Joint Appendix — El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie

Supreme Court brief1999

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No. 98-6

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1998

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY; CYPRUS FOOTE MINERAL COMPANY;

AND CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY,

PETITIONERS,

Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE; ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE; AND ZONNIE MARIE DANDY

RICHARDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF

HAROLD J. RICHARDS, SR.,

RESPONDENTS.

On Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

JOINT APPENDIX

James R. Atwood* Seth Richard Lesser*

COVINGTON & BURLING BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER

1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. & GROSSMAN LLP

P.O. Box 7566 1285 Avenue of the Americas

Washington, D.C., 20044-7566 New York, New York

(202) 662-6000 (212) 554-1400

Attorneys for Petitioners Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FILED JUNE 26, 1998

CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 13, 1998

Judgment, E/ Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie

(U.S.D.C. D. Arizona) (Jan. 5, 1996)

Verified Complaint, Neztsosie v. Rare Metals

Corp. (Court of the Navajo Nation, District

of Tuba City, Arizona) (Apr. 20, 1995)

Complaint, Cyprus Foote Minerai Co. v.

Richards (U.S.D.C. D. Arizona) (June 25,

Complaint, Richards v. Texas Zinc, et al.

(Court of the Navajo Nation, District of

Tuba City, Arizona) (Jan. 29, 1996)

Exhibit B: Order Denying Motion To

Dismiss, Richards v. Texas Zinc, et al.

(Court of the Navajo Nation, District of

Tuba City, Arizona) (Apr. 30, 1996)

Transcript of Proceedings and Order, El Paso

Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie (U.S.D.C.

D. Arizona) (May 28 & Nov. 3, 1996)

il

Order, Cyprus Foote Minerals Co. v. Richards,

(U.S.D.C. D. Arizona) (Nov. 21, 1996) ........ 72a

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit (as amended Apr. 27,

ISDE) . nce tb een 5 0 ae eee 74a

Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit Amending Opinion and

Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc

(Age. St, TRS) ws ht ve 6 ee eee 97a

la

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 96-0049-PCT-RGS

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY

Vv

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE

Date No. Description

1/5/96 I

1/5/96 2

1/5/96 = 3

2/14/96 6

COMPLAINT FILED (ms) [Entry date

01/10/96]

MOTION for preliminary injunction by pla

El Paso Natural Gas [2-1] (ms) [Entry date

01/10/96}

STATEMENT OF FACTS by pla El Paso

Natural Gas re motion for preliminary

injunction by pla El Paso Natural Gas [2-1]

(ms) [Entry date 01/10/96]

MOTION to dismiss plas complaint for

injunctive relief and declaratory judgment by

dft Laura Neztsosie, dft Arlinda Neztsosie

[6-1] (tmc) [Entry date 02/10/96]

-

2/14/96

3/8/96

3/12/96

3/12/96

3/27/96

5/28/96

7

10

12

12

13

15

2a

MEMORANDUM by dft Laura Neztsosie,

dft Arlinda Neztsosie in support of dfts

motion to dismiss plas complaint and in

opposition to plas application for

preliminary injunction [6-1], [2-1] (tmc)

{Entry date 02/16/96]

SUPPLEMENTAL by dfts Brief in response

to plas complaint for injunctive relief (tmc)

RESPONSE by pla El Paso Natural Gas to

motion to dismiss plas complaint for

injunctive relief and declaratory judgment by

dft Laura Neztsosie, dft Arlinda Neztsosie

[6-1] (tme)

REPLY by pla El Paso Natural Gas to

response {to motion for preliminary

injunction by pla El Paso Natural Gas [2-1]

(tmc)

SURREPLY by pla El Paso Natural Gas to

dfts’ supplemental brief [10-1] (ms) [Entry

date 03/28/96]

MINUTE ENTRY Judge Inits:) RGS Crt

Rptr: M. SANCHEZ granting in part

motion to dismiss plas complaint for

injunctive relief and declaratory judgment by

dft Laura Neztsosie, dft Arlinda Neztsosie

[6-1]. ORD denying in part motion for

preliminary injunction by pla El Paso

Natural Gas [2-1] FUR ORD that pltf post

bond in the amount of $1,000. See

transcript of details. [15] (qo) [Entry date

05/29/96]

11/6/96 29

11/14/96 30

$1,000.00 in support of this injunction

pursuant to FRCP 65(c) (cc: all counsel) re:

order [29-1] (tmc)

NOTICE of Preliminary Injunction Appeal

by El Paso Natural Gas from District Court

order [29-1] (cc: all counsel/9CCA/RGS

(jw) [Entry date 11/15/96}.

Date

6/25/96

6/25/96

8/2/96

8/2/96

8/2/96

4a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 96-01524-PCT-RGS

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERALS COMPANY

v.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS

No. Description

l COMPLAINT FILED (ms) [Entry date

06/27/96]

2 MOTION for preliminary injunction by plas

[2-1] (ms) [Entry date 06/27/96]

5 ANSWER by dft Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards (rew) [Entry date 08/07/96]

6 RESPONSE (Memorandum of points and

authorities in support of dft’s opposition) by

dft Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards to motion

for preliminary injunction by plas [2-1]

(rew) [Entry date 08/07/96]

7 DECLARATION of David K Ringwood by

dft Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards in support

of response in opposition [6-1], re motion

for preliminary injunction by plas [2-1] [2-1]

(rew) [Entry date 08/07/96]

8/12/96 8

11/26/96 10

11/27/96 11

11/27/96 12

Sa

REPLY MEMORANDUM in support by all

plas to response to motion for preliminary

injunction by plas [2-] (rew) [Entry date

08/14/96}

ORDER by Judge Roger G. Strand granting

in part and denying in part motion for

preliminary injunction by plas [2-1]; cash

bond approved in the amount of $1000.00 in

support of this injunction pursuant to FRCvP

65(c) (cc: all counsel/finance) (rew) [Edit

date 11/26/96}

NOTICE of Interlocutory Appeal by Cyprus

Foote Mineral, Cyprus Amax Minerals from

District Court order [10-1] (cc:

9CCA/cnsI/RGS) (rew) [Entry date

11/29/96}

NOTICE by all plas of filing cash bond in

support of injunction (rew) [Entry date

11/29/96}

6a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-17121

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY

Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE

No. 96-17139

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERALS COMPANY and

Date

11/26/96

12/4/96

CYPRUS AMAX MINERAL COMPANY

v.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS

Description

DOCKET CAUSE AND ENTERED APPEAR-

ANCES OF COUNSEL, CADS SENT (Y/N):

YES. Preliminary Injunction appeal. Briefing to be

established pursuant to Cir. R. 3-3. CADS is past

due; CADS must be filed no later than 12/3/96 for

Christopher Robbins. [96-17121] (dl) [96-17121]

DOCKETED CAUSE AND ENTERED APPEAR-

ANCES OF COUNSEL. CADS SENT (Y/N):

YES. Briefing to be established by MoAtt pursuant

to Cir.R.3-3. This is an appeal from an order re:

a Preliminary Injunction. [96-17139] (dl) [96-

17139}

12/6/96

12/6/96

12/16/96

12/31/96

1/8/97

7a

Filed aplts’ joint motion to consolidate preliminary

injunction appeals and to consolidate briefing

schedules in 96-17121 & 96-17139; [96-17121]

served on 12/5/96 to (MOATT). [3132999] (jr) [96-

17121]

Filed aplts’ joint motion to consolidate preliminary

injunction appeals and to consolidate briefing

scheduled in 96-17121 & 96-17139; [96-17139]

served on 12/4/96 to (MOATT). [3133007] (jr) [96-

17139]

Rec’d aplts’ (El Paso Natural Gas, Cyprus Foote,

et al) joint brief in 15 copies 21 pages & 5 excerpts

of record in 2 volumes (Informal: no) deficient

need motion to consolidate and corrected proof of

service; served on 6/12/96. Notified csl. [96-

17121, 96-17139] (jr) [96-17121 96-17139]

Filed order MOATT (SL) granting aplts unopposed

joint motion to cons cases 96-17121 and 96-117139.

The brfg schedule established in 96-17139 shall

govern these cons appeals. Aplts jt brf, excerpts of

record are due 12/26/96; aples’ brf due 1/23/97;

ROA is due 1/30/97; rpy brf is due 14 days from

svc of the aples brf. [96-17121, 96-17139] (ot) [96-

17121 96-17139}

Received Appellant El Paso Natural Gas in 96-

17121, Appellant Cyprus Foote Mineral in 96-

17139’s satisfaction of (major) brief deficiency

(amended proof of service of opening brief, served

12/13/96) (Inserted in brief) [96-17121, 96-17139]

(em) [96-17121, 96-17139]

ee a

1/8/97

1/13/97

1/29/97

5/5/97

2/11/98

2/25/98

8a

Filed original and 15 copies Appellant El Paso

Natural Gas in 96-17121, Appellant Cyprus Foote

Mineral in 96-17139, Appellant Cyprus Amax

Minerals in 96-17139 opening brief (Informal: n)

21 pages and five excerpts of record in 2 volumes;

served on 12/13/96 [96-17121, 96-17139] (em) [96-

17121, 96-17139]

Filed original and 15 copies aples’ joint 24 page

brief; served on 1/9/97. [96-17121, 96-17139] (jr)

[96-17121 96-17139]

Filed original and 15 copies aples’ joint reply

(Informal: no) 18 pages; served on 1/27/97. [96-

17121, 96-17139] (jr) [96-17121, 96-17139]

ARGUED AND SUBMITTED TO Harry

PREGERSON, Warren J. FERGUSON, Andrew J.

KLEINFELD [96-17121, 96-17139] (mlm) [96-

17121, 96-17139]

FILED OPINION: AFFIRMED ins part,

REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. (Termi-

nated on the Merits after Oral Hearing; Affirmed

(in part) and Reversed (in part); Written, Signed,

Published. Harry PREGERSON, author; Warren J.

FERGUSON; Andrew J. KLEINFELD, dissenting)

FILED AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. — [96-

17121, 96-17139] (jr) [96-17121, 96-17139]

[3401655] Filed original and 40 copies Appellant

Cyprus Foote Mineral and Cyprus Amax Minerals

96-17139 petition for rehearing with suggestion for

rehearing en banc 16 p.pages, served on 2/24/98

(counsel to sent amended cert of service indicating

2/25/98

4/27/98

5/5/98

5/6/98

6/12/98

9a

date) PANEL AND ACTIVE JUDGES [96-17139]

(em) [96-17139]

[3402252] Filed original and 40 copies aplt’s

petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing

en banc 19 pages; served on 2/25/98 to (PANEL &

ALL ACTIVE JUDGES). [96-17121] (jr) [96-

17121]

Filed order amending opinion and denying pet for

rhrg en banc and amended opinion (Judges Harry

PREGERSON, author, Warren J. FERGUSON,

Ancrew J. KLEINFELD, dissent) (Orig. opinion

id: [3392495-1] in 96-17121, [3392495-1] in 96-

17139) [(3402252-1] in 96-17121, [3401655-1] in

96-17139 [96-17121, 96-17139] (gail) [96-17121

96-17139]

Filed aplts’ motion to stay mandate pending filing

of petition for writ of certiorari; [96-17121, 96-

17139] served on 5/4/98 to (PREGERSON).

[3445943] [96-17121, 96-17139] ORIGINAL &

COPIES REC’D (hard copies) (jr) [96-17121 96-

17139}

Filed aples’ opposition to motion to stay madt;

served on 5/5/98 to (PREGERSON). [96-17121,

96-17139] (jr) [96-17121 96-17139]

Filed order (Harry PREGERSON) plaintiff-aplts’

motion to stay the mandate pending petition for writ

of certiorari is granted. [3445943-1] in 96-17121,

96-17139 [96-17121, 96-17139] (jr) [96-17121 96-

17139]

7/6/98

10/16/98

10a

Rec'd ntc from Supreme Court; petition for

certiorari filed. Supreme Court No. 98-6; filed on

6/26/98 & placed on the dkt 6/29/98 [96-17121,

96-17139] (jr) [96-17121 96-17139]

Received notice from Supreme Court, petition for

certiorari GRANTED on 10/13/98. Supreme Court

No. 98-6 (PANEL) (sm) [96-17121 96-17139]

_— a. on

lla

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,

a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,

Defendants.

No. CIV 96-0049-PCT-RGS

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY

("EPNG"), by and through counsel undersigned, states the

following in support of its Complaint for Injunctive Relief and

Declaratory Judgment:

JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

1.

EPNG is a Delaware corporation, licensed to do

business, and doing business, in the State of Arizona.

> —_~sedee~ ~- -

12a

Il.

Laura Neztsosie and Arlinda Neztsosie are enrolled

members of the Navajo Indian Tribe and reside on the Navajo

Nation Reservation near Tuba City, Arizona.

Il.

This Court has jurisdiction over this dispute

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337, and 2201, et seq.

Furthermore, either the relief sought by Plaintiff herein is

within the jurisdiction limits of this Court, or Plaintiff need

not demonstrate adherence to any jurisdictional amount

requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Finally, venue in this

Court is appropriate as to all Defendants.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

IV.

Plaintiff incorporates Paragraph I through III of this

Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

V.

From 1957 through 1968, EPNG, and its wholly-

owned subsidiary, Rare Metals Corporation of America, Inc.

("RMCA"), which was subsequently merged into EPNG and

ceased to exist in 1962, operated open-pit, class one uranium

mines in the Cameron/Tuba City area.

VI.

At all times relevant hereto, these uranium mines

and their remains were operated and maintained properly,

pursuant to all necessary licenses and permits, and in

13a

conformance with requirements imposed by all appropriate

regulatory authorities, including the Navajo Nation, the United

States Atomic Energy Commission, the United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, and the Arizona Atomic Energy

Commission.

Vil.

Throughout the time that EPNG and RMCA

operated the uranium mines, they sold to the United States

Atomic Energy Commission all of the uranium concentrate

mined, produced, processed, and ultimately milled, as a result

of uranium mining activities, pursuant to their operations

licenses with the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

Accordingly, all of EPNG’s activities at the mine sites, and

their surrounding areas, were performed pursuant to an

exclusive contract with the United States government.

VIL.

On April 20, 1995, Defendants Neztsosie filed a

Complaint against EPNG and its former defunct subsidiary,

RMCA,, in the Navajo Tribal Court, Tuba City District. (TC-

CV-0052-95)

IX.

The Complaint filed by Defendants Neztsosie

alleges that water collected in the Cameron mine pits, as a

result of uranium mining activities, was consumed by Laura

and Arlinda Neztsosie, and their livestock. Defendants

Neztsosie further allege that the same water also was used for

swimming, bathing, and washing clothes.

l4a

X.

The Neztsosie Defendants claimed that radioactive

substances gradually were released into the water, the

surrounding soil and the ambient air as a result of uranium

mining activities. Further, the Neztsosie Defendants assert

that, as a result of this alleged contamination, they have

suffered radioactive and heavy metal poisoning throughout

their lifetimes. The Neztsosies’ Complaint states causes of

action for negligence, strict liability based upon abnormally

dangerous activities, outrageous conduct, misrepresentation,

and fraud, all allegedly due to uranium mining activities. The

Neztsosie Defendants seek compensatory and punitive damages

against EPNG as a result of the described uranium mining

activities.

XI.

For its Answer to the Neztsosies’ Complaint in the

Navajo Tribal Court, EPNG affirmatively alleges that the

Navajo Tribal Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear

this case.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Request for Declaratory Relief)

XII.

Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs I through XI of

this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

XIll.

As there is a dispute regarding the substantial

federal question of whether the Navajo Tribal Court has

subject matter jurisdiction over the Neztsosies’ personal injury

15a

claims under the present circumstances, there is a justifiable

controversy between these parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201 ef seq.

XIV.

Because the activities and resulting damages alleged

in the Neztsosies’ Complaint in the Navajo Tribal Court

involved the mining, processing, milling and production of

uranium pursuant to an exclusive contract with the United

States government, as well as the comprehensive laws of the

United States, there exist overriding federal interests in this

matter such that the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over EPNG

and the subject matter of the Neztsosies’ Complaint would be

inconsistent with these overriding federal interests.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff EPNG prays this Court to

enter judgment for declaratory relief in its favor as follows:

A. That the Navajo Tribal Court has no

jurisdiction over EPNG or the subject matter of the

Neztsosies’ pending Complaint in the Navajo Tribal Court;

B. For Plaintiff's reasonable costs incurred

herein; and

Cc. For such other and further relief as the Court

may deem just and proper under the circumstances.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Request for Injunctive Relief)

XV.

Plaintiff incorporates Paragraphs | through XIV of

this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

16a

XVI.

Due to the content and nature of the Neztsosies’

allegations currently pending against EPNG in the Navajo

Tribal Court, EPNG has suffered, and continues to suffer,

immediate and irreparable harm.

XVII.

As a result of EPNG’s necessary efforts to defend

itself against the Neztsosies’ allegations in a tribal forum that

has no jurisdiction to hear this matter, EPNG has suffered and

continues to suffer immediate and irreparable harm.

XVIII.

The Neztsosie Defendants’ past and continuing

conduct in asserting the underlying personal injury claims

against EPNG in the Navajo Tribal Court have caused extreme

prejudice to EPNG, and is in direct violation of the rights of

EPNG.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff EPNG prays that this

Court grant its request for injunctive relief as follows:

A. A preliminary injunction and permanent

injunction barring the Neztsosie Defendants from maintaining

their underlying personal injury Complaint against EPNG, and

any of its subsidiaries, in the Navajo Tribal Court, inasmuch

as the Navajo Tribal Court possesses no jurisdiction to hear

that matter;

B. EPNG’s reasonable costs incurred in pursuit

of injunctive relief; and

Cc. For such other and further relief as the Court

may deem just and proper under the circumstances.

17a

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Sth day of

January, 1996.

O’CONNOR, CAVANAUGH,

ANDERSON, WESTOVER,

KILLINGSWORTH & BERESHEARS

By:

Richard J. Woods

Troy B. Froderman

Eric A. Mark

Attorneys for Plaintiff

and

Jamye Boone Ward, Co-Counsel

for Plaintiff

—— > ob

fe

ee te eR

18a

IN THE COURT OF THE NAVAJO NATION

DISTRICT OF TUBA CITY, ARIZONA

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,

Plaintiffs,

vs

RARE METALS CORPORATION and

EL PASO NATURAL GAS CORPORATION, and

all affiliates and assignees thereof,

Defendants.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS, ARLINDA

NEZTSOSIE AND LAURA NEZTSOSIE, by and through

their attorney, Cherie V. Daut, and file the following

Complaint:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction of this matter lies in the Navajo

Nation Court, Tuba City District, according to 7 N.T.C.

253(5), 7 Navajo Tribal Code section 133 (a,b,c,d,e), 7

Navajo Tribal Code section 254, 7 Navajo Tribal Code section

302, 7 Navajo Tribal Code section 6030610, 7 Navajo Tribal

Code section 651, Titlke 7 Navajo Tribal Code Section

602(a)(1), all of which provide for original jurisdiction in the

Tribal Courts of the Navajo Nation.

19a

¥ All Plaintiffs are Navajo Indians, all of

Defendants acts and emission took place solely on the Navajo

Nation Reservation. Venue in proper in Tuba City since all

transactions and occurrences took place in the Cameron and

Tuba City, Arizona areas, and is based on the current location

and convenience of the Plaintiffs.

3. Defendants or their affiliates or assignees,

owned and operated open pit uranium mines in_ the

Cameron/Tuba City area (Cameron mines) from

approximately 1950 to 1965. The Cameron mines were left

open and uncovered by Defendants during the mining

operations and upon the termination of Defendant's uranium

mining activities the Cameron mines remained open and

uncovered for many years.

4. Due to Defendants operation of the Cameron

mines the resultant open mining pits served as large collecting

areas for water which would have otherwise been scarce in the

Cameron/Tuba City arid climate.

5. Plaintiffs utilized the water which collected

in the Cameron mine pits, which were created by Defendants

mining operations, for drinking, bathing, swimming, clothes

laundering and stock watering, and as a result, Plaintiffs were

exposed to vast quantities of radioactive and non-radioactive

substances which were released into the Cameron mine water

and surrounding areas.

6. Defendants operation of the Cameron mines

into the water table from which plaintiffs utilized well water

for drinking, bathing, swimming, clothes laundering and stock

watering.

20a

7. Defendants operation of the Cameron mines

has caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe injuries and damages,

including severe health effects, emotion distress, annoyance

and discomfort, severe physical and mental impairment and

disability and fear of death, and as a result Plaintiffs have

incurred medical expenses, decreased earning capacity, pain,

suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and other past, present and

future economic and non-economic damages.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF - NEGLIGENCE

8. Plaintiffs repeat the allegation which are

contained in paragraphs | through 7 and incorporate them by

reference herein:

9. Plaintiffs Laura Neztsosie and Arlinda

Neztsosie have at all times lived in the Cameron Mines area.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendants operated the Cameron

Mines, where Defendants mined, accumulated, handled

uranium ore.

10. Defendants knew or should have known that

the hazardous materials which were generated from the mining

of uranium ore constituted a grave risk to the health of

persons who might have come in contact with it, including the

Plaintiffs, and that care and caution should have been

exercised in the handling of such materials.

11. As a direct and proximate result of the

Defendants’ failure to properly, safely and adequately contain

waste has migrated off-site where it has entered the ground

and surface water which is, and has been, utilized by the

Plaintiffs.

2la

12. Uranium and uranium mining waste

continues to leave the Cameron mine sites which were created

by Defendants and are a continuing and ongoing source of

contamination to water, land and air, as well as to animals

(sheep and cattle) which are owned and consumed by

Plaintiffs.

13. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs to use

reasonable care in the handling and disposal of the hazardous

radioactive and toxic materials which were produced as a

result of their creation and operation of the Cameron uranium

mines.

14. Defendants negligently caused or permitted

radioactive and toxic emission to be released from the

Cameron uranium mines. These emissions were regularly

carried by ground water and soil and contaminated the

properties and air where Plaintiffs resided.

15. Defendants also negligently failed to warn

Plaintiffs of the potential for leakage and actual leakage of the

hazardous radioactive and toxic materials into the air, ground

water and soil in the vicinities of the Cameron uranium mines.

16. As a direct and proximate result of

Defendants’ breach of duty, Plaintiffs sustained severe injuries

and losses, including but not limited to emotion distress and

fear, severe physical injury, loss of enjoyment of life, and

17. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiffs

by failing to properly control and contain the radioactive

and/or hazardous materials which were produced by

Defendants mining activities at the Cameron mines, by

negligently releasing the radioactive and/or hazardous

materials into the air and allowing radioactive materials to

22a

migrate or leach into the ground water, surface water, rivers

and soil in the vicinity.

18. These releases and contamination of the air,

ground water, surface water, rivers and soil in the vicinity of

the Cameron mines were proximately caused by Defendants

and the results were aggravated by the negligent acts and/or

emissions of the Defendants including, but not limited to, the

following:

(A) permitting the emissions, releases and leaks

of radioactive and/or hazardous materials from the Cameron

mines to occur;

(B) failing to determine where and how the

emissions, releases and leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous

materials occurred and in failing to correct the problems to

prevent further leakage and emissions:

(C) failing to provide adequate containment of

the radioactive and/or hazardous material;

(D) failing to provide adequate air, surface

water, ground water, rivers and soil sampling and/or

monitoring to detect releases of radioactive and/or hazardous

materials;

(E) failing to take proper measurements of

particle sizes and emissions;

(F) failing to test uranium ores adequately for

the presence of hazardous or toxic materials;

(G) failing to timely and adequately warn or

otherwise notify Plaintiffs of such contamination and to

prevent recurring releases:

23a

(H) failing to take timely and adequate remedial

actions to contain and clean-up such contamination and to

prevent recurring releases;

(I) failing to properly train and supervise

Defendants employees to insure that the necessary safeguards

and procedures would be followed in the event that any

emissions, releases or leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous

materials from the Cameron mines and properties might

occur:

(J) failing to comply with applicable Navajo

Tribal laws;

(K) completely failing to construct and implement

remedial measures for containing radioactive and heavy metal

releases from the open pit mines and uranium tailing areas of

the Cameron mines. As a direct and proximate result of

Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs sustained severe injuries and

damages.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY -

STRICT LIABILITY

19. ‘Plaintiffs repeat the allegations which are

contained in Paragraphs 1 through 18 and incorporate them by

reference herein.

20. Defendants operated the Cameron mines in

a manner that created emissions containing high concentrations

of radioactive materials and toxic metals including but not

limited to the following: uranium, copper, manganese,

magnesium, molybdenum, sodium, chloride, sulfate, fluoride,

silica, barium, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, iron,

lead, nickel, silver, strontium, vanadium, zinc, aluminum,

24a

lithium, radium 226, uranium 238, uranium 234, uranium

235, radon 228, radon222, selenium, plutonium, lanthandies

including cerium, luropium, lanthium, gallium, thorium,

arsenic, mercury, and nitrates, as well as alpha, beta and

gamma radiation, and other radioactive and toxic chemicals

and particularities which is, as such, as a non-natural use of

land and as such, constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity

which created risks to Plaintiffs and others.

21. Defendant’s open pit mining of radioactive

and non radioactive hazardous substances as indicated in

Paragraph 20 supra is an abnormally dangers activity or ultra

hazardous activity, i.e., one which necessarily involves a risk

of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which

cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care and is

not a matter of common usage.

22. Defendants area strictly liable to Plaintiff for

all damages and injuries which have resulted and will result

from the open pit mining of radioactive and non-radioactive

hazardous substances as indicated in Paragraph 20 supra at the

Cameron uranium mines.

23. Defendants’ open pit mining of radioactive

and non radioactive materials at the Cameron uranium mines

have directly and proximately caused releases of such

substances into the environment surround the Cameron

uranium mines. As a direct and proximate result of

Defendant’s operation of the Cameron uranium mines in the

aforesaid manner, Plaintiffs suffered the aforementioned

injuries and damages to themselves for which Defendants are

strictly liable.

—

25a

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT

24. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations which are

contained in Paragraphs | through 23 and incorporate them by

reference herein.

25. The actions and inactions of Defendants

complained of herein are so outrageous in character and so

extreme in degree as to compel a reasonable person in the

Navajo community to declare the same as atrocious, beyond

all bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

Navajo community.

26. Asa direct and proximate result of the above

conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional distress and

have injured and damaged as alleged herein.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

MISREPRESENTATION/FRAUD AND DECEIT

27. Plaintiffs repeat the allegation which are

contained in Paragraphs | through 26 and incorporate them by

reference.

28. Defendants failed, both negligent and

intentionally, to disclose to Plaintiffs, material facts which

were known concerning the nature, magnitude and effects of

the releases of the exposure to radioactive and other hazardous

substances which were produced by Deferdant’s open pit

mining operations at the Cameron mines.

29. Defendants knew of and _ concealed,

misrepresented and failed to disclose the true facts which the

intention of creating a false impression of the actual facts in

the minds of Plaintiffs, and with the intent that Plaintiffs be

26a

lulled into complacency and refrain from seeking redress or

pursuing remedial action due to the development of Plaintiffs’

severe physical injuries.

30. ‘Plaintiffs reasonably believe Defendants’

misrepresentation and relied upon the same in refraining until

the present from seeking redress of pursuing remedial action.

As a direct result of Defendants’ negligent and/or intentionally

false and deceptive representations and Plaintiff's reasonable

relief of and reliance thereon, many of the injuries and

damages to Plaintiffs «rising out of the releases of hazardous

substances into the environment were compounded by the

passage of time and direct, daily exposure of Plaintiffs to

same.

31. Asa direct and proximate result of the above

conduct, Plaintiffs have been injured and damaged as alleged

herein.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST ALL

DEFENDANTS

32. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations which are in

Paragraph 1 through 31 above and incorporates them by

reference herein.

33. The actions of Defendants complained of

herein were attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, and

insult, and the wanton and reckless disregard for Plaintiffs

health and well being to and award of exemplary damages.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays that judgment be

entered in their favor and against Defendants for

27a

compensatory damages, consequential damages, special

damages and exemplary damages, reasonable costs and

expenses associated with this litigation, including attorney's

fees and such other and further relief as this Court deems just

and proper.

Cherie V. Daut,

Attorney for Plaintiffs’

Laura Neztsosie and

Arlinda Neztsosie

P.O. Box 1357

Shiprock, New Mexico 87420

(505) 368-5878

and

Rebecca Lorenz -——_—NO

Attorney at Law

Melat, Pressman, Ezell and Higby

Attorney at Law

711 South Tejon

Colorado Springs

CO 80903

[April 20, 1995]

28a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERAL COMPANY,

a Pennsylvania corporation;

CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY,

a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS,

individually and as representative of the

Estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr.,

Defendants.

No. 96-1524-PHX-RGS

COMPLAINT

1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

1. This is an action by which plaintiffs Cyprus

Foote Mineral Company and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company

(collectively, "Cyprus") seek declaratory and injunctive relief

to bar the prosecution of a lawsuit entitled Zonnie Marie

Dandy Richards (The Estates of Harold J. Richards, Sr.,

Deceased) v. Texas Zinc, Vanadium Corporation of America,

Atlas Corporation, and all affiliates, joint venturers and

assignees thereof, pending in the District Court of the Navajo

Nation, Kayenta District, ("Navajo Tribal Court"), No. KY-

CV-002-95 (the "Tribal Court Suit"). The Tribal Court Suit

29a

is “patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions"

established by the Price Anderson Act, as amended, 42

U.S.C. § 2210 et seq. , and the exclusive federal control of the

_ entire field of nuclear safety.

Il. THE PARTIES

2. Cyprus Foote Mineral Company is a

corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State

of Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in Kings

Mountain, North Carolina. Cyprus Amax Minerals Company

is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the

State of Delaware with its principal place of business in

Denver, Colorado. Cyprus Amax Minerals Company is the

parent of Cyprus Foote Mineral Company. Cyprus is the

successor by merger of Vanadium Corporation of America

("VCA") and Foote Mineral Company ("Foote"). Under AEC

Source Material License No. SUA-547, VCA operated the

Monument No. 2 uranium mine and concentrator from

approximately 1943 through 1967. In 1967, VCA was

merged with Foote. The Monument No. 2 facility was closed

during or shortly before 1969.

. 3. Defendant Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards,

individually and as representative of the Estate of Harold J.

Richards, Sr. ("Richards"), is a member of the Navajo Nation

and upon information and belief resides on that portion of the

Navajo Nation within the borders of the State of Arizona. On

or about March 29, 1995, Richards filed the Tribal Court Suit

against "Texas Zinc, Vanadium Corporation of America, Atlas

thereof." On information and belief, the Cyprus defendants,

as successor to VCA, are the only defendants to have been

served with process in the Tribal Court Suit. On January 29,

1996, Richards filed a First Amended Verified Complaint in

30a

the Tribal Court Suit, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit

A.

lll. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This Court has jurisdiction of this action

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in that this is an action arising under

the Constitution, laws or treaties Of the United States,

particularly Art. 1, § 8 and An. VI, clause 2 of the

Constitution of the United States. Jurisdiction is also

conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) of the 1988

Amendments; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship, and

the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000, exclusive of

interest and costs), and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (Acts of Congress

regulating commerce).

5. Venue is proper in this Distriet pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that defendants reside in this District

and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

the plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District. Venue is also

conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) in that defendants’

Tribal Court Suit claims for “public liability” arising out of a

“nuclear incident” occurred in this District.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

ee 1946, when the first Atomic Energy

3la

uranium, the basic raw material essential © the production of

nuclear weapons. All of the MED functions were transferred

to the AEC by Executive Order No. 9816, effective December

31, 1946. The AEC was established by the Atomic Energy

Act of 1946 (Pub.L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755).

7. At the end of World War II, uranium

production in the United States was practically nonexistent and

the nation was dependent on small and unreliable foreign

supplies of uranium. Responding to urgent military

requirements, the AEC in 1947 instituted the Domestic

Uranium Procurement Program ("the Procurement Program").

The Procurement Program was designed to create a domestic

mining and milling industry to provide uranium concentrate

for the government's vital nuclear weapons program. The

Procurement Program was designed to fulfill the "paramount

objective of assuring the common defense and security” set

forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The Director of the

Procurement Program has stated that "[njo single material

ever has been so essential to our safety, or even to our

survival, as uranium.”

8. Both the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and

1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2210 et. seq.) provided that the federal

government would be the sole owner of uranium products.

Moreover, at all times material hereto, the AEC exercised and

safety control measures. See e.g. 10 CFR parts 20 and

The control of the federal government over the entire

of nuclear materials has been described as “unique,”

32a

development of a domestic uranium industry, the AEC entered

into contracts with several different companies, including

VCA, calling for the construction and operation of uranium

mills. These AEC contracts typically contained terms

specifying where and when the uranium mills would be built,

how they would be built, what their capacities would be, how

much ore would be processed quarterly, how the uranium

concentrate would be verified, sampled, assayed and

packaged, from whom and where the company could purchase

ore, and for how much the concentrate would be sold to the

AEC.

10. | Under AEC Source Material License No.

SUA-547, VCA mined uranium at the Monument No. 2 mine,

located in Cane Valley, Arizona. On information and belief,

prospecting began at that site in approximately 1943. During

the mid-1960’s, the grade of uranium ore extracted from the

Monument No. 2 mine became lower. Thus, pursuant to

AEC specifications and instructions, VCA constructed the

Monument No. 2 concentrator, which concentrated the

uranium ore before shipping for further milling at VCA’s

Naturita and Durango, Colorado mills, and after 1963, at

VCA’s mill in Shiprock, New Mexico. The remnants of the

ore concentrating process consisted of sand-like particles

known as uranium tailings. These tailings were stored on a

tailings pile on land adjacent to the concentrator and mine. In

1954, Congress made a finding that "byproduct material” is to

be regulated “in the national interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d).

Uranium tailings are “byproduct material." 42 U.S.C. §

2014(e).

(2) The Price-Anderson Act and the 1988

Amendments

11. In1957, Congress passed the Price-Anderson

Act to address liability and compensation for damages and

33a

injury which might be occasioned by the atomic energy

program.

12. Asamended in 1988, the Price-Anderson Act

provides for federal jurisdiction over “public liability

action{s].". The term "public liability action" means “any suit

asserting public liability." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). “Public

liability” means “any legal liability arising out of or resulting

from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation." 42

U.S.C. § 2014(w). "Nuclear incident" means “any

occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence,

within the United States causing bodily injury, sickness,

disease or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of

or use of property, arising of or resulting from the

radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of

source, special nuclear or byproduct material." Id. § 2014(q).

"Source material” includes the uranium ore mined at the

Monument No. 2 mine. “Byproduct material" includes

uranium mill tailings. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(2).

13. A “nuclear incident” may be sudden and

accidental or occur over a long period of time. S.Rep. No.

296, 85th Cong., Ist Session 16, reprinted in 1957 U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin. News 1803, 1817.

14. The Price-Anderson Act, as amended,

establishes a federal cause of action for radiation injuries,

establishes federal jurisdiction over that cause of action and

channels all legal liability to the federal courts for that cause

of action.

15. Acclaim growing out of any nuclear incident

is compensable under the terms of the Price-Anderson Act or

it is not compensable at all.

34a

16. Congress has completely occupied the field

of nuclear safety. Except to the extent specifically permitted

by Congress, neither States nor Indian Tribes, including their

courts, may assert authority or jurisdiction over any matter

touching this area. Congress has ceded no authority or

jurisdiction to Indian tribal courts to adjudicate “public

liability” actions.

(3) The Tribal Court Suit

17. As set forth in paragraph 3 above, Richards

filed suit against VCA and others on March 29, 1995 in

Navajo Tribal Court. On August 3, 1995, the Navajo Tribal

Court ordered the Foote Mineral Company, Cyprus Foote

Mineral Company and Cyrus Amax Mineral Company be

joined as defendants in the Tribal Court Suit. At the time the

Tribal Court Suit was filed, Cyprus was not transacting any

business within the Navajo Nation. No process was ever

personally served in the Tribal Court Suit upon Cyprus within

the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.

18. Cyprus filed a Motion for More Definite

Statement on September 19, 1995. By order dated January 3,

1995, the Navajo Tribal Court granted that motion. Thus,

Richards filed a First Amended Verified Complaint ("Tribal

Court Complaint") on January 29, 1995. Exhibit A. Cyprus

moved to dismiss the Tribal Court Suit for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction on February 29, 1996. By order dated

April 30, 1996, the Navajo Tribal Court denied that motion.

Exhibit B.

19. In the Tribal Court Complaint, Richards

alleges that Mr. Richards lived near the Monument No. 2

mine and concentrator as a child, between approximately 1950

through 1959. Richards also alleges that Mr. and Mrs.

Richards lived near a uranium mill in Mexican Hat, Utah

35a

from approximately 1959 through 1965. Cyprus and its

predecessors had no interest whatsoever in the Mexican Hat

uranium mill.

20. Richards generally alleges that "{a]s a result

of Defendants’ conduct of milling and mining uranium ore .

. . Vast quantities of both radioactive and non-radioactive

hazardous substances released into the environment . . . and

have caused and will cause Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased)

and Plaintiff Zonnie Richards to suffer injuries and damages,

including adverse health effects, terminal primary renal cell

carcinoma, emotional distress, and annoyance and discomfort

21. The Tribal Court Complaint contains seven

counts, including claims for wrongful death and loss of

consortium, based on theories of negligence, strict liability and

fraud. Each count seeks damages "in excess of ONE

HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000) DOLLARS and further

amounts that would fairly and accurately compensate [{Mrs.

Richards] for her damages. "

22. The Tribal Court Suit seeks to impose

"public liability" on Cyprus in an action arising out of a

“nuclear incident”.

23. The assertion of Tribal Court jurisdiction

over Cyprus in the Tribal Court Suit concerning the

transaction and occurrences set forth in the Complaint therein

constitute patent violations of express jurisdictional

eta a Gr canis a as

amended the exclusivity of federal law concerning

nuclear safety. vs

(4) EE! Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie

36a

24. Cyprus requests that the court take judicial

notice of the proceedings in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Laura

Neztsosie and Arlinda Neztsosie, CIV 96-0049-PCT-RGS. In

that action, the Neztsosies filed suit against El Paso Natural

Gas Co. ("EPNG") in Navajo Tribal Court, alleging that they

had suffered injuries resulting from EPNG’s operations of an

open pit uranium mine near Tuba City, Arizona. EPNG filed

an action in this district seeking declaratory and injunctive

relief on the ground that the Neztsosie’s Tribal Court Suit was

barred by express jurisdiction prohibitions in the Price-

Anderson Act, as amended.

25. A hearing was held on May 28, 1996 on

EPNG’s application for preliminary injunction before the

Honorable Roger G. Strand. Although no formal ruling has

been issued to date, Judge Strand indicated from the bench

that he would enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing claims for

relief in Navajo Tribal Court that constituted claims under the

Price Anderson Act.

COUNT ONE: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

26. Plaintiffs incorporated by reference all the

allegations of Paragraphs | through 23 of this Complaint.

27. Plaintiffs are “interested parties" within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2201. They seek a declaration of

their rights and legal relations concerning whether they are

obligated to appear in and defend themselves in the Tribal

Court Suit.

28. Specifically, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201,

et seq., plaintiffs requests declaratory judgment against

defendants that:

37a

a. That the Navajo Tribal Court is without

subject matter jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate any claims

against plaintiffs of the sort alleged in the Tribal Court Suit.

b. That any "judgment," “order” or

"decree" or the like which the defendants may procure from

the Navajo Tribal Court with respect to any such pending or

threatened suit against plaintiffs by defendants in null, void

and of no force and effect.

c. That the efforts and threatened efforts of

the defendants to pursue claims of the sort currently alleged

in the Tribal Court Suit are and wold be violative of plaintiffs’

rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed plaintiffs under

the Constitution, Treaties, and laws of the United States aud

of the State of Arizona.

COUNT TWO: INJUNCTION

29. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the

allegations of Paragraphs | through 26 of this Complaint.

30. Unless preliminary and permanently

enjoined, Richards will proceed with their present and

threatened actions seeking to require Cyprus to defend actions

in the Navajo Tribal Court, which actions purport to impose

"public liability" for a "nuclear incident" upon Cyprus, all

without jurisdiction over the subject matter of such suits.

31. Other than by this suit, Cyprus lacks an

adequate remedy at law and Richards’ actions and threatened

actions will cause Cyprus irreparable harm and injury.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, independently and in

furtherance of their requested declaratory judgment, pray that

this Court issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary

38a

injunction and permanent injunction enjoining defendants and

their agents from prosecuting or pursuing the Tribal Court

' Suit or commencing any similar claims or proceedings against

plaintiffs or their property in the Navajo Tribal Court or

otherwise than in this Court or in some Court of the State of

Arizona having jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Plaintiffs further request an aware of their costs

incurred in this matter, together with such other and further

relief, equitable and legal, to which they may be entitled.

DATED this 25th day of June, 1996.

LEWIS AND ROCA LLP

By

Tom Galbraith

R. Neil Taylor III

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

39a

EXHIBIT A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NAVAJO NATION

KAYENTA DISTRICT COURT

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS

the estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr.

(deceased)

Plaintiff,

vs.

TEXAS ZINC, VANADIUM CORPORATION OF

AMERICA, ATLAS CORPORATION, and all

affiliates joint venturers and assignees

thereof,

Defendants.

KY-CV-002-95

FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT

COMES NOW ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS, and

files the following VERIFIED COMPLAINT:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Jurisdiction of this matter lies in the Navajo Nation

Court, Kaventa District, according to 7 N.T.C. 253 (5), 7

Navajo Tribal Code Section 133 (a,b,c,d,e). 7 Navajo Tribal

Code Section 254, 7 Navajo Tribal Code Section 302, 7

Navajo Tribal Code Section 602-610, 7 Navajo Tribal Code

Section 651, Title 7 Navajo Tribal Code Section 602 (a) (1),

40a

all of which provide for original jurisdiction in the Tribal

Courts of the Navajo Nation.

2. The Plaintiff is a Navajo Indian and, all of the

Defendants’ acts and omissions took place solely on the

Navajo National Reservation. Venue is proper in Kayenta

based on the place or places where all transactions and

occurrences took place and the sites of the original injury

(Mexican Hat and Cane Valley) and is based on the current

location and convenience of the Plaintiff.

3 Texas Zinc Corporation, Atlas Corporation,

Vanadium Corporation of America, and their successors and

assignees partners, joint ventures and/or subdivision thereof

one another operated uranium mining and uranium milling

facilities in Mexican Hat, Utah and Cane Valley, Arizona.

4. From approximately 1950-1963 at various periods

of time Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased), husband of

Plaintiff Zonnie Richards resided at Defendants’ uranium

milling facilities in Mexican Hat, Utah and as a child at the

Cane Valley, VCA #2 Uranium mill and mine site, Arizona.

5. From 1950 to 1963, Plaintiff Harold J. Richards,

Sr. (deceased), C#116.384 was exposed to vanadium and

uranium and various radioactive substances and heavy metals

through his residence at Defendants’ Mexican Hat, Utah

uranium mill and as a child, at the Cane Valley, VCA #2

uranium mill and mine sites, Arizona.

6. Defendants operated the Mexican Hat and Cane

Valley uranium mine and mill, either as sole entities and/or as

partners, joint ventures and/or subdivisions or assignees

thereof of one another, from approximately 1950 to 1963.

Defendants produced vanadium and uranium concentrate from

raw ore which was mined from uranium mines through out the

4la

Navajo Nation Reservation and from VCA #2 (Cane Valley

mines) mine in Cane Valley where Harold Richards, Sr.

(deceased) resided as a child.

7. From 1959 to 1965, Mr. Richards (deceased),

resided in a small trailer located less than 50 yards away from

the Mexican Hat mill tailings pile.

8. Mr. Richards (deceased) resided with his parents at

the Vanadium Corporation of America (VCA #2 herein after)

Uranium Mill site in Cane Valley from approximately 1953 to

1959 when he was still a child.

9. From approximately 1953 to 1959, Mr. Richards

(deceased) resided with his parents at the VCA #2 site mill

less than 50 yards away from the VCA #2 mill in a residential

location which was provided by Defendants for VCA #2 mill

and mine workers so that they could walk to work at the VCA

#2 mill and mine.

10. During the time that Mr. Richards (deceased), as a

child, resided less than 50 yards away from the VCA #2 mill

site, no showers, bathing facilities or running water for daily

bathing or washing of clothes was available.

11. Asa result of Defendants’ conduct of milling and

mining uranium ore at Cane Valley and milling uranium ore

at Mexican Hat, Utah vast quantities of both radioactive and

non-radioactive hazardous substances released into the

environment at both the Cane Valley, VCA #2 mill site and

Mexican Hat mill site, and have caused and will cause Harold

Richards, Sr. (deceased) and Plaintiff Zonnie Richards to

suffer injuries and damages, including adverse health effects,

terminal primary renal cell carcinoma, emotional distress, and

annoyance and discomfort, physical and mental impairment

and disability, and fear of personal injury and death as well as

42a

loss of care, comfort and consortium and as a result, the

Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards has incurred medical

expenses and decreased earning capacity, pain and suffering,

loss of enjoyment of life, and other past, present and future

economic and non-economic damages.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

WRONGFUL DEATH OF

HAROLD J. RICHARDS, SR... NEGLIGENCE

12. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in

Paragraph | through 11 and incorporates them by reference

herein.

13. Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) was married to

Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards when they resided

together at the Mexican Hat mill site.

14. Harold J. Richards, Sr., (deceased), was born

December 4, 1936. From approximately 1955 to 1963, he

resided at either the Cane Valley, Arizona uranium mine and

uranium mill, as a child, Mexican Hat uranium mill with his

wife, Plaintiff, Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards. Harold

Richards, Sr. (deceased) was exposed to vanadium, uranium

and various radioactive substances and heavy metals through

his residence at the Defendants’ Cane Valley uranium mine

and mill, as a child, and Mexican Hat uranium mill areas

when he resided there with his wife, Plaintiff herein.

15. At the time of Harold Richard, Sr. (deceased) and

Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards residence in Mexican

Hat, Utah, they lived (50) yards away from Defendants

Mexican Hat uranium mill in a small trailer together. Plaintiff

Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards and Harold Richards, Sr.

(deceased) were allowed to live in such close proximity to the

Mexican Hat uranium mill by Defendants, herein, with

43a

Defendants’ full knowledge of this residence and its proximity

to the Mexican Hat uranium mill. At all times pertinent

hereto concerning the Mexican Hat uranium mill, Plaintiff

Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards and Harold Richards, Sr.

Sy ee ee a ene CIEE os tasband and

wife.

16. Asa result of Defendants’ conduct, i.e, the milling

of uranium and vanadium ores at Mexican Hat, Utah during

Plaintiff's husband Harold Richard, Sr. (deceased) residence

at the Mexican Hat mill, Plaintiff's husbaid Harold Richards,

Sr. (deceased) clothes, furniture, housewares, home and food

were contaminated with uranium ore dust, yellow cake and

toxic Chemical residue which came from Defendant's uranium

mill at Mexican Hat, Utah. These items were then handled,

laundered together, eaten, worn, sat upon and lived in or

otherwise came in contact with Mr. Richards (deceased) and

Plaintiff. Due to Defendants uranium milling activities in

Mexican Hat, Utah, excessive and deleterious quantities of

both radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous substances

were released into close proximity of Plaintiff Zonnie Marie

Dandy Richards and harold Richards, Sr. Mexican Hat

residence. Additionally due to Defendants uranium mining

and milling activities at Cane Valley at Harold Richard's Cane

Valley resided as a child.

Excessive and deleterious qualities of both radioactive and

non-radioactive hazardous substances were released into close

mental impairment and disability, and fear of personal injury

and death. As a result of defendants release of these

substances in both Mexican Hat and Cane Valley, Plaintiff

Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards and her deceased husband

44a

Harold Richards, Sr., have incurred and will incur in medical

expenses including decreased earning capacity, pain and

suffering, and death, loss of enjoyment of life, and other past,

present and future economic and non-economic damages.

17. During the years the Defendants operated and were

responsible for the Mexican Hat mill and Cane Valley

uranium mine and mill, Defendants accumulated, handled,

processed, treated, stored, burned, and otherwise disposed of

large quantities of radioactive and/or hazardous materials at

their property in Cane Valley, Arizona and Mexican Hat,

Utah.

18. Defendants knew or should have known that these

radioactive and/or hazardous materials and constituents posed

a hazard to the health and emotional well-being of Plaintiff

and her husband, Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased).

19. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff and to Harold

Richard, Sr. (Deceased) to use reasonable care in the handling

and disposal of the hazardous radioactive and toxic materials

used or produced at the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane

Valley uranium mine and mill.

20. Defendants negligently caused or permitted

radioactive and toxic emissions to be released from the

Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mill and

mine. These emissions were regularly carried by ground

water and soil and contaminated the properties and air where

Plaintiff and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) resided

21. Defendants also negligently failed to warn Plaintiff

and Harold Richards Sr. (deceased) of the potential for

leakage and actual leakage of the hazardous radioactive and

toxic materials into the ground water soil and in air of

Plaintiff and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) home or homes

4Sa

and the vicinities of the uranium mill as well as Plaintiff and

her husband's food, clothing and home environments.

22. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’

breach of duty, the Plaintiff and Harold Richards, Sr.

(deceased) sustained injuries and losses, including but not

limited to emotional distress and fear, physical injury, loss of

as yet unknown.

23. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff and

Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) by failing to properly control

and contain the radioactive and/or hazardous materials within

the confines of the facility and property which they owned, by

negligently releasing the radioactive and/or hazardous

materials into the air and allowing radioactive materials to

migrate or leach into the ground water, surface water, rivers

and soil in the vicinity of the Mexican Hat mill site and Cane

Valley mine and mill site where Harold Richards, Sr.

(decreased) resided

24. These releases and contaminations of the air,

ground water, surface water, rivers and soil in the vicinity of

the facilities of the Mexican Hat mill site and Cane Valley

mill and mines sites as well as Plaintiff's husband’s food,

clothing and home environment were proximately caused by

Defendants and the results were aggravated by the negligent

acts and/or emissions of the defendants including, but not

limited to, the following:

(A) permitting the emissions, releases and leaks of

radioactive and/or hazardous materials from the facility

and property to occur;

(B) failing to determine where and how the emissions,

releases and leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous

46a

materials occurred and in failing to correct the problems

to prevent further leakage and emissions,

(C) failing to provide adequate containment of the

radioactive and/or hazardous materials;

(D) failing to provide adequate air, surface water, ground

water, rivers and soil sampling and/or monitoring to

detect releases of radioactive and/or hazardous materials;

(E) failing to take proper measurements of particle sizes

and emissions;

(F) failing to test incoming ores adequately for the

presence of hazardous or toxic materials;

(G) failing to timely and adequately warn or otherwise

notify Plaintiff and her husband, Harold Richards, Sr.

(deceased) of such contamination and to prevent

reoccurring releases;

(H) failing to take timely and adequate remedial actions

to contain and clean up such contamination and to prevent

reoccurring releases,

(1) failing to property train and supervise their employee

to imsure that the necessary safeguards and procedures

would be followed in the event that any emissions,

releases or leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous materials

from the facility and property might occur;

(J) failing to comply with applicable Tribal laws,

(K) being negligent in the construction and

of remedial measures for containing

releases from the tailing ponds and operating facilities;

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(L) failing to prevent Harold Richards. Sr. (deceased)

from coming in contact with touching or otherwise being

exposed to uranium dust, yellow cake and/or toxic

hemical residue on Plaintiff's husband Harold Richards.

Sr. (deceased) food, clothing, body, and home

environment.

25. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’

conduct, Harold Richard, Sr. (deceased) sustained injury and

damage in that he contracted renal cell carcinoma.

26. As a direct and proximate result of Harold J.

Richards, Sr.’s (deceased) exposure to the radioactive and non

radioactive hazardous substances which were released by

Defendants at the Mexican Hat mill and the Cane Valley

uranium mine (VCA #2). Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased)

developed and died as a result of renal cell carcinoma.

27. As a consequences of aforesaid injury, Harold

Richards, Sr. died on January 5, 1993.

28. Left surviving was his wife, Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards.

29. As a result of the death of Harold Richards, Sr.,

Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards suffered the loss of

society of her husband and other related economic and non-

30. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards, pray’s for Judgment against the Defendant’s, in a

sum in excess of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

($100,000.00) DOLLARS and such further amounts that

would fairly and accurately compensate her for her aforesaid

damages.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

ULTRA HAZARDOUS

31. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in

Paragraph | through 30 and incorporates them by reference

herein.

32. Defendants operated the Mexican Hat uranium mill

and Cane Valley uranium mill and mine in a manner that

created emissions containing high concentrations of radioactive

materials and toxic metals including but not limited to the

following: uranium, copper, manganese, magnesium,

molybdenum, sodium, chloride, sulfate, fluoride, silica,

barium, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, iron, lead,

nickel, silver, strontium, vanadium zinc, aluminum, lithium,

radium 226, uranium 238, uranium 234, uranium 235, radon

228, radon 222, selenium, plutonium, lanthanum including

curium, luropium, lanthium, gallium, thorium, asernic,

mercury, and nitrates as well as alpha, beta and gamma

radiation, and other radioactive and toxic chemicals and

particularities which is, as such, as a non-natural use of land

and as such, constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity

which created risks to Plaintiffs and others.

33. The collection, handling and processing of

radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous substances as

indicated in Paragraph 32 supra is an abnormally dangerous

activity or ultra hazardous activity, i.e., one which necessarily

involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels

of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the

utmost care and is not a matter of common usage.

34. Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff and Harold

Richard, Sr. (deceased) for all damages and injuries which

have resulted and will result from the collection and

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processing of radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous

substances as indicated in Paragraph 32 supra at the Mexican

Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mine and mill

facilities and properties.

35. Harold Richard Sr. (deceased) was born on

December 4, 1936 and resided with his wife, Plaintiff Zonnie

Marie Dandy Richards at Defendants Mexican Hat uranium

mill site. Harold Richard Sr. (deceased) also resided as a

child at the Defendant's Cane Valley Uranium mill and mine

site.

36. Defendants’ collection, handling and processing of

radioactive and non-radioactive materials at the Mexican Hat

uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mill and mine facilities

and properties have directly and proximately caused releases

of such substances into the environment and community

surrounding the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley

uranium mill and mine facilities and properties where Harold

J. Richards, Sr. (deceased), either as a child (Cane Valley,

VCA #2 as a child and Mexican Hat as an adult) or as

husband to Plaintiff, resided.

37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's

operation of the Mexican Hat uranium mill and the Cane

Valley uranium mine and mill facilities in the aforesaid

manner, Plaintiff suffered the aforementioned injuries and

damages as alleged herein to herself for which Defendants are

strictly liable.

38. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’

conduct, Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) sustained injury and

damage in that he contracted renal cell carcinoma.

39. As a consequence of the aforesaid injury, Harold

Richards, Sr. died on January 5, 1993. Left surviving is his

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wife, Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards, who has suffered a loss

of society comfort and consortium and other related damages.

40. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs Zonnie Marie Dandy,

prays for Judgment against the Defendant, in a sum in excess

of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00) DOLLARS

and such further amounts that would fairly and accurately

compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

LOSS OF CONSORTIUM: NEGLIGENCE

HAROLD J. RICHARDS

41. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in

Paragraphs | through 40 above, and incorporates them by

reference herein.

42. Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) was born on

December 4, 1936. From approximately 1950 to 1963,

Plaintiff Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) was exposed to

radioactive and non-radioactive toxic substances at the

Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mine and

mill facilities, where he resided, either as an adult or as a

child.

43. Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards and her

husband Harold J. Richards, Sr., (deceased) were exposed to

vanadium, uranium and various radioactive substances and

heavy metals through their residence at the Defendants

Mexican Hat Uranium mill. Harold J. Richards, Sr.

(deceased) was also exposed to vanadium, uranium radioactive

and non-radioactive substances and heavy metals at the

Defendant’s Cane Valley uranium mine and mill facilities

where he resided with his parents as a child.

S5la

44. From 1959 to 1965 Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards and her husband resided less than (50) feet from

Defendants Mexican Hat uranium mill. Plaintiff Zonnie

Marie Dandy Richards and Harold J. Rich: eds, Sr. (deceased)

were allowed to live in such close proxim ‘ty to the Mexican

Hat uranium mill by Defendants and with Defendants full

knowledge of their residence in such close proximity to these

facilities. At all times pertinent hereto concerning the

Mexican Hat uranium mill, Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards and Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) were married

and resided together as husband and wife.

45. Asa result of Defendants’ conduct, i.e., the milling

of uranium ore, and Mr. Harold J. Richard Sr. (deceased)

residence at the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley

uranium mine and mill, as a child, Harold Richards, Sr.

(deceased) came in contact with deleterious quantities of both

radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous substances which

were released by Defendants’ operations at the Mexican Hat

and Cane Valley uranium facilities.

46. During the years the Defendants operated and were

responsible for the Mexican Hat mill and Cane Valley mine

and mill Defendants accumulated, handled, processed, treated,

stored, burned, and otherwise disposed of large quantities of

radioactive and/or hazardous materials at their properties in

Mexican Hat, Utah and Cane Valley, Arizona.

47. Defendants knew or should have known that these

radioactive and/or hazardous materials and constituents posed

a hazard to the health and emotional well-being of Plaintiff

Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased).

48. Defendants owed a duty to Harold Richards, Sr.

(deceased) and thereby to Plaintiff to use reasonable care in

the handling and disposal of the hazardous radioactive and

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toxic materials used or produced at the Mexican Hat uranium

mill and Cane Valley mines.

49. Defendants negligently caused or permitted

radioactive and toxic emissions to be released from the

Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mine and

mill. These emissions were regularly carried by ground

water, soil and air and, therein contaminated the property or

properties where Plaintiff and/or Harold Richards Sr.

(deceased) resided.

50. Defendants also negligently failed to warn Plaintiff

and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased) of the potential for

leakage and actual leakage of the hazardous radioactive and

toxic materials into the ground water and soil of Plaintiff

and/or Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased), residence of

residences.

51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’

breach of duty, Harold Richards, Sr. and Plaintiff sustained

injuries and losses, including but not limited io emotional

distress and fear, physical injury, loss of enjoyment of life,

and other economic and non-economic losses as yet unknown.

52. Defendants breached their duty to Harold Richards,

Sr. (deceased) and to Plaintiff by failing to properly control

and contain the radioactive and/or hazardous materials within

the confines of the facilities and properties which they owned,

by negligently releasing the radioactive and/or hazardous

materials into the air and allowing radioactive materials to

migrate or leach into the ground water, surface water, rivers

and soil in the vicinity of the Mexican Hat mill and Cane

Valley mine and mill sites.

53. These releases and contaminations of the air, ground

water, surface water, rivers and soil in the vicinity of the

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facilities of the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley

uranium mine and mill sites were proximately caused by

Defendants and the results were aggravated by the negligent

acts and/or emissions of the Defendants including, but not

limited to, the following:

(A) permitting the emissions, releases and leaks of

radioactive and/or hazardous materials from the facility

and property to occur;

(B) failing to determine where and how the emissions,

releases and leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous

materials occurred and in failing to correct the problems

to prevent further leakage and emissions:

(C) failing to provide adequate containment of the

radioactive and/or hazardous materials:

(D) failing to provide adequate air, surface water, ground

water, rivers and soil sampling and/or monitoring to

detect releases of radioactive and/or hazardous materials:

(E) failing to take proper measurements of particle sizes

and emissions;

(F) failing to test incoming ores adequate!

y for the

presence of hazardous or toxic materials;

(G) failing to timely and adequately warn or otherwise

notify Plaintiffs of such contamination and to prevent

reoccurring releases;

(H) failing to take timely and adequate remedial actions

to contain and clean up such contamination and to prevent

reoccurring releases;

54a

(I) failing to properly train and supervise their employees

to insure that the necessary safeguards and procedures

would be followed in the even that any emissions,

releases or leaks of radioactive and/or hazardous materials

from the facilities and properties might occur;

(J) failing to comply with applicable Tribal laws;

(K) being negligent in the construction and

implementation of remedial measures for containing

releases from the tailing ponds and operating facilities.

(L) failing to prevent Harold J. Richards, Sr. from

coming in contact with, touching, or otherwise being

exposed to uranium dust, yellow cake and/or toxic

chemical residue on Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards’s husband's food, clothing and body and home

environment.

54. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff's

conduct, Harold J. Richards, Sr. sustained injury and damage

in that he contracted renal cell carcinoma.

55. As a consequence of the aforesaid injury, Harold J.

Richards, Sr. died on January 5, 1993.

56. Left surviving was his wife Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards.

57. Asa result of the death of Harold J. Richards, Sr.,

Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards has suffered and will

continue to suffer a loss of consortium.

58. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards, prays for Judgment against the Defendants, in a sum

in excess of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00)

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DOLLARS and such further amounts that would fairly and

accurately compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

LOSS OF CONSORTIUM: _

ULTRA HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY

59. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in

— 1 through 58 and incorporate them by reference

rein.

60. Plaintiff Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) was the

lawful spouse of Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards at

times relevant to the Defendant's Mexican Hat mill

operations.

61. Defendants operated the Mexican Hat uranium mill

and Cane Valley uranium mill and uranium mine in a manner

that created emissions containing high concentrations of

radioactive materials and toxic metals including but not limited

to the following: uranium, copper, manganese, magnesium,

molybdenum, sodium, chloride, sulfate, fluoride, silica,

barium, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, cobalt, iron, lead,

nickel, silver, strontium, vanadium zinc, aluminum, lithium,

radium 226, uranium 238, uranium 234, uranium 235, radon

228, radon 222, selenium, plutonium, lanthanum including

curium, luropium, lanthium, gallium, thorium, asernic,

mercury, and nitrates as well as alpha, beta and gamma

radiation, and other radioactive and toxic chemicals and

particulate which is, as such, was a non-natural use of land

and as such, constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity

which created risks to Plaintiffs and others.

62. The collection, handling and processing of

radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous substances as

indicated in Paragraph 61-supra is an abnormally dangerous

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activity or ultra hazardous activity, i.e., one which necessarily

involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels

of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the

utmost care and is not a matter of common usage.

63. Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff for all

damages and injuries which have resulted and will result from

the collection and processing of radioactive and non-

radioactive hazardous substances as indicated in Paragraph 61-

supra at the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley

uranium mill and mine facility and property.

64. Defendants’ collection, handling and processing of

radioactive and non-radioactive materials at the Mexican Hat

uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mill and mines have

directly and proximately caused releases of such substances

into the environment and communities surrounding the

Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley uranium mill and

mine facilities and properties.

65. Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) was born on

December 4, 1936, and at times relevant to the Mexican Hat

uranium mill resided with his wife Plaintiff Zonnie Marie

Dandy Richards.

66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’

operation of the Mexican Hat uranium mill and Cane Valley

uranium mine and mill facilities in the aforesaid manner,

Harold J. Richards Sr. (deceased) suffered the aforementioned

injuries and damages as alleged herein, for which Defendants

are strictly liable.

67. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's

conduct, Harold J. Richards, Sr. (deceased) sustained injury

and damage in that he contracted renal cell carcinoma.

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68. As a consequence of the aforesaid injury, Harold J.

Richards, Sr. died on January 5, 1993. Left surviving was his

wife, Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards.

69. Asa result of the death of Harold J. Richards, Sr.

his wife has suffered and will suffer loss of consortium.

70. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards prays for Judgment against the Defendant, in a sum

in excess of One HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00)

DOLLARS and such further amounts that would fairly and

accurately compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT

71. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in

Paragraph 1 through 70 above, and incorporates them by

reference herein.

72. The actions and inactions of Defendants complained

of herein are so outrageous in character and so extreme in

degree as to compel a reasonable person in the Navajo

community to declare the same as atrocious, beyond all

bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

Navajo community.

73. As a direct and proximate result of the above

conduct, Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress and

has been injured and damaged as alleged herein.

74. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff's Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards prays for Judgment against the Defendant, in sum in

excess of ONE THOUSAND ($100,000.00) DOLLARS and

such further amounts that would fairly and accurately

compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

58a

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

MISREPRESENTATION/FRAUD AND DECEIT

75. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in

Paragraph | through 74 above and incorporates them by

reference herein.

76. Defendants failed, both negligently and intentionally,

to disclose to Harold J. Richards, Sr. and to Plaintiff, material

facts which were known to them concerning the nature,

magnitude and effects of the release of and exposure to

radioactive and other hazardous substances which were

generated, handled, stored, treated or disposed of at the

Mexican Hat uranium mill and the Cane Valley uranium mill

and mine facilities and properties.

77. Defendants knew of and concealed, misrepresented

and failed to disclose the true facts with the intention of

creating a false impression of the actual facts in the minds of

Harold Richards, Sr. and Plaintiff, and with the intent that

Harold Richards, Sr. and Plaintiff be lulled into complacency

and refrain from seeking redress or pursuing remedial action

due to the development and death from renal cell cancer of

Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased).

78. Plaintiff and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased)

reasonably believed Defendants’ misrepresentations and relied

upon the same in refraining until the resent from seeking

redress or pursuing remedial action.

79. As a direct result of Defendants’ negligent and/or

intentionally false and deceptive representations and Plaintiff

and Harold Richards, Sr. (deceased), reasonable relief of and

reliance thereon, many of the injuries and damages to Plaintiff

arising out of the releases of hazardous substances into the

59a

environment were compounded by the passage of time and

direct, daily exposure by Harold J. Richards, Sr. to same.

80. As a direct and prominent result of Defendants’

— Plaintiff has been injured and damaged as alleged

in

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards pray’s for Judgment against the defendant, in a sum

in excess of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00)

DOLLARS and such further amounts that would fairly and

accurately compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RULING

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST ALL

DEFENDANTS

81. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in

Paragraph 1 through above 80 and incorporates them by

reference herein.

82. The actions of Defendants complained of herein were

attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, and insult, and the

wholly wanton and reckless disregard of Harold Richards,

Sr.’s and Plaintiff's lives and health by Defendants actions

justifies to an additional award of exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards prays for Judgment against the Defendant, in a sum

in excess of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000.00)

DOLLARS and further amounts that would fairly and

accurately compensate her for her aforesaid damages.

60a

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered

in their favor and against Defendants for compensatory

damages, consequential damages, special damages and

exemplary damages, reasonable costs and expenses associated

with this litigation, including attorney’s fees and such other

and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

/signed/ 1-29-96

Cherie V. Daut

Attorney at Law for

P.O. Box 1357

Shiprock, New Mexico 87420

(505) 368-5878

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EXHIBIT B

IN THE DISTRICT OF THE NAVAJO NATION

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF KAYENTA, ARIZONA

(The Estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr.

Deceased),

Plaintiff,

VS.

TEXAS ZINC, VANADIUM CORPORATION OF

AMERICA, ATLAS CORPORATION, and all

affiliates joint venturers and

assignees thereof,

Defendants.

KY-CV-002-95

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter came before the Court on the

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Plaintiff Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards, on behalf

of the Estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr., alleges that the

lived as a child near the defendants’ mining and

uranium milling facility in Mexican Hat, Utah. The plaintiffs

claim that the defendants operated the Mexican Hat uranium

Ht

62a

mill and VCA #2 uranium mine. They are located on Navajo

trust land. Through his residence near one or more of these

sites, Mr. Richards was exposed to radioactive materials from

the processing of uranium that allegedly caused his death. As

a result, Zonnie Richards filed a civil suit seeking damages for

injuries. It is unclear to the Court whether she has filed suit

in her capacity as representative of her deceased husband's

estate or, individually, in her own right or both.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Vanadium Corporation of American and

the successors-in-interest to VCA, Cyprus Foote Mineral

Corporation and Foote Minerals Corporation assert that the

Navajo Court has no jurisdiction under express provisions of

federal law, the Price-Anderson Act. 42 USC ss2011 et esq.

This case presents the question of whether the

Navajo Court has civil jurisdiction over the defendants. They

claim that 1) Navajo Nation jurisdiction is pre-empted by the

Price-Anderson Act and 2) the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction

would frustrate the removal provisions of the Act, which give

the defendants an "absolute" right to remove the case to

federal court. That question can be resolved by considering

the impact of treaties, statutes and the inherent sovereignty of

the Navajo Nation.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The Navajo Nation Code grants the District Courts

original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the

defendant "...has caused an action to occur within the

territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation." 7 NTC ss253(2).

The issue is whether the Navajo Nation has the power to

assert civil jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants whose

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allegedly tortious conduct occurred within the Navajo Nation,

given the Price-Anderson Act.

Indian nations have been characterized as "quasi-

sovereigns", Fisher vy. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390, 96

S.Ct. 943, 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 106 (976) (per curiam: , and it has

been noted that the sovereignty of tribes is different from that

of states. y

Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th cir. 1959); 1 NTC Chapter 1.

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 143,

100 S.Ct. 2578, 2583, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980).

The United States Supreme Court has suggested the

following analysis for ascertaining the limits of tribal

sovereignty: Indian nations retain those powers of self-

government not voluntarily relinquished by treaty, not divested

by Congressional enactment, and not inconsistent with the

overriding sovereign interests of the United States. Oliphant

y. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09, 98 S.Ct.

1011, 1020-21, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). See United States v.

Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303

(1978). Tribes may also exercise those powers which would

otherwise be inconsistent with overriding federal interests if

Congress has explicitly delegated such powers to them.

Montana v. United States. =F SsU.S._, 101 S.Ct. 1245,

67 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1981).

This Court does not find anything in the 1850 or

1868 Navajo Treaties to support the proposition that the

Navajo Tribe has explicitly relinquished civil jurisdiction over

non-Indians. However, the defendants have presented the

claim that the Price-Anderson Act precludes the Navajo

Nation from hearing the claims raised. The applicable

provision is 42 USC ss2210(n)(2) which confers original

jurisdiction on the U.S. District Courts, without regard for

diversity of citizenship or the amount in controversy, over any

64a

public liability action “arising out of or resulting from a

nuclear incident." ss2014(w). Whether or not this is a

"nuclear incident" is a factual issue for trial.

With respect to the third prong of the analysis, the

defendants argue that the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction

over it would be inconsistent with overriding federal interests

and thus is not among the retained powers of the tribe. The

tribal court’s power to adjudicate claims involving injuries

from uranium operations located on the Navajo reservation is

of the type the United States has a concern in protecting. The

federal government has an interest in regulating the production

of nuclear power and protecting the health and safety of the

public. However, the exercise of civil jurisdiction by the

Navajo court is consistent with the federal interests in

resolving claims of injuries arising out of a nuclear incident.

Assuming jurisdiction over this case is necessary to protect

tribal self-government, to control internal relations and does

not jeopardize the security and safety concerns which

prompted the Price-Anderson Act.

In this case, the alleged actions took place within

the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. As the

injuries occurred on the reservation, a tribal forum to redress

such injuries is clearly related to tribal self-government or

internal relations since the defendants’ allegedly tortious

conduct occurred on the reservation. Defendants are located

on the reservation and the plaintiffs live on the reservation.

Defendants are located on the reservation and the plaintiffs

live on the reservation. As such, the defendants’ activities

giving rise to the dispute are within the territorial sovereignty

of the tribe.

Further, the plaintiffs did business within the

Navajo Nation and thus there is a consensusal link under

United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). This is

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important since the U.S. Supreme Court make that an

underpinning for civil jurisdiction over non-Indian in

Montana. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a tribe

may regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter

consensusal relationships with the tribe or its members,

through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other

arrangements. Id. at 565. Here, the defendants chose to

operate mills and mines on the reservation. It is assumed that

in order to do business on the reservation agreements or

dealings with the Navajo Nation were made which subjected

defendants to tribal court civil jurisdiction. Arizona Public

Services v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, A~CV-08-87

(decided 1990).

Another aspect of Montana is that a tribe may retain

inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of

non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that

conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political

integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of

the tribe. Id. at 566. The facts before the court suggest that

non-Indians operating uranium mines and mills threatens the

tribe’s political or economic security to justify tribal

regulation. Commercial activities in the Navajo Nation must

abide by Navajo Nation laws. In addition, the inherent

dangers entailed in uranium mining and milling may threaten

the welfare and safety of the Tribe. Thus, the defendants are

within the jurisdiction of the Navajo courts.

CHOICE OF LAW

The defendants ask the court to defer to federal

jurisdiction as a matter of comity. That is a reverse Farmer’s

Union claim. National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. et al.

y. Crow Tribe of Indians et al.. 471 U.S. 845 (9th Cir. 1985).

That court believed that the existence and extent of a tribal

court’s jurisdiction requires an examination of tribal

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sovereignty which should be conducted in the first instance in

the Tribal Court evaluating the factual and legal bases for a

jurisdictional challenge. Id. at 855-56.

The most recent Navajo Nation Supreme Court

decision on comity is Rough Rock Community School _v.

Navajo Nation, No. SC-CV-06-94 (March 14, 1996). This is

an “applicable law" decision and not a “deference to another

sovereign" decision.

In Rough Rock the Navajo Supreme Court ruled

that under the Navajo Nation doctrine of comity, a foreign

statute, court decision or public act must comply with Navajo

Nation public policy. The Navajo Nation is aware that

economic development is important to the Nation. However,

there are consequences for doing business on the Nation.

Under the Navajo Nation’s sovereign authority to regulate

business, establish the rules for doing business within the

Navajo Nation, or decide which acts of state of foreign

jurisdictions will or will not be honored within the Navajo

Nation is a matter of comity.

The Navajo Nation courts have the authority to

apply any federal law that may be applicable. 7 NTC

ss204(a). This action arose within the territorial jurisdiction

of the Navajo Nation involving Navajo plaintiffs. The Navajo

Nation courts have the power to apply federal law. Comity is

not applicable in this case.

In addition, defendants claim they have a right to

consolidate all related actions in the appropriate federal court

because “nuclear energy issues are emotionally charged;

scientific evidence on causation is complex; and damages

claims are potentially gargantuan." Defendants brief at 32.

argument that tribal courts are somehow biased or not

competent enough to render just decisions. lowa Mutual

67a

Insurance Co. vs. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987). Since

this case cannot be removed to federal court, requiring the

defendants to defend in the Navajo Nation court would not be

unduly unfair or inconvenient. Defendants are encouraged to

consolidate any related claims in this forum.

It is therefore, ORDERED that defendants Motion

to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is hereby

DENIED. The defendants are further encouraged to

consolidate any related claims in this forum.

So ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1996.

_t{signed}

JUDGE, District Court of the Navajo Nation

68a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 96-0049-PCT-RGS

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a Delaware

Corporation,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE and ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,

Defendants.

Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary

Injunction and Granting Limited Injunction

Transcript of Proceedings

May 28, 1996

THE COURT: The plaintiff's application for preliminary

injunction is denied to the extent that it in any way seeks to

have this Court declare any aspect the jurisdiction of the

Navajo tribal court. There is -- there is a set of differing

views as to what this lawsuit involves. And when I say "this

lawsuit," I mean the lawsuit brought by the defendants here as

plaintiffs against El Paso Natural Gas in the tribal court.

The Navajo tribal court may or may not be presented with_

the issue of whether or not it has jurisdiction over all aspects

of this case, that is to say this case should it include claims

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under the Price-Anderson Act as well as simply claims of

negligence and other bases for a tort claim.

The Court does grant El Paso Natural Gas Company’s

requested relief to the extent that it enjoins the named

defendants here, plaintiffs in the tribal court, from pursuing a

Price-Anderson Act complaint in tribal Court. The Court's

rationale for granting that limited aspect of the relief is

application of the National Farmer’s three-factor test to the

issues involved plus a consideration of the holdings in the case

decided in this District Court in 1981, UNC Resources versus

Benally.

In citing that case, I recognize that there are significant

variations in the contacts, but taking the relevant analysis, the

Court does that in supporting its limited grant of relief to the

El Paso Natural Gas Company here by way of the preliminary

injunction granted.

Now, I want it clear to the parties as to what is granted

here and what is not granted here, and what the parties can

and can’t do in tribal court. The parties are enjoined from

pursuing, as I said earlier, a cause of action in tribal court

based upon the Price-Anderson Act for the reasons stated.

If the plaintiffs in that court want to, in effect, test the

extent to which the Navajo tribal court believes it has

jurisdiction, presumably it might be able to seek declaratory

relief in that court from the tribal court as to its opinions as to

its -- extent of its jurisdiction. And that is consistent with the

Court’s disinclination to in any way impede the jurisdiction of

the tribal court in exploring its powers.

It is a case of importance in the sense that there’s no

doubt but what the operation of a facility on the -- on tribal

lands that may affect a broad segment of tribal population

from a health standpoint or otherwise is a matter of dramatic

and significant concern to the tribe and to its government.

It is, of course, also true that the United States has a very

strong and compelling interest to assure that it operates its

nuclear industry in all of its varying facets in a manner that is

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uniformly appropriate for all who are exposed to both its

benefits and its burdens. And because of the uniqueness of

the geographic location of the sovereign tribal governments

within the boundaries of the United States, it compounds this

problem and, of course, also in part of that mix of complexity

is the power, burden and responsibility of Congress to enact

laws concerning the sovereign Indian nations within the United

States.

It is the Court's belief that its ruling in this area preserves

tribal sovereignty in its fullest measure, but at the same time

recognizes the interests that have been argued concerning the

nuclear industry, for lack of a better word, within the United

States.

It’s hoped that this will enable the parties to clarify the

issue within the tribal court of its jurisdiction. It may be that

it will conclude that on this narrow area it lacks jurisdiction

or defers jurisdiction or is otherwise willing to permit claims

to be adjudicated not in its own forum, or it may feel that

clearly it does have it and if that’s true, why then presumably

there will be opportunities to test that decision within its own

legal structure and there may be other occasions upon which

that can be tested as well and in the United States District

Court or in other courts.

I hope I’ve helped to clear and not muddy the waters that

have been brought to me by this litigation.

STRAND, Judge:

On May 28, 1996, plaintiff El Paso Natural Gas

Company’s application for a preliminary injunction of all

tribal proceedings in the case of Neztsosie v. El Paso Natural

Gas Company, Court of the Navajo Nation, District of Tuba

Tila

City, Case No. TC-CV-0052-95, came on for hearing. After

considering the parties’ written motions, their supporting

memoranda, and oral argument of counsel both at the hearing

on May 28, 1996, and at a telephonic hearing regarding the

wording of this order on July 11, 1996, this Court makes the

=— ruling pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Plaintiff El Paso Natural Gas Company's Application for

Preliminary Injunction is denied to the extent that it in any

way seeks to have this Court rule on any aspect of jurisdiction

of the Navajo tribal court. This Court denies El Paso Natural

Gas Company's request for an injunction of tribal proceedings

in Neztsosie v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, except to the

extent that Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie seek relief based upon

the Price-Anderson Act in tribal court. In all other respects,

the relief sought by the plaintiff in its application for

preliminary injunction is denied.

_ In reaching this decision, this Court relies on the

principles of tribal sovereignty, the tribal exhaustion doctrine,

the factors set forth in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. vy.

Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), UNC Resources,

Inc. v. Benally, 518 F.Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981), and on

arguments and authorities presented by the parties in their

papers and oral argument. In reaching this decision, the

Court does not determine whether or not the provisions of the

Price-Anderson Act have auy application to the claims asserted

by Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie in tribal court. It is further

ORDERED, approving cash bond in the amount of ONE

THOUSAND and 00/100 DOLLARS ($1,000.00) in support

ene Ponte

Cc).

SO ORDERED on this 3rd day of November, 1996.

Hon. Roger G. Strand

Judge of the United States District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 96-01524-PCT-RGS

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERALS COMPANY,

a Pennsylvania Corporation, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS,

individually and as representative of

the Estate of Harold J. Richards, Sr.,

Defendant.

Order

Plaintiff has filed this action seeking an order enjoining

Defendant from pursuing the lawsuit of Zonnie Marie Dandy

Richards (The State of Harold J. Richards, Sr., Deceased) v.

Texas Zinc, et al., which is pending in the District Court of

the Navajo Nation, Kayenta District, No. KY-CV-002-95.

Plaintiffs have filed an application for preliminary injunctive

relief. After considering the parties’ pleadings, the Court

makes the following ruling:

Plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction is

denied to the extent that it seeks to have this Court decide

whether the Navajo tribal court has jurisdiction over the case

before it. Further, Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction of the

tribal proceeding in Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards (The State

of Harold J. Richards, Sr., Deceased) v. Texas Zinc, et al. is

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denied except to the extent that Defendant seeks relief under

the Price-Anderson Act in tribal court.

The Court bases its decision on the principles of tribal

sovereignty, the tribal exhaustion doctrine, the factors set

forth in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of

Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), UNC Resources, Inc. v.

Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981), and the

additional authorities cited by the parties in their pleadings.

In reaching this decision, the Court does not determine

whether or not the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act have

any application to the claims asserted by Defendant in tribal

court.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part

Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary Injunction (doc. #2).

FURTHER ORDERED approving a cash bond in the

amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1000.00) in

support of this injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(c).

DATED this 21st day of NOVEMBER, 1996.

[signed]

HONORABLE ROGER G. STRAND

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,

a Delaware Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE; ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-17121

DC No. CV-96-00049-RGS

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERAL COMPANY,

a Pennsylvania Corporation;

CYPRUS AMAX MINERAL COMPANY,

a Delaware Corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS,

individually and as representative

of the Estate of Harold J.Richards, Sr.,

Defendant- Appellee.

No. 96-17139

DC No. CV-96-01524-RGS

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Filed February 11, 1998

Amended April 27, |

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Before: Judges Harry Pregerson, Warren J. Ferguson, and

Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges

Opinion by Judge Pregerson; Dissent by Judge Kleinfeld

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Members of the Navajo Nation (the "Navajo Court

Plaintiffs") filed two separate actions in Navajo Tribal Court

against corporations that conducted uranium mining operations

on the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Navajo Court

Plaintiffs alleged personal injury and wrongful death claims

based on Navajo common law. In response to those actions,

El Paso Natural Gas Company ("El Paso") and Cyprus Foote

Mineral Company and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company

(collectively “Cyprus") filed two separate suits in federal

district court seeking preliminary injunctions to enjoin the

Navajo Tribal Court from asserting jurisdiction over the

Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ claims. El Paso and Cyprus

(collectively the “mining companies") alleged that all actions

arising from "nuclear incidents" fall within the Price-Anderson

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 ef seg., and must be litigated in

federal court.

The district court granted in part, and denied in part, the

mining companies’ requests for preliminary injunctions. The

district court granted the preliminary injunctions to the extent

the Navajo Court Plaintiffs alleged claims under Price-

did not allege Price-Anderson claims. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We affirm in part and reverse

in part.

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

The two actions filed by the Navajo Court Plaintiffs have

been consolidated for this appeal. The facts and prior

proceedings in each of these actions are as follows:

1. Neztsosie v. El Paso

Between 1956 and 1959, Rare Metals Corporation of

America ("Rare Metals"), a now defunct subsidiary of El

Paso, conducted uranium mining operations on the Navajo

Nation Reservation. On March 29, 1995, Laura and Arlinda

Neztsosie (the "Neztsosies"), members of the Navajo Nation,

filed suit against Rare Metals in Navajo Tribal Court. The

Neztsosies asserted claims for personal injuries arising from

Rare Metals’ uranium mining activities.

On January 5, 1996, El Paso filed suit against the

Neztsosies in the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona. El Paso sought a preliminary injunction enjoining

the Neztsosies from prosecuting their claims in the Navajo

Tribal Court. El Paso also sought a declaration that the

Navajo Tribal Court had no jurisdiction over the Neztsosies’s

claims. El Paso asserted that the Neztsosies had to litigate

their claims in federal court because their claims alleged

liability arising from a “nuclear incident" under the Price-

Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2210.

After a hearing, District Court Judge Robert G. Strand,

entered an order denying in part, and granting in part, El

Paso’s request for a preliminary injunction. The district court

denied El Paso’s request for a preliminary injunction "to the

extent that it in any way seeks to have this Court rule on any

aspect of jurisdiction of the Navajo tribal court . . . except to

the extent that [the Neztsosies] seek relief based upon the

Price-Anderson Act in tribal court." In reaching its decision,

the district court relied on “principles of tribal sovereignty”

and the “tribal exhaustion doctrine." The district court stated,

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however, that it did not determine whether Price-Anderson

had any application to the claims asserted by the Neztsosies in

Tribal Court.

2. Richards v. Cyprus

Cyprus Foote Mineral Company is the successor by

merger to Vanadium Corporation of America ("VCA"). From

the 1940's through the 1960’s, VCA operated a uranium mine

in Cane Valley, Arizona, known as Monument No. 2 mine.

During the 1960's, VCA also constructed and operated a

uranium concentrator at the Monument No. 2 mine site. The

remnants of the ore concentrating process consisted of

uranium tailings. The tailings produced by the concentrator

were stored on a tailings pile on land adjacent to the

Monument No. 2 mine site.

On April 20, 1995, Zonnie Marie Dandy Richards, a

member of the Navajo\ Nation, filed suit individually, and as

representative of her deceased husband’s estate, against VCA

and others in Navajo Tribal Court. Richards asserted claims

for wrongful death and personal injuries arising from VCA’s

activities at the Monument No. 2 mine site.

On June 26, 1996, Cyprus filed suit against Richards in

the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Like El Paso, Cyprus sought a preliminary injunction

enjoining Richards from prosecuting her claims in Navajo

Tribal Court. Cyprus also sought a declaration that the

Navajo Tribal Court had no jurisdiction over Richards’s

claims. Cyprus alleged that Richards had to litigate her

claims in federal court because she alleged liability arising

from a "nuclear incident" under Price-Anderson.

The Richards action, like the Neztsosie action, was

assigned to District Court Judge Strand. The district court

entered an order substantially similar to the order issued in the

Neztsosie matter. The district court denied in part, and

granted in part, Cyprus’s request for a preliminary injunction.

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El Paso and Cyprus timely appeal the district court’s

orders.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether the district court was

required to abstain from granting or denying an injunction

when a party has failed to exhaust tribal court remedies.

Burlington N. R.R. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868, 869-70 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc).

1. The Tribal Exhaustion Requirement

The Supreme Court has stated that, subject to certain

exceptions, comity principles require federal courts to either

dismiss or abstain from deciding cases in which a party asserts

that concurrent jurisdiction exists in an Indian tribal court.

Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th

Cir. 1991) (citing National Farmers Un. Ins. Cos. v. Crow

Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) and Jowa Mut. Ins. Co.

v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)). “Considerations of comity

require the exhaustion of tribal remedies before the [tribal

court’s jurisdiction] may be addressed by the district court."

Wellman v. Chevron USA, Inc., 815 F.2d 577, 578 (9th Cir.

1987). “The requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies is

not discretionary; it is mandatory." Burlington N. R.R. v.

Crow Tribal Council ("Crow Tribal Council"), 940 F.2d 1239,

1245 (9th Cir. 1991). “Until petitioners have exhausted the

remedies available to them in the Tribal Court system, it

would be premature for a federal court to consider any relief."

National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 (footnote omitted); see

also Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1691 (1997) ("[A] party

must exhaust tribal court remedies before a federal district

court may entertain a challenge to tribal jurisdiction.")

(emphasis added); Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d at 1244

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("[FJederal courts should not even make a ruling on tribal

court jurisdiction until tribal remedies are exhausted.")

(citation omitted).

"[T]he initial determination of whether the Tribe has

jurisdiction lies with the tribal court alone.” Crow Tribal

Council, 940 F.2d at 1244. "[NJon-Indian defendants must

exhaust tribal court remedies before seeking relief in federal

court, even where defendants allege that proceedings in tribal

court exceed tribal sovereign jurisdiction." /d.

The tribal exhaustion requirement is based on

considerations of comity and the long-standing policy of

promoting tribal self-government and _self-determination.

National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856. "[T]he federal policy

supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to

Stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a ‘full

Opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.’" Jowa Mut.,

480 U.S. at 16 (quoting National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857).

The existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction

require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty. "[{T}hat

examination should be conducted in the first instance in the

Tribal Court itself." National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856.

"[P]roper respect for tribal legal institutions requires that they

be given a ‘full opportunity’ to consider the issues before them

and ‘to rectify errors.’" Jowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16 (citing

National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857).

While tribal exhaustion promotes tribal self-government

and self-determination, it also promotes judicial efficiency:

[T}he orderly administration of justice in the federal

court will be served by allowing a full record to be

developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits

or any question conce:ning appropriate relief is

addressed . . . . Exhaustion of tribal court remedies,

moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to

the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction,

and will also provide other courts with the benefit of

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their expertise in such matters in the event of further

judicial review.

National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57. “Congress is

committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and

self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide

the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first

opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the

challenge." Jd. at 856.

In this case, the mining companies have not exhausted

their tribal court remedies. Instead, the mining companies

chose to file actions in federal district court seeking to enjoin

the Navajo Tribal Court from asserting jurisdiction over the

Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ claims. See Jowa Mut., 480 U.S. at

17 ("At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means that

tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the

determinations of the lower tribal-courts."). Thus, unless an

exception to the tribal exhaustion requirement applies, the

district court was obligated to abstain from ruling on the tribal

court’s jurisdiction over the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ common

law claims.

An exception to the tribal exhaustion requirement exists

where: (1) an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a

desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith; (2) tribal court

jurisdiction patently would violate express jurisdictional

prohibitions; (3) exhaustion would be futile because of the

lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the tribal court’s

jurisdiction; or (4) no federal grant authorizes tribal

governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by

Montana’s main rule. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, ___

U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 1416 n.14 (1997); National

Farmers, 471 U.S. 845 at 856 n.21. In this case, the parties

only dispute the applicability of the “express jurisdictional

prohibition" exception to tribal court jurisdiction. "A

substantial showing must be made by the party seeking to

invoke [the ‘express jurisdictional prohibition’] exception to

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the tribal exhaustion rule." Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley

("Farley"), 115 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1997). "{T]ribal

courts rarely lose the first opportunity to determine

rae aioe an ‘express jurisdictional prohibition. ’"

II. The District Court’s Orders

. In this case, the district court’s orders appear to hold that

Price-Anderson constitutes an express prohibition of tribal

court jurisdiction. The district court denied the mining

companies’ requests for preliminary injunctions "except to the

extent that [the Navajo Court Plaintiffs] seek relief based upon

the Price-Anderson Act in tribal court." The district court also

stated that it did not determine whether Price-Anderson had

any application to the claims asserted by the Navajo Court

Plaintiffs.

The mining companies have appealed that portion of the

district court’s orders that allow the Navajo Court Plaintiffs to

pursue claims in Navajo Tribal Court other than Price-

Anderson claims. The mining companies assert that the

Navajo Court Plaintiffs are barred from pursuing any claims

in Navajo Tribal Court because the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’

claims arise from a nuclear tort and fall within the ambit of

Price-Anderson.

The Navajo Court Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have not

appealed the district court’s rulings that Price-Anderson

constitutes an express prohibition of tribal court jurisdiction.

Rather, the Navajo Court Plaintiffs seek to affirm that portion

of the district court’s orders that allow them to pursue claims

other than Price-Anderson claims in Navajo Tribal Court. The

Navajo Court Plaintiffs contend that their claims are based on

Navajo common law and do not implicate Price-Anderson.

It is unclear why the Navajo Court Plaintiffs have not

appealed the district court’s rulings that Price-Anderson

constitutes an express jurisdictional prohibition that prevents

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the Navajo Tribal Court from determining its jurisdiction over

such claims. Nevertheless, because of the important comity

considerations involved, we sua sponte examine whether

Price-Anderson constitutes an express prohibition of tribal

court jurisdiction. See Stone v. City and County of San

Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Issues

touching on federalism and comity may be considered sua

sponte.").'

As the following discussion demonstrates, we conclude

that Price-Anderson does not contain an express jurisdictional

prohibition barring the Navajo Tribal Court from determining

its jurisdiction over the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’ claims.

Therefore the mining companies, before proceeding in federal

court, are obligated to first exhaust their tribal court remedies.

‘Our decision to review this issue sua sponte is further supported by:

(1) the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Farley, 115 F.3d at 1505, which

expressly rejected the claim that Price-Anderson constitutes an express

jurisdictional prohibition; and (2) the district court's misplaced reliance on

UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 518 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Ariz. 1981), in

considering the tribal exhaustion doctrine.

In Benally, a corporation operating a uranium mill near the Navajo

reservation brought an action in federal district court to enjoin several

members of the Navajo Nation from proceeding in Navajo Tribal Court on

civil actions alleging personal injuries and property damage arising from

the corporation’s activities. Jd. at 1048. The district court concluded that

the tribal court had no jurisdiction. Benally is not dispositive, however,

because it was decided before the Supreme Court announced the tribal

exhaustion doctrine in National Farmers. Moreover, the conduct at issue

in Benally took place off the reservation, whereas in this case the alleged

conduct took place on the Navajo Nation Reservation. Tribal jurisdiction

applies more clearly to conduct occurring on reservation lands. See lowa

Mut., 480 U.S. at 18 ("Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians

on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty .") (emphasis

added); Crawford, 947 F.2d at 1408 ("When the dispute is a ‘reservation

affair’ . . . there is no discretion not to defer.").

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Ill. Price-Anderson

its legislative history mandate exclusive federal court

Jurisdiction for claims arising from "nuclear incidents." The

mining companies also assert that we may infer an express

Jurisdictional prohibition. These contentions are not

persuasive.

Before 1954, a federal monopoly existed over the use,

control, and ownership of nuclear technology. Pacific Gas &

Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.

Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983). In 1954, however,

Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act to encourage the

Private sector to become involved in the development of

atomic energy under federal regulation. /d. at 206-07.

In 1957, Congress enacted Price-Anderson. Price-

Anderson amended the Atomic Energy Act by creating

specific protections for the nuclear industry from tort liability.

See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251

(1984). Price-Anderson contains three distinct elements.

First, it sets a ceiling on the aggregate damage award for

nuclear tort claims that can be imposed against an entity

involved in the use or handling of radioactive material. Jn re

TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 852 (3d Cir.

1991). Second, it indemnifies any entity exposed to potential

liability for activity resulting in a nuclear incident, even if the

entity did not directly participate in the activity. Jd. Third,

Price-Anderson established an indemnification program

through which the federal government would require entities

involved in nuclear activities to obtain private insurance to a

ee ges and then the federal government would pay all

public liability claims above that liabili iling. ;

F.3d at 1503. at

Until amended in 1988, Price-Anderson’s provisions

regarding nuclear tort litigation did not apply unless and until

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") determined that

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an “extraordinary nuclear occurrence" had transpired.

O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1095-

96 (7th Cir. 1994). The 1988 amendments to Price-Anderson

expanded its reach to include all "public liability actions” and

eliminated the requirement that the NRC designate an

extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).

See also S. Rep. No. 218, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, at 13

(1987) ("Any suit asserting public liability shall be deemed to

be an action arising under the Price-Anderson Act."); H.R.

Rep. No. 104, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1 (same).

Price-Anderson states:

With respect to any public liability action

arising out of or resulting from a nuclear

incident, the United States district court in the

district where the nuclear incident takes place

_ . . Shall have original jurisdiction without

regard to the citizenship of any party or the

amount in controversy. Upon motion of the

defendant . . . any such action pending in any

State court . . . or United States district court

shall be removed or transferred to the United

States district court having venue under this

subsection.

42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2). Price-Anderson defines “public

liability action" as "any suit asserting public liability." /d.

§ 2014(hh). “Public liability means any legal liability arising

out of or resulting from a nuclear incident." Jd. § 2014(w).

A “nuclear incident means any occurrence . . . within the

United States causing . . . bodily injury, sickness, disease, or

death . . . arising out of or resulting from the radioactive,

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toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source,’

special nuclear, or byproduct material."’ Jd. § 2014(q).

“Although the public liability cause of action is built

around preexisting state law, it contains some distinctively

federal elements as well." O'Conner, 13 F.3d at 1096: see

also 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) ("The substantive rules for decision

in [a public liability] action shall be derived from the law of

the State in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless

such law is inconsistent with the provisions of [42 U.S.C.

§ 2210)."). For example, Price-Anderson as amended in 1988

provides the limitations period for public liability actions, 42

U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1), provides for venue, id. § 2210(n)(2),

limits the availability of punitive damages in an action arising

out of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, id. § 2210(s), and

mandates the waiver of normally-available defenses in the case

of extraordinary nuclear occurrences. Jd. § 2210(n)(1).

IV. Price-Anderson does not Constitute an

Express Jurisdictional Prohibition

One exception to the tribal exhaustion requirement calls

for an express jurisdictional prohibition. See National

Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 n.21. This exception rarely

applies. See Farley, 115 F.3d at 1502 (noting that a tribal

court "rarely" loses the opportunity to determine its

jurisdiction because of an express jurisdictional prohibition).

"Civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on

reservation lands ‘presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless

affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal

*[S]ource material (1) uranium, thorium, . . . or (2) ores

containing one or more of the foregoing materials.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(2).

**[B]yproduct material” includes “the tailings or wastes produced by

the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore

processed primarily for its source material content.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e).

86a

statute." Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the

Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1989)

(emphasis added) (quoting Jowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18).

Price-Anderson contains no such express prohibition of

tribal court jurisdiction. Price-Anderson provides for

concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction over claims

arising from nuclear incidents. It merely grants defendants

the right, rather than the obligation, to remove such cases to

federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) ("Upon motion of

the defendant . . . any such action pending in any State court

_. . Shall be removed or transferred to the United States

district court having venue under this subsection. ").*

In Farley, the Tenth Circuit held that Price-Anderson

does not constitute an express jurisdictional prohibition. In

that case, certain members of the Navajo Nation filed an

action in the Navajo Tribal Court against two mining

companies. The mining companies had conducted operations

on the Navajo Nation Reservation between 1952 and 1973.

Farley, 115 F.3d at 1500. The plaintiffs alleged that the

mining companies’ mill released vast quantities of radioactive

and toxic materials, which caused injuries. Jd. The mining

companies, without answering the tribal court complaint, filed

an action in federal district court seeking to enjoin the suit

from proceeding in the tribal court. /d. The mining

‘The mining companies’ reliance on United States v. White Mountain

Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Yakima

Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986) is misplaced. In White

Mountain, we stated: “There is no point in requiring exhaustion . . .

because tribal court jurisdiction is clearly foreclosed by the sovereign

immunity of the United States." White Mountain, 784 F.2d at 920 n.10;

see also Yakima, 806 F.2d at 861 (following White Mountain). Unlike

White Mountain and Yakima, in this case, Navajo Tribal Court jurisdiction

is not “clearly foreclosed” by Price-Anderson. Moreover, it is for the

Navajo Tribal Court to first determine whether the Navajo Court Plaintiffs

have even asserted Price-Anderson claims.

87a

companies asserted that Price-Anderson constitutes an express

jurisdictional prohibition of tribal court suits involving nuclear

torts. Thus, they argued that they had no obligation to

exhaust tribal court remedies. Jd.

The district court disagreed and stated that the "Price-

Anderson Act and its amendments are devoid of any mention

of “Indians,” ‘tribes,’ or ‘tribal-court jurisdiction.”” Kerr-

McGee Corp. v. Farley, 915 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D.N.M.

1995), aff'd, 115 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1997). The district

court further noted:

The Price-Anderson Act does not affirmatively

limit tribal court jurisdiction. Although

Congress has plenary power to define the

jurisdiction of tribal courts, it did not exercise

that power, when it drafted the Price-Anderson

Act. The Act makes no reference to Indians

and nothing in the legislative history suggests

any intent to render inoperative the established

policy promoting tribal self-government.

915 F. Supp. at 280 (citation omitted).

pr penser racine oe

to stay all proceedings before it until the mining companies

exhausted their tribal court remedies. The Tenth Circuit

noted: "The 1988 amendments [to Price-Anderson] do not

explicitly create exclusive federal court jurisdiction over

nuclear incident litigation." Farley, 115 F.3d at 1504.

*At oral argument, the mining companies contended that the Supreme

Court's recent decision in Strate controlled this case. In Strate, the

Supreme Court found that, absent a treaty or statute, an Indian tribe lacked

jurisdiction over a dispute between nonmembers of the tribe when thai

dispute arose from an accident occurring on a state highway within the

reservation. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1407-08. The Court noted that, when a

88a

the 1988 Price-Anderson amendments recognize the Act’s

exclusivity. See Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1553

(6th Cir. 1997) ("{A plaintiff] can sue under the Price-

Anderson Act, as amended, or not at all."); Jn re TMI Litig.,

940 F.2d at 854 ("A claim growing out of any nuclear

incident is compensable under the terms of the [1988

claim only where the tribe regulates one of two situations discussed in

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493, 101 S. Ct.

1245 (1981): (1) consensual relationships between nonmembers and the

tribe, or (2) conduct which “threatens or has some direct effect on the

political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the

tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.

We find Strate inapposite to the facts of this case because the

incident in Strate arose from a traffic accident on a state highway within

the tribe’s reservation. The Strate Court placed great emphasis on the fact

that the state highway was open to the public and controlled and maintained

by the state. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1414. Conversely, in this case the

Navajo Nation retained tribal sovereignty over the land the mining

companies occupied, which land was neither open to the public nor

controlled or maintained by any entity other than the tribe. The Strate

Court expressly declined to address cases, like the present one, where the

disputec tort involved nonmembers of the tribe and occurred on tribal land.

See id. at 1408 ("We express no view on the governing law or proper

forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation." )

(emphasis added). Because this case is distinguishable from Strate, we

need not consider whether a Montana exception applies. It seems

indisputable, however, that a claim involving uranium contamination poses

a danger to the ‘health or welfare of the tribe.’

The dissent contends that Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 106

F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997) has expanded

Strate, and that those two cases control the outcome here. In Red Wolf,

we held that a railroad sued for a tort arising on a reservation must exhaust

its tribal court remedies before a district court can exercise jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court vacated our decision in Red Wolf and instructed us to

reconsider our holding in light of Strate. But here, unlike in Red Wolf,

there is no question that the Navajo Nation retained its sovereignty over the

89a

Amendments to the Act] or it is not compensable at all."):

O'Conner, 13 F.3d at 1099 ("The broad definition of *public

liability action’ embodied in the Price-Anderson Act implies

that Congress has exercised power under Article I and has

enacted a new and independent, indeed exclusive, cause of

action."). These cases are inapplicable, however, because

-they only address federal-state jurisdictional issues relating to

Price-Anderson. They do not address Indian tribes or tribal

sovereignty .

. "Indian tribes occupy a unique status under our law.”

National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 851. "The condition of the

Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that

of any other two people in existence . . . . The relation of the

Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal

distinctions which exist nowhere else." Cherokee Nation v.

Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15-16 (1831).

Comity concerns differ between federal-state and

federal-tribal jurisdiction:

As in cases raising comity concerns regarding

federal-tribal jurisdiction arise out of mutual

respect between sovereigns. In the realm of

federal-tribal jurisdiction, however, Congress

has expressed an additional interest in

promoting the development of _ tribal

sovereignty . The Supreme Court has

assiduously advocated federal abstention in

favor of tribal courts.

Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 445 (10th Cir. 1991). Thus,

even if Price-Anderson preempts state court jurisdiction -- still

an open question in this circuit -- there is no express

hibition of tribal jurisdiction.

90a

The Supreme Court has also recognized that comity

concerns differ between federal-state and federal-tribal

jurisdiction. In Jowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, the Supreme

Court refused to infer that the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. §

1332, divested tribal courts of jurisdiction in diversity actions.

lowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 17-18. The Supreme Court stated that

§ 1332 “makes no reference to Indians and nothing in the

legislative history suggests any intent to render inoperative the

established federal policy promoting tribal self-government."

Id. at 17.

The Supreme Court noted: "‘Because the Tribe retains

all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been

divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference

from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains

intact." Jd. at 18 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,

455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982)). Thus, the Court held that

"in the absence of any indication that Congress intended

[§ 1332] to limit the jurisdiction of the tribal courts, we

decline . . . to hold that tribal sovereignty can be impaired in

this fashion." Jd.

We have also refused to infer a prohibition of tribal

court jurisdiction absent express language in addressing 28

U.S.C. § 1355. United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724 (9th

Cir. 1992). Section 1355 states: "The district courts shall

have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the

States" over certain actions brought by the federal

government. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (emphasis added). We noted

that the plain language of § 1355 “only grants the district

court original jurisdiction ‘exclusive of the courts of the

States,’ not exclusive of all other courts that would otherwise

have had jurisdiction. Since a tribal court is not a state court,

we hold that it does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction

provision of section 1355." Jd.

The mining companies rely on Lower Brule Constr.

Co. v. Sheesley’s Plumbing & Heating Co., 84 B.R. 638

(D.S.D. 1988) in asserting that tribal jurisdiction can be

9la

limited absent an express jurisdictional prohibition. This claim

is also without merit. In Brule, the Tribal Housing Authority

asserted that the tribal court had jurisdiction over a bankruptcy

action. /d. at 640. The district court disagreed, however, and

concluded that the tribal court’s civil jurisdiction was

“unlimited only in relation to matters of Indian self-

government." Jd. at 641. The district court reasoned that

requiring tribal courts to perform as bankruptcy courts "would

not promote self-government among the Indian tribes, even

assuming that a body of ‘bankruptcy’ law existed in tribal

court." /d. The court further noted: "The Bankruptcy Code

makes no reference to Indians or tribal courts and there is no

Congressional grant of authority for Indian tribal courts to

assume jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings." Jd. at 642.

Brule is of limited guidance in this case. First, we

have already determined that an express jurisdictional

prohibition is required to limit tribal court jurisdiction. See

Plainbull, 957 F.2d at 726; see also Farley, 115 F.3d at 1505

("Simply put, ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ is not conferred unless

conferred explicitly."). Second, the tribe in Brule did not

allege that it had a body of bankruptcy law which it could

apply. In this case, however, the Navajo Court Plaintiffs have

apparently asserted claims based on Navajo common law - an

area Clearly within the Navajo Tribal Court’s expertise.°

Even if the issue were ambiguous, federal courts are

“required to construe ambiguity in statutes on Indian affairs in

favor of preserving Indian sovereignty." Poodry v.

Tonawanda Band of Sene a Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 889 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 610 (1996). In this case,

*The mining companies also contend that Price-Anderson is the

exclusive method for bringing nuclear tort claims because Price-Anderson

provides a means of consolidating claims and ensuring a fair and equitable

distribution of funds to all those affected by a nuclear incident. This claim

is unavailing because it merely seeks to “infer” a jurisdictional prohibition

where no “express” jurisdictional prohibition exists.

92a

members of the Navajo Nation have alleged claims for

personal injury and wrongful death arising from activity

occurring on the Navajo Nation Reservation. Allowing the

Navajo Tribal Court to determine its jurisdiction over these

claims will preserve Indian sovereignty.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we hold that Price-

Anderson does not constitute an express jurisdictional

prohibition that prevents the Navajo Tribal Court from

determining its jurisdiction over the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’

claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising from

activities occurring on the Navajo Nation Reservation.’

Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the district court's

orders granting the mining companies’ requests for

preliminary injunctions. We affirm that portion of the district

court’s orders denying the mining companies’ requests for

preliminary injunctions.

Because the Navajo Tribal Court is to determine in the

first instance whether it has jurisdiction over the Navajo Court

Plaintiffs’ claims, we remand this matter to the district court

to either enter a stay of all proceedings or dismiss the

complaint without prejudice pending the exhaustion of tribal

court remedies. See Jowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 20 n.14.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED.

"In holding that Price-Anderson does not constitute an express

jurisdictional prohibition, we need not consider the Navajo Court Plaintiffs’

alternative claim that Price-Anderson does not apply because the mining

companies had no indemnity agreement with the federal government. See

Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251-52 n.12 ("Government indemnification is

available only to those required to maintain financial protection . . . and

the liability limitation applies only to those who are indemnified.").

93a

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

In these two lawsuits, three Navajo Indians sued El

Paso Natural Gas Company, a Delaware corporation, and

Cyprus Foote Mineral Company, a Pennsylvania corporation,

in Navajo tribal court. The Richards case alleged death from

cancer caused by radiation. The Neztsosies’ case alleged that

the Neztsosies and their cattle were poisoned by drinking

water contaminated with radiation and heavy metals. The

uranium mining occurred many years ago. In ruling on a

motion for preliminary injunction, the district court ruled that

tribal court proceedings were enjoined as to Price-Anderson

claims, but not as to other claims, and did not rule on whether

the Price-Anderson Act applied to claims asserted by plaintiffs

in tribal court. Plaintiffs did not appeal the injunction against

litigating Price-Anderson claims in tribal court, so it should be

treated as law of the case. The corporations appealed denial

of the preliminary injunction as to all claims not covered by

Price-Anderson. The majority opinion lets the plaintiffs sue

the corporations in tribal court on all their claims, Price-

Anderson or not. That is incorrect.

; The Price-Anderson-Act, as originally enacted in 1957,

did not create a federal tort cause of action, nor confer

jurisdiction on the federal courts. Kiick v. Metropolitan

Edison Co., 784 F.2d 490, 493 (3d Cir. 19%); Stibitz v.

General Pub. Util. Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 1984).

Congress amended the Act to expand federal jurisdiction to

include claims arising from any “nuclear incident." See

O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1096

(7th Cir. 1994).

The statute provides that federal district courts have

original jurisdiction with respect to "any public liability action

arising out of or resuiting from a nuclear incident." 42

U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2). Cases brought in state courts "shall be

94a

removed" to federal court. Jd. “Public liability" in this

statute means “any legal liability arising out of or resulting

from a nuclear incident." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w). A “nuclear

incident" was defined as any occurrence arising out of the

hazardous properties of nuclear materials that causes sickness,

personal injury or death:

any occurrence, including an extraordinary

nuclear occurrence, within the United States

causing, within or outside the United States,

bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or

loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of

property, arising out of or resulting from the

radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other

hazardous properties of source, special nuclear,

or byproduct material.

42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). I do not think there are any actions that

can arise out of sickness or death resulting from the hazardous

properties of nuclear material that are not Price-Anderson

actions. That should be the end of the case, because the

plaintiffs did not appeal the determination by the district court

that Price-Anderson actions could not be asserted in tribal

court.

Plaintiffs’ claims for injury and death resulting from

nuclear materials left over from uranium mining were Price-

Anderson claims or nothing, and Price-Anderson claims must

be brought in federal district court. Congress did not leave

room for non-federal tribunals to interfere with nuclear

development that Congress favored, or foster nuclear

development it disfavored. Two circuits have held that the

federal cause of action is exclusive. The Third Circuit stated:

Congress clearly intended to supplant all

possible state causes of action when the factual

prerequisite of the statute are met... .

95a

Congress clearly considered the decisions of

our court holding that Congress had not

intended to create a federal cause of action for

Cases not based upon an extraordinary nuclear

occurrence . . . . Congress then provided, in

the [1988] Amendments Act, the clearest

expression of intent that there be a federal

cause of action arising directly under the Act.

In re TMI Cases Consolidated, 940 F.2d 832, 857 (3d Cir.

1991). The court concluded, "After the Amendments Act, no

State cause of action based on public liability exists. A claim

growing out of any nuciear incident is compensable under the

terms of the Amendments Act or it is not compensable at all."

Id. at 854 (emphasis in original). In O'Conner vy.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994), the

Seventh Circuit similarly held: "A claim growing out of any

nuclear incident is compensable under [Price-Anderson] or it

is not compensable at all." O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1099.

The majority should not have reached over the head of

the parties to reverse On a matter not even raised, whether

prosecution of Price-Anderson claims in tribal court should

have been enjoined.

Because (1) it is law of the case, not appealed, that the

tribal court lacks jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims, and

(2) there are no claims that can be made that are not Price-

Anderson claims, it necessarily follows tat (3) there are no

claims that can be made in tribal court. There can be no claim

for which exhaustion in tribal court can be required.

We made a somewhat similar exhaustion doctrine

mistake in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Red Wolf, 106

F.3d 868 (9th Cir.), vacated 118 S. Ct. 37, 139 L. Ed. 2d 5

(1997). The Supreme Court made short work of our error,

vacating it in a memorandum decision for further

consideration in light of Strate v. A-] Contractors, 117 S. Ct.

1404 (1997). The Court held in Strate, 117 S. Ct. 1404

—_

96a

(1997), that exhaustion in tribal court is not required, where

"it is plain that no federal grant of authority provides for tribal

governance of nonmembers’ conduct":

When, as in this case, it is plain that no federal

grant provides for tribal governance of

nonmembers’ conduct . . . covered by

{Montana v. United States,’ 450 U.S. 544

(1981)] main rule, it will be equally evident

that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority

over disputes arising from such conduct. As in

criminal proceedings, state or federal courts

will be the only forums competen. to adjudicate

those claims. Therefore, when tribal-court

jurisdiction over an action such as this one is

challenged in federal court, the otherwise

applicable exhaustion requirement, must give

way, for it would serve no purpose other than

delay.

Id. 1416 n.14. The majority has in footnote 5 attempted to

limit Strate to its facts, as we might with a poorly reasoned

decision of our own that had not stood up well over time.

We cannot do that with a Supreme Court decision.

97a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,

a Delaware Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

LAURA NEZTSOSIE; ARLINDA NEZTSOSIE,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-17121

DC No. CV-96-00049-RGS

CYPRUS FOOTE MINERAL COMPANY,

a Pennsylvania Corporation;

CYPRUS AMAX MINERAL COMPANY,

a Delaware Corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

ZONNIE MARIE DANDY RICHARDS,

individually and as representative

of the Estate of Harold J.Richards, Sr.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-17139

DC No. CV-96-01524-RGS

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

April 27, 1998

98a 99a

Before: Judges Harry Pregerson, Warren J. Ferguson, and Replace

Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges

"Strate v. A-1 Contractors, U.S. ,117S.

ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND DENYING Ct. 1404 (1997)"

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

with

The opinion filed on February 11, 1998 is amended as

follows: " Strate"

At Slip. Op. p. 1284, first full paragraph, lines 3-8: At Slip Op. p. 1291, n.5, first full paragraph, line 7:

Replace Replace

"(2) tribal court jurisdiction “is patently "Id. at 1407-08."

violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions";

or (3) exhaustion would be futile because of the with

lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the

tribal court’s jurisdiction. National Farmers, "Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1407-08."

471 U.S. 845 at 857 n.21 (emphasis added)."

With these amendments, Judges Pregerson and

with Ferguson voted to deny the petition for rehearing, Judge

Pregerson voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc

"(2) tribal court jurisdiction patently would and Judge Ferguson so recommends. Judge Kleinfeld voted

violate express jurisdictional prohibitions; (3) to grant the petition for rehearing and to accept the suggestion

exhaustion would be futile because of the lack for rehearing en banc.

of an adequate opportunity to challenge the

tribal court’s jurisdiction; or (4) no federal The full court has been advised of the en banc

grant authorizes tribal governance of suggestion and no judge has requested a vote on it.

nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by

Montana’s main rule. See Strate v. A-1 The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion

Contractors, U.S. , 1178S. Ct. 1404, 1416 for rehearing en banc is rejected.

n.14 (1997); National Farmers, 471 U.S. at

856 n.21."

At Slip Op. p. 1291, n.5, first full paragraph, lines 2-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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