Amicus Curiae Brief — New Mexico Ex Rel. Ortiz v. Reed

Suweme Court, U.S,

FILED

MAR 23 1996

aS )

."

No. 97-1217

CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1997

STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. MANUEL ORTIZ,

Petitioner,

Vv.

TIMOTHY REED,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To

The Supreme Court Of New Mexico

BRIEF OF 40 STATES AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT CF PETITIONER,

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY

Attorney General

JEFFREY S. SUTTON

State Solicitor

Counsel of Record

JUDITH L. FRENCH

Assistant Attorney Generai

ELISE PORTER

Assistant Attorney General

30 E. Broad Street, ! 7th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428

(614) 466-8980

BILL PRYOR

Attorney General

State of Alabama

BRUCE M. BOTELHO

Attorney General

State of Alaska

GRANT WOODS

Attorney General

State of Arizona

WINSTON BRYANT

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

DANIEL E. LUNGREN

Attorney General

State of California

GALE A. NORTON

Attorney General

State of Colorado

JOHN M. BAILEY

Chief State’s Attorney

State of Connecticut

M. JANE BRADY

Attorney General

State of Delaware

ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH

Attorney General

State of Florida

MARGERY S. BRONSTER

Attorney General

State of Hawan

JAMES E. RYAN

Attorney General

State of Illinois

ALAN G. LANCE

Attorney General

State of Idaho

THOMAS J. MILLER

Attorney General

State of lowa

ALBERT B. CHANDLER III

Attorney General

State of Kentucky

RICHARD P. IEYOUB

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

ANDREW KETTERER

Attorney General

State of Maine

J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR.

Attorney General

State of Maryland

SCOTT HARSHBARGER

Attorney General

State of Massachusetts

FRANK J. KELLEY

Attorney General

State of Michigan

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY III

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

MICHAEL C. MOORE

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

ee

OO a + ee ey

JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON

Attorney General

State of Missouri

JOSEPH P. MAZUREK

Attorney General

State of Montana

DON STENBERG

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA

Attorney General

State of Nevada

PHILIP T. MCLAUGHLIN

Attorney General

State of New Hampshire

DENNIS C. VACCO

Attorney General

State of New York

MICHAEL F. EASLEY

Attorney General

State of North Carolina

HEIDI HEITKAMP

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

W.A. DREW EDMONDSON

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma

D. MICHAEL FISHER

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

JEFFREY B. PINE

Attorney General

State of Rhode Island

CHARLES M. CONDON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

MARK BARNETT

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Attorney General

State of Tennessee

DAN MORALES

State of Texas

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Virginia

CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE

Attorney General

State of Washington

DARRELL V. MCGRAW, JR.

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................... ae

STATEMENT OF AMICI INTEREST ............... l

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............ 2

I. THE LOWER COURT MISTAKENLY

ADDED TWO UNIQUE EXCEPTIONS TO

THE EXTRADITION CLAUSE .............. 2

A. THE CLAUSE DOES NOT CONTAIN-

A“DURESS” EXCEPTION ........... 2

B. THE LOWER COURT

IMPERMISSIBLY RELIED ON ITS

STATE CONSTITUTION TO

JUSTIFY NON-COMPLIANCE WITH

THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ........... 5

II. THE LOWER COURT DECISION

THREATENS TO DILUTE STATE RIGHTS

UNDER THE EXTRADITION CLAUSE AND

THE GOAL OF INTERSTATE COMITY

THAT THE CLAUSE EMBRACES ........... 6

lil. THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT'S

DECISION CREATES A CONFLICT IN THE

ET 9.65 4-46-00ba0 Davee te cea) 9

CONCLUSION ... + rebeseuans Fans a

APPENDIX wa 4 TeTTET TTT

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Appleyard v. Massachusetts,

es ae Gee 2,3,8

Beckwith v. Evatt,

819 S.W. 2d 453 (Tenn. Crim App. 1991) _..... 10

California v. Superior Court of California,

a ll a ca ee a 7

Castrictia v. State,

cheeks akevakdsakeudes 10

Coungeris v. Sheahan,

58 P36 Fae Crm Ce. 1.983) ...... 2... wee. 9

James M. Douglas v. State of Florida,

No. 97-32215-CICI

(Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,

Volusia County, Dec. 4, 1997) ................ 9

Holmes v. Klevenhagen et all,

S19 S.W. 2d $39 (Tex 1991) ................. 9

Hyatt v. People,

ERNE Renee Se 3

INS v. Elias-Zacarias,

ie i rile SR a ta 3

Kentucky v. Dennison,

65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861)... 2... 2... eke, 7

Michigan v. Doran,

a a ait alee 6,7,8,10

Nash vy. Miller,

ne 4 bcnth eobnnsdauees+ bkebs 10

Pacileo v. Walker,

en ee 4

Puerto Rico v. Branstad,

Das 2 ch ca eahatee a §,8,11

Roberts v. Reilly,

116U.S. 80(1885) _......... as eee eae 2

Strachan v. Colon,

77 N.Y.2d 499(1991) .......... 10

Strachan v. Colon,

941 F.2d 128 (2nd Cir. N.Y.1991) ............ 9

Sweeney v. Woodall,

| pre en ee 4

Statutory Provisions Page

Sr RN ws urns dds Cavcw ec ee 7

ae Ge, GD. . veceetus cei... 7

STATEMENT OF AMICI INTEREST

Amicus State of Ohio and 39 other amici States write to

urge the Court to grant the petition of the State of New Mexico

At stake is the essential right of one State to demand the return

of a fugitive from justice located in another State.

In this instance, while the executive branches of Ohio,

New Mexico and virtually all other States join together in

recognizing and supporting the right to reclaim a fugitive from

justice, the judicial branch of New Mexico (the asylum State)

erected a barrier to extradition by creating an exception to this

Court’s definition of a “fugitive” under the extradition clause

In doing so, the New Mexico Supreme Court purported to

decide issues regarding Ohio’s prisons that this Court has long

held should be decided by Ohio’s courts. Left unreviewed, this

novel exception threatens to disrupt an interstate principle of

comity that lies at the heart of our federal system of

government.

The State of Ohio, as an initial matter, plainly has a

strong interest in the resolution of this case. Though not a

party, it understandably wishes to see Mr. Reed returned to its

jurisdiction. The other amici States, as potential demanding

States, likewise share an interest in ensuring that State courts

throughout the country respect and enforce the requirements of

the clause. And, as potential asylum States, the amici States

also seek clear criteria for meeting their obligations under the

clause. Perhaps most importantly, the amici States share an

interest in maintaining the values of comity and interstate

cooperation that Article IV of the United States Constitution

embodies.

Extradition claims arise frequently in a federal system of

government. In 1997, Ohio made 218 extradition requests from

its sister States, and returned 209 prisoners to other States. See

Appendix. Other States show significant extradition activity as

well In 1997, California had a total of 685 extradition requests

2

(demands or returns), New York a total of 490, Texas an

approximate total of 700, and Pennsylvania a total of 543. /d.

The requirements of the extradition clause, in short, have

frequent application.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The petition should be granted for three independent

reasons. First, the lower court added two interpretive glosses

to the clause unique to extradition jurisprudence. It held that

the definition of “fugitive” is subject to a “duress” exception, a

holding that is contrary to Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80

(1885), Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222 (1906), and

their progeny. And it held that an asylum State may rely on its

Own constitution to sidestep the requirements of the federal

clause. Second, these components of the decision threaten

markedly to dilute the requirements of the clause and to

disfigure enforcement of it. Third, by diverging from U S.

Supreme Court precedent, the decision also creates a split of

authority in the lower courts.

1. THE LOWER COURT MISTAKENLY ADDED

TWO UNIQUE EXCEPTIONS TO THE

EXTRADITION CLAUSE.

A. THE CLAUSE DOES NOT

CONTAIN A “DURESS”

EXCEPTION.

In case after case, the Court has set forth clear criteria

for ascertaining who is a “fugitive” under the extradition clause

and who is not. One: was the individual present in the

demanding State at the time the crime was committed? Two:

is the individual no longer in the demanding State? Roberts, 116

U.S. at 95. Once these criteria have been met, that ends the

matter. Even if individuals leave the demanding State for some

3

reason other than to flee justice and even if they remain ignorant

of the crime they committed, they nonetheless constitute

“fugitives” from justice when found in another State.

Appleyard, 203 U.S. at 226-27. The only exception to this

bright-line rule is where uncontradicted evidence shows that the

accused was not in the demanding State at the time he or she

committed the crime; for under those circumstances the

individual could not possibly have “fled” the demanding State.

Hyatt v. People, 188 U.S. 691 (1903).

Despite these clear lines and despite decades of

precedent honoring them, the New Mexico Supreme Court

found that Timothy Reed, the respondent in this case, was not

a fugitive. No one disputes that he committed a crime in Ohio.

And no one disputes that Ohio found him in New Mexico. In

nonetheless concluding that the extradition clause did not

require his return to Ohio, the New Mexico Supreme Court

looked to Mr. Reed’s subjective belief that he would be

mistreated in Ohio’s prisons and would not be given a hearing

by Ohio officials before being returned to prison. Under these

circumstances, the court concluded, Reed fled Ohio in “duress”

and therefore was not a fugitive.

This sudden exception to the definition of “fugitive” has

no jurisprudential pedigree of any kind, and threatens to

diminish the strict requirements of the extradition clause. Unlike

deportation law, which permits asylurn based on a reasonable

belief of persecution (see, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478 (1992)), interstate extradition knows no such exception.

While an individual resisting deportation may rely on the

potential for mistreatment in the foreign country’s prison

system, an individual resisting extradition to another State may

not. Because this Court stands ready to review all claims of

prison mistreatment, whether brought in federal or State court,

the Constitution does not permit one State to presume that

another State has a gulag for a prison system.

4

Twice before, in fact, the Court has rejected attempts by

asylum States to investigate alleged mistreatment in demanding

States. In Sweeney v. Woodall 344 U.S. 86 (1952), a fugitive

from Alabama argued that rendition back to that State would

subject him to cruel and unusual punishment. /d. at 87. The

Court held that Woodall had made no showing that his rights

could not be vindicated in the courts of Alabama, and that

therefore any alleged hardship was subject to challenge only in

the courts of Alabama, and if necessary on review in the United

States Supreme Court. /d. at 89.

In Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86 (1980), an escapee

from an Arkansas prison was found in California, after which the

California governor agreed to return him to Arkansas. Soon

thereafter, the Supreme Court of California issued a writ of

habeas corpus to conduct hearings into the conditions of the

Arkansas prison system. Relying on Woodall, the Court

reversed: “Once the Governor of [the asylum State] issued the

warrant for arrest and rendition in response to the request of the

Governor of the [demanding State], claims as to constitutional

defects in the [demanding State’s] penal system should be heard

in the courts of the [demanding State], not those of [the asylum

State].” /d. at 88 (citation omitted).

Neither Woodall nor Walker, to be sure, dealt directly

with the definition of “fugitive.” They instead dealt with a direct

attempt by a lower court to investigate allegations of prison

mistreatment in another State. Yet from the vantage point of

the extradition clause, the two come to the same: Whether the

courts of the asylum State seize direct authority to investigate

allegations of mistreatment or claim indirect authority to do so

by reconfiguring the definition of fugitive, they still arrogate

rights they do not have. It is a fixed mark of extradition law that

in the first instance such investigations remain the province of

the courts in the demanding State and if necessary the province

of this Court in ensuring adherence to the United States

5

Constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court’s contrary

conclusion should be reviewed -- and reversed.

B. THE LOWER COURT

IMPERMISSIBLY RELIED ON ITS

STATE CONSTITUTION TO

JUSTIFY NON-COMPLIANCE

WITH THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

Aside from improperly adding a “duress” gloss tc the

extradition clause, the lower court mistakenly relied on the New

Mexico Constitution for doing so. Under the supremacy clause,

the constitution of one of the 50 States simply is not superior to

the Constitution of the United States.

The New Mexico Supreme Court left little doubt about

the source of its supposed authority to alter federal extradition

law. In resolving Mr. Reed’s claims that he should not be

extradited to Ohio, the court firmly asserted that it would “seek

resolution in our own laws and Constitution. * * * The New

Mexico Constitution guarantees rights that no law can

abrogate.” Op. p. 34. Relying on the due process clause of its

constitution, which guarantees to all persons life and liberty, as

well as the right to “seek[] and obtain[] safety and happiness,”

the court concluded that “the extradition process was not meant

to abrogate the New Mexico Constitution which regards

‘seeking and obtaining safety’ as a ‘natural, inherent and

inalienable’ right.” Op. p. 40. This analysis unabashedly

elevates state law over federal law.

And it is plainly wrong. Because the commands of the

extradition clause are federal in nature, mandatory and

enforceable by federal courts, Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483

6

U.S. 219 (1987); Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289

(1978), a state court simply cannot ignore them -- even to the

well-meaning end of dignifying the State’s own constitution.

This aspect of the decision separately warrants review.

Il. THE LOWER COURT DECISION THREATENS

TO DILUTE STATE RIGHTS UNDER THE

EXTRADITION CLAUSE AND THE GOAL OF

INTERSTATE COMITY THAT THE CLAUSE

EMBRACES.

Left as is, the decision of the New Mexico Supreme

Court threatens one of the foundations of the federal system of

government established by Article IV of the United States

Constitution.

The amici States no doubt vigorously support the

significance and independent authority of their State

constitutions. At the same time, they fully recognize that the

United States Constitution places important limits on the States

and their constitutions. One such limit is the power to resist

extradition.

Article IV embodies the necessary requirements of a

compact among the several States on the one hand and between

the United States and the States on the other. As one of these

requirements, the extradition clause says:

A person charged in any State with Treason,

Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from

Justice, and be found in another State, shall on

Demand of the Executive Authority of the State

from which he fled, be delivered up, to be

removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the

Crime.

7

U.S. Const. Art. IV, sec. 2. In implementing the clause,

Congress enacted the Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. §3182 (“Act”).

Failure to “deliver{] up” a fugitive “to be removed to the

State having Jurisdiction of the Crime” undermines one of the

essential policy considerations underlying Article [V. It also

destroys a delicate component of the balance of power among

the States. As the Court stated over a century ago:

[T]he statesmen who framed the Constitution

were fully sensible, that from the complex

character of the Government, it must fail unless

the States mutually supported each other and the

General Government, and that nothing would be

more likely to disturb its peace, and end in

discord, than permitting an offender against the

laws of a State, by passing over a mathematical

line which divides it from another, to defy its

process, and stand ready, under the protection of

the State, to repeat the offense as soon as

another opportunity offered.

Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 100 (1861).

The clause and the Act, together with decisions from this

Court, make clear that extradition is “to be a summary

procedure, * * * to be kept within narrow bounds.” California

v. Superior Court of California, 482 U.S. 400, 407 (1987).

Once the governor of the asylum State has granted extradition,

it serves as prima facie evidence that the constitutional and

statutory requirements have been met. Michigan v. Doran, 439

U.S. 282, 289 (1978). The only inquiry permitted is: “(a)

whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b)

whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the

demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named

in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is

a fugitive.” /d at 289. These are “historic facts readily

verifiable.” /d. It is settled law that “the commands of the

Extradition Clause are mandatory and afford no discretion to the

* * * courts of the asylum State.” Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483

U.S. 219 (1987).

After finding that the first three of the Doran criteria had

been met, the New Mexico Supreme Court, rather than treating

his fugitive status as an “historical fact readily verifiable,”

inquired into the reasons for Reed’s flight. The reasons for a

person’s flight from the demanding State are irrelevant to the

determination of fugitive status, and therefore cannot be

inquired into by state courts. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203

U.S. 222, 227 (1906). Appleyard specified that “it is only

necessary that the accused, having been in the demanding state

when the crime was committed, thereafter leave that state and

be found within the territory of another.” /d. It follows that

any inquiry into other matters is irrelevant, should not have been

allowed at hearing, and cannot be relied on by the state supreme

court in making an extradition determination.

But the actions of the lower courts go beyond forbidden

inquiry. The trial court in New Mexico conducted, and the

Supreme Court of New Mexico relied upon, a hearing at which

Reed was allowed to present evidence of alleged threats to his

safety and life by Ohio prison authorities. The New Mexico

Supreme Court noted that this evidence was “unrebutted.”

However, New Mexico as the asylum State did not have easy

access to information needed to rebut such evidence. Ohio was

not a party to the case, and therefore had no opportunity to

present evidence. Even if it had had such an opportunity, it

would have been required at great expense and difficulty to

present evidence in a foreign court hundreds of miles from the

State. Witnesses, documents, and other evidence would all have

had to be transported. Prison and parole personnel would have

been taken away from vital tasks at home in order to prove what

9

should be an “historical fact easily verifiable.” Many demanding

States, moreover, frequently will not have the resources to

engage in this sort of litigation, thereby allowing offenders

simply to “pass{]over a mathematical line” to freedom.

Asylum States will suffer as well. If even one state court

system develops an “exception” jurisprudence with regard to

extradition, it will become a haven for escapees, parole-jumpers

and bail-skippers from all over the country. The asylum State’s

courts will be clogged with fugitives demanding extensive

hearings. Those who fit the asylum State’s exception, having

defied one State’s laws with impunity, will be encouraged to

repeat their behavior. Even more “disturbing” to interstate

peace, States could potentially retaliate against each other for

refusing extradition of fugitives from their States.

Worse yet, such a decision in one State will soon be

cited as precedent by escapees in other States. Nor is this an

idle threat. An escapee who fled to Florida recently cited the

decision below in an attempt to escape extradition to Ohio.

See, James M. Douglas v. State of Florida, No. 97-32215-C1CI

(Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Volusia County, Dec.

4, 1997)(Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus) ,

on appeal, No. 97-3428 (Sth District Court of Appeals of

Florida)(reproduced in Appendix).

il, THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT’S

DECISION CREATES A CONFLICT IN

THE LOWER COURTS.

Not surprisingly, in light of the clear direction from the

Court in this area, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision

creates a conflict in the state and lower federal courts. See, e.g.

Coungeris v. Sheahan, \\ F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 1993 (sufficiency

of charge should be challenged in demanding State, not asylum

State); Strachan v. Colon, 941 F.2d 128 (2nd Cir.

10

1991)(equities should be addressed in demanding State, not

asylum State); Holmes v. Klevenhagen et al., 819 S.W. 2d 539

(Tex 1991)(trial judge “was without authority to consider

equitable issues during the writ hearing”); Beckwith v. Evatt,

819 S.W. 2d 453 (Tenn. Crim App. 1991)(petitioner not

allowed to raise violation of his rights by demanding State in

extradition hearing); Strachan v. Colon, 77 N.Y .2d 499, 571

N.E.2d 65 (1991)(petitioner’s due process claim could not be

heard in courts of asylum State); Castriotta v. State, 111 Nev.

67, 888 P.2d 927 (1995)(district court correctly held that

evidence outside of Doran criteria should be brought in

demanding State’s courts); Nash v. Miller, 223 Neb. 605, 391

N.W.2d 143(1986)(fugitivity defined as leaving the demanding

State after having allegedly committing a crime there). This

conflict of authority also supports the writ.

eh

a

11

CONCLUSION

What has long been true should remain true. “[T]}he

commands of the Extradition Clause are mandatory and afford

no discretion to the * * * courts of the asylum State.” Puerto

Rico v. Branstad 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987). Because the lower

court failed to heed this admonition, the 40 amici States join

New Mexico in urging the Court to grant the writ.

Respectfully submitted,

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY

Attorney General of Ohio

JEFFREY S. SUTTON

State Solicitor

Counsel of Record

JUDITH L. FRENCH

ELISE PORTER

Assistant Attorneys General

30 E. Broad Street, 17th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428

(614) 466-8980

,

A-1 A-2

Maryland 192 §7 249

Number of Extraditions in 1997 for various States Massachsetts N/A N/A 1S|*

Michigan N/A N/A 244

State Requests to Renditions Total Minnesota 82 155 37

other States _to other States

Mississippi N/A N/A 212

Alabama N/A N/A 240 Montana 7] S] 122

Alaska 1] 58 . 69 New

; Hampshire 4] 28 69

Arizona 240 342 582

New Mexico N/A N/A 258*

Arkansas N/A N/A 179

ae New York i96 294 490

California N/A N/A 685 |

: | North

Connecticut 214 N/A N/A . Carolina 123 388 Si}

|

Delaware 170 N/A N/A | Ohio 718 209 427

.

Florida N/A N/A 1300°* Pennsylvania 189 354 543

Idaho 84 78 162 | Rhode Island 172 33 250

Illinois 265 373 638 ) South

| Carolina 135 22 157

lowa N/A N/A 178

| South Dakota 45 56 101

Kentucky N/A N/A 323

Louisiana 149 129 278

Tennessee 130 120 250

. Texas 200 $00 700**

A-3

Utah 66 29 95

Vermont ! 26 27

Virginia 279 170 449

Washington 172 322 494

. For fiscal year 1997: July 1, 1996-June 30 1997.

ee Estimated.

A-4

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR

VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 97-32215-CICI

DIVISION: 32

JAMES M. DOUGLAS,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner.

/

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This matter came on for consideration on the petition of

the petitioner, JAMES M. DOUGLAS, for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. The petitioner is currently in custody in Volusia

County, having been arrested on a warrant for escape from the

prison system of the State of Ohio.

The State of Ohio has issued a Request for Interstate

Rendition for James Michael Douglas, who was convicted of the

crimes of murder and theft, and was serving a term of

incarceration of 15 years to life, when he escaped. The

Governor and Secretary of State of Florida on June 24, 1997,

A-5

issued a warrant demanding the arrest and securing of Mr.

Douglas and the delivery of Mr. Douglas into the custody of

agents to be taken back to the State of Ohio from which he fled.

It appears that the requirements of §941.10, Florida

Statutes, have been appropriately complied with by the State of

Florida. It appears further that the principal case law governing

the discretion of this Court in dealing with the extradition

process is Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978). That case

provides four criteria which may be raised by any person seeking

to cOntest extradition. Those four criteria are:

1. Whether the extradition documents are on their

face in order,

2. Whether the petitioner has been charged with a

crime in the demanding state,

3 Whether the petitioner is the person named in

the request for extradition, and

4 Whether the petitioner is a fugitive.

The petitioner in the present case attacks extradition on

the basis of the fourth criterion - that is, he asserts that he is not

a fugitive. The basis for that assertion is that he believes that he

cannot be treated fairly in the State of Ohio, and that his life

would be in danger if he is returned there. In support of his

position, the petitioner has provided the Court with a copy of

the case of Reed v. State of New Mexico | SW ___,, Docket

No.: 22,749 (Supreme Court of New Mexico, Sept. 9, 1997).

While the Court is impressed with the materials supplied

by the petitioner with respect to his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, to grant the petition would expand the powers of an

asylum state beyond the permissible boundaries established by

A-6

the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. It is

clear that the United States Supreme Court has minimized the

scope of inquiry available to asylum states with respect to the

issue of extradition. California v. Superior Court, 482 U.S.

400, 402 (1987). Under the guidelines set forth there an asylum

state can do no more than decide whether the requirements of

the Extradition Act have been met. See also Michigan v.

Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978). Thus, this Court’s inquiry

must be limited to the existence of a crime charged against a

defendant, technical compliance with the required

documentation, concurrence of identity between the defendant

and the person sought for extradition and fugitivity. It might,

perhaps, be appropriate for a federal court to make the inquiry

requested by the petitioner, but this Court feels constrained by

the constitutional limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause,

and the opinion of the United States Supreme Court cited

above.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the petition of the petitioner, JAMES

M. DOUGLAS, for Writ of Habeas Corpus be and the same is

hereby denied

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, in Daytona

Beach, Volusia County, Florida this 4th day of December, 1997.

Ls/

DAVID A. MONACO

CIRCUIT JUDGE

Copies to:

Paul J. Dubbeld, Esquire

Hon. John W. Tanner, State Attorney

Raul Zambrano, Assistant State Attorney