Amicus Curiae Brief — Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg

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Supreme Court, U. 5

3 *

FEB 22 1999

No. 98-591 |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1998

ALBERTSONS, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

HALLIE KIRKINGBURG,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL AND

THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

STEPHEN A. BOKAT ANN ELIZABETH REESMAN *

ROBIN S. CONRAD CORRIE L. FISCHEL

SUSSAN MAHALLATI KYSELA MCGUINESS & WILLIAMS

NATIONAL CHAMBER 1015 Fifteenth St., N. W.

LITIGATION CENTER, INC. Suite 1200

1615 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005

Washington, D.C. 20062 (202) 789-8600

(202) 463-5337 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Advisory

The Chamber of Commerce Council

of the United States

of America * Counsel of Record

WILSON - Eras Printinc Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TED Ce Far r ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ......................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ———— 5

P|, CREE SES LE NE a POW Stee te aN 7

I. THERE ARE NO PER SE DISABILITIES

WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE AMERI-

CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 7

A. The ADA Requires an Individualized In-

quiry to Determine Whether an Individual

D =. .. 7

B. Congress Did Not Provide for Per Se Dis-

abilities Under the bK 14

C. Recognizing Per Se Disabilities Would Com-

promise the Goals of the bK 15

II. THE ADA PERMITS EMPLOYERS TO USE

PHYSICAL CRITERIA TO DETERMINE

WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL WITH A DIS-

ABILITY IS “QUALIFIED” ow... 18

A. The ADA Permits Employers to Rely on a

Federal Regulation or Other Federal Stand-

ards With Physical Criteria 18

B. The ADA Also Permits Employers to Use

Physical Criteria Other Than Federal Stand-

ards to Determine Whether an Individual Is

Qualified When the Safety of Others Is at

ST EE Vee ae a ee 20

C. Public Policy Dictates That Employers Be

Permitted to Develop and Apply Adequate

Standards to Protect the Safety of the Pub-

% — . AS I OA BR oy a 29

86. ——+————ñ—ñ—ñ——— 30

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) 3

Baert v. Euclid Beverage, 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir.

Zenn 5, 9, 12

Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108 (8th

Cir. 1995) 8

Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) 5 * 3, 8. 9, 11

Buck v. DOT, 56 F.3d 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 23

Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742

NR ISSR OR a ne a CC Oe 3

CONRAIL v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) 3

Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629 (6th

r 8

Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.8d 1385 (5th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1011 (1994) ........... 19, 20

Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988),

aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 198999 24, 25

DeLuca v. Winer Industries, 58 F.8d 793 80

Cir. 1995) 8

Dot hard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) .......... 28

Ennis v. National Association of Business & Edu-

cation Radio, 53 F.8d 55 (4th Cir. 1995) 12, 13

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775

RAL SRA REA HO Sa Ge Se ee a 3

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.8d 1112 (11th

Cir. 1993) 26, 27

Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986) 10

Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates, 100 F.3d 907

(Iith Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 630

(1997) PCTV 8

Griggs v. Duke “Power Company, 401 U.S. 424

(1971) 25

Hazen Paper Co. v Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1998)... 3

International Union UAW v. Johnson Controls,

499 U.S. 187 (1991) ...8, 28, 30

Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.8d 102 (3d Cir.

NER SE eS RN eS Seay AR 8

Kirkingburg v. Albertsons, Inc., 148 F.3d 1228

(9th Cir. 1998) we 4. 5, 18

iti

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,

EES Deen Coe ae 3

Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867 (2d

RENE SS a 9

Sanders v. Arneson Products, 91 F.3d 1351 (9th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997).. 8

School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.

AEE a ED a ea 3, 5, 12, 22-23

Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.

EST EN SNS ee oT Os 8

Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442

U.S. 397 (1979) ....... 3, 7, 24

Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Ine., 120 F.3d 50 (5th

I .. .. 8,14

Tyndall v. National Education Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209

rr 8

University of Teras v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390

1 ͤ ² ꝛ2——ᷣ . 3

Ward v. Skinner, 943 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959 (199227777 23

Wernick v. FRB, 91 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1996) 8

Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400

FF 28

White v. York International Corp., 45 F.8d 357

A "Dll eS 8

STATUTES

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

GOOD —. . ˙— 4. 5

7 5, 8

e een 2. 7

e 18

2 | 6

rr 7,18

rr. 8

42 U.S.C. 6 12112 (b) (5) (a 16

42 U.S.C. § 12113 (a) b 6, 18

D äĩ4(ẽV 2222 22

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

42 U.S.C. 88 1218112189 1 2

Rehabilitation . of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 88 701 et

8 3 eit ie 9

r a 2

.... i 2

i ae ie ae 27

RST | ee 27

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) —00 26

REGULATIONS

29 C.FR. Part 1630

29 C. F. R. § 1630.2(j) (1) (i) 14

rene I i 5, 11, 22

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558 (1990) 18, 20, 22

H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990), reprinted in

RRR 10, 14, 15, 21

H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990), reprinted in

RE Ta Qe . 10, 18, 20

S. Rep. No. 101-116 (19899999 10, 14, 15, 21

135 Cong. Rec. 810711 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) 16

MISCELLANEOUS

The American Heritage Dictionary (2d ed. 1982) 23

Jon Cheney, EEOC v. EXXON Corp: Will Fr.

ron's Blanket Exclusion of Former Substance

Abusers Hold Up Under the ADA? 48 Baylor

Ss Ff F- Wao For eel, 30

EEOC, A Technical Assistance Manual on the

Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Ameri-

cans with Disabilities Act (1991) 6. 11. 19

Erica W. Harris, Controlled Impairments Under

the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Search

For the Meaning of Disability, 73 Washington

L. Rev. 575 (19995 17

United States Commission on Civil Rights, Help-

ing Employers Comply with the ADA (1998) 17

The Equal Employment Advisory Council and The

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of Amer

ica respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.

Letters of consent from both parties have been filed

with the Court. The brief urges this Court to reverse

the decision below, and thus supports the position of

Petitioner Albertsons, Inc.

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC)

is a dor mews association of employers organized

in 1976 to promote sound approaches to the elimina-

tion of employment discrimination. Its members in-

clude over 300 of the nation’s largest private sector

corporations. EEAC’s directors and officers include

many of industry’s leading experts in the field of

equal employment opportunity. Their combined ex-

perience gives EEAC a unique depth of understand-

ing of the practical, as well as legal, considerations

relevant to the proper interpretation and application

of equal employment policies and requirements.

EEAC’s members are firmly committed to the princi-

ples of nondiscrimination and equal employment

opportunity.

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of

America (the Chamber) is the largest federation of

business companies and associations in the world.

The Chamber represents an underlying membership

of more than three million businesses and organiza-

tions of every size, in every sector and region. An

important function of the Chamber is to represent

the interests of its members in court on employment

1 Counsel for amici curiae authored the brief in its entirety.

No person or entity, other than the amici, their members, or

their counsel, made a monetary contribution to the prepara-

tion or submission of the brief.

2

law issues of national concern to the business com-

munity.

All of EEAC’s members and many of the Chamber’s

members are employers subject to Title I of the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42

U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Title I). Many own com-

mercial facilities subject to Title III of the ADA, 42

U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Title III), and many own,

operate, lease, or lease to places of public accommo-

dation, also subject to Title III. Moreover, many

members are federal contractors subject to Section

503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

§ 793, which requires covered employers to take affirm-

ative action to employ and advance in employment

qualified individuals with disabilities. Also, some

members are the recipients of federal financial assist-

ance and therefore are subject to the non-discrimina-

tion provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

29 U.S.C. § 794.

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 share a common defi-

nition of “disability” which establishes the parameters

of the protected class under each statute. Both stat-

utes define “disability” in terms of an impairment

that “substantially limits” a major life activity. Thus,

EEAC’s and the Chamber’s members have a direct

interest in the issues presented in this case; i. e.,

whether a particular impairment can be a disability

per se regardless of whether the impairment substan-

tially limits the individual in a major life activity,

and whether employers may rely on federal govern-

ment standards establishing minimum physical cri-

teria, or establish their own standards which may

exceed federal standards, in determining whether an

individual is a “qualified” individual with a disability.

3

Because of its interest in the application of the

nation’s fair employment laws, EEAC has filed briefs

as amicus curiae in numerous cases before this Court,

the United States Courts of Appeals, and various

state supreme courts. As part of this activity, EEAC

participated as amicus curiae in Bragdon v. Abbott,

118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), which addressed the defini-

tion of a “disability” under the ADA. EEAC also

participated as amicus curiae in School Board of

Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), and

other cases in this Court construing the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973. E.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.

287 (1985), CONRAIL v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624

(1984); University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.

390 (1981); Southeastern Community College v.

Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Similarly, EEAC and

the Chamber have participated in numerous other

employment discrimination cases before this Court.

E. g., International Union UAW v. Johnson Controls,

499 U.S. 187 (1991) (sex discrimination) ; Burling-

ton Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (sexual

harassment); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775 (1998) (sexual harassment); McKennon v.

Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995)

(after-acquired evidence); Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-

gins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (age discrimination).

Thus, EEAC and the Chamber have an interest in,

and a familiarity with, the issues and policy concerns

involved in this case.

EEAC and the Chamber seek to assist the Court

by highlighting the impact its decision in this case

may have beyond the immediate concerns of the par-

ties to the case. Accordingly, this brief brings to the

attention of the Court relevant matter that has not

already been brought to its attention by the parties.

Because of their experience in these matters, EEAC

4

and the Chamber are well situated to brief the Court

on the relevant concerns of the business community

and the significance of this case to employers.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Albertsons hired Respondent Kirking-

burg as a driver in its distribution center in Port-

land, Oregon in 1990. Kirkingburg v. Albertsons,

Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998). Albert-

sons requires that all of its truck drivers meet the

minimum Department of Transportation (DOT)

visual acuity standards of 20/40 corrected in each

eye. Before Kirkingburg started the job, as well as

several months later, examining physicians certified

incorrectly that he met the DOT vision standards.

Id. at 1230 n.2.

In late 1991, Kirkingburg fell from a truck while

at work and was injured. Upon his return to work

in November of 1992, Albertsons, in accordance with

company policy, required Kirkingburg to obtain a

current DOT certification. This time, the physician

reported accurately that while Kirkingburg’s vision

was 20/20 corrected in the right eye, it was only

20/200 corrected in the left, thus failing the mini-

mum DOT vision requirements. Based on this report,

Kirkingburg was denied DOT certification, and Al-

bertsons refused to reinstate him as a truck driver.

Id. at 1231.

Several months later, Kirkingburg obtained a “vision

waiver” from the DOT under an experimental pro-

gram designed to obtain empirical data to study

drivers with monocular vision, Albertsons, however,

did not accept the waiver. Jd. at 1231. Kirkingburg

filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., alleging that Albertsons had

discriminated against him based on his alleged dis-

—

3

ability. The district court granted summary judg-

ment for Albertsons. 143 F.3d at 1230. The Ninth

Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that (1)

Kirkingburg is protected by the ADA because his

limited vision renders him an individual with a dis-

ability under the ADA; and (2) Albertsons’ require-

ment that truck drivers meet the DOT vision stand-

ards without a waiver is invalid. Id. at 1237. The

Court granted Albertsons’ petition for a writ of

certiorari.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The statutory definition of “disability” establishes

the scope of the class protected under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 58 12101

et seq. Thus, the first element of the plaintiff’s bur-

den of proof in an ADA case is to show that he or

she has a physical or mental impairment that sub-

stantially limits a major life activity, has a record

of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such

an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

An individualized analysis is always required to

determine whether an impairment rises to the level

of a disability. E. g., Baert v. Euclid Beverage, 149

F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 1998). The Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency

charged with enforcing the ADA, agrees that the

statute requires such an individualized analysis. 29

C.F.R. § 1630 App. (Section 1630.2(j) Substantially

limits). This Court conducted the individualized

analysis required by the statute in Bragdon v. Abbott,

118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), as well as in a case inter-

preting the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA’s predeces-

sor, in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480

U.S. 273 (1987).

The requirement of an individualized inquiry pre-

cludes any finding that per se disabilities can exist

6

under the ADA. The Ninth Circuit improperly dis-

regarded that requirement when it concluded, based

solely on a medical diagnosis, that the Respondent was

an individual with a disability protected by the ADA,

without determining whether he was limited in a

major life activity.

Moreover, a ruling that per se disabilities can exist

under the Act may potentially compromise the rights

of those with true disabilities. Congress placed limi-

tations on the length to which employers must go to

provide reasonable accommodations by indicating that

when doing so becomes an “undue hardship,” the

employer’s obligations end. 42 U.S.C. §12111(10) (a).

If the scope of the protected class is interpreted too

broadly, individuals without true disabilities may be-

come entitled to accommodations, at the expense of

someone truly in need. Therefore, the Court should

not extend the coverage of the ADA to those not sub-

stantially limited in a major life activity by allowing

per se disabilities under the statute.

The ADA permits employers to use physical criteria

established by federal regulations or other federal

standards to determine whether an individual is a

qualified for a job. EEOC guidance supports such a

finding. EEOC, A Technical Assistance Manual on

the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Ameri-

cans with Disabilities Act IV-16 (1991) (hereinafter

EEOC Technical Assistance Manual). Further, em-

ployers may utilize physical criteria, even if not con-

tained in a federal government safety standard, to

determine who is qualified when safety is at issue,

as long as such criteria are job related and consistent

with business necessity. See 42 U.S.C.§ 12113 (a).

This Court previously has held that using physical

criteria to determine qualifications for a federally

7

funded program is acceptable under the Rehabilita-

tion Act. Southeastern Community College v. Davis,

442 U.S. 397 (1979). Employers who determine

qualifications based on physical criteria should be able

to rely on such standards without going through

an individualized analysis as to whether the individual

poses a direct threat to the health and safety of

others. As long as the criteria are job related and

consistent with business necessity, such criteria should

be allowed under the ADA.

Public policy dictates that employers develop safety

standards to protect the safety of the general public.

Employers have an affirmative obligation to ensure

that employees perform the essential functions of the

job in a safe manner. Employers should be permitted

to use qualification standards based on physical cri-

teria so long as they are job related and consistent

with business necessity. Otherwise, employers risk

facing potential penalties under both civil and crimi-

nal law. Further, allowing individuals who are un-

able to meet the physical standards that define the

essential functions of a safety-sensitive position to

hold such positions places the public at risk. Congress

did not contemplate such a result.

ARGUMENT

I. THERE ARE NO PER SE DISABILITIES WITHIN

THE MEANING OF THE AMERICANS WITH DIS-

ABILITIES ACT

A. The ADA Requires an Individualized Inquiry to

Determine Whether an Individual Has a Disability

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, prohibits discrimination in

employment against a “qualified individual with a

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). The ADA defines

“disability” as follows:

. 0 EMT ̃ß——— — ON

The term “disability” means, with respect to an

individual—

(A) a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an im-

pairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

As the courts of appeals have held, the statutory

definition of “disability” eireumseribes the protected

class by establishing a threshold requirement that all

potential ADA plaintiffs must meet. Each alleged

victim of disability-based discrimination must demon-

strate, as the first element of his or her burden of

proof, that he or she has a “disability” as defined in

the law. Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, 105 F.5d 12,

14-15 (1st Cir. 1997); Wernick v. FRB, 91 F.3d 379,

383 (2d Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d

102, 105 (3d Cir. 1997); Tyndall v. National Educ.

Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1994); Still v. Free-

port-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 50-51 (5th Cir.

1997); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629,

633 (6th Cir. 1998); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., 53

F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest

Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) ; Sanders

v. Arneson Prods., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir.

1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997); White v.

York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995);

Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907, 910

(11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 630 (1997) .?

2 Title I of the ADA also prohibits discrimination against

an individual “because of the known disability of an individual

with whom the individual or entity is known to have a rela-

tionship or association.” 42 U.S.C. 5 12112 (b) (4). Thus,

9

The determination as to whether a particular plain-

tiff is protected by the ADA is an individual one.

“The question of whether an impairment constitutes

a disability and whether it substantially impairs a

major life activity is an individualized inquiry, which

must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Baert v.

Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir.

1998). Accordingly, “[cJourts have been careful to

distinguish impairments which merely affect major

life activities and those which substantially limit

major life activities.” Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P. C.,

135 F.3d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1998).

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA’s prede-

cessor, also requires such an individualized analysis.“

although the ADA will protect nondisabled individuals in this

instance, this protection still flows from the existence of a

disability. Moreover, the ADA generally prohibits retaliation,

coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference against any

individual who opposes acts that are unlawful under the ADA,

who participates in a proceeding under the ADA, who exer-

cises rights granted by the ADA, or who aids or encourages

another in doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Again, however,

protection is linked inextricably to disability.

3 As the Chief Justice emphasized in Bragdon v. Abbott,

“whether [an individual] has a disability covered by the ADA

is an individualized inquiry. The Act could not be clearer on

this point: Section 12102(2) states explicitly that the dis-

ability determination must be made with respect to an in-

dividual. Were this not sufficiently clear, the Act goes on to

provide that the ‘major activities’ allegedly limited by an im-

pairment must be those of such individual. § 12102 (3) (A).“

Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2214 (1998) (Rehnquist,

C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id.

at 2217 (O’Connor, J, concurring in part and dissenting in

part). -

The ADA definition of “disability” mirrors the definition

of “handicapped individual” that appeared in the Rehabilita-

tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., at the time the ADA

10

“The definitional task cannot be accomplished merely

through abstract lists and categories of impairments.

The inquiry is, of necessity, an individualized one—

whether the particular impairment constitutes for the

particular person a significant barrier to employ-

ment.” Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th

Cir. 1986).

The EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing

Title I of the ADA, also interprets the statute as

requiring an individualized analysis of whether an

individual has a disability. In explanatory material

accompanying its regulations interpreting Title I of

the ADA, the EEOC explains in detail the need for

an individualized determination of whether an im-

pairment substantially limits a major life activity:

Determining whether a physical or mental im-

pairment exists is only the first step in deter-

mining whether or not an individual is disabled.

Many impairments do not impact an individual’s

life to the degree that they constitute disabling

impairments. An impairment rises to the level

of disability if the impairment substantially

limits one or more of the individual’s major life

activities. Multiple impairments that combine

to substantially limit one or more of an individ-

ual’s major life activities also constitute a dis-

ability.

The ADA and this part, like the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, do not attempt a “laundry list” of

impairments that are “disabilities.” The deter-

mination of whether an individual has a disabil-

was passed, and the ADA’s legislative history confirms the

Rehabilitation Act as the source of the ADA definition.

S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) ; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt.

2, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 332;

H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990

U. S. C. C. A. N. 445, 450.

11

ity is not necessarily based on the name or diag-

nosis of the impairment the person has, but

rather on the effect of that impairment on the

life of the individual. Some impairments may

be disabling for particular individuals but not

for others, depending on the stage of the disease

or disorder, the presence of other impairments

that combine to make the impairment disabling

or any number of other factors.

29 C. F. R. § 1630 App. (Section 1630.2 (j) Substan-

tially limits).

The agency’s position, that whether a person is an

“individual with a disability” depends upon the degree

to which the impairment affects the individual’s major

life activities, is consistent with the statutory lan-

guage. Indeed, in its Technical Assistance Manual on

the ADA, the EEOC stresses that “the determination

as to whether an individual is substantially limited

must always be based on the effect of an impairment

on that individual’s life activities.” EEOC Technical

Assistance Manual at II-4 (emphasis in original).

In Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), t. is

Court conducted the necessary individualized analysis

to determine that the individual in question was an

“individual with a disability” protected by the ADA.

First, the Court considered whether Abbott had an

“impairment.” Jd. at 2202. Having determined that

she did, the Court then considered whether the im-

pairment substantially limited Abbott in a major life

activity. Id. at 2205. Only then, after considering

the medical evidence, did the Court conclude that

Abbott was an “individual with a disability” protected

by the ADA. Id. at 2207.5

5 Having done so, the Court declined to address specifically

whether per se disabilities could exist under the ADA. Id. at

2207.

12

Likewise, this Court has conducted the individual-

ized analysis required by the Rehabilitation Act be-

fore determining that a plaintiff was covered by the

statute. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480

U.S. 273 (1987), involved a teacher who was termi-

nated because her tuberculosis which had been in re-

mission for twenty years, recurred three times in two

years, and the school board feared contagion. Id. at

276. This Court’s holding in Arline was that a person

who meets the statutory definition of an individual

with a disability is not disqualified from the protected

class merely because the disability poses a threat of

contagion. As part of its reasoning in Arline, how-

ever, this Court carefully considered the statutory

definition before determining that Arline was a mem-

ber of the protected class. The Court based this con-

clusion on the individualized evidence presented by

the plaintiff about the extent to which her major life

activities had been limited by her impairment. For

this reason, the Court ruled, Arline had a “record”

of a disability that placed her within the protected

class. Id. at 281.

Since the ADA requires that an individualized

analysis be conducted to determine if an individual

has a disability, no impairment can be a disability

per se. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits both have

stated expressly that the ADA covers no disabilities

per se. Ennis v. National Ass’n of Business & Educ.

Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995); Baert v.

Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir.

1998). The Seventh Circuit pointed out that per se

disabilities cannot exist even when a disease, “as a

practical matter” may always be found to be disabl-

ing. Id. at 631. In Ennis, the Fourth Circuit found

that:

-—-—_ K — —

13

the plain lan of the provision requires that

a finding of disability be made on an individual-

[by]-individual basis. The term ‘disability’ is

specifically defined, for each of subparts (A),

(B), and (C), “with respect to the individual,”

and the individualized focus is reinforced by the

requirement that the underlying impairment sub-

stantially limit a major life activity of the

individual.

> * * *

Were we to hold that A. J. was disabled under

the ADA, therefore, we would have to conclude

that HIV-positive status is per se a disability.

The plain language of the statute, which contem-

plates case-by-case determinations of whether

a given impairment substantially limits a major

life activity, whether an individual has a record

of such a substantially limiting impairment, or

whether an individual is being perceived as hav-

ing such a substantially limiting impairment,

simply would not permit this a [sic] conclusion.

Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60 (emphasis in original) (citations

omitted).

The Ninth Circuit failed to make this individual-

ized analysis to determine whether Kirkingburg was

substantially limited in a major life activity. Instead,

the court found that “the appropriate inquiry in cases

such as this is whether, as a result of a physical im-

pairment, the individual is required to perform a

major life activity in a different manner from other

persons.” Kirkingburg, 143 F.3d at 1232 n.4. The

Ninth Circuit thus ignored the pivotal statutory defi-

nition, which requires the court to examine whether

an individual is actually limited.“

If the Ninth Circuit had considered whether Respondent’s

condition substantially limited his major life activities, it

might have reached a different conclusion. For example, in

14

B. Congress Did Not Provide for Per Se Disabilities

Under the ADA

The legislative history of the ADA supports the

interpretation that the Act’s protection extends only

to those individuals actually limited in a major life

activity as a result of an impairment. The Committee

Reports state unequivocally that “[a] physical or

mental impairment does not constitute a disability

under the first prong of the definition for purposes

of the ADA unless its severity is such that it results

in a ‘substantial limitation’ of one or more major life

activities.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, re-

printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334; S. Rep. No.

101-116, at 22. As the Reports explain, “[a] person

is considered an individual with a disability for pur-

poses of the first prong of the definition when the

individual’s important life activities are restricted as

to the conditions, manner, or duration under which

they can be performed in comparison to most people.”

H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in

1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at

22.7 Once again, Congress utilized language showing

that it intended to protect individuals who were re-

stricted as compared to others.

The approach taken by Congress was a functional

one, as is evident from the example in the Committee

Reports:

Still v. Freeport-McCoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50 (5th Cir. 1997),

the Fifth Circuit conducted the individualized analysis re-

quired by the statute and determined that a plaintiff with

partial blindness was not an individual with a disability be-

cause he was not substantially limited in performing normal

daily activities.

7The EEOC adopted these factors to define what is sub-

stantially limiting” in its regulations interpreting Title I of

the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1) (ii).

H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N, at 334; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 22. This

example confirms that Congress was focusing not on

the abstract effects of a given impairment, but on

how the individual actually was limited on a func-

tional basis in performing the major life activity.

The Ninth Circuit erroneously focused on the im-

pairment to Kirkingburg’s eye, rather than on the

extent to which it actually limited him in seeing. The

Ninth Circuit’s analysis effectively labels monocular

vision a per se disability, contrary to the language of

the statute.

The statutory definition of “disability” mandates

an individualized inquiry into whether a physical or

mental impairment substantially limits the individual

in one or more major life activities. To declare, by

judicial fiat, that an impairment is per se a disability

undermines this important concept. Accordingly, this

Court should make clear that there are no per se

disabilities under the ADA.

C. Recognizing Per Se Disabilities Would Compromise

the Goals of the ADA

Throughout debate and passage of the ADA, Con-

gressional sponsors reiterated the statute’s important

goal of extending opportunities to individuals with

disabilities. As Senator Harkin stated, “For too long,

individuals with disabilities have been excluded, segre-

gated, and otherwise denied equal, effective, and

meaningful opportunity to participate in the economic

16

and social mainstream of American life. It is time

we eliminate these injustices.” 135 Cong. Rec. 810711

(daily ed. September 7, 1989). This statement re-

veals that the purpose of the ADA is to extend statu-

tory protection to those individuals who have dis-

abilities that severely restrict their participation in

activities that others enjoy. It is not intended to pro-

vide a vehicle for others to obtain protection to which

they are not entitled. Creating coverage under the

ADA for individuals based merely on the name of an

impairment will expand the protected class well be-

yond the statutory definition, and create substantial

problems for employers and employees.

In particular, an overly expansive reading of the

protected class could well compromise the rights cre-

ated by the ADA for those truly in need of statutory

protection. The ADA requires that employers pro-

vide reasonable accommodation to individuals with

disabilities unless doing so would impose an “undue

hardship” on the employer’s business. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(5)(a). While some accommodations, taken

alone, will not impose an undue hardship, a number

of accommodations in the aggregate may well reach

that level. The greater the number of individuals en-

titled to accommodation, the sooner it is likely that

the next person to need an accommodation will be

denied one because providing the accommodation

would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s

business.

In addition, an overly broad interpretation of the

statutory definition also increases the possibility that

the ADA will become a vehicle for employees with

poor performance records to seek special rights in

the workplace. Commissioner Russell G. Redenbaugh

of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has voiced

these very concerns. In his statement included in the

17

Commission’s 1998 report on the ALA, Commissioner

Redenbaugh, a blind individual, suggests that a broad

reading of the ADA will impact individuals with dis-

abilities negatively.

An over-expansive lication of ADA may cre-

ate the impression that members of the class it

protects become what is termed in human re-

sources jargon “fire proof.” The impression (and

sometimes the reality) can also be that the “nor-

mal” standard (i.e., that if you are disabled and

can do the job you are protected by the ADA)

becomes distorted to the extent it becomes a tool

which an employee may use to become “fire

proof.”

United States Commission on Civil Rights, Helping

Employers Comply with the ADA 280 (1998). As

another commentator observed: “Both just cause pro-

tection and the right to demand reasonable accommo-

dation serve as powerful incentives for individuals to

seek protection under the ADA. Employees can obtain

protection before their employers have taken adverse

employment action.” Erica W. Harris, Controlled Im-

pairments Under the Americans with Disabilities

Act: A Search For the Meaning of Disability, 73

Washington L. Rev. 575, 585 (1998).

EEAC’s and the Chamber’s members have a long

history of providing equal employment opportunities

for individuals with disabilities, and a strong com-

mitment to nondiscrimination. These exemplary em-

ployers support the goals of the ADA as applied to

individuals with disabilities. Those goals will become

clouded, however, if the expansion of the definition of

what constitutes a disability under the ADA is ex-

panded to recognize certain conditions as per se dis-

abilities.

II. THE ADA PERMITS EMPLOYERS TO USE PHYSI-

CAL CRITERIA TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN

INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY IS “QUALI-

FIED”

A. The ADA Permits Employers to Rely on a Federal

Regulation or Other Federal Standards With Phy-

sical Criteria

Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in

employment against a “qualified individual with a

disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), defined as an in-

dividual with a disability who, with or without reason-

able accommodation, can perform the essential func-

tions of the employment position that such individual

holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. §12111(8). The em-

ployer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are

“essential” must be considered. Jd. The ADA ex-

plicitly permits an employer to use “qualification

standards, tests or selection criteria” even though

doing so may screen out individuals with disabilities,

provided that the employer can show that the stand-

ard, test or criterion is “job related and consistent

with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. 5 12113 (a).

The ADA’s legislative history reflects the drafters’

concern that government standards established for

safety and security sensitive positions be preserved,

stating unequivocally that the ADA is not intended

to “override any legitimate medical standards estab-

lished by federal, state or local law, or by employers

for applicants for safety or security sensitive posi-

tions, if the medical standards are consistent with

[the ADA].” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 43

(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 446;

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558, at 57-58 (1990).

The EEOC’s interpretation of the ADA also sup-

ports this conclusion. According to the EEOC, “[t]he

ADA does not override health and safety require-

19

ments established under other Federal laws. If a

standard is required by another Federal law, an em-

ployer must comply with it and does not have to show

that the standard is job related and consistent with

business necessity.” EEOC Technical Assistance Man-

ual at IV-16 (emphasis added). As examples, the

EEOC states that “[a]n employee who is being hired

to drive a vehicle in interstate commerce must meet

safety requirements established by the U.S. Depart-

ment of Transportation. Employers also must con-

form to health and safety requirements of the U.S.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration.” Id.

The Rehabilitation Act also permits an employer to

rely on federal safety standards. In Chandler v. City

of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1895 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 511 U.S. 1011 (1994), plaintiffs contended

that the city’s Driver Safety Program, which used

standards based on Department of Transportation

safety regulations that prohibit the employment of

drivers with certain vision impairments and insulin-

dependent diabetes, violated the Rehabilitation Act.

The Fifth Circuit determined that the drivers were

unqualified and held as a matter of law that “a

driver with insulin-dependent diabetes or with vision

that is impaired to the extent discussed in 49 C. F. R.

§ 391.41 presents a genuine substantial risk that he

could injure himself or others.” Jd. at 1395. In con-

cluding that individuals with such impairments could

not be qualified because they could not meet the physi-

cal qualifications set forth for drivers by the Depart-

ment of Transportation, the Fifth Circuit relied on

the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act, ob-

serving that the “definition of a qualified handicapped

individual also includes a personal safety require-

ment—an otherwise qualified handicapped individual

is defined as one who ‘can perform the essential func-

20

tions of the position in question without endangering

the health and safety of the individual or others.’”

Id. at 1393. Indeed, the court warned, Woe unto the

employer who put such an employee behind the wheel

of a vehicle owned by the employer which is involved

in a vehicular accident.” Id.

Thus, the legislative history, the EEOC’s guidance,

and the Rehabilitation Act all support the conclusion

that employers may use federal safety standards as

selection criteria without violating the ADA. Employ-

ers need not even demonstrate that the standard is

job related and consistent with business necessity. A

contrary interpretation of the ADA would compro-

mise the safety of the public and lead to confusion as

to an employer’s obligation under federal law.

B. The ADA Also Permits Employers to Use Physical

Criteria Other Than Federal Standards to Determine

Whether an Individual Is Qualified When the Safety

of Others Is at Issue

Where appropriate, the ADA also permits employ-

ers to use minimum medical criteria as qualification

standards even where they are not mandated to do so

by law. As noted above, the ADA’s legislative history

states that Congress did not intend that the ADA

“override any legitimate medical standards estab-

lished by federal, state or local law, or by employers

for applicants for safety or security sensitive posi-

tions, if the medical standards are consistent with

[the ADA].” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 43,

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 466; H.R. Conf.

Rep. No. 101-558, at 57-58 (emphasis added).* In-

8 With limited exception, the legislative history reveals that

Congress intended to prohibit employers from using stand-

ards that resulted in a blanket exclusion of individuals with

certain disabilities. This general prohibition is distinct from

what Congress did intend for employers to utilize, i.e., stand-

21

deed, “Under the legislation an employer may still

devise physical and other job criteria and tests for a

job so long as the criteria or tests are job-related and

consistent with business necessity.” S. Rep. No. 101-

116, at 27.

In explaining what medical examinations for em-

ployees might be “job related and consistent with

business necessity,” the House Labor Committee

stated:

Section 102(c)(4) prohibits medical exams of

employees unless job related and consistent with

business necessity. Certain jobs require periodic

physicals in order to determine fitness for duty.

For example, Federal safety regulations require

bus and truck drivers to have a medical exam

at least biennially. In certain industries, such as

air transportation, physical qualifications for

some employees are critical. Those employees,

for example, pilots, may have to meet medical

standards established by Federal, State or local

law or regulation, or otherwise fulfill require-

ments for obtaining a medical certificate, as a

prerequisite for employment. In other instances,

because a particular job function may have a

significant impact on public safety, e.g. flight

attendants, an employee’s state of health is im-

portant in establishing job qualifications, even

though a medical certificate might not be re-

quired by law.

H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74, reprinted in 1990

U.S. C. C. A. N. at 356-57 (emphasis added). Similarly,

the Conference Report explains:

ards based on certain physical abilities. See S. Lab. Rep. No.

101-116, at 27. This is an important distinction, because

standards based on physical abilities address the individual’s

ability to do a certain essential function of the job, regardless

of the type of disability an individual may have.

22

In certain industries, such as air transporta-

tion, applicants for security and safety related

positions are normally chosen on the basis of

many competitive factors, some of which are

identified as a result of post-offer pre-employ-

ment medical examinations. Thus, after the em-

ployer receives the results of the post-offer med-

ical examination for applicants for safety or

security sensitive positions, only those applicants

who meet the employer’s criteria for the job

must receive confirmed offers of employment, so

long as the employer does not use those results

of the exam to screen out qualified disabled in-

dividuals on the basis of disability.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558, at 59 (emphasis added).

Hence, the legislative history also supports an em-

ployer’s use of physical criteria beyond those promul-

gated by the federal government to determine qualifi-

cations to perform the essential functions of the job

as long as the criteria are job related and consistent

with business necessity.

The EEOC also confirms that an employer can use

physical standards to determine job qualifications. In

its interpretive guidance accompanying its ADA regu-

lations, the agency specifically ties the statutory pro-

vision allowing employers to use selection criteria

that are “job related and consistent with business

necessity” to selection criteria such as “safety require-

ments, vision or hearing requirements, walking re-

quirements, [and] lifting requirements. 29

C.F.R. § 1630 App. (Section 1630.10 Qualifications,

Standards, Tests and Other Selection Criteria) .®

® Thus, it would be inaccurate to subject such physical

qualification standards to the more stringent “direct threat“

analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (b). Congress took the “direct

threat” standard, which requires an individualized analysis,

from School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273

23

The statutory language and legislative history cited

above strongly indicate that Congress could not have

meant for an individualized analysis to be conducted

every time a qualification standard is at issue. The

meaning of “standard” is “an acknowledged measure

of comparison for quantitative or qualitative value.”

The American Heritage Dictionary (2d ed. 1982).

The whole point of setting qualification standards is

to be able to compare individuals, regardless of

whether they have disabilities, by some objective

measure that the employer ties to the function and

purpose of the job. The standards themselves cannot,

if employers are expected to run businesses, be anal-

yzed on a case by case basis. Indeed, “[o]nce an

individual has admitted that he does not meet such a

necessary—as opposed to a merely convenient—stand-

ard, the Rehabilitation Act does not forbid the appli-

cation to him of a general rule.” Buck v. DOT, 56

F.3d 1406, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding the

Federal Highway Administration’s decision to decline

to waive its hearing requirements and allow deaf in-

dividuals to drive). See also Ward v. Skinner, 943

F.2d 157, 162-164 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding Secre-

tary of Transportation’s denial of waiver of DOT rule

excluding individuals with history of epilepsy from

(1987), in which this Court remanded the question of whether

a school teacher with tuberculosis was “otherwise qualified”

for her position despite the contagion, and required an in-

dividualized inquiry into the nature, duration, severity and

probability of the risk. Id. at 288. The rationale behind the

use of an individualized “direct threat” analysis in this con-

text is to prevent employers from making employment deci-

sions based on unfounded stereotypes associated with certain

types of disabilities. The use of physical criteria to set job

qualifications, however, does not require this individualized

analysis, because its focus is tied to the skills necessary to

achieve the purpose and function of the job, as opposed to

the traits associated with a certain disability.

24

driving commercial vehicles to plaintiff who had not

experienced seizure in seven years), cert. denied, 503

IJ. S. 959 (1992).

This Court previously has recognized that stand-

ards utilizing physical criteria to select qualified

applicants for participation in a federally-funded pro-

gram are acceptable in an analysis of the Rehabili-

tation Act. In Southeastern Community College v.

Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), this Court held that an

individual with a hearing disability was not qualified

to participate in a nursing program due to the fact

that she could not communicate effectively in the pro-

gram. Noting that “[a]n otherwise qualified person

is one who is able to meet all of a program’s require-

ments in spite of his handicap,” id. at 407, this Court

found that physical qualifications may be part of the

program’s requirements, observing that Inlothing in

the language or history of § 504 [of the Rehabilita-

tion Act] reflects an intention to limit the freedom

of an educational institution to require reasonable

physical qualifications for admission to a clinical train-

ing program.” Id. at 415.

In Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E. D. Pa.

1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989), the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania also approved the use of

physical criteria to define qualification standards un-

der the Rehabilitation Act. The court reviewed a

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) policy that

excluded all individuals wtih insulin-dependent dia-

betes from special agent and investigation specialist

positions. The court rejected the notion that an in-

10 It is important to note that this qualification standard

did not exclude all individuals with a certain disability.

Rather, it applied only to those with insulin-dependent

diabetes.

25

dividualized analysis should be conducted, since “there

exists no reliable method of determining in advance

those insulin-dependent diabetics who do not present

a substantial risk of having a sudden and unexpected

severe hypoglycemic episode while on a duty assign-

ment.“ Id. at 517.

In concluding that this policy did not violate the

Rehabilitation Act, the district court judge explained

why physical criteria used to establish job qualifica-

tions need not pass muster under an individualized

analysis:

. . . Congress’ intent in enacting the Rehabilita-

tion Act was not that employers must accept

applicants for jobs where eminently qualified

medical specialists are of the opinion that the job

requirements pose a reasonably probable risk

of harm to the applicant and others by reason

of the applicant’s “handicap,” in this case being

that of an insulin-dependent diabetic. Where, as

here, qualified medical opinion is divided as to

what is an acceptable degree of risk, a decision

must be made.

Id. at 520.

This Court first used the phrases “business neces-

sity” and “related to job performance” to establish

the employer’s burden in justifying selection criteria

with an adverse impact on a protected class under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v.

Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)

11 Since then, the Griggs standard was codified by the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII to provide that

“TCajn unlawful employment practice based on disparate im-

pact is established under this subchapter only if a complain-

ing party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular

employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the

basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin and the

26

Since Griggs, the courts of appeals have applied this

rule in cases involving challenges to safety-related

qualification standards. For example, in Fitzpatrick

v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993), the

Eleventh Circuit examined the City of Atlanta’s

safety rule banning firefighters from wearing even

closely-shaved beards—because facial hair interferes

with the tight seal necessary for proper operation of

a respirator or self-contained breathing apparatus

(SCBA). Id. at 1114. The plaintiffs alleged that such

a policy had a disparate impact on African-American

males, who suffer disproportionately from a bacterial

disorder that precludes them from shaving their faces.

In finding that the City’s policy was consistent with

business necessity, the court held that “these safety

claims would afford the City an affirmative defense,

for protecting employees from workplace hazards is

a goal that, as a matter of law, has been found to

qualify as an important business goal for Title VII

purposes.” Jd. at 1119. As the Eleventh Circuit ex-

plained, “[m]easures demonstrably necessary to meet-

ing the goal of ensuring worker safety are therefore

deemed to be ‘required by business necessity’ under

Tit] VII.“ Id.

In analyzing this issue, the Eleventh Circuit cap-

tured the important policy reason why such safety

standards should be considered consistent with busi-

ness necessity: “The mere absence of unfortunate in-

cidents is not sufficient to establish the safety of

shadow beards; otherwise, safety measures could be

instituted only once accidents had occurred rather

than in order to avert accidents.” Id. at 1121. Al-

though the city was not required to comply with

respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice

is job related for the position in question and consistent with

business necessity ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i).

27

Occupational Safety and Health standards, the court

looked to OSHA, National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health, and American National Standards

Institute standards, which are voluntary private in-

dustry standards, as validation for the safety reasons

behind the City’s policy. The court further found that

the plaintiffs were unable to show a less discrimina-

tory alternative that would meet the City’s legitimate

business need. Jd. at 1122.

The Eleventh Cireuit also rejected the plaintiffs’

argument that the policy violated the Rehabilitation

Act, based on its analysis under Title VII:

Because of the conceptual similarity between the

Title VII less discriminatory alternative and

the §504 reasonable accommodation showings,

this same evidence suffices to carry the City’s

initial burden of showing that there exists no

reasonable accommodation that would permit the

firefighters to perform the essential function of

obtaining a safe seal on their SCBA’s without

being clean shaven.

Id. at 1127.

In addition to determining when facially neutral

selection criteria are consistent with “business neces-

sity” under Title VII in disparate impact cases, the

courts also have addressed whether employers can

intentionally exclude against an individual based

on a protected characteristic such as age or sex based

on a safety-related bona fide occupational qualifica-

tion (“BFOQ”).” This Court previously has acknowl-

12 Under Title VII, classifications based on religion, sex, or

national origin are allowed “where religion, sex, or national

origin is a bona fide ¢ cupational qualification reasonably

necessary to the normal operation of that particular business

or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-2(e) (1). This same prin-

ciple is applicable to the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (1).

28

edged that the “business necessity defense” under

Title VII (which is the applicable standard under the

ADA) is “more lenient for the employer than the

statutory BFOQ defense” under Title VII. Interna-

tional Union UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,

198 (1991). In Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321

(1977), this Court found that women could be ex-

cluded from prison guard positions in an all-male

maximum security prison because the “likelihood that

inmates would assault a woman because she was a

woman would pose a real threat not only to the victim

of the assault but also to the basic control of the

penitentiary and protection of its inmates and the

other security personnel.” Id. at 335. Similarly, in

Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400

(1985), this Court endorsed the use of a two part

safety BFOQ defense in a case involving age related

safety standards for flight engineers, although affirm-

ing the appellate court’s ruling that the BFOQ stand-

ard was not met.

Thus, even when an employer is intentionally tar-

geting a certain protected group, this Court has found

that safety standards are allowed when safety con-

cerns are at issue. The use of physical criteria, how-

ever, does not intentionally target individuals with

disabilities, nor are they a proxy for some qualifica-

13 This Court rejected a BFOQ safety defense in Johnson

Controls, in which the employer excluded fertile women from

jobs that involved lead exposure. One primary reason for

doing so, however, was this Court’s finding that customer

safety was not at issue in the case, observing that the “(t]he

unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls’ female employees,

are neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essen-

tial to the business of battery manufacturing.” 499 U.S. at

203. This Court further noted that the employer did not

present medical evidence to substantiate a real risk to the

unborn fetuses. Id.

29

tion standards as age or sex were used in the cases

discussed above. Therefore, this Court should permit

employers to use physical criteria as qualifications as

long as they are job related and consistent with busi-

ness necessity.

C. Public Policy Dictates That Employers Be Per-

mitted to Develop and

— a i cee Stentante

It is difficult to believe that Congress through

sage of the ADA intended to discourage the develop-

ment of safety standards in the workplace. A ruling

that employers cannot set qualification standards that

are job related and consistent with business necessity

to compare qualified applicants or employees could

achieve just such a result. It is an important goal

that businesses and industries collectively attempt to

self-regulate in the interest of public safety. Busi-

nesses may not, however, continue to make the effort

to participate in self-regulation if such efforts will

actually result in legal liability. Punishing employers

who adhere to legitimate safety standards will create

a disincentive to maintain needed safety standards.

Public policy dictates that employers be permitted

to develop and apply safety standards to determine if

an employee is qualified. Employers face bad pub-

licity if they are perceived as endangering the safety

of the general public. In addition, both private citi-

zens and the government can sue employers if an

employer's actions compromise the safety of the

public, or even natural resources.

A highly publicized incident that demonstra i

reality is the Exxon Valdez accident. — 2 rn

obligations under the ADA and the Rehabilitation

Act, Exxon placed an individual with an alcohol prob-

lem in charge of a ship after he successfully completed

30

a rehabilitation program. Jon Cheney, EEOC v.

EXXON Corp.: Will Exxon’s Blanket Exclusion of

Former Substance Abusers Hold Up Under the ADA?

48 Baylor L. Rev. 549, 550 (1996). After the ship

hit a reef and starting spilling oil, Exxon “spent $2.5

billion dollars cleaning up the accident. Settling with

federal and state authorities for criminal charges and

civil libalities cost Exxon another $1 billion. And in

1994, an Alaska jury found Exxon reckless and as-

sessed record punitive damages of $5 billion.” Jd.

Employers must take preventive measures to ensure

that employees are able to perform the essential func-

tions of the job in a safe manner. An employer that

fails to do so will have a difficult time convincing a

jury that it should not be accountable for damages

because it was fulfilling its obligation under the ADA.

While compliance with the ADA, as a federal law,

may in theory preempt a state tort law claim as this

Court discussed in Johnson Controls, once an accident

has occurred, it will be difficult for an employer to

show that it could not tell at the time that imminent

danger was possible when standards, designed to show

what criteria are necessary, were available. See John-

son Controls, 499 U.S. at 209. Indeed, Justice White’s

concurring opinion notes, “it will be difficult for em-

ployers to determine in advance what will constitute

negligence.” Id. at 215.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, amici Equal Employ-

ment Advisory Council and The Chamber of Com-

merce of the United States of America respectfully

submit that the decision below should be reversed.

STEPHEN A. BOKAT

ROBIN S. CONRAD

SUSSAN MAHALLATI KYSELA

NATIONAL CHAMBER

LITIGATION CENTER, INC.

1615 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20062

(202) 463-5337

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

The Chamber of Commerce

of the United States

of America

Respectfully submitted,

ANN ELIZABETH REESMAN *

ConR L. FISCHEL

McGUINEss & WILLIAMS

1015 Fifteenth St., N. W.

Suite 1200

Washington, D. C. 20005

(202) 789-8600

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Equal Employment Advisory

Council

* Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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