Amicus Curiae Brief — Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
. Petiti
v.
RONALD R. YESKEY,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF AMIC1 CURIAE
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP FOR JUSTICE,
AMERICAN FOUNDATION FOR THE BLIND, DISABILITY
RIGHTS COUNCIL OF GREATER WASHINGTON,
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL AND
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
Barbara E. Ransom, Esquire
Judith Gran, Esquire*
125 S. 9th Street
Suite 700
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107
(215) 627-7100
Counsel for The Amici Curiae
*Counsel of Record
BEST AVAILABLE COPY |
1.
FABER GP REFUMMMEUMED co ccccccrsceccnaseneses ii
INTERESTS OF AMBCICURIAER ... wc ccc ccccccccnne 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................-. 3
PRES occ vceversecsnsntweceveseunaeess 4
I. PETITIONERS’ ATTEMPT TO EXEMPT PRISONS
FROM THE ADA Is INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRIMARY
PURPOSE OF CONGRESS TO CREATE A COMPREHENSIVE
STATUTE THAT WOULD ROOT OUT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
IN EVERY ASPECT OF AMERICAN SOCIETY. .......... 4
A. States Have Historically Sponsored,
Supported, and Enacted Policies Which
Purposely Discriminate Against Persons With
PT Te re ee ee ere ee 8
B. Congress Carefully Considered This History
of Unconstitutional Discrimination When It Drafied
—F Srrvrevery vires: eee 10
C. The Broad Scope of Title Il of the ADA Was
Designed to Address the History of Discrimination
and Exclusion of Persons With Disabilities by
Meer eee 17
D. Title Il Does Not Permit Exclusions or
Exceptions for Certain State Entities, Services,
Pe, GPR bs kc kaceznecedeusers 21
OAM cc ee ieevasens sans tedheenetee 27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) .......... 21, 22
Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876. F. Supp. 773 (D. $.C. 1995) .... 21
Allison v. Dep't of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494
ee csc ccccceccecece 26
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) . . . 24
Baker v. Seabold, No. 87-5486, 1987 WL 38691 (6th Cir.
Ce ccene 20
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ............. 5
Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988)........... 20
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.
6, 8, 10
Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481
(9th Cir.1991), petition for cert filed
ES 18, 20, 24, 26
Crowder v. Kitagwa, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) ........ 22 |
Doe v. Gaughan, 808 F.2d 871 (ist Cir. 1986) .......... 24
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) .............. 22
Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F.Supp. 303 (D.N.H.1994) .... 22... 22
Evans v United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)... ......... 19
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) 2... 22
Franklin v. Dist. of Columbia, 960 F.Supp. 394
(D.C.D.C. 19PT) 2. ccc ccc cc cece 21
ii
Galloway v. Superior Court of Dist. of Columbia,
816 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. 1993)... 22
Garcia v. San Antonio Metrcpolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528 (1985). ee 22
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) ............ 18-19
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) ........., 12
Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rys. Comm. , 502 U.S. 197
GD hove cceSe vecenccnccccavacceccccec 18
Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994)... 00... 2]
Journey v. Vitek, 685 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1982)........... 20
LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987) ........ 20, 26
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)............... 24
Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. eee 25
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343
F.Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) .... 2... 2... 8
People v. Agnew, 68 Misc.2d 128; 326 N.Y .S.2d 477
ee NE 66 6 Kobe Weade soe eek 10
Ruiz v. Estelle, S03 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.Tex. 1980),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (Sth Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983) ......... 26
Salinas v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 469(1997). .......... 18
School Bd. of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline.
480 U.S. 273 (1987)... 2... 8, 21, 22
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) .... 19
Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F.Supp. 1190 (N.D. W.Va.1976) . 10, 20
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985). .......... 19
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) .............. 26
Statutes d
24 C.F.R., Part 40, App. A (1989) .................. 21
28 C.F.R. § 39.170)... eee eee eee 20
ED vas ss oa. 8b wee Oks deen 20
GEE, nc cob ood sccnsbaiea danas 2,17
en ee ac cenbeudbaweledane eee 12
ERAT RS VOU Relea a 5 24
ng ey re eg emia 17
American with Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on S.2345
Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Handicapped if the
Committee on Labor and Human Relations, 100th Cong.
SS GE, Se Wc chebeceeoceéee 14
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearings on
H.R. 4498 Before the House Subcomm. on Select
Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 100th
SG SPU, ctkvecuckcececscuse: 15
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on
S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Relations and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 10\st.
Ss CLE oie tcedeeeeebeceberice 14
Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 4151-4157
Sade sbdtbeekwes ctw ebawetecks 5, 20-21
Civit Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ................. 12
IV
Civil Rights of Institutional Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997
RO ca Pitti ge ees 5, 21
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ......................... 22
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994) ................. 5
Education for All Handicapped Children Act,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1970) ................. 5
Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C.
I 5
Mass Gen. Laws ch. 127,§ 133A ................... 10
Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. | REBAR 5
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
ES rari Pees ee passim
Congressional Reports
136 Cong. Rec. S 9695 (daily ed. i, re 7
Committee Reports of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Relations, S.Rep. No. 101-116 at 8 (1989) _._.. 9
H.R. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess, reprinted in 1990
EE 2 ot pb dares u cutee. passim
President's Commission on the HIV Epidemic
NY ich” ee nar 6,7, 11
S. Rep. No. 64, 100TH Cong., Ist Sess. 1987 .......... 12
S. Rep. No. 101-116, 101st Cong. Ist Sess. 1989 ...... passim
Other Sources
Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream (March 1986)
(surveying 1000 disabled persons) ..........-++-+- 11
Timothy M. Cook, The Scope of the Right to Meaningful
Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under
Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1471
GERD oo cece ceed eecn cee seseedecescooese 5
J. Ellis & R. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 414, 479-480 (1985) . 4
From ADA to Empowerment: The Report of the
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of
Americans with Disabilities (Oct. 12, 1990) ........ 11
Louis Harris and Associates, The ICD (International
Center for the Disabled) Survey of Disabled Americans:
Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream
GENES cc cecctcccsecswestedesccoces ll
Louis Harris and Associates, Employing The ICD
Sa eee
Joint Report of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
and Public Citizen's Health Group, Criminalizing the
Seriously Mentally Ill: The Abuse of Jails as Mental
rrr eee 11, 24
J. Landman, Human Sterilization 302-303 (1932) ......... ll
A. Moore, The Feeble-Minded in New York 3 (1911) ...... 8-9
National Council on the Handicapped, Toward Independence
GED 6 coc SR a cccesciseoacscecseceves 11
National Council on the Handicapped, On the Threshold of
Independence (Jan.1988) ... 2... 6 eee eee 1]
vi
Ira P. Robbins, George Bush's America Meets Dante's
Inferno: The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison,
1S Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 49 (1996) .............. 25
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating
the Spectrum of Individual Abilities
Pe scedéleteaeedueacse cee 9, 10, 11, 12
M.C. Weber, Disability Discrimination By StateAnd
Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 Of The Rehabilitation Act And Title II
of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 36 Wm. & Mary L.
ey St deters beeceacecescs sees ox 12
Vil
No. 97-634
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
RONALD R. YESKEY,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP FOR JUSTICE, AMERICAN
FOUNDATION FOR THE BLIND, DISABILITY RIGHTS COUNCIL OF
GREATER WASHINGTON, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE
MENTALLY ILL AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PEOPLE WITH
AIDS IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
INTERESTS OF AMICIC CURIAE
Amicus curiae National Advisory Group for Justice has been
granted consent to participate in the briefing by all the parties and
is joined by amici curiae American Foundation for the Blind,
Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington, National Alliance
for the Mentally Ill, and National Association for People with
AIDS. All these amici curiae are deeply familiar with our Nation's
disabilities and with the various legislative efforts to redress this
discrimination, particularly the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101- 12213 (ADA) (1990).'
The amici curiae are: organizations comprised of persons
with disabilities and their families; organizations instrumental in the
drafting and enactment of the ADA and other civil rights
legislation; organizations involved on a daily basis in shaping
national policy on disability and other anti-discrimination issues,
including the implementation of the ADA; and, organizations
advocating for the rights and interests of persons with disabilities.
A short description of each organization appears in the Addendum.
These organizations and their members have direct
experience with the state sponsored discriminatory activities and
attitudes which informed Congress in its drafting of the ADA.
They have a direct stake in the interpretation of the Act, including
both its scope and its constitutionality. Finally, these orga izations
and their members include families with loved ones in prison who
would be immediately and negatively affected by the limitations
proposed by the petitioners in this case.
‘No Counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. no person
or entity other than the amnici curiae, its members, and its counsel made any
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Throughout the history of our Nation, individuals with
disabilities have been subjected to a regime of segregation,
invidious discrimination, and exclusion. That regime is reflected in
a tapestry of state laws, policies, and practices. It reveals a legacy
of state sponsored and codified prejudice grounded in stereotypes
and inaccurate perceptions of the abilities and limitations of many
of our citizens. Despite piecemeal legislative efforts to eradicate
these deeply-rooted patterns of discrimination over five decades,
the regime has remained pervasive and wide-spread. Congress
sought to redress this national problem with the passage of the
ADA.
Congress, the voice of the States speaking in unison on issues
that affect the Nation, is a body of duly elected representatives of the
people. Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act to
move existing Constitutional protections within the grasp of
individuals with disabilities and remedy the effects of the invidious
Congress intended that the Act reach any State or local government
department or agency, including the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections.
Amici curiae recognize that State prisons are penal
institutions, the responsibility for and management of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of the respective States, and do not suggest otherwise in
its argument. The administrators of State prisons must overcome
Herculean obstacles as they seek to maintain order and discipline ,
secure their institutions, and rehabilitate, to the extent possible, the
inmates placed in their custody. Amici in no way seek to minimize
or reassign those task nor do they portend to seek special privileges
for persons with disabilities.
Amici merely ask that this Court consider only that Ronald
Yeskey asked to participate in a program established and
implemented by administrators of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections to the same extent as his similarly situated non-disabled
peers. Ronald Yeskey was not allowed to participate solely on the
basis of his disability. Petitioners’ denial is consistent with reports
that persons with disabilities receive longer and harsher sentences,
serve more of their sentences than do their non-disabled peers and
are more unlikely to receive any habilitation while incarcerated.’
ARGUMENT
1. | PETITIONERS' ATTEMPT TO EXEMPT PRISONS FROM THE
ADA Is INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF
CONGRESS TO CREATE A COMPREHENSIVE STATUTE THAT
WOULD Root OUT UNCONSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN EVERY ASPECT OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY.
The ADA was the culmination of a prolonged legislative
initiative begun in earnest more than twenty years earlier with the
passage of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
794, which prohibits discrimination in any program or activity --
including programs operated by State agencies -- that receives
Federal financial assistance.” Congress intended the Rehabilitation
*See, e.g., J. Ellis & R. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 414, 479-480 (1985).
*In addition to the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA was built on the foundation
established by Congress through the enactment of numerous other statutes in
the two decades preceding the ADA that prohibited discrimination against
4
Act to cure the Nation’s “failure to recognize the intrinsic rights of
the handicapped.” Timothy M. Cook, The Scope of the Right to
Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under
Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1471, 1478
(1987). Three years of hearings prior to the enactment of § 504
made clear to the lawmakers that “although accessibility would
entail burdens, eliminating the evil of exclusion would
economically and morally outweigh the costs.” Jd. at 1478-79.
Despite the intent behind the Rehabilitation Act to extend
protection to persons with disabilities, discrimination persisted.
After extensive consideration of continuing and pervasive
discrimination faced by people with disabilities, Congress came to
the conclusion that existing federal and state laws were not
adequate, that its piecemeal approach to legislating in different
people with disabilities. These included: the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, 20 U.S.C.§§ 1401-1485 (1970), enacted despite this Court's
opining that *[Education] is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments...required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities” Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), and in the
wake of judicial decisions holding that the exclusion of children with
disabilities from public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause: the
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
$§ 6000-6083 (1994) (amending Mental Retardation Facilities and Community
Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963), enacted because Congress
found that government funded agencies “tend to overlook or exclude persons
with developmental disabilities in their planning and delivery of services,”
$ 6000(a)(4), and which required States to assure protection of civil rights and
the provision of treatment, services, and habilitation; the Fair Housing
Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988), that prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability in the sale or rental of housing; the
Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1968), that requires
federally funded or leased buildings to be accessible; the Urban Mass
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1612-1625 (1970) (repealed July 5, 1994),
requiring eligible jurisdictions to provide accessibility plans for mass
§ 1997 (1980), which gives discretionary authority to the U.S. Attorney
General to bring an action against “any State or political subdivision of a State
official, employee, or agent thereof, or other person acting on behalf of a etate
for depriving institutionalized persons of rights secured under the constitution
or federal laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a).
5
substantive areas was ineffective and confusing, and that
comprehensive federal legislation was imperative to protect all
people with disabilities against all forms of discrimination, whether
public or private. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 47-48,
reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 330.* As Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh, speaking on behalf of President Bush, told
Congress:
One of its (the ADA's) most impressive strengths is its
comprehensive character. Over the last 20 years civil rights
laws protecting disabled persons have been enacted in a
piecemeal fashion. Thus, existing federal laws are like a
patchwork quilt in need of repair. There are holes in the
fabric, serious gaps in coverage that leave persons with
disabilities without adequate civil rights protection.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 48; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 19
(1989).° :
The need for additional comprehensive Federal legislation
was also recognized by State officials who testified about the ADA
before Congressional committees. For example, the Committee
Reports cite the testimony of Neil Hartigan, the Attorney General
from Illinois, who stated:
“See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
443 (1985) (six years prior to these hearings, this Court recognized the need
for Federal legislative protections for persons with disabilities because of the
historical failure of states to ensure individual rights).
was one of the major recommendations made by the National Council on
Disability in its two reports to Congress, and was recommended by the
President's Commission on the HIV Epidemic, as well. H.R. Rep. 101-485, pt.
2, at 48; S. Rep. No.101-116, at 19.
Under the current federal law, the Rehabilitation Act's non-
discrimination requirements are tied to the receipt of federal
financial assistance. Unfortunately, what this translates to is
total confusion for the disability community and the inability
to expect consistent treatment. Where there is no state law
prohibiting discriminatory practices, two programs that are
exactly alike, except for funding sources, can treat people
with disabilities completely differently from those who don't
have disabilities.
S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 12.° Congress’ intent was to ensure that
all decisions based on disability, public or private, were guided by
facts, not myths, fears, and stereotypes. As Senator Dole stated:
We have included in this legislation all people with all
disabilities, no matter how misunderstood, because that is
what this bill is about--replacing misunderstanding with
understanding.
136 Cong. Rec. $ 9695 (July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dole).
“Further evidence of State support for the ADA came from the Chairman of
the President's Committee on the Employment of Persons with Disabilities who
informed Congress that:
the fifty State Governors’ Committees, with whom the President's
Committee works, report that existing State laws do not adequately
counter such acts of discrimination.” $. Rep. No. 101-116, at 18.
discrimination on their own. The Committee Reports cite the testimony of
Admiral James Watson, Chairperson of the President's Commission on the
HIV Epidemic, who stated:
[E}nough time has, in my opinion, been given to the States to
legislate what is right. Too many States, for whatever reason, still
perpetuate confusion, It is time for Federal action. Id.
7
A. States Have Historically Sponsored, Supported, and
Enacted Policies Which Purposely Discriminate Against
Persons With Disabilities.
Congressional consideration of the ADA took place against
an historical backdrop of longstanding State sponsored
discrimination against people with disabilities that can only be
called "grotesque." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 438. This
discrimination arose not only from deep-seated prejudice against
individuals with disabilities, but from archaic laws that reflect
inaccurate stereotypes about disabilities. School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987). For example, during
the early part of the 20th century, practically every state adopted a
policy of segregating and isolating individuals with disabilities for
life in massive custodial institutions. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461-
462 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting in part). The States
actively inculcated fear of mentally retarded persons and undertook
major outreach efforts to identify and remove them from the
community. The State of Pennsylvania excluded mentally retarded
children from public schools by enacting laws which relieved the
State Board of Education “from any obligation to educate a child
whom a public school psychologist certifies as uneducable and
untrainable.” Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F.Supp. 279, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
The virulence and bigotry directed by the States towards
people with disabilities "rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst
excesses of Jim Crow." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461, (Marshall, J,
concurring and dissenting in part). People with disabilities were
blamed for all of society's worst evils, from crime to poverty. The
goal was not merely to separate them from the community, but to
prevent them from reproducing so as to literally “nearly extinguish
their race." Jd. at 462 (citing A. Moore, The Feeble-Minded in
New York 3(1911)). “To assure this end, twenty-nine states
enacted compulsory eugenic sterilization laws between 1907 and
1931." dd. at 463 (citing J. Landman, Human Sterilization 302-303
(1932)). State legislation also prohibited people with mental
retardation from marrying. Similar laws were directed at
individuals with epilepsy and mental illness. Most states
categorically disqualified “idiots” and other persons labeled as
disabled from voting, without regard to individual capacity and
with discretion to exclude left in the hands of low-level election
officials. Id. at 464.
Although one might have hoped that archaic state laws and
practices that blatantly discriminated against people with disabilities
would have disappeared by the 1980's, this was not the reality
confronting Congress as it began to draft the ADA. For example,
even in 1983 fifteen states still had laws authorizing the compulsory
sterilization of individuals with mental illness or retardation, and at
least four states authorized the sterilization of persons with
epilepsy.’ Thousands of individuals with disabilities remained
unnecessarily segregated in large institutions where abuse by staff,
and other dangerous physical conditions, were common. U.S.
Commission Report at 33-35. Moreover, people with disabilities
continued to be denied basic civil rights that other citizens take for
granted. For example, many states unjustifiably restricted the right
of persons with disabilities to vote, to hold public office, or to
obtain a license to hunt or fish. /d. at 40. Many states also
"U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of
Individual Disabilities at 37 (1983) (hereinafter U.S. Commission Report]. As
petitioners recognize the U_S. Commission Report was heavily relied upon by
Congress in assessing the nature and extent of the discrimination that still
existed against persons with disabilities. Petitioners’ Brief at 16-17. The
Report was entered into testimony before House and Senate subcommittees and
was quoted in the Committee Reports of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Relations, $.Rep. No. 101-116, at 8 (1989) and the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28, 31 (1990).
9
prohibited individuals with disabilities from marrying or entering
into contracts. /d. Indeed, several states continued to make
marriages of the mentally retarded a criminal offense. Cleburne, |
473 U.S. at 463. Many states mandated that parents with
to terminate parental rights. U.S. Commission Report at 40, 167.
Governmental discrimination was pervasive throughout the
criminal justice system." Jd. at 168.
B. Congress Carefully Considered This History of
Unconstitutional Discrimination When It Drafted the ADA.
Before enacting the ADA, Congress carefully explored the
problems of discrimination against people with disabilities. It
conducted numerous hearings on the ADA and considered
testimony by hundreds of people about discrimination across the
entire spectrum of governmental functions, including education,
law enforcement such as police, courts, and jails. In its extensive
deliberations on the ADA,’ Congress also reviewed authoritative
patients from seeking parole, even though the courts had long since declared
that such laws violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
127, § 133A. See also Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F.Supp. 1190 (N._D. W.Va.
1976), People v. Agnew, 68 Mise.2d 128, 133-134; 326 N.Y.S.2d 477, N.Y.
Sup. Ct. (1971).
*The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Senate
Subcommittee on the Handicapped held five hearings on the bill. On
September 7, 1989, the bill passed the Senate with overwhelming support by a
vote of 76 to 8. In the House, over twenty hearings were held before four
House committees’ subcommittees. The House and Senate Conference
Committee convened twice. The conference bill passed by an overwhelming
majority in both the House (by a vote of 377 to 28) and the Senate (by a vote of
91 to 6). The ADA was signed by President Bush on July 26, 1990.
10
status of people with disabilities, all of which concluded that
comprehensive civil rights legislation was necessary to combat
pervasive discrimination against people with disabilities. '°
Contrary to petitioners’ claim, however, the report does
not focus simply on the warehousing of disabled people in
segregated institutions. It also describes discrimination in more
than 20 broad categories of state provided or supported programs
or services, and refers specifically to prisons and jails as settings
types of discrimination by the criminal justice system, including:
Disproportionate number of mentally retarded people in
"° Both the House and the Senate cited seven substantive studies or reports
to support the conclusion that discrimination against the disabled is a serious
and pervasive problem. S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 6; H.R.Rep. No. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 28 (both citing National Council on the Handicapped: On the
Threshold of Independence (Jan. 1988) (updating the legislative changes
recommended in Toward Independence)); Report of the President's
Commussion on the HIV Epidemic (June 1988) (reviewing the medical,
financial, ethical, policy, and legal issues that affect those afflicted with HIV):
Louis Harris and Associates, Employing The ICD (International Center for the
Disabled) Survey II: Disabled Americans (1987) (surveying 210 top managers,
301 equal employment managers, 210 department heads and line managers,
and 200 top managers in companies employing 10-49 people); Louis Harris
and Associates, The ICD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled
Amencans into the Mainstream (March 1986) (surveying 1000 disabled
persons), National Council on the Handicapped, Toward Independence
(Feb. 1986) (reviewing different laws and programs that affect disabled persons
and offering recommendations for legislative changes); U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (Sept. 1983)
(reporting on, among other things, the history, nature, and extent of
discrmination against the disabled); From ADA to Empowerment: The Report
of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilites (Oct. 12, 1990) (compiling findings and recommendations
following the formation of a Task Force, which conducted 14 Washington,
D C , teleconference meetings with participants from across the country, held
63 public forums in the 50 states and some territories, held other meetings
involving 25,000 participants, testified in congressional hearings, met with
and vanous Cabinet members, and met with opponents of the ADA).
11
communication with handicapped persons by law
enforcement personnel; Insufficient availability of
interpreters; Inadequate treatment and rehabilitation
programs in penal and juvenile facilities; Inability to deal
with physically handicapped accused persons and convicts,
(e.g. accessible jail cells and toilet facilities); and, abuse of
handicapped persons by other inmates.
U.S. Commission Report at 168."
Title II was the least dramatic of the ADA's additions to
existing law; its primary purpose was to extend to all State entities
the non-discrimination requirements already applicable to most
governmental agencies under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.’
Nonetheless, as petitioners concede, Congress heard a wealth of
"The legislative history of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
enacted to overturn the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City College
v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), shows that Congress understood that the
Rehabilitanon Act applies to pnsons. The Senate Report explained the need
for acuon as follows:
Clear violations of federal law go uncorrected while students lose
valuable educational benefits that can rarely be recovered and
employees lose jobs or job opportunities. Prolonged debate takes
place over what constitutes a “program or activity” under the civil
rights law, while the universities, schools, and correctional facilities
receive millions of federal dollars.
S. Rep. No. 64, 100th Cong., ist Sess. 24 (1987) (emphasis supplied).
"See M.C. Weber, Disability Discrimination By State And Local
Government. The Relationship Between Section 504 Of The Rehabilitation Act
and Title Il of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1089, 1117 (1995) (suggesting that Title II's legislative history is, in reality, a
form of subsequent legislative history for section 504). Further, the ADA itself
provides that “[nJothing in the ADA shall be construed to provide a lesser
standard than the standard applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act.” 42
U.S.C.§ 12201(a). The legislative history of Title II also displays strong
support for § 504 and its regulations. See, H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 1, at
26.
12
——
testimony from a wide range of people, including “mothers,
fathers, and children; from students and workers", who all “spoke
eloquently about the daily problems they encounter in society as a
result of their disabilities." Petitioners’ Brief at 13. Congress
heard powerful accounts of discrimination by many types of public
entities, including the courts, schools, voting, police and fire
departments, mental retardation institutions, as well as about
prisons and jails.
For example, the House Reports describe discrimination
against people with epilepsy in the criminal justice system:
In order to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it
is often necessary to provide training to public employees
about disability. For example, persons who have epilepsy ,
and a variety of other disabilities, are frequently
inappropriately arrested and jailed because police officers
have not received proper training in the recognition of and
deprived of medications while in jail, resulting in further
seizures. Such discriminatory treatment based on disability
can be avoided by proper training.”
Similarly, Belinda Mason, a board member of the National
Association of People with AIDS, testified:
A man passing through a central Kentucky town was
stopped for drunk driving. After he told the arresting
officers that he had AIDS, the man's car was driven to a
parking lot of the jail. Instead of putting the man in jail,
"H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(IIl), at 50, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. vol.
4, 473.
13
the officers locked him inside his car to spend the night.
The car was eventually surrounded by sightseers, staring
and pointing at the man.
A woman in another part of Kentucky had managed a
school cafeteria for a number of years. Her adult son, who was
living in California, became ill with AIDS. The woman went to
California to bring her son home so she could care for him. But
when she returned, she was abruptly fired from her job."
Justin Dart, the Chairperson of the Task Force on the
Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, related
the following account, which had been told to the Task Force by a
ider to hearing impaired individuals in Illinois:
We have clients who have been arrested and held in jail
over night without ever knowing their rights nor what they
are being held for. We have clients whose children have
been taken away from them and told to get parent
information, but have no place to go because the services
are not accessible. What chance do they ever have to get
their children back?”
Cindy Miller, a Massachusetts rehabilitation counselor,
testified about the abominable treatment of individuals with
disabilities in state institutions and by police across the country:
“Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on S.2345 Before
the Senate Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm on Labor and Human
Relations, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988).
“Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Relations and the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped, 10st. Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
i4
As a rehabilitation counselor, I have seen these institutions.
The smell of human waste and detergent has stuck in my
throat. I have looked into the vegetative eyes of its
inmates in their sterile environments. . . . I have
witnessed their jailers rationalize taking away their
wheelchairs as a form of “punishment” -- as if that is
different then punishing prisoners by breaking their legs. |
have witnessed their jailers taking away their food as form
of “punishment” -- as if that is different than starvation. |
have witnessed their jailers talk about them in the third
person and leave them naked to the public — as if this
doesn't strip them of their human dignity. We have laws
to protect animals from these conditions, while Americans
with disabilities continue to suffer.
Crimes against Americans with disabilities is an ignored
epidemic in America. The Police do not provide crime
prevention, apprehension or prosecution because they see it
as fate that Americans with disabilities will be victims. I
have given up on police protection because of their attitude
that Americans with disabilities are natural victims. Never
was this so graphic as when an officer pointed his gun at
my head, cocked it, and unknowingly to me pulled the
trigger on an empty barrel because he thought it would be
“funny” since I have quadraparesis and couldn't flee or
fight."
deliberately excluded people with disabilities from the court
“Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearings on H.R. 4498 Before
the House Subcomm. on Select Education of the Comm. on Education and
Labor, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988).
15
system, voting, and jury service.'’ For example, Emeka Nwojke,
a Massachusetts resident, testified about his experience in court,
where he went to pursue a complaint that he had been unlawfully
discriminated against because of his disability:
First of all, I could not get into the building because there
were about 500 steps to get in there. Then I called for the
security guard to help me, who happened to be a
policeman. He told me there was an entrance at the back
door for the handicapped people... . I readily agreed
and I went to the back door. I went to the back door and
there were three more stairs for me to get over to be able
to ring a bell to announce my arrival so that somebody
would come and open the door and maybe let me in. I was
not able to do that. So, I was at the back door for an hour
waiting for somebody to come back so I could call for
help. This is the court system that is supposed to give me a
fair hearing. It took me 2 hours to get in."
Based on its exhaustive and meticulous consideration of
this and similar testimony and reports, Congress made nine general
Findings about the widespread discrimination against persons with
disabilities that existed in virtually every aspect of society.'? These
"Id. Testimony of Nancy Turkin, executive director of the Center for
Independent Living.
* Id. Testimony of Nancy Husted-Jensen, Chairman of the Governor's
Commission on the Handicapped in Rhode Island. She recanted the
Constitutional deprivation experienced by persons with disabilities who tried to
vote. The Board of Election Commission's director told her that even though
they were registered, voters with disabilities had been turned away at the
polling place for “not looking competent.”
"These findings include, inter alia, that 43,000,000 Americans with
physical or mental disabilities have been isolated, segregated and discriminated
against in such critical areas as employment, public accommodations,
16
Findings provide the rationale for the purpose, sc»pe, and remedial
standards of the ADA. They represent the factual and legal
predicate for Congress’ actions. They more than support
Congress’ conclusion that it was necessary to “provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a). Nota single one of the Congressional Findings is
incompatible or irrelevant to prisons.”
C. The Broad Scope of Title Il of the ADA Was Designed
to Address the History of Discrimination and Exclusion of
Persons With Disabilities by States and State Entities.
The ADA's universal mandate applies to every agency and
official of state government.” There is no exception for prisons or
education, institutionalization, and access to public services; individuals who
have been discriminated against on the basis of disability often have no legal
recourse to redress discrimination that has tended to relegate them to lesser
services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities, the
Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure —
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals; and the continuing existence of unfair and
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free
society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity. 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a).
*Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the term “public services,” as used in
Finding 3 and in the heading of Title II, is not limited to services available to
the general public. By definition, Title Il, encompasses all the programs and =
services of a “public entity,” many of which are not open to the general public.
Further, the phrase “our free society” in Finding 9 is a reference to America’s
political tradition and values, and was hardly meant to draw a distinction
between people in prison and those in the community.
"Title I prohibits discrimination in the “services, programs, or activities of
a public entity,” and defines a “public entity” to include “any department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States
local government.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(B), 12132 (1990).
17
any other unit of state government. In fact, Congress deliberately
chose not to list all of the different state functions covered by Title
II in order to ensure that there would be no gaps in its universal
coverage of all units of state and local government.”
There is no merit to petitioners’ contention that the ‘clear
statement rule,” articulated by the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991), removes state prisons from the scope of
Title II. Even if the clear statement doctrine is relevant to the
interpretation of a federal statute that impinges on the operations of
a State prison, it only applies if the statute is ambiguous. Salinas v.
United States, 118 S.Ct. 469, 475 (1997); Hilton v. South Carolina
Public Rys. Comm. , 502 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1991); Gregory, 501
U.S. at 467. It does not permit the courts to take seriously every
far-fetched interpretation of a statute offered by litigants. As the
Court explained in Salinas:
A statute can be unambiguous without addressing every
interpretative theory offered by a party. It need only be
“plain to anyone reading the Act” that the statute applies to
™See H.R. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 84.
“It is doubtful whether the “clear statement rule” has any applicability at all
to Title II's regulation of state prisons. In Gregory, the Court justified its
apy ‘ication of the rule, previously invoked only to assess a purported
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, because the federal statute at
issue impinged on a state constitutional provision governing the qualifications
of state judges, a subject which "goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by
the States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity.”
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. As Judge Posner stated in Crawford v. Indiana
Dep't. of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997), petition for cert.
filed, (Dec. 19, 1997):
Maybe there is an inner core of sovereign functions, such as the
balance of power between governor and state legislature, that if
somehow imperiled by the ADA would be protected by the
clear-statement rule, but the mere provision of public services, such
as schools and prisons, is not within that inner core.
18
the conduct at issue.
118 S.Ct. at 475 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467). No matter
how much the Federal statute may intrude on a traditional state
function, a court "cannot press statutory construction to the point of
disingenuous evasion." Id. (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, n.9 (1996)). Otherwise, the clear statement
rule, “while purporting to be an exercise in judicial restraint,
would trench upon the legislative powers vested in Congress by
Art. I, § 1, of the Constitution." United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675, 680 (1985).
The clear statement rule does not warrant a departure from
the terms of Title II to exclude prisoners from its protection. No
ordinary reader could plausibly conclude that the definition of
“public entity” excludes a state department of corrections, or any
other state entity for that matter.“ When it uses language that is
plainly comprehensive, Congress does not have to list by name
each particular state function it intends to regulate.” Gregory, 501
U.S. at 467. As Judge Posner stated:
We doubt, moreover, that Congress could speak much more
clearly than it did when it made the Act expressly applicable
to all public entities and defined the term “public entity" to
include every possible agency of state or local government.
*Title Il is not per se ambiguous just because some courts have strained to
find ambiguity where none exists.
* By contrast, the statute at issue in Gregory (the ADEA) was “sweeping
or. its face, and our task was to construe an exception from that otherwise
broad coverage.” Evans v United States, 504 U.S. 255, 294, n.8 (1992)
(Thomas J., dissenting). The court invoked the clear statement rule only
because the exception — for "an appointee on the policy making level” — was
susceptible of two plausible constructions. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456.
19
Crawford, 115 F.3d at 485.
Furthermore, the ADA expressly requires that the Act be
construed to provide at least the protections available under the
standards and regulations of the Rehabilitation Act. In its
deliberations on the ADA, Congress took great pains to study § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act to determine its inadequacies and make
changes where it thought appropriate.” By the time Congress
enacted the ADA, every court considering the question had ruled
that the Rehabilitation Act applied to prisons,” and the Department
of Justice had promulgated regulations setting forth the
requirements imposed by the Act in prison.” This Court had also
**The report of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for example, in
explaining the origins of Title II, stated:
Seventeen years of experience with section 504 - in the developmen’
and issuance of regulations, guidelines, and standards, in the
implementation of those requirements, and in the interpretation of |
law - have demonstrated the need for further legislative action in this
areca.
H.R. 104-485, 101 Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 24.
"Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988); Journey v. Vitek, 685
F.2d 239, 242 (8th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Seabold, No. 87-5486, 1987 WL
38691 (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1987); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F.Supp. 1190 (N.D.
W.Va.1976). See also LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987)
(vacating as moot judgment of district court that prison officials violated
Rehabilitation Act).
"See 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(h) (program includes a "department of
corrections”); 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(d)(ii) (setting forth procedure for prisoner to
file a complaint). Significantly, this regulation was submitted to Congress
during its consideration of the ADA. Further, the ADA requires the Attorney
General to promulgate regulations governing "program accessibility, existing
facilites” that are consistent with the Rehabilitation Act regulations set forth in
28 C.F.R. Part 39, 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b). In turn, 28 C.F.R. Part 39.150,
which governs “program accessibility, existing facilities”, mandates that state
agencies covered by the Rehabilitation Act "meet accessibility requirements to
the extent compelled by the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, as amended (42
U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157), and any regulations implementing it." At the time the
ADA was passed, the regulations promulgated under the Architectural Barriers
20
repeatedly emphasized that the federal regulations are "an
important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504." School Bd.
of Nassau County, 480 U.S. at 279 (quoting Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 304 n.24 (1985)). There is nothing in either the text
or legislative history of the ADA to suggest that Congress
disapproved of the application of the Rehabilitation Act to prisons,
or that it wished the ADA to be interpreted differently.
Application of Title II to persons in State prisons is consistent
with other civil rights legislation passed by Congress, such as the
Civil Rights Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), which
empowers the U.S. Attorney General to initiate civil actions to
protect the constitutional and statutory rights of persons residing in
institutions, including correctional facilities. 42 U.S.C. 1997
(1)(B)(ii). Although Congress amended CRIPA in 1997 to limit
prisoner litigation, it could have, but did not seek to eliminate the
ADA from the scope of its protection. The broad language of Title
II also parallels that in other federal anti-discrimination statutes,
such as Title VI and Title [X of the Civil Rights Act and the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, that have been applied
to correctional facilities. See Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th
Cir. 1994) (Title IX); Franklin v. District of Columbia, 960
F.Supp. 394, 432 (D.C. D.C. 1997) (Title VI); Alexander S. v.
Boyd, 876. F. Supp. 773 (D. S.C. 1995) (IDEA).
D. Title Il Does Not Permit Exclusions or Exceptions
for Certain State Entities, Services, Functions, or
Locations
The petitioners contend that because prison management is a
Act included the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards accessibility
guidelines, then set forth in 24 C.F.R. Part 40, App. A (1989), which, at §
4.1.4{9)(c), explicitly refer to "detention or correctional facilities.
21
core function traditionally left to the discretion of the States, the
Court should invent an exception from Title II specifically for this
State program. Although there is no question that prison
management is one of a state's most significant responsibilities, it is
no more vital than any other important government function, such
as education, public health, voting, child protection services, or the
courts, all of which are routinely understood to be covered by both
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” The interpretative strategy
urged by the petitioners lacks rational boundaries and could
eviscerate Title II if it were applied to remove other important
State programs and services from the scope of the ADA.
As this Court recognized in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985), it is
“difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle" to
distinguish those federal statutes that "trench on traditional
gO-crnmental functions" from those that do not. Petitioners’
approach could therefore threaten to exclude significant segments
of State and local governmental activities from the reach of other
federal statutes, such as Title VI, Title VII and Title IX of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. This would require the reversal of an
enormous body of settled law, since federal courts have regularly
applied civil rights statutes that are phrased in general terms to a
variety of governmental activities that could be characterized as
"core state functions." See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
*See, ¢.g., Crowder v. Kitagwa, 81 F.3d at 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996)
(state public health and safety legislation); Galloway v. Superior Court of Dist.
of Columbia, 816 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D.C. 1993) (courts and jurors); Eric L. v.
Bird, 848 F.Supp. 303 (D. N.H. 1994) (state foster care services). This Court
has also concluded that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to public schools
and public health, School Bd. of Nassau County, 480 U.S. 273 and medical
care, Alexander, 469 U.S. 287.
22
Like prisons, a number of essential State entities are not
specifically mentioned by Title II, do not always provide services
to people who participate voluntarily, and are not necessarily open
to the general public. For example, every day thousands of
individuals with disabilities have business in the state courts — both
civil and criminal — as parties, witnesses, jurors, employees, or
citizens observing the proceedings. Yet Title II makes no explicit
mention of the courts, and they are not expressly referred to in any
of the Congressional Findings.” Further, many psychiatric and
forensic facilities provide mental health and restoration services to
committed patients in locked settings that are closed to the public.
The same is true of developmental centers for persons with
retardation that provide custodial and rehabilitation services to
programs, such as State operated group homes, public health
hospitals, child protection services, and numerous government
offices, are well within the scope and purpose of Title II even
though not open to the public in any meaningful sense.
Even within the general category of law enforcement, it
might be difficult to carve out an exemption limited to state
prisons. Other state law enforcement programs, such as forensic
hospitals, juvenile delinquency programs, community corrections,
treatment centers for sex offenders who have completed their
sentences, probation, parole, and jails could arguably be
Many other examples of core state functions that are not explicitly listed in
cuher Title ll or in the Congyessional Findings demonstrate the fallacy of
petitioners’ tortured reading of Title II. Could a fire department allow an
unwanted group home for people with mental retardation to burn to the ground
without nsking a lawsuit under the ADA? Are police free to ignore crimes
cerebral palsy from its galleries because it thought them too disturbing to look
at? None of these state entities are mentioned by name in Title Il.
23
excluded.” Whether the ADA was applicable or not could depend
on whether the program at issue was run by the department of
correction Or a separate state agency in that particular state. For
example, Congress clearly intended that facilities like Atascadero
State Hospital -- a maximum security forensic institution operated
by the California Department of Mental Health -- be covered by
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.” Yet in many states identical
facilities are run by the Department of Correction even though they
can hold patients who have not committed any crime.” Petitioners’
concession that certain activities within the prison, such as visiting
rooms and administrative buildings, are properly within the reach
of Title II further illustrates the difficulties and arbitrariness of the
effort to write exemptions into Title II that have no basis in its
textual language.
There is nothing “absurd” or at odds with the purposes of the
ADA to extend its protections to prisoners. See Crawford, 115
F.3d at 485-487. Just as the prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of race applies to the segregation of prisoners, Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), it is reasonable to proscribe
discrimination on the basis of disability in the programs available in
“Although jails pnmarily hold people who are awaiting trial and presumed
innocent, forty-five states use jails to detain people with mental illness who are
wailing for a psychiatne evaluation or mental health services in the community,
and have not even been charged with a crime. See Joint Report of the National
Alliance for the Mentally Ill and Public Citizen's Health Group, Criminalizing
the Serwousty Mentally Ill: The Abuse of Jails as Mental Hospitals (1992).
“Congress responded to this Court's decision in Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985), by amending the Rehabilitation Act to
ensure that discruminauon of the sort alleged in that case would be covered.
Moreover, the ADA includes a waiver of sovereign immunity, 42 U.S.C., §
12202, that was expressly designed to comply with standards set forth in
Atascadero. S.Rep. No. 101-116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. at 86.
"See, e.g., Doe v. Gaughan, 808 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1986) (describing
Bridgewater State Hospital in Massachusetts).
24
state correctional facilities. Prisoners suffer from the same wide
range of disabilities experienced by individuals with disabilities in
the community. Some use wheelchairs, some are blind, mentally
retarded, or deaf, and others suffer from AIDS, epilepsy, mental
iliness, diabetes, or cerebral palsy. Within the prison environment,
they are vulnerable to identical, if not worse, discrimination and
oppression than that faced by people with disabilities in the
community or other institutional settings.“ This may include
intentional mistreatment resulting from bias and stereotypes, as
well as the denial of the opportunity to participate in programs,
services, and activities within the prison. For example, a deaf
prisoner who cannot communicate with the prison doctor about a
medical issue is in exactly the same desperate position as a deaf
person in a psychiatric institution with a similar need. Both are at
a considerable disadvantage compared to a deaf person in the
community who has the option of seeking another doctor.
Similarly, a prisoner who cannot access rehabilitative programs
because he uses a wheelchair, and therefore cannot earn "good
time” or satisfy the prerequisites of the parole board, suffers the
same harm as a person with the identical disability who remains
unnecessarily institutionalized because she cannot attend vocational
programs in a mental hospital.
Application of Title II of the ADA to prisons is no more
complex nor no less critical than it is in any other institution where
people are held involuntarily and virtually every aspect of their
lives is controlled. Most of the problems facing individuals with
disabilities have exactly the same solutions in prison as in the
“Ira P. Robbins, George Bush's America Meets Dante's Inferno. The
Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 49 (1996).
See also Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1986) (prison guard
repeatedly assaulted paraplegic inmates with knife, forced them to sit in own
feces, and taunted them with remarks like "you crippled bastard you should be
dead”).
25
community: make buildings and bathrooms accessible, provide
interpreters and auxiliary communication devices, and ensure that
or services by eligibility requirements produced by erroneous
stereotypes.” Nor are prisons unique in confronting conflicts
between competing goals in the management of difficult people.
Similar conflicts arise whether the institution is a conventional
mental hospital where patients may be both violent and mentally ill,
Or an institution for people with mental retardation where fiscal
constraints make it difficult to satisfy the treatment and habilitation
needs of all residents. Even in a state university, the administration
faces complicated operational and budgetary issues that affect
every aspect of the daily lives of the students, staff, and faculty.
The ADA does not require prison administrators, anymore
than any other public official, to do anything that is unreasonable
or unduly burdensome or that would fundamentally alter its
programs. What is “reasonable” will depend on the circumstances,
and in the prison context, important management concerns such as
security are “highly relevant to determining the feasibility of the
accommodations disabled prisoners need in order to have access to
desired programs and services." Crawford, 115 F.3d at 487.*
*Many of the accommodations required by the ADA are also mandated by
the Constitution. See, ¢.g., LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d at 394 (finding
unconstitutional, in an opinion written by retired Supreme Court Justice
Powell, the failure to provide paraplegic inmate with handicap toilet in cell and
work area); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1346 (S.D.Tex. 1980), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (Sth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1042 (1983) (mentally retarded prisoners facing disciplinary charges must be
provided with “counsel substitute” under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
570 (1974), even though non-disabled inmates have no such right).
“Courts have consistently applied Title I of the ADA to employment of
prison guards hy taking into account prison management and security
concerns. See, e.g., Allison v. Dep't of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494 (8th Cir.
1996).
26
Thus, the ADA will no more wreak havoc within the prison system
than it has in any other state program.
CONCLUSION
Amici curiae ask this Court to focus on the harm that
occurred when the Pennsylvania department of corrections denied
Ronald Yeskey, a person with a disability, solely on the basis of his
disability, equal access to a program authorized by the General
Assembly. The Legislature's charge to the Department of
Corrections was to implement the State Motivational Boot Camp
program. The Legislature authorized a program to rehabilitate
youthful offenders by providing them, inter alia, continuing
education, vocational training and pre-release counseling as a hedge
against reincarceration. Ronald Yeskey's participation in a
program, authorized by legislation and implemented by the
department, does not impinge on the State's authority to manage its
correctional facilities.
Petitioners have taken a hard line in pressing their asserted
right to determine who can and cannot participate in the program.
Petitioners have made no claim that Mr. Yeskey was not in all
respects, save his disability, an appropriate candidate for the
program. To its discredit, petitioners did and continues to seek
relief from the judiciary to continue the unequal treatment that the
States spoke with a single voice to eradicate.
27
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia
we athela Leahy
_ Barbara E. Ransom, Esquire
Judith Gran, Esquire*
125 S. 9th Street
Suite 700
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
(215) 627-7100
Counsel for The Amici Curiae
* Counsel of Record
28
—_—_—~
ADDENDUM
DESCRIPTIONS OF AMICI CURIAE
The National Advisory Group for Justice (NAG) is a Project
of National Significance funded by the Administration for
Developmental Disabilities, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services to assist that federal agency in fulfilling its
mandate to prevent discrimination against persons with
developmental disabilities. Persons with developmental disabilities,
whether accused of, victims of, or witnesses to crimes, are denied
full access to the services, supports and programs in the criminal
justice system to the same degree as their non-disabled peers. The
NAG was established, therefore, to examine nationwide legal
trends in the criminal justice system as they affect persons with
developmental disabilities and directs its resources to the
enforcement ot the Americans with Disabilities Act. The NAG
seeks reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities
throughout the criminal justice system.
The grantee organization, the Public Interest Law Center of
Philadelphia (PILCOP), is a non-profit law firm established in
1974 which has responded on a national level to the needs of
persons with disabilities. For more than 25 years, PILCOP has
maintained close and productive working relationships with
disability rights organizations and is well-known for its mission.
With Self Advocates Becoming Empowered (SABE), a national,
non-profit, grassroots organization of Self-advocates, PILCOP
implements the NAG’s programs.
The American Foundation for the Blind’s (AFB) mission is
to enable persons who are blind or visually impaired to achieve
equality of access and opportunity that will ensure freedom of
choice in their lives. AFB accomplishes this mission by taking a
national leadership role in the development and implementation of
public policy and legislation, informational and educational
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programs, and quality services.
The Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington
(DRC), established in 1992 as a regional advocacy organization,
addresses systemic discrimination against people with disabilities in
every aspect of society. The DRC’s goals are to promote, secure
and protect the full participation of people with disabilities in the
community, which the DRC believes will strengthen society as a
whole.
The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) is a
national organization of families of people with severe mental
illnesses and people with severe mental illnesses themselves.
Comprised of 172,000 members and more than 1,100 affiliates
nationwide, NAMI’s goals are to educate the public about severe
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness
and major depression as treatable brain disorders, and to advocate
for the advancement of treatment services for people with these
disorders. An important part of NAMI’s mission is to advocate on
behalf of people with severe mental illnesses involved in the
criminal justice systems. In this capacity, NAMI, along with
Public Citizens’ Health Research Group, published a report in 1992
entitled Criminalizing the Seriously Mental Ill that documented the
serious treatment needs of people with severe mental illness who
are inmates in jails and prisons.
The National Association of People with AIDS (NAPWA),
founded in 1983, advocates on behalf of all people living with HIV
and AIDS in order to end the pandemic and the human suffering
caused by HIV/AIDS.
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.