Petition for Writ of Certiorari — New Mexico Ex Rel. Ortiz v. Reed

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3 Court, U.S.

ILE D

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“ 97 1217 JAN 23 198

NO. ___pesiee OF PHE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1997

7

STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. MANUEL ORTIZ,

Petitioner,

v.

TIMOTHY REED,

Respondent.

¢

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To

The Supreme Court Of New Mexico

o

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

®

Tom Upatt

Attorney General of New Mexico

EvizasetH M. BLaispett

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

ArtHurR W. Pepin

Assistant Attorney General

Post Office Drawer 1508

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-1508

(505) 827-6083 or (505) 827-6934

Counsel for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO, (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does a state court violate the Extradition Clause by

allowing a claim of duress to defeat the fugitivity

requirement of a valid extradition demand?

Does a state court violate the Extradition and Suprem-

acy Clauses of the Federal Constitution by denying

rendition based on a state constitutional right to seek

and obtain safety and happiness?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....----05ss essere i

OPINION BELOW........---::::eeeeeeeeeere eres |

JURISDICTION ....... 000 ese eee rere errr ete e eee ees 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED...... |

STATEMENT OF THE CASE......- ++. 05555 e eee eees 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........->- 5

ini i ignificant And

a inion Below Raises A Signi

el 2 Question Regarding The Proper Scope

Of An Asylum State’s Determination Of Fugitive :

Status Under The Extradition Clause .........-. ‘

inion Below Raises A Substantial Question

Rees ing The Impact Of State Constitutional Guar- i

antees On Extradition Jurisprudence..........++--

CONCLUSION ...... 0. cece cece creer eee rene nen neees 14

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Barton v. Malley, 626 F.2d 151 (CA10 1980).......... 11

California v. Superior Court of California, 482 U.S.

ET ENEGG46¥bbs Gh vo edie ch 0baed bac edudereccs 13

California First Bank v, State, 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d

DENS sakU needles dawhebaccetachececsecltn co. 12

Carpenter v. Jamerson, 432 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio a 4

Chamberlain v. Celeste, 729 F.2d 1071 (CA6 1984)...9, 11

Galloway v. Josey, 507 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1987), cert.

denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988)....................0... 6

In re Ropp, 541 A.2d 86 (Vt. 1988)...........000000.., 6

Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (CADC), cert.

SS a y

Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978).............. 5, 6

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).............. 11

Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86 (1980) ................ 6, 8

People ex rel. Bowman v. Woods, 264 N.E.2d 151 (Ill.

a Nia Rd a 8

People ex rel. Strachan v. Colon, 571 N.E.2d 65 (N.Y.

Rig id ce a ah 8

Petition of James, 575 N.E.2d 38 (Mass. ascniane 11

Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 nee 12

Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, _. N.M. __, 947 P.2d 86

(1997)

Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107

N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988).................... 12

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885)... .... 2.66. e cece 6

Skaggs Drug Center v. General Electric Co.,63 N.M. —

a Fe Be GE CE ho ccacctenccacsdessnecacs 12

South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412 (1933)........... 6

State v. Engler, 85 F.3d 1205 (CA6 1996)............. 13

State ex rel. Reddin v. Meekma, 306 N.W.2d 664

(Wis.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981)............ 11

State ex rel. Sheppard v. Kisner, 394 S.E.2d 907 (W.

We, Ge oN nae ceddsuaks cehansebibotsndsevenccess 11

Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911)............... 7

Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952)................ 7

Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798

ED Ee CO ecb ceduscetanegsnéeneckessndecceeens 12

United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980)........... 10

Wynsma v. Leach, 536 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1975).......... 11

STATUTES

aD WE. TR cs ccdedenseresetepindedintscswetinns 1

DEBE Came: DOR. Gh Ge ods ccc cecedetisconcives 11, 12

Ohio Admin. Code § 5120:1-1-18(F) (1979 ed.)......... 10

CONSTITUTIONS

Constitution of the United States, Extradition

Cate, AOD GE 1b dnc cccccnucoscnsdscesscosessa 1

Constitution of the United States, Supremacy

Coat, AED VE ov csecncvcnsdivessosgeesecisconcs 2

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amend-

PAASuatheviuveusd devacdsensinceavciieecd.«....... 2

Constitution of the United States, F

I ocd dn dcvékock Bate lssc: a as 2

Rute:

nae cde nt | SARs Pe rates Rar 1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, State of New Mexico, respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and

opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court entered in

this matter on September 9, 1997.

o

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court is in

Appendix A. It is reported at Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, __

N.M. __, 947 P.2d 86 (1997).

S

JURISDICTION

Judgment of the New Mexico Supreme Court was

entered September 9, 1997. A timely motion for recon-

sideration was denied October 28, 1997. The denial order

is in Appendix B. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) and Supreme Court Rule

13.1.

S

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Constitution of the United States, Extradition Clause,

Article IV, § 2:

“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony,

or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found

in another State, shall on Demand of the executive

Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered

up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the

Crime.”

Constitution of the United States, Supremacy Clause,

Article VI:

“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of

the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any

State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment:

“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law... . ”

Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth Amend-

ment:

“ _.. [NJor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law... . ”

S

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 16, 1994, Timothy Reed (Reed) was

arrested on a warrant issued by the Governor of New

Mexico pursuant to a request for rendition by Ohio (Tape

1, 12/9/94, 182).! Ohio sought rendition of Reed for

violation of parole (R.P.6 to R.P.8). He had been granted

parole after serving part of the prison terms imposed for

1 Reed’s habeas corpus proceedings were recorded on

audiotape. Citations were taken from a Fisher Studio Standard

Tape Deck with about 580 counts per tape side. The reference

“R.P.-__” is to a page number of the Record Proper, which

contains the documents filed with the court in New Mexico.

Reed’s 1982 and 1983 felony convictions on two counts of

aggravated robbery and one count of theft of drugs (R.P.6

to R.P.11). Reed challenged extradition in New Mexico by

writ of habeas corpus filed in state district court (R.P.21 to

R.P.30). Reed admitted he fled Ohio while on parole but

claimed he was not a fugitive for purposes of extradition

because his flight was under duress (R.P.22). He claimed

he was compelled to flee Ohio by his belief that Ohio

authorities intended to revoke his parole withect due

process and to cause him physical harm if he were

returned to an Ohio prison (T-1, 12/9/94, 217-240).

Over objections by the State of New Mexico (State),

Reed presented his own testimony as well as affidavits

from Ohio prisoners alleging: (1) that Reed had previ-

ously been mistreated by Ohio authorities; (2) that Ohio

authorities were animated by improper motives in seek-

ing to revoke his parole; and (3) that he fled Ohio under

duress caused by his belief that Ohio authorities would

revoke his parole without due process and by his expec-

tation that he would suffer bodily harm if returned to an

Ohio prison (T-1, 12/9/94, 273-90; T-2, 12/23/94, 120,

130; 210-213; R.P.152-R.P.163).

On January 20, 1995, the New Mexico district court

granted the writ and directed Reed’s release

(R.P.164-181). The State appealed the grant of the writ to

the New Mexico Supreme Court, which held that all the

requirements for extradition were met except the estab-

lishment of fugitive status. Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, __

N.M. __, 947 P.2d 86 (1997) (at Appendix A; hereafter

“Reed, App. A at __”), App. A at 34-37. The court found

that Reed was granted parole on May 5, 1992 and fled

Ohio on March 22, 1993 Reed, App. A at 5, 54. The court

erred in characterizing this as “a one-year parole term,”

id., when in fact Reed was paroled on May 5, 1992 “[flor a

period of not less than one year” at which point he would

have become eligible for consideration of final release

conditioned upon his “satisfactory conduct and adjust-

ment” (R.P.90).

The New Mexico Supreme Court held that Reed was

not a fugitive because his flight from Ohio to New Mex-

ico was under duress which was induced by Ohio author-

ities. Reed, App. A at 38-44. It accepted Reed's claim that

he believed Ohio authorities would deny him due process

in the anticipated parole revocation proceedings and

would harm him if he returned to an Ohio prison. Reed,

App. A at 55-62. This holding was premised on Reed's

testimony and the failure of Ohio authorities to answer

Keed’s charges in the New Mexico district court. Reed,

App. A at 53-58.

The New Mexico Supreme Court held in the alterna-

tive that, even if Reed were a fugitive, his uncontradicted

allegations that he would be denied due process and

would suffer bodily harm in Ohio entitled Reed to asy-

lum in New Mexico under the New Mexico Constitution’s

guarantee of the right to seek and obtain safety. Reed,

App. A at 49-52; App. A at 60.

The State moved for the court to reconsider the

majority opinion’s misapprehension of extradition law as

well as the concurring opinion’s misapprehension of

Ohio law and the probable cause determination needed to

support rendition for a parole violation (State’s motion,

Oct. 9, 1997). By order of October 28, 1997, the New

Mexico Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner's

PEE a ee

a oe

motion for rehearing (App. B). The court also summarily

denied the State’s motion to recall the mandate it issued

pending this application for writ of certiorari (State's

motion, Nov. 3, 1997; Order Nov. 6, 1997). Ohio’s rendi-

tion request remains outstanding and Reed remains sub-

ject to arrest as an interstate fugitive as of January 1998.

S

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Opinion Below Raises A Significant And

Recurring Question Regarding The Proper Scope Of

An Asylum State’s Determination Of Fugitive Sta-

tus ''nder The Extradition Clause.

The Opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court rests

on a very expansive interpretation of the power an asy-

lum state may exercise under the Extradition Clause

before a fugitive is returned to the demanding state. This

profound expansion in the scope of extradition proceed-

ings requires guidance from this Court lest the limited

inquiry into “historic facts readily verifiable,” intended in

Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978), becomes a

process by which asylum states audit the functioning of

penal institutions in their sister states.

For more than two centuries the Extradition Clause

has obliged the respective states to return to a sister state

those who have fled from its criminal justice or penal

institutions. This Court made clear in Doran that a court

considering release on habeas corpus “may do no more

than decide” whether (1) the extradition documents are

in order, (2) the petitioner has been charged with a crime

in the demanding state, (3) he or she is the person named

in the extradition documents and (4) he or she is a fugi-

tive. 439 U.S. at 289. Despite the restrictive language of

Doran, a court faced with claims such as Reed’s may be

tempted to grant asylum from alleged injustices under

the guise of an inquiry into fugitive status. This tempta-

tion is heightened by the absence of the demanding state,

which is not a party to the habeas proceeding and which

cannot be expected to send witnesses and evidence to the

several states wherein its fugitives are found. The New

Mexico courts in this case succumbed to this temptation,

resulting in a grave misinterpretation of the Extradition

Clause.

Since at least 1885 the determination of fugitive sta-

tus has meant only that the asylum state must find that

the person sought was present in the demanding state at

the time of the alleged crime and that he or she has been

found in the asylum state. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289

U.S. 412, 420 (1933); Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 97

(1885). The only defense to fugitivity has been uncon-

trovertible proof that the fugitive was not in the demand-

ing state at the time of the alleged crime. Bailey, 289 U.S.

at 420; In re Ropp, 541 A.2d 86, 88 (Vt. 1988); Galloway v.

Josey, 507 So.2d 590, 592-93 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 485

U.S. 1006 (1988).

In Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1980), this

Court held that the courts of California could not condi-

tion extradition on the outcome of a hearing in California

which would consider evidence on the fugitive’s claim

that prison conditions in Arkansas would impose cruel

d unusual punishment if he was returned there. Claims

of constitutional defects in the Arkansas prison system

had to be heard in the state and federal courts of

Arkansas, not California. Id. Here the New Mexico

Supreme Court ruled that the fugitivity inquiry required

a New Mexico court to determine whether the fugitive

fled from unjust conditions or the unjust prospective

denial of constitutional rights, holding that extradition

was only available if the fugitive “seeks to avoid the

maintenance and administration of what is just.” Reed,

App. A at 41.

Expanding on the fugitivity inquiry, the New Mexico

Supreme Court held that an asylum state may counte-

nance and accept the claim of a paroled felon that his fear

of inadequate procedural protections in parole revocation

proceedings and his fear of unjust treatment in the

demanding state’s prisons establishes a defense of duress

for his flight from the demanding state. This expansion of

the fugitivity inquiry is in direct conflict with the Court's

long-standing view that the asylum state’s extradition

inquiry is very limited. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 289 (extradi-

tion review is a limited inquiry into historic facts readily

verifiable); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 286 (1911)

(one is a fugitive from justice who must be returned to

the demanding state “when, as here, it appears that the

prisoner was in the state in the neighborhood of the time

alleged”). Denying review will let stand a decision which

portends a wide expansion of the asylum state’s inquiry

into fugitivity as a means to test the bona fides of the

demanding state’s motives and intentions in seeking

extradition.

This Court has not directly addressed the scope of

the fugitivity inquiry since Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 US.

86, 89 (1952), which held that an escaped felon’s allega-

tions of cruel and inhumane treatment by Alabama

authorities did not alter his status as a fugitive from

Alabama. His claims of brutal, life-threatening mistreat-

ment by Alabama prison authorities had to be addressed

in the state and federal courts of Alabama after compli-

ance by Ohio with Alabama’s demand for extradition. Id.

Woodall should have put to rest the temptation for

courts of an asylum state to use the fugitivity inquiry as a

forum in which to judge the constitutional adequacy of

the criminal justice institutions of a sister state. It did not.

An asylum court may be faced with an apparently sym-

pathetic habeas corpus petitioner confessing his fear of

scandalous institutional mistreatment by the demanding

state. Some asylum courts have been tempted to burden

the demanding state with a duty to answer these claims

by proof that the demanding state’s motives are pure and

its institutions humane. See Walker, 449 U.S. at 87-88

(reversing California Supreme Court’s holding that the

petitioner was entitled to a hearing in California on his

claim he expected cruel and unusual treatment if

returned to an Arkansas prison); People ex rel. Strachan v.

Colon, 571 N.E.2d 65, 68 (N.Y. 1991) (habeas petitioner

could show he was not a fugitive by evidence that a

gross, irreparable harm or denial of access to state and

federal courts would result if he was returned to Florida,

but he failed to present such evidence); People ex rel.

Bowman v. Woods, 264 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ill. 1970) (Ala-

bama’s unexplained delay was so fundamentally unfair

to the fugitive that Alabama had forfeited its right to seek

return of an escaped felon who had lived openly in

Illinois for eighteen years).

In addition, several dissents have advocated a posi-

tion which would broadly expand the scope of the

fugitivity inquiry in a manner similar to that adopted by

the New Mexico Supreme Court. See Carpenter v. Jamerson,

432 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ohio 1982) (Brown, J., dissenting)

(habeas petitioner’s uncontroverted claim that he left

Georgia with the consent of his probation officer meant

he was not a fugitive and should have been released);

Chamberlain v. Celeste, 729 F.2d 1071, 1077 (CA6 1984)

(Martin, J., dissenting) (habeas court should review fugi-

tive’s plea agreement with demanding state, find it fully

completed and find he was not a fugitive despite the

demanding state’s contrary interpretation of the agree-

ment); Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 684-85 (CADC)

(Bazelon, J., dissenting) (extradition should not be per-

mitted where habeas petitioner alleges the demanding

state denied his right to a trial for ten months and

imposed barbarously cruel and unusual punishment),

cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).

The New Mexico Supreme Court denied extradition

here on the ground that a person who alleges duress as

the reason for his flight is not a fugitive. Under this

holding asylum states may hear evidence and draw con-

clusions about the constitutional adequacy of criminal

justice institutions in demanding states. This is a seminal

departure from prior interpretation of the Extradition

Clause. It requires a demanding state to appear and con-

travene a fugitive’s allegations of duress arising from

expected mistreatment lest the asylum court find the

claims are “uncontroverted” and thus valid, as did the

court here. Reed, App. A at 23-25, 58, 64. The extradition

process will dissolve into chaos if, instead of meeting a

fugitive’s claims in state or federal court after his return

to the demanding state, a demanding state is instead

10

oblige’ 0 prove to the courts of an asylum state that

allegations of expected ill treatment in the demanding

state are unfounded.

The New Mexico Supreme Court not only expanded

the scope of the fugitivity inquiry, it also recognized a

duress defense in extradition cases which is broader than

the duress defense this Court has recognized in federal

criminal cases. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,

410-12 (1980) (jail escapee who proves that egregious

conditions in jail compelled his escape must also show “a

bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon

as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive

force”). Here the New Mexico Supreme Court held that

duress experienced by Reed in 1993 barred his extradition

to Ohio in 1997,

The broad scope of the duress defense permitted by

the New Mexico Supreme Court's fugitivity inquiry

opens the door for courts in asylum states greatly to

expand their review of the demanding state’s motive for

seeking extradition as well as its conditions of imprison-

ment. It is important for this Court to address the scope

of the fugitivity inquiry at the nascent stage of this

expansion in order to foment or forestall its further devel-

opment.?

? Although the concurring opinion rejected this expanded

fugitivity inquiry, it reached the equally flawed conclusion that

rendition was properly denied because Ohio did not hold a

preliminary hearing. Reed, App. A at 72-80. Such a hearing is

required under Ohio law only after a parolee held in custody

outside Ohio is returned to Ohio. Ohio Admin. Code

§ 5120:1-1-18(F) (1979 ed.). A preliminary hearing is required by

11

2. The Opinion Below Raises A Substantial Question

Regarding The Impact Of State Constitutional Guar-

antees On Extradition Jurisprudence

The New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the New

Mexico Constitution's guarantee of the right to seek and

obtain safety as an independent ground to deny Reed's

extradition to Ohio. Reed, App. A at 49-51. It held that this

provision granted Reed asylum in New Mexico even if he

was a fugitive from Ohio. Reed, App. A at 63. This

reliance on rights arising under a state constitution as a

basis for refusing to return a fugitive to a demanding

state erases the Extradition Clause from the Federal Con-

stitution and ignores its Supremacy Clause.

The New Mexico Constitution states that all persons

have the right “of seeking and obtaining safety and hap-

piness.” N.M. Const. art. Il, § 4. The New Mexico

Supreme Court found that Ohio had rebutted neither

due process when a parolee is imprisoned pending a final parole

revocation hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972).

However a fugitive who has already been found guilty in the

demanding state and has any part of his sentence remaining

unserved is not entitled to a probable cause inquiry before the

fugitive is returned to the demanding state since the fact of

conviction satis/ies the Doran requiremeni that the fugitive be

charged with a crime in the demanding state. Petition of James,

575 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Mass. 1991); State ex rel. Sheppard v. Kisner, 394

S.E.2d 907, 908 (W. Va. 1990); Chamberlain v. Celeste, 729 F.2d

1071, 1075 (CA6 1984); State ex rel. Reddin v. Meekma, 306 N.W.2d

664, 667-68 (Wis.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981); Barton v.

Malley, 626 F.2d 151, 159 (CA10 1980); Wynsma v. Leach, 536 P.2d

817, 819-20 (Colo. 1975). The concurring opinion would

improperly graft Morrissey’s due process requirements for

parole revocation onto the asylum state's rendition proceedings.

12

Reed's claim of improper motive in seeking his extradi-

tion for his assertion that he expected cruel and life-

threatening treatment if returned to Ohio, and so con-

cluded: “We hold that the extradition process was not

meant to abrogate the New Mexico Constitution which

regards ‘seeking and raining safety’ as a ‘natural,

inherent and inalienabiev cight. See N.M. Const. art. IL,

§ 4. Reed came to New Mexico explicitly for the purpose

of ‘seeking and obtaining safety.’” Reed, App. A at 51.

The Court held that the right to seek safety written

into the New Mexico Constitution afforded Reed asylum

in New Mexico as a “refuge from injustice.” Reed, App. A

at 63. Prior to Reed, the New Mexico Supreme Court had

mentioned the right to seek and obtain safety and happi-

ness in only four cases, none of which interpreted the

clause as providing substantive rights. See California First

Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646 (1990); Trujillo v.

City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990);

Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M.

688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988); Skaggs Drug Center v. General

Electric Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957).

The holding of the New Mexico Supreme Court per-

mits an asylum state to deny extradition in order to

guarantee to the fugitive a right created solely by the

asylum state’s constitution. Reliance upon an indepen-

dent state constitutional provision to defeat rendition is

at odds with the essential nature of a national extradition

requirement. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228

(1987) (with regard to a state’s duty under the Extradition

Clause, “[bJecause the duty is directly imposed upon the

States by the Constitution itself, there can be no need to

weigh the performance of the federal obligation against

13

the powers reserved to the States under the Tenth

Amendment”). See also California v. Superior Court of Cali-

fornia, 482 U.S. 400, 405 (1987) (“The federal Constitution

places certain limits on the sovereign powers of the

States, limits that are an essential part of the Framers’

conception of national identity and Union. One such limit

is found in . . . the Extradition Clause”).

New Mexico has now held that the New Mexico

Constitution’s guarantee of a person’s right to seek and

obtain safety requires New Mexico to grant asylum to

fugitives from other states which do not provide this

guarantee or which fail to measure up to New Mexico's

standard for “safety.” This holding directly contravenes

the bedrock principle of the Supremacy Clause that the

United States Constitution binds the courts of every state

regardless of the provisions of state law or a state’s

constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court ignored the

Supremacy Clause and disregarded the “obvious objec-

tive of the Extradition Clause . . . that no State should

become a safe haven for the fugitives of a sister State's

criminal justice system.” Superior Court of California, 482

U.S. at 406. See also State v. Engler, 85 F.3d 1205, 1209 (CA6

1996) (Michigan governor had no power to grant asylum

to a fugitive and deny rendition sought by Alabama).

The New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance on its

constitutional guarantee of the right to seek safety invites

each state to deny extradition whenever it determines

that a unique provision of its constitution affords a pro-

tection not adequately respected in the demanding state.

Granting this writ will afford the Court an opportunity to

guide state courts in the extent, if any, that unique state

14 App. 1

constitutional guarantees have an impact on extradition APPENDIX A

analysis. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number

CONCLUSION Filing Date:

Docket No. 22,749_

6

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to

review the judgment and opinion of the New Mexico TIMOTHY REED,

Supreme Court in this cause. Petitioner-Appellee,

Filed Sep. 9, 1997

Respectfully submitted, (Filed Sep )

Tom Upait ee

Attorney General of New Mexico STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel.,

E MANUEL ORTIZ, Director, Taos

uzaseTH M. Brasvent County Adult Detention Center,

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record Respondent-Appellant.

pear ereathye hema APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT

Assistant Attorney General OF TAOS COUNTY

Post Office Drawer 1508 Peggy J. Nelson, District Judge

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-1508 Hon. Tom Udall, Attorney General

(505) 827-6083 or (505) 827-6934 Anthony Tupler, Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for Petitioner Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

T. Glenn Ellington, Chief Public Defender

Sue Anne Herrmann, Assistant Public Defenders

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Peter Cubra

Richard D. Weiner

Jama Fisk

Albuquerque, NM

For Amicus Curiae

New Mexico Chapter of the National Lawyer's Guild

App. 2

OPINION

FRANCHINI, Chief Justice.

Timothy Reed filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus to challenge his extradition from New Mexico to

Ohio. The district court granted his writ on the grounds

that the extradition documents were not in order and

Reed was not a fugitive from justice. This case is distin-

guished from other extradition cases by a unique fact

pattern that is supported by compelling evidence. We

conclude that the extradition documents are in order.

However, we agree with the district court that the con-

duct of the State of Ohio forced Reed to flee the state

under duress, in fear of death or great bodily harm at the

hands of government officials. We hold that Reed is not a

fugitive from justice and affirm the writ of habeas corpus.

I. FACTS

Timothy Reed — also known as Little Rock Reed - is

part Lakota Sioux. In 1982 and 1983 Reed pleaded guilty

to one charge of theft of drugs and two charges of aggra-

vated robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of

up to 25 years imprisonment. Most of that prison time

was spent at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility,

known as “Lucasville” after the name of the Ohio town

where the prison is located.

A. Reed’s Growing National Reputation; Animos-

ity of Prison Officials

In Lucasville, Reed became a jailhouse lawyer and

“writ writer” who helped other inmates prepare petitions

App. 3

for writs of habeas corpus. He also was an advocate for

the rights of incarcerated Native Americans to practice

traditional religious beliefs while in prison. The undis-

puted evidence shows that this advocacy incurred the

animosity of prison officials.

While in Lucasville Reed wrote several articles on

Native American religious rights and other Indian issues.

These were published in national periodicals. See, e.g.,

Little Rock Reed, The American Indian in the White Man's

Prison: A Story of Genocide, 2(1) J. of Prisoners on Prisons,

Fall 1989; Little Rock Reed, Native American -vs- Anglo

Rehabilitation: Contrasting Cultural Perspectives, 2(2) J. of

Prisoners on Prisons, Spring 1990. These articles con-

tained strong criticisms of the treatment of American

Indian prisoners by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority

(Parole Authority) and the Ohio Department of Reha-

bilitation and Correction (Ohio Department of Correc-

tions). Though incarcerated in Lucasville, Reed acquired

a national reputation as a spokesperson for the rights of

American Indian prisoners. He was contacted by scholars

and other advocates and was asked to provide materials

regarding Native American issues for various confer-

ences.

The record shows that Reed was a source of aggrava-

tion to Ohio prison officials because of his criticisms of

the Ohio prison system. Reed states that he was mis-

treated in prison and was denied parole in retaliation for

his speech activities.

App. 4

B. First Parole Rescinded; Threat by Chairman of

Parole Authority

Reed's supporters petitioned the Parole Authority

urging that he be given parole. In October 1990, Reed wes

finally granted parole and transferred from Lucasville to

a six-week reintegration program at a minimum security

prison in Orient, Ohio. Shortly before his scheduled

release from Orient, Reed was asked to sign a “contract”

which was required of all parolees. Reed felt the contract

compelled him to waive his constitutional rights so he

altered the wording and then signed it.

On December 5, 1990, Reed met with the Chairman of

the Parole Authority. Reed was informed that his parole

was being rescinded because of his refusal to sign the

contract as written. Reed testified that at this meeting the

Chairman cursed him and said “that I was his property,

and that I was going to serve twenty-five actual years in

maximum security if he [the Chairman] lives that long to

ensure it.” The Chairman also stated he did not give a

damn about Reed’s so-called constitutional rights. Reed

was returned to Lucasville.

Reed filed a habeas corpus petition in state court

challenging the recision of his parole. The district court

dismissed the petition and the Ohio Court of Appeals

affirmed. See Reed v. Tate, 1992 WL 129404 (Ohio Ct.App

June 10, 1992), aff’g Reed v. Tate, No. 91 C1-122 (Scioto

County, Ohio C.P. Ct. Sept. 18, 1991).

App. 5

C. Second Parole

Approximately a year and half after his first parole,

Reed agreed to sign the parole contract, intending to

challenge it later in court. He was released from

Lucasville on May 5, 1992 to serve a one-year parole term.

Shortly after his release, Reed received permission from

his parole officer to travel to South Dakota to participate

in the Sun Dance, a Lakota Sioux religious ceremony.

Reed took up residence with his mother in Cincinnati,

working as director of the Native American Prisoners’

Research and Rehabilitation Project (Native American

Project) while studying full-time towards a bachelor’s

degree in criminal justice and Indian affairs.

D. Continued Advocacy; Warden’s Personal

Resentment

During the time he was on parole, Reed published

articles and made speeches about such matters as Ameri-

can Indian religious freedom and alleged offenses by the

Ohio prison system. See, e.g., Little Rock Reed, Today's

Prison Administrators Were Trained by Fascists: And What

About Tomorrow?, Iron House Drum (Native American

Prisoners’ Rehabilitation Research Project, Villa Hills,

Ky.), 2d ed. 1992, at

Reed also actively corresponded with various offi-

cials of the Ohio Department of Corrections including

Arthur Tate, Jr., the warden at Lucasville. In these letters

he criticized the void of religious services for Native

American prisoners. Reed offered to mediate between the

Department and religious organizations who were

App. 6

attempting to fill this void. Some of this correspondence

was published in such a way as to favor Reed’s point of

view at the expense of the integrity of the prison officials.

See, e.g., Little Rock Reed, An Exchange Between the

NAPRRP and an Ethnocentric Prisoncrat: Three Letters, Iron

House Drum (Native American Prisoners’ Rehabilitation

Research Project, Villa Hills, Ky.), 2d ed. 1992, at 3-4

(correspondence between Reed and Tate).

In his letters, Reed suggested that warden Tate was

unresponsive and insensitive. Tate wrote an angry

response to Reed, in a letter dated October 16, 1992. He

stated, “I personally resent your continued attacks and

attempts to dictate to me the ‘specifics’ of how

{Lucasville’s] Native American program must operate.”

Letter from Arthur Tate, Jr., Warden, Southern Ohio Cor-

rectional Facility, to Timothy Reed (Oct. 16, 1992). Reed

became concerned that Tate or other officials of the

Department of Corrections and the Parole Authority

might try to violate his parole because of their objections

to his speech activities.

E. Suppression of Reed’s Speech Activities by

Parole Authority

With his parole officer’s permission, Reed made pre-

sentations at various conferences such as the 43rd Annual

Conference of the Governors’ Interstate Indian Council in

Utah. At a state-wide gathering of Ohio Indian organiza-

tions at Ohio State University, he spoke about the depri-

vation of religious expression for Native Americans by

U.S. prisons in general and by the Ohio Department of

Corrections in particular.

App. 7

In September or October 1992, shortly after this i

mentioned conference, Reed was summoned to a eae .

with his parole officer, Ron Mitchell. wrprate. on ub

uncontradicted testimony, Mitchell said that for be

time in his thirteen-year career he had been per os

contacted by the chief of the Parole Authority. As

testified:

He told me that the chief directed him to give

i blic again about

e an order not to speak in pu

watiies relating to the Ohio Department of

i d he told me

rrections or Parole Authority, an

ree if | wrote any more articles about the Adult

Parole Authority or the Department of a

tions, and if I wrote any more letters ¥ : ny

rison officials in Ohio, my parole wou eg

revoked and I would be returned to the peniten

tiary.

Reed responded that he would no longer travel or —

to prison officials. However, he would contions to wo :

and publish his writings, and when invited to pic

town conferences, he would send video-taped pre

tions.

Reed was forced to cancel speaking Cg a -%

several religious conferences including the pies “8

ference of the Catholic werner bea hte ho

to testify before the Un 7

nee nich on va Poe Affairs. Reed stated that, ;

he felt concern after warden Tate’s expression of eng

resentment, he now felt real fear of retaliation ard e

chief of the Parole Authority suppressed his speech.

App. 8

F. Threats by Prison Officials

Reed maintained contact with inmates inside

Lucasville. They warned him that corrections officials

were greatly displeased with Reed’s criticism of the

prison management. It was from these contacts, accord-

ing to Reed’s uncontroverted testimony, that he learned

that prison personnel had expressed an intention to cause

him death or great bodily harm if he were ever returned

to Lucasville. This further corroborated Reed's fear that

he could be subject to retaliation because of his speech

activities.

G. Dispute with Devoto

Reed asserts that the opportunity for this retaliation

arose from a chain of events beginning with a minor

traffic incident on February 16, 1993. In order to keep an

appointment with his counselor, Reed had borrowed a car

from Dinah Devoto, a volunteer at the Native American

Project where Reed worked. Devoto was a city council

member in Villa Hills, Kentucky, just across the border

from Cincinnati. Reed bumped into another car on an icy

road and was fined $105 by Ohio police. Reed’s grand-

mother paid the fine on April 2, 1993.

The accident was minor, but the incident fueled the

anger of Dinah Devoto’s husband Steve, who apparently

begrudged his wife’s volunteer work with Native Ameri-

can Project. Steve Devoto had remarked to other people

that he would like to severely hurt Reed. The record

shows that, in an argument over the phone, Steve Devoto

told Reed to stay away from his family and threatened to

App. 9

blow off Reed’s head. This statement was witnessed by

Devoto’s six year old daughter. This argument occurred

on March 12, 1993, six weeks before Reed’s parole term

expired.

On the evening of Thursday, March 18, 1993, Reed

was served with a summons and complaint. As a result of

the telephone argument, Steve Devoto charged Reed with

the misdemeanor of “terroristic threatening” in violation

of Kentucky law. See Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 508.080(a)

(Banks-Baldwin Supp.1990) (proscribing a threat “to com-

mit any crime likely to result in death or serious physical

injury to another person”).

Reed immediately contacted the Devotos. Dinah pre

pared an affidavit in which she swore that the misde-

meanor charge her husband had filed against Reed was

false. She stated that she and Steve had discussed the

matter and offered to meet with Reed's parole officer to

confirm that the charge was false and that Steve intended

to drop the charge. Reed’s brother, Matthew Scull, picked

up the affidavit from the Devotos early the next morning.

H. Parole Authority Refuses to Arrange a Prelimi-

nary Parole Revocation Hearing

Reed called Mitchell on Friday, March 19, 1993, when

the parole office opened at 9:00 a.m. Scull witnessed the

call and later prepared an affidavit which corroborates

Reed’s account of the conversation. Reed explained that

he had been served the misdemeanor summons and com-

plaint for threatening Steve Devoto’s life. He told Mit-

chell that Steve and Dinah Devoto would verify that the

charge was false, that it was actually Steve who had

App. 10

threatened Reed’s life, and that Steve intended to with-

draw his complaint.

Mitchell responded that Reed must report to the

parole office on the following Monday morning, March

22, 1993, at 9:00 A.M., at which time he would be

arrested. As Reed testified at trial:

I said, “Look, Dinah Devoto and Steve Devoto

are ready to come into your office with me. Can

we visit you this morning?” He said, “No. I

want you to come in Monday morning. You

know, I like you, but there’s nothing I can do for

you. You say your goodbyes to your family and

friends. Report here at 9:00 am Monday morn-

ing. You’re going back to Lucasville.”

Reed implored Mitchell to allow him to show evidence of

his innocence before deciding to revoke his parole. Reed

attempted to read Dinah Devoto’s affidavit to Mitchell,

but Mitchell refused to hear it. Mitchell told Reed he

would have to wait until after he was back in prison

before he could present evidence of his innocence to the

Ohio Parole Board. As Reed testified, Mitchell “assured

me that I was going to have no hearing whatsoever. I was

going back to Lucasville without any due process.” This

last remark is significant because in Morrissey v. Brewer,

the United States Supreme Court concluded that before

parole can be revoked, due process requires a preliminary

hearing to establish whether there is probable cause for

revocation. If probable cause is established, a second final

hearing is required. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

485-89 (1972). Ohio adopted these due process require-

ments in Parker v. Cardwell, 289 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ohio Ct.

App. 1972).

App. 11

Under Reed’s undisputed testimony, Mitchell speci-

fically remarked that there would be no preliminary hear-

ing and that Reed would have to see the Parole Board

after he was back in Lucasville. Reed indicated that, as a

jailhouse lawyer, he was familiar with the parole revoca-

tion process, and implies that he would not have misun-

derstood Mitchell’s comments. Reed believed the Ohio

parole officials had no intention of respecting his due

process rights because they wanted to suppress his

speech activities by returning him to prison as soon as

possible.

I. Futile Attempts to Forestall Arrest and Arrange

a Preliminary Revocation Hearing

Between Friday, March 19 and Sunday, March 21

Reed and his supporters made many phone calls in an

effort to prevent the revocation of his parole without a

proper hearing. Reed asked Dinah Devoto to fax her

affidavit to Mitchell and to phone him. In a later affidavit,

Devoto recounted her conversation with Mitchell: “[Mit-

chell] told me that high ranking officials in the adult

parole authority hold contempt for Reed because of his

writings . .. and that for this reason Reed would serve the

remaining 7-to-25-year sentence in prison.” Dinah Devoto

Aff. ¢ 2 (Sept. 28, 1994). Steve Devoto called the regional

supervisor of the Parole Authority and, expressing

remorse, admitted his misdemeanor complaint was false.

On Sunday, March 21, 1993, Reed went to visit Pro-

fessor Harold E. Pepinsky, a scholarly associate and advi-

sor with whom he had corresponded since his days in

Lucasville. Pepinsky holds a law degree from Harvard

App. 12

and is a professor of Criminal Justice at Indiana Univer-

sity. Pepinsky called Mitchell, reaching him at home. He

asked what would happen if Reed did show up to be

arrested on Monday morning.

Mr. Mitchell told me that while he kept Rock

waiting outside, he would “call Columbus for

instructions.” He denied any knowledge of what

those instructions would be. Legally, I cannot

see what difference that makes. When he told

me he would get instructions from Columbus,

he effectively promised me that the entire statu-

tory [Morrissey v. Brewer] appeal process for

Rock on revocation would be bypassed by one

phone call, before Rock even had a chance to say

anything for himself to the officer.

Pepinsky Aff. | 7 (Sept. 27, 1994). In his efforts to fore-

stall Reed’s return to Lucasville, Pepinsky had attempted

to contact the governor of Ohio, Ohio legislators, the

President of the United States, the U.S. Department of

Justice, the F.B.1., and the U.S. Attorney General. All told

him that they had no jurisdiction to review the case. He

was told that his only recourse was to petition the Parole

Authority even though the Authority was the very

agency denying Reed’s right to due process.

J. Reed Fears for His Life; Riot at Lucasville

Reed states that he knew by this time that his life was

in danger. As he testified, “Lucasville is my coffin.” Reed

was already aware from his contacts with inmates inside

Lucasville that prison officials had made statements that

he would receive bodily harm if he were returned to

Lucasville.

App. 13

Reed also testified, “I knew then that I was in serious

danger, ah particularly because I also had knowledge of

the riot that was about to take place in Lucasville.”

Through his inmate contacts, Reed had been presented

with evidence that warden Tate’s policies in Lucasville

were fomenting great tension and violence. Reed’s con-

tacts told him that Tate hatt imposed forced integration,

placing members of the Black Panthers in the same cell

with members of the Aryan Brotherhood. In the past

Reed had written to Tate about the increasingly dan-

gerous situation at Lucasville, predicting that the war-

den’s policies would result in a riot. Reed felt certain that

if he reported to be arrested by Mitchell he would be

returned to Lucasville only to find himself in the middie

of a riot.

It appears that Reed had been well informed because

a bloody riot occurred at Lucasville on Easter Sunday,

April 11, 1993, about three weeks after he was supposed

to report to Mitchell. Hostages were taken in a siege that

lasted for eleven days. When it was over eight people

were dead, including Dennis Weaver, who, like Reed, was

a Native American writ writer and supporter of pris-

oners’ rights.

K. Reed Flees under Duress; Continued Advocacy

Reed did not show up to be arrested at Mitchell's

office at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, March 22, 1993. Claiming

he was forced to choose between violating parole and

being beaten or killed at Lucasville, he fled Ohio. The

following day he was declared “a Parole Violator-at-

Large.”

App. 14

He eventually ended up in Taos, New Mexico, where

he found work as a paralegal, writer, and secretary for

the Center for Advocacy cf Human Rights. Even while

avoiding the Ohio authorities, Reed continued to publish

and speak out on prison and Native American issues. See,

e.g., The American Indian in the White Man's Prisons: A

Story of Genocide (Little Rock Reed ed., 1993) (an anthol-

ogy of essays by Reed and others); Little Rock Reed, Some

evidence relating to the Lucasville riot, Prison News Serv.,

Sept/Oct. 1994, at 3.

L. Resolution of Devoto Complaint

Steve Devoto did not drop his “terroristic threaten-

ing” complaint. On June 29, 1993, about four months after

Devoto filed the complaint and Reed left Ohio, Reed was

tried in absentia and received a 30-day suspended sen-

tence. Commonwealth v. Reed, No. 93-M-01300 (Ky. Dist.

Ct. June 29, 1993).

M. Affidavits Describing Threats Against Reed by

Prison Officials

Reed continued to correspond with inmates inside

Lucasville including John Perotti, another jailhouse law-

yer. Perotti, at his own initiative, sent a letter to the

Center for Advocacy of Human Rights describing threats

by prison officials to cause Reed death or great bodily

harm. After Reed was arrested to be extradited, he asked

Perotti to memorialize these allegations in a sworn state-

ment. Perotti responded with an affidavit that included

the following:

App. 15

2. On [August 6, 1994], I was assaulted by

prison guards in retaliation for attempting to

distribute an article written by Little Rock (aka

Timothy) Reed in which he presented evidence

that the prison officials at Lucasville orches-

trated the riot in which a number of people were

killed in the spring of 1993. ...

3. When the prison guards assaulted me as

set forth above, they told me that my beating

was nothing compared to what Little Rock (aka

Timothy) Reed could expect if and when he is

returned to the Southern Ohio Correctional

Facility.

Perotti Aff. {4 2-3 (Oct. 3, 1994).

Reed obtained similar affidavits from other pris-

oners. A prisoner named Daniel Cahill, who was being

investigated for gang activity, described a conversation

with the investigating officer.

On January 12, 1994, the Investigating officer,

Mr. Flick, after reading newspaper articles < my

possession, noticed an article pertaining to Tim-

othy Reed (A.K.A. Little Rock). Mr. Flick

stated: .. . “Reed would not be lucky enough to

get out of prison alive if he was returned to the

Ohio prison system.”

Cahill Aff. (Oct. 28, 1994). Another prisoner, Ahmad

‘Abdul-Mugsit, provided a similar affidavit.

That on at least two (2) separate occasions

during the course of the earlier part of this year

(i.e. approximately April and May, 1994) I had

over heard several know [sic] and unknown

administrative officals [sic] of this facility

{Lucasville] allude to the fact of Little Rock [sic]

life being in jeopardy if he was ever returned to

App. 16

the State of Ohio and custody of the Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections.

Abdul-Mugsit Aff. ¥ 4 (Oct. 20, 1994). Reed testified that

these affidavits “merely confirmed what I already know

...+ That the prison officials intend to do serious bodily

injury or to kill me when I’m returned to Ohio.”

N. Reed is Arrested in New Mexico

In late September 1994, the State of Ohio initiated

procedures to extradite Reed. On September 27, 1994, Jill

Goldhart, acting chief of the Ohio Parole Authority, ex-

ecuted an Ohio State warrant for the arrest of Reed for

violating parole. On the same day she also executed a

“Request for Extradition Requisition” asking the Gover-

nor of Ohio to petition for the extradition of Reed from

New Mexico.

The Governor of Ohio, on October 12, 1994, signed a

“Request for Interstate Rendition” asking the Governor of

New Mexico to issue a warrant on behalf of the State of

Ohio for Reed's arrest and return to Ohio. On October 26,

1994, the Governor of New Mexico issued the warra.. ,

and the following day Reed was arrested as a fugitive

from justice. A copy of the Governor’s warrant was filed

in the Taos County District Court on October 28. Three

days later Reed appeared in the Taos District Court and

informed the court that he wished to challenge the consti-

tutionality of his arrest and would file a petition for writ

of habeas corpus.

App. 17

O. Reed Seeks Federal Relief

While pursuing his habeas corpus petition in the

state court, Reed also filed, on November 4, 1994, a pro se

civil rights lawsuit in federal district court. Invoking 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), he sought recision of the extradition

warrant pending an investigation of his claims that Ohio

prison officials intend to cause him death or great bodily

harm. The federal court denied Reed's claim, stating that,

if Reed's allegations were true, his sole federal remedy

was a habeas corpus petition, and this could be pursued

only after he had exhausted all his state remedies. See

Reed v. King, No. CIV-94-1267 MV/LFG, slip op. (DNM

Nov. 10, 1994).

P. Crucial Extradition Documents are Missing

Extradition laws require specific documentation

before an out-of-state extradition request will be honored.

See NMSA 1978, § 31-4-3 (1937); 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1994).

Though the record is somewhat muddled on this point, it

appears that certain crucial documents were not attached

to the Governor’s warrant when it was issued on October

26, when it was served on Reed on October 27, and when

it was filed in the Taos District Court on October 28. The

latest date by which the documents in question could

have appeared was November 16, 1994, about two weeks

after Reed had been arrested on the Governor's warrant.

The missing documents proved that Reed was con-

victed in 1982 and 1983, was paroled in 1992, and was

declared a parole violator-at-large in 1993. Implicit in this

App. 18

controversy is the possibility that these crucial docu-

ments may not have been in the possession of the Gover-

nor of New Mexico when he issued his warrant for

Reed's arrest. He thus could not have relied upon them as

the legal justification for his warrant.

Q. State Habeas Corpus Hearing

On November 11, 1994, Reed filed his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus raising numerous challenges to the

Governor’s warrant. Three hearings were held, on

December 9 and 23, 1994, and January 4, 1995.

During the hearings, the State emphasized that under

the United States Supreme Court opinion Michigan v.

Doran the court was limited to considering only four

questions: (1) whether the extradition documents are in

order; (2) whether the demanding state has charged the

defendant with a crime; (3) whether the defendant is the

person named in the extradition request; and (4) whether

the defendant is a fugitive. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S.

282, 289 (1978). The State contended that, under this rule,

virtually all Reed’s evidence and arguments were beyond

the scope of permissible inquiry at an extradition hearing.

Relying on its legal argument that most of Reed's

evidence was irrelevant, the State did not dispute any

facts that Reed’s evidence purported to support, nor did

it introduce any contrary evidence of its own. The State

produced no statement by anyone associated with the

Ohio prison system to undermine Reed's claim that Ohio

prison officials intended to kill him or cause him great

bodily harm. The State presented no witnesses of its own

App. 19

and cross examined only one of Reed’s witnesses, Manuel

Ortiz, Director of Taos Adult Detention Center, asking

him only to identify Reed and to review each of the

extradition documents. There were no challenges to the

credibility of any witness or any exhibit. In its proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law, the State offered

no findings of fact whatsoever to counter Reed’s version

of the facts. On appeal, the State specifically declined to

refute the arguments of the amicus brief filed by the New

Mexico Chapter of the National Lawyer’s Guild. In short,

no evidence of any kind and no argument whatsoever

was offered to contradict Reed’s claim that his life would

be endangered if he were extradited to Ohio.

Applying the four-part Michigan v. Doran analysis,

the district court found: (a) The extradition documents,

on their face, were not in order, because, without the

missing crucial documents, there was insufficient legal

support for issuing the Governor’s warrant. Reed v. Ortiz,

No. 94-1 CR Misc., 1995 WL 118952, at *4-5 (NM Dist. Ct.

Jan. 20, 1995). (b) The extradition documents did show

that Reed had been charged with a crime in the demand-

ing state. Id. at *4. (c) Reed is the same person named in

the request for requisition and the Governor’s warrant.

Id. (d) Reed was not a fugitive from justice because the

uncontroverted evidence shows that he left Ohio “under

duress and under a reasonable fear for his safety and his

life.” Id. at *5-8.

On January 20, 1995, the district court granted habeas

corpus to Reed and ordered his immediate release. The

State timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. See Rule

5-802(G)(1) NMRA 1997 (State’s right to appeal grants of

App. 20

habeas); Rule 12-102(A)(4) NMRA 1997 (Supreme Court

takes appeals from grants of habeas).

We now conclude, under the four Doran factors, that

the extradition documents are in order, that Reed was

charged with a crime in Ohio, and that Reed is the person

named in the extradition request. However, we affirm the

district court’s grant of habeas corpus because Reed is

not a fugitive from justice.

Il. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Abuse of Discretion

On appeal, we must determine whether the district

court abused its discretion, first, by admitting the chal-

lenged evidence, and then by granting Reed’s writ of

habeas corpus based upon that evidence. The main issues

in this case turn on the interplay between law and fact.

We must ascertain whether the challenged evidence was

properly considered as a matter of law. If we answer that

question in the affirmative, then we must assess whether

the district court properly applied extradition law to

those facts, and whether there is sufficient evidence to

logically support the court’s legal and factual conclu-

sions.

In this case, the district court will have abused its

discretion if it admitted improper evidence, if it misin-

terprets the legal effect of that evidence, or if its conclu-

sions are clearly illogical in light of the evidence. See State

v. Lucero, 98 NM 311, 314, 648 P.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App.

1982) (defining abuse of discretion).

App. 21

B. De Novo

Questions of law or questions of mixed fact and law

are generally reviewed de novo by appellate courts. State

v. Attaway, 1994 NMSC 011, 117 NM 141, 144-45, 870 P.2d

103, 106-07; Duncan v. Kerby, 1993 NMSC 011, 115 NM

344, 347-48, 851 P.2d 466, 469-70. It is the role of appellate

courts to say what the law is and how the law should be

applied to specific facts; on the other hand, ‘rial courts, as

fact gatherers, are usually in a better position to make

factual determinations. This means that, when presented

with questions that implicate both law and fact, we will

look anew at all the evidence and arguments in the

record. We do not gather new evidence. Nor can we,

when examining a paper and tape-recorded record, arbi-

trarily dismiss the trial court’s assessment of the cred-

ibility of witnesses and evidence. But we do apply our

own judgment in gleaning the facts from the record,

assimilating them into a coherent story, weighing their

relevance, and evaluating their legal significance. By the

same token, we will analyze the legal issues without any

presumption in favor of the judgment of the court below.

See McNair v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc., 62 F.3d 651, 654 (4th

Cir.1995) (assessing evidence); Wilmington Trust Co. v.

Baldwin (In re Van Ostrand’s Estate), 195 A. 287, 295 (Del.

1937) (no new evidence); Slaughter v. Martin, 63 So. 689,

690 (Ala. Ct. App. 1913) (judgment).

C. Burden of Proof

The grant of extradition by the governor of the asy-

lum state “is prima facie evidence that the constitutional

and statutory requirements have been met.” Doran, 439

App. 22

U.S. at 289. Implicit in the governor’s action is that the

four Doran requirements have been met: the extradition

documents are in order, and the petitioner is charged

with a crime in the demanding state, is the person named

in the demand, and is a fugitive. See id. at 289. The

burden thus shifts to the defendant to prove that at least

one of the four Doran requirements has not been fulfilled.

The defendant must meet a difficult standard - proof

beyond a reasonable doubt - in defeating this presump-

tion. See South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 421-22

(1933) (“beyond reasonable doubt” standard of proof);

Bazaldua v. Hanrahan, 92 NM 596, 598, 592 P.2d 512, 514

(1979) (same concept).

D. Credibility of Evidence

The rules of evidence do not apply in “[p]roceedings

for extradition or rendition.” Rule 11-1101(D)(2) NMRA

1997. Extradition hearings are not criminal trials in which

the guilt or innocence of the defendant is adjudicated.

Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1980). The

hearing functions simply to ascertain whether the evi-

dence of criminal conduct by the defendant is sufficient

to justify extradition. Id. Thus, the court may consider

unsworn statements of absent witnesses as well as hear-

say. It may also consider, as the court did in this case,

sworn affidavits based upon personal knowledge. See id.

(unsworn statements, hearsay); People ex rel. Strachan v.

Colon, 571 N.E.2d 65, 68 (N.Y. 1991) (quoting People ex rel.

Little v. Ciuros, 377 N.E.2d 980, 981 (N.Y. 1978), and men-

tioning affidavits as possible evidence of irreparable

harm). Of course the court has complete discretion in

App. 23

determining the weight such evidence should be

accorded.

In this case, the State has not in any way impeached

or contradicted Reed’s version of the facts. In fact, in its

Brief in Chief, the State appears to accept the veracity, if

not the relevance, of Reed’s evidence: “The court's find-

ings on the fugitivity question are supported by consider-

able, although improper and irrelevant evidence.”

Resp’t’s Br. in Chief at 7.

“As a general proposition, unimpeached and uncon-

tradicted sworn testimony must be accepted as true.”

State v. Chavez, 78 NM 446, 447, 432 P.2d 411, 412 (1967).

This is not an inflexible rule. See State v. Lovato, 112 NM

517, 521, 817 P.2d 251, 255 (Ct. App. 1991) (listing excep-

tions to the rule); see also Walton v. State, 566 P.2d 765, 768

(Idaho 1977) (uncontroverted evidence does not automat-

ically mean petitioner has shown absence from demand-

ing state at time of offense). On the other hand,

undisputed evidence cannot be arbitrarily rejected.

Ramsey v. United States, 263 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1959).

The State appears to be arguing that the extradition

documents, buttressed by the presumption of their val-

idity, are sufficient to controvert Reed’s evidence. See

Walton, 566 P.2d at 768. We disagree. It is true that, absent

any evidence to the contrary, the extradition documents

are presumed to establish the four Doran requirements.

But once the defendant presents evidence that tends to

refute any of the Doran requirements, the court must

resolve the issue upon the evidence presented. See Wal-

ton, 566 P.2d at 768.

App. 24

The only challenge the State has brought against

Reed's evidence is to its admissibility and relevance, not

to its veracity or sufficiency. By relying exclusively on its

legal argument that the evidence is inadmissible, the

State has abdicated any objection to the credibility of the

evidence. The court below found Reed’s testimony, wit-

nesses, and exhibits entirely credible. We have

exhaustively examined the sufficiency, as opposed to the

relevancy of the evidence in a light most favorable to the

extradition »* Reed. See Meek v. State, 321 N.E.2d 205, 206

(Ind. 1975). We find nothing that materially challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Reed’s version

of the facts. Many courts have considered claims similar

to Reed’s, but few have been faced, as we have, with such

a singular fact pattern and such compelling evidence. See,

e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Mills v. Baldi, 70 A.2nd 439, 442

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1950) (“There is absolutely no evidence in

the case at bar, except relator’s own self-serving declara-

tions, that he would be subjected to mob violence or that

he would not receive a fair and impartial trial in

Tuscallosa County.”).

We also disagree with the state that the evidence

should be excluded on the grounds that it is irrelevant.

Our rules of evidence define “Relevant evidence” as “evi-

dence having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.” Rule 11-401 NMRA 1997. Reed

made a prima facie showing that he fled Ohio in fear of

death or great bodily harm. As we explain below, this

showing is a direct response to the question of whether

App. 25

Reed is a fugitive from justice. Any evidence that illumi-

nated this issue was appropriately admitted by the dis-

trict court. See People ex rel. Bowman v. Woods, 264 N.E.2d

151, 152-53 (Ill. 1970) (stating that unusual facts estab-

lished by the accused require closer scrutiny by the

court). The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

evidence that tended to make “more probable” Reed’s

contention that he is a refugee from injustice. See Rule

11-401.

Ill. LAWS IN QUESTION

Extradition law is founded on the Extradition Clause

of the U.S. Constitution:

A Person charged in any State with Treasor.

Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee fro-m }:

tice, and be found in another State, sh". ©

Demand of the executive Authority of the State

from which he fled, be delivered up, to be

removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the

Crime.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. The language of the Clause is

imperative and limits the discretion that the sovereign

states might wish to exercise. Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483

U.S. 219, 227 (1987). The purposes of the Clause are to

preclude “any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugi-

tives from justice of another state and thus ‘balkanize’ the

administration of criminal justice among the several

states” and to enable “each state to bring offenders to

trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged

offense was committed.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 287.

App. 26

The Extradition Clause, however, does not set forth a

specific procedure by which interstate extradition is to be

accomplished. The Extradition Act specifies the extradi-

tion process. See § 3182. It has been little changed since it

was first approved in 1793. Culifornia v. Superior Court,

482 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1987); Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d

677, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

The Act describes the documentation required when

one state demands a fugitive be returned from another

state in which he or she has found asylum. Upon being

presented with the proper documents, the executive of

the asylum state is required to have the fugitive arrested.

The demanding state has thirty days in which to provide

an agent to whom the fugitive is to be delivered. Section

3182. Section 3182 is often interpreted as prescribing a

“summary” executive procedure. See Doran, 439 U.S. at

288. This means that the governor of the asylum state

disposes of the case in a prompt and simple manner, by

merely examining whether proper and authentic docu-

mentation has been provided by the demanding state. See

Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of

“summary proceeding”). The Act makes no provision for

judicial review or any defenses the defendant might pre-

sent.

Further requirements in the extradition process are

found in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. 11 U.L.A.

97 (1995). Forty-eight states, including New Mexico and

Ohio, have adopted the Uniform Act. See NMSA 1978,

§§ 31-4-1 to -30 (1937, as amended through 1981); Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2963.01 to -.29 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 &

Supp. 1996); 11 U.L.A. 97 (table, Mississippi and South

Carolina not listed). This Uniform Act was designed to

App. 27

supplement and conform to the overriding federal consti-

tutional and statutory mandates. See Coungeris v. Sheahan,

11 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993); Wright v. Bourbeau, 490

A.2d 522, 525 (Conn. Ct. 1985).

The imperative nature of the extradition process is

reiterated by the New Mexico Uniform Criminal Extradi-

tion Act:

[I]t is the duty of the governor of this state to

have arrested and delivered up to the executive

authority of any other state of the United States

any person charged in that state with treason,

felony or other crime, who has fled from justice

and is found in this state.

Section 31-4-2. Our Uniform Act sets forth in greater

detail than the Federal Act the processes and documents

necessary in an extradition proceeding. Compare § 31-4-3

(form of demand), with § 3182 (procedural and documen-

tation requirements).

The restrictive nature of the federal laws is somewhat

moderated by the Uniform Act which gives the executive

some latitude in evaluating the extradition demand. Dis-

cretionary language is included in the provision that per-

mits the governor to seek investigative assistance from a

prosecuting officer who will report “the situation and

circumstances of the person so demanded” and whether

that person “ought to be surrendered.” Section 31-4-4.

Similarly, the governor “shall sign a warrant of arrest”

upon determining whether “the demand should be com-

plied with.” Section 31-4-7. Executive discretion is also

suggested by the rule that “(t]he governor of this state

may also surrender [any person whose extradition is

App. 28

demanded] even though such person left the demanding

state involuntarily.” Section 31-4-5 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, unlike the federal laws, our Uniform

Act provides for the due process and habeas corpus

rights of the defendant.

No person arrested upon such warrant shall

be delivered over to the agent whom the execu-

tive authority demanding him shall have

appointed to receive him unless he shall first be

taken forthwith before a judge of a court of

record in this state, who shall inform him of the

demand made for his surrender and of the crime

with which he is charged, and that he has the

right to demand and procure legal counsel; and

if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he

or they desire to test the legality of his arrest,

the judge of such court of record shall fix a

reasonable time to be allowed him within which

to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When such

writ is applied for, notice thereof, and of the

time and place of hearing thereon, shall be given

to the prosecuting officer of the county in which

the arrest is made and in which the accused is in

custody, and to the said agent of the demanding

state.

Section 31-4-10.

The implicit executive discretion and the habeas

corpus hearing are not without limits. For example, “[t}he

guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which

he is charged may not be inquired into by the governor or

in any proceeding after the demand for extradition [has]

been presented to the governor.” Section 31-4-20. These

App. 29

limitations have been further specified by decisions of the

United States Supreme Court.

While Michigan v. Doran expressly describes the exec-

utive extradition procedure as “summary,” it does not

explicitly make a similar pronouncement regarding the

judicial habeas corpus evaluation of an extradition

demand. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 288, 290. Doran does

mention that “[t}he Clause never contemplated that the

asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary

inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial

arrest and trial.” Id. at 288. We do not believe that the

judicial habeas hearing is summary in the same sense as

the executive extradition process. To be sure, the habeas

hearing takes place with the least possible delay after the

arrest of the defendant, it is an abbreviated version of a

full trial, it is interrupted by few dilatory pleas, it dis-

penses with many formalities such as strict adherence to

the rules of evidence, and as dictated by Michigan v.

Doran, the scope of its inquiry is limited. See 439 U.S. at

289. However, the U.S. Supreme Court did not intend to

prevent the defendant from raising defenses to the four

criteria listed in Doran, to utterly preclude the introduc-

tion of evidence beyond the face of the extradition docu-

ments, to shield the state from presenting evidence to

refute the defendant’s defenses, or to so abbreviate the

proceeding as to preclude a fair hearing of the defen-

dant’s claims. 3

This, in part, is because of the essential nature of a

habeas proceeding. While extradition is given mandatory

status by the U.S. Constitution, habeas corpus is virtually

inviolate: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

App. 30

shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebel-

lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S.

Const. art. I, § 9. The New Mexico and Ohio Constitutions

accord the same deference to habeas corpus. See NM

Const. art. Il, § 7; Ohio Const. art. I, § 8 (Banks-Baldwin

1994). Habeas corpus is one of the most ancient and

venerated principles of law, described by Blackstone as

“the great and efficacious writ.” 3 William Blackstone,

Commentaries *131. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated

that “[i]t must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas

corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and

there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.”

Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26. (1939).

The right to habeas corpus and the mandatory nature

of extradition do not inherently conflict. “The extradition

clause is a procedural provision. It does not impinge

upon any substantive right of any individual and does

not affect any provision of the Constitution or its Amend-

ments protecting such rights.” Johnson v. Matthews, 182

F.2d at 682. A habeas hearing, on the other hand, con-

cerns a defendant's fundamental rights. It is an equitable

proceeding which commands that the state (or keeper of

the body) show the authority under which imprisonment

is authorized. See Rule 5-802(A) (scope and purpose of

writ of habeas corpus); Caristo v. Sullivan, 112 N.M. 623,

628, 818 P.2d 401, 406 (1991) (stating that “habeas corpus

protects our most basic right of freedom from illegal

restraint”). Thus, under our Uniform Criminal Extradi-

tion Act, a defendant is provided a habeas corpus hearing

to show how the process of extradition has resulted in his

or her unconstitutional imprisonment. See Johnson v. Cox,

72 NM 55, 57, 380 P.2d 199, 201 (1963); see also § 31-4-10.

App. 31

The laws of extradition, though they permit only limited

judicial review, do not supplant the basic right to the

Great Writ. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400. (1963)

(discussing the historical importance of the “Great Writ”),

overruled on other grounds by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.

72, 87-90. (1977).

IV. LIMITS TO JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF ASY-

LUM STATE

A. Michigan v. Doran: Courts May Review Only

Four Questions

As we have already mentioned, the scope of judicial

review in an extradition habeas hearing was drawn by

the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Doran:

Once the governor has granted extradition, a

court considering release on habeas corpus can

do no more than decide (a) whether the extradi-

tion documents on their face are in order; (b)

whether the petitioner has been charged with a

crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the

petitioner is the person named in the request for

extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a

fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifia-

ble.

439 U.S. at 289. Not long after Doran was issued, this

analysis was adopted in New Mexico. Bazaldua, 92 NM at

599, 592 P.2d at 514-15.

The asylum state has a duty to deliver a properly

extradited fugitive to the demanding state. The effect of

the four Doran criteria is to assure that this duty allows

for only limited discretion on the part of the asylum state.

Branstad, 483 U.S. at 228. On the other hand, there would

App. 32

be no point in asking these four questions if it were not

possible for the defendant to raise legitimate defenses to

each one. Furthermore, the Supreme Court intended that

if one of the four questions is answered in the negative

then the defendant cannot be extradited. Cf. Munsey v.

Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 374 (1905) (suggesting that defen-

dant is not a fugitive from justice and may be discharged

if it is conclusively proven that the person was not within

demanding state when the crime was committed).

B. Despite the Restrictions of Michigan v. Doran,

Some Review is Contemplated

It is simply impossible to make a determination of

the four Doran factors without making factual findings.

The Doran court itself stated the four factors “are historic

facts readily verifiable.” 439 U.S. at 289. The court of the

asylum state has jurisdiction to establish the validity of

these facts. Id. at 297 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

Thus, despite proclamations that “the commands of

the Extradition Clause are mandatory, and afford no dis-

cretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum

State,” the U.S. Supreme Court must have intended some

sort of inquiry when it required courts to verify the four

historic facts. See Branstad, 483 U.S. at 227 (statement that

there is no discretion). The Court surely presumed that

some defendants would deny that the documents are in

order, that they have been charged with no crime, that

they are the wrong person, or that they are not a fugitive.

Furthermore, there must be circumstances in which these

defenses are valid. To conclude otherwise would “render

meaningless the guarantee of a habeas corpus hearing

App. 33

and the accompanying right to present evidence against

the warrant” under the Uniform Criminal Extradition

Act. Galloway v. Josey, 507 So.2d 590, 592 (Fla.1987); see

§ 31-4-10.

The role of the court in the asylum state, though

limited, is not merely clerical or perfunctory, restricted to

woodenly and superficially noting whether the proper

statements and pieces of paper have been provided.

“Since individual circumstances surrounding extradition

demands are varied and diverse, the mechanical applica-

tion of fixed and absolute rules is inappropriate if justice

is to be achieved in a particular case.” Wright, 490 A.2d at

526. Nor are courts in the role of notaries or paper

checkers, confirming the apparent propriety and orderli-

ness of the documentation. “To the contrary, in the lim-

ited area within which it operates, the judicial authority

of the asylum court is undiminished.” Narel v. Liburdi, 441

A.2d 177, 180 (Conn. 1981).

The Governor’s warrant is accorded presumptive

validity. Doran, 439 U.S. at 289. However, like any legal

presumption, this one may be rebutted upon a showing

of persuasive evidence. Id. at 293 (Blackmun, J., concur-

ring); State v. Ritter, 246 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Wis. 1976)

(stating that “governor’s warrant is only prima facie

valid”). We conclude that some cases may present circum-

stances so unusual and egregious that the asylum state

has no choice but to deny the extradition warrant and

grant habeas corpus to the defendant. See People ex rel.

Harris v. Mahoney, 579 N.Y.S.2d 582, 589 (Sup. Ct. 1991)

(stating that extradition demands must be respected

App. 34

“le]xcept in the rarest and most egregious of circum-

stances”), aff'd, 604 N.Y.S.2d 574 (App. Div. 1993); Little,

377 N.E.2d at 981i (same concept).

With the foregoing principles in mind, we shall apply

the Doran analysis to the facts of this case. Reed does not

dispute that he “is the person named in the request for

extradition.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 289. We shall analyze the

remaining three Doran questions.

Vv. EXTRADITION DOCUMENTS ON THEIR FACE

ARE IN ORDER

The executive of the asylum state need not recognize

a demand for extradition unless specific documents are

providea by the executive of the demanding state. The

federal Extradition Act, § 3182, and our Uniform Criminal

Extradition Act, § 31-4-3, itemize the required documents.

In evaluating whether the documents comply with these

statutes, Doran directs the court of the asylum state to

verify that the extradition documents are in order “on

their face.” 439 U.S. at 289. By limiting the review of this

question to the “face” of the documents, the Doran court

seems to have intended a review only of the language

and other markings on the surfaces of the pages without

any explanation, modification, or addition from extrinsic

facts or evidence. In re Stoneman, 146 N.Y.S. 172, 175 (Sur.

Ct. 1914). Only the appearance of authenticity is required.

Cf. United States v. Gordon, 901 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1990)

(suggesting facial defect would cause a person looking

simply at a document to suspect it was invalid).

App. 35

When entered into evidence at Reed’s habeas hear-

ing, the extradition documents were divided into two

groups. The first consisted of the seven pages that were

originally served on Reed and filed in Taos District Court

in the last days of October 1994. The second group -

totaling nine pages — were the missing crucial documents

whose whereabouts were uncertain until November 16,

1994.

We have meticulously examined Reed’s extradition

documents in light of the pertinent statutes and conclude

that, between the two groups of papers, no statutorily

required items were missing. See generally § 3182 (listing

required documentation); § 31-4-3 (same). Once a Gover-

fior’s warrant is issued, there is a strong presumption

that all the constitutional and statutory requirements

have been met. Bazaldua, 92 NM at 598, 592 P.2d at 514.

This presumption can only be refuted by proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. /d. In this case, it does appear that the

documents were somehow disassembled. However, as the

trial court stated, “No evidence was presented during

any of the hearings as to the usage, availability, or non-

availability of [the second group of] documents at the

time the Governor’s Warrant was issued.” Reed v. Ortiz,

1995 WL 118952, at *5; see also Commonwealth v. Hebert, 530

A.2d 422, 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (suggesting extradition

warrant will be verified unless evidence is presented to

rebut regularity of warrant).

We also find no harm in the fact that the parties may

have been served with incomplete documentation. The

missing documents were eventually provided, albeit

about two weeks after Reed was arrested. Though this

may have caused some inconvenience, it does not seem to

App. 36

have impaired Reed’s petition for habeas corpus. See

People v. DeSpain, 436 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)

(“The weight of authority is that deficiencies in the docu-

ments supporting the rendition warrant may be satisfied

at a later time.”).

We hold, therefore, that the district court abused its

discretion when it concluded that the extradition docu-

ments were not in order on their face.

VI. CHARGED WITH A CRIME IN DEMANDING

STATE

Several of the extradition documents are copies of

official state records showing that Reed was charged with

a crime in Ohio and specifying the statutes under which

he was charged. They establish that in 1982 Reed was

charged with, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted for

Aggravated Robbery in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

§ 2911.01 (Page 1982), and Theft of Drugs in violation of

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.21 (Page 1982) (repealed

1990). Simiiar statements are made regarding his convic-

tion for Aggravated Robbery in 1983. Copies of official

state documents also show that, under Ohio Rev. Code

Ann. § 2967.15(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1994), Reed was

declared to be a parole violator-at-large. There is no

express mention of the Kentucky complaint by Steve

Devoto, because it did not concern an offense against the

laws of Ohio.

Thus, the Governor of New Mexico based his warrant

upon the naming of an Ohio law and official documents

showing Reed was charged with violating that law. For

the purposes of an extradition inquiry, this settles the

App. 37

question of whether Reed has been charged with a crime

in the demanding state. California v. Superior Court, 482

U.S. at 409 (if the allegations in the extradition documents

are accepted as true, then the defendants have been prop-

erly charged with a crime under the law of the demand-

ing state, and this ends the inquiry).

Reed challenges the extradition documents claiming

that he can demonstrate the complaint by Steve Devoto

was fraudulent and a miscarriage of justice. Given his

earlier convictions, this argument is irrelevant. The

“charged with a crime” question does not turn on

whether the defendant has committed a new crime while

on parole. The inquiry is whether the extradition docu-

ments show that the defendant has been charged with

any crime whatsoever under the laws of the demanding

state.

Taking the broad definition of “charged with

crime” as including the responsibility for crime,

the charge would not cease or be merged in the

conviction, but would stand until the judgment

is satisfied. It would include every person

accused, until he should be acquitted, or until

the judgment inflicted should be satisfied.

Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 F. 980, 983 (6th Cir. 1905). The

judgment is not deemed satisfied until the defendant has

fulfilled his or her obligation to society. In Reed's case,

for purposes of the extradition law, this obligation does

not end until his final release after the last day of parole.

See Ex parte Nabors, 33 NM 324, 329, 267 P. 58, 60 (1928)

(stating that parole violator may be extradited, not for

parole violation per se, but for original crime which has

not been fully expiated).

App. 38

VII. FUGITIVITY AND DURESS

A. Fugitivity Defined

“Fugitive from justice” has been defined as a person

who is charged with a crime against the laws of a state,

and who, upon being sought to answer for the crime,

leaves that state. See Nabors, 33 NM at 329-30, 267 P. at 60.

This definition dismisses any regard for the person's

purpose or motive for leaving the state. Id. at 330, 267 P.

at 60-61 (“[I]f the person demanded had committed a

crime in the demanding state, and when sought to

answer for it had left that state and was found in another,

he was a fugitive.”).

This definition seems to require nothing more than

the presence within the asylum state of a person who has

been charged with a crime in the demanding state. How-

ever, if the courts of the asylum state are limited to so

narrow a definition of “fugitive from justice,” then any

argument on the fugitivity element would be meaning-

less. Such a definition would require nothing more than a

simple two-pronged evaluation: a determination that (1)

the defendant is charged with a crime in the demanding

state, and (2) is present within the asylum state. See 1

Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 97, at 385

(13th ed. 1989) (“[A] fugitive is defined as a person who

commits a crime within a state and thereafter leaves the

jurisdiction.”).

The first prong is already addressed by part (b) of the

Doran analysis which inquires whether the defendant

“has been charged with a crime in the demanding state.”

Doran, 439 U.S. at 289; see Parks v. Bourbeau, 477 A.2d 636,

App. 39

641 (Conn. 1984) (suggesting that a finding that defen-

dant was not charged with a crime by the demanding

state would have supported claim that he is not a fugitive

from justice). Thus, even though the defendant is present

at the habeas hearing in the asylum state, it seems that

part (d) of the Doran analysis requires a nothing more

than tautological determination that the defendant is pre-

sent in the asylum state. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 289. This

pointless determination cannot logically be the limit of

the Doran fugitivity analysis.

The U.S. Supreme Court stated long ago:

One arrested and held as a fugitive from

justice is entitled, of right, upon habeas corpus,

to question the lawfulness of his arrest and

imprisonment, showing by competent evidence,

as a ground for his release, that he was not,

within the meaning of the Constitution and laws

of the United States, a fugitive from the justice

of the demanding state, and thereby overcoming

the presumption to the contrary arising from the

face of an extradition warrant.

Illinois ex rel. McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 109 (1907).

The very existence of the fugitivity inquiry in Doran

shows that the Court has not abandoned this position.

The U.S. Supreme Court could only have intended that,

the other three Doran requirements notwithstanding, the

defendant may not be a fugitive from justice. In other

words, there must be some circumstances, however rare,

that defeat the mere preserce of the defendant in the

asylum state as a test of fugitivity. See Carpenter v. Jamer-

son, 432 N.E.2d 177, 180-81 (Ohio 1982) (implying that

defendant could conceivably rebut “by proof beyond a

App. 40

reasonable doubt the presumption attached to the gover-

nor’s warrant that he is a fugitive from justice”). In this

case, we conclude that, because he was forced by the

conduct of government officials to flee the State of Ohio,

Reed’s mere presence in New Mexico does not render

him a fugitive from justice.

One of the few defenses to the fugitivity element that

has been successful is proof that the accused was not

“present in the demanding state at the time of the com-

mission of the alleged crime.” Section 31-4-3; see Galloway,

507 So.2d at 593 (discussing this defense). The burden of

proof on the accused is substantial. The evidence must be

not only clear and convincing, but uncontradicted and

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Munsey, 196 U.S.

at 375 (stating “merely contradictory evidence on the

subject of presence in or absence from the state” is not

sufficient); United States ex rel. Vitiello v. Flood, 374 F.2d

554, 558 (2d Cir. 1967) (defendant “must conclusively

establish his absence by clear and convincing proof”).

Such a determination requires an investigation that goes

well beyond the face of the extradition documents. South

Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. at 418 (suggesting defendant's

story about not being a fugitive “should have been sub-

jected to rigid scrutiny” and the judge should have

“demanded that the prisoner present himself for exam-

ination [and] show what effort had been made to secure

the presence of important witnesses”). To meet the bur-

den of proof the defendant must offer the testimony and

affidavits - much as Reed did in this case - of witnesses

who can establish the defendant’s whereabouts at the

time of the crime. Pakulski v. Hickey, 731 F.2d 382, 389 (6th

App. 41

Cir. 1984) (discussing a hearing that included “the testi-

mony of thirty or more witnesses and . . . a number of

affidavits”). This line of cases shows that defenses to the

fugitivity question may require significant factfinding at

the habeas hearing.

The focus of our analysis is whether Reed is a “fugi-

tive from justice”; in other words, whether he seeks to

avoid the maintenance and administration of what is just.

The facts demonstrate conclusively that Ohio’s conduct

toward Reed was not just. Reed is thus not a fugitive

from justice. Rather, he is a refugee from injustice.

B. The Revocation of Reed’s Parole

The most troubling aspect of this entire case is that

Ohio seeks Reed’s return for a violation that Ohio,

through its agents, provoked by its own actions. The

reason Ohio seeks Reed’s extradition is because he is a

parole violator-at-large. Reed violated parole by choosing

“to flee Ohio rather than face death or great bodily harm

upon the revocation of his parole without due process.

Had Ohio’s agents obeyed their own laws, Reed would

not have been forced to flee.

Nearly twenty years before Reed was denied a parole

revocation hearing, the United States Supreme Court in

Morrissey v. Brewer set forth minimal due process require-

ments for parole revocation. See 408 U.S. at 484-89. These

standards were soon thereafter adopted by Ohio courts,

in Parker v. Cardwell. See 289 N.E.2d at 385; see also Ohio

App. 42

Admin.Code § 5120:1-1-18 (1979, prior to 1995 amend-

ment) (specifying procedures for on-site parole revoca-

tion hearing). Under Morrissey, the Due Process Clause

requires that a parolee receive a preliminary hearing in

order to determine whether there is probable cause for

revocation. Upon a finding of probable cause, there must

still be a second final hearing. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at

485-89; Parker, 289 N.E.2d at 385.

The preliminary hearing - or on-site hearing as it is

sometimes called — should be “conducted at or reason-

ably near the place of the alleged parole violation or

arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while

information is fresh and sources are available.” Moreover,

the hearing should be supervised by a hearing officer

who is “not directly involved in the case.” Morrissey, 408

U.S. at 485; see also Parker, 289 N.E.2d at 385. At the

hearing the parolee must be given the opportunity to

speak and present evidence in his or her own behalf, and

should be able to question those who have provided the

adverse information upon which the parole revocation is

based. Before determining whether there is probable

cause for revocation, the hearing officer must examine the

information presented at the hearing. Morrissey, 408 U.S.

at 486-87; Parker, 289 N.E.2d at 385; see also State v. Min-

gua, 327 N.E.2d 791, 794-95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). Only

after a finding of probable cause at the on-site hearing

can the parolee be returned “to the state correctional

institution pending the final decision.” Morrissey, 408 U.S.

at 487. The undisputed record shows that the agents of

Ohio's penal system intended to deny to Reed this basic

due process guarantee.

App. 43

Though we do not base our determination on the

illegality of Ohio's conduct, it is apparent that the

attempt by agents of the Ohio Parole Authority to revoke

Reed’s parole without a preliminary on-site hearing was

unconstitutional. Under the uncontradicted evidence, no

other conclusion is possible. See id. at 484 (“[T]here is no

interest on the part of the State in revoking parole with-

out any procedural guarantees at all.”); State v. Vigil, 97

NM 749, 750-51, 643 P.2d 618, 619-20 (Ct. App. 1982)

(discussing Morrissey and reversing probation revocation

because defendant was denied right of confrontation at

revocation hearing). Though our conclusion here is not

affected by Ohio law, it is almost certain that this conduct

would be found to violate Ohio’s own Constitution and

its laws governing the revocation of parole. See Ohio

Const. art. L, § 1 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (right to defend

liberty); Ohio Const. art. I, § 16 (Banks-Baldwin 1994)

(“due course of law”); see also Parker, 289 N.E.2d at 385

(adopting the procedures set forth in Morrissey); State v.

Hochhausler, 668 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ohio 1996) (discussing

due process under Ohio Constitution); Ohio Amin.Code

§ 5120:1-1-18 (procedures for parole revocation).

This conclusion is not binding on any subsequent

adjudication, any more than a finding of liability in a civil

trial for a particular cause of action is binding on a

determination of guilt in a criminal trial for the same

cause of action. See State v. Hoeffel, 112 NM 358, 359-60,

815 P.2d 654, 655-56 (Ct. App. 1991) (civil verdict is not

binding on related criminal proceeding). However, under

Doran, it is our duty as the asylum state to determine

whether Reed is a fugitive. See 439 U.S. at 289. We are

limited to the evidence in the record in making this

App. 44

determination. The evidence of Ohio’s conduct bears

directly on the question we must answer: whether Reed

was a fugitive from justice.

From our standpoint, it is immaterial whether the

actions of the State of Ohio are ultimately vindicated or

condemned. Because of those actions —- whatever their

legal posture — the district court was faced with the

choices of invoking a virtually sui generis remedy to the

rigid precepts of extradition law or of returning Reed to

possible death or great bodily harm. Reed has demon-

strated beyond a reasonable doubt that, if not for the

actions of the State of Ohio, New Mexico courts would

not be faced with this choice. Cf. Morrison v. Stepanski, 839

F. Supp. 1130, 1142 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (if not for deprivation

of due process, things would be different).

Furthermore, because Ohio’s conduct has placed this

problem under our jurisdiction, we will seek resolution in

our own laws and Constitution. While Doran forms the

framework of our analysis, New Mexico is the state to

which Ohio forced Reed to flee. In applying the Doran

framework, we do not believe we are required by Ohio's

actions to cast aside the jurisprudence that is unique to

this state. The New Mexico Constitution guarantees

rights that no law can abrogate. In addition to our own

Bill of Rights, the New Mexico Constitution offers unique

protections that are not duplicated by its federal counter-

part. We do not construe any provision of the federal

constitution to require a New Mexico court to ignore its

own constitutional guarantees of life and liberty and

safety.

App. 45

With these factors in mind, we will explain why

Reed, in seeking refuge t om injustice, is not a fugitive

from justice.

C. Duress

1. Duress defined

Among the oldest principles of criminal law is that

“it is not reasonable to punish conduct, however criminal

it may be, if that conduct was not the product of the

actor’s own, unimpeded will.” 2 Gene P. Schultz, Proving

Criminal Defenses 4 9.01 (1994); see 4 Blackstone, supra, at

*27. (“[A] man should be excused for those acts which are

done through unavoidable force and compulsion.”).

Duress and necessity are two forms of compulsicn that

may be raised as valid defenses in criminal law. Though

we will refer to the defense raised by Reed as “duress,”

some of his claims might be categorized as necessity. This

is immaterial because the distinction between duress and

necessity has been blurred by modern case law and is no

longer deemed decisive. See United States v. Bailey, 444

U.S. 394, 410 (1980). Both these “defenses were designed

to spare a person from punishment if he acted ‘under

threats or conditions that a person of ordinary firmness

would have been unable to resist,’ or if he reasonably

believed that criminal action ‘was necessary to avoid a

harm more serious than that sought to be prevented by

the statute defining the offense.’” Id. at 410 (quoting -

and reversing on other grounds — United States v. Bailey,

585 F.2d 1087, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). The courts of

Ohio recognize the defense of duress. See State v. Procter,

367 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (stating that

App. 46

Ohio recognizes that the defense of duress “as a legiti-

mate defense to all crimes, except the taking of the life of

an innocent person”). Similarly, we have held “that

duress is a defense available in New Mexico except when

the crime charged is a homicide or a crime requiring

intent to kill.” Esquibel v. State, 91 NM 498, 501, 576 P.2d

1129, 1132 (1978), overruled on-sther grounds by State v.

Wilson, 1994 NMSC 008, 116 NM 793, 795-96, 867 P2d

1175, 177-78.

Many extradition cases establish rules that tend to

limit duress as a defense to the Doran fugitivity require-

ment. We find that none of these cases apply to the

distinctive facts of Reed’s case. For example, many courts

have noted that the motives of the demanding state are

beyond review. It is irrelevant that the defendant could

show that, notwithstanding the express language of the

extradition documents, the demanding state's unspoken

motives are vindictive, illegal, or dishonest. S * Golden v.

Dupnik, 726 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Beckwith

v. Evatt, 819 S.W.2d 453, 457-58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

(“[T]he petitioner is not entitled to probe more deeply

into any political motivation inspiring the issuance of the

governor's warrant.”). However, we do not grant habeas

corpus because Ohio seeks Reed’s return solely for the

purpose of suppressing his speech activities. We do not

consider Ohio's motives but rather the effect of Ohio’s

conduct. Whatever its motives, had Ohio conducted itself

appropriately, Reed would not have been forced to

choose between death and flight. More importantly, our

courts would not have been forced to choose between

ignoring and preventing the violation of Reed’s constitu-

tional rights.

App. 47

The courts of the asylum state may not prognosticate

about the fairness or anticipated result of judicial pro-

ceedings in the demanding state. Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S.

432, 440 (1914); Strachan, 571 N.E.2d at 68. Thus, if Reed

were finally given a preliminary on-site hearing upon

being returned to Ohio, we have no jurisdiction to specu-

late on the impartiality or possible outcome of that hear-

ing. We do not address this question at all. Our concern is

that Reed would never have fled Ohio had he been prom-

ised a hearing in the first place. For this reason he was

never at any time a fugitive from justice. Whether Reed

could now txcveive a hearing in Ohio is irrelevant. The

belated offer of a hearing cannot somehow transform him

into a fugitive.

The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act states that the

asylum ate’s courts may not question the guilt or inno-

cence vs the defendant for any crimes charged in the

demanding state. Section 31-4-20. We do not consider

whether Reed was legitimately found guilty of the com-

plaint made by Steve Devoto, whether under Ohio law he

could be found guilty of violating parole, or whether his

original convictions for aggravated robbery and theft of

drugs were valid. Under the Doran analysis, the question

of criminal charges is considered separately from the

fugitive question. A person may not be a fugitive even

though legitimately charged with a crime in the demand-

ing state. We consider only whether, regardless of the

various charges, Reed may be considered a fugitive from

justice. His guilt or innocence for these crimes is irrele-

vant to the novel circumstances that caused him to flee

Ohio under duress.

App. 48

The courts of the asylum state have no authority to

investigate prison conditions in the demanding state.

Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1980); Sweeney v.

Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 87-89 (1952). This is true even when

federal courts have previously concluded that the prison

system of the demanding state violates proscriptions

against “cruel and unusual punishment.” Brown v. Sheriff

of Wayne County, 330 N.W.2d 335, 343-44 (Mich. 1982).

Reed is not alleging that his extradition should be barred

because the overall prison conditions in Ohio are inhu-

mane; rather he is arguing — and the district court agreed

- that he was singled out for imprisonment so that he

could be beaten or killed by government officials.

Though, in his writings, Reed alleged many grievances

against the Ohio penal system, those grievances are not

the basis of his defense. The general prison conditions -

and the treatment of other prisoners have no bearing on

the kind of individual treatment he reasonably feared he

would receive in the hands of state officials. Reed fled the

apparently conspiratorial intent of state officials to sub-

ject a [sic] him to death or great bodily harm. We have

found no case, including Sweeney v. Woodall, that contem-

plates such a situation. See 344 U.S. at 91-92 (Douglas, J.,

dissenting) (describing horrific prison conditions suffered

by Woodall, but in no way suggesting that his suffering

was unique within the prison, or that he was singled out

by government officials).

Also beyond the scope of review is the defendant's

fear of being confined with other inmates who have

threatened him or who may have reason to injure him.

Thus, a defendant cannot avoid extradition because he

will be incarcerated in the same prison as a co-defendant

App. 49

against whom he testified. Chamberlain v. Celeste, 729 F.2d

1071, 1077 (6th Cir. 1984). Reed’s case is distinguished

because it is the prison officials themselves — his putative

protectors - who threatened him harm.

2. Fundamental constitutional rights

Reed has shown beyond a reasonable doubt, with

persuasive and uncontroverted evidence, that he left

Ohio because he risked death or great bodily harm at the

hands of prison officials if he had reported to be arrested

by his parole officer. Reed was not threatened with the

deprivation of any ordinary civil right - not merely lib-

erty or freedom of speech - but with the deprivation of

life itself. There is no right more fundamental than the

right to one’s own life.

The New Mexico Constitution decrees that the gov-

ernment may deprive no person of life “without due

process of law.” NM Const. art. Il, § 18 (as amended

1972). Moreover, the New Mexico Constitution guaran-

tees that the enjoyment of “life and liberty” is a “natural,

inherent and inalienable” right. NM Const. art. II, § 4.

The same provision of our Constitution also accords the

same value to the right “of seeking and obtaining safety

and happiness.” Id. The Ohio Constitution contains simi-

lar provisions. See Ohio Const. art. I § 1 (“All men

_. . have certain inalienable rights, among which are

those of enjoying and defending life and liberty - . - and

seeking and obtaining happiness and safety.”); Ohio

Const. art. I, § 16 (due course of law).

App. 50

When a person’s life is jeopardized by the actions of

the state without due process, no constitutional interest is

of greater consequence. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,

9 (1985) (“The suspect’s fundamental interest in his own

life need not be elaborated upon.”). The transgression is

not only against a single human being but also the most

basic principles upon which our system of government

was founded.

From the popular hatred and abhorrence of ille-

gal confinement, torture and extortion of confes-

sions of violations of the ‘law of the land’

evolved the fundamental idea that no man’s life,

liberty or property be forfeited as criminal pun-

ishment for violation of that law until there had

been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a

public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excite-

ment and tyrannical power. Thus, as assurance

against ancient evils, our country, in order to

preserve ‘the blessings of liberty’, wrote into its

basic law the requirement, among others, that

the forfeiture of the lives, liberties or property of

people accused of crime can only follow if pro-

cedural safeguards of due process have been

obeyed.

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940). There can

be no dispute that the gravest constitutional concerns are

raised by a showing that, upon revocation of parole, a

defendant will be subject to death or great bodily harm a*

the hands of state officials. When a case presents extraor-

dinary circumstances, the presumptions in favor of extra-

dition may be defeated. See, e.g., Bowman, 264 N.E.2d at

153 (“The ends of justice will not be served by enforcing

extradition for the crime involved on a person who has

lived openly within this State for the last eighteen years,

App. 51

and who has been imprisoned on three occasions during

the pendency of the extradition proceedings.”). But see

People v. Martin, 567 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)

(disputing Bowman). This case presents extraordinary cir-

cumstances. When extradition will directly result in the

deprivation without due process of the defendant's life,

the New Mexico Constitution requires the protection of

his or her life and safety. NM Const. art. Il, §§ 4 & 18.

The Doran court relied upon the early case, In re

Strauss, which acknowledged that the extradition process

may be tainted by official corruption. However Strauss

went on to say that extradition “is but one step in secur-

ing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he

may be tried, and in no manner determines the question

of guilt.” In re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 332-33 (1905) (quoted

by Doran, 439 U.S. at 288). Nevertheless, we have been

presented with circumstances in which extradition is

something much more invidious than a mere “step in

securing the presence of the defendant.” Id. Extradition,

in this particular case, initiated a process intended to

place the defendant in the hands of those who threatened

to violate his most basic constitutional rights. When con-

fronted with such an exceptional situation, we do not

believe we are required to discard the protections guaran-

teed by our own constitution.

We hold that the extradition process was not meant

to abrogate the New Mexico Constitution which regards

“seeking and obtaining safety” as a “natural, inherent

and inalienable” right. See NM Const. art. II, § 4. Reed

came to New Mexico explicitly for the purpose of “seek-

ing and obtaining safety.” Our courts have not fully

defined the scope of this constitutional provision. See

App. 52

State v. Sutton, 112 NM 449, 455, 816 P.2d 518, 524 (Ct.

App. 1991), modified on other grounds, State v. Gomez, 1997

NMSC 006, 4 32, 122 NM 777, 786, 932 P.2d 1, 10. How-

ever, it certainly applies to individuals like Reed who

were threatened with death or great bodily harm by

government officials of another state, and who had no

recourse or remedy within that threatening state. “In

interpreting the more expansive language of Article II,

Section 4, we are mindful of the more intimate relation-

ship existing between a state government and its people,

as well as the more expansive role states traditionally

have played in keeping and maintaining the peace within

their borders.” California First Bank v. State, 111 NM 64,

76, 801 P.2d 646, 658 (1990). On a national level, when the

broad concept of federalism is concerned, the rights of

the individual are sometimes displaced. However, on the

state level, our Constitution can offer not only to protect

life, but also the “more expansive” guarantee of obtaining

safety. One of the more important functions of the indi-

vidual states is to secure the rights of the individuals

within their borders. See id.; Gomez, 1997 NMSC 006,

11 18-20, 122 NM at 783-84, 932 P.2d at 7-8 (stating that

New Mexico follows an interstitial rather than lock-step

approach to constitutional interpretation, discussing cir-

cumstances in which our own constitution is interpreted

differently from its federal counterpart).

3. Factors that make this case unique in extra-

dition law

Throughout this opinion we have emphasized that, in

the context of extradition law, Reed's situation is unique.

App. 53

There is no controlling authority that addresses all of the

peculiar circumstances of this case. We have closely stud-

ied and sought guidance from the many judicial opinions

and accepted canons of extradition law. Nevertheless, a

mechanical reading of this precedent would overlook

important elements of Reed’s case and militate the intol-

erable result of sending him back to face death or great

bodily harm. Whatever a court's mandate may be under

extradition law, it is clearly not to send a defendant back

to face such a fate.

Several factors bring this case outside the ordinary

tenets of extradition law. In defining these factors we

have looked to New Mexico jury instructions and judicial

opinions that set forth the elements necessary for a suc-

cessful duress defense. See UJI 14-5130 NMRA 1997 (stat-

ing duress requires that defendant feared immediate

great bodily harm if he or she did not commit the crime

and if a reasonable person would have acted in the same

way); Esquibel, 91 NM at 500, 576 P.2d at 1131 (same

elements); see also Procter, 367 N.E.2d at 913 (duress

requires well-grounded apprehension of present and emi-

nent [sic] death or serious bodily injury). The amicus

suggests that Reed's status as a parole violator-at-large is

analogous to that of an escaped convict; thus insight may

be found in the jury instructions that set forth the ele-

ments of duress as a defense to escaping from a jail or

penitentiary. See UJI 14-5132 NMRA 1997. Also, within

extradition case law, there are frequently mentiored cir-

cumstances - such as the lack of a remedy in the demand-

ing state — that, if proven, would strengthen a claim of

duress. See, ¢.g., Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 89 (noting that

fugitive made no showing that relief was unavailable in

App. 54

the courts of the demanding state). These various sources

describe some of the considerations that are relevant in

establishing a duress defense in an extradition context.

No single factor or group of factors is dispositive. In the

present case, the following circumstances demonstrate

why the trial court’s determination is supported by sub-

stantial evidence.

a. Reed was properly and legally released

from imprisonment

The record shows that Reed began his one-year

parole term on May 5, 1992. No legal actions were taken

to revoke his parole up to March 22, 1993, the likely date

he fled from Ohio. Nor was he arrested because of Steve

Devoto’s complaint or for any other reason. Thus, up to

the moment he fled, his release from prison was entirely

legal. He was not, for example, an escaped convict, nor

was there any warrant for his arrest. In this regard, the

only question before us is the legality of the flight itself.

See United States v. Corona, 687 F.Supp. 84, 86 n.2

(S.D.N.Y.) (“While flight is generally considered one of

the means of reasonably avoiding coerced criminal activ-

ity, in the present case the flight itself was alleged the

crime.”), aff'd mem., 868 F.2d 1268 (2d Cir. 1988).

b. Reed reasonably feared death or great

bodily harm from state officials

Reed has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that

prison officials expressed an intention to cause him death

or great bodily harm if he were ever returned to

Lucasvilie. Moreover, we accept his conclusion that his

App. 55

parole was about to be revoked without a due process

hearing. His parole officer told him to “say your good-

byes to your family and friends,” and assured Reed he

would have no preliminary on-site hearing before revoca-

tion. Reed knew the workings of the parole revocation

process. He was sufficiently knowledgeable to under-

stand that the parole officer's words signified he was

being denied his due process rights. He reasonably feared

that his parole was going to be revoked and that he

would be returned to Lucasville where prison officials

could carry out their threats to kill him or cause him

bodily harm.

We do not believe that in this situation it is logical to

require that the death or great bodily harm be “impend-

ing,” “immediate,” “present,” or “imminent.” In this case,

such terminology would be misleading. “What consti-

tutes present, immediate and impending compulsion

depends on the circumstances of each case.” Esquibel, 91

NM at 502, 576 P.2d at 1133. A more precise resolution of

this immediacy condition is provided by another of the

factors discussed below which requires proof that the

accused had no relief in the demanding state. See id. at

499-500, 576 P.2d at 1130-31 (stating “opportunity to

avoid” is alternative expression to “present, imminent,

and impending”). The showing of harm in this case is

similar to the showing of a “well-founded fear of per-

secution” found in cases of asylum from foreign nations.

See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)

(1982)). Additionally, it would be impossible for a defen-

dant to predict the future and prove absolutely that he or

she would be killed or beaten upon return to prison.

App. 56

United States v. Dagnachew, 808 F.Supp. 1517, 1522

(D.Colo. 1992) (no need to absolutely prove harm). The

constitutional rights at stake are so important that we

believe it is sufficient to show, as Reed has, that the fear

was reasonable.

¢. Reed used no force or violence during or

after flight from the demanding state

There is no contention that Reed committed any act

of force or violence in prison, on parole, or after his flight

from Ohio. The undisputed record proves that Steve

Devoto’s “terroristic threatening” complaint involved no

actual force or violence.

d. There was no relief or protection in the

demanding state

The circumstances of a parolee who leaves his or her

home state under duress are analogous to those of a

convict who escapes prison under duress. In determining

whether Reed had an adequate remedy in Ohio, it is

useful to look at the comparable requirement that

escaped prisoners must prove. The escapee must show,

either that there was no time to complain to or seek

reprieve from governmental authorities, or that, under

the circumstances, it would have been futile for him or

her to complain to or seek reprieve from governmental

authorities. See UJ] 14-5132; Linited States v. Kinslow, 860

F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing “opportunities to

avoid the perceived danger”), overruled on other grounds

by United States v. Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.

1992).

App. 57

It is apparent from the record that the Parole Author-

ity was intractable in its resolve to return Reed to

Lucasville as quickly as possible. Direct appeals to the

Parole Authority and other Ohio officials proved futile. It

would surely have forestalled Reed’s flight from Ohio if

he could have filed a petition in state or federal court

seeking equitable relief enjoining the Parole Authority

from revoking his parole without an aa-site preliminary

hearing.

However, Reed learned of Steve Devoto’s complaint

on a Thursday evening. He called his parole officer the

next day, Friday morning. He was instructed to report to

be arrested at 9:00 a.m. the following Monday morning.

Friday, after his phone call to the parole officer, was

Reed’s only opportunity to fully appreciate his options,

find legal representation, compose the proper documents,

gather any necessary fees, file a petition, and receive a

judicial remedy before the courts closed Friday evening.

Reed cannot be held liable for his inability to initiate a

legal action within the last few business hours before his

arrest. Moreover, it is not certain what judicial remedy he

could seek before actually being arrested. Cf. Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (discussing limited circum-

stances in which court in equity can interfere with a

criminal prosecution). Under the undisputed facts, Reed

“did not have time to complain to or seek reprieve from

governmental authorities.” See United States v. Agard, 605

F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing the lack of a

“reasonable opportunity to escape other than by engag-

ing in the otherwise unlawful --tivity”).

The futility of seeking reprieve from Ohio govern-

mental officials was underscored by the inflexibility of

App. 58

Reed’s parole officer, the history of seemingly conspir-

atorial animosity from officials at the Ohio Department of

Corrections and the Parole Authority, and the frantic

ineffectual phone calls initiated on Reed’s behalf by

Pepinsky. To borrow the words of the U.S. Supreme

Court, “if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to

violating the law, ‘a chance both to refuse to do the

criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,’ ” the

defense of duress will fail. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.

at 410 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott,

Handbook on Criminal Law 379 (1972)). Reed did not have

such an alternative.

e. Reed’s allegedly unlawful behavior was

provoked by the demanding state

Most significant in this case is that the State of Ohio

provoked the very parole violation upon which it now

bases its demand for extradition. Reed’s predicament was

caused by state officials acting under color of state law.

He had no reasonable recourse other than flight. Nor-

mally we trust the state to control those who threaten to

deprive a person of life without due process. But when

the state itself is the one posing the threat - and when, as

in this case, federal remedies have been refused — the

only one who can protect the individual from the threat is

a sister state.

The uncontroverted evidence is that the original

extradition petition is the direct result of a concerted

effort by the agents of Ohio to deny Reed of his most

basic rights without due process. Furthermore, Reed

steadfastly asserts he would never have left Ohio if he

App. 59

had been promised a due process hearing. Using these

facts to illuminate the legitimacy of the extradition

demand, we are immediately faced with the question of

whether a state by clearly inappropriate, if not uncon-

stitutional, misconduct can create a fugitive from justice

where otherwise none would exist.

The law is replete with examples in which a state is

prohibited from taking advantage of its affirmative acts

that deny due process to a defendant. See, e.g., State v.

Breit, 1996 NMSC 067, {4 18-48, 122 NM 655, 666-70, 930

P.2d 792, 803-07 (prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Smith,

470 N.E.2d 883, 885-86 (Ohio 1984) (same); State v. Gutier-

rez, 1993 NMSC 062, 116 NM 431, 445-47, 863 P.2d 1052,

1066-68 (unreasonable search and seizure); State v. Pi

Kappa Alpha Fraternity, 491 N.E.2d 1129, 1131-33 (Ohio

1986) (same). We see no reason why extradition should be

exempt from this constitutional principle. “If the Govern-

ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it

invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites

anarchy.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485

(1928) (Brandeis, J., disserfting), overruled on other grounds

by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-54 (1967); see also

Galloway, 507 So.2d at 594-95 (“[T}he constitution forbids

a state from exercising its extradition powers based on

false accusations, simple ignorance of the law or wanton

abuse of process.”).

The fact that a state is prohibited from | aking advan-

tage of its own unlawful conduct brings this case outside

the traditional holding that “[a]n individual brought into

the asylum state involuntarily, unlawfully, or under com-

pulsion is still a fugitive from justice.” Dunn v. Hindman,

836 F.Supp. 750, 755-56 (D. Kan. 1993); see, e.g., Mozingo v.

App. 60

State, 562 So.2d 300, 303-05 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (pris-

oner arrested for crime in demanding state, transferred

legally to prison in another state, is fugitive upon parole

from prison); Ex parte Ponzi, 290 S.W. 170, 173 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1926) (defendant allegedly kidnapped in one state

and brought into asylum state). We hold that, in extradi-

tion cases, duress may be raised as a defense to the

fugitivity element if the individual was incited to cross

state lines - and would otherwise never have done so -

by the illegal actions of the demanding state. A state

cannot now exploit its own unlawful conduct.

It has been suggested that Ohio had no constitutional

obligation to provide Reed a preliminary hearing prior to

taking him into custody. This suggestion seriously mis-

construes Reed’s circumstances. This implies that Reed

should have allowed himself to be arrested so as to test

the reliability of his parole officer’s threat that he would

be returned to Lucasville without a hearing. The question

in this case is not whether Reed should receive a hearing

after being taken into custody. Rather, it is whether Reed

was promised a hearing before he was taken into custody.

The fact is, he was promised he would not receive a

hearing upon being arrested. Moreover, he reasonably

believed, upon being returned to Lucasville without a

hearing, he would be subject to death or great bodily

harm. It is not reasonable to require a defendant to stake

his life on the likelihood that the state will follow the

dictates of due process after it has threatened not to do

so.

Similarly, we distinguish this case from those that

dismiss, in an extradition proceeding, consideration of

the defendant’s motives or reasons for leaving the

App. 61

demanding state. See Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S.

222, 227 (1906). It has even been held that a defendant's

“fear for his personal safety was not sufficient to justify

his flight from justice.” Dunn, 836 F.Supp. at 756. Thus,

there are several disturbing cases in which there was no

defense for those who feared being lynched. See, e.g.,

People ex rel. Heard v. Babb, 107 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ill. 1952)

(“His fear of lynching does not change the nature of the

act, but merely constitutes the motive therefor.”). This

case is of an entirely different order because the demand-

ing state itself threatened the defendant's safety, and then

attempted to extradite him for a violation that never

would have occurred had the demanding state followed

its own laws. Our holding is in accord with those few

cases that granted writs of habeas corpus to defendants

who proved they would find no governmental protection

from being lynched upon extradition to the demanding

state. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superinten-

dent of County Prison, 31 A.2d 576, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1943) (refusal to extradite upon showing of competent

evidence that officials in the demanding state would not

protect defendant from lynching); In re Hampton, 13 Ohio

Dec. 579, 579 (Hamilton County C.P. 1895) (judge, who

previously extradited prisoner into the hands of a lynch

mob in Kentucky, refused to extradite another prisoner to

Kentucky).

Additionally, it makes no difference that Reed might

be provided a hearing in Ohio in which he could answer

for fleeing the state. Ohio’s delayed offer of due process

has no bearing on Reed's status as a fugitive in the State

of New Mexico. Doran requires that we determine

whether Reed is a fugitive and it violates basic justice to

App. 62

presume under the undisputed facts that Reed was ever

at any time a fugitive. The State of Ohio cannot now use

the offer of a belated hearing to transform Reed into a

fugitive from justice. Cf. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.

516, 536 (1884) (“Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to

the injury of the persons and property of its subjects, is

not law, whether manifested as the decree of a personal

monarch or of an impersonal multitude.”). Conduct that

was valid in the eyes of the law at the time it occurred,

cannot after the fact — ex post facto — be rendered invalid.

See State v. Alderette, 111 NM 297, 300, 804 P.2d 1116, 1119

(Ct. App. 1990). Administrative bodies - like the Parole

Authority — “cannot change innocence into guilt; or pun-

ish innocence as a crime,” any more than can legislative

bodies. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)

(discussing ex post facto laws passed by legislative

bodies).

In raising these issues, we are not, despite the con-

cerns of the State, deciding whether Ohio can now right-

fully pursue a hearing process that it originally seems to

have waived. Nor will we consider the “unclean hands”

with which Ohio offers a belated parole revocation hear-

ing. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 483-84 (Brandeis, J. dissenting)

(“[A] court will not redress a wrong when he who

invokes its aid has unclean hands. . . . Where the govern-

ment is the actor, the reasons for applying [the doctrine of

unclean hands] are even more persuasive.”). Nor, as the

amicus posits, do we explore a “presumption of vindic-

tiveness” on the part of Ohio. Dunn, 836 F. Supp. at 754.

Rather, the question before us is whether, in light of

Ohio’s actions —- however legal and constitutional they

App. 63

may or may not be - Reed should be considered a fugi-

tive. We conclude that no offer of a hearing could turn

Reed into a fugitive once it was established he was never

a fugitive in the first place.

f. Reed’s circumstances invoke protections

in the New Mexico Constitution

The New Mexico Constitution requires that we grant

Reed’s writ of habeas corpus. Reed faced the deprivation

of his life without due process of law if he had remained

in Ohio. The New Mexico Constitution cannot tolerate

such an outcome. NM Const. art. IL, §§ 4 & 18. Moreover,

Reed was precluded from seeking safety in Ohio. The

deprivation of his life would have been carried out under

color of state law and Reed was denied any legal recourse

against this deprivation. He fled to New Mexico for the

express purpose of finding safety. For this reason, Reed

properly comes under the protection of Article II, Section

4 of the New Mexico Constitution which guarantees the

right “of seeking and obtaining safety.” Reed did not flee

from justice. He sought refuge from injustice.

g. A reasonable person under similar cir-

cumstances would have acted as did

Reed

The State presented no evidence to undermine Reed's

contention that he was faced with a choice of evils: either

being killed at Lucasville or flight from Ohio. See United

States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410 (defining the defense of

necessity as “choice of evils” in which “physical forces

beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the

App. 64

lesser of two evils”). A reasonable person in Reed’s situa-

tion would choose escape above the probability of death

or bodily injury.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Extradition laws are intended to bring offenders to

justice. They are not intended to be - and we cannot

suffer them to be - a vehicle for the suppression of

constitutional rights. Courts in this nation have always

been empowered to prevent injustice. See Hampton, 13

Ohio Dec. at 579 (refusing to extradite defendant who

was in proven danger of being lynched). Habeas extradi-

tion proceedings are not exempted from the exercise of

this power. For the foregoing reasons we conclude that,

under the uncontroverted facts of this case, Reed is not a

fugitive from justice. We affirm the district court in grant-

ing his writ of habeas corpus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Gene E. Franchini

GENE E. FRANCHINI,

Chief Justice

we concur:

/s/ Patricio M. Serna

PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice

/s/ Dan A. McKinnon, III

DAN A. MCKINNON, III, Justice

JOSEPH F. BACA, Justice (dissenting)

PAMELA B. MINZNER, Justice (specially concurring)

Po AG Rr OP ert i HIE Some

App. 65

MINZNER, Justice (specially concurring).

While I concur in the result reached by the majority, |

respectfully disagree with the fugitivity analysis relied

upon by the majority. The circumstances of this case

require us to consider the respective roles of the courts of

this State and those of Ohio, but I believe the analysis on

which the majority opinion relies expands the role of an

asylum state beyond acceptable limits. Both the Suprem-

acy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const.

art. VI, cl. 2, and the Supreme Law of the Land Clause of

the New Mexico Constitution, NM Const. art. IL, § 1,

compel us to recognize limits on the power and authority

of an asylum state. The analysis on which the majority

opinion relies would take this Court, and other courts,

beyond those limits. Nevertheless, I agree with the major-

ity that, on these facts, the district court’s decision should

be affirmed. Ohio has not demonstrated the requisite

probable cause necessary for justifying the restraint of

Reed’s conditional liberty as a parolee involved in extra-

dition. As a result, I would affirm the grant of the writ of

habeas corpus for Ohio’s failure to substantially charge

Reed with a parole violation.

As the majority opinion explains, the U.S. Constitu-

tion explicitly mandates the extradition of a fugitive upon

the “Demand of the executive Authority of the State from

which he fled. ... ” U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2. The United

States Supreme Court has specifically limited the scope of

inquiry available to courts in an asylum state in the

context of a request for extradition. California v. Superior

App. 66

Court, 482 U.S. 400, 402 (1987) (“At issue in this case are

the limits imposed by federal law upon state court habeas

corpus proceedings challenging an extradition warrant.”)

(emphasis added). “The courts of asylum States may do

no more than ascertain whether the requisites of the

Extradition Act have been met.” California, 482 U.S. at

408; see also Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978)

(limiting judicial inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings

challenging extradition to four issues: technical compli-

ance with required documentation; existence of a crime

charged against defendant; concurrence of identity

between the defendant and the person sought for extradi-

tion; and fugitivity).

In Michigan v. Doran, the Supreme Court limited the

scope of habeas review in order to protect the principle,

embodied in the Extradition Clause, of preventing “any

state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice

of another state and thus ‘balkanize’ the administration

of criminal justice among the several states.” Doran, 439

U.S. at 287. Indeed, frustration of these principles “would

create a serious impediment to national unity,” Puerto

Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987) (finding in the

federal courts a power to compel extradition), because

federal limits to state authority in extradition matters

“are an essential part of the Framers’ conception of

national identity and union.” California, 482 U.S. at 405.

The majority opinion relies heavily on the issue of

“fugitivity,” a permissible ground of review under Doran.

However, the issue of fugitivity is a narrow one. “[T]o be

a fugitive from justice it is necessary ‘that having within a

state committed that which by its laws constitutes a

crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal

App. 67

process to answer for his offence [sic], he has left its

jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another.’ ”

California, 482 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting

Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 97 (1885)). Thus, justice, in

the phrase “fugitive from justice,” does not mean the

“administration of what is just” or fair; it means the

administration of law. Webster's Third New International

Dictionary 1228 (1976) (defining “justice” separately as

“the maintenance and administration of what is just” and

the “administration of law”). But see Majority Opinion,

{ 86. As long as the accused “committed that which by

[the demanding state’s] laws constitutes a crime,” the

justice portion of fugitivity is satisfied. This term does not

allow an asylum state to question the fairness with which

the demanding state treated the accused.

As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court has found it

sufficient that the accused meet “the technical definition

of a ‘fugitive.’ ” California, 482 U.S. at 408. The only issue

under fugitivity other than presence in the asylum state is

flight from the demanding state. Under the requirement

of flight, “when [the accused] is sought to be subjected to

[the demanding state’s] criminal process . . . , he has left

its jurisdiction.” Roberts, 116 U.S. at 97. This requirement

is responsible for the factual inquiry in habeas cases. See,

e.g., Galloway v. Josey, 507 So.2d 590, 593 (Fla. 1987). In

effect, presence in the demanding state at the time of the

commission of a crime is a jurisdictional requirement

without which principles of comity would not command

extradition. Thus, any inquiry into the motives of the

accused in fleeing the demanding state, or the conduct of

the demanding state in relation to the accused, under the

App. 68

fugitivity requirement transgresses the spirit, if not the

letter, of a long line of U.S. Supreme Court opinions.

In Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1952) (per

curiam), the Supreme Court reversed a Federal Court of

Appeals’ remand of a habeas corpus petition on allega-

tions of confinement of the accused amounting to cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court found that

“[clonsiderations fundamental to our federal system

require that the prisoner test the claimed unconstitu-

tionality of his treatment by [the demanding state] in the

courts of that State.” Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 90 (emphasis

added). The Court noted that the “resort to a form of

‘self-help’ ” in fleeing the demanding state should neither

weaken the demanding state’s authority to review the

accusations of official misconduct nor create authority in

the asylum state to review the actions of those officials.

Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 89-90 (“Had he never eluded the

custody of his former jailers he certainly would be enti-

tled to no privilege permitting him to attack Alabama’‘s

penal process by an action brought outside the territorial

confines of Alabama in a forum where there would be no

one to appear and answer for that State.”).

In Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86 (1980), the Court

applied the rationale of Sweeney to actions of state courts

by reversing a writ of habeas corpus granted to an

escaped felon by the California Supreme Court on the

basis that a penitentiary in Arkansas, the demanding

state, potentially operated in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Relying on Doran and Sweeney, the Supreme

Court found that “claims as to constitutional defects in

the Arkansas penal system should be heard in the courts

App. 69

of Arkansas, not those of California.” Pacileo, 449 U.S. at

88.

Finally, in California v. Superior Court, the Supreme

Court reversed a writ of habeas corpus granted by the

California Supreme Court based on a finding that a valid

California custody decree precluded a valid charge of

kidnapping against the legal custodian under the law of

Louisiana, the demanding state. California, 482 U.S. at

404-05. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to allow inquiry

by an asylum state into potential defenses despite the

virtual impossibility of the crime and the substantial state

interest of California in the enforcement of its child cus-

tody decree under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a

constitutional provision with purposes similar to the

Extradition Clause. California, 482 U.S. at 412 (“[UJnder

the Extradition Act, it is for the Louisiana courts to do

justice in this case. .. . ).

Throughout each of these cases, the U.S. Supreme

Court has maintained that issues of the type involved

here, such as alleged constitutional violations by officials

of the demanding state, are to be addressed in the

demanding state or, after exhaustion of remedies, in fed-

eral court. Duress is a substantive defense to a criminal

act and touches on both the mens rea and the actus reus

of the crime. Cf. United States v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615

(7th Cir. 1978) (distinguishing necessity and duress on the

basis of actus reus and mens rea). Under duress, there is

no question that the accused committed the act in ques-

tion; it is only culpability which is in dispute. Reed may

raise the defense of duress in Ohio for the parole viola-

tion and also, if he were so charged under Ohio Rev.

Code Ann. Section 2967.15(C)(1), for the offense of

App. 70

escape. See State v. Cross, 391 N.E.2d 319, 322-24 (1979)

(discussing the defense of duress for the crime of escape);

see also Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 501-02, 576 P.2d

1129, 1132-33 (1978) (allowing the defense of duress for

the crime of escape in the context of a history of beatings

and serious threats by prison guards and personnel),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Wilson, 1994 NMSC

008, 116 N.M. 793, 795-96, 867 P.2d 1175, 1177-78. How-

ever, by creating an exception to extradition for govern-

mentally-inflicted duress, the majority opinion appears to

me inconsistent with existing case law. Cf. California, 482

U.S. at 407-08 (stating that extradition proceedings “are

‘emphatically’ not the appropriate time or place for enter-

taining defenses”) (citations omitted).

A parolee is certainly entitled to a preliminary hear-

ing to determine whether probable cause exists for

believing the parolee has violated the conditions of

parole. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). However,

Ohio is not under a constitutional obligation to provide

this hearing prior to taking the parolee into custody. See

Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 (1976) (“Loss of liberty

as a parole violator does not occur until the parolee is

taken into custody under the warrant.”); D’Amato v. U.S.

Parole Com'n, 837 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding no

due process violation when warrant for parole violation

was issued but not yet executed). As a result, even if the

parole officer in this case threatened to arrest Reed, the

Adult Parole Authority (APA) then would have a reason-

able time to afford Reed the preliminary hearing. See

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485 (“[D]ue process would seem to

require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or

reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation

App. 71

or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest... . ”)

(emphasis added). Even if Ohio were to deny Reed a

preliminary hearing, it would be a decision of the APA,

the proper neutral party to which Morrissey referred, and,

eventually, the Ohio or federal judiciary, rather than the

individual parole officer. Further, while it is true that in

Sweeney there was no showing that relief was unavailable

in the demanding state, Reed has not made a showing

that relief actually is unavailable in Ohio. Cf. Wright v.

Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 661 N.E.2d 728 (Ohio 1996)

(evaluating a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel

reinstatement of parole), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 127 (1996);

State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul, 652 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ohio

1995) (“[H]abeas corpus will lie in certain extraordinary

circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a

person's liberty. . . . ”); Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 46 F.3d 503,

510 (6th Cir.) (providing “prospective injunctive relief”

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of procedural due

process rights by the Ohio Parole Revocation procedures),

cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 120, cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 274 (1995).

I do not mean to suggest that conclusive proof of a

constitutional violation by a demanding state would be

sufficient to create authority in the asylum state to deny

extradition. Rather, I believe the ambiguous showing by

Reed of a constitutional violation and the unavailability

of remedies in Ohio illustrates the troublesome nature of

investigating Ohio’s conduct without giving Ohio an

opportunity to respond. See Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 89-90. In

addition, the complexity of Reed’s situation emphasizes

the difficulty of undertaking such an inquiry in an asy-

lum state. California, 482 U.S. at 417 (Stevens, J., dissent-

ing) (“[A]n asylum state court’s inquiry may not reach

App. 72

the merits of issues thai could be fully litigated in the

charging State; such examinations entangle the asylum

State’s judicial system in laws with which it is unfamiliar

and endanger the summary nature of extradition pro-

ceedings.”). In short, Reed’s “self-help” cannot provide

him with a remedy in a sister state that is otherwise

unavailable. Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 89-90. The Extradition

Clause, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, serves

as a barrier to an asylum state’s review of the past con-

duct of the demanding state and prevents speculation

about future misconduct. Cf. Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 91

(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“We cannot assume unlaw-

ful action of the prison officials which would prevent the

petitioner from invoking the aid of the local courts nor

readily open the door to such a claim. Our federal system

presupposes confidence that a demanding State will not

exploit the action of an asylum state by indulging in

outlawed conduct to a returned fugitive from justice.”)

(citation omitted).

New Mexico simply lacks authority in our federal

system of government to intercede on Reed's behalf in an

extradition proceeding for alleged potential violations of

his right to due process of law by another state. The

Supremacy Clause prevents us from applying New Mex-

ico constitutional protections of due process and of seek-

ing safety in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court's

interpretation of the Extradition Clause and its imple-

menting legislation. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Con-

stitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall

be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be

bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of

App. 73

any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). Thus, the

majority's reliance on New Mexico's protection of “seek-

ing and obtaining safety,” NM Const. art. II, § 4, even if

this provision contains a substantive protection, is mis-

placed in an extradition proceeding. The majority states

that “Reed came to New Mexico explicitly for the pur-

pose of ‘seeking and obtaining safety,’ ” Majority Opin-

ion, { 105, and the district court noted that Reed “wanted

to seek sanctuary” in New Mexico. Reed v. Ortiz, No. 94-1

CR Misc., 1995 WL 118952, at *6-7 (NM Dist. Ct. Jan. 20,

1995). These statements clarify the issue involved; Reed

does not contest, at least primarily, the technical validity

of Ohio’s request for extradition, but rather, he desires

political asylum in a sister state from alleged constitu-

tional abuses or potential abuses by Ohio. This is pre-

cisely the type of conflict between states that the

Extradition Clause seeks to prevent. See Doran, 439 U.S. at

287.

As “Great” a writ as habeas corpus is, we may not

issue the writ in excess of our authority. See Sweeney, 344

U.S. at 90. Our powers as a sovereign state are not unlim-

ited, and we may not ignore the restraints imposed by the

federal Constitution. Even though the majority concludes

that Reed is not a fugitive, because of Ohio’s actions

precipitating his flight from Ohio, I am not persuaded we

can review the constitutionality or propriety of Ohio's

actions without exceeding New Mexico’s authority in

extradition matters.

App. 74

Nonetheless, under the facts presented, I would not

allow Reed to be extradited to Ohio. Under Doran, the

demanding state must demonstrate to the asylum state

that there is probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

The magistrate or justice of the peace before

whom the criminal charge is filed must issue an

arrest warrant if it is determined that there is

reasonable cause to believe that an offense has

been committed. The inquiry the judicial officer

is required to make is directed at the traditional

determination of reasonable grounds or proba-

ble cause.

Doran, 439 U.S. at 289 (footnote omitted). In fact, the

holding in Doran was partially based on the judicial

determination “that there was ‘reasonable cause to

believe that such offense(s) were committed and that the

accused committed them.’ ” Doran, 439 U.S. at 289.

The usage of “probable cause” clearly suggests the

influence of the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme

Court's analysis. Doran, 439 U.S. at 294-296 (Blackmun, J.,

concurring); Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 763 n. 6 (8th

Cir. 1980) (stating that the probable cause requirement

“may be founded in the Fourth Amendment, as well as in

the Extradition Clause and statute”); cf. Gerstein v. Pugh,

420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring “a judicial determina-

tion of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended

restraint of liberty following arrest” under the Fourth

Amendment). “The extradition process involves an

‘extended restraint of liberty following arrest’ even more

severe than that accompanying detention within a single

state.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 296 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

App. 75

Therefore, asylum states have a duty to ensure that prob-

able cause exists in order to justify the restraint on the

accused’s liberty. See Crew v. State, 486 A.2d 664, 666

(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (“When the liberty of a person is

being infringed upon when he is forcibly removed from

one state to another, a judicial finding of probable cause

is demanded.”).

Although parolees do not enjoy the absolute liberty

of a criminal defendant not yet convicted, the U.S.

Supreme Court has found a conditional liberty not to be

re-institutionalized unless the parolee violates the condi-

tions of parole. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-82 (“By

whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen

as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

The Supreme Court found significant state and societal

interests in “restoring [the parolee] to normal and useful

life within the law” and determined that arbitrary parole

revocation constituted a serious impediment to such a

goal. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483-84. As a result, the

Supreme Court found a constitutional right to a prelimi-

nary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists

to believe the parolee violated the conditions of parole in

order to justify extended incarceration pending a final

parole revocation hearing. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at

485-86; accord Young v. Harper, 117 S.Ct. 1148, 1151-54

(1997) (concluding that preparole is sufficiently similar to

parole to require the protections articulated in Morrissey).

While a parolee may be temporarily detained prior to

the preliminary hearing, see Moody, 429 U.S. at 85-89, the

Fourteenth Amendment requires a finding of probable

cause in order to justify prolonged or substantial confine-

ment. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487 (“Such a determination

App. 76

would be sufficient to warrant the parolee’s continued

detention and return to the state correctional institution

pending the final decision.”).! Thus, for purposes of

' It might be suggested that there should be a presumptive

inference of probable cause based on the subsequent conviction

of a parolee or the presence alone of a parolee in the asylum

state without permission. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490 (“[A]

parolee cannot relitigate issues determined against him in other

forums, as in the situation presented when the revocation is

based on conviction of another crime.”); Barton v. Malley, 626

F.2d 151, 159 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding presence in another state

without permission sufficient probable cause to believe parolee

violated parole such that a preliminary hearing was not

constitutionally required). Under such a notion, the Due Process

Clause would not require a preliminary hearing for a

determination of probable cause.

Under the conditional liberty addressed in Morrissey, this

position has merit. However, Ohio requires a preliminary

hearing to determine probable cause in Reed’s situation. Ohio

Admin. Code § 5120:1-1-18 (1979, prior to 1995 amendment).

Further, in this hearing, Reed would be entitled to present

relevant witnesses and documentary evidence, to be

represented by counsel, to confront witnesses, and to present

mitigating factors. See Section 5120:1-1-18(A); § 5120:1-1-18(H).

Because Ohio would not presume probable cause and would

grant a hearing on the merits for a determination of probable

cause, Reed’s increased level of conditional liberty as

established by Ohio constitutionally may require a preliminary

hearing for a determination of probable cause. Cf. Sandin v.

Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995) (stating that “States may

under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are

protected by the Due Process Clause” and that such state actions

are “generally limited to freedom from restraint”); Garcia v. Las

Vegas Medical Center, 112 N.M. 441, 443-45, 816 P.2d 510, 512-14

(Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the effect of state law on the

requirements of procedural due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment and concluding that procedural protections are

wholly federal, while substantive interests established by state

App. 77

extradition for a parolee, a clear example of an “extended

restraint” of a parolee’s conditional liberty, an asylum

law may demand greater procedural protection by the

Fourteenth Amendment); see also Brooks v. Shanks, 1994 NMSC

113, 118 N.M. 716, 720, 885 P.2d 637, 641 (“A state may create a

liberty interest by establishing procedures that control how a

deprivation of rights or privileges such as good-time credits

may be imposed.”) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 546

(1974)); State v. Chavez, 94 N.M. 102, 103-05, 607 P.2d 640, 641-43

(Ct. App. 1979). “State law is relevant only insofar as federal

rights are dependent on state law,” Garcia, 112 N.M. at 444, 816

P.2d at 513, and the conditional liberty of a parolee is entirely

dependent on the limits of parole imposed by state law. Cf.

DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 597 A.2d 807, 821 (Conn. 1991) (“[A]n

underlying conviction is recognized in this state as conclusive

proof that there was probable cause for charges unless it is

proven that the conviction was obtained through fraud, duress, or

other unlawful means.”) (emphasis added). In light of the

ambiguity of the federal constitutional requirements for the

protection of Reed’s conditional liberty, New Mexico should not

be required to make an inference Ohio itself would not make.

See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls

for such procedural protections the particular situation

demands.”).

This result is not changed by Ohio Rev. Code Ann., Section

2967.15(B) (Banks-Baldwin 1994). Under Section 2967.15(B), a

parolee who is convicted of a crime while on parole is not

entitled to a preliminary hearing. However, Reed’s Kentucky

conviction is not controlled by this statute for two reasons. First,

although the Ohio statute is substantially similar to provisions

held to be constitutional, see Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 46 F.3d at

508-09, this provision does not apply to Reed, in light of the Ex

Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, because he was

convicted of his initial crime before October 6, 1994, the

effective date of the statute. See Kellogg, 46 F.3d at 509-10

(holding the application of a similar rule of the Ohio Adult

Parole Authority to violate the principles of ex post facto for

those convicted of the initial crime before September 1, 1992, the

App. 78

state must confirm that the demanding state has made a

determination of probable cause for a parole violation.

However, due to the nature of parole and the lesser

protection of conditional liberty, the probable cause

determination need not be made by a judicial officer.

Rather, in accordance with Morrissey, a neutral adminis-

trative authority may find probable cause after an infor-

mal hearing about which the accused is entitled to notice

and in which there must be an opportunity for the

accused to present evidence and confront witnesses. Mor-

rissey, 408 U.S. at 485-87. If the demanding state has made

such a determination, then “the courts of the asylum state

are without power to review the determination.” Doran,

439 U.S. at 290. However, “the asylum state need not

grant extradition unless that determination has been

made. The demanding state, of course, has the burden of

so demonstrating.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 296 (Blackmun, J.,

concurring).

effective date of the rule); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.021

(Banks-Baldwin 1996) (discussing applicability of 1996

amendments). Second, Reed had not been convicted of the

Kentucky offense at the time he was told to report to be arrested

and, subsequently, declared to be a parole violator. As a result,

Reed would have been entitled to a preliminary hearing on the

matter in Ohio had he not fled the state. See Ohio Admin. Code

§ 5120:1-1-18(G)(1)(c) (requiring a probable cause hearing for

one charged but not yet convicted of a new crime if the parolee

has not been given a preliminary hearing on the new charge

with notice that it serves as a substitute for a separate probable

cause hearing). Therefore, Reed is entitled to a preliminary

hearing to determine “whether or not there is probable cause or

reasonable grounds to believe that [he] has committed an act

which would constitute a violation of the conditions of

release... . ” Section 5120:1-1-18(A).

App. 79

Unlike the factual issue of fugitivity, Parks v. Bour-

beau, 477 A.2d 636, 641 n.9 (Conn. 1984) (“The inquiry

whether a plaintiff is a fugitive from justice is one of fact

which is to be resolved by the governor of the asylum

state.”), the issue of whether a determination of probable

cause has been made by the demanding state is a ques-

tion of law. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 95 (1885) (stating

that the issue of fugitivity is one of fact while that of

charging is one of law “and is always open upon the face

of the papers to judicial inquiry, on application for a

discharge under a writ of habeas corpus.”); Parks, 477

A.2d at 640-41 (“[T]he requisite that one must be ‘sub-

stantially charged’ requires that the charge be based upon

‘probable cause’ [and] . . . is [a question] of law.”). As a

result, the district court’s determination that probable

cause existed as to the parole violation will be reviewed

de novo. See Duncan v. Kerby, 1993 NMSC 011, 115 NM

344, 347-48, 851 P.2d 466, 469-79 (applying this standard

to the review of a lower court’s grant or denial of a writ

of habeas corpus). The district court’s conclusion that

Reed had been substantially charged with a crime in Ohio

did not include a finding of any determination of proba-

ble cause. Reed v. Ortiz, No. 94-1 CR Misc., 1995 WL

118952, at *4 (NM Dist. Ct. Jan. 20, 1995). In addition, the

district court did not address whether Ohio had con-

ducted a preliminary hearing in accordance with Mor-

rissey. Under de novo review, the district court's finding

cannot withstand scrutiny.

Ohio has not carried its burden of demonstrating that

it made a determination that probable cause existed to

believe that Reed violated the conditions of his parole.

According to the record, “[t]he Superintendent of Parole

App. 80

Supervision . . . brought information to the attention of

the Adult Parole Authority that [Reed] has violated the

terms and conditions of his parole. . . . ” Special Minutes

of the State of Ohio Adult Parole Authority, March 23,

1993. In addition, Reed “will be charged with absconding

supervision, failing to follow instructions of parole offi-

cer, leaving the state without prior written permission,

failing to report his arrest, and involving himself in fur-

ther criminal activity.” Jill D. Goldhart Aff. (October 3,

1994) (emphasis added). There is neither an explicit find-

ing of probable cause nor sufficient information provided

to show that a probable cause determination has been

made.? In fact, the future tense used by the Ohio officials

necessarily implies that there has been no such deter-

mination. In any case, for parolees, the determination of

probable cause must be made in a preliminary hearing,

and Ohio’s documentation demonstrates that there has

2 Because the documents neither explicitly nor implicitly

demonstrate a finding of probable cause, the question of

whether the documents must facially show a finding of

probable cause need not be addressed. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 296

(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“It is enough if the papers submitted

by the demanding state in support of its request for extradition

facially show that a neutral magistrate has made a finding of

probable cause.”); compare Crew v. State, 486 A.2d 664, 666

(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (“Inferences . . . are not sufficient. A

judge should explicitly make the finding, not only to assure that

he has focused on that requirement, but also so that the asylum

state will know that the finding has been affirmatively made.”),

with White v. King County, 748 P.2d 616, 620-21 (Wash. 1988)

(inferring a finding of probable cause from an arrest warrant

based on the statutory requirement of such for the issuance of a

warrant), and In re Whitehouse, 467 N.E.2d 228, 230-31 (Mass. Ct.

App. 1984) (same).

App. 81

been no hearing. Jill D. Goldhart Aff. (October 3, 1994)

(“Reed will be returned to Ohio for a parole violation on-

site hearing.”).

In response to Ohio’s failure to make a probable

cause determination, | would normally favor a remand to

the district court to make this determination indepen-

dently before allowing the extradition of a parolee, see Ex

Parte Sanchez, 642 S.W.2d 809, 811-12 (Tex. Crim. App.

1982) (“[W]e find no prohibition in Michigan v. Dor-

an... that would preclude a neutral judicial officer of

this State from making this [probable cause] determina-

tion.”), or a denial of extradition pending Ohio's deter-

mination of probable cause. However, | believe the length

of time Reed was incarcerated without a preliminary

hearing violates the requirement of holding a probable

cause hearing “as promptly as convenient after arrest

while informati

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