Petition for Writ of Certiorari — New Mexico Ex Rel. Ortiz v. Reed
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3 Court, U.S.
ILE D
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“ 97 1217 JAN 23 198
NO. ___pesiee OF PHE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997
7
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. MANUEL ORTIZ,
Petitioner,
v.
TIMOTHY REED,
Respondent.
¢
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To
The Supreme Court Of New Mexico
o
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
®
Tom Upatt
Attorney General of New Mexico
EvizasetH M. BLaispett
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
ArtHurR W. Pepin
Assistant Attorney General
Post Office Drawer 1508
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-1508
(505) 827-6083 or (505) 827-6934
Counsel for Petitioner
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO, (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Does a state court violate the Extradition Clause by
allowing a claim of duress to defeat the fugitivity
requirement of a valid extradition demand?
Does a state court violate the Extradition and Suprem-
acy Clauses of the Federal Constitution by denying
rendition based on a state constitutional right to seek
and obtain safety and happiness?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .....----05ss essere i
OPINION BELOW........---::::eeeeeeeeeere eres |
JURISDICTION ....... 000 ese eee rere errr ete e eee ees 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED...... |
STATEMENT OF THE CASE......- ++. 05555 e eee eees 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........->- 5
ini i ignificant And
a inion Below Raises A Signi
el 2 Question Regarding The Proper Scope
Of An Asylum State’s Determination Of Fugitive :
Status Under The Extradition Clause .........-. ‘
inion Below Raises A Substantial Question
Rees ing The Impact Of State Constitutional Guar- i
antees On Extradition Jurisprudence..........++--
CONCLUSION ...... 0. cece cece creer eee rene nen neees 14
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Barton v. Malley, 626 F.2d 151 (CA10 1980).......... 11
California v. Superior Court of California, 482 U.S.
ET ENEGG46¥bbs Gh vo edie ch 0baed bac edudereccs 13
California First Bank v, State, 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d
DENS sakU needles dawhebaccetachececsecltn co. 12
Carpenter v. Jamerson, 432 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio a 4
Chamberlain v. Celeste, 729 F.2d 1071 (CA6 1984)...9, 11
Galloway v. Josey, 507 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988)....................0... 6
In re Ropp, 541 A.2d 86 (Vt. 1988)...........000000.., 6
Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (CADC), cert.
SS a y
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978).............. 5, 6
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).............. 11
Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86 (1980) ................ 6, 8
People ex rel. Bowman v. Woods, 264 N.E.2d 151 (Ill.
a Nia Rd a 8
People ex rel. Strachan v. Colon, 571 N.E.2d 65 (N.Y.
Rig id ce a ah 8
Petition of James, 575 N.E.2d 38 (Mass. ascniane 11
Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 nee 12
Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, _. N.M. __, 947 P.2d 86
(1997)
Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107
N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988).................... 12
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885)... .... 2.66. e cece 6
Skaggs Drug Center v. General Electric Co.,63 N.M. —
a Fe Be GE CE ho ccacctenccacsdessnecacs 12
South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412 (1933)........... 6
State v. Engler, 85 F.3d 1205 (CA6 1996)............. 13
State ex rel. Reddin v. Meekma, 306 N.W.2d 664
(Wis.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981)............ 11
State ex rel. Sheppard v. Kisner, 394 S.E.2d 907 (W.
We, Ge oN nae ceddsuaks cehansebibotsndsevenccess 11
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911)............... 7
Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952)................ 7
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798
ED Ee CO ecb ceduscetanegsnéeneckessndecceeens 12
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980)........... 10
Wynsma v. Leach, 536 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1975).......... 11
STATUTES
aD WE. TR cs ccdedenseresetepindedintscswetinns 1
DEBE Came: DOR. Gh Ge ods ccc cecedetisconcives 11, 12
Ohio Admin. Code § 5120:1-1-18(F) (1979 ed.)......... 10
CONSTITUTIONS
Constitution of the United States, Extradition
Cate, AOD GE 1b dnc cccccnucoscnsdscesscosessa 1
Constitution of the United States, Supremacy
Coat, AED VE ov csecncvcnsdivessosgeesecisconcs 2
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amend-
PAASuatheviuveusd devacdsensinceavciieecd.«....... 2
Constitution of the United States, F
I ocd dn dcvékock Bate lssc: a as 2
Rute:
nae cde nt | SARs Pe rates Rar 1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner, State of New Mexico, respectfully prays
that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and
opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court entered in
this matter on September 9, 1997.
o
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court is in
Appendix A. It is reported at Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, __
N.M. __, 947 P.2d 86 (1997).
S
JURISDICTION
Judgment of the New Mexico Supreme Court was
entered September 9, 1997. A timely motion for recon-
sideration was denied October 28, 1997. The denial order
is in Appendix B. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) and Supreme Court Rule
13.1.
S
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Constitution of the United States, Extradition Clause,
Article IV, § 2:
“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony,
or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found
in another State, shall on Demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.”
Constitution of the United States, Supremacy Clause,
Article VI:
“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment:
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... . ”
Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth Amend-
ment:
“ _.. [NJor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law... . ”
S
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 16, 1994, Timothy Reed (Reed) was
arrested on a warrant issued by the Governor of New
Mexico pursuant to a request for rendition by Ohio (Tape
1, 12/9/94, 182).! Ohio sought rendition of Reed for
violation of parole (R.P.6 to R.P.8). He had been granted
parole after serving part of the prison terms imposed for
1 Reed’s habeas corpus proceedings were recorded on
audiotape. Citations were taken from a Fisher Studio Standard
Tape Deck with about 580 counts per tape side. The reference
“R.P.-__” is to a page number of the Record Proper, which
contains the documents filed with the court in New Mexico.
Reed’s 1982 and 1983 felony convictions on two counts of
aggravated robbery and one count of theft of drugs (R.P.6
to R.P.11). Reed challenged extradition in New Mexico by
writ of habeas corpus filed in state district court (R.P.21 to
R.P.30). Reed admitted he fled Ohio while on parole but
claimed he was not a fugitive for purposes of extradition
because his flight was under duress (R.P.22). He claimed
he was compelled to flee Ohio by his belief that Ohio
authorities intended to revoke his parole withect due
process and to cause him physical harm if he were
returned to an Ohio prison (T-1, 12/9/94, 217-240).
Over objections by the State of New Mexico (State),
Reed presented his own testimony as well as affidavits
from Ohio prisoners alleging: (1) that Reed had previ-
ously been mistreated by Ohio authorities; (2) that Ohio
authorities were animated by improper motives in seek-
ing to revoke his parole; and (3) that he fled Ohio under
duress caused by his belief that Ohio authorities would
revoke his parole without due process and by his expec-
tation that he would suffer bodily harm if returned to an
Ohio prison (T-1, 12/9/94, 273-90; T-2, 12/23/94, 120,
130; 210-213; R.P.152-R.P.163).
On January 20, 1995, the New Mexico district court
granted the writ and directed Reed’s release
(R.P.164-181). The State appealed the grant of the writ to
the New Mexico Supreme Court, which held that all the
requirements for extradition were met except the estab-
lishment of fugitive status. Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, __
N.M. __, 947 P.2d 86 (1997) (at Appendix A; hereafter
“Reed, App. A at __”), App. A at 34-37. The court found
that Reed was granted parole on May 5, 1992 and fled
Ohio on March 22, 1993 Reed, App. A at 5, 54. The court
erred in characterizing this as “a one-year parole term,”
id., when in fact Reed was paroled on May 5, 1992 “[flor a
period of not less than one year” at which point he would
have become eligible for consideration of final release
conditioned upon his “satisfactory conduct and adjust-
ment” (R.P.90).
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that Reed was
not a fugitive because his flight from Ohio to New Mex-
ico was under duress which was induced by Ohio author-
ities. Reed, App. A at 38-44. It accepted Reed's claim that
he believed Ohio authorities would deny him due process
in the anticipated parole revocation proceedings and
would harm him if he returned to an Ohio prison. Reed,
App. A at 55-62. This holding was premised on Reed's
testimony and the failure of Ohio authorities to answer
Keed’s charges in the New Mexico district court. Reed,
App. A at 53-58.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held in the alterna-
tive that, even if Reed were a fugitive, his uncontradicted
allegations that he would be denied due process and
would suffer bodily harm in Ohio entitled Reed to asy-
lum in New Mexico under the New Mexico Constitution’s
guarantee of the right to seek and obtain safety. Reed,
App. A at 49-52; App. A at 60.
The State moved for the court to reconsider the
majority opinion’s misapprehension of extradition law as
well as the concurring opinion’s misapprehension of
Ohio law and the probable cause determination needed to
support rendition for a parole violation (State’s motion,
Oct. 9, 1997). By order of October 28, 1997, the New
Mexico Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner's
PEE a ee
a oe
motion for rehearing (App. B). The court also summarily
denied the State’s motion to recall the mandate it issued
pending this application for writ of certiorari (State's
motion, Nov. 3, 1997; Order Nov. 6, 1997). Ohio’s rendi-
tion request remains outstanding and Reed remains sub-
ject to arrest as an interstate fugitive as of January 1998.
S
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. The Opinion Below Raises A Significant And
Recurring Question Regarding The Proper Scope Of
An Asylum State’s Determination Of Fugitive Sta-
tus ''nder The Extradition Clause.
The Opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court rests
on a very expansive interpretation of the power an asy-
lum state may exercise under the Extradition Clause
before a fugitive is returned to the demanding state. This
profound expansion in the scope of extradition proceed-
ings requires guidance from this Court lest the limited
inquiry into “historic facts readily verifiable,” intended in
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978), becomes a
process by which asylum states audit the functioning of
penal institutions in their sister states.
For more than two centuries the Extradition Clause
has obliged the respective states to return to a sister state
those who have fled from its criminal justice or penal
institutions. This Court made clear in Doran that a court
considering release on habeas corpus “may do no more
than decide” whether (1) the extradition documents are
in order, (2) the petitioner has been charged with a crime
in the demanding state, (3) he or she is the person named
in the extradition documents and (4) he or she is a fugi-
tive. 439 U.S. at 289. Despite the restrictive language of
Doran, a court faced with claims such as Reed’s may be
tempted to grant asylum from alleged injustices under
the guise of an inquiry into fugitive status. This tempta-
tion is heightened by the absence of the demanding state,
which is not a party to the habeas proceeding and which
cannot be expected to send witnesses and evidence to the
several states wherein its fugitives are found. The New
Mexico courts in this case succumbed to this temptation,
resulting in a grave misinterpretation of the Extradition
Clause.
Since at least 1885 the determination of fugitive sta-
tus has meant only that the asylum state must find that
the person sought was present in the demanding state at
the time of the alleged crime and that he or she has been
found in the asylum state. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289
U.S. 412, 420 (1933); Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 97
(1885). The only defense to fugitivity has been uncon-
trovertible proof that the fugitive was not in the demand-
ing state at the time of the alleged crime. Bailey, 289 U.S.
at 420; In re Ropp, 541 A.2d 86, 88 (Vt. 1988); Galloway v.
Josey, 507 So.2d 590, 592-93 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1006 (1988).
In Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1980), this
Court held that the courts of California could not condi-
tion extradition on the outcome of a hearing in California
which would consider evidence on the fugitive’s claim
that prison conditions in Arkansas would impose cruel
d unusual punishment if he was returned there. Claims
of constitutional defects in the Arkansas prison system
had to be heard in the state and federal courts of
Arkansas, not California. Id. Here the New Mexico
Supreme Court ruled that the fugitivity inquiry required
a New Mexico court to determine whether the fugitive
fled from unjust conditions or the unjust prospective
denial of constitutional rights, holding that extradition
was only available if the fugitive “seeks to avoid the
maintenance and administration of what is just.” Reed,
App. A at 41.
Expanding on the fugitivity inquiry, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that an asylum state may counte-
nance and accept the claim of a paroled felon that his fear
of inadequate procedural protections in parole revocation
proceedings and his fear of unjust treatment in the
demanding state’s prisons establishes a defense of duress
for his flight from the demanding state. This expansion of
the fugitivity inquiry is in direct conflict with the Court's
long-standing view that the asylum state’s extradition
inquiry is very limited. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 289 (extradi-
tion review is a limited inquiry into historic facts readily
verifiable); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 286 (1911)
(one is a fugitive from justice who must be returned to
the demanding state “when, as here, it appears that the
prisoner was in the state in the neighborhood of the time
alleged”). Denying review will let stand a decision which
portends a wide expansion of the asylum state’s inquiry
into fugitivity as a means to test the bona fides of the
demanding state’s motives and intentions in seeking
extradition.
This Court has not directly addressed the scope of
the fugitivity inquiry since Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 US.
86, 89 (1952), which held that an escaped felon’s allega-
tions of cruel and inhumane treatment by Alabama
authorities did not alter his status as a fugitive from
Alabama. His claims of brutal, life-threatening mistreat-
ment by Alabama prison authorities had to be addressed
in the state and federal courts of Alabama after compli-
ance by Ohio with Alabama’s demand for extradition. Id.
Woodall should have put to rest the temptation for
courts of an asylum state to use the fugitivity inquiry as a
forum in which to judge the constitutional adequacy of
the criminal justice institutions of a sister state. It did not.
An asylum court may be faced with an apparently sym-
pathetic habeas corpus petitioner confessing his fear of
scandalous institutional mistreatment by the demanding
state. Some asylum courts have been tempted to burden
the demanding state with a duty to answer these claims
by proof that the demanding state’s motives are pure and
its institutions humane. See Walker, 449 U.S. at 87-88
(reversing California Supreme Court’s holding that the
petitioner was entitled to a hearing in California on his
claim he expected cruel and unusual treatment if
returned to an Arkansas prison); People ex rel. Strachan v.
Colon, 571 N.E.2d 65, 68 (N.Y. 1991) (habeas petitioner
could show he was not a fugitive by evidence that a
gross, irreparable harm or denial of access to state and
federal courts would result if he was returned to Florida,
but he failed to present such evidence); People ex rel.
Bowman v. Woods, 264 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ill. 1970) (Ala-
bama’s unexplained delay was so fundamentally unfair
to the fugitive that Alabama had forfeited its right to seek
return of an escaped felon who had lived openly in
Illinois for eighteen years).
In addition, several dissents have advocated a posi-
tion which would broadly expand the scope of the
fugitivity inquiry in a manner similar to that adopted by
the New Mexico Supreme Court. See Carpenter v. Jamerson,
432 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ohio 1982) (Brown, J., dissenting)
(habeas petitioner’s uncontroverted claim that he left
Georgia with the consent of his probation officer meant
he was not a fugitive and should have been released);
Chamberlain v. Celeste, 729 F.2d 1071, 1077 (CA6 1984)
(Martin, J., dissenting) (habeas court should review fugi-
tive’s plea agreement with demanding state, find it fully
completed and find he was not a fugitive despite the
demanding state’s contrary interpretation of the agree-
ment); Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 684-85 (CADC)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting) (extradition should not be per-
mitted where habeas petitioner alleges the demanding
state denied his right to a trial for ten months and
imposed barbarously cruel and unusual punishment),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
The New Mexico Supreme Court denied extradition
here on the ground that a person who alleges duress as
the reason for his flight is not a fugitive. Under this
holding asylum states may hear evidence and draw con-
clusions about the constitutional adequacy of criminal
justice institutions in demanding states. This is a seminal
departure from prior interpretation of the Extradition
Clause. It requires a demanding state to appear and con-
travene a fugitive’s allegations of duress arising from
expected mistreatment lest the asylum court find the
claims are “uncontroverted” and thus valid, as did the
court here. Reed, App. A at 23-25, 58, 64. The extradition
process will dissolve into chaos if, instead of meeting a
fugitive’s claims in state or federal court after his return
to the demanding state, a demanding state is instead
10
oblige’ 0 prove to the courts of an asylum state that
allegations of expected ill treatment in the demanding
state are unfounded.
The New Mexico Supreme Court not only expanded
the scope of the fugitivity inquiry, it also recognized a
duress defense in extradition cases which is broader than
the duress defense this Court has recognized in federal
criminal cases. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
410-12 (1980) (jail escapee who proves that egregious
conditions in jail compelled his escape must also show “a
bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon
as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive
force”). Here the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
duress experienced by Reed in 1993 barred his extradition
to Ohio in 1997,
The broad scope of the duress defense permitted by
the New Mexico Supreme Court's fugitivity inquiry
opens the door for courts in asylum states greatly to
expand their review of the demanding state’s motive for
seeking extradition as well as its conditions of imprison-
ment. It is important for this Court to address the scope
of the fugitivity inquiry at the nascent stage of this
expansion in order to foment or forestall its further devel-
opment.?
? Although the concurring opinion rejected this expanded
fugitivity inquiry, it reached the equally flawed conclusion that
rendition was properly denied because Ohio did not hold a
preliminary hearing. Reed, App. A at 72-80. Such a hearing is
required under Ohio law only after a parolee held in custody
outside Ohio is returned to Ohio. Ohio Admin. Code
§ 5120:1-1-18(F) (1979 ed.). A preliminary hearing is required by
11
2. The Opinion Below Raises A Substantial Question
Regarding The Impact Of State Constitutional Guar-
antees On Extradition Jurisprudence
The New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the New
Mexico Constitution's guarantee of the right to seek and
obtain safety as an independent ground to deny Reed's
extradition to Ohio. Reed, App. A at 49-51. It held that this
provision granted Reed asylum in New Mexico even if he
was a fugitive from Ohio. Reed, App. A at 63. This
reliance on rights arising under a state constitution as a
basis for refusing to return a fugitive to a demanding
state erases the Extradition Clause from the Federal Con-
stitution and ignores its Supremacy Clause.
The New Mexico Constitution states that all persons
have the right “of seeking and obtaining safety and hap-
piness.” N.M. Const. art. Il, § 4. The New Mexico
Supreme Court found that Ohio had rebutted neither
due process when a parolee is imprisoned pending a final parole
revocation hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972).
However a fugitive who has already been found guilty in the
demanding state and has any part of his sentence remaining
unserved is not entitled to a probable cause inquiry before the
fugitive is returned to the demanding state since the fact of
conviction satis/ies the Doran requiremeni that the fugitive be
charged with a crime in the demanding state. Petition of James,
575 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Mass. 1991); State ex rel. Sheppard v. Kisner, 394
S.E.2d 907, 908 (W. Va. 1990); Chamberlain v. Celeste, 729 F.2d
1071, 1075 (CA6 1984); State ex rel. Reddin v. Meekma, 306 N.W.2d
664, 667-68 (Wis.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981); Barton v.
Malley, 626 F.2d 151, 159 (CA10 1980); Wynsma v. Leach, 536 P.2d
817, 819-20 (Colo. 1975). The concurring opinion would
improperly graft Morrissey’s due process requirements for
parole revocation onto the asylum state's rendition proceedings.
12
Reed's claim of improper motive in seeking his extradi-
tion for his assertion that he expected cruel and life-
threatening treatment if returned to Ohio, and so con-
cluded: “We hold that the extradition process was not
meant to abrogate the New Mexico Constitution which
regards ‘seeking and raining safety’ as a ‘natural,
inherent and inalienabiev cight. See N.M. Const. art. IL,
§ 4. Reed came to New Mexico explicitly for the purpose
of ‘seeking and obtaining safety.’” Reed, App. A at 51.
The Court held that the right to seek safety written
into the New Mexico Constitution afforded Reed asylum
in New Mexico as a “refuge from injustice.” Reed, App. A
at 63. Prior to Reed, the New Mexico Supreme Court had
mentioned the right to seek and obtain safety and happi-
ness in only four cases, none of which interpreted the
clause as providing substantive rights. See California First
Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646 (1990); Trujillo v.
City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990);
Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M.
688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988); Skaggs Drug Center v. General
Electric Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957).
The holding of the New Mexico Supreme Court per-
mits an asylum state to deny extradition in order to
guarantee to the fugitive a right created solely by the
asylum state’s constitution. Reliance upon an indepen-
dent state constitutional provision to defeat rendition is
at odds with the essential nature of a national extradition
requirement. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228
(1987) (with regard to a state’s duty under the Extradition
Clause, “[bJecause the duty is directly imposed upon the
States by the Constitution itself, there can be no need to
weigh the performance of the federal obligation against
13
the powers reserved to the States under the Tenth
Amendment”). See also California v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia, 482 U.S. 400, 405 (1987) (“The federal Constitution
places certain limits on the sovereign powers of the
States, limits that are an essential part of the Framers’
conception of national identity and Union. One such limit
is found in . . . the Extradition Clause”).
New Mexico has now held that the New Mexico
Constitution’s guarantee of a person’s right to seek and
obtain safety requires New Mexico to grant asylum to
fugitives from other states which do not provide this
guarantee or which fail to measure up to New Mexico's
standard for “safety.” This holding directly contravenes
the bedrock principle of the Supremacy Clause that the
United States Constitution binds the courts of every state
regardless of the provisions of state law or a state’s
constitution. The New Mexico Supreme Court ignored the
Supremacy Clause and disregarded the “obvious objec-
tive of the Extradition Clause . . . that no State should
become a safe haven for the fugitives of a sister State's
criminal justice system.” Superior Court of California, 482
U.S. at 406. See also State v. Engler, 85 F.3d 1205, 1209 (CA6
1996) (Michigan governor had no power to grant asylum
to a fugitive and deny rendition sought by Alabama).
The New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance on its
constitutional guarantee of the right to seek safety invites
each state to deny extradition whenever it determines
that a unique provision of its constitution affords a pro-
tection not adequately respected in the demanding state.
Granting this writ will afford the Court an opportunity to
guide state courts in the extent, if any, that unique state
14 App. 1
constitutional guarantees have an impact on extradition APPENDIX A
analysis. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number
CONCLUSION Filing Date:
Docket No. 22,749_
6
For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to
review the judgment and opinion of the New Mexico TIMOTHY REED,
Supreme Court in this cause. Petitioner-Appellee,
Filed Sep. 9, 1997
Respectfully submitted, (Filed Sep )
Tom Upait ee
Attorney General of New Mexico STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel.,
E MANUEL ORTIZ, Director, Taos
uzaseTH M. Brasvent County Adult Detention Center,
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record Respondent-Appellant.
pear ereathye hema APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT
Assistant Attorney General OF TAOS COUNTY
Post Office Drawer 1508 Peggy J. Nelson, District Judge
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-1508 Hon. Tom Udall, Attorney General
(505) 827-6083 or (505) 827-6934 Anthony Tupler, Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
T. Glenn Ellington, Chief Public Defender
Sue Anne Herrmann, Assistant Public Defenders
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Peter Cubra
Richard D. Weiner
Jama Fisk
Albuquerque, NM
For Amicus Curiae
New Mexico Chapter of the National Lawyer's Guild
App. 2
OPINION
FRANCHINI, Chief Justice.
Timothy Reed filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus to challenge his extradition from New Mexico to
Ohio. The district court granted his writ on the grounds
that the extradition documents were not in order and
Reed was not a fugitive from justice. This case is distin-
guished from other extradition cases by a unique fact
pattern that is supported by compelling evidence. We
conclude that the extradition documents are in order.
However, we agree with the district court that the con-
duct of the State of Ohio forced Reed to flee the state
under duress, in fear of death or great bodily harm at the
hands of government officials. We hold that Reed is not a
fugitive from justice and affirm the writ of habeas corpus.
I. FACTS
Timothy Reed — also known as Little Rock Reed - is
part Lakota Sioux. In 1982 and 1983 Reed pleaded guilty
to one charge of theft of drugs and two charges of aggra-
vated robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of
up to 25 years imprisonment. Most of that prison time
was spent at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility,
known as “Lucasville” after the name of the Ohio town
where the prison is located.
A. Reed’s Growing National Reputation; Animos-
ity of Prison Officials
In Lucasville, Reed became a jailhouse lawyer and
“writ writer” who helped other inmates prepare petitions
App. 3
for writs of habeas corpus. He also was an advocate for
the rights of incarcerated Native Americans to practice
traditional religious beliefs while in prison. The undis-
puted evidence shows that this advocacy incurred the
animosity of prison officials.
While in Lucasville Reed wrote several articles on
Native American religious rights and other Indian issues.
These were published in national periodicals. See, e.g.,
Little Rock Reed, The American Indian in the White Man's
Prison: A Story of Genocide, 2(1) J. of Prisoners on Prisons,
Fall 1989; Little Rock Reed, Native American -vs- Anglo
Rehabilitation: Contrasting Cultural Perspectives, 2(2) J. of
Prisoners on Prisons, Spring 1990. These articles con-
tained strong criticisms of the treatment of American
Indian prisoners by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority
(Parole Authority) and the Ohio Department of Reha-
bilitation and Correction (Ohio Department of Correc-
tions). Though incarcerated in Lucasville, Reed acquired
a national reputation as a spokesperson for the rights of
American Indian prisoners. He was contacted by scholars
and other advocates and was asked to provide materials
regarding Native American issues for various confer-
ences.
The record shows that Reed was a source of aggrava-
tion to Ohio prison officials because of his criticisms of
the Ohio prison system. Reed states that he was mis-
treated in prison and was denied parole in retaliation for
his speech activities.
App. 4
B. First Parole Rescinded; Threat by Chairman of
Parole Authority
Reed's supporters petitioned the Parole Authority
urging that he be given parole. In October 1990, Reed wes
finally granted parole and transferred from Lucasville to
a six-week reintegration program at a minimum security
prison in Orient, Ohio. Shortly before his scheduled
release from Orient, Reed was asked to sign a “contract”
which was required of all parolees. Reed felt the contract
compelled him to waive his constitutional rights so he
altered the wording and then signed it.
On December 5, 1990, Reed met with the Chairman of
the Parole Authority. Reed was informed that his parole
was being rescinded because of his refusal to sign the
contract as written. Reed testified that at this meeting the
Chairman cursed him and said “that I was his property,
and that I was going to serve twenty-five actual years in
maximum security if he [the Chairman] lives that long to
ensure it.” The Chairman also stated he did not give a
damn about Reed’s so-called constitutional rights. Reed
was returned to Lucasville.
Reed filed a habeas corpus petition in state court
challenging the recision of his parole. The district court
dismissed the petition and the Ohio Court of Appeals
affirmed. See Reed v. Tate, 1992 WL 129404 (Ohio Ct.App
June 10, 1992), aff’g Reed v. Tate, No. 91 C1-122 (Scioto
County, Ohio C.P. Ct. Sept. 18, 1991).
App. 5
C. Second Parole
Approximately a year and half after his first parole,
Reed agreed to sign the parole contract, intending to
challenge it later in court. He was released from
Lucasville on May 5, 1992 to serve a one-year parole term.
Shortly after his release, Reed received permission from
his parole officer to travel to South Dakota to participate
in the Sun Dance, a Lakota Sioux religious ceremony.
Reed took up residence with his mother in Cincinnati,
working as director of the Native American Prisoners’
Research and Rehabilitation Project (Native American
Project) while studying full-time towards a bachelor’s
degree in criminal justice and Indian affairs.
D. Continued Advocacy; Warden’s Personal
Resentment
During the time he was on parole, Reed published
articles and made speeches about such matters as Ameri-
can Indian religious freedom and alleged offenses by the
Ohio prison system. See, e.g., Little Rock Reed, Today's
Prison Administrators Were Trained by Fascists: And What
About Tomorrow?, Iron House Drum (Native American
Prisoners’ Rehabilitation Research Project, Villa Hills,
Ky.), 2d ed. 1992, at
Reed also actively corresponded with various offi-
cials of the Ohio Department of Corrections including
Arthur Tate, Jr., the warden at Lucasville. In these letters
he criticized the void of religious services for Native
American prisoners. Reed offered to mediate between the
Department and religious organizations who were
App. 6
attempting to fill this void. Some of this correspondence
was published in such a way as to favor Reed’s point of
view at the expense of the integrity of the prison officials.
See, e.g., Little Rock Reed, An Exchange Between the
NAPRRP and an Ethnocentric Prisoncrat: Three Letters, Iron
House Drum (Native American Prisoners’ Rehabilitation
Research Project, Villa Hills, Ky.), 2d ed. 1992, at 3-4
(correspondence between Reed and Tate).
In his letters, Reed suggested that warden Tate was
unresponsive and insensitive. Tate wrote an angry
response to Reed, in a letter dated October 16, 1992. He
stated, “I personally resent your continued attacks and
attempts to dictate to me the ‘specifics’ of how
{Lucasville’s] Native American program must operate.”
Letter from Arthur Tate, Jr., Warden, Southern Ohio Cor-
rectional Facility, to Timothy Reed (Oct. 16, 1992). Reed
became concerned that Tate or other officials of the
Department of Corrections and the Parole Authority
might try to violate his parole because of their objections
to his speech activities.
E. Suppression of Reed’s Speech Activities by
Parole Authority
With his parole officer’s permission, Reed made pre-
sentations at various conferences such as the 43rd Annual
Conference of the Governors’ Interstate Indian Council in
Utah. At a state-wide gathering of Ohio Indian organiza-
tions at Ohio State University, he spoke about the depri-
vation of religious expression for Native Americans by
U.S. prisons in general and by the Ohio Department of
Corrections in particular.
App. 7
In September or October 1992, shortly after this i
mentioned conference, Reed was summoned to a eae .
with his parole officer, Ron Mitchell. wrprate. on ub
uncontradicted testimony, Mitchell said that for be
time in his thirteen-year career he had been per os
contacted by the chief of the Parole Authority. As
testified:
He told me that the chief directed him to give
i blic again about
e an order not to speak in pu
watiies relating to the Ohio Department of
i d he told me
rrections or Parole Authority, an
ree if | wrote any more articles about the Adult
Parole Authority or the Department of a
tions, and if I wrote any more letters ¥ : ny
rison officials in Ohio, my parole wou eg
revoked and I would be returned to the peniten
tiary.
Reed responded that he would no longer travel or —
to prison officials. However, he would contions to wo :
and publish his writings, and when invited to pic
town conferences, he would send video-taped pre
tions.
Reed was forced to cancel speaking Cg a -%
several religious conferences including the pies “8
ference of the Catholic werner bea hte ho
to testify before the Un 7
nee nich on va Poe Affairs. Reed stated that, ;
he felt concern after warden Tate’s expression of eng
resentment, he now felt real fear of retaliation ard e
chief of the Parole Authority suppressed his speech.
App. 8
F. Threats by Prison Officials
Reed maintained contact with inmates inside
Lucasville. They warned him that corrections officials
were greatly displeased with Reed’s criticism of the
prison management. It was from these contacts, accord-
ing to Reed’s uncontroverted testimony, that he learned
that prison personnel had expressed an intention to cause
him death or great bodily harm if he were ever returned
to Lucasville. This further corroborated Reed's fear that
he could be subject to retaliation because of his speech
activities.
G. Dispute with Devoto
Reed asserts that the opportunity for this retaliation
arose from a chain of events beginning with a minor
traffic incident on February 16, 1993. In order to keep an
appointment with his counselor, Reed had borrowed a car
from Dinah Devoto, a volunteer at the Native American
Project where Reed worked. Devoto was a city council
member in Villa Hills, Kentucky, just across the border
from Cincinnati. Reed bumped into another car on an icy
road and was fined $105 by Ohio police. Reed’s grand-
mother paid the fine on April 2, 1993.
The accident was minor, but the incident fueled the
anger of Dinah Devoto’s husband Steve, who apparently
begrudged his wife’s volunteer work with Native Ameri-
can Project. Steve Devoto had remarked to other people
that he would like to severely hurt Reed. The record
shows that, in an argument over the phone, Steve Devoto
told Reed to stay away from his family and threatened to
App. 9
blow off Reed’s head. This statement was witnessed by
Devoto’s six year old daughter. This argument occurred
on March 12, 1993, six weeks before Reed’s parole term
expired.
On the evening of Thursday, March 18, 1993, Reed
was served with a summons and complaint. As a result of
the telephone argument, Steve Devoto charged Reed with
the misdemeanor of “terroristic threatening” in violation
of Kentucky law. See Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 508.080(a)
(Banks-Baldwin Supp.1990) (proscribing a threat “to com-
mit any crime likely to result in death or serious physical
injury to another person”).
Reed immediately contacted the Devotos. Dinah pre
pared an affidavit in which she swore that the misde-
meanor charge her husband had filed against Reed was
false. She stated that she and Steve had discussed the
matter and offered to meet with Reed's parole officer to
confirm that the charge was false and that Steve intended
to drop the charge. Reed’s brother, Matthew Scull, picked
up the affidavit from the Devotos early the next morning.
H. Parole Authority Refuses to Arrange a Prelimi-
nary Parole Revocation Hearing
Reed called Mitchell on Friday, March 19, 1993, when
the parole office opened at 9:00 a.m. Scull witnessed the
call and later prepared an affidavit which corroborates
Reed’s account of the conversation. Reed explained that
he had been served the misdemeanor summons and com-
plaint for threatening Steve Devoto’s life. He told Mit-
chell that Steve and Dinah Devoto would verify that the
charge was false, that it was actually Steve who had
App. 10
threatened Reed’s life, and that Steve intended to with-
draw his complaint.
Mitchell responded that Reed must report to the
parole office on the following Monday morning, March
22, 1993, at 9:00 A.M., at which time he would be
arrested. As Reed testified at trial:
I said, “Look, Dinah Devoto and Steve Devoto
are ready to come into your office with me. Can
we visit you this morning?” He said, “No. I
want you to come in Monday morning. You
know, I like you, but there’s nothing I can do for
you. You say your goodbyes to your family and
friends. Report here at 9:00 am Monday morn-
ing. You’re going back to Lucasville.”
Reed implored Mitchell to allow him to show evidence of
his innocence before deciding to revoke his parole. Reed
attempted to read Dinah Devoto’s affidavit to Mitchell,
but Mitchell refused to hear it. Mitchell told Reed he
would have to wait until after he was back in prison
before he could present evidence of his innocence to the
Ohio Parole Board. As Reed testified, Mitchell “assured
me that I was going to have no hearing whatsoever. I was
going back to Lucasville without any due process.” This
last remark is significant because in Morrissey v. Brewer,
the United States Supreme Court concluded that before
parole can be revoked, due process requires a preliminary
hearing to establish whether there is probable cause for
revocation. If probable cause is established, a second final
hearing is required. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
485-89 (1972). Ohio adopted these due process require-
ments in Parker v. Cardwell, 289 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1972).
App. 11
Under Reed’s undisputed testimony, Mitchell speci-
fically remarked that there would be no preliminary hear-
ing and that Reed would have to see the Parole Board
after he was back in Lucasville. Reed indicated that, as a
jailhouse lawyer, he was familiar with the parole revoca-
tion process, and implies that he would not have misun-
derstood Mitchell’s comments. Reed believed the Ohio
parole officials had no intention of respecting his due
process rights because they wanted to suppress his
speech activities by returning him to prison as soon as
possible.
I. Futile Attempts to Forestall Arrest and Arrange
a Preliminary Revocation Hearing
Between Friday, March 19 and Sunday, March 21
Reed and his supporters made many phone calls in an
effort to prevent the revocation of his parole without a
proper hearing. Reed asked Dinah Devoto to fax her
affidavit to Mitchell and to phone him. In a later affidavit,
Devoto recounted her conversation with Mitchell: “[Mit-
chell] told me that high ranking officials in the adult
parole authority hold contempt for Reed because of his
writings . .. and that for this reason Reed would serve the
remaining 7-to-25-year sentence in prison.” Dinah Devoto
Aff. ¢ 2 (Sept. 28, 1994). Steve Devoto called the regional
supervisor of the Parole Authority and, expressing
remorse, admitted his misdemeanor complaint was false.
On Sunday, March 21, 1993, Reed went to visit Pro-
fessor Harold E. Pepinsky, a scholarly associate and advi-
sor with whom he had corresponded since his days in
Lucasville. Pepinsky holds a law degree from Harvard
App. 12
and is a professor of Criminal Justice at Indiana Univer-
sity. Pepinsky called Mitchell, reaching him at home. He
asked what would happen if Reed did show up to be
arrested on Monday morning.
Mr. Mitchell told me that while he kept Rock
waiting outside, he would “call Columbus for
instructions.” He denied any knowledge of what
those instructions would be. Legally, I cannot
see what difference that makes. When he told
me he would get instructions from Columbus,
he effectively promised me that the entire statu-
tory [Morrissey v. Brewer] appeal process for
Rock on revocation would be bypassed by one
phone call, before Rock even had a chance to say
anything for himself to the officer.
Pepinsky Aff. | 7 (Sept. 27, 1994). In his efforts to fore-
stall Reed’s return to Lucasville, Pepinsky had attempted
to contact the governor of Ohio, Ohio legislators, the
President of the United States, the U.S. Department of
Justice, the F.B.1., and the U.S. Attorney General. All told
him that they had no jurisdiction to review the case. He
was told that his only recourse was to petition the Parole
Authority even though the Authority was the very
agency denying Reed’s right to due process.
J. Reed Fears for His Life; Riot at Lucasville
Reed states that he knew by this time that his life was
in danger. As he testified, “Lucasville is my coffin.” Reed
was already aware from his contacts with inmates inside
Lucasville that prison officials had made statements that
he would receive bodily harm if he were returned to
Lucasville.
App. 13
Reed also testified, “I knew then that I was in serious
danger, ah particularly because I also had knowledge of
the riot that was about to take place in Lucasville.”
Through his inmate contacts, Reed had been presented
with evidence that warden Tate’s policies in Lucasville
were fomenting great tension and violence. Reed’s con-
tacts told him that Tate hatt imposed forced integration,
placing members of the Black Panthers in the same cell
with members of the Aryan Brotherhood. In the past
Reed had written to Tate about the increasingly dan-
gerous situation at Lucasville, predicting that the war-
den’s policies would result in a riot. Reed felt certain that
if he reported to be arrested by Mitchell he would be
returned to Lucasville only to find himself in the middie
of a riot.
It appears that Reed had been well informed because
a bloody riot occurred at Lucasville on Easter Sunday,
April 11, 1993, about three weeks after he was supposed
to report to Mitchell. Hostages were taken in a siege that
lasted for eleven days. When it was over eight people
were dead, including Dennis Weaver, who, like Reed, was
a Native American writ writer and supporter of pris-
oners’ rights.
K. Reed Flees under Duress; Continued Advocacy
Reed did not show up to be arrested at Mitchell's
office at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, March 22, 1993. Claiming
he was forced to choose between violating parole and
being beaten or killed at Lucasville, he fled Ohio. The
following day he was declared “a Parole Violator-at-
Large.”
App. 14
He eventually ended up in Taos, New Mexico, where
he found work as a paralegal, writer, and secretary for
the Center for Advocacy cf Human Rights. Even while
avoiding the Ohio authorities, Reed continued to publish
and speak out on prison and Native American issues. See,
e.g., The American Indian in the White Man's Prisons: A
Story of Genocide (Little Rock Reed ed., 1993) (an anthol-
ogy of essays by Reed and others); Little Rock Reed, Some
evidence relating to the Lucasville riot, Prison News Serv.,
Sept/Oct. 1994, at 3.
L. Resolution of Devoto Complaint
Steve Devoto did not drop his “terroristic threaten-
ing” complaint. On June 29, 1993, about four months after
Devoto filed the complaint and Reed left Ohio, Reed was
tried in absentia and received a 30-day suspended sen-
tence. Commonwealth v. Reed, No. 93-M-01300 (Ky. Dist.
Ct. June 29, 1993).
M. Affidavits Describing Threats Against Reed by
Prison Officials
Reed continued to correspond with inmates inside
Lucasville including John Perotti, another jailhouse law-
yer. Perotti, at his own initiative, sent a letter to the
Center for Advocacy of Human Rights describing threats
by prison officials to cause Reed death or great bodily
harm. After Reed was arrested to be extradited, he asked
Perotti to memorialize these allegations in a sworn state-
ment. Perotti responded with an affidavit that included
the following:
App. 15
2. On [August 6, 1994], I was assaulted by
prison guards in retaliation for attempting to
distribute an article written by Little Rock (aka
Timothy) Reed in which he presented evidence
that the prison officials at Lucasville orches-
trated the riot in which a number of people were
killed in the spring of 1993. ...
3. When the prison guards assaulted me as
set forth above, they told me that my beating
was nothing compared to what Little Rock (aka
Timothy) Reed could expect if and when he is
returned to the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility.
Perotti Aff. {4 2-3 (Oct. 3, 1994).
Reed obtained similar affidavits from other pris-
oners. A prisoner named Daniel Cahill, who was being
investigated for gang activity, described a conversation
with the investigating officer.
On January 12, 1994, the Investigating officer,
Mr. Flick, after reading newspaper articles < my
possession, noticed an article pertaining to Tim-
othy Reed (A.K.A. Little Rock). Mr. Flick
stated: .. . “Reed would not be lucky enough to
get out of prison alive if he was returned to the
Ohio prison system.”
Cahill Aff. (Oct. 28, 1994). Another prisoner, Ahmad
‘Abdul-Mugsit, provided a similar affidavit.
That on at least two (2) separate occasions
during the course of the earlier part of this year
(i.e. approximately April and May, 1994) I had
over heard several know [sic] and unknown
administrative officals [sic] of this facility
{Lucasville] allude to the fact of Little Rock [sic]
life being in jeopardy if he was ever returned to
App. 16
the State of Ohio and custody of the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections.
Abdul-Mugsit Aff. ¥ 4 (Oct. 20, 1994). Reed testified that
these affidavits “merely confirmed what I already know
...+ That the prison officials intend to do serious bodily
injury or to kill me when I’m returned to Ohio.”
N. Reed is Arrested in New Mexico
In late September 1994, the State of Ohio initiated
procedures to extradite Reed. On September 27, 1994, Jill
Goldhart, acting chief of the Ohio Parole Authority, ex-
ecuted an Ohio State warrant for the arrest of Reed for
violating parole. On the same day she also executed a
“Request for Extradition Requisition” asking the Gover-
nor of Ohio to petition for the extradition of Reed from
New Mexico.
The Governor of Ohio, on October 12, 1994, signed a
“Request for Interstate Rendition” asking the Governor of
New Mexico to issue a warrant on behalf of the State of
Ohio for Reed's arrest and return to Ohio. On October 26,
1994, the Governor of New Mexico issued the warra.. ,
and the following day Reed was arrested as a fugitive
from justice. A copy of the Governor’s warrant was filed
in the Taos County District Court on October 28. Three
days later Reed appeared in the Taos District Court and
informed the court that he wished to challenge the consti-
tutionality of his arrest and would file a petition for writ
of habeas corpus.
App. 17
O. Reed Seeks Federal Relief
While pursuing his habeas corpus petition in the
state court, Reed also filed, on November 4, 1994, a pro se
civil rights lawsuit in federal district court. Invoking 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), he sought recision of the extradition
warrant pending an investigation of his claims that Ohio
prison officials intend to cause him death or great bodily
harm. The federal court denied Reed's claim, stating that,
if Reed's allegations were true, his sole federal remedy
was a habeas corpus petition, and this could be pursued
only after he had exhausted all his state remedies. See
Reed v. King, No. CIV-94-1267 MV/LFG, slip op. (DNM
Nov. 10, 1994).
P. Crucial Extradition Documents are Missing
Extradition laws require specific documentation
before an out-of-state extradition request will be honored.
See NMSA 1978, § 31-4-3 (1937); 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1994).
Though the record is somewhat muddled on this point, it
appears that certain crucial documents were not attached
to the Governor’s warrant when it was issued on October
26, when it was served on Reed on October 27, and when
it was filed in the Taos District Court on October 28. The
latest date by which the documents in question could
have appeared was November 16, 1994, about two weeks
after Reed had been arrested on the Governor's warrant.
The missing documents proved that Reed was con-
victed in 1982 and 1983, was paroled in 1992, and was
declared a parole violator-at-large in 1993. Implicit in this
App. 18
controversy is the possibility that these crucial docu-
ments may not have been in the possession of the Gover-
nor of New Mexico when he issued his warrant for
Reed's arrest. He thus could not have relied upon them as
the legal justification for his warrant.
Q. State Habeas Corpus Hearing
On November 11, 1994, Reed filed his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus raising numerous challenges to the
Governor’s warrant. Three hearings were held, on
December 9 and 23, 1994, and January 4, 1995.
During the hearings, the State emphasized that under
the United States Supreme Court opinion Michigan v.
Doran the court was limited to considering only four
questions: (1) whether the extradition documents are in
order; (2) whether the demanding state has charged the
defendant with a crime; (3) whether the defendant is the
person named in the extradition request; and (4) whether
the defendant is a fugitive. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S.
282, 289 (1978). The State contended that, under this rule,
virtually all Reed’s evidence and arguments were beyond
the scope of permissible inquiry at an extradition hearing.
Relying on its legal argument that most of Reed's
evidence was irrelevant, the State did not dispute any
facts that Reed’s evidence purported to support, nor did
it introduce any contrary evidence of its own. The State
produced no statement by anyone associated with the
Ohio prison system to undermine Reed's claim that Ohio
prison officials intended to kill him or cause him great
bodily harm. The State presented no witnesses of its own
App. 19
and cross examined only one of Reed’s witnesses, Manuel
Ortiz, Director of Taos Adult Detention Center, asking
him only to identify Reed and to review each of the
extradition documents. There were no challenges to the
credibility of any witness or any exhibit. In its proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the State offered
no findings of fact whatsoever to counter Reed’s version
of the facts. On appeal, the State specifically declined to
refute the arguments of the amicus brief filed by the New
Mexico Chapter of the National Lawyer’s Guild. In short,
no evidence of any kind and no argument whatsoever
was offered to contradict Reed’s claim that his life would
be endangered if he were extradited to Ohio.
Applying the four-part Michigan v. Doran analysis,
the district court found: (a) The extradition documents,
on their face, were not in order, because, without the
missing crucial documents, there was insufficient legal
support for issuing the Governor’s warrant. Reed v. Ortiz,
No. 94-1 CR Misc., 1995 WL 118952, at *4-5 (NM Dist. Ct.
Jan. 20, 1995). (b) The extradition documents did show
that Reed had been charged with a crime in the demand-
ing state. Id. at *4. (c) Reed is the same person named in
the request for requisition and the Governor’s warrant.
Id. (d) Reed was not a fugitive from justice because the
uncontroverted evidence shows that he left Ohio “under
duress and under a reasonable fear for his safety and his
life.” Id. at *5-8.
On January 20, 1995, the district court granted habeas
corpus to Reed and ordered his immediate release. The
State timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. See Rule
5-802(G)(1) NMRA 1997 (State’s right to appeal grants of
App. 20
habeas); Rule 12-102(A)(4) NMRA 1997 (Supreme Court
takes appeals from grants of habeas).
We now conclude, under the four Doran factors, that
the extradition documents are in order, that Reed was
charged with a crime in Ohio, and that Reed is the person
named in the extradition request. However, we affirm the
district court’s grant of habeas corpus because Reed is
not a fugitive from justice.
Il. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Abuse of Discretion
On appeal, we must determine whether the district
court abused its discretion, first, by admitting the chal-
lenged evidence, and then by granting Reed’s writ of
habeas corpus based upon that evidence. The main issues
in this case turn on the interplay between law and fact.
We must ascertain whether the challenged evidence was
properly considered as a matter of law. If we answer that
question in the affirmative, then we must assess whether
the district court properly applied extradition law to
those facts, and whether there is sufficient evidence to
logically support the court’s legal and factual conclu-
sions.
In this case, the district court will have abused its
discretion if it admitted improper evidence, if it misin-
terprets the legal effect of that evidence, or if its conclu-
sions are clearly illogical in light of the evidence. See State
v. Lucero, 98 NM 311, 314, 648 P.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App.
1982) (defining abuse of discretion).
App. 21
B. De Novo
Questions of law or questions of mixed fact and law
are generally reviewed de novo by appellate courts. State
v. Attaway, 1994 NMSC 011, 117 NM 141, 144-45, 870 P.2d
103, 106-07; Duncan v. Kerby, 1993 NMSC 011, 115 NM
344, 347-48, 851 P.2d 466, 469-70. It is the role of appellate
courts to say what the law is and how the law should be
applied to specific facts; on the other hand, ‘rial courts, as
fact gatherers, are usually in a better position to make
factual determinations. This means that, when presented
with questions that implicate both law and fact, we will
look anew at all the evidence and arguments in the
record. We do not gather new evidence. Nor can we,
when examining a paper and tape-recorded record, arbi-
trarily dismiss the trial court’s assessment of the cred-
ibility of witnesses and evidence. But we do apply our
own judgment in gleaning the facts from the record,
assimilating them into a coherent story, weighing their
relevance, and evaluating their legal significance. By the
same token, we will analyze the legal issues without any
presumption in favor of the judgment of the court below.
See McNair v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc., 62 F.3d 651, 654 (4th
Cir.1995) (assessing evidence); Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Baldwin (In re Van Ostrand’s Estate), 195 A. 287, 295 (Del.
1937) (no new evidence); Slaughter v. Martin, 63 So. 689,
690 (Ala. Ct. App. 1913) (judgment).
C. Burden of Proof
The grant of extradition by the governor of the asy-
lum state “is prima facie evidence that the constitutional
and statutory requirements have been met.” Doran, 439
App. 22
U.S. at 289. Implicit in the governor’s action is that the
four Doran requirements have been met: the extradition
documents are in order, and the petitioner is charged
with a crime in the demanding state, is the person named
in the demand, and is a fugitive. See id. at 289. The
burden thus shifts to the defendant to prove that at least
one of the four Doran requirements has not been fulfilled.
The defendant must meet a difficult standard - proof
beyond a reasonable doubt - in defeating this presump-
tion. See South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 421-22
(1933) (“beyond reasonable doubt” standard of proof);
Bazaldua v. Hanrahan, 92 NM 596, 598, 592 P.2d 512, 514
(1979) (same concept).
D. Credibility of Evidence
The rules of evidence do not apply in “[p]roceedings
for extradition or rendition.” Rule 11-1101(D)(2) NMRA
1997. Extradition hearings are not criminal trials in which
the guilt or innocence of the defendant is adjudicated.
Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1980). The
hearing functions simply to ascertain whether the evi-
dence of criminal conduct by the defendant is sufficient
to justify extradition. Id. Thus, the court may consider
unsworn statements of absent witnesses as well as hear-
say. It may also consider, as the court did in this case,
sworn affidavits based upon personal knowledge. See id.
(unsworn statements, hearsay); People ex rel. Strachan v.
Colon, 571 N.E.2d 65, 68 (N.Y. 1991) (quoting People ex rel.
Little v. Ciuros, 377 N.E.2d 980, 981 (N.Y. 1978), and men-
tioning affidavits as possible evidence of irreparable
harm). Of course the court has complete discretion in
App. 23
determining the weight such evidence should be
accorded.
In this case, the State has not in any way impeached
or contradicted Reed’s version of the facts. In fact, in its
Brief in Chief, the State appears to accept the veracity, if
not the relevance, of Reed’s evidence: “The court's find-
ings on the fugitivity question are supported by consider-
able, although improper and irrelevant evidence.”
Resp’t’s Br. in Chief at 7.
“As a general proposition, unimpeached and uncon-
tradicted sworn testimony must be accepted as true.”
State v. Chavez, 78 NM 446, 447, 432 P.2d 411, 412 (1967).
This is not an inflexible rule. See State v. Lovato, 112 NM
517, 521, 817 P.2d 251, 255 (Ct. App. 1991) (listing excep-
tions to the rule); see also Walton v. State, 566 P.2d 765, 768
(Idaho 1977) (uncontroverted evidence does not automat-
ically mean petitioner has shown absence from demand-
ing state at time of offense). On the other hand,
undisputed evidence cannot be arbitrarily rejected.
Ramsey v. United States, 263 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1959).
The State appears to be arguing that the extradition
documents, buttressed by the presumption of their val-
idity, are sufficient to controvert Reed’s evidence. See
Walton, 566 P.2d at 768. We disagree. It is true that, absent
any evidence to the contrary, the extradition documents
are presumed to establish the four Doran requirements.
But once the defendant presents evidence that tends to
refute any of the Doran requirements, the court must
resolve the issue upon the evidence presented. See Wal-
ton, 566 P.2d at 768.
App. 24
The only challenge the State has brought against
Reed's evidence is to its admissibility and relevance, not
to its veracity or sufficiency. By relying exclusively on its
legal argument that the evidence is inadmissible, the
State has abdicated any objection to the credibility of the
evidence. The court below found Reed’s testimony, wit-
nesses, and exhibits entirely credible. We have
exhaustively examined the sufficiency, as opposed to the
relevancy of the evidence in a light most favorable to the
extradition »* Reed. See Meek v. State, 321 N.E.2d 205, 206
(Ind. 1975). We find nothing that materially challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Reed’s version
of the facts. Many courts have considered claims similar
to Reed’s, but few have been faced, as we have, with such
a singular fact pattern and such compelling evidence. See,
e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Mills v. Baldi, 70 A.2nd 439, 442
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1950) (“There is absolutely no evidence in
the case at bar, except relator’s own self-serving declara-
tions, that he would be subjected to mob violence or that
he would not receive a fair and impartial trial in
Tuscallosa County.”).
We also disagree with the state that the evidence
should be excluded on the grounds that it is irrelevant.
Our rules of evidence define “Relevant evidence” as “evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Rule 11-401 NMRA 1997. Reed
made a prima facie showing that he fled Ohio in fear of
death or great bodily harm. As we explain below, this
showing is a direct response to the question of whether
App. 25
Reed is a fugitive from justice. Any evidence that illumi-
nated this issue was appropriately admitted by the dis-
trict court. See People ex rel. Bowman v. Woods, 264 N.E.2d
151, 152-53 (Ill. 1970) (stating that unusual facts estab-
lished by the accused require closer scrutiny by the
court). The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
evidence that tended to make “more probable” Reed’s
contention that he is a refugee from injustice. See Rule
11-401.
Ill. LAWS IN QUESTION
Extradition law is founded on the Extradition Clause
of the U.S. Constitution:
A Person charged in any State with Treasor.
Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee fro-m }:
tice, and be found in another State, sh". ©
Demand of the executive Authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. The language of the Clause is
imperative and limits the discretion that the sovereign
states might wish to exercise. Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483
U.S. 219, 227 (1987). The purposes of the Clause are to
preclude “any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugi-
tives from justice of another state and thus ‘balkanize’ the
administration of criminal justice among the several
states” and to enable “each state to bring offenders to
trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged
offense was committed.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 287.
App. 26
The Extradition Clause, however, does not set forth a
specific procedure by which interstate extradition is to be
accomplished. The Extradition Act specifies the extradi-
tion process. See § 3182. It has been little changed since it
was first approved in 1793. Culifornia v. Superior Court,
482 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1987); Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d
677, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
The Act describes the documentation required when
one state demands a fugitive be returned from another
state in which he or she has found asylum. Upon being
presented with the proper documents, the executive of
the asylum state is required to have the fugitive arrested.
The demanding state has thirty days in which to provide
an agent to whom the fugitive is to be delivered. Section
3182. Section 3182 is often interpreted as prescribing a
“summary” executive procedure. See Doran, 439 U.S. at
288. This means that the governor of the asylum state
disposes of the case in a prompt and simple manner, by
merely examining whether proper and authentic docu-
mentation has been provided by the demanding state. See
Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of
“summary proceeding”). The Act makes no provision for
judicial review or any defenses the defendant might pre-
sent.
Further requirements in the extradition process are
found in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. 11 U.L.A.
97 (1995). Forty-eight states, including New Mexico and
Ohio, have adopted the Uniform Act. See NMSA 1978,
§§ 31-4-1 to -30 (1937, as amended through 1981); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2963.01 to -.29 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 &
Supp. 1996); 11 U.L.A. 97 (table, Mississippi and South
Carolina not listed). This Uniform Act was designed to
App. 27
supplement and conform to the overriding federal consti-
tutional and statutory mandates. See Coungeris v. Sheahan,
11 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993); Wright v. Bourbeau, 490
A.2d 522, 525 (Conn. Ct. 1985).
The imperative nature of the extradition process is
reiterated by the New Mexico Uniform Criminal Extradi-
tion Act:
[I]t is the duty of the governor of this state to
have arrested and delivered up to the executive
authority of any other state of the United States
any person charged in that state with treason,
felony or other crime, who has fled from justice
and is found in this state.
Section 31-4-2. Our Uniform Act sets forth in greater
detail than the Federal Act the processes and documents
necessary in an extradition proceeding. Compare § 31-4-3
(form of demand), with § 3182 (procedural and documen-
tation requirements).
The restrictive nature of the federal laws is somewhat
moderated by the Uniform Act which gives the executive
some latitude in evaluating the extradition demand. Dis-
cretionary language is included in the provision that per-
mits the governor to seek investigative assistance from a
prosecuting officer who will report “the situation and
circumstances of the person so demanded” and whether
that person “ought to be surrendered.” Section 31-4-4.
Similarly, the governor “shall sign a warrant of arrest”
upon determining whether “the demand should be com-
plied with.” Section 31-4-7. Executive discretion is also
suggested by the rule that “(t]he governor of this state
may also surrender [any person whose extradition is
App. 28
demanded] even though such person left the demanding
state involuntarily.” Section 31-4-5 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, unlike the federal laws, our Uniform
Act provides for the due process and habeas corpus
rights of the defendant.
No person arrested upon such warrant shall
be delivered over to the agent whom the execu-
tive authority demanding him shall have
appointed to receive him unless he shall first be
taken forthwith before a judge of a court of
record in this state, who shall inform him of the
demand made for his surrender and of the crime
with which he is charged, and that he has the
right to demand and procure legal counsel; and
if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he
or they desire to test the legality of his arrest,
the judge of such court of record shall fix a
reasonable time to be allowed him within which
to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When such
writ is applied for, notice thereof, and of the
time and place of hearing thereon, shall be given
to the prosecuting officer of the county in which
the arrest is made and in which the accused is in
custody, and to the said agent of the demanding
state.
Section 31-4-10.
The implicit executive discretion and the habeas
corpus hearing are not without limits. For example, “[t}he
guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which
he is charged may not be inquired into by the governor or
in any proceeding after the demand for extradition [has]
been presented to the governor.” Section 31-4-20. These
App. 29
limitations have been further specified by decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.
While Michigan v. Doran expressly describes the exec-
utive extradition procedure as “summary,” it does not
explicitly make a similar pronouncement regarding the
judicial habeas corpus evaluation of an extradition
demand. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 288, 290. Doran does
mention that “[t}he Clause never contemplated that the
asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary
inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial
arrest and trial.” Id. at 288. We do not believe that the
judicial habeas hearing is summary in the same sense as
the executive extradition process. To be sure, the habeas
hearing takes place with the least possible delay after the
arrest of the defendant, it is an abbreviated version of a
full trial, it is interrupted by few dilatory pleas, it dis-
penses with many formalities such as strict adherence to
the rules of evidence, and as dictated by Michigan v.
Doran, the scope of its inquiry is limited. See 439 U.S. at
289. However, the U.S. Supreme Court did not intend to
prevent the defendant from raising defenses to the four
criteria listed in Doran, to utterly preclude the introduc-
tion of evidence beyond the face of the extradition docu-
ments, to shield the state from presenting evidence to
refute the defendant’s defenses, or to so abbreviate the
proceeding as to preclude a fair hearing of the defen-
dant’s claims. 3
This, in part, is because of the essential nature of a
habeas proceeding. While extradition is given mandatory
status by the U.S. Constitution, habeas corpus is virtually
inviolate: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
App. 30
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebel-
lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9. The New Mexico and Ohio Constitutions
accord the same deference to habeas corpus. See NM
Const. art. Il, § 7; Ohio Const. art. I, § 8 (Banks-Baldwin
1994). Habeas corpus is one of the most ancient and
venerated principles of law, described by Blackstone as
“the great and efficacious writ.” 3 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *131. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated
that “[i]t must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas
corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and
there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.”
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26. (1939).
The right to habeas corpus and the mandatory nature
of extradition do not inherently conflict. “The extradition
clause is a procedural provision. It does not impinge
upon any substantive right of any individual and does
not affect any provision of the Constitution or its Amend-
ments protecting such rights.” Johnson v. Matthews, 182
F.2d at 682. A habeas hearing, on the other hand, con-
cerns a defendant's fundamental rights. It is an equitable
proceeding which commands that the state (or keeper of
the body) show the authority under which imprisonment
is authorized. See Rule 5-802(A) (scope and purpose of
writ of habeas corpus); Caristo v. Sullivan, 112 N.M. 623,
628, 818 P.2d 401, 406 (1991) (stating that “habeas corpus
protects our most basic right of freedom from illegal
restraint”). Thus, under our Uniform Criminal Extradi-
tion Act, a defendant is provided a habeas corpus hearing
to show how the process of extradition has resulted in his
or her unconstitutional imprisonment. See Johnson v. Cox,
72 NM 55, 57, 380 P.2d 199, 201 (1963); see also § 31-4-10.
App. 31
The laws of extradition, though they permit only limited
judicial review, do not supplant the basic right to the
Great Writ. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400. (1963)
(discussing the historical importance of the “Great Writ”),
overruled on other grounds by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 87-90. (1977).
IV. LIMITS TO JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF ASY-
LUM STATE
A. Michigan v. Doran: Courts May Review Only
Four Questions
As we have already mentioned, the scope of judicial
review in an extradition habeas hearing was drawn by
the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Doran:
Once the governor has granted extradition, a
court considering release on habeas corpus can
do no more than decide (a) whether the extradi-
tion documents on their face are in order; (b)
whether the petitioner has been charged with a
crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the
petitioner is the person named in the request for
extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a
fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifia-
ble.
439 U.S. at 289. Not long after Doran was issued, this
analysis was adopted in New Mexico. Bazaldua, 92 NM at
599, 592 P.2d at 514-15.
The asylum state has a duty to deliver a properly
extradited fugitive to the demanding state. The effect of
the four Doran criteria is to assure that this duty allows
for only limited discretion on the part of the asylum state.
Branstad, 483 U.S. at 228. On the other hand, there would
App. 32
be no point in asking these four questions if it were not
possible for the defendant to raise legitimate defenses to
each one. Furthermore, the Supreme Court intended that
if one of the four questions is answered in the negative
then the defendant cannot be extradited. Cf. Munsey v.
Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 374 (1905) (suggesting that defen-
dant is not a fugitive from justice and may be discharged
if it is conclusively proven that the person was not within
demanding state when the crime was committed).
B. Despite the Restrictions of Michigan v. Doran,
Some Review is Contemplated
It is simply impossible to make a determination of
the four Doran factors without making factual findings.
The Doran court itself stated the four factors “are historic
facts readily verifiable.” 439 U.S. at 289. The court of the
asylum state has jurisdiction to establish the validity of
these facts. Id. at 297 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Thus, despite proclamations that “the commands of
the Extradition Clause are mandatory, and afford no dis-
cretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum
State,” the U.S. Supreme Court must have intended some
sort of inquiry when it required courts to verify the four
historic facts. See Branstad, 483 U.S. at 227 (statement that
there is no discretion). The Court surely presumed that
some defendants would deny that the documents are in
order, that they have been charged with no crime, that
they are the wrong person, or that they are not a fugitive.
Furthermore, there must be circumstances in which these
defenses are valid. To conclude otherwise would “render
meaningless the guarantee of a habeas corpus hearing
App. 33
and the accompanying right to present evidence against
the warrant” under the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act. Galloway v. Josey, 507 So.2d 590, 592 (Fla.1987); see
§ 31-4-10.
The role of the court in the asylum state, though
limited, is not merely clerical or perfunctory, restricted to
woodenly and superficially noting whether the proper
statements and pieces of paper have been provided.
“Since individual circumstances surrounding extradition
demands are varied and diverse, the mechanical applica-
tion of fixed and absolute rules is inappropriate if justice
is to be achieved in a particular case.” Wright, 490 A.2d at
526. Nor are courts in the role of notaries or paper
checkers, confirming the apparent propriety and orderli-
ness of the documentation. “To the contrary, in the lim-
ited area within which it operates, the judicial authority
of the asylum court is undiminished.” Narel v. Liburdi, 441
A.2d 177, 180 (Conn. 1981).
The Governor’s warrant is accorded presumptive
validity. Doran, 439 U.S. at 289. However, like any legal
presumption, this one may be rebutted upon a showing
of persuasive evidence. Id. at 293 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); State v. Ritter, 246 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Wis. 1976)
(stating that “governor’s warrant is only prima facie
valid”). We conclude that some cases may present circum-
stances so unusual and egregious that the asylum state
has no choice but to deny the extradition warrant and
grant habeas corpus to the defendant. See People ex rel.
Harris v. Mahoney, 579 N.Y.S.2d 582, 589 (Sup. Ct. 1991)
(stating that extradition demands must be respected
App. 34
“le]xcept in the rarest and most egregious of circum-
stances”), aff'd, 604 N.Y.S.2d 574 (App. Div. 1993); Little,
377 N.E.2d at 981i (same concept).
With the foregoing principles in mind, we shall apply
the Doran analysis to the facts of this case. Reed does not
dispute that he “is the person named in the request for
extradition.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 289. We shall analyze the
remaining three Doran questions.
Vv. EXTRADITION DOCUMENTS ON THEIR FACE
ARE IN ORDER
The executive of the asylum state need not recognize
a demand for extradition unless specific documents are
providea by the executive of the demanding state. The
federal Extradition Act, § 3182, and our Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, § 31-4-3, itemize the required documents.
In evaluating whether the documents comply with these
statutes, Doran directs the court of the asylum state to
verify that the extradition documents are in order “on
their face.” 439 U.S. at 289. By limiting the review of this
question to the “face” of the documents, the Doran court
seems to have intended a review only of the language
and other markings on the surfaces of the pages without
any explanation, modification, or addition from extrinsic
facts or evidence. In re Stoneman, 146 N.Y.S. 172, 175 (Sur.
Ct. 1914). Only the appearance of authenticity is required.
Cf. United States v. Gordon, 901 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1990)
(suggesting facial defect would cause a person looking
simply at a document to suspect it was invalid).
App. 35
When entered into evidence at Reed’s habeas hear-
ing, the extradition documents were divided into two
groups. The first consisted of the seven pages that were
originally served on Reed and filed in Taos District Court
in the last days of October 1994. The second group -
totaling nine pages — were the missing crucial documents
whose whereabouts were uncertain until November 16,
1994.
We have meticulously examined Reed’s extradition
documents in light of the pertinent statutes and conclude
that, between the two groups of papers, no statutorily
required items were missing. See generally § 3182 (listing
required documentation); § 31-4-3 (same). Once a Gover-
fior’s warrant is issued, there is a strong presumption
that all the constitutional and statutory requirements
have been met. Bazaldua, 92 NM at 598, 592 P.2d at 514.
This presumption can only be refuted by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. /d. In this case, it does appear that the
documents were somehow disassembled. However, as the
trial court stated, “No evidence was presented during
any of the hearings as to the usage, availability, or non-
availability of [the second group of] documents at the
time the Governor’s Warrant was issued.” Reed v. Ortiz,
1995 WL 118952, at *5; see also Commonwealth v. Hebert, 530
A.2d 422, 423 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (suggesting extradition
warrant will be verified unless evidence is presented to
rebut regularity of warrant).
We also find no harm in the fact that the parties may
have been served with incomplete documentation. The
missing documents were eventually provided, albeit
about two weeks after Reed was arrested. Though this
may have caused some inconvenience, it does not seem to
App. 36
have impaired Reed’s petition for habeas corpus. See
People v. DeSpain, 436 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(“The weight of authority is that deficiencies in the docu-
ments supporting the rendition warrant may be satisfied
at a later time.”).
We hold, therefore, that the district court abused its
discretion when it concluded that the extradition docu-
ments were not in order on their face.
VI. CHARGED WITH A CRIME IN DEMANDING
STATE
Several of the extradition documents are copies of
official state records showing that Reed was charged with
a crime in Ohio and specifying the statutes under which
he was charged. They establish that in 1982 Reed was
charged with, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted for
Aggravated Robbery in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2911.01 (Page 1982), and Theft of Drugs in violation of
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.21 (Page 1982) (repealed
1990). Simiiar statements are made regarding his convic-
tion for Aggravated Robbery in 1983. Copies of official
state documents also show that, under Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2967.15(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1994), Reed was
declared to be a parole violator-at-large. There is no
express mention of the Kentucky complaint by Steve
Devoto, because it did not concern an offense against the
laws of Ohio.
Thus, the Governor of New Mexico based his warrant
upon the naming of an Ohio law and official documents
showing Reed was charged with violating that law. For
the purposes of an extradition inquiry, this settles the
App. 37
question of whether Reed has been charged with a crime
in the demanding state. California v. Superior Court, 482
U.S. at 409 (if the allegations in the extradition documents
are accepted as true, then the defendants have been prop-
erly charged with a crime under the law of the demand-
ing state, and this ends the inquiry).
Reed challenges the extradition documents claiming
that he can demonstrate the complaint by Steve Devoto
was fraudulent and a miscarriage of justice. Given his
earlier convictions, this argument is irrelevant. The
“charged with a crime” question does not turn on
whether the defendant has committed a new crime while
on parole. The inquiry is whether the extradition docu-
ments show that the defendant has been charged with
any crime whatsoever under the laws of the demanding
state.
Taking the broad definition of “charged with
crime” as including the responsibility for crime,
the charge would not cease or be merged in the
conviction, but would stand until the judgment
is satisfied. It would include every person
accused, until he should be acquitted, or until
the judgment inflicted should be satisfied.
Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 F. 980, 983 (6th Cir. 1905). The
judgment is not deemed satisfied until the defendant has
fulfilled his or her obligation to society. In Reed's case,
for purposes of the extradition law, this obligation does
not end until his final release after the last day of parole.
See Ex parte Nabors, 33 NM 324, 329, 267 P. 58, 60 (1928)
(stating that parole violator may be extradited, not for
parole violation per se, but for original crime which has
not been fully expiated).
App. 38
VII. FUGITIVITY AND DURESS
A. Fugitivity Defined
“Fugitive from justice” has been defined as a person
who is charged with a crime against the laws of a state,
and who, upon being sought to answer for the crime,
leaves that state. See Nabors, 33 NM at 329-30, 267 P. at 60.
This definition dismisses any regard for the person's
purpose or motive for leaving the state. Id. at 330, 267 P.
at 60-61 (“[I]f the person demanded had committed a
crime in the demanding state, and when sought to
answer for it had left that state and was found in another,
he was a fugitive.”).
This definition seems to require nothing more than
the presence within the asylum state of a person who has
been charged with a crime in the demanding state. How-
ever, if the courts of the asylum state are limited to so
narrow a definition of “fugitive from justice,” then any
argument on the fugitivity element would be meaning-
less. Such a definition would require nothing more than a
simple two-pronged evaluation: a determination that (1)
the defendant is charged with a crime in the demanding
state, and (2) is present within the asylum state. See 1
Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 97, at 385
(13th ed. 1989) (“[A] fugitive is defined as a person who
commits a crime within a state and thereafter leaves the
jurisdiction.”).
The first prong is already addressed by part (b) of the
Doran analysis which inquires whether the defendant
“has been charged with a crime in the demanding state.”
Doran, 439 U.S. at 289; see Parks v. Bourbeau, 477 A.2d 636,
App. 39
641 (Conn. 1984) (suggesting that a finding that defen-
dant was not charged with a crime by the demanding
state would have supported claim that he is not a fugitive
from justice). Thus, even though the defendant is present
at the habeas hearing in the asylum state, it seems that
part (d) of the Doran analysis requires a nothing more
than tautological determination that the defendant is pre-
sent in the asylum state. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 289. This
pointless determination cannot logically be the limit of
the Doran fugitivity analysis.
The U.S. Supreme Court stated long ago:
One arrested and held as a fugitive from
justice is entitled, of right, upon habeas corpus,
to question the lawfulness of his arrest and
imprisonment, showing by competent evidence,
as a ground for his release, that he was not,
within the meaning of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, a fugitive from the justice
of the demanding state, and thereby overcoming
the presumption to the contrary arising from the
face of an extradition warrant.
Illinois ex rel. McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 109 (1907).
The very existence of the fugitivity inquiry in Doran
shows that the Court has not abandoned this position.
The U.S. Supreme Court could only have intended that,
the other three Doran requirements notwithstanding, the
defendant may not be a fugitive from justice. In other
words, there must be some circumstances, however rare,
that defeat the mere preserce of the defendant in the
asylum state as a test of fugitivity. See Carpenter v. Jamer-
son, 432 N.E.2d 177, 180-81 (Ohio 1982) (implying that
defendant could conceivably rebut “by proof beyond a
App. 40
reasonable doubt the presumption attached to the gover-
nor’s warrant that he is a fugitive from justice”). In this
case, we conclude that, because he was forced by the
conduct of government officials to flee the State of Ohio,
Reed’s mere presence in New Mexico does not render
him a fugitive from justice.
One of the few defenses to the fugitivity element that
has been successful is proof that the accused was not
“present in the demanding state at the time of the com-
mission of the alleged crime.” Section 31-4-3; see Galloway,
507 So.2d at 593 (discussing this defense). The burden of
proof on the accused is substantial. The evidence must be
not only clear and convincing, but uncontradicted and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Munsey, 196 U.S.
at 375 (stating “merely contradictory evidence on the
subject of presence in or absence from the state” is not
sufficient); United States ex rel. Vitiello v. Flood, 374 F.2d
554, 558 (2d Cir. 1967) (defendant “must conclusively
establish his absence by clear and convincing proof”).
Such a determination requires an investigation that goes
well beyond the face of the extradition documents. South
Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. at 418 (suggesting defendant's
story about not being a fugitive “should have been sub-
jected to rigid scrutiny” and the judge should have
“demanded that the prisoner present himself for exam-
ination [and] show what effort had been made to secure
the presence of important witnesses”). To meet the bur-
den of proof the defendant must offer the testimony and
affidavits - much as Reed did in this case - of witnesses
who can establish the defendant’s whereabouts at the
time of the crime. Pakulski v. Hickey, 731 F.2d 382, 389 (6th
App. 41
Cir. 1984) (discussing a hearing that included “the testi-
mony of thirty or more witnesses and . . . a number of
affidavits”). This line of cases shows that defenses to the
fugitivity question may require significant factfinding at
the habeas hearing.
The focus of our analysis is whether Reed is a “fugi-
tive from justice”; in other words, whether he seeks to
avoid the maintenance and administration of what is just.
The facts demonstrate conclusively that Ohio’s conduct
toward Reed was not just. Reed is thus not a fugitive
from justice. Rather, he is a refugee from injustice.
B. The Revocation of Reed’s Parole
The most troubling aspect of this entire case is that
Ohio seeks Reed’s return for a violation that Ohio,
through its agents, provoked by its own actions. The
reason Ohio seeks Reed’s extradition is because he is a
parole violator-at-large. Reed violated parole by choosing
“to flee Ohio rather than face death or great bodily harm
upon the revocation of his parole without due process.
Had Ohio’s agents obeyed their own laws, Reed would
not have been forced to flee.
Nearly twenty years before Reed was denied a parole
revocation hearing, the United States Supreme Court in
Morrissey v. Brewer set forth minimal due process require-
ments for parole revocation. See 408 U.S. at 484-89. These
standards were soon thereafter adopted by Ohio courts,
in Parker v. Cardwell. See 289 N.E.2d at 385; see also Ohio
App. 42
Admin.Code § 5120:1-1-18 (1979, prior to 1995 amend-
ment) (specifying procedures for on-site parole revoca-
tion hearing). Under Morrissey, the Due Process Clause
requires that a parolee receive a preliminary hearing in
order to determine whether there is probable cause for
revocation. Upon a finding of probable cause, there must
still be a second final hearing. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
485-89; Parker, 289 N.E.2d at 385.
The preliminary hearing - or on-site hearing as it is
sometimes called — should be “conducted at or reason-
ably near the place of the alleged parole violation or
arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while
information is fresh and sources are available.” Moreover,
the hearing should be supervised by a hearing officer
who is “not directly involved in the case.” Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 485; see also Parker, 289 N.E.2d at 385. At the
hearing the parolee must be given the opportunity to
speak and present evidence in his or her own behalf, and
should be able to question those who have provided the
adverse information upon which the parole revocation is
based. Before determining whether there is probable
cause for revocation, the hearing officer must examine the
information presented at the hearing. Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 486-87; Parker, 289 N.E.2d at 385; see also State v. Min-
gua, 327 N.E.2d 791, 794-95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). Only
after a finding of probable cause at the on-site hearing
can the parolee be returned “to the state correctional
institution pending the final decision.” Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 487. The undisputed record shows that the agents of
Ohio's penal system intended to deny to Reed this basic
due process guarantee.
App. 43
Though we do not base our determination on the
illegality of Ohio's conduct, it is apparent that the
attempt by agents of the Ohio Parole Authority to revoke
Reed’s parole without a preliminary on-site hearing was
unconstitutional. Under the uncontradicted evidence, no
other conclusion is possible. See id. at 484 (“[T]here is no
interest on the part of the State in revoking parole with-
out any procedural guarantees at all.”); State v. Vigil, 97
NM 749, 750-51, 643 P.2d 618, 619-20 (Ct. App. 1982)
(discussing Morrissey and reversing probation revocation
because defendant was denied right of confrontation at
revocation hearing). Though our conclusion here is not
affected by Ohio law, it is almost certain that this conduct
would be found to violate Ohio’s own Constitution and
its laws governing the revocation of parole. See Ohio
Const. art. L, § 1 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (right to defend
liberty); Ohio Const. art. I, § 16 (Banks-Baldwin 1994)
(“due course of law”); see also Parker, 289 N.E.2d at 385
(adopting the procedures set forth in Morrissey); State v.
Hochhausler, 668 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ohio 1996) (discussing
due process under Ohio Constitution); Ohio Amin.Code
§ 5120:1-1-18 (procedures for parole revocation).
This conclusion is not binding on any subsequent
adjudication, any more than a finding of liability in a civil
trial for a particular cause of action is binding on a
determination of guilt in a criminal trial for the same
cause of action. See State v. Hoeffel, 112 NM 358, 359-60,
815 P.2d 654, 655-56 (Ct. App. 1991) (civil verdict is not
binding on related criminal proceeding). However, under
Doran, it is our duty as the asylum state to determine
whether Reed is a fugitive. See 439 U.S. at 289. We are
limited to the evidence in the record in making this
App. 44
determination. The evidence of Ohio’s conduct bears
directly on the question we must answer: whether Reed
was a fugitive from justice.
From our standpoint, it is immaterial whether the
actions of the State of Ohio are ultimately vindicated or
condemned. Because of those actions —- whatever their
legal posture — the district court was faced with the
choices of invoking a virtually sui generis remedy to the
rigid precepts of extradition law or of returning Reed to
possible death or great bodily harm. Reed has demon-
strated beyond a reasonable doubt that, if not for the
actions of the State of Ohio, New Mexico courts would
not be faced with this choice. Cf. Morrison v. Stepanski, 839
F. Supp. 1130, 1142 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (if not for deprivation
of due process, things would be different).
Furthermore, because Ohio’s conduct has placed this
problem under our jurisdiction, we will seek resolution in
our own laws and Constitution. While Doran forms the
framework of our analysis, New Mexico is the state to
which Ohio forced Reed to flee. In applying the Doran
framework, we do not believe we are required by Ohio's
actions to cast aside the jurisprudence that is unique to
this state. The New Mexico Constitution guarantees
rights that no law can abrogate. In addition to our own
Bill of Rights, the New Mexico Constitution offers unique
protections that are not duplicated by its federal counter-
part. We do not construe any provision of the federal
constitution to require a New Mexico court to ignore its
own constitutional guarantees of life and liberty and
safety.
App. 45
With these factors in mind, we will explain why
Reed, in seeking refuge t om injustice, is not a fugitive
from justice.
C. Duress
1. Duress defined
Among the oldest principles of criminal law is that
“it is not reasonable to punish conduct, however criminal
it may be, if that conduct was not the product of the
actor’s own, unimpeded will.” 2 Gene P. Schultz, Proving
Criminal Defenses 4 9.01 (1994); see 4 Blackstone, supra, at
*27. (“[A] man should be excused for those acts which are
done through unavoidable force and compulsion.”).
Duress and necessity are two forms of compulsicn that
may be raised as valid defenses in criminal law. Though
we will refer to the defense raised by Reed as “duress,”
some of his claims might be categorized as necessity. This
is immaterial because the distinction between duress and
necessity has been blurred by modern case law and is no
longer deemed decisive. See United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394, 410 (1980). Both these “defenses were designed
to spare a person from punishment if he acted ‘under
threats or conditions that a person of ordinary firmness
would have been unable to resist,’ or if he reasonably
believed that criminal action ‘was necessary to avoid a
harm more serious than that sought to be prevented by
the statute defining the offense.’” Id. at 410 (quoting -
and reversing on other grounds — United States v. Bailey,
585 F.2d 1087, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). The courts of
Ohio recognize the defense of duress. See State v. Procter,
367 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (stating that
App. 46
Ohio recognizes that the defense of duress “as a legiti-
mate defense to all crimes, except the taking of the life of
an innocent person”). Similarly, we have held “that
duress is a defense available in New Mexico except when
the crime charged is a homicide or a crime requiring
intent to kill.” Esquibel v. State, 91 NM 498, 501, 576 P.2d
1129, 1132 (1978), overruled on-sther grounds by State v.
Wilson, 1994 NMSC 008, 116 NM 793, 795-96, 867 P2d
1175, 177-78.
Many extradition cases establish rules that tend to
limit duress as a defense to the Doran fugitivity require-
ment. We find that none of these cases apply to the
distinctive facts of Reed’s case. For example, many courts
have noted that the motives of the demanding state are
beyond review. It is irrelevant that the defendant could
show that, notwithstanding the express language of the
extradition documents, the demanding state's unspoken
motives are vindictive, illegal, or dishonest. S * Golden v.
Dupnik, 726 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Beckwith
v. Evatt, 819 S.W.2d 453, 457-58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)
(“[T]he petitioner is not entitled to probe more deeply
into any political motivation inspiring the issuance of the
governor's warrant.”). However, we do not grant habeas
corpus because Ohio seeks Reed’s return solely for the
purpose of suppressing his speech activities. We do not
consider Ohio's motives but rather the effect of Ohio’s
conduct. Whatever its motives, had Ohio conducted itself
appropriately, Reed would not have been forced to
choose between death and flight. More importantly, our
courts would not have been forced to choose between
ignoring and preventing the violation of Reed’s constitu-
tional rights.
App. 47
The courts of the asylum state may not prognosticate
about the fairness or anticipated result of judicial pro-
ceedings in the demanding state. Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S.
432, 440 (1914); Strachan, 571 N.E.2d at 68. Thus, if Reed
were finally given a preliminary on-site hearing upon
being returned to Ohio, we have no jurisdiction to specu-
late on the impartiality or possible outcome of that hear-
ing. We do not address this question at all. Our concern is
that Reed would never have fled Ohio had he been prom-
ised a hearing in the first place. For this reason he was
never at any time a fugitive from justice. Whether Reed
could now txcveive a hearing in Ohio is irrelevant. The
belated offer of a hearing cannot somehow transform him
into a fugitive.
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act states that the
asylum ate’s courts may not question the guilt or inno-
cence vs the defendant for any crimes charged in the
demanding state. Section 31-4-20. We do not consider
whether Reed was legitimately found guilty of the com-
plaint made by Steve Devoto, whether under Ohio law he
could be found guilty of violating parole, or whether his
original convictions for aggravated robbery and theft of
drugs were valid. Under the Doran analysis, the question
of criminal charges is considered separately from the
fugitive question. A person may not be a fugitive even
though legitimately charged with a crime in the demand-
ing state. We consider only whether, regardless of the
various charges, Reed may be considered a fugitive from
justice. His guilt or innocence for these crimes is irrele-
vant to the novel circumstances that caused him to flee
Ohio under duress.
App. 48
The courts of the asylum state have no authority to
investigate prison conditions in the demanding state.
Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1980); Sweeney v.
Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 87-89 (1952). This is true even when
federal courts have previously concluded that the prison
system of the demanding state violates proscriptions
against “cruel and unusual punishment.” Brown v. Sheriff
of Wayne County, 330 N.W.2d 335, 343-44 (Mich. 1982).
Reed is not alleging that his extradition should be barred
because the overall prison conditions in Ohio are inhu-
mane; rather he is arguing — and the district court agreed
- that he was singled out for imprisonment so that he
could be beaten or killed by government officials.
Though, in his writings, Reed alleged many grievances
against the Ohio penal system, those grievances are not
the basis of his defense. The general prison conditions -
and the treatment of other prisoners have no bearing on
the kind of individual treatment he reasonably feared he
would receive in the hands of state officials. Reed fled the
apparently conspiratorial intent of state officials to sub-
ject a [sic] him to death or great bodily harm. We have
found no case, including Sweeney v. Woodall, that contem-
plates such a situation. See 344 U.S. at 91-92 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (describing horrific prison conditions suffered
by Woodall, but in no way suggesting that his suffering
was unique within the prison, or that he was singled out
by government officials).
Also beyond the scope of review is the defendant's
fear of being confined with other inmates who have
threatened him or who may have reason to injure him.
Thus, a defendant cannot avoid extradition because he
will be incarcerated in the same prison as a co-defendant
App. 49
against whom he testified. Chamberlain v. Celeste, 729 F.2d
1071, 1077 (6th Cir. 1984). Reed’s case is distinguished
because it is the prison officials themselves — his putative
protectors - who threatened him harm.
2. Fundamental constitutional rights
Reed has shown beyond a reasonable doubt, with
persuasive and uncontroverted evidence, that he left
Ohio because he risked death or great bodily harm at the
hands of prison officials if he had reported to be arrested
by his parole officer. Reed was not threatened with the
deprivation of any ordinary civil right - not merely lib-
erty or freedom of speech - but with the deprivation of
life itself. There is no right more fundamental than the
right to one’s own life.
The New Mexico Constitution decrees that the gov-
ernment may deprive no person of life “without due
process of law.” NM Const. art. Il, § 18 (as amended
1972). Moreover, the New Mexico Constitution guaran-
tees that the enjoyment of “life and liberty” is a “natural,
inherent and inalienable” right. NM Const. art. II, § 4.
The same provision of our Constitution also accords the
same value to the right “of seeking and obtaining safety
and happiness.” Id. The Ohio Constitution contains simi-
lar provisions. See Ohio Const. art. I § 1 (“All men
_. . have certain inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty - . - and
seeking and obtaining happiness and safety.”); Ohio
Const. art. I, § 16 (due course of law).
App. 50
When a person’s life is jeopardized by the actions of
the state without due process, no constitutional interest is
of greater consequence. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
9 (1985) (“The suspect’s fundamental interest in his own
life need not be elaborated upon.”). The transgression is
not only against a single human being but also the most
basic principles upon which our system of government
was founded.
From the popular hatred and abhorrence of ille-
gal confinement, torture and extortion of confes-
sions of violations of the ‘law of the land’
evolved the fundamental idea that no man’s life,
liberty or property be forfeited as criminal pun-
ishment for violation of that law until there had
been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a
public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excite-
ment and tyrannical power. Thus, as assurance
against ancient evils, our country, in order to
preserve ‘the blessings of liberty’, wrote into its
basic law the requirement, among others, that
the forfeiture of the lives, liberties or property of
people accused of crime can only follow if pro-
cedural safeguards of due process have been
obeyed.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940). There can
be no dispute that the gravest constitutional concerns are
raised by a showing that, upon revocation of parole, a
defendant will be subject to death or great bodily harm a*
the hands of state officials. When a case presents extraor-
dinary circumstances, the presumptions in favor of extra-
dition may be defeated. See, e.g., Bowman, 264 N.E.2d at
153 (“The ends of justice will not be served by enforcing
extradition for the crime involved on a person who has
lived openly within this State for the last eighteen years,
App. 51
and who has been imprisoned on three occasions during
the pendency of the extradition proceedings.”). But see
People v. Martin, 567 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(disputing Bowman). This case presents extraordinary cir-
cumstances. When extradition will directly result in the
deprivation without due process of the defendant's life,
the New Mexico Constitution requires the protection of
his or her life and safety. NM Const. art. Il, §§ 4 & 18.
The Doran court relied upon the early case, In re
Strauss, which acknowledged that the extradition process
may be tainted by official corruption. However Strauss
went on to say that extradition “is but one step in secur-
ing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he
may be tried, and in no manner determines the question
of guilt.” In re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 332-33 (1905) (quoted
by Doran, 439 U.S. at 288). Nevertheless, we have been
presented with circumstances in which extradition is
something much more invidious than a mere “step in
securing the presence of the defendant.” Id. Extradition,
in this particular case, initiated a process intended to
place the defendant in the hands of those who threatened
to violate his most basic constitutional rights. When con-
fronted with such an exceptional situation, we do not
believe we are required to discard the protections guaran-
teed by our own constitution.
We hold that the extradition process was not meant
to abrogate the New Mexico Constitution which regards
“seeking and obtaining safety” as a “natural, inherent
and inalienable” right. See NM Const. art. II, § 4. Reed
came to New Mexico explicitly for the purpose of “seek-
ing and obtaining safety.” Our courts have not fully
defined the scope of this constitutional provision. See
App. 52
State v. Sutton, 112 NM 449, 455, 816 P.2d 518, 524 (Ct.
App. 1991), modified on other grounds, State v. Gomez, 1997
NMSC 006, 4 32, 122 NM 777, 786, 932 P.2d 1, 10. How-
ever, it certainly applies to individuals like Reed who
were threatened with death or great bodily harm by
government officials of another state, and who had no
recourse or remedy within that threatening state. “In
interpreting the more expansive language of Article II,
Section 4, we are mindful of the more intimate relation-
ship existing between a state government and its people,
as well as the more expansive role states traditionally
have played in keeping and maintaining the peace within
their borders.” California First Bank v. State, 111 NM 64,
76, 801 P.2d 646, 658 (1990). On a national level, when the
broad concept of federalism is concerned, the rights of
the individual are sometimes displaced. However, on the
state level, our Constitution can offer not only to protect
life, but also the “more expansive” guarantee of obtaining
safety. One of the more important functions of the indi-
vidual states is to secure the rights of the individuals
within their borders. See id.; Gomez, 1997 NMSC 006,
11 18-20, 122 NM at 783-84, 932 P.2d at 7-8 (stating that
New Mexico follows an interstitial rather than lock-step
approach to constitutional interpretation, discussing cir-
cumstances in which our own constitution is interpreted
differently from its federal counterpart).
3. Factors that make this case unique in extra-
dition law
Throughout this opinion we have emphasized that, in
the context of extradition law, Reed's situation is unique.
App. 53
There is no controlling authority that addresses all of the
peculiar circumstances of this case. We have closely stud-
ied and sought guidance from the many judicial opinions
and accepted canons of extradition law. Nevertheless, a
mechanical reading of this precedent would overlook
important elements of Reed’s case and militate the intol-
erable result of sending him back to face death or great
bodily harm. Whatever a court's mandate may be under
extradition law, it is clearly not to send a defendant back
to face such a fate.
Several factors bring this case outside the ordinary
tenets of extradition law. In defining these factors we
have looked to New Mexico jury instructions and judicial
opinions that set forth the elements necessary for a suc-
cessful duress defense. See UJI 14-5130 NMRA 1997 (stat-
ing duress requires that defendant feared immediate
great bodily harm if he or she did not commit the crime
and if a reasonable person would have acted in the same
way); Esquibel, 91 NM at 500, 576 P.2d at 1131 (same
elements); see also Procter, 367 N.E.2d at 913 (duress
requires well-grounded apprehension of present and emi-
nent [sic] death or serious bodily injury). The amicus
suggests that Reed's status as a parole violator-at-large is
analogous to that of an escaped convict; thus insight may
be found in the jury instructions that set forth the ele-
ments of duress as a defense to escaping from a jail or
penitentiary. See UJI 14-5132 NMRA 1997. Also, within
extradition case law, there are frequently mentiored cir-
cumstances - such as the lack of a remedy in the demand-
ing state — that, if proven, would strengthen a claim of
duress. See, ¢.g., Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 89 (noting that
fugitive made no showing that relief was unavailable in
App. 54
the courts of the demanding state). These various sources
describe some of the considerations that are relevant in
establishing a duress defense in an extradition context.
No single factor or group of factors is dispositive. In the
present case, the following circumstances demonstrate
why the trial court’s determination is supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
a. Reed was properly and legally released
from imprisonment
The record shows that Reed began his one-year
parole term on May 5, 1992. No legal actions were taken
to revoke his parole up to March 22, 1993, the likely date
he fled from Ohio. Nor was he arrested because of Steve
Devoto’s complaint or for any other reason. Thus, up to
the moment he fled, his release from prison was entirely
legal. He was not, for example, an escaped convict, nor
was there any warrant for his arrest. In this regard, the
only question before us is the legality of the flight itself.
See United States v. Corona, 687 F.Supp. 84, 86 n.2
(S.D.N.Y.) (“While flight is generally considered one of
the means of reasonably avoiding coerced criminal activ-
ity, in the present case the flight itself was alleged the
crime.”), aff'd mem., 868 F.2d 1268 (2d Cir. 1988).
b. Reed reasonably feared death or great
bodily harm from state officials
Reed has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
prison officials expressed an intention to cause him death
or great bodily harm if he were ever returned to
Lucasvilie. Moreover, we accept his conclusion that his
App. 55
parole was about to be revoked without a due process
hearing. His parole officer told him to “say your good-
byes to your family and friends,” and assured Reed he
would have no preliminary on-site hearing before revoca-
tion. Reed knew the workings of the parole revocation
process. He was sufficiently knowledgeable to under-
stand that the parole officer's words signified he was
being denied his due process rights. He reasonably feared
that his parole was going to be revoked and that he
would be returned to Lucasville where prison officials
could carry out their threats to kill him or cause him
bodily harm.
We do not believe that in this situation it is logical to
require that the death or great bodily harm be “impend-
ing,” “immediate,” “present,” or “imminent.” In this case,
such terminology would be misleading. “What consti-
tutes present, immediate and impending compulsion
depends on the circumstances of each case.” Esquibel, 91
NM at 502, 576 P.2d at 1133. A more precise resolution of
this immediacy condition is provided by another of the
factors discussed below which requires proof that the
accused had no relief in the demanding state. See id. at
499-500, 576 P.2d at 1130-31 (stating “opportunity to
avoid” is alternative expression to “present, imminent,
and impending”). The showing of harm in this case is
similar to the showing of a “well-founded fear of per-
secution” found in cases of asylum from foreign nations.
See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(1982)). Additionally, it would be impossible for a defen-
dant to predict the future and prove absolutely that he or
she would be killed or beaten upon return to prison.
App. 56
United States v. Dagnachew, 808 F.Supp. 1517, 1522
(D.Colo. 1992) (no need to absolutely prove harm). The
constitutional rights at stake are so important that we
believe it is sufficient to show, as Reed has, that the fear
was reasonable.
¢. Reed used no force or violence during or
after flight from the demanding state
There is no contention that Reed committed any act
of force or violence in prison, on parole, or after his flight
from Ohio. The undisputed record proves that Steve
Devoto’s “terroristic threatening” complaint involved no
actual force or violence.
d. There was no relief or protection in the
demanding state
The circumstances of a parolee who leaves his or her
home state under duress are analogous to those of a
convict who escapes prison under duress. In determining
whether Reed had an adequate remedy in Ohio, it is
useful to look at the comparable requirement that
escaped prisoners must prove. The escapee must show,
either that there was no time to complain to or seek
reprieve from governmental authorities, or that, under
the circumstances, it would have been futile for him or
her to complain to or seek reprieve from governmental
authorities. See UJ] 14-5132; Linited States v. Kinslow, 860
F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing “opportunities to
avoid the perceived danger”), overruled on other grounds
by United States v. Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.
1992).
App. 57
It is apparent from the record that the Parole Author-
ity was intractable in its resolve to return Reed to
Lucasville as quickly as possible. Direct appeals to the
Parole Authority and other Ohio officials proved futile. It
would surely have forestalled Reed’s flight from Ohio if
he could have filed a petition in state or federal court
seeking equitable relief enjoining the Parole Authority
from revoking his parole without an aa-site preliminary
hearing.
However, Reed learned of Steve Devoto’s complaint
on a Thursday evening. He called his parole officer the
next day, Friday morning. He was instructed to report to
be arrested at 9:00 a.m. the following Monday morning.
Friday, after his phone call to the parole officer, was
Reed’s only opportunity to fully appreciate his options,
find legal representation, compose the proper documents,
gather any necessary fees, file a petition, and receive a
judicial remedy before the courts closed Friday evening.
Reed cannot be held liable for his inability to initiate a
legal action within the last few business hours before his
arrest. Moreover, it is not certain what judicial remedy he
could seek before actually being arrested. Cf. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (discussing limited circum-
stances in which court in equity can interfere with a
criminal prosecution). Under the undisputed facts, Reed
“did not have time to complain to or seek reprieve from
governmental authorities.” See United States v. Agard, 605
F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing the lack of a
“reasonable opportunity to escape other than by engag-
ing in the otherwise unlawful --tivity”).
The futility of seeking reprieve from Ohio govern-
mental officials was underscored by the inflexibility of
App. 58
Reed’s parole officer, the history of seemingly conspir-
atorial animosity from officials at the Ohio Department of
Corrections and the Parole Authority, and the frantic
ineffectual phone calls initiated on Reed’s behalf by
Pepinsky. To borrow the words of the U.S. Supreme
Court, “if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to
violating the law, ‘a chance both to refuse to do the
criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,’ ” the
defense of duress will fail. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
at 410 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott,
Handbook on Criminal Law 379 (1972)). Reed did not have
such an alternative.
e. Reed’s allegedly unlawful behavior was
provoked by the demanding state
Most significant in this case is that the State of Ohio
provoked the very parole violation upon which it now
bases its demand for extradition. Reed’s predicament was
caused by state officials acting under color of state law.
He had no reasonable recourse other than flight. Nor-
mally we trust the state to control those who threaten to
deprive a person of life without due process. But when
the state itself is the one posing the threat - and when, as
in this case, federal remedies have been refused — the
only one who can protect the individual from the threat is
a sister state.
The uncontroverted evidence is that the original
extradition petition is the direct result of a concerted
effort by the agents of Ohio to deny Reed of his most
basic rights without due process. Furthermore, Reed
steadfastly asserts he would never have left Ohio if he
App. 59
had been promised a due process hearing. Using these
facts to illuminate the legitimacy of the extradition
demand, we are immediately faced with the question of
whether a state by clearly inappropriate, if not uncon-
stitutional, misconduct can create a fugitive from justice
where otherwise none would exist.
The law is replete with examples in which a state is
prohibited from taking advantage of its affirmative acts
that deny due process to a defendant. See, e.g., State v.
Breit, 1996 NMSC 067, {4 18-48, 122 NM 655, 666-70, 930
P.2d 792, 803-07 (prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Smith,
470 N.E.2d 883, 885-86 (Ohio 1984) (same); State v. Gutier-
rez, 1993 NMSC 062, 116 NM 431, 445-47, 863 P.2d 1052,
1066-68 (unreasonable search and seizure); State v. Pi
Kappa Alpha Fraternity, 491 N.E.2d 1129, 1131-33 (Ohio
1986) (same). We see no reason why extradition should be
exempt from this constitutional principle. “If the Govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., disserfting), overruled on other grounds
by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-54 (1967); see also
Galloway, 507 So.2d at 594-95 (“[T}he constitution forbids
a state from exercising its extradition powers based on
false accusations, simple ignorance of the law or wanton
abuse of process.”).
The fact that a state is prohibited from | aking advan-
tage of its own unlawful conduct brings this case outside
the traditional holding that “[a]n individual brought into
the asylum state involuntarily, unlawfully, or under com-
pulsion is still a fugitive from justice.” Dunn v. Hindman,
836 F.Supp. 750, 755-56 (D. Kan. 1993); see, e.g., Mozingo v.
App. 60
State, 562 So.2d 300, 303-05 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (pris-
oner arrested for crime in demanding state, transferred
legally to prison in another state, is fugitive upon parole
from prison); Ex parte Ponzi, 290 S.W. 170, 173 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1926) (defendant allegedly kidnapped in one state
and brought into asylum state). We hold that, in extradi-
tion cases, duress may be raised as a defense to the
fugitivity element if the individual was incited to cross
state lines - and would otherwise never have done so -
by the illegal actions of the demanding state. A state
cannot now exploit its own unlawful conduct.
It has been suggested that Ohio had no constitutional
obligation to provide Reed a preliminary hearing prior to
taking him into custody. This suggestion seriously mis-
construes Reed’s circumstances. This implies that Reed
should have allowed himself to be arrested so as to test
the reliability of his parole officer’s threat that he would
be returned to Lucasville without a hearing. The question
in this case is not whether Reed should receive a hearing
after being taken into custody. Rather, it is whether Reed
was promised a hearing before he was taken into custody.
The fact is, he was promised he would not receive a
hearing upon being arrested. Moreover, he reasonably
believed, upon being returned to Lucasville without a
hearing, he would be subject to death or great bodily
harm. It is not reasonable to require a defendant to stake
his life on the likelihood that the state will follow the
dictates of due process after it has threatened not to do
so.
Similarly, we distinguish this case from those that
dismiss, in an extradition proceeding, consideration of
the defendant’s motives or reasons for leaving the
App. 61
demanding state. See Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S.
222, 227 (1906). It has even been held that a defendant's
“fear for his personal safety was not sufficient to justify
his flight from justice.” Dunn, 836 F.Supp. at 756. Thus,
there are several disturbing cases in which there was no
defense for those who feared being lynched. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Heard v. Babb, 107 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ill. 1952)
(“His fear of lynching does not change the nature of the
act, but merely constitutes the motive therefor.”). This
case is of an entirely different order because the demand-
ing state itself threatened the defendant's safety, and then
attempted to extradite him for a violation that never
would have occurred had the demanding state followed
its own laws. Our holding is in accord with those few
cases that granted writs of habeas corpus to defendants
who proved they would find no governmental protection
from being lynched upon extradition to the demanding
state. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superinten-
dent of County Prison, 31 A.2d 576, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1943) (refusal to extradite upon showing of competent
evidence that officials in the demanding state would not
protect defendant from lynching); In re Hampton, 13 Ohio
Dec. 579, 579 (Hamilton County C.P. 1895) (judge, who
previously extradited prisoner into the hands of a lynch
mob in Kentucky, refused to extradite another prisoner to
Kentucky).
Additionally, it makes no difference that Reed might
be provided a hearing in Ohio in which he could answer
for fleeing the state. Ohio’s delayed offer of due process
has no bearing on Reed's status as a fugitive in the State
of New Mexico. Doran requires that we determine
whether Reed is a fugitive and it violates basic justice to
App. 62
presume under the undisputed facts that Reed was ever
at any time a fugitive. The State of Ohio cannot now use
the offer of a belated hearing to transform Reed into a
fugitive from justice. Cf. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 536 (1884) (“Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to
the injury of the persons and property of its subjects, is
not law, whether manifested as the decree of a personal
monarch or of an impersonal multitude.”). Conduct that
was valid in the eyes of the law at the time it occurred,
cannot after the fact — ex post facto — be rendered invalid.
See State v. Alderette, 111 NM 297, 300, 804 P.2d 1116, 1119
(Ct. App. 1990). Administrative bodies - like the Parole
Authority — “cannot change innocence into guilt; or pun-
ish innocence as a crime,” any more than can legislative
bodies. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)
(discussing ex post facto laws passed by legislative
bodies).
In raising these issues, we are not, despite the con-
cerns of the State, deciding whether Ohio can now right-
fully pursue a hearing process that it originally seems to
have waived. Nor will we consider the “unclean hands”
with which Ohio offers a belated parole revocation hear-
ing. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 483-84 (Brandeis, J. dissenting)
(“[A] court will not redress a wrong when he who
invokes its aid has unclean hands. . . . Where the govern-
ment is the actor, the reasons for applying [the doctrine of
unclean hands] are even more persuasive.”). Nor, as the
amicus posits, do we explore a “presumption of vindic-
tiveness” on the part of Ohio. Dunn, 836 F. Supp. at 754.
Rather, the question before us is whether, in light of
Ohio’s actions —- however legal and constitutional they
App. 63
may or may not be - Reed should be considered a fugi-
tive. We conclude that no offer of a hearing could turn
Reed into a fugitive once it was established he was never
a fugitive in the first place.
f. Reed’s circumstances invoke protections
in the New Mexico Constitution
The New Mexico Constitution requires that we grant
Reed’s writ of habeas corpus. Reed faced the deprivation
of his life without due process of law if he had remained
in Ohio. The New Mexico Constitution cannot tolerate
such an outcome. NM Const. art. IL, §§ 4 & 18. Moreover,
Reed was precluded from seeking safety in Ohio. The
deprivation of his life would have been carried out under
color of state law and Reed was denied any legal recourse
against this deprivation. He fled to New Mexico for the
express purpose of finding safety. For this reason, Reed
properly comes under the protection of Article II, Section
4 of the New Mexico Constitution which guarantees the
right “of seeking and obtaining safety.” Reed did not flee
from justice. He sought refuge from injustice.
g. A reasonable person under similar cir-
cumstances would have acted as did
Reed
The State presented no evidence to undermine Reed's
contention that he was faced with a choice of evils: either
being killed at Lucasville or flight from Ohio. See United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410 (defining the defense of
necessity as “choice of evils” in which “physical forces
beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the
App. 64
lesser of two evils”). A reasonable person in Reed’s situa-
tion would choose escape above the probability of death
or bodily injury.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Extradition laws are intended to bring offenders to
justice. They are not intended to be - and we cannot
suffer them to be - a vehicle for the suppression of
constitutional rights. Courts in this nation have always
been empowered to prevent injustice. See Hampton, 13
Ohio Dec. at 579 (refusing to extradite defendant who
was in proven danger of being lynched). Habeas extradi-
tion proceedings are not exempted from the exercise of
this power. For the foregoing reasons we conclude that,
under the uncontroverted facts of this case, Reed is not a
fugitive from justice. We affirm the district court in grant-
ing his writ of habeas corpus.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gene E. Franchini
GENE E. FRANCHINI,
Chief Justice
we concur:
/s/ Patricio M. Serna
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
/s/ Dan A. McKinnon, III
DAN A. MCKINNON, III, Justice
JOSEPH F. BACA, Justice (dissenting)
PAMELA B. MINZNER, Justice (specially concurring)
Po AG Rr OP ert i HIE Some
App. 65
MINZNER, Justice (specially concurring).
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, |
respectfully disagree with the fugitivity analysis relied
upon by the majority. The circumstances of this case
require us to consider the respective roles of the courts of
this State and those of Ohio, but I believe the analysis on
which the majority opinion relies expands the role of an
asylum state beyond acceptable limits. Both the Suprem-
acy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const.
art. VI, cl. 2, and the Supreme Law of the Land Clause of
the New Mexico Constitution, NM Const. art. IL, § 1,
compel us to recognize limits on the power and authority
of an asylum state. The analysis on which the majority
opinion relies would take this Court, and other courts,
beyond those limits. Nevertheless, I agree with the major-
ity that, on these facts, the district court’s decision should
be affirmed. Ohio has not demonstrated the requisite
probable cause necessary for justifying the restraint of
Reed’s conditional liberty as a parolee involved in extra-
dition. As a result, I would affirm the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus for Ohio’s failure to substantially charge
Reed with a parole violation.
As the majority opinion explains, the U.S. Constitu-
tion explicitly mandates the extradition of a fugitive upon
the “Demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled. ... ” U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2. The United
States Supreme Court has specifically limited the scope of
inquiry available to courts in an asylum state in the
context of a request for extradition. California v. Superior
App. 66
Court, 482 U.S. 400, 402 (1987) (“At issue in this case are
the limits imposed by federal law upon state court habeas
corpus proceedings challenging an extradition warrant.”)
(emphasis added). “The courts of asylum States may do
no more than ascertain whether the requisites of the
Extradition Act have been met.” California, 482 U.S. at
408; see also Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978)
(limiting judicial inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings
challenging extradition to four issues: technical compli-
ance with required documentation; existence of a crime
charged against defendant; concurrence of identity
between the defendant and the person sought for extradi-
tion; and fugitivity).
In Michigan v. Doran, the Supreme Court limited the
scope of habeas review in order to protect the principle,
embodied in the Extradition Clause, of preventing “any
state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice
of another state and thus ‘balkanize’ the administration
of criminal justice among the several states.” Doran, 439
U.S. at 287. Indeed, frustration of these principles “would
create a serious impediment to national unity,” Puerto
Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987) (finding in the
federal courts a power to compel extradition), because
federal limits to state authority in extradition matters
“are an essential part of the Framers’ conception of
national identity and union.” California, 482 U.S. at 405.
The majority opinion relies heavily on the issue of
“fugitivity,” a permissible ground of review under Doran.
However, the issue of fugitivity is a narrow one. “[T]o be
a fugitive from justice it is necessary ‘that having within a
state committed that which by its laws constitutes a
crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal
App. 67
process to answer for his offence [sic], he has left its
jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another.’ ”
California, 482 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 97 (1885)). Thus, justice, in
the phrase “fugitive from justice,” does not mean the
“administration of what is just” or fair; it means the
administration of law. Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1228 (1976) (defining “justice” separately as
“the maintenance and administration of what is just” and
the “administration of law”). But see Majority Opinion,
{ 86. As long as the accused “committed that which by
[the demanding state’s] laws constitutes a crime,” the
justice portion of fugitivity is satisfied. This term does not
allow an asylum state to question the fairness with which
the demanding state treated the accused.
As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court has found it
sufficient that the accused meet “the technical definition
of a ‘fugitive.’ ” California, 482 U.S. at 408. The only issue
under fugitivity other than presence in the asylum state is
flight from the demanding state. Under the requirement
of flight, “when [the accused] is sought to be subjected to
[the demanding state’s] criminal process . . . , he has left
its jurisdiction.” Roberts, 116 U.S. at 97. This requirement
is responsible for the factual inquiry in habeas cases. See,
e.g., Galloway v. Josey, 507 So.2d 590, 593 (Fla. 1987). In
effect, presence in the demanding state at the time of the
commission of a crime is a jurisdictional requirement
without which principles of comity would not command
extradition. Thus, any inquiry into the motives of the
accused in fleeing the demanding state, or the conduct of
the demanding state in relation to the accused, under the
App. 68
fugitivity requirement transgresses the spirit, if not the
letter, of a long line of U.S. Supreme Court opinions.
In Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1952) (per
curiam), the Supreme Court reversed a Federal Court of
Appeals’ remand of a habeas corpus petition on allega-
tions of confinement of the accused amounting to cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court found that
“[clonsiderations fundamental to our federal system
require that the prisoner test the claimed unconstitu-
tionality of his treatment by [the demanding state] in the
courts of that State.” Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 90 (emphasis
added). The Court noted that the “resort to a form of
‘self-help’ ” in fleeing the demanding state should neither
weaken the demanding state’s authority to review the
accusations of official misconduct nor create authority in
the asylum state to review the actions of those officials.
Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 89-90 (“Had he never eluded the
custody of his former jailers he certainly would be enti-
tled to no privilege permitting him to attack Alabama’‘s
penal process by an action brought outside the territorial
confines of Alabama in a forum where there would be no
one to appear and answer for that State.”).
In Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86 (1980), the Court
applied the rationale of Sweeney to actions of state courts
by reversing a writ of habeas corpus granted to an
escaped felon by the California Supreme Court on the
basis that a penitentiary in Arkansas, the demanding
state, potentially operated in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Relying on Doran and Sweeney, the Supreme
Court found that “claims as to constitutional defects in
the Arkansas penal system should be heard in the courts
App. 69
of Arkansas, not those of California.” Pacileo, 449 U.S. at
88.
Finally, in California v. Superior Court, the Supreme
Court reversed a writ of habeas corpus granted by the
California Supreme Court based on a finding that a valid
California custody decree precluded a valid charge of
kidnapping against the legal custodian under the law of
Louisiana, the demanding state. California, 482 U.S. at
404-05. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to allow inquiry
by an asylum state into potential defenses despite the
virtual impossibility of the crime and the substantial state
interest of California in the enforcement of its child cus-
tody decree under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a
constitutional provision with purposes similar to the
Extradition Clause. California, 482 U.S. at 412 (“[UJnder
the Extradition Act, it is for the Louisiana courts to do
justice in this case. .. . ).
Throughout each of these cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court has maintained that issues of the type involved
here, such as alleged constitutional violations by officials
of the demanding state, are to be addressed in the
demanding state or, after exhaustion of remedies, in fed-
eral court. Duress is a substantive defense to a criminal
act and touches on both the mens rea and the actus reus
of the crime. Cf. United States v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615
(7th Cir. 1978) (distinguishing necessity and duress on the
basis of actus reus and mens rea). Under duress, there is
no question that the accused committed the act in ques-
tion; it is only culpability which is in dispute. Reed may
raise the defense of duress in Ohio for the parole viola-
tion and also, if he were so charged under Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. Section 2967.15(C)(1), for the offense of
App. 70
escape. See State v. Cross, 391 N.E.2d 319, 322-24 (1979)
(discussing the defense of duress for the crime of escape);
see also Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 501-02, 576 P.2d
1129, 1132-33 (1978) (allowing the defense of duress for
the crime of escape in the context of a history of beatings
and serious threats by prison guards and personnel),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Wilson, 1994 NMSC
008, 116 N.M. 793, 795-96, 867 P.2d 1175, 1177-78. How-
ever, by creating an exception to extradition for govern-
mentally-inflicted duress, the majority opinion appears to
me inconsistent with existing case law. Cf. California, 482
U.S. at 407-08 (stating that extradition proceedings “are
‘emphatically’ not the appropriate time or place for enter-
taining defenses”) (citations omitted).
A parolee is certainly entitled to a preliminary hear-
ing to determine whether probable cause exists for
believing the parolee has violated the conditions of
parole. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). However,
Ohio is not under a constitutional obligation to provide
this hearing prior to taking the parolee into custody. See
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 (1976) (“Loss of liberty
as a parole violator does not occur until the parolee is
taken into custody under the warrant.”); D’Amato v. U.S.
Parole Com'n, 837 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding no
due process violation when warrant for parole violation
was issued but not yet executed). As a result, even if the
parole officer in this case threatened to arrest Reed, the
Adult Parole Authority (APA) then would have a reason-
able time to afford Reed the preliminary hearing. See
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485 (“[D]ue process would seem to
require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or
reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation
App. 71
or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest... . ”)
(emphasis added). Even if Ohio were to deny Reed a
preliminary hearing, it would be a decision of the APA,
the proper neutral party to which Morrissey referred, and,
eventually, the Ohio or federal judiciary, rather than the
individual parole officer. Further, while it is true that in
Sweeney there was no showing that relief was unavailable
in the demanding state, Reed has not made a showing
that relief actually is unavailable in Ohio. Cf. Wright v.
Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 661 N.E.2d 728 (Ohio 1996)
(evaluating a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
reinstatement of parole), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 127 (1996);
State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul, 652 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ohio
1995) (“[H]abeas corpus will lie in certain extraordinary
circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a
person's liberty. . . . ”); Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 46 F.3d 503,
510 (6th Cir.) (providing “prospective injunctive relief”
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of procedural due
process rights by the Ohio Parole Revocation procedures),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 120, cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 274 (1995).
I do not mean to suggest that conclusive proof of a
constitutional violation by a demanding state would be
sufficient to create authority in the asylum state to deny
extradition. Rather, I believe the ambiguous showing by
Reed of a constitutional violation and the unavailability
of remedies in Ohio illustrates the troublesome nature of
investigating Ohio’s conduct without giving Ohio an
opportunity to respond. See Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 89-90. In
addition, the complexity of Reed’s situation emphasizes
the difficulty of undertaking such an inquiry in an asy-
lum state. California, 482 U.S. at 417 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“[A]n asylum state court’s inquiry may not reach
App. 72
the merits of issues thai could be fully litigated in the
charging State; such examinations entangle the asylum
State’s judicial system in laws with which it is unfamiliar
and endanger the summary nature of extradition pro-
ceedings.”). In short, Reed’s “self-help” cannot provide
him with a remedy in a sister state that is otherwise
unavailable. Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 89-90. The Extradition
Clause, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, serves
as a barrier to an asylum state’s review of the past con-
duct of the demanding state and prevents speculation
about future misconduct. Cf. Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 91
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“We cannot assume unlaw-
ful action of the prison officials which would prevent the
petitioner from invoking the aid of the local courts nor
readily open the door to such a claim. Our federal system
presupposes confidence that a demanding State will not
exploit the action of an asylum state by indulging in
outlawed conduct to a returned fugitive from justice.”)
(citation omitted).
New Mexico simply lacks authority in our federal
system of government to intercede on Reed's behalf in an
extradition proceeding for alleged potential violations of
his right to due process of law by another state. The
Supremacy Clause prevents us from applying New Mex-
ico constitutional protections of due process and of seek-
ing safety in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Extradition Clause and its imple-
menting legislation. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Con-
stitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
App. 73
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). Thus, the
majority's reliance on New Mexico's protection of “seek-
ing and obtaining safety,” NM Const. art. II, § 4, even if
this provision contains a substantive protection, is mis-
placed in an extradition proceeding. The majority states
that “Reed came to New Mexico explicitly for the pur-
pose of ‘seeking and obtaining safety,’ ” Majority Opin-
ion, { 105, and the district court noted that Reed “wanted
to seek sanctuary” in New Mexico. Reed v. Ortiz, No. 94-1
CR Misc., 1995 WL 118952, at *6-7 (NM Dist. Ct. Jan. 20,
1995). These statements clarify the issue involved; Reed
does not contest, at least primarily, the technical validity
of Ohio’s request for extradition, but rather, he desires
political asylum in a sister state from alleged constitu-
tional abuses or potential abuses by Ohio. This is pre-
cisely the type of conflict between states that the
Extradition Clause seeks to prevent. See Doran, 439 U.S. at
287.
As “Great” a writ as habeas corpus is, we may not
issue the writ in excess of our authority. See Sweeney, 344
U.S. at 90. Our powers as a sovereign state are not unlim-
ited, and we may not ignore the restraints imposed by the
federal Constitution. Even though the majority concludes
that Reed is not a fugitive, because of Ohio’s actions
precipitating his flight from Ohio, I am not persuaded we
can review the constitutionality or propriety of Ohio's
actions without exceeding New Mexico’s authority in
extradition matters.
App. 74
Nonetheless, under the facts presented, I would not
allow Reed to be extradited to Ohio. Under Doran, the
demanding state must demonstrate to the asylum state
that there is probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
The magistrate or justice of the peace before
whom the criminal charge is filed must issue an
arrest warrant if it is determined that there is
reasonable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed. The inquiry the judicial officer
is required to make is directed at the traditional
determination of reasonable grounds or proba-
ble cause.
Doran, 439 U.S. at 289 (footnote omitted). In fact, the
holding in Doran was partially based on the judicial
determination “that there was ‘reasonable cause to
believe that such offense(s) were committed and that the
accused committed them.’ ” Doran, 439 U.S. at 289.
The usage of “probable cause” clearly suggests the
influence of the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme
Court's analysis. Doran, 439 U.S. at 294-296 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 763 n. 6 (8th
Cir. 1980) (stating that the probable cause requirement
“may be founded in the Fourth Amendment, as well as in
the Extradition Clause and statute”); cf. Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring “a judicial determina-
tion of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint of liberty following arrest” under the Fourth
Amendment). “The extradition process involves an
‘extended restraint of liberty following arrest’ even more
severe than that accompanying detention within a single
state.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 296 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
App. 75
Therefore, asylum states have a duty to ensure that prob-
able cause exists in order to justify the restraint on the
accused’s liberty. See Crew v. State, 486 A.2d 664, 666
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (“When the liberty of a person is
being infringed upon when he is forcibly removed from
one state to another, a judicial finding of probable cause
is demanded.”).
Although parolees do not enjoy the absolute liberty
of a criminal defendant not yet convicted, the U.S.
Supreme Court has found a conditional liberty not to be
re-institutionalized unless the parolee violates the condi-
tions of parole. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-82 (“By
whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen
as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
The Supreme Court found significant state and societal
interests in “restoring [the parolee] to normal and useful
life within the law” and determined that arbitrary parole
revocation constituted a serious impediment to such a
goal. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483-84. As a result, the
Supreme Court found a constitutional right to a prelimi-
nary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists
to believe the parolee violated the conditions of parole in
order to justify extended incarceration pending a final
parole revocation hearing. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
485-86; accord Young v. Harper, 117 S.Ct. 1148, 1151-54
(1997) (concluding that preparole is sufficiently similar to
parole to require the protections articulated in Morrissey).
While a parolee may be temporarily detained prior to
the preliminary hearing, see Moody, 429 U.S. at 85-89, the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a finding of probable
cause in order to justify prolonged or substantial confine-
ment. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487 (“Such a determination
App. 76
would be sufficient to warrant the parolee’s continued
detention and return to the state correctional institution
pending the final decision.”).! Thus, for purposes of
' It might be suggested that there should be a presumptive
inference of probable cause based on the subsequent conviction
of a parolee or the presence alone of a parolee in the asylum
state without permission. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490 (“[A]
parolee cannot relitigate issues determined against him in other
forums, as in the situation presented when the revocation is
based on conviction of another crime.”); Barton v. Malley, 626
F.2d 151, 159 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding presence in another state
without permission sufficient probable cause to believe parolee
violated parole such that a preliminary hearing was not
constitutionally required). Under such a notion, the Due Process
Clause would not require a preliminary hearing for a
determination of probable cause.
Under the conditional liberty addressed in Morrissey, this
position has merit. However, Ohio requires a preliminary
hearing to determine probable cause in Reed’s situation. Ohio
Admin. Code § 5120:1-1-18 (1979, prior to 1995 amendment).
Further, in this hearing, Reed would be entitled to present
relevant witnesses and documentary evidence, to be
represented by counsel, to confront witnesses, and to present
mitigating factors. See Section 5120:1-1-18(A); § 5120:1-1-18(H).
Because Ohio would not presume probable cause and would
grant a hearing on the merits for a determination of probable
cause, Reed’s increased level of conditional liberty as
established by Ohio constitutionally may require a preliminary
hearing for a determination of probable cause. Cf. Sandin v.
Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995) (stating that “States may
under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are
protected by the Due Process Clause” and that such state actions
are “generally limited to freedom from restraint”); Garcia v. Las
Vegas Medical Center, 112 N.M. 441, 443-45, 816 P.2d 510, 512-14
(Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the effect of state law on the
requirements of procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment and concluding that procedural protections are
wholly federal, while substantive interests established by state
App. 77
extradition for a parolee, a clear example of an “extended
restraint” of a parolee’s conditional liberty, an asylum
law may demand greater procedural protection by the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Brooks v. Shanks, 1994 NMSC
113, 118 N.M. 716, 720, 885 P.2d 637, 641 (“A state may create a
liberty interest by establishing procedures that control how a
deprivation of rights or privileges such as good-time credits
may be imposed.”) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 546
(1974)); State v. Chavez, 94 N.M. 102, 103-05, 607 P.2d 640, 641-43
(Ct. App. 1979). “State law is relevant only insofar as federal
rights are dependent on state law,” Garcia, 112 N.M. at 444, 816
P.2d at 513, and the conditional liberty of a parolee is entirely
dependent on the limits of parole imposed by state law. Cf.
DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 597 A.2d 807, 821 (Conn. 1991) (“[A]n
underlying conviction is recognized in this state as conclusive
proof that there was probable cause for charges unless it is
proven that the conviction was obtained through fraud, duress, or
other unlawful means.”) (emphasis added). In light of the
ambiguity of the federal constitutional requirements for the
protection of Reed’s conditional liberty, New Mexico should not
be required to make an inference Ohio itself would not make.
See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections the particular situation
demands.”).
This result is not changed by Ohio Rev. Code Ann., Section
2967.15(B) (Banks-Baldwin 1994). Under Section 2967.15(B), a
parolee who is convicted of a crime while on parole is not
entitled to a preliminary hearing. However, Reed’s Kentucky
conviction is not controlled by this statute for two reasons. First,
although the Ohio statute is substantially similar to provisions
held to be constitutional, see Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 46 F.3d at
508-09, this provision does not apply to Reed, in light of the Ex
Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, because he was
convicted of his initial crime before October 6, 1994, the
effective date of the statute. See Kellogg, 46 F.3d at 509-10
(holding the application of a similar rule of the Ohio Adult
Parole Authority to violate the principles of ex post facto for
those convicted of the initial crime before September 1, 1992, the
App. 78
state must confirm that the demanding state has made a
determination of probable cause for a parole violation.
However, due to the nature of parole and the lesser
protection of conditional liberty, the probable cause
determination need not be made by a judicial officer.
Rather, in accordance with Morrissey, a neutral adminis-
trative authority may find probable cause after an infor-
mal hearing about which the accused is entitled to notice
and in which there must be an opportunity for the
accused to present evidence and confront witnesses. Mor-
rissey, 408 U.S. at 485-87. If the demanding state has made
such a determination, then “the courts of the asylum state
are without power to review the determination.” Doran,
439 U.S. at 290. However, “the asylum state need not
grant extradition unless that determination has been
made. The demanding state, of course, has the burden of
so demonstrating.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 296 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
effective date of the rule); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.021
(Banks-Baldwin 1996) (discussing applicability of 1996
amendments). Second, Reed had not been convicted of the
Kentucky offense at the time he was told to report to be arrested
and, subsequently, declared to be a parole violator. As a result,
Reed would have been entitled to a preliminary hearing on the
matter in Ohio had he not fled the state. See Ohio Admin. Code
§ 5120:1-1-18(G)(1)(c) (requiring a probable cause hearing for
one charged but not yet convicted of a new crime if the parolee
has not been given a preliminary hearing on the new charge
with notice that it serves as a substitute for a separate probable
cause hearing). Therefore, Reed is entitled to a preliminary
hearing to determine “whether or not there is probable cause or
reasonable grounds to believe that [he] has committed an act
which would constitute a violation of the conditions of
release... . ” Section 5120:1-1-18(A).
App. 79
Unlike the factual issue of fugitivity, Parks v. Bour-
beau, 477 A.2d 636, 641 n.9 (Conn. 1984) (“The inquiry
whether a plaintiff is a fugitive from justice is one of fact
which is to be resolved by the governor of the asylum
state.”), the issue of whether a determination of probable
cause has been made by the demanding state is a ques-
tion of law. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 95 (1885) (stating
that the issue of fugitivity is one of fact while that of
charging is one of law “and is always open upon the face
of the papers to judicial inquiry, on application for a
discharge under a writ of habeas corpus.”); Parks, 477
A.2d at 640-41 (“[T]he requisite that one must be ‘sub-
stantially charged’ requires that the charge be based upon
‘probable cause’ [and] . . . is [a question] of law.”). As a
result, the district court’s determination that probable
cause existed as to the parole violation will be reviewed
de novo. See Duncan v. Kerby, 1993 NMSC 011, 115 NM
344, 347-48, 851 P.2d 466, 469-79 (applying this standard
to the review of a lower court’s grant or denial of a writ
of habeas corpus). The district court’s conclusion that
Reed had been substantially charged with a crime in Ohio
did not include a finding of any determination of proba-
ble cause. Reed v. Ortiz, No. 94-1 CR Misc., 1995 WL
118952, at *4 (NM Dist. Ct. Jan. 20, 1995). In addition, the
district court did not address whether Ohio had con-
ducted a preliminary hearing in accordance with Mor-
rissey. Under de novo review, the district court's finding
cannot withstand scrutiny.
Ohio has not carried its burden of demonstrating that
it made a determination that probable cause existed to
believe that Reed violated the conditions of his parole.
According to the record, “[t]he Superintendent of Parole
App. 80
Supervision . . . brought information to the attention of
the Adult Parole Authority that [Reed] has violated the
terms and conditions of his parole. . . . ” Special Minutes
of the State of Ohio Adult Parole Authority, March 23,
1993. In addition, Reed “will be charged with absconding
supervision, failing to follow instructions of parole offi-
cer, leaving the state without prior written permission,
failing to report his arrest, and involving himself in fur-
ther criminal activity.” Jill D. Goldhart Aff. (October 3,
1994) (emphasis added). There is neither an explicit find-
ing of probable cause nor sufficient information provided
to show that a probable cause determination has been
made.? In fact, the future tense used by the Ohio officials
necessarily implies that there has been no such deter-
mination. In any case, for parolees, the determination of
probable cause must be made in a preliminary hearing,
and Ohio’s documentation demonstrates that there has
2 Because the documents neither explicitly nor implicitly
demonstrate a finding of probable cause, the question of
whether the documents must facially show a finding of
probable cause need not be addressed. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 296
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“It is enough if the papers submitted
by the demanding state in support of its request for extradition
facially show that a neutral magistrate has made a finding of
probable cause.”); compare Crew v. State, 486 A.2d 664, 666
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (“Inferences . . . are not sufficient. A
judge should explicitly make the finding, not only to assure that
he has focused on that requirement, but also so that the asylum
state will know that the finding has been affirmatively made.”),
with White v. King County, 748 P.2d 616, 620-21 (Wash. 1988)
(inferring a finding of probable cause from an arrest warrant
based on the statutory requirement of such for the issuance of a
warrant), and In re Whitehouse, 467 N.E.2d 228, 230-31 (Mass. Ct.
App. 1984) (same).
App. 81
been no hearing. Jill D. Goldhart Aff. (October 3, 1994)
(“Reed will be returned to Ohio for a parole violation on-
site hearing.”).
In response to Ohio’s failure to make a probable
cause determination, | would normally favor a remand to
the district court to make this determination indepen-
dently before allowing the extradition of a parolee, see Ex
Parte Sanchez, 642 S.W.2d 809, 811-12 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982) (“[W]e find no prohibition in Michigan v. Dor-
an... that would preclude a neutral judicial officer of
this State from making this [probable cause] determina-
tion.”), or a denial of extradition pending Ohio's deter-
mination of probable cause. However, | believe the length
of time Reed was incarcerated without a preliminary
hearing violates the requirement of holding a probable
cause hearing “as promptly as convenient after arrest
while informati
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