Respondents Brief — United States v. Locke
Supreme Court brief1999
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Nos. 98-1701 AND 98-1706 Supreme
In The Supreme Court NOV 1 9 1999
Of The United States
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS
Vv.
GARY LOCKE ET. AL., RESPONDENTS.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT TANKER
OWNERS (INTERTANKO), PETITIONER,
V.
GARY LOCKE ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF For STATE RESPONDENTS
CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
Attorney General
WILLIAM BERGGREN COLLINS*
Sr. Assistant Attorney General
JAY D. GEcK
THOMAS C. MorRILL
Assistant Attorneys General
JERRI LYNN THOMAS
Senior Counsel, Assistant A ttorney General
P.O. Box 40100
OLYMPIA, WA 98504-0100
TELEPHONE: (360) 753-6245
*Counsel of Record for State Respondents
NOVEMBER 18, 1999
IBEST AVAILABLE COPY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SED SMN hnnterstinicnipiiieniibbethigeciiia. cng ico |
A. Washington’s Waters Are A Priceless
cpt Tee EO l
B. An Oil Spill Could Be Devastating To
Washington’s Citizens And Environment............_ 2
e Navigation In Puget Sound Is Difficult ................_. 3
D. Washington’s Rules Protect State
Waters From Oil Spills .............ccccccvesssssssesessesssssssss...... 4
l. Operations Required While In
Or Near Washington Waters...........00................ 6
a Other Spill Prevention Requirements
Directly Related To Protecting
Washington Waters ........20..ccccs:ccccesesesssss.-........ 7
E. Congress Enacted The Oil Pollution
Act To Prevent And Respond To Oil
wap sty to oe pup ay, hE OT 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....ccccscsccccossssesssesseseesossssccs... 1]
ONE eeidnindariitisiiie cles. 13
A. There Is A Strong Presumption Against
Preemption Of State Police PoWeP....ceecccecccccoosss........ 13
B. Standards For Preemption Of State
Oil Spill Prevention LawS ...........c0cc0escsccssssseeeeoeoses...... 17
& Title II Of The Ports And Waterways
Safety Act, As Interpreted By
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Does Not
Establish Broad Field Preemption
Of State Police Power ..........:.sssccssecsesssssssseeeeeeeoooss,.,... 20
G.
Congress Expressly Preserved State
Police Powers In § 1018 Of The
Oil Pollution Act Of 1990...............cccccccceceeeeeeeeeeeneeeenees 24
Washington Laws Are Not Preempted
By International Treaties .............::sssssersesessesnensennnenrees 30
Title I Of The Ports and Waterways
Safety Act Does Not Require Preemption
Of State Police POWETS ..........:sscssscssscssersersensennenennensernees 34
Washington’s Requirements Do Not
Conflict With United States Or
Government’s Chart Are Often
Unrelated And Do Not Show Conflict............. 38
2. Some Washington Operational
Requirements Prescribe Conduct
Directly Necessitated By Local Conditions.....42
3. Spill Prevention Requirements
That Mirror Federal And
International Requirementts................--ssseeeeees 44
4. Washington Requirements That
Differ From Federal Requirements
Case No Conflict......c-cccssssserccesssosceccrcesesoneves 47
Express Statements Of Preemption By The
Coast Guard, Standing Alone, Do Not
Preempt Aspects Of Washington’s
Oil Spill Prevention Planning ................-sreereeeenenees 48
CONCLUSION .........:scccsssessssscssnsrsenresersesnneatnnnnnnncannnsannnnannnns 50
‘ iit ,
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American Dredging Co. v. Miller
a 14
Askew v. American Waterways Operators
aR a 13,14
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.
SS SIN SINR a 14
California v. ARC America Corp.
I 18
California v. Zook
IR 19, 44
Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy
Packet Co. v. Board of Trustees of the
Town of Catlettsburg
BO WB. CES CR) SIP (IBID) onan sceccesesccceccceecseseesessenees 14
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
CE A 18
City of New York v. FCC
7 ST A 48, 49
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia
EE Co 14
English v. General Electric Co.
EE IY, ee a ee passim
iv
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n
SOS UG. Gi Ca cree: sesececsnensscnnstntininecnnsenessiaginasie 18, 19, 22
Hillsborough Cy. v. Automated Medi-cal Lab., Inc.
yh? & ff ee een 18, 38
Hines v. Davidowitz
ing) BS) , ee 16, 17
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit
2 FD 15
Huse v. Glover
DOU 6, 14
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon
OU 25
International Ass'n of Independent Tanker Owners v.
Locke
148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) ...........cccccceesnenenenees iene 5
Jones v. Rath Packing Co. .
Le See eee 17
Kelly v. Washington
. 2S), woe 1S
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
te 0) err 13
Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Board of
Health of the State of Louisiana
ji jic £ |) a 14
New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino
Pe Ree ee 18
v
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
ee ES passim
Rice v. Norman Williams Co.
Ee Lee 19
Shaw y. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
ee 17, 18, 26
Silkwood vy. Kerr-McGee Corp.
| EE Ee aS 19
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
NE a en ne 14
United States v. Belmont
ERG REN ana eee aie 16
United States v. Pink
ESSE CS a NED 16, 17, 32
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Rev.,
CETTE IE TA TRL 32, 33
Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.
EE a 14
v. Miller
STE ye rr ee Rae 16, 17
Statutes
Federal
Oil Pollution Act of 1990
Pub. L. No. 101-380, August 18, 1990,
1046 Stet. 4B4 ......c.ccccccrecnsccsecseessevsecessnssesesnesevosonssnosesees passim
§§ 1002-1006 ........2csecsessessnrsnsenesnssnerssennennennsnnannsnnsnnsnnennes 10
8) | ene passim
§ 1018(a)(1)-(2)...-----eesverseenernesnenessnssnsncensensensensens 11, 24, 25
§ 1018(C) .....reccecseeseesnsreesusenennsnnsnsnnsnneneensensnnennsens 11, 25, 28
§ 1016......-cssccescsssveeressrssneensensensennsensenssneensnssensnnsensnnennennes 10
§ ANOD......eccescoesssssncsnesnsensesseessensensssssnnsnnsnsennsesennensssnsnnsnnents 9
§ 4103 ......csescessseesessnnseneennsensesssennnnnsnnsnntenscsnennsensennesnsanensne 9
§ 41 14(G) .....cnsccecsvessnssnessnessesnsenncsneenennesnsensennanenanssnensessny 10
§ 41 15(8) ....-.nscseccveesvesnersesennenneensennssnssnnsnnsenssnenvennennnsnnsnnee 9
§ 41 1S(D) ....n-sseeseecvecnersrssnssnsensensannssnsnnsenssnennsnnennnanennsanesies 10
§ 41 16(D).....-.nccsecvessesneenesnsensensenennssnsensenennensensennansnnssnsnenscs 10
§ 4202......eecneccesssesressneenerneensensssnssnssnensnennennennssasenannsnnernents 29
§ 4202(C) ...-ssecveesvesvssnesnernesseensenesnssnsensnnennsnnennensenennennsnnenes 29
33 U.S.C. § 1223 ......cecesccscssersenesesnssnensnnsnsnsensnssnenenennsnensansnennes 38
33 U.S.C. § 1225(D) ...-.e-sececereeseesesnessensnnsnsnennsnenssnenensanensnnensnens 35
33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2)
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)..........--++-+- 29
33 U.S.C. § 1517(k)\))
43 U.S.C. § 1820(c)
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act............:c.cscsssssesseseseeeee 29
46 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(9)
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act..............s0vss+«: 29
ee ee ctinteninntsninesijecbiemnviiaeionppinininanentincnetatei 37, 40
i Sb PP ciitineninnss pesiicieinsnetjiainstcalsinniiaiiliiassenss 20, 22, 40
Sap tae a teitittetinintennriecineninuicdnanininitniegmmntecitnaticial 23
Oil Terminal and Oil Tanker Environmental
Oversight and Monitoring Act of 1990
(FFE ie PE ID ccceccncccernsentscenenentsccscscenvesscsnosses 29
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA).......... passim
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Reform Act of 1990
(§ 8001; § 8202; § 8202(c) § B202(€))..........eccesereeeeseneeenees 30
State
Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.030(4).........cccsessscessseessesesenenseeenees 5
Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.170(2)..........cccscssscssessseserseseneneeeees 5
Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.030(1), (3) ........ccccccccssesesesseseensenenenes 5
Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.040(1), (3) ......c-ccccscsssesesssesensesenenenes 4
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 88.46.080-.090 .00........cccccccccseseeseneneenenenes 5
1991 Wash. Laws ch. 200, § 101 .....cccccccccssccesssssssssssvesereessssnsers 4
Other Authorities
41 Fed. Reg. 18766 (1976) ....cssscsssssssssesssssssssssssssnssnssssnnnnnseee 37
43 Fed. Rew, 10FFOCIGID secsscisnecicneerncsesrssinsrmnrsnsici 36
2 Waal Silk TO icici issicebics pinch nnclccaieohitons 37
Sa Weak. Cites SI a ioiosiii cece 10
Cab et TE III sisi siies dictsiininvicianion’ 10
S 686, § 310, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 11, 1989)..........0 27
S. Rep. No. 101-94, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990)......... 9, 28
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-380, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 156 (1990).......cssessresserseseesressserssssersenerensnsnees 30
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., pp. 121-22 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N, 799-B00 .........cccssccccscrssrssesnserrseenens 26, 27
H.R. Report No. 92-563, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.,
B®. 15 (1971). .......cccscsccnsvecessvesscsosveresenssosessesononesenssssosesers 35, 36
Lord Donaldson, London:HMSO, Safer Ships,
Cleaner Seas 4 6.20 (May 1994) .......cccsccccseeserreerseenesssseneees 33
Directorate for Science, Technology and
Industry Maritime Transport Committee,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Paris, Non-Observance
Of International Rules And Standards:
Competitive Advantages 3 (January 1996) ............:.:00+0-+ 33
Treatises
Articles of Protocol Of 1978.........c:scssesssessesssesseeessessesseeesesess, 30
of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL)............ 31, 32, 33
International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS).......ccccccecccsecessesosssessoseseoeess passim
International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers, 1978 (STOW) .0......:cececcscoscosessecseseeoe.es, passim
PU ovinaphpientiiancilneipinmia ad hati aa 41, 42, 45, 46
Ge richisiteniatesinttichanstninbiintapeists ripisbeaaiiiti as 2. 41, 42, 45
Pee avininvescaiguaiisnmeniattstesedaghianuiiiaildn ies ie cis 41,42
FP iiiinictievonrenpecticiiiillaniiitdsen vialin diet aigs Ra 41,42
PIE oseniiiientasstntnilstnuimininbinniingicats sd teen 45
Ree ainincscenilinbintiitieaiicbciiniininaiealgie eae i 45
SE actacicntenisiohebitigtitandssicaihedinnucias: Tidak. metas 2 46
FOr ialeihuciatsiiitindieatiissaiihmnitaiinita ing sie the Dea 40
Ne a eA SIENA TS IIIA SRAM Me tt) 43
ate cE RE ET RAGE SNE Bete” SRR ly 39, 40, 46
International Safety Management Code
REE RS ERE i sr A ERED 31, 32, 45
i I TEESE! NOTRE Ee CREST A 45
oat 8 RRC AITESIE: LS SR TP AE Biv eM 44
sep ese EES SERNA AOI MS STS CoRR RON 46
Regulations
Federal
33 CAFR. § 155,700 cccossscssssssnsseeee Ra eRe Te 46
SOGRT OC OURIIO a iciiisitinerscdscdbacucsches 39
SOBA, 6 SABI onccrsereneinctsieiostcbvccietemaea te 6
OOM 0 OOIIIIE oo oie
SR, 0 NE nena 6
SOI, BION se ceciccienintibveiinsetheniicie chal 40, 41
| RRR ME cs ER POSES fe 2 x
RIE, ONS caacti oncicciisstickiceesicet SAE 39
pL ES 48
Pa Sh, ema es 7 39
OG CPR. § BSOS-Y SCR oacccascccernencaceonsveconsee SGA Haale? 39
46 CFR. §§ Part 112, n.b, 112.25-3, 25-5, 25-10... 40, 41
QROTI DOIG wivcsicrcitnisee dlc ih ga a eneenearonees 8
State
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-130 vcccccsssssssvsvsssssescsssessseseese 47
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(1)....ccssccssssssseesssessssesesee 6
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(1)(€) ..sceccesssssssecssseeen 6, 42
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(1)(b)........ccsscesseeseeceneeeeees 41
xi
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(2).ecccccessesesosseseoeooee.... 5
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(3).ecccceccessseeseseeeooees... 6
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(4) .ecccceccceeeccooeoooc... 6, 38
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(5).cccecceccssssseseeeoeoeec... 7
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200(6).ec.ecseccceecseseeeeoeoeec.... a
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205(1) essecsecseececseoooocc...... 6,7
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205(2), (3) eeesecceeo......... 6, 41
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-210(1).eccccseseeeeeoooeocc.... 6, 40
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-210(2), (3), (4) seccecceccooo....... 7
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215 oo.ccccccsessseseseeoeoc... 7, 43
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215(1).ecccsscsseessecesooeoocc..... 4]
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215(1)-(10).ecceccccccoeeeoo........ a
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-220 ...cccccccscssesseseeeeeooecc...... 44
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-220(1) ccccsecsecseeceoeeeooocs.. 41
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-225 o..ccccscssosssssesseseeeeeocca..... 6
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230 cccccccsecsseseeeeooococe.... 8, 45
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235 ccccccccseesseeecoocc... 8,47
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235()..ccceccscssesesssseeeooeecc..... 6
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235(3)..ccceccsccssseeseseeeoooee..... 8
xii
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250 s.ccccccccssssssssssssssssssssssssee 8, 46
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250(1)ss.cccsscscscssssssssessssssssssssseee 8
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-255 ..cccccvccccsvsssssssssesseee niches 8
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-260 ..ccccccccccccscssssssssssssssssssee 8, 46
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-265 ..cccccccccsecssessssssssssssssssssssessee 5
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-540 ..cccccsvccscscsssssssssssssssseeseeeeen 43
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-550(1)s.c.csccssssssvsssssssesseeeee 5, 32
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-31-210(3)scccccsssssssssssssssssssssssssssssee 5
Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendmente.............. 48
citizens and environment lingers to this day. Although
Washington has not suffered a similar catastrophe, its waters
present navigation hazards in excess of Prince William Sound.
JA at 124. Several near-disasters have been avoided by good
fortune. JA at 65, 126-27.
The Exxon Valdez spill focused the attention of both
Congress and the states on the risks posed by oil tankers
Congress responded by enacting the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-380, August 18, 1990, 104 Stat. 484. The Oil
Pollution Act (OPA 90) coordinates and enhances several
aspects of the federal Prevention, response, liability, and
compensation regimes that deal with vessel-caused pollution.
to determine compliance with such plans. These requirements
of Washington’s oil spill prevention plans are the subject of
this litigation. 3
A. Washington’s Waters Are A Priceless Resource
Washington’s waters contain some of the richest and
sea with habitat ranging from muddy bays to open rocky
shores. The Strait of Juan de Fuca is a transition zone between
the wave-exposed coast and the quieter Puget Sound waters.
Recreational use is extensive; there are over ninety parks
located on or adjacent to Puget Sound, with an annual
estimated visitation of over fifty-five million. JA at 180-90.
2
Washington’s citizens live and work in the cities, towns, and
rural areas around Puget Sound.
Shoreline vegetation covers 2,500 miles of Washington
coast, providing a major link in the food chain. In addition to
food, coastal habitat provides refuge from predators and a
place for reproduction and raising off-spring. JA at 153-57.
Washington waters support thousands of species of plants and
animals. JA at 137-43. At least 125 species of birds spend
some part of the year in Washington waters; sixty species
winter here and fifteen species come in the summer to breed.
JA at 162-71.
Washington is also home to five species of salmon and
many other fish species, plus shrimp, clams, oysters, and
scallops. Washington fisheries are important as both a
commercial and a recreational resource. In 1993, the
wholesale value of the commercial fishery was $354 million,
sports anglers caught 475,632 salmon, and 1,252,177 pounds of
clams were harvested. Fisheries also are significant to the
economy and culture of treaty Indian tribes. JA at 174-78.
B. An Oil Spill Could Be Devastating To Washington’s
Citizens And Environment
Washington’s waters are particularly vulnerable to
damage from a spill. In Puget Sound, the water exchange is
limited so that sediments in shallow areas would be heavily
contaminated. JA at 193. Even on the rocky coast, damage
could be extensive because it is home to long-lived,
slow-growing species, such as mussels, that do not disperse
well. JA at 142-43.
The effects of an oil spill in Washington waters will
depend on a number of factors, such as the location of the spill,
the number of gallons involved, and the type of oil. Heavy oil
can kill invertebrates and plants outright. JA at 142. Birds,
such as ducks, that live on the water are highly susceptible to
3
hypothermia after exposure to oil.' If fish and wildlife are not
killed outright, their tissues likely are tainted by oil. Some
species, such as clams, retain oil in their tissues for many
months, destroying livelihoods and endangering human health.
Animals will be constantly recontaminated by oil leaching out
of the sediment. Fisheries will be shut down entirely after a
spill. JA at 141-42. Washington’s fisheries could suffer
permanent damage through destruction of habitat and genetic
damage. JA at 198. Recreational enjoyment and the lives of
millions will be affected. JA at 141, 178, 181, 195, 201-02.
al Navigation In Puget Sound Is Difficult
Most tanker traffic in Washington is through Puget
Sound to refineries located both to the north and south.“
JA at 120, 122-23. The Puget Sound area is extremely difficult
to navigate. JA at 124. Tankers enter Puget Sound through the
Strait of Juan de Fuca. Exhibit 34 is a chart of the Strait of
Juan de Fuca and the northern part of Puget Sound. The
western end of the Strait has persistent fog, and it is heavily
fished, causing congestion problems. JA at 123.
Tankers bound for the northern refineries must
negotiate between Hein Bank and Smith Island where the
waterway is narrow and congested. The tankers continue to the
northeast and shoot the gap between Davidson Rock and
Lawson Reef with dangerous obstacles on the edge of traffic
lanes. At this point, the vessel turns north to enter Rosario
Strait. As illustrated on Exhibit 34, Rosario Strait is too
' Between 175,000 and 300,000 Common Murres were killed in
the Exxon Valdez spill. The estimates of dead eagles from the Exxon Valdez
spill range from 200 to over 900. Between 3,500 and 5,000 sea otters died
as a result of the Exxon Valdez spill. JA at 194-97.
* Although there is some tanker traffic on the Columbia River,
most oil is transported on the river by tank barge. JA at 120. This case
challenges spill prevention plans for tankers.
* Exhibit 34 (Affidavit of Stanley J. Norman, JA at 88) has been
lodged with the Court and served on the parties.
4
narrow for traffic lanes and one-way traffic for tankers is
necessary. JA at 122.
Tankers bound for the two Anacortes refineries proceed
up to the vicinity of Shannon Point, turn right, pass through the
narrow Guemes Channel, and proceed to sh: low Padilla Bay,
where the refineries are located. The currents in the Guemes
Channel are extremely strong, with frequen’ fog and a
significant range of tides. Tankers bound for the Cherry Point
and Ferndale refineries continue up Rosario Strait, past such
obstacles as Peapod Rocks and Lummi Rocks. JA at 122-23.
Exhibit 33 is a chart of southern Puget Sound.’ Tankers
southbound for Tacoma transit broader waterways, but they are
frequently more congested than the ones going north. There
are also myriad obstructions close to the western side of the
southbound traffic lane. JA at 124.
D. Washington’s Rules Protect State Waters From Oil
Spills
In 1991, the Washington Legislature acted to protect
“some of the most unique and special marine environments in
the United States”. 1991 Wash. Laws ch. 200, § 101. The
Legislature recognized that these marine environments were
threatened by “billions of gallons of crude oil and refined
petroleum products . . . transported by vessel on the navigable
waters of the state [each year]”. /d. The Legislature concluded
that “prevention is the best method to protect the unique and
special marine environments in this state”. Jd.
Under the 1991 law, all companies that operate tankers
headed into Washington waters through the Strait of Juan de
Fuca or the Columbia River are required to file oil spill
prevention plans that meet certain requirements. Wash. Rev.
Code § 88.46.040(1). These planning requirements provide
“the best achievable protection [BAP] from damages caused by
* Exhibit 33 (Affidavit of Stanley J. Norman, JA at 88) has been
lodged with the Court and served on the parties,
:
g
i agency. Code
§§ 88.46.030(4), .170(2). State inspections take place when
the vessel is in port. Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-31-210(3);
317-2:1-550(1).
It is unlawful to operate a tanker in Washington waters
without an approved prevention plan. The 1991 law provides
civil and criminal penalties against the owner or operator if
there iis a violation. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 88.46,080-.090.5
133. The Coast Guard’s maritime safety program ‘spends
eighty percent of its available resources addressing design and
technical requirements. JA at 133.
* The state's only rule regarding technological equipment, Wash.
1. Operations Required While In Or Near
Washington Waters
A number of Washington’s requirements are performed
in or near Washington waters.’ For example, Washington
requires that the navigation watch in Washington waters
consist of at least two licensed deck officers. Wash. Admin.
Code § 317-21-200(1). (The Coast Guard imposes the same
requirement for tankers. 33 C.F.R.'§ 164.13(c).) A tanker not
equipped with automatic stand-by switching gear for standby
generators must operate with stand-by generators running and
immediately available to assume the electrical load while
underway in state waters. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-
210(1). Washington requires the position of a vessel to be
recorded at fifteen minute intervals or less. Wash. Admin.
Code § 317-21-205(1). (The Coast Guard requires the position
of the vessel to be plotted on a chart of the area. 33 C-F.R.
§ 164.11(c).)
A few examples illustrate how these requirements are
appropriate measures for spill prevention in Washington.
Navigation Watch During Restricted Visibility
A navigation watch has three primary functions:
navigation, collision avoidance, and administration. When
visibility is not restricted, two officers can perform this
workload. During restricted visibility, a great deal more
attention must be paid to navigation and collision avoidance.
JA at 99. When a tanker is operating in restricted visibility, as
determined by the vessel master or officer in charge, a
Washington oil spill prevention plan requires three licensed
deck officers, one of whom may be a pilot, on the navigation
watch in pilotage waters. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-
200(1)(a). A third deck officer will significantly decrease
human-caused error during the long and stressful transit
through the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound. JA at 207.
” Examples include Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-21-200(1),
(3)-(6); -205(1)-(3); -210(1)-(4); -215(1)-(10); -225; -235(1); -245,
Anchor Watch
Washington has a history of problems with vessels
dragging anchor This is a major hazard for with
pre
existing, mechanical failure. JA at 208. A failure of critical
navigation and engineering equipment subsystems could result
in a grounding or collision and subsequent oil spill in the
confines of Puget Sound. JA at 110.
2. Other Spill Prevention Requirements
operations peri rmed exclusively in Washington waters.*
Some mirror Coast Guard requirements, while others add on to
existing Coast Guard requirements.
Training Policies
Washington requires that the oil spill prevention plan
explain how the company has provided training to its crews
and lists training criteria. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230.
Training is vital to oil spill prevention since sixty-five to eighty
percent of all vessel accidents and casualties are caused by
human error. JA at 111.
Drug And Alcohol Testing
Washington requires all companies to establish testing
programs consistent with those required by the Coast Guard in
33 C.F.R. Part 95 and 46 C.F.R. Part 4, except 46 C.F.R.
§ 16.500 . The Washington standard goes further by requiring
the company to include random alcohol tests, and by applying
the requirement to foreign flag vessels. Wash. Admin. Code
§ 317-21-235. The purpose of the testing program is to prevent
crew members from being intoxicated and unable to perform
their duties. JA at 114-15.
Language
Washington requires licensed deck officers and the
vessel’s designated person in charge to communicate in
English and a language understood and spoken by subordinate
officers and unlicensed crew. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-
250(1). English language communication is critical. For
example, in the area west of Port Angeles before a pilot boards
the vessel, deck watch officers with limited English have
trouble communicating with the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic
system, as well as other vessels, when they are required to talk
to them to arrange safe passage in collision avoidance
situations. JA at 123-24.
* Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-21-200(2), -220, -230, -235(3), -250,
-255, -260.
E. Congress Enacted The Oil Pollution Act To Prevent
And Respond To Oil Spills From Tankers
Washington required oil spill prevention plans and
compliance with BAP rules shortly after Congress enacted the
based on expressions that spill prevention was critical. In the
words of one Senate Report:
“[A]ny oil spill, no matter how quickly we respond to it
or how well we contain it, is going to harm the
environment. Consequently, preventing oil spills is
more important than containing and cleaning them up
quickly.” §. Rep. No. 101-94, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.,
pp. 2-3 (1990) (second italics ours), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 724.
on a tanker be no more than fifteen hours in any twenty-four-
hour period and no more than thirty-six hours in any seventy-
two-hour period.
In pursuit of the highest standards of prevention,
Congress departed from international standards in several
respects. Congress required tankers be constructed with double
hulls by January 1, 2015.'' This requirement applied to both
United States and foreign flag tankers. Furthermore, the
secretary of transportation (secretary) was required to adopt
rules for single hull tankers operating in United States waters to
* OPA 90 § 4101; State App. at Sla-52a.
OPA 90 § 4103; State App. at 54a-57a,
" OPA 90 § 4115(a); State App. at 72a-77a.
and feasible”. OPA 90 §
4115(b); State App. at 77a-78a. Congress departed from norms
advocated by international organizations. '?
must have at least two licensed deck officers on the bridge. '*
Although these subjects might also fall within the jurisdiction
of the flag state, the Coast Guard concluded that the rules
should “apply to foreign flag tankers and U.S. tankers sailing
on registry because these tankers pose a similar risk to the
environment”. 58 Fed. Reg. 27628 (1993).
In addition to its increased prevention measures, the Oil
Pollution Act contained new provisions imposing federal
liability for spills and damage to natural resources.’ And it
imposed new requirements for demonstrating financial
responsibility." These provisions also departed from the
international regime for oil pollution liability and
compensation.
In enacting the Oil Pollution Act, Congress considered
the question of preemption and expressly indicated its intent to
? In its 1996 rulemaking for single hull tankers, th. Coast Guard
responded to comments that it was “undermining the international process;
that competency and manning requirements fall under flag state jurisdiction:
and the [rule] goes beyond international requirements in some cases”.
61 Fed. Reg. 39771 (1996). The Coast Guard responded by stating:
“Where international standards do not address certain operations, the Coast
" OPA 90 § 4114(a); State App. at 70a.
‘OPA 90 § 4116(b); State App. at 84a.
° OPA 90 §§ 1002-1006; State App. at 8a-25a.
OPA 90 § 1016; State App. at 39a-42a,
obligations or liabilities of any person under . . . State law.
including common law”. Section 1018(c) stated that Congress
additional mM relating to the discharge, or
substantial threat of a discharge, of oil”
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
preempt.
1 4s strong presumption against preemption applies to preserve
W.-shington’s oil spill prevention laws. The presumption is not
of the fields are not carefully limited to fields where federal
law leaves no room for State oil spill prevention laws.
Petitioners have failed to show real, irreconcilable conflicts
that imply Con ional intent to displace states from fields
addressed by oil spil! prevention plans.
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978),
this Court held that Title II of the PWSA preempted the field of
tanker design and construction. The Court's holding and its
reasoning does not extend to other subjects listed in Title Il of
the PWSA. The Court specifically distinguished manning and
12
operational requirements, such as a local pilot and a tug escort,
from design and construction. Petitioners’ argument draws an
unwarranted inference of preemption by simply labeling state
laws with subjects of rulemaking under Title II. This
expansion of Ray is inconsistent with the decision and other
preemption decisions of this Court.
By enacting § 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act, Congress
demonstrated its understanding that, except for the field of
design and construction adjudicated in Ray, other fields were
not preempted. The language of that savings provision is broad
and refers to any requirements imposed by states with respect
to the discharge and potential discharge of oil. Congress would
not enact a broad saving of state power in § 1018, if there were
no state powers to be saved.
The treaties entered into by the United States do not
conflict with Washington’s law. The standards described by
treaties are not self-executing and require the signature
governments to adopt laws for implementation. Although the
United States agrees to accept certificates issued by foreign
flag states regarding certain matters, no conflict is presented
with that system. Washington does not control ships to verify
such certificates or act in conflict with federal actions.
Washington directs its regulations to tanker companies and
implements safety audits to determine whether owners and
operators follow their oil spill prevention plans.
Nor are Washington’s requirements in conflict with
federal law. There is no claim of physical impossibility.
Washington’s law does not stand as an obstacle to achieving
the objectives of Congress. From the PWSA to the Oil
Pollution Act, the objective of Congress is to prevent oil spills
and to allow states to further that objective. Washington law
serves this core purpose and presents no conflicts with any
federal statute or rule.
Congress has not, under Title I of the PWSA,
preempted all state law that might address the same subject
matter as a Coast Guard regulation. Under normal rules of
13
preemption, a state rule should not be preempted unless it
Presents physical conflicts or obstacles to a lawful Coast Guard
rule. This may occur under Title I if the Coast Guard adopts
safety standards that are specific to Puget Sound. Only then
conflict between state and federal law.
ARGUMENT
A. There Is A Strong Presumption Against Preemption
Of State Police Power
“In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in
which Congress has ‘legislated in a field which the States have
(1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)). Both Intertanko and the federal government
attempt to undermine this strong presumption.
1. Intertanko relies on the maritime context of the state
oil spill prevention plan to argue that this Court should
disregard or reorder the federalism relationship of the states
This Court has already rejected similar arguments. In Askew y.
American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S, 325 (1973), this
Court refused to
“allow federal admiralty jurisdiction to swallow most of
the police power of the States over oil spillage — an
insidious form of pollution of vast concern to every
coastal city or port and to all the estuaries on which the
14
life of the ocean and the lives of the coastal people are
greatly dependent.” Askew, 411 U.S. at 328-29.
Askew, thus, affirmed that the states’ historic police powers
extend beyond liability and include setting requirements for
preventing oil spills. State power was not preempted by
complex federal regulations affecting maritime safety and the
environment.'’
For 150 years, this Court has consistently held that the
States retain inherent sovereign powers to protect their citizens
and their environment from risks presented by maritime
activities, except to the extent that state law conflicts with
federal law or when Congress has used its power to preempt
state law from a subject. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the
Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299 (1851) (Congress had not
acted to preempt state power to require pilotage); Cincinnati,
Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Board of
Trustees of the Town of Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 559,
562 (1882) (local authorities may regulate anchoring and
wharfing); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548 (1886) (fee on
boats using locks); Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & SS. Co. vy.
Board of Health of the State of Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455, 465-
66 (1886) (states have power to impose quarantine and
inspection measures for ships arriving from international
commerce).
'” Askew explained that Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 US.
205 (1917), and its progeny “mark isolated instances” where state law was
affected by a need for uniform federal maritime law. Askew, 411 U.S. at
388; see also Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 118 (1962) (“we
must candidly acknowledge that the decisions between 1917 and 1926
produced no reliable determinant of valid state law coverage”); American
Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 458-62 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
concurring, questioning viability of Jensen). Petitioner Intertanko,
however, quotes Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924),
the progeny of Jensen, to argue that maritime commerce requires uniformity
in all regards, implying that there is no room for any state laws affecting
tankers. Intertanko Br. at 20.
15
In Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court
motor vessels for general safety Purposes in the face of “a
maze of [federal] regulation”. /d. at 4-5. The Court rejected
the broad and undefined preemption of maritime matters urged
here by Intertanko and amici:
“There is no constitutional rule which compels
Congress to occupy the whole field. . . . [T]he exercise
by the State of its police power, which would be valid if
not superseded by Federal action, is superseded only
where the repugnance or conflict is so ‘direct and
Positive’ that the two acts cannot “be reconciled or
consistently stand together.” Kelly, 302 U.S. at 10.
To be sure, Kelly recognized that Congressional action could
preempt state law, but preemption was narrowly confined.
conflict with the law of the State”. Id. at 443 (quoting Savage
v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)). Huron also notes that
Congress had recognized that air pollution caused peculiarly
local harms, which further contradicted the ship owner’s
argument that Congress impliedly displaced state power to
criminally cite a shipowner violating state air pollution laws.
Id. at 446.
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 15] (1978),
this Court struck down Washington requirements for tanker
design and construction, while upholding state operational
requirements, such as a local pilot on registered vessels and a
presumptions against preemption of state laws applied. Ray,
16
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
2. The government seeks to connect the state’s
regulations to an area addressed in international treaties and
conventions to seek a special preemption if state regulation
“hinders” the Nation’s conduct of its foreign affairs. U.S. Br.
at 29,47. The government’s attempt to equate “preemption by
treaty” to “interference with the federal government’s
exclusive authority to conduct the foreign affairs” (U.S. Br. at
29) ignores how these two subjects present different problems.
Washington does not contend that it can violate a
lawful treaty entered into by the United States nor does it
attack any treaty entered into by the United States. Petitioners,
however, fail to identify treaty provisions that have been
violated. As shown below at Part E (Argument), pages 30-34,
Washington violates no self-executing treaty requirements.
Cases such as United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937),
and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), which involve
State actions that violated an international agreement, have
little relevance to this case.
Petitioners incorrectly invoke this Court’s prior
decisions concerning interference with “foreign affairs”. These
“foreign affairs” cases involve discriminatory treatment of
aliens or foreign citizens. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Hines
struck down a Pennsylvania statute that required aliens to
register because it imposed “distinct, unusual and extraordinary
burdens and obligations upon aliens” (Hines, 312 U.S. at 65) in
direct conflict with comprehensive federal registration laws (id.
at 66-68) and in conflict with the constitutional choice that the
power to regulate and register aliens is not concurrently shared
with the states (id. at 68-69). Zschernig invalidated an Oregon
law that provided that an estate would escheat to the state
rather than go to an heir living in a communist country,
again imposing a discriminatory burden based on foreign status
17
that was not “incidental or indirect”. Zschernig, 389 U.S.
at 434-35,
The government contends that Hines compels a
conclusion that Washington’s power to Prevent oil spills
operates in “the narrowest of limits”. U.S. Br. at 29. This
argument ignores how that description of state power in Hines
was expressly based on the nature of Congress’ exclusive
power over naturalization and the direct connection between
State discrimination and foreign relations. See Hines, 312 U.S.
at 66, 68-69. State power should not fall within the “narrowest
nations will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from
the authority and jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless
clearly necessary to effectuate the national policy”),
B. Standards For Preemption Of State Oil Spill
Prevention Laws
1. The central issue in this case is whether Congress
has preempted state power to regulate oil tankers to prevent oil
spills and, if so, how to define the scope and nature of that
preemption. Preemption is fundamentally a question of
Congressional intent. English v. General Electric Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). Congressional intent to preempt state
law can either be express or implied. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
2. Express preemption occurs when Congress expressly
States its intent to preempt in the language of a statute. Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 US. 519, 530 (1977) (Federal Meat
Inspection Act expressly prohibited “marking, labeling,
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan covered”
by ERISA).
3. The Court has recognized two types of implied
preemption. The first is labeled implied field preemption.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)
(“state law is pre-empted if . . . federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference
that congress left no room for the State to supplement it”)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
second is conflict preemption. A “state law is pre-empted if
that law actually conflicts with federal law”. Jd. A state law is
in conflict with a federal law to the extent “it actually conflicts
with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state and
federal law is impossible, or when the state law ‘stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purpose and objectives of Congress’”. California v. ARC
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989) (citations
omitted).'*
4. The most difficult problem where there is a claim of
field preemption is defining “the boundaries of the pre-empted
field” (English, 496 U.S. at 82) where Congress has left no
room for state law. In determining the existence and scope of
field preemption, there are three principles often used by this
Court that are relevant to determining Congressional intent in
this case. First, no “intent to pre-empt may be inferred from
the comprehensiveness of the” federal statutes or regula-tions
at issue in a case. Hillsborough Cy. v. Automated Medi-cal
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1985); New York State Dep't
of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973).
Second, the conflict between the state law and the field
of federal law must be real, not speculative. “The existence of
a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the
'* The Court has indicated that the labels used to describe conflict
and field preemption are not “rigidly distinct”. See Gade v. National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n.2 (1992).
does: not arise because of a mere “tension” between the state
law and the field claimed to be preempted, Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (state law claims for
field of federal nuclear safety); English, 496 U.S. at 85-86, 90
(enjoining “seeking out conflicts between state and federal
regulation where none clearly exists”). To determine if there is
an irreconcilable conflict between state law and a field of
federal law, the “key question is thus at what point the state
regulation sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it
should be deemed pre-empted”. Gade v. National Solid Wastes
110 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
Judgment) (“a high threshold must be met if a state law is to be
pre-empted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act”),
controwersial question: whether Congress intended to make its
jurisdiction exclusive”, /d. at 731.
Cc. Title If Of The Ports And Waterways Safety Act, As
Interpreted By Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Does
Not Establish Broad Field Preemption Of State
Police Power
1. The federal government makes much of the fact that
Congress has a long history of regulating maritime commerce.
U.S. Br. at 18-24. The government points to this history to
support its conclusion that Congress intended to preempt the
requirements for Washington’s oil spill prevention plans.
We draw the opposite conclusion. Congress has not
acted to expressly preempt state police power as it relates to
maritime commerce, and neither petitioner claims that
Washington’s requirements have been expressly preempted.
Yet the history recited by the government demonstrates that
states have, since the Constitution was ratified, applied their
police power to maritime commerce. If Congress truly intends
to preempt state regulation in this area, it has the power to state
its intentions clearly and unambiguously.
2. Since Congress has not expressly preempted state
law, petitioners argue that Title II of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act, as amended, impliedly establishes a broad field
preemption of state police power in the area of vessel “design,
equipping, personnel qualification, and manning”. 46 U.S.C.
§ 3703(a). Intertanko claims that all of Washington’s
requirements fall within these broadly stated fields. Intertanko
Br. at 23. The federal government argues that some
requirements fall within similarly labeled fields but, except for
providing a few examples, has not specifically identified which
ones. U.S. Br. at 33-41. Petitioners pin their broad field
preemption arguments to this Court’s opinion in Ray.
Petitioners’ interpretation of Title II is not well taken.
In Ray, this Court was careful to define the boundaries of the
field. The field preemption identified by this Court in Ray was
narrow and dealt only with tanker design and construction.
According to this Court: “Title II’s principal concern is tanker
trary to petitioners’ suggestion, the Court did not hold that all
the subjects in Title II of the PWSA were similarly preempted.
3. The government argues that Ray applies to all the
Subjects in Title II and that the Court discussed tanker design
Court was careful to distinguish these valid requirements from
design and construction. In sustainjng the pilotage
requirement, the Court specifically noted the requirement for a
state pilot was not a design requirement. The Court said:
“Of course, that a tanker is certified under
federal law as a safe vessel insofar as its design and
construction characteristics are concerned does not
mean that it is free to ignore otherwise valid state or
“A tug-escort provision is not a design
requirement, such as is promulgated under Title II. /t is
22
more akin to an operating rule arising from the
iarities of local waters{.J” Jd at 171 (emphasis
added).
Thus, in Ray, this Court carefully limited the field to tanker
design and construction and found no Congressional intent to
preempt other fields mentioned in Title II.
4. Where Ray was based on an actual irreconcilable
conflict between state and federal design and construction
standards, petitioners’ field preemption argument amounts to
little more than a labeling exercise. They attach a label, such
as “manning”, to Washington’s requirements and then claim it
falls into a preempted field because 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) lists
“manning” as an area for regulation. Under this theory,
however, the tug escort requirement in Ray should have been
preempted because it could be labeled an “operation”, which is
also listed in 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a).
No other decision of this Court turns field preemption
into a labeling exercise. Field preemption can be described as
a species of conflict preemption. English, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5;
Gade, 505 U.S. at 104 n.2 (O’Connor, J.); Gade, 505 U.S. at
114 (Souter, J., dissenting). To have implied field preemption,
the field must be carefully limited to a subject where Congress
has left no room for state regulation. A state requirement must
be examined to see if there is an irreconcilable conflict with a
Congressional scheme. The Court followed this method of
analysis in Ray. It concluded that the field of design and con-
struction was preempted, essentially because a tanker can have
but one blueprint for design and construction. The Court said:
“This statutory pattern shows that Congress, insofar as
design characteristics are concerned, has entrusted to
the Secretary the duty of determining which oil tankers
are sufficiently safe to be allowed to proceed in the
navigable waters of the United States. This indicates to
us that Congress intended uniform national standards
for design and construction of tankers that would
foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent
e
nevertheless be barred by state law from operating in
the navigable waters of the United States on the ground
that its design characteristics constitute an undue
hazard.” Ray, 435 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis added).
This reasoning does not apply generally to the broad
categories of federal regulations that petitioners contend are
field preempted. While it is clear a tanker can have only one
blueprint, it is equally clear that operational requirements can
change from port to port, and they must at all times respond to
5. Petitioners also rely on minor textual signals, such as
the directive that the secretary “shall” adopt rules. U.S. Br. at
26; Intertanko Br. at 21-22. No other case relies on the
difference between “shall” and “may” to infer that Congress
impliedly displaced state law from a field. That explanation in
6. Petitioners’ broad field Preemption arguments
depend on an extension of Ray beyond its logic and holding.
Most importantly, the labels obtained from Title II of the
24
compliance with those prevention measures. This Court should
reject petitioners’ reliance on broad arguments of field
preemption to eliminate sovereign powers of the states when
there is no Congressional expression nor regulatory scheme
that requires that type of broad preemption of state laws.
D. Congress Expressly Preserved State Police Powers
In § 1018 Of The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
1. While Congress has not expressly preempted state
law, it has expressly declared its intention not to preempt state
law in § 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act. This is important for two
reasons. First, since preemption is based on the intent of Con-
gress, § 1018 directly states Congress’ intent. Second, § 1018
impliedly contradicts petitioners’ expansive reading of Ray.
2. Section 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act, provides, in
part:
“(a) PRESERVATION OF STATE AUTHORITIES; SOLID
WASTE DisPOsAL ACT.—Nothing in this Act or the Act
of March 3, 1851 shall—
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as
preempting, the authority of any State or political
subdivision thereof from imposing any additional
liability or requirements with respect to—
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by
oil within such State, or
(B) any removal activities in connection
with such a discharge; or
(2) affect, or be construed or interpreted to
affect or modify in any way the obligations or
liabilities of any person under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.) or State law,
including common law.
25
(¢) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND LIABILITIES;
PENALTIES.—Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3,
1851 (46 U.S.C. 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 9509), shall
in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the
authority of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof—
(1) to impose additional liability or additional
requirements: or
(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of.
any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in
nature) for any violation of law;
relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a
discharge, of oil.” OPA 90 § 1018(a), (c) (emphasis
added); 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718: State App. at 46a-47a.
3. The language of subsections 1018(a) and (c) is very
broad. Section 1018(a) states that “[njothing in this Act... .
shat) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting,
the authority of any State . . . from imposing any additional
“[njothing in this Act . . . shall in any way affect, or be
construed to affect, the authority of... any State. . _
provisions of the Oil Pollution Act be pursued in a cooperative
manner with the states without preemption of state laws.
The phrases “with respect to” and “relating to” are
deliberately expansive, allowing states to determine which
aspects of oil pollution they deem appropriate to regulate. See
Ingersoll-Rand Co. y. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990)
(law “relates to” an employee benefit plan if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan, even if it is not specifically
designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect);
26
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (“A law ‘relates to’ an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan.”). Washington’s
spill prevention planning is among the most important
requirements that a state might impose “with respect to” or
“relating to” the discharge of oil.
4. Section 1018 supports the state’s argument that no
broad field preemption was ever intended by Congress in 1978 or
since. By enacting the Oil Pollution Act and by enacting § 1018,
Congress demonstrated its understanding that, except for the field
of design and construction adjudicated in Ray, other fields were
not occupied by federal law to the exclusion of state law. It
would make no sense for Congress to express a broad savings of
state powers from preemption in § 1018, if it had already
preempted those state powers. Congress does not preempt state
powers in such an ambiguous or duplicitous manner.
5. Both petitioners urge this Court to infer that the
scope of § 1018 confirms that Congress intended to preempt
state laws, because the Conference Report explained that:
“The Conference substitute does not disturb the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 435
U.S. 151 (1978).” U.S. Br. at 42; Intertanko Br. at 47.
Petitioners take the Conference Report’s statement about Ray
out of context. The report describes a broadly worded savings
clause that could be understood as affecting the holding in Ray.
According to the Conference Report
“(Subsection (a) of section 1018 of the substitute states
explicitly that nothing in the substitute, or the Act of
March 3, 1851 (the Limitation of Liability Act), shall
affect in any way the authority of a State or local
government fo impose additional liability or other
requirements with respect to oil pollution or to the
discharge of oil within that State . . .
27
Similarly, subsection (c) clarifies that nothing in the
substitute, the Limitation of Liability Act, or in section
9509 of the Internal Revenue Code shall affect in any
way the authority of the United States or any State or
local government to impose additional liability or
requirements, or to determine the amount of, any civil
or criminal penalty for any violation of law.” H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pp.
121-22 (1990) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 799-800.
The reference to Ray in the Conference Report confirms
only that the broad language of § 1018 does not undo the
careful holding in Ray that the field of tanker design and
construction is preempted. Ray, however, did not hold that all
the subjects listed in the PWSA defined the field to be
preempted. See Argument, Part C supra p.20-24.
6. Intertanko makes several arguments that § 1018 does
not reflect intent to preserve state authority to impose
additional requirements. First, Intertanko relies on Judge
Graber’s dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc. Intertanko
Br. at 45. The Oil Pollution Act begen as S 686 on the Senate
side, and as HR 1465 on the House side. S 686, sponsored by
Senator Mitchell of Maine, contained virtually the same
expression of non-preemption that appears in § 1018. S 686
also contained a second Savings clause, section 310.2°
Although the Conference Report was silent about section 310,
Judge Graber reasoned that since the Conference Committee
dropped section 310, it Supports an inference that § 1018
addresses only state liability laws.
© 'S 686, section 310, provided: “Nothing in this title shall be
construed or interpreted as changing, diminishing, or preempting in any
way the authority of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, to regulate
oil tankers or to provide for oil spill liability or contingency response
planning and activities in State waters.” S 686, § 310, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. (Aug. 11, 1989).
28
The more logical inference, however, is that section 310
was eliminated because it was duplicative of section 106.
Section 106 was a broad statement of intent not to preempt
state law. The report from the Environment and Public Works
Committee considering S 686 states:
“Section 106 of the reported bill explicitly preserves the
authority of any State to impose its own requirements
or standards with respect to discharges of oil within
such State... .
Preemption has been discussed by the members of the
Committee more than any other single issue. S. 686
does not embrace any preemption of State oil spill
liability laws, State oil spill funds, or State fees, taxes,
or penalties used to contribute to such funds. The long-
standing policy in environmental laws of not
preempting State authority and recognizing the rights
of States to determine for themselves the best way in
which to protect their citizens, is clearly affirmed in S.
686." S. Rep. No. 101-94, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., pp.
17-18 (1989) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 739-740. |
When the conference committee blended the provisions of
S686 and HR 1465 to create the Oil Pollution Act, it
incorporated verbatim section 106(e) of S 686, by renumbering
the subsection as § 1018(c). The Senate Report on S 686 had
previously explained that it intended section 106(e) to confirm
the absence of any significant intent to preempt:
“This subsection reinforces the position stated clearly
elsewhere that no aspect of state oil spill programs is
preempted, including the authority to impose additional
requirements or penalties.” S. Rep. No. 101-94, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess., p. 18 (1989) (emphasis added),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 740.
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1820(c); and the
Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(k)(1). Intertanko argues
that this establishes that § 1018 is simply a substitute for those
Pollution Act replaced other liability funds. The plain
language of § 1018, however, cannot support a cramped
interpretation that it only addresses liability.
Intertanko also points out that the express non-
Preemptive provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(2), was amended by the
Oil Pollution Act to add the phrase “or with respect to any
removal activities related to such discharge”. OPA 90
§ 4202(c). —_ Intertanko argues this amendment would be
unnecessary if § 1018 applied broadly. Section § 4202
amended parts of the FWPCA to set up a national response and
planning system. The amendment to § 1321(0)(2) merely
makes the FWPCA consistent with § 1018. Again, this fails to
demonstrate that § 1018 is narrow or limited,7!
*! Intertanko points to two other sections of the Oil Pollution Act
that have non-preemptive language and argues that they would be
30
E. Washington Laws Are Not Preempted By
International Treaties
1. In its field preemption argument, the federal
government relies on international treaties as a purpose of
Congress. As a separate argument, however, the government
makes the statement that treaties addressing tankers
“independently” have preemptive force. U.S. Br. at 28.
Intertanko cites to four conventions affecting shipping to argue
that treaties fully occupy a “domain” to the exclusion of other
lawmaking. Intertanko Br. at 30. Petitioners’ reliance on these
international treaties is not well taken.
2. The four treaties addressed by Intertanko and the
government provide broad goals, which do not create
self-executing rights. Article I(b) of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS)
provides that the contracting governments “undertake to
promulgate all laws, decrees, orders and regulations and to take
all other steps which may be necessary to give the present
Convention full and complete effect”. The Articles of Protocol
of 1978, amending SOLAS, uses the same formulation — that
the parties “undertake to give effect to the provisions”.
Protocal of 1978, Article I. On its face, the standards and
provisions of SOLAS do not independently preempt state laws.
officials” in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet, Alaska. H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 101-380, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 156 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 835. The savings clause in section 5002(n)(1) simply makes
it clear that this unique entity “is not intended to affect the authority of the
state of Alaska or the federal government with respect to the operation of oil
tanker and terminal facilities”. /d. Title VIII, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System Reform Act of 1990 (§ 8001), deals with issues pertaining to the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Section 8202 authorizes a civil penalty for
discharges in transit from oil fields to the pipeline and during transportation
through the pipeline or handling at the terminal facilities. Section 8202(e)
provides that states are not preempted from imposing additional liability.
Even if, under Intertanko’s reading, § 1018 is limited to liability, it was not
necessary to enact section 8202(c). Congress simply made section 8202
consistent with § 1018. It did not imply that § 1018 intends something
different than its broad language.
31
Petitioners cite to the International Safety Management
Code (ISM), adopted as Chapter IX of SOLAS, which
addresses broad subjects such as “management” and
“operation” of ships. The ISM illustrates the limited effect of
the conventions. The ISM Code recites broad aspirations for
management and operation of ships. See ISM Code 2.1 (“The
Company should establish a safety and environmental-
Protection policy”) (emphasis added). The ISM leaves
extensive room for state spill prevention planning that ensures
Preparation for the needs and risks presented by that state’s
waters, acknowledging “ships Operate under a wide range of
different conditions” and the ISM _ provides only “general
Principles and objectives”, ISM Code Preamble § 4.
The International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW)
(as amended through 1995) takes the same form as SOLAS.
Article I of that Convention provides that the STCW does not
contain self-executing laws or Standards, but that the parties
must “undertake to promulgate all laws, decrees, orders and
regulations and to take all other Steps which may be
necessary”. The STCW provisions are written in terms of each
country using its own laws to implement the minimum
requirements. The same description applies to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973
(MARPOL). See MARPOL Article I(1) (“Parties . . .
undertake to give effect to the Provisions of the present
Convention”),
3. International treaties may include specific provisions
that are arguably mandatory or create rights that independently
preempt Washington law. For example, Article X of the
STCW provides that “(ships ... are subject, while in the ports
of a Party, to control by officers duly authorized by that Party
to verify that all seafarers serving on board who are required to
be certificated by the Convention are so certificated” This
Provision is not material to this case. Washington has
disclaimed power to “control ships”, aid the record fails to
32
show that Washington has attempted to control ships to verify
certificates in violation of Article X of the STCW. Wash.
Admin. Code § 317-21-550(1). Washington directs its
regulation at owners and operators to avoid conflict with the
operative provisions of international law. Accordingly, this
case does not present any situations where there is direct
conflict between Washington law and a treaty right. See also
Argument, Part G infra p. 37-48.”
4. In essence, petitioners are asking this Court to
conclude that SOLAS and the ISM, the STCW, and MARPOL
command each signatory nation to abandon federalist forms of
government. The Note Verbale from Denmark, cited by the
federal government, complains that a federalist form of
government creates a potential for state laws that could be in
conflict with federal laws. Intertanko App. at 354a. Neither
the Note Verbal nor the amicus brief of the European Nations
identifies any treaty provision that Washington State has
violated.
These arguments indirectly confirm that international
conventions such as SOLAS, the STCW, and MARPOL are
made with the knowledge that the government has a federalist
form of government. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida
Dep't of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (holding that agreement
between two federalist nations is interpreted to reflect
knowledge that the U.S. has both federal and state taxes); Pink,
315 U.S. at 230 (international treaties shall be construed to
preserve state powers). As explained in Wardair Canada, the
” In footnotes, the government asks this Court to address whether
Washington has violated a vessel management agreement with Canada or
interfered with innocent passage. U.S. Br. at nn.22 & 23. Neither alleged
conflict was presented to the district court. No record exists beyond the
bare assertions in briefing that a conflict could exist. Moreover, each
assertion seems focused on the mistaken assumption that Washington has
some power or intent to control ships during passage. In the absence of an
actual case or controversy and a ruling by the court of appeals, these issues
are not properly before this Court or fairly subsumed in the question
presented.
impair a uniform international system. SOLAS, the STCW,
and MARPOL do not substitute for the laws of the
” Lord Donaldson, London:HMSO, Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas
1 6.20 (May 1994); JA at 314-15.
s .
implementing countries and do not address operational needs
particular to the waters of the United States. Based on its —
actions in adopting the Oil Pollution Act and prior laws, it is
inappropriate to impugn Congress with an intent that these _
international conventions are the solitary means of protecting
each state’s marine environment. Congress has never made
international uniformity and convenience of the tanker industry
a goal that displaces state power to enact laws tailored to
preventing oil spills in state waters.
F. Title I Of The Ports and Waterways Safety Act Does
Not Require Preemption Of State Police Powers
1. In addition to arguments that states are impliedly
preempted on broad fields, petitioners argue that Washington
law is preempted due to conflict. Conflict preemption exists
when “it is impossible for a private party to comply with both
state and federal requirements, or where state law ‘stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress’”. English, 496 U.S. at
79 (citation omitted) (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). Physical
impossibility, however, has not been asserted as a basis for
conflict preemption. JA at 87. Moreover, the rulings that
rejected Intertanko’s commerce clause arguments confirm that
it is not impracticable to comply with plan requirements. Pet.
App. at 32a-33a, 8la-85a. Indeed, many Intertanko members
have complied. JA at 119. Petitioners, however, make two
further arguments under the label of conflict preemption.25
2. Petitioners argue, again, that the full purposes and
objectives of Congress include creating a singular set of
convenient regulations for the tanker industry and that
Washington’s law presents an obstacle to this purpose. This
argument is indistinguishable from petitioners’ arguments that
** Note 22, above, addresses the third conflict argument, made by
the federal government, claiming potential conflict with a United
States/Canada vessel traffic agreement or with doctrines regarding innocent
Passage.
35
fields are impliedly preempted, addressed above. Furthermore,
the Court of Appeals opinion on this case provides a persuasive
explanation that Washington’s law does not, on its face,
present any obstacle to the full purposes of Congress.
Congress has never endorsed simplistic devotion to
international uniformity to the exclusion of state police powers
tailored to oil spill prevention programs in local waters.
Pet. App. at 17a-18a; see Argument, Part E supra p. 30-34.
3. The government points its conflict preemption
argument at the individual requirements of the Washington
law. The government does not focus on actual conflicts.
Instead, it contends that Title I of the PWSA requires
preemption of any state law if it addresses the same subject
matter as a federal regulation. U.S. Br. at 27-28. This
argument is based on 33 U.S.C. § 1225(b), which provides that:
“Nothing contained in this section, with respect to structures,
prohibits a state or political subdivision from prescribing
higher safety equipment requirements or safety standards than
those prescribed by Regulations hereunder.” The government
relies upon Ray to make this argument.
Ray invalidated Washington’s prohibition on tankers of
125,000 DWT in port, because the Coast Guard had adopted a
rule that permitted these so called supertankers on Puget
Sound. Ray, 435 U.S. at 174-75.7° The Court rejected the
state’s argument that Title | of the PWSA applied only to
equipment. Ray, 435 U.S. at 174. The Court concluded that a
size limit was a vessel safety standard and held the state could
not impose higher safety standards for vessels. The legislative
history of this provision establishes that Congress was
concerned with vessel standards, not vessel operations.
According to the House Report:.
“The Coast Guard witness said that it was their
intention that higher vessel equipment regulations and
** The Court also described this provision as an invalid design
requirement. Ray, 435 U.S. at 175-76.
36
standards by States should apply to structures only and
not to vessels. He agreed that the language of H.R.
17830 was not clear in this regard and that we should
put some clarifying language in the section.
Your Committee adopted the suggested
language since it will make clear the intent mentioned
above.” H.R. Report No. 92-563, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.,
p. 15 (1971).
While a Coast Guard vessel safety standard for Puget
Sound will preempt a higher state vessel standard, this same
reasoning does not extend to the state operational requirements
at issue in this case.
This is confirmed by the holding in Ray with regard to
tug escorts, which do not constitute a vessel safety standard.
4. Moreover, for a rule to have preemptive effect, it
must be a safety standard for Puget Sound. As this Court said
in Ray, the “relevant [preemption] inquiry under Title I [of the
PWSA] is . . . whether the Secretary has either promulgated his
own . . . requirement for Puget Sound tanker navigation or has
decided that no such requirement should be imposed at all”.
Ray, 435 U.S. at 171-72. If federal rules addressed the
“peculiarities of local waters that call for special precautionary
measures” (id. at 171), then a court could examine whether
state law was in conflict with such rules. Thus, Washington’s
37
supertanker prohibition was in direct conflict with a “local
navigation rule” that determined “in what circumstances tanker
size is to limit navigation in Puget Sound”. Id. at 174-75
(emphasis added).
The federal government’s Title | preemption claim is
Coast Guard never considered the application of this rule to
Puget Sound. The proposed rule would have applied to “the
navigable waters of the United States, except the Panama Canal
and St. Lawrence Seaway”. 41 Fed. Reg. 18766 (1976). The
Coast Guard decided not to adopt the rule because it “would
not be practicable in all navigable waters”. 42 Fed. Reg. 5957
(1977). The Coast Guard has not concluded that the fixed
interval requirement is not practicable in Puget Sound. In is an
important safety measure given the difficulty of navigation.
5. Washington’s interpretation of Ray is consistent
with this Court’s jurisprudence on conflict preemption.
Allowing preemption when a general Coast Guard rule
coincides with the subject matter of a State law creates a
Presumption against state police powers. It leads to
preemption when there has been no analysis of whether the
State requirement presents a significant obstacle to a federal
Purpose or a physical impossibility.
G. Washington’s Requirements Do Not Conflict With
United States Or International Requirements
The federal government seeks to show preemption both
by a recitation of examples (U.S. Br. at 33-41) and by using a
chart attached as an appendix that lists laws by broad category.
In the examples, however, the government often applies its
Title II field preemption argument, by attaching labels and
citing to 46 U.S.C. § 3703. The government also Cites
38
33 U.S.C. § 1223, to apply its contention that any regulation
under Title I of the PWSA carries automatic preemption. Both
of these arguments wrongly use broad or mechanical
preemption concepts. The above arguments have already
addressed the error of such preemption analysis.
The government’s examples allow Washington to
demonstrate that there is no conflict between state and federal
requirements, or with international standards. Part 2 in this
section shows there is no conflict presented by Washington's
requirements for conduct in or near Washington waters. Part 3
reviews the Washington requirements that are reasonable spill
prevention measures mirroring the federal law or international
standards. Part 4 reviews the Washington requirements that are
slightly different, but present no meaningful conflict.
1. The Laws Listed In The Government's Chart
Are Often Unrelated And Do Not Show
Conflict
As a threshold matter, the government’s chart creates a
misimpression. The government characterizes the chart as “a
comprehensive comparison of the state BAP rules to the
federal and international standards”. U.S. Br. at 34 n.14. The
apparent implication is that this opaque list of laws and
standards implies that there is no room for state prevention
plans, or that conflict must be in the air. Comprehensiveness
and complexity are hallmarks of regulatory laws and do not,
standing alone, justify an inference of preemption. Eg,
Hillsborough Cy., 471 U.S. at 716-17.
As shown by the following examples, the chart should
not be used to infer that conflict is in the air. Many of the laws
listed by the chart have little bearing on Washington’s spill
prevention plans and show no hint of conflict.
Example I — Security Rounds — Wash. Admin. Code
§ 317-21-200(4)
A spill prevention plan requires the company to
describe how its master will designate places on the vessel to
39
be periodically examined for safety and spill hazards such as
defective machinery, hull integrity, or crew activities. Security
rounds occur while under power, anchored, or docked in
Washington waters. JA at 101. The government’s chart lists
the following federal laws and international treaties: 46 C.F.R.
§§ 35.05-15, 15.1109; 33 C.F.R. §§ 155.810, 164.13(b);
STCW A-VIII/2 (part 4-3, 4-4), (51.4)(anchored); U.S. Br. at
4a.
The four reguiations have little or no relevance to
security rounds and certainly show no conflict:
¢ 46 C.F.R. § 15-1109 provides that “[eJach master of a
vessel that operates beyond the Boundary Line shall
ensure observance of the principles concerning
watchkeeping set out in STCW Regulation VIII/2 and
section A-VIII/2 of the STCW Code.”
e 46 C.F.R. § 35.05-15(a) provides that “[a]t least one
member of the crew of a manned tank vessel shal! be on
board at all times except when the vessel is gas free or
is moored at a dock or terminal at which watchman
service is provided.”
e 33 C.F.R. § 155.810 provides that “[t]he vessel operator
of each tank vessel that contains more oil than the
normal clingage and unpumpable bilge or sump
residues in any cargo tank shall maintain surveillance of
that vessel by using a person who is responsible for the
security of the vessel and for keeping unauthorized
persons off the vessel.”
e 33 C.F.R. § 164.13(b) provides that “[e]ach tanker must
have an engineering watch capable of monitoring the
propulsion system, communicating with the bridge and
implementing manual control measures immediately
when necessary. The watch must be physically present
in the machinery spaces or in the main control space
and must consist of at least a licensed engineer.”
40
The international standards on the list include unrelated
issues. The arguably relevant sections are not inconsistent with
Washington’s requirements, although not specific to Puget
Sound. STCW A-VIII/2 (51.4) provides: “While at anchor,
the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall . . . ensure
that inspection rounds of the ship are made periodically.”
STCW A-VIII (part 4) deals with principles of ing
while in port. Part 4-3 governs performing the deck watch.
These principles include making “rounds to inspect the ship at
appropriate intervals”. STCW A-VIII (part 4-3) ( 102.1).
Part 4-4 governs performing tc cagineering watch, which is
unrelated.
Example 2 — Standby Generator — Wash. Admin.
Code § 317-21-210(1)
A spill prevention plan requires tankers without
automatic switching gear for stand-by generators to turn on
their stand-by generators to be available to assume the
electrical load while underway in Washington waters. The
government's chart lists the following federal laws and
international treaties: 46 U.S.C. § 3703; 33 CFR. §
164.25(a)(3); 46 C.F.R. §§ Part 112, n.b, 112.25-3, 25-5,
25-10; SOLAS ch. II-1, Reg. 44; U.S. Br. at 7a.
First, the standby generator aspect of a Washington
spill prevention plan illustrates the illogic of the government’s
field preemption argument that the labels in 46 U.S.C.
§ 3703(a) “design, construction, alteration, _repair,
maintenance, Operations, equipping, personnel qualification,
and manning”) can be used to infer Congressional intent to
preempt. Turning on a standby generator addresses the danger
of losing power in confined waters. It is an operational
necessity peculiar to Washington and analogous to local
pilotage. It is not design and construction.
Furthermore, no conflict is shown by the regulations or
unrelated international standards:
41
¢ 33 C.F.R. § 164.25(a) provides that equipment be tes’ ed
no more than twelve hours before entering the waters of
the United States or getting underway, including a
“[s}tandby or emergency generator, for as long as
necessary to show proper functioning, including steady
state temperature and pressure readings.” /d. at (a)(3).
© 46 C.F.R. §§ Part 112, 112.25-3, 25-5, 25-10 deals
with the normal source for emergency loads, It is an
equipment requirement. 46 C.F.R. § 112.25-3(a) (“The
normal source for emergency loads must be the ship’s
Service generating plant.”). 46 C.F.R. § 112.25-5
provides for a transfer to a “final emergency power
source”.
e SOLAS ch. II-1, Reg. 44 sets out technical specification
for starting emergency generating sets and does not
address whether a standby generator should be ready in
the narrow confines of Puget Sound. SOLAS ch. II-1,
Reg. 4(1) (“Emergency generating sets shall be capable
of being readily started in their cold condition at a
temperature of [zero degrees Celsius].”).
Example 3 - STCW Requirements For Crew
Certification
The government’s chart asserts that Washington’s
operational requirements for local waters?’ somehow implicate
crew certification requirements of the STCW, listing STCW
A-II/1, A-II/2, A-II/3, and A-II/4. As an example, Wash.
Admin. Code § 317-21-205(3) requires the master to have a
schedule for comparing the steering gyrocompass with the
magnetic compass, because of the risk of accident from an
erroneous compass heading. JA at 106. The government's
chart lists STCW A-II/2 (p. 43). U.S. Br. at 6a.
*” Wash. Admin. Code $§ 317-21-200(1)(b), -205(2), (3), -215(1),
-220(1)-(3). U.S. Br. at 2a, Sa-6a, 8a-9a.
42
Chapter II of the STCW Code establishes standards of
seafarer certification. STCW A-II/2 identifies “[mJandatory
The certification of a master and chief mate for using
compasses is not implicated by a spill prevention plan with a
schedule for checking compasses in Puget Sound. This is like
comparing the certified competence of a master to run the ship,
with the state’s requirement that a ship use a local pilot in
Puget Sound. Sections A-II/1, A-II/3, and A-II/4 of the STCW
set out other mandatory minimum requirements for
certification that simply ensure competence, allowing these
persons to be able to comply with particular needs for
operating in Washington waters.
2. Some Washington Operational Requirements
Prescribe Conduct Directly Necessitated By
Local Conditions
A number of Washington’s spill prevention require-
ments focus on conduct that should occur in or near Washing-
ton waters. No conflict is presented by these requirements.
Operating In Restricted Visibility — Wash. Admin.
Code § 317-21-200(1)(a)
Washington requires three licensed deck officers, one
of whom may be a pilot, on the bridge during restricted
visibility. Washington requires this sensible step to avoid a
collision or grounding in the narrow and congested waters of
the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound. JA at 99. In
addition to its field preemption theory, the government argues
that this requirement is preempted because of a Coast Guard
rule requiring a minimum of two officers or because of a
conflict with rest requirements of federal law.
43
The general Coast Guard requirement of two licensed
officers on the bridge presents no conflict, nor is there conflict
with the international goal of ensuring that watch officers
obtain at least ten hours of rest in a twenty-four-hour period.
The alleged conflict is based on the four-hour travel time
between buoy J and pilotage waters when the third deck officer
must come from the ship’s crew. U.S. Br. at 37-38. Nothing in
the record supports the speculation that additional crew would
have to be flown to Washington. Ten hours of rest allows a
deck officer to work fourteen hours a day, if needed. Thus,
even after serving two four-hour watches, a deck officer could
still work an additional six hours, which could include the four
hours between buoy J and pilotage waters. In any event, the
STCW provides an exception for overriding operational
conditions, such as restricted visability. STCW A-VIII/1.3
(“The requirements for rest periods laid down in paragraphs |
and 2 need not be maintained in the case of an emergency or
drill or in other overriding operational conditions.”) (emphasis
added). This can include restricted visability.
Prearrival Tests And Inspections — Wash. Admin.
Code § 317-21-215
A Washington plan requires tankers to make certain
tests and inspections twelve hours or less before entering state
waters. The government claims this requirement is preempted
by Title II of the PWSA, because they label it an equipment
requirement. U.S. Br. at 40. It is not an equipment
requirement. It is an operational requirement, directly related
to safe entrance into Washington. JA at 110. Except for its
field preemption theory, the federal government shows no
inconsistency with federal and international standards.
Conflict preemption is not applicable.
Advance Notice Of Entry — Wash. Admin. Code.
§ 317-21-540
Washington requires tankers to give advance notice of
entry into state waters. The government argues that this
requirement is preempted under Title I of the PWSA,
44
3. Spill Prevention Requirements That Mirror
Federal And International Requirements
Some of Washington’s safety requirements for
prevention plans affect Washington waters but are not
performed exclusively in Washington. Many of these
requirements, however, are the same as federal and
international standards and create no conflicts.
Emergency Procedures — Wash. Admin. Code § 317-
21-220
A Washington plan requires the master of the vessel to
post “station bills” for the crew stating crew assignments for
various emergencies, such as fire or oil spills. The master must
also establish written procedures for emergencies, such as
collision, loss of propulsion, and loss of Steering. The
government argues that this operational requirement is a
proficiency requirement and that there is a need for uniformity
in an emergency. U.S. Br. at 40. The government
misunderstands the requirement. It requires the company to
post procedures and have written policies. JA at 110-11. It is
consistent with federal and international standards. ISM Code
8.1-8.2 (8.1 — “The company should establish procedures to
identify, describe and respond to potential emergency
shipboard situations.” 8.2 — “The company should establish
programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency
actions.”). Any company that complies with the ISM Code
should have a plan that meets Washington’s requirement.
45
Personnel Policies-Training — Wash. Admin. Code
§ 317-21-230
A Washington plan requires a tanker company to
explain how it will provide training for its crew. The
government argues that this requirement imposes a personnel
qualification on the certificated seafarers or requires training
beyond that necessary to get a license or certification. U.S. Br.
at 35. The government misunderstands this requirement.
Washington requires the company to explain how it will
provide necessary training. Washington does not evaluate
crew licenses or certificates.
The petitions speculate without basis that a tanker
would have to fly a special crew to Washington. The training
that the company describes need only be consistent with
federal and international requirements. The ISM Code requires
companies to “establish and maintain procedures for
identifying any training which may be required” and to “ensure
that such training is provided for all personnel concerned”.
ISM Code 6.5. It is analogous” to the training required under
the STCW. See STCW A-II/2 (minimum standard of
competence for masters and chief mates on ships of 500 gross
tonnage or more); A-III/2 (minimum standard of competence
for chief engineer officers and second engineer officers on
ships powered by main propulsion machinery of 3,000 kW
propulsion power or more); A-II/1 (minimum standard of
competence for officers in charge of a navigational watch on
ships of 500 gross tonnage or more); A-III/1 (minimum
standard of competence for officers in charge of an engineering
watch in a manned engine-room or designated duty engineers
** When Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230 was adopted in 1995,
the state did require a company to provide training beyond that necessary to
obtain a seafarer license. However, that is no longer true. When the ISM
Code, authorized by SOLAS Chapter. IX, went into effect in 1998 and the
1995 Amendment to the STCW was implemented by the federal
government, the Washington requirements and the _ international
requirements converged.
46
in a periodically unmanned engine-room); A-VI/1 (mandatory
iniesuma requl for familierization end basic saf
training and instruction for all seafarers); A-VIII/2, Part III
(Watchkeeping at sea). Washington simply intends that each
company confirm its training in a plan that Washington can use
to ensure compliance.
Language - Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250
A Washington plan requires all licensed deck officers
and the vessel’s “designated person in charge”, 33 C.F.R.
§ 155.700, to communicate in English and a language
understood by subordinate officers and unlicensed crew. The
government argues that Washington's “requires all licensed
deck officers to speak the language of the entire unlicensed
crew”. U.S. Br. at 36. There is nothing in the record to
support this claim. The government misunderstands the
Washington requirement. With regard to English, needed for
external communication, Washington's requirement is the
same as STCW Table A-II/1 (English language) (page 34). JA
at 132. With regard to the crew, Washington requires “a
language understood and spoken by subordinate officers and
the unlicensed crew”. Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-250. The
government cites no difference in federal law or international
standards.
Management — Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-260
A Washington plan requires a company to describe
active management practices, policies, and safety procedures.
The government argues that this is preempted under Title II,
because they label it a personnel qualification. U.S. Br at
36-37. It is not a personnel qualification. It is a requirement
directed to the company operating the vessel. It is consistent
with the ISM Code: “A document of compliance should be
issued for every Company complying with the requirements of
the ISM Code by the Administration[.]” ISM Code 13.2.
Washington accepts ISM certification obtained by companies.
Once again, Washington requires no different conduct than
required by federal law or international standards.
Event Reporting —- Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-130
Under a Washington plan, the owner or operator shall
report events, such as collisions, for each vessel covered by the
plan. This requirement is slightly different than the federal
of an analogous federal requirement does not explain why the
Washington requirement creates an irreconcilable conflict.
Illicit Drug And Alcohol Testing — Wash. Admin.
Code § 317-21-235
A Washington plan requires the company to have
minimal drug and alcohol testing and prohibits consumption in
Washington. The most important difference with the Coast
Guard's drug and alcohol rule is that Washington applies its
requirement to companies with foreign flagged tankers while
the federal requirements apply only to United States flagged
vessels. The only reason advanced by the government to
Support a claim of conflict is that foreign governments have
informed the federal government that their laws might not
coming to Washington. JA at 256. The government does not
explain why including foreign flag vessels in this Washington
requirement is an obstacle to achieving the purpose of Con-
gress. For example, the government does not appear to claim
that safety will be enhanced by not testing foreign flag crews.”°
amounts to “express preemption”. Intertanko Br. at 33; U.S.
Br. at 44. As this Court emphasized in City of New York v.
Federal Communications Commission, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988),
Congressional intent to preempt state law may arise through an
agency “acting within the scope of its congressionally
delegated authority”, but in such cases
“the correct focus is on the federal agency that seeks to
displace state law and on the proper bounds of its
lawful authority to undertake such action. The
statutorily authorized regulations of an agency will pre-
empt any state or local law that conflicts with such
regulations or frustrates the purposes thereof, Beyond
that, however, in proper circumstances the agency may
determine that its authority is exclusive[.]” Jd at 64
(emphasis added).
* The federal government suggests that Washington's testing
might violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution and that federal
tests are limited to crew in “safety-sensitive positions”. U.S. Br. at 34 The
federal drug testing applies broadly to crew members, including those who
occupy “a position, or perform the duties and functions of a position,
required by the vessel's Certificate of Inspection” or who perform “duties
and functions of patrolmen or watchmen required by this chapter”. 46
C.F.R. § 16.230(a\1), (2).
Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 476 US. at 374”.
Id. at 66.
The Court of Appeals properly concluded that
Intertanko and the government had not shown preemption
based solely on simple declarations by the Coast Guard. As
noted in City of New York, an agency’s choice to preempt state
law is not valid if “it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned”. /d. at 64 (quoting United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374 (1961)). Here, the savings clauses of the Oil
Pollution Act and the lack of Congressional intent to preempt
Washington from the fields associated with oil spill prevention
planning and inspections showed that the Coast Guard needed
to do more than simply declare a zone of preemption. In light
of these Congressional intentions, the Coast Guard needed to
demonstrate that its preemption reflected a precisely described
zone of actual conflicts or an area of exclusivity that
corresponded with Congress’ intent to broadly include state
powers to protect state waters from oil spills.
The inability of the Coast Guard to simply declare
zones of federal preemption does not limit its ability to fulfill
its statutory obligations. The Court of Appeals opinion casts
no doubt on the ability of the Coast Guard to displace a state
law that actually conflicts with “a Coast Guard rule.
Washington has never denied that preemption must follow
from a proper showing of conflict or frustration of purpose
with a lawfully enacted Coast Guard rule.
CONCLUSION
The judgement of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed.
CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
Attorney General
WILLIAM BERGGREN COLLINS*
Sr. Assistant Attorney General
Jay D. Geck
THOMAS C. MORRILL
Assistant Attorneys General
JERRI LYNN THOMAS
Senior Counsel, Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 40100
OLYMPIA, WA 98504-0100
TELEPHONE: (360) 753-6245
*Counsel of Record for State Respondents
NOVEMBER 18, 1999
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.