relevance to this case.

Petitioners incorrectly invoke this Court’s prior

decisions concerning interference with “foreign affairs”. These

“foreign affairs” cases involve discriminatory treatment of

aliens or foreign citizens. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.

52 (1941); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Hines

struck down a Pennsylvania statute that required aliens to

register because it imposed “distinct, unusual and extraordinary

burdens and obligations upon aliens” (Hines, 312 U.S. at 65) in

direct conflict with comprehensive federal registration laws (id.

at 66-68) and in conflict with the constitutional choice that the

power to regulate and register aliens is not concurrently shared

with the states (id. at 68-69). Zschernig invalidated an Oregon

law that provided that an estate would escheat to the state

rather than go to an heir living in a communist country,

again imposing a discriminatory burden based on foreign status

17

that was not “incidental or indirect”. Zschernig, 389 U.S.

at 434-35,

The government contends that Hines compels a

conclusion that Washington’s power to Prevent oil spills

operates in “the narrowest of limits”. U.S. Br. at 29. This

argument ignores how that description of state power in Hines

was expressly based on the nature of Congress’ exclusive

power over naturalization and the direct connection between

State discrimination and foreign relations. See Hines, 312 U.S.

at 66, 68-69. State power should not fall within the “narrowest

nations will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from

the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless

clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy”),

B. Standards For Preemption Of State Oil Spill

Prevention Laws

1. The central issue in this case is whether Congress

has preempted state power to regulate oil tankers to prevent oil

spills and, if so, how to define the scope and nature of that

preemption. Preemption is fundamentally a question of

Congressional intent. English v. General Electric Co.,

496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). Congressional intent to preempt state

law can either be express or implied. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,

Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).

2. Express preemption occurs when Congress expressly

States its intent to preempt in the language of a statute. Jones v.

Rath Packing Co., 430 US. 519, 530 (1977) (Federal Meat

Inspection Act expressly prohibited “marking, labeling,

now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan covered”

by ERISA).

3. The Court has recognized two types of implied

preemption. The first is labeled implied field preemption.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)

(“state law is pre-empted if . . . federal law so thoroughly

occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference

that congress left no room for the State to supplement it”)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

second is conflict preemption. A “state law is pre-empted if

that law actually conflicts with federal law”. Jd. A state law is

in conflict with a federal law to the extent “it actually conflicts

with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state and

federal law is impossible, or when the state law ‘stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purpose and objectives of Congress’”. California v. ARC

America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989) (citations

omitted).'*

4. The most difficult problem where there is a claim of

field preemption is defining “the boundaries of the pre-empted

field” (English, 496 U.S. at 82) where Congress has left no

room for state law. In determining the existence and scope of

field preemption, there are three principles often used by this

Court that are relevant to determining Congressional intent in

this case. First, no “intent to pre-empt may be inferred from

the comprehensiveness of the” federal statutes or regula-tions

at issue in a case. Hillsborough Cy. v. Automated Medi-cal

Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1985); New York State Dep't

of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973).

Second, the conflict between the state law and the field

of federal law must be real, not speculative. “The existence of

a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the

'* The Court has indicated that the labels used to describe conflict

and field preemption are not “rigidly distinct”. See Gade v. National Solid

Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992).

does: not arise because of a mere “tension” between the state

law and the field claimed to be preempted, Silkwood v. Kerr-

McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (state law claims for

field of federal nuclear safety); English, 496 U.S. at 85-86, 90

(enjoining “seeking out conflicts between state and federal

regulation where none clearly exists”). To determine if there is

an irreconcilable conflict between state law and a field of

federal law, the “key question is thus at what point the state

regulation sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it

should be deemed pre-empted”. Gade v. National Solid Wastes

110 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

Judgment) (“a high threshold must be met if a state law is to be

pre-empted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act”),

controwersial question: whether Congress intended to make its

jurisdiction exclusive”, /d. at 731.

Cc. Title If Of The Ports And Waterways Safety Act, As

Interpreted By Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Does

Not Establish Broad Field Preemption Of State

Police Power

1. The federal government makes much of the fact that

Congress has a long history of regulating maritime commerce.

U.S. Br. at 18-24. The government points to this history to

support its conclusion that Congress intended to preempt the

requirements for Washington’s oil spill prevention plans.

We draw the opposite conclusion. Congress has not

acted to expressly preempt state police power as it relates to

maritime commerce, and neither petitioner claims that

Washington’s requirements have been expressly preempted.

Yet the history recited by the government demonstrates that

states have, since the Constitution was ratified, applied their

police power to maritime commerce. If Congress truly intends

to preempt state regulation in this area, it has the power to state

its intentions clearly and unambiguously.

2. Since Congress has not expressly preempted state

law, petitioners argue that Title II of the Ports and Waterways

Safety Act, as amended, impliedly establishes a broad field

preemption of state police power in the area of vessel “design,

equipping, personnel qualification, and manning”. 46 U.S.C.

§ 3703(a). Intertanko claims that all of Washington’s

requirements fall within these broadly stated fields. Intertanko

Br. at 23. The federal government argues that some

requirements fall within similarly labeled fields but, except for

providing a few examples, has not specifically identified which

ones. U.S. Br. at 33-41. Petitioners pin their broad field

preemption arguments to this Court’s opinion in Ray.

Petitioners’ interpretation of Title II is not well taken.

In Ray, this Court was careful to define the boundaries of the

field. The field preemption identified by this Court in Ray was

narrow and dealt only with tanker design and construction.

According to this Court: “Title II’s principal concern is tanker

trary to petitioners’ suggestion, the Court did not hold that all

the subjects in Title II of the PWSA were similarly preempted.

3. The government argues that Ray applies to all the

Subjects in Title II and that the Court discussed tanker design

Court was careful to distinguish these valid requirements from

design and construction. In sustainjng the pilotage

requirement, the Court specifically noted the requirement for a

state pilot was not a design requirement. The Court said:

“Of course, that a tanker is certified under

federal law as a safe vessel insofar as its design and

construction characteristics are concerned does not

mean that it is free to ignore otherwise valid state or

“A tug-escort provision is not a design

requirement, such as is promulgated under Title II. /t is

22

more akin to an operating rule arising from the

iarities of local waters{.J” Jd at 171 (emphasis

added).

Thus, in Ray, this Court carefully limited the field to tanker

design and construction and found no Congressional intent to

preempt other fields mentioned in Title II.

4. Where Ray was based on an actual irreconcilable

conflict between state and federal design and construction

standards, petitioners’ field preemption argument amounts to

little more than a labeling exercise. They attach a label, such

as “manning”, to Washington’s requirements and then claim it

falls into a preempted field because 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) lists

“manning” as an area for regulation. Under this theory,

however, the tug escort requirement in Ray should have been

preempted because it could be labeled an “operation”, which is

also listed in 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a).

No other decision of this Court turns field preemption

into a labeling exercise. Field preemption can be described as

a species of conflict preemption. English, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5;

Gade, 505 U.S. at 104 n.2 (O’Connor, J.); Gade, 505 U.S. at

114 (Souter, J., dissenting). To have implied field preemption,

the field must be carefully limited to a subject where Congress

has left no room for state regulation. A state requirement must

be examined to see if there is an irreconcilable conflict with a

Congressional scheme. The Court followed this method of

analysis in Ray. It concluded that the field of design and con-

struction was preempted, essentially because a tanker can have

but one blueprint for design and construction. The Court said:

“This statutory pattern shows that Congress, insofar as

design characteristics are concerned, has entrusted to

the Secretary the duty of determining which oil tankers

are sufficiently safe to be allowed to proceed in the

navigable waters of the United States. This indicates to

us that Congress intended uniform national standards

for design and construction of tankers that would

foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent

e

nevertheless be barred by state law from operating in

the navigable waters of the United States on the ground

that its design characteristics constitute an undue

hazard.” Ray, 435 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis added).

This reasoning does not apply generally to the broad

categories of federal regulations that petitioners contend are

field preempted. While it is clear a tanker can have only one

blueprint, it is equally clear that operational requirements can

change from port to port, and they must at all times respond to

5. Petitioners also rely on minor textual signals, such as

the directive that the secretary “shall” adopt rules. U.S. Br. at

26; Intertanko Br. at 21-22. No other case relies on the

difference between “shall” and “may” to infer that Congress

impliedly displaced state law from a field. That explanation in

6. Petitioners’ broad field Preemption arguments

depend on an extension of Ray beyond its logic and holding.

Most importantly, the labels obtained from Title II of the

24

compliance with those prevention measures. This Court should

reject petitioners’ reliance on broad arguments of field

preemption to eliminate sovereign powers of the states when

there is no Congressional expression nor regulatory scheme

that requires that type of broad preemption of state laws.

D. Congress Expressly Preserved State Police Powers

In § 1018 Of The Oil Pollution Act of 1990

1. While Congress has not expressly preempted state

law, it has expressly declared its intention not to preempt state

law in § 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act. This is important for two

reasons. First, since preemption is based on the intent of Con-

gress, § 1018 directly states Congress’ intent. Second, § 1018

impliedly contradicts petitioners’ expansive reading of Ray.

2. Section 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act, provides, in

part:

“(a) PRESERVATION OF STATE AUTHORITIES; SOLID

WASTE DisPOsAL ACT.—Nothing in this Act or the Act

of March 3, 1851 shall—

(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as

preempting, the authority of any State or political

subdivision thereof from imposing any additional

liability or requirements with respect to—

(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by

oil within such State, or

(B) any removal activities in connection

with such a discharge; or

(2) affect, or be construed or interpreted to

affect or modify in any way the obligations or

liabilities of any person under the Solid Waste

Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.) or State law,

including common law.

25

(¢) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND LIABILITIES;

PENALTIES.—Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3,

1851 (46 U.S.C. 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 9509), shall

in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the

authority of the United States or any State or political

subdivision thereof—

(1) to impose additional liability or additional

requirements: or

(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of.

any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in

nature) for any violation of law;

relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a

discharge, of oil.” OPA 90 § 1018(a), (c) (emphasis

added); 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718: State App. at 46a-47a.

3. The language of subsections 1018(a) and (c) is very

broad. Section 1018(a) states that “[njothing in this Act... .

shat) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting,

the authority of any State . . . from imposing any additional

“[njothing in this Act . . . shall in any way affect, or be

construed to affect, the authority of... any State. . _

provisions of the Oil Pollution Act be pursued in a cooperative

manner with the states without preemption of state laws.

The phrases “with respect to” and “relating to” are

deliberately expansive, allowing states to determine which

aspects of oil pollution they deem appropriate to regulate. See

Ingersoll-Rand Co. y. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990)

(law “relates to” an employee benefit plan if it has a connection

with or reference to such a plan, even if it is not specifically

designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect);

26

Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (“A law ‘relates to’ an employee

benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a

connection with or reference to such a plan.”). Washington’s

spill prevention planning is among the most important

requirements that a state might impose “with respect to” or

“relating to” the discharge of oil.

4. Section 1018 supports the state’s argument that no

broad field preemption was ever intended by Congress in 1978 or

since. By enacting the Oil Pollution Act and by enacting § 1018,

Congress demonstrated its understanding that, except for the field

of design and construction adjudicated in Ray, other fields were

not occupied by federal law to the exclusion of state law. It

would make no sense for Congress to express a broad savings of

state powers from preemption in § 1018, if it had already

preempted those state powers. Congress does not preempt state

powers in such an ambiguous or duplicitous manner.

5. Both petitioners urge this Court to infer that the

scope of § 1018 confirms that Congress intended to preempt

state laws, because the Conference Report explained that:

“The Conference substitute does not disturb the Supreme

Court’s decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 435

U.S. 151 (1978).” U.S. Br. at 42; Intertanko Br. at 47.

Petitioners take the Conference Report’s statement about Ray

out of context. The report describes a broadly worded savings

clause that could be understood as affecting the holding in Ray.

According to the Conference Report

“(Subsection (a) of section 1018 of the substitute states

explicitly that nothing in the substitute, or the Act of

March 3, 1851 (the Limitation of Liability Act), shall

affect in any way the authority of a State or local

government fo impose additional liability or other

requirements with respect to oil pollution or to the

discharge of oil within that State . . .

27

Similarly, subsection (c) clarifies that nothing in the

substitute, the Limitation of Liability Act, or in section

9509 of the Internal Revenue Code shall affect in any

way the authority of the United States or any State or

local government to impose additional liability or

requirements, or to determine the amount of, any civil

or criminal penalty for any violation of law.” H.R.

Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pp.

121-22 (1990) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added),

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 799-800.

The reference to Ray in the Conference Report confirms

only that the broad language of § 1018 does not undo the

careful holding in Ray that the field of tanker design and

construction is preempted. Ray, however, did not hold that all

the subjects listed in the PWSA defined the field to be

preempted. See Argument, Part C supra p.20-24.

6. Intertanko makes several arguments that § 1018 does

not reflect intent to preserve state authority to impose

additional requirements. First, Intertanko relies on Judge

Graber’s dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc. Intertanko

Br. at 45. The Oil Pollution Act begen as S 686 on the Senate

side, and as HR 1465 on the House side. S 686, sponsored by

Senator Mitchell of Maine, contained virtually the same

expression of non-preemption that appears in § 1018. S 686

also contained a second Savings clause, section 310.2°

Although the Conference Report was silent about section 310,

Judge Graber reasoned that since the Conference Committee

dropped section 310, it Supports an inference that § 1018

addresses only state liability laws.

© 'S 686, section 310, provided: “Nothing in this title shall be

construed or interpreted as changing, diminishing, or preempting in any

way the authority of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, to regulate

oil tankers or to provide for oil spill liability or contingency response

planning and activities in State waters.” S 686, § 310, 101st Cong., Ist

Sess. (Aug. 11, 1989).

28

The more logical inference, however, is that section 310

was eliminated because it was duplicative of section 106.

Section 106 was a broad statement of intent not to preempt

state law. The report from the Environment and Public Works

Committee considering S 686 states:

“Section 106 of the reported bill explicitly preserves the

authority of any State to impose its own requirements

or standards with respect to discharges of oil within

such State... .

Preemption has been discussed by the members of the

Committee more than any other single issue. S. 686

does not embrace any preemption of State oil spill

liability laws, State oil spill funds, or State fees, taxes,

or penalties used to contribute to such funds. The long-

standing policy in environmental laws of not

preempting State authority and recognizing the rights

of States to determine for themselves the best way in

which to protect their citizens, is clearly affirmed in S.

686." S. Rep. No. 101-94, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., pp.

17-18 (1989) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 739-740. |

When the conference committee blended the provisions of

S686 and HR 1465 to create the Oil Pollution Act, it

incorporated verbatim section 106(e) of S 686, by renumbering

the subsection as § 1018(c). The Senate Report on S 686 had

previously explained that it intended section 106(e) to confirm

the absence of any significant intent to preempt:

“This subsection reinforces the position stated clearly

elsewhere that no aspect of state oil spill programs is

preempted, including the authority to impose additional

requirements or penalties.” S. Rep. No. 101-94, 101st

Cong., Ist Sess., p. 18 (1989) (emphasis added),

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 740.

Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1820(c); and the

Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(k)(1). Intertanko argues

that this establishes that § 1018 is simply a substitute for those

Pollution Act replaced other liability funds. The plain

language of § 1018, however, cannot support a cramped

interpretation that it only addresses liability.

Intertanko also points out that the express non-

Preemptive provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2), was amended by the

Oil Pollution Act to add the phrase “or with respect to any

removal activities related to such discharge”. OPA 90

§ 4202(c). —_ Intertanko argues this amendment would be

unnecessary if § 1018 applied broadly. Section § 4202

amended parts of the FWPCA to set up a national response and

planning system. The amendment to § 1321(0)(2) merely

makes the FWPCA consistent with § 1018. Again, this fails to

demonstrate that § 1018 is narrow or limited,7!

*! Intertanko points to two other sections of the Oil Pollution Act

that have non-preemptive language and argues that they would be

30

E. Washington Laws Are Not Preempted By

International Treaties

1. In its field preemption argument, the federal

government relies on international treaties as a purpose of

Congress. As a separate argument, however, the government

makes the statement that treaties addressing tankers

“independently” have preemptive force. U.S. Br. at 28.

Intertanko cites to four conventions affecting shipping to argue

that treaties fully occupy a “domain” to the exclusion of other

lawmaking. Intertanko Br. at 30. Petitioners’ reliance on these

international treaties is not well taken.

2. The four treaties addressed by Intertanko and the

government provide broad goals, which do not create

self-executing rights. Article I(b) of the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS)

provides that the contracting governments “undertake to

promulgate all laws, decrees, orders and regulations and to take

all other steps which may be necessary to give the present

Convention full and complete effect”. The Articles of Protocol

of 1978, amending SOLAS, uses the same formulation — that

the parties “undertake to give effect to the provisions”.

Protocal of 1978, Article I. On its face, the standards and

provisions of SOLAS do not independently preempt state laws.

officials” in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet, Alaska. H.R. Conf.

Rep. No. 101-380, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 156 (1990), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 835. The savings clause in section 5002(n)(1) simply makes

it clear that this unique entity “is not intended to affect the authority of the

state of Alaska or the federal government with respect to the operation of oil

tanker and terminal facilities”. /d. Title VIII, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline

System Reform Act of 1990 (§ 8001), deals with issues pertaining to the

Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Section 8202 authorizes a civil penalty for

discharges in transit from oil fields to the pipeline and during transportation

through the pipeline or handling at the terminal facilities. Section 8202(e)

provides that states are not preempted from imposing additional liability.

Even if, under Intertanko’s reading, § 1018 is limited to liability, it was not

necessary to enact section 8202(c). Congress simply made section 8202

consistent with § 1018. It did not imply that § 1018 intends something

different than its broad language.

31

Petitioners cite to the International Safety Management

Code (ISM), adopted as Chapter IX of SOLAS, which

addresses broad subjects such as “management” and

“operation” of ships. The ISM illustrates the limited effect of

the conventions. The ISM Code recites broad aspirations for

management and operation of ships. See ISM Code 2.1 (“The

Company should establish a safety and environmental-

Protection policy”) (emphasis added). The ISM leaves

extensive room for state spill prevention planning that ensures

Preparation for the needs and risks presented by that state’s

waters, acknowledging “ships Operate under a wide range of

different conditions” and the ISM _ provides only “general

Principles and objectives”, ISM Code Preamble § 4.

The International Convention on Standards of Training,

Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW)

(as amended through 1995) takes the same form as SOLAS.

Article I of that Convention provides that the STCW does not

contain self-executing laws or Standards, but that the parties

must “undertake to promulgate all laws, decrees, orders and

regulations and to take all other Steps which may be

necessary”. The STCW provisions are written in terms of each

country using its own laws to implement the minimum

requirements. The same description applies to the International

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973

(MARPOL). See MARPOL Article I(1) (“Parties . . .

undertake to give effect to the Provisions of the present

Convention”),

3. International treaties may include specific provisions

that are arguably mandatory or create rights that independently

preempt Washington law. For example, Article X of the

STCW provides that “(ships ... are subject, while in the ports

of a Party, to control by officers duly authorized by that Party

to verify that all seafarers serving on board who are required to

be certificated by the Convention are so certificated” This

Provision is not material to this case. Washington has

disclaimed power to “control ships”, aid the record fails to

32

show that Washington has attempted to control ships to verify

certificates in violation of Article X of the STCW. Wash.

Admin. Code § 317-21-550(1). Washington directs its

regulation at owners and operators to avoid conflict with the

operative provisions of international law. Accordingly, this

case does not present any situations where there is direct

conflict between Washington law and a treaty right. See also

Argument, Part G infra p. 37-48.”

4. In essence, petitioners are asking this Court to

conclude that SOLAS and the ISM, the STCW, and MARPOL

command each signatory nation to abandon federalist forms of

government. The Note Verbale from Denmark, cited by the

federal government, complains that a federalist form of

government creates a potential for state laws that could be in

conflict with federal laws. Intertanko App. at 354a. Neither

the Note Verbal nor the amicus brief of the European Nations

identifies any treaty provision that Washington State has

violated.

These arguments indirectly confirm that international

conventions such as SOLAS, the STCW, and MARPOL are

made with the knowledge that the government has a federalist

form of government. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida

Dep't of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (holding that agreement

between two federalist nations is interpreted to reflect

knowledge that the U.S. has both federal and state taxes); Pink,

315 U.S. at 230 (international treaties shall be construed to

preserve state powers). As explained in Wardair Canada, the

” In footnotes, the government asks this Court to address whether

Washington has violated a vessel management agreement with Canada or

interfered with innocent passage. U.S. Br. at nn.22 & 23. Neither alleged

conflict was presented to the district court. No record exists beyond the

bare assertions in briefing that a conflict could exist. Moreover, each

assertion seems focused on the mistaken assumption that Washington has

some power or intent to control ships during passage. In the absence of an

actual case or controversy and a ruling by the court of appeals, these issues

are not properly before this Court or fairly subsumed in the question

presented.

impair a uniform international system. SOLAS, the STCW,

and MARPOL do not substitute for the laws of the

” Lord Donaldson, London:HMSO, Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas

1 6.20 (May 1994); JA at 314-15.

s .

implementing countries and do not address operational needs

particular to the waters of the United States. Based on its —

actions in adopting the Oil Pollution Act and prior laws, it is

inappropriate to impugn Congress with an intent that these _

international conventions are the solitary means of protecting

each state’s marine environment. Congress has never made

international uniformity and convenience of the tanker industry

a goal that displaces state power to enact laws tailored to

preventing oil spills in state waters.

F. Title I Of The Ports and Waterways Safety Act Does

Not Require Preemption Of State Police Powers

1. In addition to arguments that states are impliedly

preempted on broad fields, petitioners argue that Washington

law is preempted due to conflict. Conflict preemption exists

when “it is impossible for a private party to comply with both

state and federal requirements, or where state law ‘stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress’”. English, 496 U.S. at

79 (citation omitted) (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). Physical

impossibility, however, has not been asserted as a basis for

conflict preemption. JA at 87. Moreover, the rulings that

rejected Intertanko’s commerce clause arguments confirm that

it is not impracticable to comply with plan requirements. Pet.

App. at 32a-33a, 8la-85a. Indeed, many Intertanko members

have complied. JA at 119. Petitioners, however, make two

further arguments under the label of conflict preemption.25

2. Petitioners argue, again, that the full purposes and

objectives of Congress include creating a singular set of

convenient regulations for the tanker industry and that

Washington’s law presents an obstacle to this purpose. This

argument is indistinguishable from petitioners’ arguments that

** Note 22, above, addresses the third conflict argument, made by

the federal government, claiming potential conflict with a United

States/Canada vessel traffic agreement or with doctrines regarding innocent

Passage.

35

fields are impliedly preempted, addressed above. Furthermore,

the Court of Appeals opinion on this case provides a persuasive

explanation that Washington’s law does not, on its face,

present any obstacle to the full purposes of Congress.

Congress has never endorsed simplistic devotion to

international uniformity to the exclusion of state police powers

tailored to oil spill prevention programs in local waters.

Pet. App. at 17a-18a; see Argument, Part E supra p. 30-34.

3. The government points its conflict preemption

argument at the individual requirements of the Washington

law. The government does not focus on actual conflicts.

Instead, it contends that Title I of the PWSA requires

preemption of any state law if it addresses the same subject

matter as a federal regulation. U.S. Br. at 27-28. This

argument is based on 33 U.S.C. § 1225(b), which provides that:

“Nothing contained in this section, with respect to structures,

prohibits a state or political subdivision from prescribing

higher safety equipment requirements or safety standards than

those prescribed by Regulations hereunder.” The government

relies upon Ray to make this argument.

Ray invalidated Washington’s prohibition on tankers of

125,000 DWT in port, because the Coast Guard had adopted a

rule that permitted these so called supertankers on Puget

Sound. Ray, 435 U.S. at 174-75.7° The Court rejected the

state’s argument that Title | of the PWSA applied only to

equipment. Ray, 435 U.S. at 174. The Court concluded that a

size limit was a vessel safety standard and held the state could

not impose higher safety standards for vessels. The legislative

history of this provision establishes that Congress was

concerned with vessel standards, not vessel operations.

According to the House Report:.

“The Coast Guard witness said that it was their

intention that higher vessel equipment regulations and

** The Court also described this provision as an invalid design

requirement. Ray, 435 U.S. at 175-76.

36

standards by States should apply to structures only and

not to vessels. He agreed that the language of H.R.

17830 was not clear in this regard and that we should

put some clarifying language in the section.

Your Committee adopted the suggested

language since it will make clear the intent mentioned

above.” H.R. Report No. 92-563, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.,

p. 15 (1971).

While a Coast Guard vessel safety standard for Puget

Sound will preempt a higher state vessel standard, this same

reasoning does not extend to the state operational requirements

at issue in this case.

This is confirmed by the holding in Ray with regard to

tug escorts, which do not constitute a vessel safety standard.

4. Moreover, for a rule to have preemptive effect, it

must be a safety standard for Puget Sound. As this Court said

in Ray, the “relevant [preemption] inquiry under Title I [of the

PWSA] is . . . whether the Secretary has either promulgated his

own . . . requirement for Puget Sound tanker navigation or has

decided that no such requirement should be imposed at all”.

Ray, 435 U.S. at 171-72. If federal rules addressed the

“peculiarities of local waters that call for special precautionary

measures” (id. at 171), then a court could examine whether

state law was in conflict with such rules. Thus, Washington’s

37

supertanker prohibition was in direct conflict with a “local

navigation rule” that determined “in what circumstances tanker

size is to limit navigation in Puget Sound”. Id. at 174-75

(emphasis added).

The federal government’s Title | preemption claim is

Coast Guard never considered the application of this rule to

Puget Sound. The proposed rule would have applied to “the

navigable waters of the United States, except the Panama Canal

and St. Lawrence Seaway”. 41 Fed. Reg. 18766 (1976). The

Coast Guard decided not to adopt the rule because it “would

not be practicable in all navigable waters”. 42 Fed. Reg. 5957

(1977). The Coast Guard has not concluded that the fixed

interval requirement is not practicable in Puget Sound. In is an

important safety measure given the difficulty of navigation.

5. Washington’s interpretation of Ray is consistent

with this Court’s jurisprudence on conflict preemption.

Allowing preemption when a general Coast Guard rule

coincides with the subject matter of a State law creates a

Presumption against state police powers. It leads to

preemption when there has been no analysis of whether the

State requirement presents a significant obstacle to a federal

Purpose or a physical impossibility.

G. Washington’s Requirements Do Not Conflict With

United States Or International Requirements

The federal government seeks to show preemption both

by a recitation of examples (U.S. Br. at 33-41) and by using a

chart attached as an appendix that lists laws by broad category.

In the examples, however, the government often applies its

Title II field preemption argument, by attaching labels and

citing to 46 U.S.C. § 3703. The government also Cites

38

33 U.S.C. § 1223, to apply its contention that any regulation

under Title I of the PWSA carries automatic preemption. Both

of these arguments wrongly use broad or mechanical

preemption concepts. The above arguments have already

addressed the error of such preemption analysis.

The government’s examples allow Washington to

demonstrate that there is no conflict between state and federal

requirements, or with international standards. Part 2 in this

section shows there is no conflict presented by Washington's

requirements for conduct in or near Washington waters. Part 3

reviews the Washington requirements that are reasonable spill

prevention measures mirroring the federal law or international

standards. Part 4 reviews the Washington requirements that are

slightly different, but present no meaningful conflict.

1. The Laws Listed In The Government's Chart

Are Often Unrelated And Do Not Show

Conflict

As a threshold matter, the government’s chart creates a

misimpression. The government characterizes the chart as “a

comprehensive comparison of the state BAP rules to the

federal and international standards”. U.S. Br. at 34 n.14. The

apparent implication is that this opaque list of laws and

standards implies that there is no room for state prevention

plans, or that conflict must be in the air. Comprehensiveness

and complexity are hallmarks of regulatory laws and do not,

standing alone, justify an inference of preemption. Eg,

Hillsborough Cy., 471 U.S. at 716-17.

As shown by the following examples, the chart should

not be used to infer that conflict is in the air. Many of the laws

listed by the chart have little bearing on Washington’s spill

prevention plans and show no hint of conflict.

Example I — Security Rounds — Wash. Admin. Code

§ 317-21-200(4)

A spill prevention plan requires the company to

describe how its master will designate places on the vessel to

39

be periodically examined for safety and spill hazards such as

defective machinery, hull integrity, or crew activities. Security

rounds occur while under power, anchored, or docked in

Washington waters. JA at 101. The government’s chart lists

the following federal laws and international treaties: 46 C.F.R.

§§ 35.05-15, 15.1109; 33 C.F.R. §§ 155.810, 164.13(b);

STCW A-VIII/2 (part 4-3, 4-4), (51.4)(anchored); U.S. Br. at

4a.

The four reguiations have little or no relevance to

security rounds and certainly show no conflict:

¢ 46 C.F.R. § 15-1109 provides that “[eJach master of a

vessel that operates beyond the Boundary Line shall

ensure observance of the principles concerning

watchkeeping set out in STCW Regulation VIII/2 and

section A-VIII/2 of the STCW Code.”

e 46 C.F.R. § 35.05-15(a) provides that “[a]t least one

member of the crew of a manned tank vessel shal! be on

board at all times except when the vessel is gas free or

is moored at a dock or terminal at which watchman

service is provided.”

e 33 C.F.R. § 155.810 provides that “[t]he vessel operator

of each tank vessel that contains more oil than the

normal clingage and unpumpable bilge or sump

residues in any cargo tank shall maintain surveillance of

that vessel by using a person who is responsible for the

security of the vessel and for keeping unauthorized

persons off the vessel.”

e 33 C.F.R. § 164.13(b) provides that “[e]ach tanker must

have an engineering watch capable of monitoring the

propulsion system, communicating with the bridge and

implementing manual control measures immediately

when necessary. The watch must be physically present

in the machinery spaces or in the main control space

and must consist of at least a licensed engineer.”

40

The international standards on the list include unrelated

issues. The arguably relevant sections are not inconsistent with

Washington’s requirements, although not specific to Puget

Sound. STCW A-VIII/2 (51.4) provides: “While at anchor,

the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall . . . ensure

that inspection rounds of the ship are made periodically.”

STCW A-VIII (part 4) deals with principles of ing

while in port. Part 4-3 governs performing the deck watch.

These principles include making “rounds to inspect the ship at

appropriate intervals”. STCW A-VIII (part 4-3) ( 102.1).

Part 4-4 governs performing tc cagineering watch, which is

unrelated.

Example 2 — Standby Generator — Wash. Admin.

Code § 317-21-210(1)

A spill prevention plan requires tankers without

automatic switching gear for stand-by generators to turn on

their stand-by generators to be available to assume the

electrical load while underway in Washington waters. The

government's chart lists the following federal laws and

international treaties: 46 U.S.C. § 3703; 33 CFR. §

164.25(a)(3); 46 C.F.R. §§ Part 112, n.b, 112.25-3, 25-5,

25-10; SOLAS ch. II-1, Reg. 44; U.S. Br. at 7a.

First, the standby generator aspect of a Washington

spill prevention plan illustrates the illogic of the government’s

field preemption argument that the labels in 46 U.S.C.

§ 3703(a) “design, construction, alteration, _repair,

maintenance, Operations, equipping, personnel qualification,

and manning”) can be used to infer Congressional intent to

preempt. Turning on a standby generator addresses the danger

of losing power in confined waters. It is an operational

necessity peculiar to Washington and analogous to local

pilotage. It is not design and construction.

Furthermore, no conflict is shown by the regulations or

unrelated international standards:

41

¢ 33 C.F.R. § 164.25(a) provides that equipment be tes’ ed

no more than twelve hours before entering the waters of

the United States or getting underway, including a

“[s}tandby or emergency generator, for as long as

necessary to show proper functioning, including steady

state temperature and pressure readings.” /d. at (a)(3).

© 46 C.F.R. §§ Part 112, 112.25-3, 25-5, 25-10 deals

with the normal source for emergency loads, It is an

equipment requirement. 46 C.F.R. § 112.25-3(a) (“The

normal source for emergency loads must be the ship’s

Service generating plant.”). 46 C.F.R. § 112.25-5

provides for a transfer to a “final emergency power

source”.

e SOLAS ch. II-1, Reg. 44 sets out technical specification

for starting emergency generating sets and does not

address whether a standby generator should be ready in

the narrow confines of Puget Sound. SOLAS ch. II-1,

Reg. 4(1) (“Emergency generating sets shall be capable

of being readily started in their cold condition at a

temperature of [zero degrees Celsius].”).

Example 3 - STCW Requirements For Crew

Certification

The government’s chart asserts that Washington’s

operational requirements for local waters?’ somehow implicate

crew certification requirements of the STCW, listing STCW

A-II/1, A-II/2, A-II/3, and A-II/4. As an example, Wash.

Admin. Code § 317-21-205(3) requires the master to have a

schedule for comparing the steering gyrocompass with the

magnetic compass, because of the risk of accident from an

erroneous compass heading. JA at 106. The government's

chart lists STCW A-II/2 (p. 43). U.S. Br. at 6a.

*” Wash. Admin. Code $§ 317-21-200(1)(b), -205(2), (3), -215(1),

-220(1)-(3). U.S. Br. at 2a, Sa-6a, 8a-9a.

42

Chapter II of the STCW Code establishes standards of

seafarer certification. STCW A-II/2 identifies “[mJandatory

The certification of a master and chief mate for using

compasses is not implicated by a spill prevention plan with a

schedule for checking compasses in Puget Sound. This is like

comparing the certified competence of a master to run the ship,

with the state’s requirement that a ship use a local pilot in

Puget Sound. Sections A-II/1, A-II/3, and A-II/4 of the STCW

set out other mandatory minimum requirements for

certification that simply ensure competence, allowing these

persons to be able to comply with particular needs for

operating in Washington waters.

2. Some Washington Operational Requirements

Prescribe Conduct Directly Necessitated By

Local Conditions

A number of Washington’s spill prevention require-

ments focus on conduct that should occur in or near Washing-

ton waters. No conflict is presented by these requirements.

Operating In Restricted Visibility — Wash. Admin.

Code § 317-21-200(1)(a)

Washington requires three licensed deck officers, one

of whom may be a pilot, on the bridge during restricted

visibility. Washington requires this sensible step to avoid a

collision or grounding in the narrow and congested waters of

the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound. JA at 99. In

addition to its field preemption theory, the government argues

that this requirement is preempted because of a Coast Guard

rule requiring a minimum of two officers or because of a

conflict with rest requirements of federal law.

43

The general Coast Guard requirement of two licensed

officers on the bridge presents no conflict, nor is there conflict

with the international goal of ensuring that watch officers

obtain at least ten hours of rest in a twenty-four-hour period.

The alleged conflict is based on the four-hour travel time

between buoy J and pilotage waters when the third deck officer

must come from the ship’s crew. U.S. Br. at 37-38. Nothing in

the record supports the speculation that additional crew would

have to be flown to Washington. Ten hours of rest allows a

deck officer to work fourteen hours a day, if needed. Thus,

even after serving two four-hour watches, a deck officer could

still work an additional six hours, which could include the four

hours between buoy J and pilotage waters. In any event, the

STCW provides an exception for overriding operational

conditions, such as restricted visability. STCW A-VIII/1.3

(“The requirements for rest periods laid down in paragraphs |

and 2 need not be maintained in the case of an emergency or

drill or in other overriding operational conditions.”) (emphasis

added). This can include restricted visability.

Prearrival Tests And Inspections — Wash. Admin.

Code § 317-21-215

A Washington plan requires tankers to make certain

tests and inspections twelve hours or less before entering state

waters. The government claims this requirement is preempted

by Title II of the PWSA, because they label it an equipment

requirement. U.S. Br. at 40. It is not an equipment

requirement. It is an operational requirement, directly related

to safe entrance into Washington. JA at 110. Except for its

field preemption theory, the federal government shows no

inconsistency with federal and international standards.

Conflict preemption is not applicable.

Advance Notice Of Entry — Wash. Admin. Code.

§ 317-21-540

Washington requires tankers to give advance notice of

entry into state waters. The government argues that this

requirement is preempted under Title I of the PWSA,

44

3. Spill Prevention Requirements That Mirror

Federal And International Requirements

Some of Washington’s safety requirements for

prevention plans affect Washington waters but are not

performed exclusively in Washington. Many of these

requirements, however, are the same as federal and

international standards and create no conflicts.

Emergency Procedures — Wash. Admin. Code § 317-

21-220

A Washington plan requires the master of the vessel to

post “station bills” for the crew stating crew assignments for

various emergencies, such as fire or oil spills. The master must

also establish written procedures for emergencies, such as

collision, loss of propulsion, and loss of Steering. The

government argues that this operational requirement is a

proficiency requirement and that there is a need for uniformity

in an emergency. U.S. Br. at 40. The government

misunderstands the requirement. It requires the company to

post procedures and have written policies. JA at 110-11. It is

consistent with federal and international standards. ISM Code

8.1-8.2 (8.1 — “The company should establish procedures to

identify, describe and respond to potential emergency

shipboard situations.” 8.2 — “The company should establish

programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency

actions.”). Any company that complies with the ISM Code

should have a plan that meets Washington’s requirement.

45

Personnel Policies-Training — Wash. Admin. Code

§ 317-21-230

A Washington plan requires a tanker company to

explain how it will provide training for its crew. The

government argues that this requirement imposes a personnel

qualification on the certificated seafarers or requires training

beyond that necessary to get a license or certification. U.S. Br.

at 35. The government misunderstands this requirement.

Washington requires the company to explain how it will

provide necessary training. Washington does not evaluate

crew licenses or certificates.

The petitions speculate without basis that a tanker

would have to fly a special crew to Washington. The training

that the company describes need only be consistent with

federal and international requirements. The ISM Code requires

companies to “establish and maintain procedures for

identifying any training which may be required” and to “ensure

that such training is provided for all personnel concerned”.

ISM Code 6.5. It is analogous” to the training required under

the STCW. See STCW A-II/2 (minimum standard of

competence for masters and chief mates on ships of 500 gross

tonnage or more); A-III/2 (minimum standard of competence

for chief engineer officers and second engineer officers on

ships powered by main propulsion machinery of 3,000 kW

propulsion power or more); A-II/1 (minimum standard of

competence for officers in charge of a navigational watch on

ships of 500 gross tonnage or more); A-III/1 (minimum

standard of competence for officers in charge of an engineering

watch in a manned engine-room or designated duty engineers

** When Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230 was adopted in 1995,

the state did require a company to provide training beyond that necessary to

obtain a seafarer license. However, that is no longer true. When the ISM

Code, authorized by SOLAS Chapter. IX, went into effect in 1998 and the

1995 Amendment to the STCW was implemented by the federal

government, the Washington requirements and the _ international

requirements converged.

46

in a periodically unmanned engine-room); A-VI/1 (mandatory

iniesuma requl for familierization end basic saf

training and instruction for all seafarers); A-VIII/2, Part III

(Watchkeeping at sea). Washington simply intends that each

company confirm its training in a plan that Washington can use

to ensure compliance.

Language - Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250

A Washington plan requires all licensed deck officers

and the vessel’s “designated person in charge”, 33 C.F.R.

§ 155.700, to communicate in English and a language

understood by subordinate officers and unlicensed crew. The

government argues that Washington's “requires all licensed

deck officers to speak the language of the entire unlicensed

crew”. U.S. Br. at 36. There is nothing in the record to

support this claim. The government misunderstands the

Washington requirement. With regard to English, needed for

external communication, Washington's requirement is the

same as STCW Table A-II/1 (English language) (page 34). JA

at 132. With regard to the crew, Washington requires “a

language understood and spoken by subordinate officers and

the unlicensed crew”. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250. The

government cites no difference in federal law or international

standards.

Management — Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-260

A Washington plan requires a company to describe

active management practices, policies, and safety procedures.

The government argues that this is preempted under Title II,

because they label it a personnel qualification. U.S. Br at

36-37. It is not a personnel qualification. It is a requirement

directed to the company operating the vessel. It is consistent

with the ISM Code: “A document of compliance should be

issued for every Company complying with the requirements of

the ISM Code by the Administration[.]” ISM Code 13.2.

Washington accepts ISM certification obtained by companies.

Once again, Washington requires no different conduct than

required by federal law or international standards.

Event Reporting —- Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-130

Under a Washington plan, the owner or operator shall

report events, such as collisions, for each vessel covered by the

plan. This requirement is slightly different than the federal

of an analogous federal requirement does not explain why the

Washington requirement creates an irreconcilable conflict.

Illicit Drug And Alcohol Testing — Wash. Admin.

Code § 317-21-235

A Washington plan requires the company to have

minimal drug and alcohol testing and prohibits consumption in

Washington. The most important difference with the Coast

Guard's drug and alcohol rule is that Washington applies its

requirement to companies with foreign flagged tankers while

the federal requirements apply only to United States flagged

vessels. The only reason advanced by the government to

Support a claim of conflict is that foreign governments have

informed the federal government that their laws might not

coming to Washington. JA at 256. The government does not

explain why including foreign flag vessels in this Washington

requirement is an obstacle to achieving the purpose of Con-

gress. For example, the government does not appear to claim

that safety will be enhanced by not testing foreign flag crews.”°

amounts to “express preemption”. Intertanko Br. at 33; U.S.

Br. at 44. As this Court emphasized in City of New York v.

Federal Communications Commission, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988),

Congressional intent to preempt state law may arise through an

agency “acting within the scope of its congressionally

delegated authority”, but in such cases

“the correct focus is on the federal agency that seeks to

displace state law and on the proper bounds of its

lawful authority to undertake such action. The

statutorily authorized regulations of an agency will pre-

empt any state or local law that conflicts with such

regulations or frustrates the purposes thereof, Beyond

that, however, in proper circumstances the agency may

determine that its authority is exclusive[.]” Jd at 64

(emphasis added).

* The federal government suggests that Washington's testing

might violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and that federal

tests are limited to crew in “safety-sensitive positions”. U.S. Br. at 34 The

federal drug testing applies broadly to crew members, including those who

occupy “a position, or perform the duties and functions of a position,

required by the vessel's Certificate of Inspection” or who perform “duties

and functions of patrolmen or watchmen required by this chapter”. 46

C.F.R. § 16.230(a\1), (2).

Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 476 US. at 374”.

Id. at 66.

The Court of Appeals properly concluded that

Intertanko and the government had not shown preemption

based solely on simple declarations by the Coast Guard. As

noted in City of New York, an agency’s choice to preempt state

law is not valid if “it appears from the statute or its legislative

history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would

have sanctioned”. /d. at 64 (quoting United States v. Shimer,

367 U.S. 374 (1961)). Here, the savings clauses of the Oil

Pollution Act and the lack of Congressional intent to preempt

Washington from the fields associated with oil spill prevention

planning and inspections showed that the Coast Guard needed

to do more than simply declare a zone of preemption. In light

of these Congressional intentions, the Coast Guard needed to

demonstrate that its preemption reflected a precisely described

zone of actual conflicts or an area of exclusivity that

corresponded with Congress’ intent to broadly include state

powers to protect state waters from oil spills.

The inability of the Coast Guard to simply declare

zones of federal preemption does not limit its ability to fulfill

its statutory obligations. The Court of Appeals opinion casts

no doubt on the ability of the Coast Guard to displace a state

law that actually conflicts with “a Coast Guard rule.

Washington has never denied that preemption must follow

from a proper showing of conflict or frustration of purpose

with a lawfully enacted Coast Guard rule.

CONCLUSION

The judgement of the Court of Appeals should be

affirmed.

CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE

Attorney General

WILLIAM BERGGREN COLLINS*

Sr. Assistant Attorney General

Jay D. Geck

THOMAS C. MORRILL

Assistant Attorneys General

JERRI LYNN THOMAS

Senior Counsel, Assistant Attorney General

P.O. Box 40100

OLYMPIA, WA 98504-0100

TELEPHONE: (360) 753-6245

*Counsel of Record for State Respondents

NOVEMBER 18, 1999

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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