Amicus Curiae Brief — Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
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Supreme Court, U. 5
3 *
FEB 22 1999
No. 98-591 |
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
ALBERTSONS, INC.,
Petitioner,
V.
HALLIE KIRKINGBURG,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL AND
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
STEPHEN A. BOKAT ANN ELIZABETH REESMAN *
ROBIN S. CONRAD CORRIE L. FISCHEL
SUSSAN MAHALLATI KYSELA MCGUINESS & WILLIAMS
NATIONAL CHAMBER 1015 Fifteenth St., N. W.
LITIGATION CENTER, INC. Suite 1200
1615 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005
Washington, D.C. 20062 (202) 789-8600
(202) 463-5337 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Advisory
The Chamber of Commerce Council
of the United States
of America * Counsel of Record
WILSON - Eras Printinc Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TED Ce Far r ii
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ......................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ———— 5
P|, CREE SES LE NE a POW Stee te aN 7
I. THERE ARE NO PER SE DISABILITIES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 7
A. The ADA Requires an Individualized In-
quiry to Determine Whether an Individual
D =. .. 7
B. Congress Did Not Provide for Per Se Dis-
abilities Under the bK 14
C. Recognizing Per Se Disabilities Would Com-
promise the Goals of the bK 15
II. THE ADA PERMITS EMPLOYERS TO USE
PHYSICAL CRITERIA TO DETERMINE
WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL WITH A DIS-
ABILITY IS “QUALIFIED” ow... 18
A. The ADA Permits Employers to Rely on a
Federal Regulation or Other Federal Stand-
ards With Physical Criteria 18
B. The ADA Also Permits Employers to Use
Physical Criteria Other Than Federal Stand-
ards to Determine Whether an Individual Is
Qualified When the Safety of Others Is at
ST EE Vee ae a ee 20
C. Public Policy Dictates That Employers Be
Permitted to Develop and Apply Adequate
Standards to Protect the Safety of the Pub-
% — . AS I OA BR oy a 29
86. ——+————ñ—ñ—ñ——— 30
1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) 3
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir.
Zenn 5, 9, 12
Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108 (8th
Cir. 1995) 8
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) 5 * 3, 8. 9, 11
Buck v. DOT, 56 F.3d 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 23
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
NR ISSR OR a ne a CC Oe 3
CONRAIL v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) 3
Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629 (6th
r 8
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.8d 1385 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1011 (1994) ........... 19, 20
Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988),
aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 198999 24, 25
DeLuca v. Winer Industries, 58 F.8d 793 80
Cir. 1995) 8
Dot hard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) .......... 28
Ennis v. National Association of Business & Edu-
cation Radio, 53 F.8d 55 (4th Cir. 1995) 12, 13
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
RAL SRA REA HO Sa Ge Se ee a 3
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.8d 1112 (11th
Cir. 1993) 26, 27
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986) 10
Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates, 100 F.3d 907
(Iith Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 630
(1997) PCTV 8
Griggs v. Duke “Power Company, 401 U.S. 424
(1971) 25
Hazen Paper Co. v Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1998)... 3
International Union UAW v. Johnson Controls,
499 U.S. 187 (1991) ...8, 28, 30
Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.8d 102 (3d Cir.
NER SE eS RN eS Seay AR 8
Kirkingburg v. Albertsons, Inc., 148 F.3d 1228
(9th Cir. 1998) we 4. 5, 18
iti
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,
EES Deen Coe ae 3
Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867 (2d
RENE SS a 9
Sanders v. Arneson Products, 91 F.3d 1351 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997).. 8
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
AEE a ED a ea 3, 5, 12, 22-23
Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.
EST EN SNS ee oT Os 8
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397 (1979) ....... 3, 7, 24
Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Ine., 120 F.3d 50 (5th
I .. .. 8,14
Tyndall v. National Education Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209
rr 8
University of Teras v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390
1 ͤ ² ꝛ2——ᷣ . 3
Ward v. Skinner, 943 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959 (199227777 23
Wernick v. FRB, 91 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 1996) 8
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400
FF 28
White v. York International Corp., 45 F.8d 357
A "Dll eS 8
STATUTES
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
GOOD —. . ˙— 4. 5
7 5, 8
e een 2. 7
e 18
2 | 6
rr 7,18
rr. 8
42 U.S.C. 6 12112 (b) (5) (a 16
42 U.S.C. § 12113 (a) b 6, 18
D äĩ4(ẽV 2222 22
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
42 U.S.C. 88 1218112189 1 2
Rehabilitation . of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 88 701 et
8 3 eit ie 9
r a 2
.... i 2
i ae ie ae 27
RST | ee 27
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) —00 26
REGULATIONS
29 C.FR. Part 1630
29 C. F. R. § 1630.2(j) (1) (i) 14
rene I i 5, 11, 22
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558 (1990) 18, 20, 22
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990), reprinted in
RRR 10, 14, 15, 21
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 (1990), reprinted in
RE Ta Qe . 10, 18, 20
S. Rep. No. 101-116 (19899999 10, 14, 15, 21
135 Cong. Rec. 810711 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) 16
MISCELLANEOUS
The American Heritage Dictionary (2d ed. 1982) 23
Jon Cheney, EEOC v. EXXON Corp: Will Fr.
ron's Blanket Exclusion of Former Substance
Abusers Hold Up Under the ADA? 48 Baylor
Ss Ff F- Wao For eel, 30
EEOC, A Technical Assistance Manual on the
Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (1991) 6. 11. 19
Erica W. Harris, Controlled Impairments Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Search
For the Meaning of Disability, 73 Washington
L. Rev. 575 (19995 17
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Help-
ing Employers Comply with the ADA (1998) 17
The Equal Employment Advisory Council and The
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of Amer
ica respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.
Letters of consent from both parties have been filed
with the Court. The brief urges this Court to reverse
the decision below, and thus supports the position of
Petitioner Albertsons, Inc.
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
The Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC)
is a dor mews association of employers organized
in 1976 to promote sound approaches to the elimina-
tion of employment discrimination. Its members in-
clude over 300 of the nation’s largest private sector
corporations. EEAC’s directors and officers include
many of industry’s leading experts in the field of
equal employment opportunity. Their combined ex-
perience gives EEAC a unique depth of understand-
ing of the practical, as well as legal, considerations
relevant to the proper interpretation and application
of equal employment policies and requirements.
EEAC’s members are firmly committed to the princi-
ples of nondiscrimination and equal employment
opportunity.
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America (the Chamber) is the largest federation of
business companies and associations in the world.
The Chamber represents an underlying membership
of more than three million businesses and organiza-
tions of every size, in every sector and region. An
important function of the Chamber is to represent
the interests of its members in court on employment
1 Counsel for amici curiae authored the brief in its entirety.
No person or entity, other than the amici, their members, or
their counsel, made a monetary contribution to the prepara-
tion or submission of the brief.
2
law issues of national concern to the business com-
munity.
All of EEAC’s members and many of the Chamber’s
members are employers subject to Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Title I). Many own com-
mercial facilities subject to Title III of the ADA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Title III), and many own,
operate, lease, or lease to places of public accommo-
dation, also subject to Title III. Moreover, many
members are federal contractors subject to Section
503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 793, which requires covered employers to take affirm-
ative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified individuals with disabilities. Also, some
members are the recipients of federal financial assist-
ance and therefore are subject to the non-discrimina-
tion provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 share a common defi-
nition of “disability” which establishes the parameters
of the protected class under each statute. Both stat-
utes define “disability” in terms of an impairment
that “substantially limits” a major life activity. Thus,
EEAC’s and the Chamber’s members have a direct
interest in the issues presented in this case; i. e.,
whether a particular impairment can be a disability
per se regardless of whether the impairment substan-
tially limits the individual in a major life activity,
and whether employers may rely on federal govern-
ment standards establishing minimum physical cri-
teria, or establish their own standards which may
exceed federal standards, in determining whether an
individual is a “qualified” individual with a disability.
3
Because of its interest in the application of the
nation’s fair employment laws, EEAC has filed briefs
as amicus curiae in numerous cases before this Court,
the United States Courts of Appeals, and various
state supreme courts. As part of this activity, EEAC
participated as amicus curiae in Bragdon v. Abbott,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), which addressed the defini-
tion of a “disability” under the ADA. EEAC also
participated as amicus curiae in School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), and
other cases in this Court construing the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. E.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287 (1985), CONRAIL v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624
(1984); University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.
390 (1981); Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Similarly, EEAC and
the Chamber have participated in numerous other
employment discrimination cases before this Court.
E. g., International Union UAW v. Johnson Controls,
499 U.S. 187 (1991) (sex discrimination) ; Burling-
ton Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (sexual
harassment); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998) (sexual harassment); McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995)
(after-acquired evidence); Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (age discrimination).
Thus, EEAC and the Chamber have an interest in,
and a familiarity with, the issues and policy concerns
involved in this case.
EEAC and the Chamber seek to assist the Court
by highlighting the impact its decision in this case
may have beyond the immediate concerns of the par-
ties to the case. Accordingly, this brief brings to the
attention of the Court relevant matter that has not
already been brought to its attention by the parties.
Because of their experience in these matters, EEAC
4
and the Chamber are well situated to brief the Court
on the relevant concerns of the business community
and the significance of this case to employers.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Albertsons hired Respondent Kirking-
burg as a driver in its distribution center in Port-
land, Oregon in 1990. Kirkingburg v. Albertsons,
Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998). Albert-
sons requires that all of its truck drivers meet the
minimum Department of Transportation (DOT)
visual acuity standards of 20/40 corrected in each
eye. Before Kirkingburg started the job, as well as
several months later, examining physicians certified
incorrectly that he met the DOT vision standards.
Id. at 1230 n.2.
In late 1991, Kirkingburg fell from a truck while
at work and was injured. Upon his return to work
in November of 1992, Albertsons, in accordance with
company policy, required Kirkingburg to obtain a
current DOT certification. This time, the physician
reported accurately that while Kirkingburg’s vision
was 20/20 corrected in the right eye, it was only
20/200 corrected in the left, thus failing the mini-
mum DOT vision requirements. Based on this report,
Kirkingburg was denied DOT certification, and Al-
bertsons refused to reinstate him as a truck driver.
Id. at 1231.
Several months later, Kirkingburg obtained a “vision
waiver” from the DOT under an experimental pro-
gram designed to obtain empirical data to study
drivers with monocular vision, Albertsons, however,
did not accept the waiver. Jd. at 1231. Kirkingburg
filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., alleging that Albertsons had
discriminated against him based on his alleged dis-
—
3
ability. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for Albertsons. 143 F.3d at 1230. The Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that (1)
Kirkingburg is protected by the ADA because his
limited vision renders him an individual with a dis-
ability under the ADA; and (2) Albertsons’ require-
ment that truck drivers meet the DOT vision stand-
ards without a waiver is invalid. Id. at 1237. The
Court granted Albertsons’ petition for a writ of
certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The statutory definition of “disability” establishes
the scope of the class protected under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 58 12101
et seq. Thus, the first element of the plaintiff’s bur-
den of proof in an ADA case is to show that he or
she has a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity, has a record
of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such
an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
An individualized analysis is always required to
determine whether an impairment rises to the level
of a disability. E. g., Baert v. Euclid Beverage, 149
F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 1998). The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency
charged with enforcing the ADA, agrees that the
statute requires such an individualized analysis. 29
C.F.R. § 1630 App. (Section 1630.2(j) Substantially
limits). This Court conducted the individualized
analysis required by the statute in Bragdon v. Abbott,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), as well as in a case inter-
preting the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA’s predeces-
sor, in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273 (1987).
The requirement of an individualized inquiry pre-
cludes any finding that per se disabilities can exist
6
under the ADA. The Ninth Circuit improperly dis-
regarded that requirement when it concluded, based
solely on a medical diagnosis, that the Respondent was
an individual with a disability protected by the ADA,
without determining whether he was limited in a
major life activity.
Moreover, a ruling that per se disabilities can exist
under the Act may potentially compromise the rights
of those with true disabilities. Congress placed limi-
tations on the length to which employers must go to
provide reasonable accommodations by indicating that
when doing so becomes an “undue hardship,” the
employer’s obligations end. 42 U.S.C. §12111(10) (a).
If the scope of the protected class is interpreted too
broadly, individuals without true disabilities may be-
come entitled to accommodations, at the expense of
someone truly in need. Therefore, the Court should
not extend the coverage of the ADA to those not sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity by allowing
per se disabilities under the statute.
The ADA permits employers to use physical criteria
established by federal regulations or other federal
standards to determine whether an individual is a
qualified for a job. EEOC guidance supports such a
finding. EEOC, A Technical Assistance Manual on
the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act IV-16 (1991) (hereinafter
EEOC Technical Assistance Manual). Further, em-
ployers may utilize physical criteria, even if not con-
tained in a federal government safety standard, to
determine who is qualified when safety is at issue,
as long as such criteria are job related and consistent
with business necessity. See 42 U.S.C.§ 12113 (a).
This Court previously has held that using physical
criteria to determine qualifications for a federally
7
funded program is acceptable under the Rehabilita-
tion Act. Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979). Employers who determine
qualifications based on physical criteria should be able
to rely on such standards without going through
an individualized analysis as to whether the individual
poses a direct threat to the health and safety of
others. As long as the criteria are job related and
consistent with business necessity, such criteria should
be allowed under the ADA.
Public policy dictates that employers develop safety
standards to protect the safety of the general public.
Employers have an affirmative obligation to ensure
that employees perform the essential functions of the
job in a safe manner. Employers should be permitted
to use qualification standards based on physical cri-
teria so long as they are job related and consistent
with business necessity. Otherwise, employers risk
facing potential penalties under both civil and crimi-
nal law. Further, allowing individuals who are un-
able to meet the physical standards that define the
essential functions of a safety-sensitive position to
hold such positions places the public at risk. Congress
did not contemplate such a result.
ARGUMENT
I. THERE ARE NO PER SE DISABILITIES WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE AMERICANS WITH DIS-
ABILITIES ACT
A. The ADA Requires an Individualized Inquiry to
Determine Whether an Individual Has a Disability
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, prohibits discrimination in
employment against a “qualified individual with a
disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). The ADA defines
“disability” as follows:
. 0 EMT ̃ß——— — ON
The term “disability” means, with respect to an
individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
As the courts of appeals have held, the statutory
definition of “disability” eireumseribes the protected
class by establishing a threshold requirement that all
potential ADA plaintiffs must meet. Each alleged
victim of disability-based discrimination must demon-
strate, as the first element of his or her burden of
proof, that he or she has a “disability” as defined in
the law. Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, 105 F.5d 12,
14-15 (1st Cir. 1997); Wernick v. FRB, 91 F.3d 379,
383 (2d Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d
102, 105 (3d Cir. 1997); Tyndall v. National Educ.
Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1994); Still v. Free-
port-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 50-51 (5th Cir.
1997); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629,
633 (6th Cir. 1998); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., 53
F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest
Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) ; Sanders
v. Arneson Prods., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997); White v.
York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995);
Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907, 910
(11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 630 (1997) .?
2 Title I of the ADA also prohibits discrimination against
an individual “because of the known disability of an individual
with whom the individual or entity is known to have a rela-
tionship or association.” 42 U.S.C. 5 12112 (b) (4). Thus,
9
The determination as to whether a particular plain-
tiff is protected by the ADA is an individual one.
“The question of whether an impairment constitutes
a disability and whether it substantially impairs a
major life activity is an individualized inquiry, which
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Baert v.
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir.
1998). Accordingly, “[cJourts have been careful to
distinguish impairments which merely affect major
life activities and those which substantially limit
major life activities.” Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P. C.,
135 F.3d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA’s prede-
cessor, also requires such an individualized analysis.“
although the ADA will protect nondisabled individuals in this
instance, this protection still flows from the existence of a
disability. Moreover, the ADA generally prohibits retaliation,
coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference against any
individual who opposes acts that are unlawful under the ADA,
who participates in a proceeding under the ADA, who exer-
cises rights granted by the ADA, or who aids or encourages
another in doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Again, however,
protection is linked inextricably to disability.
3 As the Chief Justice emphasized in Bragdon v. Abbott,
“whether [an individual] has a disability covered by the ADA
is an individualized inquiry. The Act could not be clearer on
this point: Section 12102(2) states explicitly that the dis-
ability determination must be made with respect to an in-
dividual. Were this not sufficiently clear, the Act goes on to
provide that the ‘major activities’ allegedly limited by an im-
pairment must be those of such individual. § 12102 (3) (A).“
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2214 (1998) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id.
at 2217 (O’Connor, J, concurring in part and dissenting in
part). -
The ADA definition of “disability” mirrors the definition
of “handicapped individual” that appeared in the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., at the time the ADA
10
“The definitional task cannot be accomplished merely
through abstract lists and categories of impairments.
The inquiry is, of necessity, an individualized one—
whether the particular impairment constitutes for the
particular person a significant barrier to employ-
ment.” Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th
Cir. 1986).
The EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing
Title I of the ADA, also interprets the statute as
requiring an individualized analysis of whether an
individual has a disability. In explanatory material
accompanying its regulations interpreting Title I of
the ADA, the EEOC explains in detail the need for
an individualized determination of whether an im-
pairment substantially limits a major life activity:
Determining whether a physical or mental im-
pairment exists is only the first step in deter-
mining whether or not an individual is disabled.
Many impairments do not impact an individual’s
life to the degree that they constitute disabling
impairments. An impairment rises to the level
of disability if the impairment substantially
limits one or more of the individual’s major life
activities. Multiple impairments that combine
to substantially limit one or more of an individ-
ual’s major life activities also constitute a dis-
ability.
The ADA and this part, like the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, do not attempt a “laundry list” of
impairments that are “disabilities.” The deter-
mination of whether an individual has a disabil-
was passed, and the ADA’s legislative history confirms the
Rehabilitation Act as the source of the ADA definition.
S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) ; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt.
2, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 332;
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U. S. C. C. A. N. 445, 450.
11
ity is not necessarily based on the name or diag-
nosis of the impairment the person has, but
rather on the effect of that impairment on the
life of the individual. Some impairments may
be disabling for particular individuals but not
for others, depending on the stage of the disease
or disorder, the presence of other impairments
that combine to make the impairment disabling
or any number of other factors.
29 C. F. R. § 1630 App. (Section 1630.2 (j) Substan-
tially limits).
The agency’s position, that whether a person is an
“individual with a disability” depends upon the degree
to which the impairment affects the individual’s major
life activities, is consistent with the statutory lan-
guage. Indeed, in its Technical Assistance Manual on
the ADA, the EEOC stresses that “the determination
as to whether an individual is substantially limited
must always be based on the effect of an impairment
on that individual’s life activities.” EEOC Technical
Assistance Manual at II-4 (emphasis in original).
In Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), t. is
Court conducted the necessary individualized analysis
to determine that the individual in question was an
“individual with a disability” protected by the ADA.
First, the Court considered whether Abbott had an
“impairment.” Jd. at 2202. Having determined that
she did, the Court then considered whether the im-
pairment substantially limited Abbott in a major life
activity. Id. at 2205. Only then, after considering
the medical evidence, did the Court conclude that
Abbott was an “individual with a disability” protected
by the ADA. Id. at 2207.5
5 Having done so, the Court declined to address specifically
whether per se disabilities could exist under the ADA. Id. at
2207.
12
Likewise, this Court has conducted the individual-
ized analysis required by the Rehabilitation Act be-
fore determining that a plaintiff was covered by the
statute. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273 (1987), involved a teacher who was termi-
nated because her tuberculosis which had been in re-
mission for twenty years, recurred three times in two
years, and the school board feared contagion. Id. at
276. This Court’s holding in Arline was that a person
who meets the statutory definition of an individual
with a disability is not disqualified from the protected
class merely because the disability poses a threat of
contagion. As part of its reasoning in Arline, how-
ever, this Court carefully considered the statutory
definition before determining that Arline was a mem-
ber of the protected class. The Court based this con-
clusion on the individualized evidence presented by
the plaintiff about the extent to which her major life
activities had been limited by her impairment. For
this reason, the Court ruled, Arline had a “record”
of a disability that placed her within the protected
class. Id. at 281.
Since the ADA requires that an individualized
analysis be conducted to determine if an individual
has a disability, no impairment can be a disability
per se. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits both have
stated expressly that the ADA covers no disabilities
per se. Ennis v. National Ass’n of Business & Educ.
Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995); Baert v.
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir.
1998). The Seventh Circuit pointed out that per se
disabilities cannot exist even when a disease, “as a
practical matter” may always be found to be disabl-
ing. Id. at 631. In Ennis, the Fourth Circuit found
that:
-—-—_ K — —
13
the plain lan of the provision requires that
a finding of disability be made on an individual-
[by]-individual basis. The term ‘disability’ is
specifically defined, for each of subparts (A),
(B), and (C), “with respect to the individual,”
and the individualized focus is reinforced by the
requirement that the underlying impairment sub-
stantially limit a major life activity of the
individual.
> * * *
Were we to hold that A. J. was disabled under
the ADA, therefore, we would have to conclude
that HIV-positive status is per se a disability.
The plain language of the statute, which contem-
plates case-by-case determinations of whether
a given impairment substantially limits a major
life activity, whether an individual has a record
of such a substantially limiting impairment, or
whether an individual is being perceived as hav-
ing such a substantially limiting impairment,
simply would not permit this a [sic] conclusion.
Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
The Ninth Circuit failed to make this individual-
ized analysis to determine whether Kirkingburg was
substantially limited in a major life activity. Instead,
the court found that “the appropriate inquiry in cases
such as this is whether, as a result of a physical im-
pairment, the individual is required to perform a
major life activity in a different manner from other
persons.” Kirkingburg, 143 F.3d at 1232 n.4. The
Ninth Circuit thus ignored the pivotal statutory defi-
nition, which requires the court to examine whether
an individual is actually limited.“
If the Ninth Circuit had considered whether Respondent’s
condition substantially limited his major life activities, it
might have reached a different conclusion. For example, in
14
B. Congress Did Not Provide for Per Se Disabilities
Under the ADA
The legislative history of the ADA supports the
interpretation that the Act’s protection extends only
to those individuals actually limited in a major life
activity as a result of an impairment. The Committee
Reports state unequivocally that “[a] physical or
mental impairment does not constitute a disability
under the first prong of the definition for purposes
of the ADA unless its severity is such that it results
in a ‘substantial limitation’ of one or more major life
activities.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334; S. Rep. No.
101-116, at 22. As the Reports explain, “[a] person
is considered an individual with a disability for pur-
poses of the first prong of the definition when the
individual’s important life activities are restricted as
to the conditions, manner, or duration under which
they can be performed in comparison to most people.”
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at
22.7 Once again, Congress utilized language showing
that it intended to protect individuals who were re-
stricted as compared to others.
The approach taken by Congress was a functional
one, as is evident from the example in the Committee
Reports:
Still v. Freeport-McCoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50 (5th Cir. 1997),
the Fifth Circuit conducted the individualized analysis re-
quired by the statute and determined that a plaintiff with
partial blindness was not an individual with a disability be-
cause he was not substantially limited in performing normal
daily activities.
7The EEOC adopted these factors to define what is sub-
stantially limiting” in its regulations interpreting Title I of
the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1) (ii).
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N, at 334; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 22. This
example confirms that Congress was focusing not on
the abstract effects of a given impairment, but on
how the individual actually was limited on a func-
tional basis in performing the major life activity.
The Ninth Circuit erroneously focused on the im-
pairment to Kirkingburg’s eye, rather than on the
extent to which it actually limited him in seeing. The
Ninth Circuit’s analysis effectively labels monocular
vision a per se disability, contrary to the language of
the statute.
The statutory definition of “disability” mandates
an individualized inquiry into whether a physical or
mental impairment substantially limits the individual
in one or more major life activities. To declare, by
judicial fiat, that an impairment is per se a disability
undermines this important concept. Accordingly, this
Court should make clear that there are no per se
disabilities under the ADA.
C. Recognizing Per Se Disabilities Would Compromise
the Goals of the ADA
Throughout debate and passage of the ADA, Con-
gressional sponsors reiterated the statute’s important
goal of extending opportunities to individuals with
disabilities. As Senator Harkin stated, “For too long,
individuals with disabilities have been excluded, segre-
gated, and otherwise denied equal, effective, and
meaningful opportunity to participate in the economic
16
and social mainstream of American life. It is time
we eliminate these injustices.” 135 Cong. Rec. 810711
(daily ed. September 7, 1989). This statement re-
veals that the purpose of the ADA is to extend statu-
tory protection to those individuals who have dis-
abilities that severely restrict their participation in
activities that others enjoy. It is not intended to pro-
vide a vehicle for others to obtain protection to which
they are not entitled. Creating coverage under the
ADA for individuals based merely on the name of an
impairment will expand the protected class well be-
yond the statutory definition, and create substantial
problems for employers and employees.
In particular, an overly expansive reading of the
protected class could well compromise the rights cre-
ated by the ADA for those truly in need of statutory
protection. The ADA requires that employers pro-
vide reasonable accommodation to individuals with
disabilities unless doing so would impose an “undue
hardship” on the employer’s business. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(5)(a). While some accommodations, taken
alone, will not impose an undue hardship, a number
of accommodations in the aggregate may well reach
that level. The greater the number of individuals en-
titled to accommodation, the sooner it is likely that
the next person to need an accommodation will be
denied one because providing the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s
business.
In addition, an overly broad interpretation of the
statutory definition also increases the possibility that
the ADA will become a vehicle for employees with
poor performance records to seek special rights in
the workplace. Commissioner Russell G. Redenbaugh
of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has voiced
these very concerns. In his statement included in the
17
Commission’s 1998 report on the ALA, Commissioner
Redenbaugh, a blind individual, suggests that a broad
reading of the ADA will impact individuals with dis-
abilities negatively.
An over-expansive lication of ADA may cre-
ate the impression that members of the class it
protects become what is termed in human re-
sources jargon “fire proof.” The impression (and
sometimes the reality) can also be that the “nor-
mal” standard (i.e., that if you are disabled and
can do the job you are protected by the ADA)
becomes distorted to the extent it becomes a tool
which an employee may use to become “fire
proof.”
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Helping
Employers Comply with the ADA 280 (1998). As
another commentator observed: “Both just cause pro-
tection and the right to demand reasonable accommo-
dation serve as powerful incentives for individuals to
seek protection under the ADA. Employees can obtain
protection before their employers have taken adverse
employment action.” Erica W. Harris, Controlled Im-
pairments Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: A Search For the Meaning of Disability, 73
Washington L. Rev. 575, 585 (1998).
EEAC’s and the Chamber’s members have a long
history of providing equal employment opportunities
for individuals with disabilities, and a strong com-
mitment to nondiscrimination. These exemplary em-
ployers support the goals of the ADA as applied to
individuals with disabilities. Those goals will become
clouded, however, if the expansion of the definition of
what constitutes a disability under the ADA is ex-
panded to recognize certain conditions as per se dis-
abilities.
II. THE ADA PERMITS EMPLOYERS TO USE PHYSI-
CAL CRITERIA TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN
INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY IS “QUALI-
FIED”
A. The ADA Permits Employers to Rely on a Federal
Regulation or Other Federal Standards With Phy-
sical Criteria
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in
employment against a “qualified individual with a
disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), defined as an in-
dividual with a disability who, with or without reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential func-
tions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. §12111(8). The em-
ployer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are
“essential” must be considered. Jd. The ADA ex-
plicitly permits an employer to use “qualification
standards, tests or selection criteria” even though
doing so may screen out individuals with disabilities,
provided that the employer can show that the stand-
ard, test or criterion is “job related and consistent
with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. 5 12113 (a).
The ADA’s legislative history reflects the drafters’
concern that government standards established for
safety and security sensitive positions be preserved,
stating unequivocally that the ADA is not intended
to “override any legitimate medical standards estab-
lished by federal, state or local law, or by employers
for applicants for safety or security sensitive posi-
tions, if the medical standards are consistent with
[the ADA].” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 43
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 446;
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558, at 57-58 (1990).
The EEOC’s interpretation of the ADA also sup-
ports this conclusion. According to the EEOC, “[t]he
ADA does not override health and safety require-
19
ments established under other Federal laws. If a
standard is required by another Federal law, an em-
ployer must comply with it and does not have to show
that the standard is job related and consistent with
business necessity.” EEOC Technical Assistance Man-
ual at IV-16 (emphasis added). As examples, the
EEOC states that “[a]n employee who is being hired
to drive a vehicle in interstate commerce must meet
safety requirements established by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation. Employers also must con-
form to health and safety requirements of the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.” Id.
The Rehabilitation Act also permits an employer to
rely on federal safety standards. In Chandler v. City
of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1895 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1011 (1994), plaintiffs contended
that the city’s Driver Safety Program, which used
standards based on Department of Transportation
safety regulations that prohibit the employment of
drivers with certain vision impairments and insulin-
dependent diabetes, violated the Rehabilitation Act.
The Fifth Circuit determined that the drivers were
unqualified and held as a matter of law that “a
driver with insulin-dependent diabetes or with vision
that is impaired to the extent discussed in 49 C. F. R.
§ 391.41 presents a genuine substantial risk that he
could injure himself or others.” Jd. at 1395. In con-
cluding that individuals with such impairments could
not be qualified because they could not meet the physi-
cal qualifications set forth for drivers by the Depart-
ment of Transportation, the Fifth Circuit relied on
the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act, ob-
serving that the “definition of a qualified handicapped
individual also includes a personal safety require-
ment—an otherwise qualified handicapped individual
is defined as one who ‘can perform the essential func-
20
tions of the position in question without endangering
the health and safety of the individual or others.’”
Id. at 1393. Indeed, the court warned, Woe unto the
employer who put such an employee behind the wheel
of a vehicle owned by the employer which is involved
in a vehicular accident.” Id.
Thus, the legislative history, the EEOC’s guidance,
and the Rehabilitation Act all support the conclusion
that employers may use federal safety standards as
selection criteria without violating the ADA. Employ-
ers need not even demonstrate that the standard is
job related and consistent with business necessity. A
contrary interpretation of the ADA would compro-
mise the safety of the public and lead to confusion as
to an employer’s obligation under federal law.
B. The ADA Also Permits Employers to Use Physical
Criteria Other Than Federal Standards to Determine
Whether an Individual Is Qualified When the Safety
of Others Is at Issue
Where appropriate, the ADA also permits employ-
ers to use minimum medical criteria as qualification
standards even where they are not mandated to do so
by law. As noted above, the ADA’s legislative history
states that Congress did not intend that the ADA
“override any legitimate medical standards estab-
lished by federal, state or local law, or by employers
for applicants for safety or security sensitive posi-
tions, if the medical standards are consistent with
[the ADA].” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 43,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 466; H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 101-558, at 57-58 (emphasis added).* In-
8 With limited exception, the legislative history reveals that
Congress intended to prohibit employers from using stand-
ards that resulted in a blanket exclusion of individuals with
certain disabilities. This general prohibition is distinct from
what Congress did intend for employers to utilize, i.e., stand-
21
deed, “Under the legislation an employer may still
devise physical and other job criteria and tests for a
job so long as the criteria or tests are job-related and
consistent with business necessity.” S. Rep. No. 101-
116, at 27.
In explaining what medical examinations for em-
ployees might be “job related and consistent with
business necessity,” the House Labor Committee
stated:
Section 102(c)(4) prohibits medical exams of
employees unless job related and consistent with
business necessity. Certain jobs require periodic
physicals in order to determine fitness for duty.
For example, Federal safety regulations require
bus and truck drivers to have a medical exam
at least biennially. In certain industries, such as
air transportation, physical qualifications for
some employees are critical. Those employees,
for example, pilots, may have to meet medical
standards established by Federal, State or local
law or regulation, or otherwise fulfill require-
ments for obtaining a medical certificate, as a
prerequisite for employment. In other instances,
because a particular job function may have a
significant impact on public safety, e.g. flight
attendants, an employee’s state of health is im-
portant in establishing job qualifications, even
though a medical certificate might not be re-
quired by law.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74, reprinted in 1990
U.S. C. C. A. N. at 356-57 (emphasis added). Similarly,
the Conference Report explains:
ards based on certain physical abilities. See S. Lab. Rep. No.
101-116, at 27. This is an important distinction, because
standards based on physical abilities address the individual’s
ability to do a certain essential function of the job, regardless
of the type of disability an individual may have.
22
In certain industries, such as air transporta-
tion, applicants for security and safety related
positions are normally chosen on the basis of
many competitive factors, some of which are
identified as a result of post-offer pre-employ-
ment medical examinations. Thus, after the em-
ployer receives the results of the post-offer med-
ical examination for applicants for safety or
security sensitive positions, only those applicants
who meet the employer’s criteria for the job
must receive confirmed offers of employment, so
long as the employer does not use those results
of the exam to screen out qualified disabled in-
dividuals on the basis of disability.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558, at 59 (emphasis added).
Hence, the legislative history also supports an em-
ployer’s use of physical criteria beyond those promul-
gated by the federal government to determine qualifi-
cations to perform the essential functions of the job
as long as the criteria are job related and consistent
with business necessity.
The EEOC also confirms that an employer can use
physical standards to determine job qualifications. In
its interpretive guidance accompanying its ADA regu-
lations, the agency specifically ties the statutory pro-
vision allowing employers to use selection criteria
that are “job related and consistent with business
necessity” to selection criteria such as “safety require-
ments, vision or hearing requirements, walking re-
quirements, [and] lifting requirements. 29
C.F.R. § 1630 App. (Section 1630.10 Qualifications,
Standards, Tests and Other Selection Criteria) .®
® Thus, it would be inaccurate to subject such physical
qualification standards to the more stringent “direct threat“
analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (b). Congress took the “direct
threat” standard, which requires an individualized analysis,
from School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
23
The statutory language and legislative history cited
above strongly indicate that Congress could not have
meant for an individualized analysis to be conducted
every time a qualification standard is at issue. The
meaning of “standard” is “an acknowledged measure
of comparison for quantitative or qualitative value.”
The American Heritage Dictionary (2d ed. 1982).
The whole point of setting qualification standards is
to be able to compare individuals, regardless of
whether they have disabilities, by some objective
measure that the employer ties to the function and
purpose of the job. The standards themselves cannot,
if employers are expected to run businesses, be anal-
yzed on a case by case basis. Indeed, “[o]nce an
individual has admitted that he does not meet such a
necessary—as opposed to a merely convenient—stand-
ard, the Rehabilitation Act does not forbid the appli-
cation to him of a general rule.” Buck v. DOT, 56
F.3d 1406, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding the
Federal Highway Administration’s decision to decline
to waive its hearing requirements and allow deaf in-
dividuals to drive). See also Ward v. Skinner, 943
F.2d 157, 162-164 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding Secre-
tary of Transportation’s denial of waiver of DOT rule
excluding individuals with history of epilepsy from
(1987), in which this Court remanded the question of whether
a school teacher with tuberculosis was “otherwise qualified”
for her position despite the contagion, and required an in-
dividualized inquiry into the nature, duration, severity and
probability of the risk. Id. at 288. The rationale behind the
use of an individualized “direct threat” analysis in this con-
text is to prevent employers from making employment deci-
sions based on unfounded stereotypes associated with certain
types of disabilities. The use of physical criteria to set job
qualifications, however, does not require this individualized
analysis, because its focus is tied to the skills necessary to
achieve the purpose and function of the job, as opposed to
the traits associated with a certain disability.
24
driving commercial vehicles to plaintiff who had not
experienced seizure in seven years), cert. denied, 503
IJ. S. 959 (1992).
This Court previously has recognized that stand-
ards utilizing physical criteria to select qualified
applicants for participation in a federally-funded pro-
gram are acceptable in an analysis of the Rehabili-
tation Act. In Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), this Court held that an
individual with a hearing disability was not qualified
to participate in a nursing program due to the fact
that she could not communicate effectively in the pro-
gram. Noting that “[a]n otherwise qualified person
is one who is able to meet all of a program’s require-
ments in spite of his handicap,” id. at 407, this Court
found that physical qualifications may be part of the
program’s requirements, observing that Inlothing in
the language or history of § 504 [of the Rehabilita-
tion Act] reflects an intention to limit the freedom
of an educational institution to require reasonable
physical qualifications for admission to a clinical train-
ing program.” Id. at 415.
In Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E. D. Pa.
1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989), the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania also approved the use of
physical criteria to define qualification standards un-
der the Rehabilitation Act. The court reviewed a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) policy that
excluded all individuals wtih insulin-dependent dia-
betes from special agent and investigation specialist
positions. The court rejected the notion that an in-
10 It is important to note that this qualification standard
did not exclude all individuals with a certain disability.
Rather, it applied only to those with insulin-dependent
diabetes.
25
dividualized analysis should be conducted, since “there
exists no reliable method of determining in advance
those insulin-dependent diabetics who do not present
a substantial risk of having a sudden and unexpected
severe hypoglycemic episode while on a duty assign-
ment.“ Id. at 517.
In concluding that this policy did not violate the
Rehabilitation Act, the district court judge explained
why physical criteria used to establish job qualifica-
tions need not pass muster under an individualized
analysis:
. . . Congress’ intent in enacting the Rehabilita-
tion Act was not that employers must accept
applicants for jobs where eminently qualified
medical specialists are of the opinion that the job
requirements pose a reasonably probable risk
of harm to the applicant and others by reason
of the applicant’s “handicap,” in this case being
that of an insulin-dependent diabetic. Where, as
here, qualified medical opinion is divided as to
what is an acceptable degree of risk, a decision
must be made.
Id. at 520.
This Court first used the phrases “business neces-
sity” and “related to job performance” to establish
the employer’s burden in justifying selection criteria
with an adverse impact on a protected class under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v.
Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)
11 Since then, the Griggs standard was codified by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII to provide that
“TCajn unlawful employment practice based on disparate im-
pact is established under this subchapter only if a complain-
ing party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin and the
26
Since Griggs, the courts of appeals have applied this
rule in cases involving challenges to safety-related
qualification standards. For example, in Fitzpatrick
v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993), the
Eleventh Circuit examined the City of Atlanta’s
safety rule banning firefighters from wearing even
closely-shaved beards—because facial hair interferes
with the tight seal necessary for proper operation of
a respirator or self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA). Id. at 1114. The plaintiffs alleged that such
a policy had a disparate impact on African-American
males, who suffer disproportionately from a bacterial
disorder that precludes them from shaving their faces.
In finding that the City’s policy was consistent with
business necessity, the court held that “these safety
claims would afford the City an affirmative defense,
for protecting employees from workplace hazards is
a goal that, as a matter of law, has been found to
qualify as an important business goal for Title VII
purposes.” Jd. at 1119. As the Eleventh Circuit ex-
plained, “[m]easures demonstrably necessary to meet-
ing the goal of ensuring worker safety are therefore
deemed to be ‘required by business necessity’ under
Tit] VII.“ Id.
In analyzing this issue, the Eleventh Circuit cap-
tured the important policy reason why such safety
standards should be considered consistent with busi-
ness necessity: “The mere absence of unfortunate in-
cidents is not sufficient to establish the safety of
shadow beards; otherwise, safety measures could be
instituted only once accidents had occurred rather
than in order to avert accidents.” Id. at 1121. Al-
though the city was not required to comply with
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i).
27
Occupational Safety and Health standards, the court
looked to OSHA, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, and American National Standards
Institute standards, which are voluntary private in-
dustry standards, as validation for the safety reasons
behind the City’s policy. The court further found that
the plaintiffs were unable to show a less discrimina-
tory alternative that would meet the City’s legitimate
business need. Jd. at 1122.
The Eleventh Cireuit also rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the policy violated the Rehabilitation
Act, based on its analysis under Title VII:
Because of the conceptual similarity between the
Title VII less discriminatory alternative and
the §504 reasonable accommodation showings,
this same evidence suffices to carry the City’s
initial burden of showing that there exists no
reasonable accommodation that would permit the
firefighters to perform the essential function of
obtaining a safe seal on their SCBA’s without
being clean shaven.
Id. at 1127.
In addition to determining when facially neutral
selection criteria are consistent with “business neces-
sity” under Title VII in disparate impact cases, the
courts also have addressed whether employers can
intentionally exclude against an individual based
on a protected characteristic such as age or sex based
on a safety-related bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (“BFOQ”).” This Court previously has acknowl-
12 Under Title VII, classifications based on religion, sex, or
national origin are allowed “where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide ¢ cupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-2(e) (1). This same prin-
ciple is applicable to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (1).
28
edged that the “business necessity defense” under
Title VII (which is the applicable standard under the
ADA) is “more lenient for the employer than the
statutory BFOQ defense” under Title VII. Interna-
tional Union UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,
198 (1991). In Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977), this Court found that women could be ex-
cluded from prison guard positions in an all-male
maximum security prison because the “likelihood that
inmates would assault a woman because she was a
woman would pose a real threat not only to the victim
of the assault but also to the basic control of the
penitentiary and protection of its inmates and the
other security personnel.” Id. at 335. Similarly, in
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400
(1985), this Court endorsed the use of a two part
safety BFOQ defense in a case involving age related
safety standards for flight engineers, although affirm-
ing the appellate court’s ruling that the BFOQ stand-
ard was not met.
Thus, even when an employer is intentionally tar-
geting a certain protected group, this Court has found
that safety standards are allowed when safety con-
cerns are at issue. The use of physical criteria, how-
ever, does not intentionally target individuals with
disabilities, nor are they a proxy for some qualifica-
13 This Court rejected a BFOQ safety defense in Johnson
Controls, in which the employer excluded fertile women from
jobs that involved lead exposure. One primary reason for
doing so, however, was this Court’s finding that customer
safety was not at issue in the case, observing that the “(t]he
unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls’ female employees,
are neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essen-
tial to the business of battery manufacturing.” 499 U.S. at
203. This Court further noted that the employer did not
present medical evidence to substantiate a real risk to the
unborn fetuses. Id.
29
tion standards as age or sex were used in the cases
discussed above. Therefore, this Court should permit
employers to use physical criteria as qualifications as
long as they are job related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.
C. Public Policy Dictates That Employers Be Per-
mitted to Develop and
— a i cee Stentante
It is difficult to believe that Congress through
sage of the ADA intended to discourage the develop-
ment of safety standards in the workplace. A ruling
that employers cannot set qualification standards that
are job related and consistent with business necessity
to compare qualified applicants or employees could
achieve just such a result. It is an important goal
that businesses and industries collectively attempt to
self-regulate in the interest of public safety. Busi-
nesses may not, however, continue to make the effort
to participate in self-regulation if such efforts will
actually result in legal liability. Punishing employers
who adhere to legitimate safety standards will create
a disincentive to maintain needed safety standards.
Public policy dictates that employers be permitted
to develop and apply safety standards to determine if
an employee is qualified. Employers face bad pub-
licity if they are perceived as endangering the safety
of the general public. In addition, both private citi-
zens and the government can sue employers if an
employer's actions compromise the safety of the
public, or even natural resources.
A highly publicized incident that demonstra i
reality is the Exxon Valdez accident. — 2 rn
obligations under the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act, Exxon placed an individual with an alcohol prob-
lem in charge of a ship after he successfully completed
30
a rehabilitation program. Jon Cheney, EEOC v.
EXXON Corp.: Will Exxon’s Blanket Exclusion of
Former Substance Abusers Hold Up Under the ADA?
48 Baylor L. Rev. 549, 550 (1996). After the ship
hit a reef and starting spilling oil, Exxon “spent $2.5
billion dollars cleaning up the accident. Settling with
federal and state authorities for criminal charges and
civil libalities cost Exxon another $1 billion. And in
1994, an Alaska jury found Exxon reckless and as-
sessed record punitive damages of $5 billion.” Jd.
Employers must take preventive measures to ensure
that employees are able to perform the essential func-
tions of the job in a safe manner. An employer that
fails to do so will have a difficult time convincing a
jury that it should not be accountable for damages
because it was fulfilling its obligation under the ADA.
While compliance with the ADA, as a federal law,
may in theory preempt a state tort law claim as this
Court discussed in Johnson Controls, once an accident
has occurred, it will be difficult for an employer to
show that it could not tell at the time that imminent
danger was possible when standards, designed to show
what criteria are necessary, were available. See John-
son Controls, 499 U.S. at 209. Indeed, Justice White’s
concurring opinion notes, “it will be difficult for em-
ployers to determine in advance what will constitute
negligence.” Id. at 215.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici Equal Employ-
ment Advisory Council and The Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America respectfully
submit that the decision below should be reversed.
STEPHEN A. BOKAT
ROBIN S. CONRAD
SUSSAN MAHALLATI KYSELA
NATIONAL CHAMBER
LITIGATION CENTER, INC.
1615 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20062
(202) 463-5337
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Chamber of Commerce
of the United States
of America
Respectfully submitted,
ANN ELIZABETH REESMAN *
ConR L. FISCHEL
McGUINEss & WILLIAMS
1015 Fifteenth St., N. W.
Suite 1200
Washington, D. C. 20005
(202) 789-8600
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Equal Employment Advisory
Council
* Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.