Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach

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961482 mar 1 8 1997

NO. pecs 5 me OL

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

LEXECON INC., et al.,

. Petitioners,

MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES

& LERACH, A PARTNERSHIP, et al.,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL MICHAEL K. KELLOGG

STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO Counsel of Record

MICHELE L. ODORIZZI MARK C. HANSEN

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT JEFFREY A. LAMKEN

190 S. LaSalle Street AUSTIN C. SCHLICK

Chicago, IL 60603 SEAN A. LEV

(312) 701-7201 KELLOGG, HUBER, HANSEN,

KENNETH S. GELLER Topp & Evans, P.L.L.C.

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT 1301 K Street, N.W.

2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Suite 1000 West

Suite 6500 Washington, D.C. 20005

Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) S26-7900

(202) 463-2000

Counsel for Petitioners

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a district court, to which a case has been

transferred solely for “consolidated pretrial proceedings”

under the federal multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1407(a), may transfer the case to itself for purposes of

trial, notwithstanding section 1407(a)’s explicit command

that every such case “shall be remanded” at the conclu-

sion of pretrial proceedings “to the district from which

it was transferred.”

2. Whether, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a district

court may go outside the four corners of the complaint

and rely on its own analysis of public record materials to

decide disputed questions of fact.

(i)

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW

The following persons or entities were parties to the

proceeding in the court of appeals:

Lexecon Inc.

Daniel R. Fischel

Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach

Cotchett, Ilston & Pitre

Patrick Coughlin

William S. Lerach

Kevin P. Roddy

Leonard B. Simon

Melvyn I. Weiss

Patricia Hynes

Michael C. Spencer

Stephen R. Steinberg

Joseph Cotchett

Susan Illston

PARENT COMPANIES AND NONWHOLLY

OWNED SUBSIDIARIES

Lexecon Inc. is a privately held corporation that has

no parent companies or subsidiaries that have issued

shares to the public.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............................................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW ...... aes ii

PARENT COMPANIES AND NONWHOLLY

TU ca ii

ZABLE OP AUTIBORITIMG nn... cccceccccecec-c.-....-.-........ iv

i 1

EE 1

a ne 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...

A. Background and Prior Proceedings

cee

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..._. 10

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION RATI-

FIES AN ENTRENCHED FEDERAL COURT

PRACTICE THAT IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY

TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE RELE-

VANT STATUTES AND THAT UNDER-

MINES CONGRESS’S EXPRESS INTENT TO

PRESERVE PLAINTIFFS’ CHOICE OF

ELL 10

Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RULING WRONGLY

AUTHORIZES DISTRICT COURTS TO GO

OUTSIDE THE FOUR CORNERS OF A COM-

PLAINT AND RELY ON THEIR OWN ANAL-

YSIS OF PUBLIC RECORD MATERIALS TO

DECIDE DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT

AT THE MOTION TO DISMISS STAGE... 21

SI ib eiecareieddiiesbdieeeetasescescencnecunsenencenensaneceaseses 27

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Allen v. Westpoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40

> 7 25

Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir),

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996) -.................... 25

Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1996) ....... 26

Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust

Ca, 196 B, Gd. GET CRIBS) ccecccecscccscessse a. scscsessessees 20

Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,

MG GW SE EEE 11

Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758

PR (GH EEE 22

Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate

Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 8. Ct. 1439 (1994) .... 20

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) ....................... 22

Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249

(1992) .. Ee 18

Ernst & Ernct_ v. ~ Hochfelder, 425 US. 185

0 ——————E, 16

Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S.

I _>Ee——E—E———E——— 11

Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) ....16, 17, 20

Frey v. Stoneman, 722 P.2d 274 (Ariz. 1986) ....... 22

Friedman v. United States, 927 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.

25, 26

Greyhound Computer Corp. v. 1.B.M. Corp., 342

F. Supp. 1143 (D. Minn. 1972) ~....................... 20

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) _..... 11

Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir.

. 25

In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l

Airport, 479 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ........ 19

In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport,

Denver, Colo., 720 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Colo.

EEE 19

In re Aircrash Near Duarte, Cal., 357 F. Supp.

en 20

In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366

(S.D.N.Y. 1978) ........... sieinennbindinns 19

In re Dow Co. “Sarabond Products” ” Liability

Litig., 664 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Colo. 1987) .......... 19

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810

(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156

Ee es ee 19

In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act

Litig., 73 F.3d (4th Cir. 1906) ..................... 19

In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171

(D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 490

SE ee ee 11

In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 70 F.R.D. 23

SS ES eo ee eee 20

In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litig., 62

F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom.

Schulman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 515 F.2d 505

EES A Ee ee 20

In re Plumbing Picture Cones, 296 F. Supp. 484

(J.P.M.L. 1968). ot te 13

In re Tax Refund Litig., “723 F. “Supp. 922

TE ee Se en ee 19

In re Viatron Computer Sys. Corp. Litig., 86

F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1980) 20

Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479 (1933)... 16

Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) _....... 19

Lane v. Pefia, 116 8. Ct. 2092 (1996) . 18

Leonard v. Frankfort Elec. & Water Plant Bd.,

762 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1985)... 26

Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015

EE Eva RE ee 8 ee 25

Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. ‘Rambo, 115 S. Ct.

ET oes 2 SS Oe ee 15, 20

Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,

102 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 1996) .... 26

Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,

ee ee I tt 17

Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971) _. 19

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) . 26

Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau,

Ge a Siena i 22

— ee a OS ee ee

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) .... 13

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 388 U.S. 338

ES EE SE aT 26

Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserv-

ing, Inc., 37 F.3d 1053 (4th Cir. 1994) —.............. 25

STATUTES AND RULES

A )lU,l 1

LO ee passim

Ob a dd passim

a passim

8 0 4! Ee ae ee 25

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,

Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) ........... ...... 21

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

141 Cong. Rec. $8894 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) ........ 21

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. ms

a

H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

dp 2968 WBC.C.AuN. BEBB .nnccrcncceccecccccseccccscsessessees 12, 13

OTHER MATERIALS

15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 3866 (2d ed. 1986) ............................ 14

15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 3867 (Supp. 1996) ................. ®

Administrative Office of United States Courts,

Judicial Business of the United States Courts:

1995 Report of the Director -....................... ........ 10

George T. Conway III, Note, The Consolidation of

Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 Yale

L.J. 1099 (1987) 15

John F. Cooney, Comment, The Experience of

Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Liti-

gation Act, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 588 (1972) ........... 14

Ross D. Cooper, The Korean Air Disaster: Choice

of Law in Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 57

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (1989) 14

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation

and the Federal Courts, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 41

REE a ae ee

Report of the American Bar Association Section of

Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Su-

preme Court’s Decision in California v. ARC

America Corp., 59 Antitrust L.J. 273 (1990) _.

Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking,

140 U. Penn. L. Rev. 711 (1991) 0.

Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the

Judicial Panel, Transfer and Tag-Along Orders

Prior to a Determination of Remand: Proce-

dural and Substantive Problem or Effective

Judicial Public Policy?, 23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev.

ee

Robert H. Trangsrud, ‘Joinder “Alternatives in

Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 779

(1985)

lieth LEE LLL eee

Page

14

14

14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1996

No.

LEXECON INC., et al.,

¥. Petitioners,

MILBERG Weiss BersilAD HYNES

& LERACH, A PARTNERSHIP, ef al.,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Lexecon Inc. and Daniel R. Fischel petition for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-52a)

is reported at 102 F.3d 1524. The district court’s opinion

granting summary judgment in part (Pet. App. 64a-79a) is

reported at 884 F. Supp. 1388; the court’s opinion grant-

ing defendants’ motion to dismiss in part (Pet. App. 80a-

99a) is reported at 845 F. Supp. 1377.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

December 20, 1996. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2

. STATUTES INVOLVED

The federal multidistrict litigation statute states in

pertinent part:

When civil actions involving one or more common

questions of fact are pending in different districts,

such actions may be transferred to any district for

coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel

on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section

upon its determination that transfers for such pro-

ceedings will be for the convenience of parties and

witnesses and will promote the just and efficient

conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred

shall be remanded by the panel at or before the con-

clusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district

from which it was transferred unless it shall have

been previously terminated: Provided, however, That

the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim,

counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any

of such claims before the remainder of the action is

remanded.

28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).

The federal transfer statute provides in relevant part:

For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any

civil action to any other district or division where it

might have been brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Citing policy concerns, the Ninth Circuit has endorsed

a widespread district court practice that is directly con-

trary to the relevant statutes and that undermines plain-

tiffs’ historical right to their choice of forum for litigation.

In enacting the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1407, Congress authorized the Judicial Panel on Multi-

district Litigation (“JPML”) to transfer cases only for

3

purposes of “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceed-

ings.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). Congress specified that all

such cases must be remanded as soon as those proceed-

ings are complete: “Each action so transferred shall be

remanded by the [JPML] at or before the conclusion of

such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was

transferred unless it shall have been previously termi-

nated.” Jd. (emphasis added).

Despite this unequivocal statutory directive, district

courts assigned to oversee coordinated pretrial proceed-

ings have “routine[ly]” decided to retain those cases for

all purposes, including trial. Pet. App. 3la (Kozinski,

J., dissenting). Citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), they have

transferred” these cases to themselves, preventing the

Cases from ever returning to their home district, as Con-

gress intended. Section 1404(a) provides no support for

this practice. By its terms, it authorizes transfer only

“to any other district or division where it might have been

brought” (emphasis added). It does not authorize a dis-

trict court to transfer a case to itself.

Nonetheless, through repeated use of this “self-transfer”

mechanism, the district courts have, in Judge Kozinski’s

words, “parlayed a narrow grant of authority to conduct

consolidated discovery into a mechanism for systematically

denying plaintiffs the right to trial in their forum of

choice.” Pet. App. 30a (Kozinski, J., dissenting). And

they have accomplished this “remarkable power grab” (id.)

without any protest from the courts of appeals, which

have cited pragmatic considerations based on efficiency as

a sufficient basis for self-transfer. In fact, the practice

has been sanctioned by the JPML itself. The JPML’s

rules—which (unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure ) are not reviewed by this Court prior to becoming

effective—expressly State that cases need not be remanded

for trial where they have been “ordered transferred by the

transferee judge to the transferee or other district.” JPML

Rule 14(b).

Such concerted disregard of a clear congressional man-

date cries out for correction. Review by this Court is

4

necessary to align federal court practice with the plain

language of sections 1404 and 1407 and to restore plain-

tiffs’ traditional prerogative in choosing the forum for

trial.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision also presents a second

issue of importance to the administration of justice. It is

a fundamental premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure that plaintiffs must have an opportunity to conduct

discovery and substantiate their allegations before their

claims may be dismissed for a failure of proof. In decid-

ing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), therefore,

a court must assume the truth of all the allegations in

plaintiff's complaint. In this case, the Ninth Circuit re-

jected that bedrock rule as an outdated “formalism. Pet.

App. 23a. The majority held that courts may go outside

the four corners of the complaint and rely on public record

materials—including, in this instance, the unsworn state-

ments of a recused judge—to decide disputed questions

of fact at the motion to dismiss stage. That understanding

of the appropriate use of public records undermines the

important role of Rule 12(b)(6) and directly conflicts

with the law of other circuits.

A. Background and Prior Proceedings

1. Lexecon is one of the nation’s leading law and

economics consulting firms. Daniel Fischel is a principal

of Lexecon and the Freeman Professor of Law and Busi-

ness at the University of Chicago Law School. Professor

Fischel frequently testifies as an expert in complex class

action securities cases.

The respondents—two law firms" and certain individual

members of those firms—are plaintiffs’ class action law-

yers. They have, in recent years, brought numerous,

highly-publicized class action securities lawsuits. Professor

Fischel provided what was characterized by many com-

mentators—such as the Wall Street Journal—as decisive

1The two law firm defendants are Milberg Weiss Bershad

Hynes & Lerach and Cotchett, Illston & Petrie.

5

testimony for the defense in a number of those suits,

thereby costing defendants millions of dollars in contin-

gency fees.

In 1992, Lexecon and Professor Fischel (jointly “Lexe-

con”) filed this diversity action in the Northern District

of Illinois, their home district, alleging that respondents—

angered by this succession of costly losses—engaged in a

wide-ranging effort to ruin Lexecon’s reputation and put

it out of business. The first step in respondents’ scheme

was to name Lexecon as a defendant in Shields v. Keating,

a case heard in the District of Arizona as part of MDL

No. 834, American Continental Corporation/Lincoln

Savings & Loan Litigation. Respondents, who were class

counsel in that case, falsely accused Lexecon of com-

plicity with Charles Keating in one of the most notorious

savings and loan scandals of this century. Respondents

then used their Lincoln Savings complaint against Lexe-

con in courtrooms around the country, in the press, and

with Lexecon’s clients and business associates to portray

Professor Fischel as a “crook” and a “racketeer” and

Lexecon as a firm whose expert credentials could no longer

be trusted. As a result, Lexecon lost millions of dollars in

fees, and both petitioners suffered significant damage to

their reputations.

2. In this suit, Lexecon seeks damages for respondents’

malicious prosecution of the Lincoln Savings case, abuse

of process, tortious interference with petitioners’ existing

and prospective client relationships, defamation, and com-

mercial disparagement.

Initial pretrial matters in this case were handled by

Judge Zagel in the Northern District of Dlinois. Those

proceedings did not go well for respondents. The district

court rejected their personal jurisdiction arguments and

indicated that it did not agree with some of their key

legal contentions.

After six months of pretrial proceedings before Judge

Zagel, respondents filed a motion with the JPML pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to have this case transferred to the

6

District of Arizona and consolidated with the Lincoln

Savings litigation that gave rise to some of Lexecon’s

claims. Before the JPML could rule on defendants’ trans-

fer motion, Judge Bilby, the presiding judge in the Lincoln

Savings case, sent a letter to the JPML recusing himself

from the Lexecon case because his “involvement” in the

resolution of the underlying case would make it “improper”

for him to act as a judge in the Lexecon case.

Notwithstanding Judge Bilby’s recusal, respondents re-

newed their motion to transfer, asking the JPML to send

the Lexecon case to any other judge in Arizona. Over

Lexecon’s objections, the JPML granted respondents’ mo-

tion to transfer on the ground that there was an extensive

document depository in Arizona and that there might be

some opportunity for coordination with a still unfinished

settlement involving one of the defendants in Lincoln

Savings. Pet. App. 100a-102a. Once transferred to the

District of Arizona, the case was assigned to Judge Roll,

who had no previous familiarity with this matter or with

any of the Lincoln Savings cases.

3. No coordinated proceedings ever ensued. The trans-

fer did, however, have a significant impact on the course

of the litigation. In particular, the district court, relying

on its own “independent” evaluation of the merits of the

Lincoln Savings suit against Lexecon—and not accepting

the truth of the allegations contained in Lexecon’s com-

plaint—granted respondents’ motion to dismiss as to the

malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims. Pet.

App. 85a-92a.

After this case had been in Arizona for a year, it had

become abundantly clear that there would never be any

“coordinated or consolidated” pretrial proceedings. In-

deed, all other proceedings in MDL No. 834 had long

since been concluded, and the only other factor cited by

the JPML in ordering transfer—the presence of a “docu-

ment depository” in Arizona—did not even exist any

more. The documents that had been produced in this

case—over a million pages worth—were being kept in

7

Illinois, and only one of the 42 deponents or potential

deponents resided in Arizona. Thus, in accord with the

procedures specified by the JPML (see JPML Rule

14(d)), Lexecon moved the Arizona district court to

remand the case back to the Northern District of Illinois,

where it had been filed. The district court deferred deci-

sion on that motion until the end of discovery, at which

_ Lexecon renewed its request to return the case to

inois.

Respondents objected to the remand motion and filed

their own motion to transfer the case permanently to

Arizona. They also moved for summary judgment on all

remaining issues. Without ruling on Lexecon’s remand

motion, the court granted summary judgment to respond-

ents on all remaining issues, except for one aspect of

Lexecon’s defamation claim. Pet. App. 64a-77a.

Soon thereafter, the Arizona district court denied Lexe-

con’s motion to remand and simultaneously granted re-

spondents’ request that it transfer the case permanently to “

itself. Pet. App. 61a-62a. Without mentioning the lan-

guage of 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the court stated that there was

“[sJubstantial authority’—including JPML Rule 14(b)—

establishing that section 1407 does not require a case to

return to its original district after coordinated pretrial

proceedings are complete. Pet. App. 6la. The court fur-

ther concluded, again without mention of the relevant

statutory language, that 28 U.S.C. § 1404 gave it the

“power to transfer this action to itself.” Pet. App. 61a.

4. Lexecon believed that the district court’s actions in

transferring this case to itself violated sections 1404 and

1407 and subjected the company to potentially irreparable

harm—requiring it to go to trial in a forum thousands of

miles from home where “there was much popular feeling”

against companies that, like Lexecon, were alleged to have

been involved in the Charles Keating/Lincoln Savings

scandal. Pet. App. 47a (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Lexe-

con thus petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of

mandamus.

The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on the mandamus

petition, but eventually determined that extraordinary re-

lief was not warranted in this instance. Pet. App. 55a-

60a. The two-judge majority did note, however, that

Lexecon’s legal position had considerable force. The

majority explained that section 1407 provided an appar-

ently “clear statutory mandate” and that the court “might

well” decide on direct review that the district court’s self-

transfer decision was unlawful. Pet. App. 58a.

Judge Kozinski dissented from the refusal to issue a

writ. He would have granted the petition to correct the

district court’s “egregious, oft-repeated error” in “disre-

gard{ing] the statutory mandate” of sections 1404 and

1407. Pet. App. 58a, 59a (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

Section 1407, in his view, represented an “important policy

choice”—allowing limited transfers, but retaining plain-

tiffs’ “ancient right” to select a forum for trial—that “fed-

eral judges are bound to respect.” Pet. App. 60a; see 15

Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 3867, at 111 (Supp. 1996) (discussing Judge Kozinski’s

mandamus dissent).

5. The trial on the defamation claim—a claim that

was governed by Illinois law—then went forward in the

District of Arizona. The respondents prevailed in a jury

trial, and the district court entered final judgment.

B. The Decision Below

On appeal from that judgment, a different and sharply

divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district

court’s rulings in all respects. Judge Kozinski was the

only member of this panel who had also ruled on the

mandamus petition.

1. The majority, relying on “longstanding practice and

the efficiency arguments” in favor of self-transfer (Pet.

App. 14a), found no flaw in the district court’s decision

to transfer this case to itself. Such transfers, the majority

stated, are authorized both by the TPML’s rules and by a

9

long series of court of appeals and district court decisions.

Pet. App. 12a & n.3 (collecting cases). The majority

further concluded that, in the multidistrict litigation con-

text, the judicial interest in “efficien[t]” disposition of

cases “trump[s]” the “usual deference to a plaintiff's choice

of forum.” Pet. App. 13a & n.5. Finally, the majority

Suggested that section 1407 is concerned only with the

powers of the JPML and thus does not disturb the “tradi-

tional powers of the district court to which a case has

been transferred.” Pet. App. 15a.

The majority also affirmed the district court's dis-

missal of Lexecon’s malicious prosecution and abuse of

process claims. It rejected as “absurdly formal” the require-

ment that a district court confine its review at the motion

to dismiss stage to the allegations in Lexecon’s complaint.

Pet. App. 23a. Rather, in the majority’s view, it was

appropriate for the district court to consider the “public

record” in resolving disputed factual questions at that

stage. Id. Applying that logic here, the majority held

that Lexecon’s claims failed because, notwithstanding the

allegations in Lexecon’s complaint, the record in Lincoln

Savings showed as a matter of fact that (1) Lincoln Sav-

ings did not result in a “termination” favorable to Lexe-

con and (2) naming Lexecon as a defendant in the Lin-

coln Savings suit did not have as its “primary purpose to

inflict harm” on the company. Pet. App. 24a, 28a.

the Plain terms of section 1407 and with Congress’s

explicit intent not to authorize section 1407 transferee

courts to conduct trials. Pet. App. 30a-31la (Kozinski,

} dissenting). Nor could the district court’s course of

action be reconciled with section 1404(a), whose text

states “in plain and simple terms” that a case may be

transferred only to “‘any other district or division where

10

it might have been Brought.’” Pet. App. 41a (Kozinski,

J., dissenting) (quoting section 1404(a)). By upholding

the practice of self-transfer in the face of such clear

this

area and put the last coffin nail into the « "periment Con-

gress started in 1968 when it gave the federal courts only

a limited MDL authority.” Pet. App. 52a (Kozinski, J.,

dissenting ).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION RATIFIES AN

ENTRENCHED FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE

The lower federal courts have illegitimately converted

the multidistrict litigation statute into a mechanism for

shuttling entire cases off to far-flung districts for trial in

forums that plaintiffs would never have chosen. Although

over 92,000 cases have been transferred in the past three

decades under section 1407, only 3,500—less than four

percent—have ever returned to their home district. See

Pet. App. 30a (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Admin-

istrative Office of United States Courts, Judicial Business

of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the Director

32). The stark reality is that “once a case is sucked

into the MDL vortex, it seldom comes back.” Pet. App.

45a (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

To be sure, some cases have not returned to their

home districts because they settled or were dismissed

while consolidated pretrial proceedings were still under-

way. Many others, however, have not returned because

the district court assigned to oversee pretrial proceedings

decided to retain the case for all purposes, including

11

trial. As Judge Kozinski explained, federal judges have

“develop[ed] proprietary feelings toward the cases en-

trusted to them” and have “routine[ly]” refused to relin-

quish them at the end of pretrial proceedings. Pet. App.

31a. Thus, in the multidistrict litigation context, plain-

tiff's choice of forum—which, under traditional principles,

“should rarely be disturbed” (Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,

530 yp 501, 508 (1947) )—has “devolved to the signifi-

cance a tailbone or an appendix.”

(Kozinski, J., dissenting). de

This practice of “self-transfer” cannot be reconciled

with the language of either section 1407 or section 1404.

It is directly contrary to all evidence of i

intent and to the historical rights of plaintiffs to choose

their forum for trial. And it has been uniformly criticized

by a host of scholarly commentators as a usurpation of

legislative authority by the courts. The very fact that the

practice is now so entrenched—notwithstanding clear con-

trary directions from Congress—com is Court’

review. . ~

a. It is well established that courts must follow the

plain language of a statute and may not depart from its

ordinary English” to pursue their own ideas of wise

policy. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson

116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996). See also Estate of Cowart v.

Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (“courts

must give effect to the clear

itten”). meaning of statutes as

pretrial proceedings.

47 U.S.C. § 1407(a). See In re Korean Air Lines Dis-

aster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (R.B. Gins-

a (section 1407 “authorizfes] transfers only for

pretrial purposes”) (emphasis added),

grounds, 490 U.S. 122 (1989). so nat aad

12

If a case has not been concluded by the time such

pretrial proceedings are over, it must be returned to the

district where it was initially filed: “Each action so trans-

ferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the

conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district

from which it was transferred unless it shall have been

conclude. The statute states that the case “shall be re-

manded,” and remanded it must therefore be.

This clear statutory command is reinforced by the

“any other district.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (emphasis

added). There is no way, in ordinary English, that the

section 1404(a).

Moreover, if one looks beyond the plain text of the

relevant statutes to their legislative history, it becomes

even clearer that the lower court practice is flatly at odds

with the Congressional design. The drafting history of

section 1407 demonstrates that Congress specifically re-

jected the idea of authorizing broader transfers in the

from the standpoint of the parties and witnesses”—why

the statute “does not . . . include the trial of cases in

the consolidated proceedings” and would “not affect the

place of trial in any case.” H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898,

1900, 1901 (emphasis added). If “future experience”

demonstrated that “consolidation and coordination for

5

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do by statute in 1969: amend section 1407 to allow trans-

fers for trial.” Robert H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives

in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 779, 809

*The Ninth Circuit’s opinion incorrectly suggests that the

legislative history supports its conclusion. Pet. App. l5a. The

majority (Pet. App. 15a), the House Report makes clear that a fur-

ther amendment would be necessary to allow the transferee court to

keep the case for all purposes. See 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1902.

14

make a certain determination, “courts [can]not take it

upon themselves” to make that same determination).

Given the abundant evidence establishing that self-

transfer is fundamentally incompatible with the language

and intent of sections 1404 and 1407, it is hardly sur-

prising that commentators have uniformly criticized this

practice. Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper have

stated, with characteristic understatement, that the prac-

tice is of “questionable” legitimacy. 15 Wright, Miller &

Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3866, at 619

(2d ed. 1986). Other independent observers concur in

more forceful terms.’ As Judge Kozinski noted, “[r]e-

® Robert H. Trangsrud, supra, 70 Cornell L. Rev. at 804 (“The

reasoning in these cases is demonstrably wrong.”) ; Ross D. Cooper,

The Korean Air Disaster: Choice of Law in Federal Multidistrict

Litigation, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145, 1159 (1989) (practice of

self-transfer “does not comport with the express language of sec-

tion 1407 or section 1404 or with section 1407's legislative his-

tory”); Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the Judicial

Panel, Transfer and Tag-Along Orders Prior to a Determination

of Remand: Procedural and Substantive Problem or Effective Judi-

cial Public Policy?, 23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 841, 866 (1993) (“It is

a leap in logic to conclude that causes of action not terminated upon

dispositive motions should be retained in the transferee court under

the rubric of § 1404(a), when the statutory language of § 1407

explicitly directs remand to the transferor court.”); Report of the

American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force

to Review the Supreme Court's Decision in California v. ARC

America Corp., 59 Antitrust LJ. 271, 302 (1990) (“[T)he use of

Section 1404(a) transfers to consolidate multidistrict cases for

trial is of dubious legal validity.”); Blake M. Rhodes, Comment,

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethink-

ing, 140 U. Penn. L. Rev. 711, 734 (1991) (“[A] transferee court's

use of § 1404(a) sets Congress’s carefully crafted plan for multi-

district litigation on its head.”); Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multi-

district Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 41,

64 (1971) (the language and legislative history of section 1407 (a)

are so clear that it “originally appeared to be a futile exercise for

a 1407 transferee court to rule on a 1404 transfer motion”); John

F. Cooney, Comment, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under

the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 588, 606

(1972) (“[T]he apparently mandatory nature of the remand clause

b. The Ninth Circuit gave three reasons in support of

the result it reached. None withstands scrutiny.

First, the Ninth Circuit suggested that “longstanding

practice” was itself a sufficient justification for self-transfer.

Pet. App. 14a, 16a. The panel noted that “[rjespect for

our brethren” made it reluctant to “accuse the JPML of

violating the statute that created it” or to second-guess the

many courts that had engaged in self-transfer. Pet. App.

14a n.7, 16a.

But past practice is no excuse for ignoring a clear

Congressional command, As this Court recently recog-

nized, the existence of long-standing errors in statutory

interpretation requires action, not “hesitation,” because

“‘la]ge is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a stat-

ute.’” Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 115 S. Ct.

2144, 2149 (1995) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 115

S. Ct. 552, 557 (1994) (finding 60-year old agency inter-

pretation inconsistent with statute)). Essentially, the

Ninth Circuit is suggesting that, even if two wrongs don’t

make a right, two decades worth will—or at least we

should pretend that they do, notwithstanding a clear

conflict with an express statutory command. That has

never been, nor should it be, the law.

Nor does the existence of a JPML rule permitting self-

transfer transform an unlawful practice into a lawful one.

Congress expressly provided that the JPML’s rules must

be consistent with its enabling statute and, indeed, all of

. . » implies that transferee courts lack this jurisdiction [to grant

a section 1404 motion].”) ; George T. Conway III, Note, The Con-

solidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 9% Yale LJ.

1099, 1102-08 (1987) (“[{C)onsolidation for trial almost certainly

defies both the letter of section 1407 and the intent of its drafters.” )

(internal footnote omitted).

16

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f). See also Ernst &

Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976)

(agency rules “cannot exceed the power granted . . . by

Congress”); Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 US. 479,

503 (1933) (invalidating local court rule that was incon-

sistent with powers granted by Congress).

Section 1407, which circumscribes the authority of the

JPML, unequivocally states that a transfer is only for

“coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” and

that each case “shall be remanded” following pretrial pro-

ceedings “unless it shall have been previously terminated.”

28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). The JPML rule violates this ex-

press statutory command. It states that “[eJach trans-

ferred action that has not been terminated in the trans-

feree district court shall be remanded . . . unless ordered

transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or

other district.” JPML Rule 14(b) (emphasis added).

The italicized language simply rewrites the JPML’s en-

abling statute and adds an excuse for failure to remand

that the statute does not recognize and does not permit.

Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that self-transfer

“strongly promotes judicial efficiency, which was a pri-

mary purpose of the legislation that created the JPML.”

Pet. App. 16a. But, again, this Court has made clear that

such concerns do not justify federal courts’ disregard for

the plain meaning of the statutes that define their author-

ity. In Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989),

for example, the Court acknowledged that the exercise

of so-called pendant-party jurisdiction over state claims

resulted in “efficiency end convenience” by allowing for

the consolidation of related issues in a single proceeding.

Id. at 555. Nevertheless, because the plain meaning of

the relevant statutes demonstrated that Congress had not

granted federal courts any such authority, the Court held

that they lacked the power to hear such pendant-party

claims. See id. at 547 (“‘courts which are created by

written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written

17

law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction’”) (quoting Ex

Parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 93 (1807) (Marshall,

C.J.)).

Congress established the balance between efficiency con-

cerns and plaintiffs’ traditional choice of forum when it

wrote section 1407. The judiciary is not free to strike a

different balance. As in Finley, the lower courts may

not “trump” (Pet. App. 13a n.5) the plain language of

sections 1404 and 1407—which evince Congress’s judg-

ment that preserving plaintiffs’ choice of forum for trial

is more important than efficiency—based on their own

notions of wise judicial administration. See also Pavelic

& LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S.

120, 126 (1989) (Court is not free to pursue policy

objective at expense of “unnatural” textual interpretation;

“[ojur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it”).

Third, the Ninth Circuit argued that section 1407’s

obligation to remand applies only to the JPML, not to

the transferee court. Pet. App. 15a. On this theory, a

transferee court is free to transfer a case to itself for trial

pursuant to section 1404(a) without regard to the JPML’s

express duty under section 1407(a) to remand the case

before trial. Pet. App. 15a-16a.

But the district court’s power to preside in a transferred

case is itself circumscribed by section 1407. The trans-

feree court is assigned the case only for the limited pur-

pose of conducting “consolidated” pre-trial proceedings.

It cannot expand its power beyond what Congress has

granted under the express terms of the statute. For that

reason, the transferee court must remand the case once

consolidated pretrial proceedings are complete and its

authority under section 1407(a) has thus expired.

Moreover, the JPML’s own rules instruct litigants to

seek a remand, in the first instance, from the transferee

court. See JPML Rule 14(d). This makes sense, since

it is the judge presiding over the case, not the JPML

panel, who will know when consolidated pre-trial proceed-

ings are over and, thus, when the case must be remanded.

18

But in executing that delegated responsibility, the district

court necessarily has the same underlying statutory obli-

gation that the JPML would have if it handled requests

in the first instance. The JPML cannot alter or broaden

its authority by delegating it.*

Nor can the transferee court use its general authority un-

der section 1404(a) to render a nullity section 1407(a)’s

specific requirement that a case be remanded. It is a

fundamental canon of statutory construction that laws

should not be read in a way that makes any statutory

provision superfluous. See, e.g., Lane v. Pefa, 116 S. Ct.

2092, 2100 (1996); Connecticut National Bank v. Ger-

main, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). Yet if the district court

could transfer a case pursuant to section 1404(a), then

section 1407(a)’s requirement that the case be remanded

at the conclusion of consolidated proceedings would serve

no purpose at all. Congress provided only one exception

to the JPML’s mandatory duty to remand the case at the

end of consolidated proceedings—where the case is “termi-

nated” during coordinated pretrial proceedings. Congress

did not create an exception for transfers; indeed, a statu-

tory “command” that effectively said “the case shall be

remanded unless it is transferred” (i.e., unless it is not

remanded) would be nonsensical.

4 For this reason, it is bizarre for the Ninth Circuit to suggest

(Pet. App. 16a-17a) that Lexecon should have sought relief directly

from the JPML and that its failure to do so somehow left the

district court with no choice but to transfer the case to itself “to

avoid the absurdity of indefinitely suspended litigation, the pre-

trial proceedings of which have come to a close.” Under the

JPML’s own rules, the proper practice was for Lexecon to bring

its section 1407 argument to the district court, and not the

JPML, in the first instance. Once the district court denied the

remand motion, Lexecon was unable to pursue the matter with the

JPML because the district court simultaneously transferred the

case to itself, thereby depriving the JPML of authority to rule.

See JPML Rule 14(b). Lexecon accordingly sought mandamus,

which was the only immediate remedy available to it to vindicate

the requirement of section 1407 (a). Moreover, Lexecon objected to

the self-transfer on the additional ground that it violated the

express terms of section 1404 (a).

19

Finally, even if section 1404(a)’s general transfer au-

thority could somehow nullify the specific remand require-

ment of section 1407(a), the Ninth Circuit’s ruling per-

mitting selftransfer would still collide head-on with the

plain language of section 1404(a). As we have explained,

that provision authorizes a court to transfer a case only

to some “other district or division,” not to itself. Section

1404(a) thus provides a completely independent reason

why the court of appeals’ decision—and, indeed, all the

lower court rulings on this issue—cannot pass muster.

c. The absence of a circuit conflict, though often a

basis for denying review, in this case points in the other

direction. The very fact that the judicial highjacking of

JPML cases is so entrenched provides a powerful reason

for this Court to intervene.

As early as 1971, the Second Circuit upheld a district

court’s self-transfer decision against a claim that it violated

section 1407. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122,

124-25 (2d Cir. 1971). In the years since, the JPML

itself has issued a rule that expressly contemplates self-

transfer, and the lower courts, relying on that rule and on

the perceived efficiency benefits of self-transfer, have uni-

formly determined that such transfers are lawful. The

array of lower court precedent on this point now includes

three square circuit court holdings,® as well as a host of

district court rulings.* Indeed, the lower courts’ under-

5 In addition to the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit

so held in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819-20

& n.7 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983) Two

other appellate court decisions assume that self-transfer authority

exists. See In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act Litig.,

73 F.3d 528, 532 n.7 (4th Cir. 1996); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines,

504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).

* See, e.g., In re Tax Refund Litig., 723 F. Supp. 922, 924

(E.D.N.Y. 1989) ; In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Air-

port, Denver, Colo., 720 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (D. Colo. 1988); Jn

re Dow Co. “Sarabond Products” Liab. Litig., 664 F. Supp. 1403,

1408-04 (D. Colo. 1987); In re Air Crash Disaster at John F.

Kennedy Iit’l Airport, 479 F. Supp. 1118, 1122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ;

In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 374 (S.D.N.Y.

20

Standing on this point is now so thoroughly entrenched

that the Federal Judicial Center’s Manual for Complex

Litigation (Third) treats self-transfer as standard proce-

dure. See id. § 21.61, at 117 & n.346.

As already noted, the existence of such longstanding

errors in statutory interpretation requires action, not

“hesitation,” by this Court. Metropolitan Stevedore, 115

S. Ct. at 2149. This Court has accordingly granted re-

view to address such errors in interpretation even where

every circuit court’s precedents upheld the practice at

issue. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Inter-

state Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994);

id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (practice addressed

by Court had been upheld “in hundreds of judicial and

administrative proceedings in every circuit in the federal

system”). See also Finley, 490 U.S. at 558 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) (district court practice reviewed—and reversed

—by Court had been supported by “overwhelming con-

sensus of federal judges”).

The statutory question in this case particularly merits

the Court’s attention because it involves the limits of tlie

authority that Congress has granted to the lower federal

courts. As the Court has recognized since its earliest days,

ensuring that the federal courts stay within the bounds of

the authority Congress has vested in them is an issue of

paramount importance. See Ex Parte Bollman, supra.

Indeed, in recognition of this principle, just last Term the

Court reviewed a case involving the statutory scope of

federal.court authority even though only one circuit had

ever passed on the statutory question at issue. See Bank

One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116

1973) ; In re Aircrash Near Duarte, Cal., 357 F. Supp. 1013, 1015

(C.D. Cal. 1973) ; Greyhound Computer Corp. v. 1.B.M. Corp., 342

F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D. Minn. 1972); In re Viatron Computer

Systems Corp. Litig., 86 F.R.D. 431, 432-83 (D. Mass. 1980) ; Jn re

Master Key Antitrust Litig., 70 F.R.D. 23, 28 (D. Conn. 1975);

In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litig., 62 F.R.D. 341, 345

(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Shulman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,

515 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1975).

21

S. Ct. 637 (1996) (ruling upon federal court authority

under the Expedited Funds Availability Act). And review

of such questions is especially warranted where the federal

court practice has a significant effect on the substantive

rights of a wide class of litigants—in this instance, by

robbing multidistrict litigation plaintiffs of their historical

right to choose their forum and subjecting them to trial

in distant places before potentially hostile juries.

II. THE NINTH CIRCUITS RULING WRONGLY AU-

THORIZES DISTRICT COURTS TO GO OUTSIDE

THE FOUR CORNERS OF A COMPLAINT AND

RELY ON THEIR OWN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC

RECORD MATERIALS TO DECIDE DISPUTED

QUESTIONS OF FACT AT THE MOTION TO DIS-

MISS STAGE

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling also implicates important

public policy concerns regarding the integrity of the legal

profession. Respondents are the nation’s leading filers of

securities class action suits. In enacting the Private Secu-

rities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67,

109 Stat. 737 (1995), with bipartisan majorities in both

houses, Congress emphasized the serious societal problems

and injuries to innocent parties caused by unethical class .

action lawyers. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, 104th

Cong., Ist Sess. 31-32 (1995). See also 141 Cong. Rec.

$8894 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (“it has become in-

creasingly clear that securities class actions are extremely

vulnerable to abuses by entrepreneurs masquerading as

lawyers”) (remarks of Sen. Dodd).

Here, Lexecon alleged that respondents fabricated evi-

dence to support claims that they privately acknowledged

were baseless, attempted to use their meritless suit in an

attempt to extort concessions from Lexecon and its clients,

intimidated witnesses, defrauded the courts, and then en-

gaged in wholesale document destruction to cover-up their

misconduct. These are serious allegations, of more than

private concern, that should not have been rejected with-

out careful consideration on the merits as required by

22

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’

precedents. _ :

This Court established long ago that, in ruling on a

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), a court must accept the truth of all allegations

in the plaintiff's complaint. See Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier

Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 411 n.2 (1986) (collecting

cases). The text of Rule 12 itself makes plain that courts

may not stray beyond the four corners of the pleadings to

resolve such motions: “If . . . matters outside the plead-

ing are presented to and not excluded by the court, the

motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . .

and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to

present all material made pertinent t i

wee A pe Oo such a motion by

The Ninth Circuit, however, discarded these funda-

mental procedural protections as outmoded “formalism.”

Pet. App. 23a. In the court’s view, it is perfectly appro-

priate for a court to use any material in the “public

record”—which could include, for example, newspaper

articles, investigative reports, and all sorts of public filings

by private parties—as a basis for rejecting, at the motion

to dismiss Stage, the factual assertions in a plaintiff's com-

plaint. Id. This ruling conflicts with decisions in other

circuits and threatens to eviscerate the traditional protec-

tion afforded plaintiffs by Rule 12(b) (6).

a. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Lexe-

con’s malicious prosecution claim and its abuse of process

claim. In both instances it went beyond the four corners

of the complaint to resolve disputed issues of fact.

Under Arizona law, a necessary element of Lexecon’s

malicious prosecution claim was that the Lincoln Savings

case had terminated favorably to Lexecon. Under Arizona

law, favorable termination is a question of fact.” Lexecon’s

* See Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1313,

pee (Ariz. 1988); Frey v. Stoneman, 722 P.2d 274, 279 (Ariz.

23

complaint accordingly detailed the circumstances leading

up to the dismissal of Lexecon from that suit and why

those circumstances demonstrated that the suit terminated

favorably to Lexecon. Lexecon C.A. Excerpts 68-75, 89.

After Lexecon’s complaint was filed in Chicago, Judge

Bilby, who had presided over the earlier Lincoln Savings

case in Arizona, somehow obtained a copy and read it

“more out of intellectual curiosity than anything.” Milberg

Weiss C.A. Excerpts 359. Judge Bilby then issued an

extraordinary “order” (see Pet. App. 7a-8a n.2) describ-

ing why he disagreed with certain factual allegations in

Lexecon’s Chicago complaint concerning Lexecon’s dis-

missal from the Lincoln Savings case." Judge Bilby stated

that the purpose of his order was to give “the judge in

Chicago . . . something to rely upon.” Milberg Weiss

C.A. Excerpts 441. Judge Bilby recognized that his

recollection of various off-the-record events made him a

potential witness in the Lexecon case in Chicago, but

stated “that ain’t going to happen.” Jd. at 437. More-

over, when the Lexecon case later came before the JPML,

Judge Bilby sent the JPML a letter recusing himself be-

cause of his “involvement” in resolving the underlying case.

The Ninth Circuit held that the factual characteriza-

tions of the Lincoln Savings litigation in Judge Bilby’s

order “plainly indicated that the litigation was not ‘termi-

nated’ in Lexecon’s favor.” Pet. App. 22a. Yet, as Judge

Kozinski noted below, that “order” amounted to “little

more than testimony” by a recused judge who was not

present during key events described in Lexecon’s com-

plaint and whose statements were not “subject to the

8 The crux of Judge Bilby’s disagreement with Lexecon’s Chicago

complaint focused on the circumstances surrounding Lexecon’s de-

cision to return its professional fees of approximately $700,000

from its Lincoln Savings engagement, which it first announced four

months after its dismissal from Lincoln Savings. In his order,

Judge Bilby expressed his view, contrary to the allegations in

Lexecon’s complaint and what Judge Bilby himself said at the time

he dismissed Lexecon as a “non-settling defendant,” that this pay-

ment was a disguised quid pro quo for Lexecon’s earlier dismissal

from Lincoln Savings.

24

normal safeguards applicable to witnesses.” Pet. App.

47a n.16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

The treatment of Lexecon’s abuse of process claim was

even more extraordinary. Here, the Ninth Circuit itself

purported to make findings of fact. Under Arizona law,

an abuse of process claim requires proof that legal process

was used primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it

was not designed. The complaint alleged that respondents

brought suit against Lexecon in an attempt to ruin Lexe-

con’s reputation and destroy Professor Fischel’s credibility

as an expert witness. Lexecon was prepared to substan-

tiate those allegations, but was never given an opportunity

to do so.

The Ninth Circuit panel stated:

[T]he task of this court is to determine whether the

addition of Lexecon as a defendant in the [Lincoln

Savings} litigation had as its primary purpose an

objective for which that litigation was not intended

[i.e., “to inflict harm on Lexecon or Fischel”]. We

hold that no such objective existed... .

Pet. App. 27a, 28a. The panel, of course, had no such

task. The job of a court in dealing with a 12(b)(6)

motion is not to make findings of fact, but to determine

whether the allegations in the complaint, which the court

must assume to be true, are sufficient to state a claim.

If factual disputes—particularly disputes about motive—

can be decided conclusively at the motion to dismiss stage

based on a court’s own analysis of public record materials,

plaintiffs have no assurance that they will ever have an

opportunity to prove their case. The Ninth Circuit asked

rhetorically: “[WJhy should the district court be limited

by Lexecon’s selective telling of a story?” Pet. App. 23a.

But that is what pleading is all about. Lexecon gets a

chance to tell its side of the story, and the court must

assume the truth of that story for purposes of a 12(b) (6)

motion.

ma

on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the facts in the public

i that they

be the subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Lovelace vy.

Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (Sth Cir.

1996); Winchester Homes, Inc. v. Osmose Wood Pre-

serving, Inc., 37 F.3d 1053, 1054 (4th Cir. 1994); Hen-

son v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1994);

Allen v. Westpoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44

Cir. 1991). Ragiems

|

:

is “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b); see Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1018 (court may look

to SEC filings at motion to dismiss Stage to determine

truthful; citing Fed. R. Evid. 201); Americanos v. Carter,

74 F.3d 138, 141 (7th Cir.) (court could take notice

of facts that were “easily ascertainable” from the face of a

state statute), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1853 (1996). The

evidence relied upon by the Ninth Circuit here—particu-

larly the after-the-fact perceptions of one participant in

the earlier litigation—was plainly subject to reasonable

dispute. Thus, these courts would not have reached the

conclusion that the Ninth Circuit did here.

Indeed, application of these standards has led the Sixth

Circuit to reach a conclusion directly contrary to the

Ninth Circuit’s on facts similar to those presented here.

In Friedman v. United States, 927 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.

1991), the district court, in deciding a motion to dismiss,

had relied on a prior decision to supply a “factual basis

to consider whether plaintiff had a valid claim.” Id. at

26

261. Unlike the Ninth Circuit—which sanctioned just

such behavior here—the Sixth Circuit concluded that the

court should not have noticed such contested facts at the

motion to dismiss stage. Id. See also Newman & Schwartz

vy. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir.

1996) (concluding that district court “improperly relied

upon extra-complaint information” to resolve a disputed

issue on a 12(b)(6) motion); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d

190, 197 (Sth Cir. 1996) (reversing district court's order

dismissing plaintiff's complaint on grounds that it failed

to accept as true plaintiff's factual allegations and adopted,

instead, evidence outside the pleadings “as fact without

acknowledging any contradiction with the complaint”).

The Ninth Circuit's decision to rely upon public record

evidence to resolve the disputed question of motive is

particularly remarkable. This Court has long established

that determinations as to motive normally require cred-

ibility determinations of the kind that can only be made

after trial. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338

U.S. 338, 341 (1949) (“Findings as to the design, motive

and intent with which men act depend peculiarly upon

the credit given to witnesses by those who see and hear

them.”); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 US.

273, 287-93 (1982). Accordingly, other circuit courts

have made clear that motive determinations are generally

not suitable for resolution even at summary judgment,

much less on Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Leonard v.

Frankfort Elec. & Water Plant Bd., 752 F.2d 189, 194

(6th Cir. 1985) (“questions of intent or motive are par-

ticularly ill-suited for disposition on summary judgment”) ;

Triad Assocs. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir.

1993) (allegations of intent need only be pleaded gener-

ally and satisfy “notice pleading minimum” to survive

motion to dismiss).

“Formalism has its place,” the Ninth Circuit stated,

“but that place is not here.” Pet. App. 23a. In fact, it is

precisely here—in judging a motion to dismiss a well-

27

pleaded complaint—that formalism does have its place as

a critical protection for plaintiffs who have not yet been

afforded a chance to prove their case. The Court should

accordingly grant certiorari to resolve the intercircuit con-

flict on the appropriate use of public records at the motion

to dismiss stage and to restore Rule 12(b)(6)’s tradi-

tional protections to plaintiffs.°

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL MICHAEL K. KELLOGG

STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO Counsel of Record

MICHELE L. OporR1zz1 MARK C. HANSEN

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT JEFFREY A. LAMKEN

190 S. LaSalle Street AUSTIN C. SCHLICK

Chicago, IL 60603 SEAN A. LEV

(312) 701-7201 KELLOGG, HUBER, HANSEN

Kmomrs 8. Guam Topp & EVANS, P.L.L.C.

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT 1301 K Street, N.W.

2000 Pennsylvania Ave.,N.W, Suite 1000 West

Suite 6500 Washington, D.C. 20005

Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 326-7900

(202) 463-2000

Counsel for Petitioners

March 18, 1997

12(b) (6) ruling will become interlocutory. As

late review of the 12(b) (6) decision will take dog nap ony hie

Circuit and, if necessary, be subject to review by this Court at that

APPENDICES

if

%

:

i

E

i

A

ship; PATRICK COUGHLIN; WILLIAM S. LERACH

No. 95-15759

D.C. No. CV-93-01087-JMR

la

A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEXECON INc.; DANIEL R. FISCHEL,

v.

No. 95-16403

D.C. No. CV-93-01087-JMR

SavinGs & LOAN SECURITIES LITIGATION

-

P. Roppy; LeonarD B. Simon; MELVYN

MILBERG WeEIss BERSHAD Hynes & LERACH, a

IN RE: AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION/LINCOLN

2a

LEXECON INC.; DANIEL R. FISCHEL,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

Vv.

MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HyNeES & LERACH, a partner-

ship; PATRICK COUGHLIN; WILLIAM S. LERACH; KEVIN

P. Roppy; LEONARD B. Simon; MELVYN I. WEISS;

PaTRicIA HYNES; MICHAEL C. SPENCER; STEPHEN R.

STEINBERG, COTCHETT, ILLSTON & PITRE; JOSEPH

COTCHETT, SUSAN ILLSTON,

Defendants-A ppellees,

Nos. 95-16595; 95-16754

D.C. No. CV-93-01087-JMR

IN RE: AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION/ LINCOLN

Savincs & LOAN SECURITIES LITIGATION

LEXECON INC.; DANIEL R. FISCHEL,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

Cross-Appellees,

MILBERG WeEIss BERSHAD Hynes & LERACH, a partner-

ship; PATRICK COUGHLIN; WILLIAM S. LERACH; KEVIN

P. Roppy; LEoNARD B. Simon; MELvyN I. WEISS;

PATRICIA HYNES; MICHAEL C. SPENCER; STEPHEN R.

STEINBERG, Defendants-A ppellees,

Cross-A ppellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding

3a

Argued and Submitted

June 13, 1996—San Francisco, California

Filed December 20, 1996

Before: Joseph T. Sneed, Harry Pregerson, and

Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Sneed;

Dissent by Judge Kozinski

OPINION

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Of the many consequences of the failure i

Savings and Loan and its parent, American facies

Corporation, the litigation that produced these consoli-

dated appeals was just one. At the heart of these appeals

is a suit by Lexecon Inc, against a number of the attor-

neys who represented the consolidated class of investors

who lost money in the collapse of Lincoln Savings and its

parent. Lexecon is a law and economies consulting firm

that frequently serves as a defense expert in securities

class actions prosecuted by the law firms that are defend-

ants here. Lexecon had prepared several reports for Lin-

coln Savings and American Continental, and consequent!

became a target of the class’ claims. In due course ood

claims were resolved. Thereafter Lexecon and its prin-

cipal, Professor Daniel R. Fischel of the University of

Chicago Law School, brought an action for, inter alia

malicious prosecution and defamation in federal district

~~ for the Northern District of Illinois against several

the class attorneys—Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &

Lerach and affiliated attorneys ( “Milberg Weiss”), and

Cotchett Illston & Pitre and affiliated attorneys (“Cotch-

ett”). The underlying theory is that Milberg Weiss and

‘The firm of Greenfield & Chimicles ,

tially, but is not involved in these appeals, also a defendant ini-

—

4a

i Lincoln

Cotchett wrongfully dragged Lexecon into the oln

Savings litigation to satisfy a personal vendetta against

Lexecon and Fischel. The Judicial Panel on 4g

Litigation (“JPML”) transferred this case to District 0

Arizona and assigned it to Judge John M. Roll.

The resolution of Lexecon’s claims in Judge Roll’s

court generally was unfavorable, as were its rulings on

Milberg Weiss’ counterattacks. These have resulted =

four appeals to this court which have been consolidated.

In No. 95-16595, Lexecon appeals the adverse judg-

ment on its malicious prosecution and abuse of process

claims and the denial of its motion for leave to amend,

as well as the denial of its motion to remand the case to

i the

Illinois. In No. 95-16403, Lexecon appeals from

final judgment in favor of the Cotchett defendants.

i Weiss appeals, in No. 95-15759, the district

a denial of np se to obtain injunctive relief

against Lexecon’s prosecution of its claims, and, in No.

95-16754, the dismissal of its counterclaims against

Lexecon.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm the judgments of the district court.

I.

SOURCES OF THIS LITIGATION

Following the collapse of Lincoln Savings, investors

residing in many districts of the federal judicial system

brought actions charging violations of federal securities

laws and RICO. In due course, these cases were trans-

ferred to the District of Arizona, consolidated into MDL

834 (sometimes designated as “Shields” or “Lincoln Sav-

ings’) and assigned to Judge Richard Bilby.

As early as 1990, the consolidated plaintiff class, now

represented by (among others) Milberg Weiss and Cot-

chett, sought to add Lexecon and Fischel as defendants by

Sa

filing a fifth amended complaint. Judge Bilby denied

their motion to do so without prejudice. In February

1991, Judge Bilby granted the class’ motion to file a sixth

amended complaint, which added only Lexecon as a

defendant, and alleged that:

during 1987 and 1988 defendant Lexecon was en-

gaged by ACC/Lincoln to perform services, including

writing reports advocating the safeness of Lincoln's

operations and the value of ACC/Lincoln’s assets

which were submitted to federal and state regulators

in order to persuade them not to take regulatory

action adverse to Lincoln.

Following a period of discovery, Lexecon’s motion for

summary judgment was denied. See In re American

Continental Corp./Lincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp.

1424, 1448-49 (D. Ariz. 1992). Judge Bilby found there

existed material issues as to whether Lexecon’s reports

were false and misleading, and whether Lexecon possessed

reckless scienter as to Lincoln’s fraudulent activities. In

March 1992, the trial commenced. Almost four months

later, and shortly before the close of evidence, Lexecon

moved for a directed verdict. Judge Bilby deaied the

motion, again finding a jury question as to the level of

Lexecon’s knowledge of, and involvement in, Lincoln

Savings’ actions and practices. |

On June 22, 1992, the class attorneys and Lexecon’s

counsel met in Judge Bilby’s chambers to consider a means

by which Lexecon’s exposure to a jury verdict could be

resolved without harmful consequences to its professional

credibility and reputation. In furtherance of this end,

Lexecon urged that any agreement that might be reached

not be designated a “settlement.” To accommodate Lexe-

con’s concern, the term “resolution” was adopted. The

terms of the resolution provided: First, that the court

would enter an order dismissing Lexecon without prejudice;

second, that the parties would sign a stipulation dismissing

Lexecon with prejudice, which stipulation would be held

—_

6a

by Judge Bilby to be entered on the court’s record only if

a new suit was initiated against Lexecon on the same

claims; and, third, that Lexecon would provide class serv-

ices as a subcontractor to Touche Ross who, as another

defendant in MDL 834, had settled its liability for $7.5

million. The resolution also placed restrictions on class

counsel’s ability to cross-examine Lexecon experts in future

lawsuits about Lexecon’s involvement in MDL 834.

This unusual arrangement was implemented, although

because of disagreements between Lexecon and class coun-

sel, Lexecon discharged its obligations by turning over to

the class the approximately $700,000 it had received in

professional fees from Lincoln Savings and American

Continental, rather than performing the class services.

This discharge was accomplished in October 1992.

Those who then thought that the concerns of Lexecon

had been relieved were wrong. On November 25, 1992,

Lexecon filed in the Northern District of Illinois (Lexe-

con’s home state) the action now before us on appeal.

The complaint set forth claims for malicious prosecution,

abuse of process, tortious interference, defamation, and

common law and statutory commercial disparagement.

In June 1993, the JPML transferred the case to the Dis-

trict of Arizona for consolidation with MDL 834, and

assigned it to Judge Roll because Judge Bilby had recused

himself.

Judge Bilby’s recusal obviously resulted in part from his

reaction on learning of Lexecon’s suit in Illinois. He

arranged a telephonic hearing held on December 7, 1992,

and therein charged Lexecon with what he viewed as its

incorrect portrayal of the resolution of its role as a de-

fendant in MDL 834. Following this hearing and the

submission of letter briefs by the parties, Judge Bilby

placed an order in the record of MDL 834 in which he

found portions of Lexecon’s [Illinois complaint to be “a

false description of the conditions under which Lexecon

7a

was dismissed from this case.”* The key portions of

his order disputed Lexecon’s characterization of its pay-

ment to the Lincoln Savings class as “voluntary,” and of

2 The text of this order reads as follows:

On August 12, 1992, Lexecon Inc. was dismissed from the

above captioned matter. As this dismissal was without preju-

dice the Court retained jurisdiction and uses its powers now

to clarify the terms and conditions of that dismissal. More-

over, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) the Court of its own

initiative may correct any errors or omissions of the record.

This Order in no way “rewrites” history, rather, it serves to

clarify the terms and conditions of the Class Plaintiffs and

Lexecon’s agreement. This act of Court is required due to

certain allegations made by Lexecon in Lezecon Inc. v. Milberg

Weiss Bershad Spechrie & Learch [sic], Case No. 92 C 7768

(N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 1992), a suit filed against Class Plaintiffs’

counsel in the Northern District of Illinois.

Specifically, in that Complaint Lexecon alleges :

63. In June 1992, after all the evidence was in, but before

closing arguments, Defendants finally agreed to dismiss

Lexecon, implicitly acknowledging the lack of merit in

their complaint.

64. At the same time, because it believed that its profes-

sional services had been misused by Lincoln and [Charles

H.] Keating [Jr.], Lexecon voluntarily undertook to bene-

fit the class by providing claims administration services

(computerizing mailing lists, processing claims and the

like). When Defendants’ complaints to the court made it

impossible for Lexecon to provide these services, Lexecon

decided to benefit the class instead by voluntarily return-

ing the professional fees paid to it by Lincoln and Keat-

92. The Shields case was terminated in Lexecon’s and

Fischel’s favor.

Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Spechrie & Learch

[sic]. Complaint, {| 63, § 64 and {| 92.

The Court finds these paragraphs to be a false description of

the conditions under which Lexecon was dismissed from this

case. Although counsel for Lexecon at hearing argued that

7198 [sic) is pled merely to satisfy one of the elements of

the resolution as a termination of the litigation in Lexe-

con’s favor:

malicious prosecution, it does not meet with reality and is

factually incorrect.

The Class Plaintiffs/Lexecon resolution was a bargained-for

exchange wherein consideration flowed both ways. Lexecon

agreed to perform through Touche Ross certain administrative

services to the Class Plaintiffs. Subsequently, Lexecon paid

approximately $900,000 in cash instead of performing the ser-

vices. (footnote omitted)

In return, Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed to dismiss Lexecon from

the case without prejudice and to not cross-examine the Lexe-

con experts about any “settlement” by Lexecon of the case.

The fact that a case was filed and subsequently resolved with-

out mention of the terms was always to be a proper subject of

cross-examination. This aspect of the resolution was included

because Lexecon and Mr. Fischel were concerned that if the

term “settlement” was used, Lexecon experts would be open

to in-depth cross-examination in courts across the country with

consequent injury to its business. Hence, the term “settle-

ment,” and the connotations it might imply, was explicitly

avoided and the term “resolution” used instead.

Counsel for Lexecon has furnished the Court with a portion

of a transcript from the Eastern District of Tennessee, North-

ern District in a case captioned, FDIC v. Ernst & Whitney,

CIV 8-87-8364 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 1992) as evidence of Class

Plaintiffs’ Counsels’ bad faith breach of the resolution. A copy

of this transcript is attached as Exhibit “A”.

It is the finding of this Court that Mr. Spencer cross-

examined the Lexecon expert in accordance with the agree-

ment reached with Lexecon in MDL 834 in every respect. Mr.

Spencer never made any reference to the MDL 834 settlement

before the jury in the Tennessee case, nor asked any questions

in that case concerning a settlement in MDL 834. Indeed,

Ms. Brickell on redirect, made the point that the FDIC had

hired Lexecon after the Lincoln project. As long as Plaintiffs’

counsels’ future conduct is in accordance with Mr. Spencer’s

cross-examination in the Tennessee case, then the Lexecon

resolution will not have been breached.

Moreover, under no circumstances was the Class Plaintiffs/

Lexecon compromise a resolution in favor of either party or,

more importantly, an adjudication on the merits. Instead, it

was a bargained-for resolution of a disputed matter from

which both parties benefited.

9a

The Class Plaintiffs/Lexecon resolution was a bar-

gained-for exchange wherein considerations flowed

both ways.

Moreover, under no circumstances was the Class

Plaintiffs/Lexecon compromise a resolution in favor

of either party or, more importantly, an adjudication

on the merits. Instead, it was a bargained-for-resolu-

tion of a disputed matter from which both parties

benefited.

Lexecon’s attempt to appeal this order to this court

failed because there was as yet no final judgment in

MDL 834. Lexecon took no appeal from the final judg-

ment subsequently entered in March 1994.

Meanwhile, Judge Roll had begun his work on the case.

In November 1993 he dismissed Lexecon’s malicious

prosecution and abuse of process claims. /n re American

Continental Corp./Lincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 845 F. Supp.

1377, 1383-86 (D. Ariz. 1993). All the defendants in this

case then answered, and Milberg Weiss filed counterclaims

for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and

promissory estoppel. Discovery proceeded, followed by

the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

In March 1994, before Judge Roll resolved the sum-

mary judgment motions, final judgment was entered in

MDL 834. Lexecon thereupon moved under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1407 for a remand of its case to the Northern District

of Illinois. Judge Roll instructed Lexecon to renew this

motion after the close of discovery, which Lexecon did in

November 1994. In response, Milberg Weiss moved to

make the transfer to Arizona permanent under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1404(a) and 1406, and additionally moved for pre-

liminary and permanent injunctions against the pursuit of

this action, as well as all other claims made by Lexecon.

Judge Roll denied the latter motion, and Milberg Weiss

appealed. No. 95-15759.

10a

Prior to ruling on the remand and transfer motions,

Judge Roll granted summary judgment against Lexecon

on its claims of tortious interference, commercial dispar-

agement, and defamation based on the dissemination of

Milberg Weiss’ sixth amended complaint. Jn re American

Continental/Lincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 1388

(D. Ariz. 1995). Lexecon’s defamation claim based on

a sentence in a letter written by a Milberg Weiss partner,

Kevin P. Roddy, to, and which appeared in, The National

Law Journal, survived. Judge Roll also dismissed Milberg

Weiss’ counterclaims. /d. at 1397. Because the Cotchett

defendants, who were never Lexecon’s principal target in

this litigation, had no part in the Roddy letter, Judge

Roll entered a final judgment in their favor pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Lexecon timely appealed that

judgment. No. 95-16403.

Thereafter, Judge Roll entered an order denying Lexe-

con’s motion to return the case to the JPML for remand

to the Northern District of Illinois, and granting the Mil-

berg Weiss motion to make the transfer to the District of

Arizona permanent. Lexecon appealed the remand and

transfer decision to this court by means of a petition

for writ of mandamus, which was denied without prejudice

as to Lexecon’s raising the issue on direct appeal.

The climactic event in Judge Roll’s court occurred on

July 25-28, 1995, when Lexecon’s defamation claim based

on the Roddy letter to The National Law Journal was

tried to a jury. The jury verdict favored Milberg Weiss.

Lexecon appealed the subsequently entered final judgment,

in particular the district court’s transfer order and its

dismissal of Lexecon’s malicious prosecution and abuse of

process claims. No. 95-16595. Milberg Weiss cross-

appealed the dismissal of its counterclaims. No. 95-16754.

The order in which this court will address the issues

before us on this appeal is as follows:

lla

ae

. The permanent transfer of Lexecon’s case from

the Northern District of Illinois to the District of

Arizona.

2. The denial of Milberg Weiss’ motion for prelimi-

nary and permanent injunctions against the pur-

suit by Lexecon of its claims against Milberg

Weiss and Cotchett.

3. The dismissal of Lexecon’s malicious prosecution

and abuse of process claims.

4. The dismissal of Milberg Weiss’s counterclaims.

I.

THE PERMANENT TRANSFER TO

THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nos. 95-16595 and 95-16403

The JPML transferred Lexecon’s action to the District

of Arizona pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1407(a), which states:

When civil actions involving one or more common

questions of fact are pending in different districts,

such actions may be transferred to any district for

coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on

multidistrict litigation authorized by this section. . . .

Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the

panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial

proceedings to the district from which it was trans-

ferred unless it shall have been previously termi-

nated[.]

The decision of the court below to transfer Lexecon’s sole

surviving claim to itself for trial, and its refusal to refer the

case to the JPML for remand to Illinois, are vigorously

challenged by Lexecon—and not for the first time.

Prior to the trial on the defamation claim, Lexecon

brought before this court a petition for a writ of manda-

l2a

mus seeking: (1) to vacate the district court’s order per-

manently transferring the remaining claim to the District

of Arizona; and (2) to direct the district court to refer

the case to the JPML for remand to the Northern District

of Illinois. In an unpublished disposition, this court denied

the petition and, while recognizing that Lexecon’s argu-

ments based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407 and 1404(a) might

not lack merit, pointed out that they were contrary to

existing case law and Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(b).

We explicitly recognized that the issue could be raised in

an appeal on the merits. The dissent vigorously argued

that 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) authorizes the JPML to transfer

a case for pretrial proceedings only, precluding a section

1404(a) transfer for a trial on the merits by the transferee

court to itself, and that Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(b)

lacks a statutory basis. We now revisit these issues.

We review the district court’s transfer under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a) for an abuse of discretion. Lou v. Belzberg,

834 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485

U.S. 993 (1988). We review de novo the district court’s

interpretation of its duties under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.

Monrad v. FDIC, 62 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1995).

A. Authority for the Section 1404(a) Transfer

The power of a section 1407 transferee court to transfer

a case to itself for trial has been recognized, explicitly or

implicitly, by the courts that have considered the issue."

Patricia D. Howard, the Clerk of the JPML, has stated:

8 See, e.g., In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act

Litig., 73 F.8d 528, 582 n.7 (4th Cir. 1996); Washington Pub.

Util. Group v. United States Dist. Ct., 848 F.2d 319, 326 (9th Cir.

1988) ; Jn re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1988, 829 F.2d

1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987), af’d, 490 U.S. 122 (1989); Kohr v.

Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. de-

nied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-

25 (2d Cir. 1971); Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodia-

lysis Catheter Patent Litig., 750 F. Supp. 330, 382 (N.D. Ill.

1990) ; In re Air Crash Disaster, 476 F. Supp. 445, 450 (J.P.M.L.

1879) ; In re CBS Color Tube, 342 F. Supp. 1408, 1404-05 (J.P.M.L.

1972).

l3a

Although the Panel's power for the most part is

limited to transfer for pretrial only, it is

common for a transferee judge assigned by the Panel

to transfer to his ow or another district under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406 the actions which were

previously assigned to him or her by the Panel under

Section 1407.*

Permitting the transferee court to transfer a case to itself

upon completion of its pretrial work often promotes effi-

ciency in the disposition of the case or cases. The time

required for a new judge to become acquainted with the

litigation is eliminated, as is the possibility of conflicting

or duplicative rulings and proceedings. The above rea-

sons strongly favored trial by the transferee court in this

case, where pretrial proceedings left only one claim to be

resolved by a trial that was scheduled to begin imme-

diately and conclude in four days.

Moreover, the transferee court is empowered to dis-

pose of the cases transferred to it by means of summary

judgment or dismissal. Therefore, logic supports its abil-

* Patricia D. Howard, “A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation,” 124

F.R.D. 479, 479 (1989) ; see also Stanley A. Weigel, “The Judicial

Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Trans-

feree Courts,” 78 F.R.D. 575, 581 n.42 (1977); Moore’s Federal

Practice, Manual for Complex Litigation { 31.18 at 251 n.785 (3d

ed. 1995) (“Although transfer by the panel under § 1407 is only for

pretrial purposes, the transferee court may find it appropriate to

transfer cases to itself for trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or § 1406.”).

5 Judge Kozinski, in his dissent, decries the fact that in multi-

district litigation cases concerns for judieial economy trump the

usual deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum. We fail to see

the problem here. Judicial economy is extremely important in mul-

tidistrict litigation: sufficiently important that Congress enacted

a special statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, to ensure that in multidistrict

cases the interest in judicial economy would not be overridden by

deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum.

* See, e.g., In re Food Lion, Inc., 78 F.3d at 582; In re Korean

Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1178; Weigel, “The Judicial Panel on Multi-

district Litigation,” 78 F.R.D. at 582-83.

l4a

ity to dispose of the case, at least under the circumstances

present here, by trial.

Despite longstanding practice and the efficiency argu-

ments, Lexecon argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) re-

quires remand for trial. The provision states in relevant

part:

Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the

panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial

proceedings to the district from which it was trans-

ferred unless it shall have been previously terminated

(emphasis added). -

Equally specific is JPML R. 14(b), promulgated under

the authority granted the JPML by 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f):

Each transferred action that has not been terminated

in the transferee district court shall be remanded by

the Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless

ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the

transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404

(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.

This conflict between statute and rule, while apparent,

is not real.’ Congress in enacting section 1407 in 1968

™ The dissent contends that Judge Roll contravened the text of

28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1407(a) by denying Lexecon’s motion

to return the case to the JPML and granting Milberg Weiss’ mo-

tion to transfer the case permanently to the District of Arizona.

In making this argument, the dissent conveniently ignores the text

of JPML Rule 14(b), which clearly interprets section 1404(a) to

authorize the transferee judge to transfer the case to the transferee

district. The dissent also conveniently ignores the text of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1407(f), which explicitly grants the JPML broad authority to

“prescribe rules,” such as Rule 14(b), as long as those rules are

“not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f).

Implicit in the dissent’s argument, then, is a claim that Rule

14(b) is inconsistent with sections 1404(a) and 1407(a). The

dissent is far too quick to accuse the JPML of violating the statute

that created it. It is useful to recall that the JPML consists of

“seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time

15a

was concerned with the emerging phenomenon of com-

plex, multidistrict litigation. Its focus was upon creating

and defining the functions of the JPML, not on redefin-

ing or circumscribing the traditional powers of the district

court to which a case has been transferred. This is made

reasonably clear by the House Report accompanying the

proposed statute; that report stated that the bill “affects

only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It

would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude

the possibility of transfer under other Federal statutes.”

H. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in

1968 U.S.C.C.A.N, 1898, 1900. The report continued,

id. at 1901-02:

The subsection requires that transferred cases be

remanded to the originating district at the close of

coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not

therefore, include the trial of cases in the consoli-

dated proceedings. The experience of the Coordinat-

ing Committee [for Multiple Litigation of the U.S.

District Courts, established by the Judicial Confer-

ence of the United States] was limited to pretrial

matters, and the committee consequently considers it

desirable to keep this legislative proposal within the

confines of that experience. . . . Of course, 28

U.S.C. 1404, providing for changes of venue gen-

erally, is available in those instances where transfer

of a case for all purposes is desirable.

Thus, Congress, because of the nation’s limited experi-

ence with multidistrict litigation, sought to design only

the powers and duties of its new creation, the JPML.

by the Chief Justice of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).

Respect for our brethren, and their longstanding practice, requires

us to presume, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, that

the rules promulgated pursuant to section 1407(f) are “not in-

consistent with Acts of Congress.” The alleged inconsistencies

cited by the dissent are not sufficiently glaring to overcome that

presumption. Hence, we conclude that Rule 14(b) is a valid exer-

cise of the JPML’s rulemaking authority, and that Judge Roll’s

actions in this case were fully justified.

l6a

Despite some uncertainty about this matter initially, the

power of the transferee court to transfer a case to itself

for trial has been reinforced by its consistent recognition

in practice. Recourse to such sustained practice, particu-

larly when approved by the JPML, is a legitimate aid to

statutory interpretation. See United States v. American

Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940). In the case

before us, this reading also strongly promotes judicial

efficiency, which was a primary purpose of the legislation

that created the JPML. See H. Rep. at 2, 1968

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1899.

B. The Procedures Available to Initiate Remand

Additional insight into the apparently mandatory lan-

guage of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) is provided by JPML Rule

14(c). That rule imposes the duty on the JPML to:

consider remand of each transferred action . . . at or

before the conclusion of coordinated or consolidated

pretrial proceedings on (i) motion of any party, (ii)

suggestion of the transferee district court, or (iii)

the Panel’s own initiative[.]

The absence of any such “motion” by a party, “sugges-

tion” by the transferee court, or “initiative” of the Panel

appears to leave the case in the care of the transferee

court. Under these circumstances the transferee court

must complete the litigation, even if it involves a trial,

to avoid the absurdity of indefinitely suspended litigation,

the pretrial proceedings of which have come to a close.

Therefore, where the transferee court has declined to

suggest a remand, the JPML has not ordered a remand

on its own initiative, and the litigant has failed to seek a

remand before the JPML, the transferee court is entitled

to terminate the proceedings by conducting the trial.

Besides setting out a procedure by which the JPML’s

duty to remand is triggered, this rule thus gives effect to

the final clause of section 1407(a) by rendering its man-

17a

datory clause inoperative where the action has been

terminated, even by trial.

That is the precise position in which the case rests in

this appeal. The JPML’s duty to remand was not acti-

vated. To repeat, the trigger to such activation was never

pulled. Neither the district court nor the JPML sought to

remand the case. Moreover, Lexecon, in lieu of moving

the JPML for a remand, brought its motion before the

district court, and now appeals to us for a remedy. Neither

this procedure, nor its earlier petition for a writ of manda-

mus, amounts to a motion for remand brought before the

JPML. Lexecon failed to seek succor from the one source

that easily could have granted it if it so chose.’ The

district court, therefore, properly proceeded to conduct a

trial on the single remaining, defamation claim, following

the completion of the pretrial proceedings.

C. Propriety of the Section 1404(a) Transfer

Besides arguing that the district court’s transfer to

itself was without authority by virtue of section 1407,

Lexecon also argues that it was improper under section

1404(a). Lexecon argues that any incremental gain in

efficiency was at its expense, and that it was prejudiced

by being dragged from Chicago, Illinois, to Arizona and

forced to appear before Judge Roll, who was unfamiliar

with MDL 834 and who improperly proceeded to “dis-

mantle” its case. We disagree.

* The dissent argues that Lexecon should not be faulted for its

failure to move the JPML for remand, because Lexecon knew that

the JPML would probably have denied the motion. Even assuming

that Lexecon’s prospects for success were slim, the fact remains

that Rule 14(c) gave Lexecon the option to present its case to the

JPML, including the arguments advanced by Judge Kozinski in

his dissent. Lexecon chose not to pursue that option. In making

this choice, Lexecon also knew, or should have known, that the

option would expire, pursuant to Rule 14(b), if and when Judge

Roll decided to transfer the case permanently to the District of

18a

Lexecon, to put it gently, was no stranger to the District

of Arizona; its participation in MDL 834 precludes any

such claim. Moreover, Judge Roll had become quite

familiar with the case by the time of his decision to

transfer the trial of the defamation claim to his own

district. Finally, Judge Roll’s dismissal of most of Lexc-

con’s claims is not a ground for showing prejudice.

After a careful examination of the record and considera-

tion of the arguments, we find no reason to question the

district court’s authority to try Lexecon’s defamation claim

in the District of Arizona, or the fairness of doing so.

Ill.

THE DENIAL OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

BY MILBERG WEISS

No. 95-15759

After final judgment was entered in MDL 834 and

Lexecon renewed its motion for a suggestion of remand,

Milberg Weiss sought injunctive relief on the ground that

the final judgment was res judicata as to Lexecon’s

claims. Milberg Weiss requested:

(1) an order preliminarily enjoining plaintiffs .. .

from prosecuting or otherwise pursuing against the

Milberg Defendants, in any other judicial district or

forum, any claims or other matters that were raised

or could have~ been raised in the Lincoln Savings

action .. .; and (2) an order permanently enjoining

plaintiffs from prosecuting or otherwise pursuing those

claims or other matters in any court or forum.

The district court concluded that Lexecon’s claims were

not precluded, and denied the motion.

We must uphold the denial of injunctive relief “unless

the court incorrectly applied the law, relied on clearly

erroneous factual findings, or otherwise abused its discre-

tion.” Contract Serv. Network, Inc. v. Aubry, 62 F.3d

294, 297 (9th Cir. 1995). We review de novo issues of

19a

law underlying the denial, including the determination that

songs 8 Claims were not barred by res judicata. Id. We

events occur which prevent the appellate court from t-

ing any effective relief even if the dispute is decided in

favor of the appellant.” Holloway v. United States, 789

B. Res Judicata

Milberg Weiss supports its effort to enjoin Lexecon

arguing that the MDL 834 litigation seutiond pei

claims by reason of res judicata. This considerably over-

states the preclusive effect of Judge Bilby’s actions.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, “{a] final judgment

on te tonite of an estan pasibases tee partie oo ak

privies from relitigating issues that were or could have

been raised in that action.” Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v.

Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). Judge Bilby’s action

pertaining to Lexecon was to dismiss the claims of the

class against Lexecon without prejudice, in accordance

with the parties’ resolution. We have held that a dismissal

20a

without prejudice lacks res judicata effect. In re Corey,

892 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 815 (1990). Nor was Judge Bilby’s subsequent

order of December 31, 1992 (see supra n.2), a judgment

on the merits of the claims against Lexecon, That order

merely clarified the terms of the resolution, indeed empha-

sized that there had been no judgment on the merits of

the claims against Lexecon. .

Lexecon’s reliance on Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958

F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1050

(1993), and Golden v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 786 F.2d

1425 (9th Cir. 1986), is therefore misplaced. Those cases

develop the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction

Act, which allows a district court to enjoin litigation in

other courts if such litigation is barred by res judicata.”

Because Lexecon’s claims are not barred by res judicata,

those cases are not controlling.

C. The Requirements for Injunctive Relief

Even if Lexecon’s claims were barred by res judicata,

Milberg Weiss has still failed to show that the district

court abused its discretion in declining to grant injunctive

relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must

show either “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits and

the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) the existence

of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of

hardships tipping in the movant’s favor.” MAI Sys. Corp.

v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 516 (9th Cir.

1993) (internal quotation omitted), cert. dismissed, 114

S. Ct. 671 (1994). At the time the Milberg Weiss’ motion

was filed, no such showing could be made. At that time,

February 6, 1995, Milberg Weiss had also moved for a

1© See 28 U.S.C. § 2288 (“A court of the United States may not

grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as

expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in

aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”’) ;

Western Sys., 958 F.2d at 871; Golden, 786 F.2d at 1427.

2la

permanent transfer of this case to the Arizona District, and

Judge Roll was poised to rule on Lexecon’s motion to refer

the case to the JPML for remand. His rulings thereafter

were generally favorable to Milberg Weiss. Even had these

rulings been adverse to Milberg Weiss, it could have ap-

pealed them to this court; therefore, it could not show

either the possibility of irreparable injury or that the bal-

ance of hardships tipped in its favor. See United States v.

Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 699 (D.N.J. 1989)

(refusing to enjoin itself from entering proposed consent

decree where appealability of the decree defeated any

claim of irreparable harm). Nor was there any indication

that Lexecon was likely to initiate an entirely new lawsuit

on the same claims in a different forum. In short, Milberg

Weiss failed to establish the conditions prerequisite to the

issuance of the preliminary and permanent injunctions it

sought.”

IV.

THE DISMISSAL OF THE MALICIOUS

PROSECUTION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIMS

Nos. 95-16595 and 95-16403

We now turn to Lexecon’s appeal from the dismissal by

the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of its

malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims. Our

review of this dismissal is de novo, with all factual allega-

tions taken as true and construed in the light most favor-

able to Lexecon. See Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097,

1099 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W.

3605 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-1385). The district

court's denial of Lexecon’s motion for leave to amend its

complaint is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United

1) Lexecon requests attorneys’ fees for a frivolous appeal under

Fed. R. App. P. 88. However, Rule 38, as amended effective Decem-

ber 1, 1994, requires that any such request be made by a separately

filed motion. Without commenting on the merits of its request,

we therefore deny Lexecon’s request without prejudice to its filing

a separate motion for attorneys’ fees.

_ 22a

States v. County of San Diego, 53 F.3d 965, 969 n.6

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 183 (1995).

A. Malicious Prosecution

instituted a civil action which was (2) motivated by

malice, (3) begun without probable cause, (4) termi-

nated in plaintiff's favor and (5) damaged y

Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 758 P.2d

1313, 1319 (Ariz. 1988). Under Arizona law, probable

cause requires that the plaintiff honestly believe in the

lawsuit’s possible merits and that the belief be objectively

reasonable. /d. (citing Restatement (2d) of Torts § 675

comment c; Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 120

at 893 (Sth ed. 1984).

There is no dispute here that Lexecon has properly

pyar ngs hanage pcan ye. ung 2 ramen

as well its claim fails nonethless. Jods Eli's sulian io

MDL 834 including his order of December 31, 1992 (see

supra n.2) plainly indicated that the litigation was not

“terminated” in Lexecon’s favor.

Lexecon attempts to avoid this roadblock to its mali-

cious prosecution claim by insisting that the district court

erred in examining the MDL 834 record in ruling on

Milberg Weiss’ 12(b)(6) motion.” In general, material

Outside the pleadings cannot be considered in ruling on a

motion to dismiss, unless the motion is treated as one for

summary judgment and the parties are “given reasonable

opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such

23a

a motion by Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Jacobsen

v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir.

tion to the matters at issue, may be looked to when ruling

on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Shaw v. Hahn,

F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

(1995); Henson v. CSC Credit Serv., 29 F.3d 2

(7th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria

Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248

(9th Cir. 1992).

It would be absurdly formal to hold that Judge Bilby’s

published opinion in MDL 834 and his December 31,

et ee ee ee ee

the claim.” Frey v. Stoneman, 722 P.2d 274, 277 (Ariz.

1986) (en banc). “If entry of summary judgment was

prosecution action.” Jd. at 278-79 (internal quotation

omitted). Here, the avoidance of the use of the term

24a

“settlement” in favor of the alternative “resolution” does

not alter that result.

Lexecon urges us to rely on Bradshaw, 758 P.2d at

1321, which held that a settlement may be a favorable

termination depending on the surrounding facts. Lexecon

argues that favorable termination is a question of fact

that cannot be resolved on a 12(b)(6) motion. We dis-

agree. In Bradshaw, the settlement terms called for the

plaintiff to withdraw its action, pay the defendants

$60,000, and stipulate to a dismissal with prejudice.

Here, it was the defendant Lexecon that paid $700,000

in exchange for its dismissal from MDL 834. No addi-

tional factual development is necessary. The circum-

stances of this case do not indicate that the MDL 834

litigation against Lexecon terminated in its favor. It fol-

lows that Lexecon’s malicious prosecution claim against

both Milberg Weiss and Cotchett fails.

It also follows that we need not consider the argument

of Milberg Weiss that the tort of malicious prosecution

has been reshaped by First Amendment principles devel-

oped in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine ™ and Professional

Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,

Inc., 113 §. Ct. 1920, 1925 (1993) (“PREI”). Milberg

Weiss argues that these decisions have raised the thresh-

old for access to a malicious prosecution claim by requir-

ing the plaintiff to show that the defendant's earlier suit

was “objectively baseless” and one in which “no reason-

able litigant could realistically expect success on the

merits.” ** This formulation, if applied, would alter the

18 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404

U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381

25a

meaning under Arizona law of the “probable cause” ele-

ment, and to some degree the “malice” element, by elim-

inating the subjective, honest belief requirement.

Noerr-Pennington and PREI were federal antitrust

cases that did not address the state law tort of malicious

prosecution. In this circuit, the application of this line of

cases to state law claims has been unpredictable. For

example, the PREI objective baselessness standard was

not applied to a National Labor Relations Board decision

that a libel suit brought by an employer against a union

was an unfair labor practice. PREI was said not to be on

point. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d

1085, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other hand, a

timber company counterclaim against an environmental

organization for abuse of process, based on that organi-

zation’s efforts to enjoin logging on the timber company’s

land, was required to meet the heightened pleading stand-

ard associated with Noerr-Pennington. Oregon Natural

Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531, 533-35 (9th

Cir. 1991).

The rationalizing principle of these cases is unclear,

unless it rests on a judicial preference for certain types

of litigation that appear to promote specifically recog-

nized public interests. To encourage vigilent pursuit of

these interests, it may be thought proper to protect them

against threats of malicious prosecution by raising the

barrier to access to that remedial tort action. Milberg

Weiss argues, in substance if not in form, that the class

action on behalf of Lincoln Savings investors easily con-

forms to that rationalization. Innocent investors in im-

properly operated savings and loan institutions and their

legal representatives are as deserving of protection from

the threat of malicious prosecution by those who have

rendered financial services to such institutions as are

plaintiffs in antitrust or environmental proceedings.

While there is a certain appeal in such an approach, we

decline to rest our rejection of Lexecon’s malicious prose-

26a

cution on this ground." We hold only that the MDL 834

litigation against Lexecon was not terminated in its favor.

Therefore, under Arizona law, Lexecon has failed to state

a claim of malicious prosecution.

=

B. Abuse of Process

Abuse of process is described by the Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 682 (1977) as follows:

One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or

civil, against another primarily to accomplish a pur-

pose for which it is not designed, is subject to lia-

bility to the other for harm caused by the abuse of

process.

This definition is accepted by the Arizona courts. See

Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. App.

1982); Morn v. City of Phoenix, 730 P.2d 873, 875

(Ariz. App. 1986). Plaintiff must show that defendants

(1) committed a willful act in the use of judicial process

4% There is now extensive case law on both sides of the question

whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine brings first amendment

principles to bear on state law tort claims. See, ¢.g., State of South

Dakota v. Kansas City Southern Indus., 880 F.2d 40, 50-51 (8th

Cir. 1989) (applying first amendment analysis to a state claim

for tortious interference with contractual relations), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 1028 (1990); Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home,

Ine. v. Wells, 889 F.2d 155, 159-60 (8d Cir. 1988) (applying defa-

mation and Noerr-Pennington analyses to tort claim based on de-

fendants’ actions in alerting authorities to plaintiff’s violations of

law); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 6438, 649 (7th

Cir. 1983) (applying Noerr-Pennington and its sham litigation

exception “to protect the First Amendment right to petition

against claims of tortious interference with business relation-

ships”) ; Sierra Club v. Butz, 849 F. Supp. 984, 988-89 (N.D. Cal.

1972) (applying first amendment analyses of Noerr-Pennington

and defamation cases to state counterclaim for interference with

advantageous relationship); Florida Fern Growers, Inc. v. Con-

cerned Citizens of Putnam County, 616 So.2d 562, 569 (Fla. 1993)

(declining to follow Sierra Club v. Butz). The time may come

when this circuit must speak definitively on the question. How-

ever, this is not the right time, or the right case in which, to do so.

27a

(2) for an improper ulterior purpose. Nienstedt, 651

P.2d at 881.

The gravamen of the tort is not “the wrongful procure-

ment of legal process or the wrongful initiation of crim-

inal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no

matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than

that which it was designed to accomplish.” Restatement

§ 682, comment a; see also Morn, 730 P.2d at 875.

Accordingly, the task of this court is to determine

whether the addition of Lexecon as a defendant in the

MDL 834 litigation had as its primary purpose an ob-

jective for which that litigation was not intended. We

hold that no such objective existed in MDL 834.

It is clear that the primary purpose of the MDL 834

litigation was to recover from the collapse of American

Continental/Lincoln Savings on behalf of the investors

therein such assets as was possible under the law. Lexe-

con, of course, does not deny that. Rather, its focus is

upon its inclusion as a defendant. It asserts that class

counsel’s primary purpose in attempting to add Lexecon

and Fischel as defendants was “(1) to extract false testi-

mony implicating other Shields defendants, (2) prevent

‘Arthur Young & Co. from using Lexecon as an expert in

Shields, and (3) ‘to make Lexecon . . . far less attractive

to potential clients as expert witnesses.’” In re American

Continental, 845 F. Supp. at 1382.

Lexecon alleges that after Milberg Weiss sought to

file a fifth amended complaint adding both Lexecon and

Fischel as defendants, it offered to dismiss the motion in

exchange for “false testimony” against defend-

ants. Lexecon refused, and leave to file this fifth

complaint was subsequently denied. The alleged attempt

to extract false testimony therefore never amounted to

file their sixth amended complaint, the attempt to coerce

false testimony was not repeated. Therefore, Lexecon

28a

cannot show that the primary purpose behind Milberg

Weiss’ use of process was to coerce false testimony.

Lexecon also points to additional acts of Milberg Weiss

that it claims amounted to an abuse of process. Some of

these acts, such as the unsuccessful motion to file the

fifth amended complaint, occurred “pre-process,” and

were therefore not actionable.** Others were collateral to

the MDL 834 litigation, such as Milberg Weiss attorneys’

use of that litigation to impeach Lexecon expert witnesses

during cross-examination in separate and distinct litiga-

tion. Such cross-examination, so long as it conformed

to the terms of the MDL 834 resolution, was not improper

and therefore cannot form the basis of an abuse of proc-

ess claim.

The acts alleged by Lexecon did not have as their

primary purpose to inflict harm on Lexecon or Fischel.

Nor did the addition of Lexecon as an MDL 834 defend-

ant to assert that Lexecon bore some responsibility for

those investors’ losses constitute an abuse of

Lexecon’s abuse of process claim was therefore properly

dismissed.”"

V.

THE DISMISSAL OF MILBERG WEISS’

COUNTERCLAIMS

No. 95-16754

The Milberg Weiss counterclaims alleged fraud, breach

of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel.

%* Although Arizona courts define “process” broadly, Nienstedt,

651 P.2d at 880, we agree with the district court that it is not

read so broadly as to include a failed attempt to sue in which

process never issued.

7 Examination of Lexecon’s proposed second amended complaint

shows that it merely reiterates the same claims in new language.

Because leave to amend is inappropriate where the amendment

dos not solve the legal deficiencies in the complaint, the district

did not abuse its discretion in denying Lexecon’s motion for

Jackson, 902 F.8d at 1387.

f

Y

29a

The alleged source of these claims is the negotiations that

led to the resolution of Lexecon’s exposure to liability in

MDL 834. We review their dismissal de novo. Gotcher,

66 F.3d at 1099; Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 469

(9th Cir. 1995).

First, Milberg Weiss alleged that while Lexecon said

it was negotiating the “resolution” to avoid damaging

cross-examination about MDL 834 in future cases, its true

reason was to preserve its ability to sue class counsel for

malicious prosecution by avoiding an unfavorable jury

verdict. The district court properly dismissed this claim.

While Milberg Weiss is a party in the litigation now before

this court, it was not a party in the MDL 834 litigation;

rather, it was a counsel to the class on whose behalf the

proceedings against Lexecon were brought. As the district

court put it: “Whatever harm resulting from the resolu-

tion was sustained by the class, not by class counsel.” In

re American Continental, 884 F. Supp. at 1397.

Second, Milberg Weiss argues that during the negotia-

tions, Lexecon represented that it had no applicable in-

surance when in fact it did have such insurance, and that

it relied on that representation in agreeing to the resolu-

pleadings, or to request leave to amend. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a).

i

CONCLUSION

The judgments in Nos. 95-15759, 95-16403, 95-16595,

and 95-16754 are affirmed.

2 see a

30a

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Since the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

(JPML) was created in 1968, it has Cendirred 92.562

cases for consolidated pretrial proceedings. Only 3,508

of these—less than four percent—have been sent back

for trial in the district where the complaint was filed.

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial

Business of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the

Director 32. Yet the statute which authorizes the JPML

to transfer cases for coordinated or consolidated pretrial

Proceedings commands that “{eJach action so transferred

shall be remanded by the [JPML] at or before the con-

clusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from

which it was transferred .. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).

These numbers tell the story of a remarkable power grab

by federal judges who have parlayed a narrow grant of

authority to conduct consolidated discovery into a mech-

3la

thorizing the JPML to transfer cases for all parposes but

Soon after the MDL process got underway, a peculiar

thing started happening: Judges began to develop

prietary feelings toward the cases entrusted to them;

began using 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the venue

statute, to hold on to these cases for trial. Some

worried that such transfers were not authorized:

recognize candidly,” wrote Judge Bownes, then of

District of New Hampshire, “that there is nothing in

language of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) or 1404(a) whi

Fle:

i

e

‘

goa?

cr eee

(D.N.H. 1971). Such scruples were cast aside after the

Second Circuit’s opinion in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d

122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1971), a case that proved unusually

Since Pfizer, this practice (known as “self-transfer” )

has become a routine aspect of the MDL process. The

bwssed self-transfer by its Rule 14(b), which

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Tube Patent Litig., 342 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (J.P

32a

1972) (“In view of the pendency of [a § 1404(a)] mo-

tion, we expressly refrain from granting this motion for

remand and interfering in matters within the discretion

of the transferee judge.”).’

The majority thus has ample company in holding that

a district judge to whom a case has been sent for pretrial

under section 1407(a) may latch onto it by ordering a

section 1404(a) self-transfer. See maj. op. at 15787.

Every court that has examined the issue since Pfizer has

held or assumed that such authority exists.? But a close

1 It is for this reason that the majority’s suggestion that Lexe-

con somehow waived its right to seek return of the case to the

Northern District of Illinois is ill founded. See maj. op. at 15790-

91. Under the Panel’s rules and precedent, the JPML will not nor-

mally consider a transfer without a recommendation from the dis-

trict judge. See, e.g., J.P.M.L. R. Proc. 14(d) (“The Panel is re-

luctant to order remand absent a suggestion of remand from the

transferee district court.”); In re A.H. Robins Co., 453 F. Supp.

108, 110 (J.P.M.L. 1978); In re Holiday Magic Securities & Anti-

trust Litig., 488 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (both noting

that, absent a suggestion from the transferee court, a party seeking

remand from the JPML bears a heavy burden of persuasion).

Lexecon—in compliance with this authority—petitioned the district

court in August 1994 to refer the case back to the JPML because

stayed consideration of this motion pending the end of discovery,

Lexecon renewed its remand request at the close of discovery in

November 1994. In December 1994, defendants moved for a sec-

tion 1404(a) transfer, and in March 1995, the district court

33a

fact, Pfizer, with its one page of analysis

Washington Pub. Util. Group v. United S Dist. Ct., 848 F.2d

450 (J.P.M.L. 1979); In re CBS Color Tube, 342 F. Supp. at 1404-

065).

* See, ¢.g., Washington Pub. Util. Group, 848 F.2d at 326; In re

Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1988, 829 F.2d at 1178 n.7;

In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 68F F.2d at 820 n.7; East-

ern Air Lines, Inc. (in re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades

on Dec. 29, 1972), 649 F.2d at 1009 n.4; In re Air Crash Disaster

at Detroit Met. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 787 F. Supp. 391, 394

n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1989) ; In re Taz Refund Litig., 728 F. Supp. 922,

924 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l

Airport, Denver, Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1455, 1458

(D. Colo. 1988) ; In re Dow Co. “Sarabond Products” Liab. Litig.,

664 F. Supp. 1408, 1408-04 (D. Colo. 1987); In re Air Crash Dis-

at John F. Kennedy Int’l Airport on June 24, 1975, 479 F.

1118, 1122-28 (E.D.N.Y.

Near Chicago, 476 F. Supp. at 450; In re Anthracite Coal Anti-

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36a

Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the

Federal Courts, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 41, 64 (1971)

(the language and legislative history of section 1407(a)

are so clear that it “originally appeared to be a futile

exercise for a 1407 transferee court to rule on a 1404

transfer motion.”); John F. Cooney, Comment, The Ex-

perience of Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict

Litigation Act, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 588, 606 (1972)

(“{T]Jhe apparently mandatory nature of the remand

(“{C]onsolidation for trial almost certainly defies both

the letter of section 1407 and the intent of its drafters.”

(footnotes omitted) ); Note, The Judicial Panel and the

Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 Harv. L. Rev.

1001, 1030-31 (1974) (legislative history of section

gress apparently

ings” to “generally involve deposition and discovery.” H.

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39a

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40a

It makes perfect sense for Congress to permit the trans-

feree court to handle most pretrial legal issues—incluc ing

some dispositive motions—and still insist that trial (if

The majority’s second block quote is no more helpful. Presum-

ably, again, the majority intends to emphasize the portion of the

quote which allows, “Of course, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, providing for

changes of venue generally, is available in those instances where

complaint was filed. Trial is a unique part of the litiga-

tion process in that it involves fact-finding, usually by a

venue to itself? Again, it helps to read the applicable

statute, which in plain and simple terms provides “For

the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest

of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to

any other district or division where it might have been

brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (emphasis added). I

don’t see how this language can be read to authorize a

3

42a

U. Penn. L. Rev. at 740 (“A transferee court using

§ 1404(a) is not transferring a case to another district.

It is simply proclaiming trial jurisdiction over the case.”

(emphasis in original)). Indeed, the drafters of section

1404(a) could not possibly have meant to authorize

self-transfers because that section long predates section

1407; the possibility that a district court would be in a

position to transfer a case to itself was not something

anyone at the time could have anticipated.’ Thus, this is

not a case where the statutory language imperfectly reflects

the intention of the drafters. The language of section

1404(a) precisely matches the understanding of the Con-

gress that enacted it.

Are the federal courts nevertheless justified in tweaking

section 1404(a) to make it yield up an authorization for

self-transfer in the MDL context? Even under the best

circumstances such judicial legerdemain would be awk-

ward because it would require us to ignore the term

“other” in section 1404(a). But these are not ideal

circumstances because such manipulation creates a power

® Defendants make a Rube Goldberg argument that Lexecon’s

case was, in fact, transferred to another district: Although trans-

ferred temporarily for pretrial purposes, the case was still techni-

cally pending in the Northern District of Illinois when the section

1404(a) transfer moved it to the District of Arizona, an “other

district .. . where it might have been brought.” See Br. of Milberg

Defendants and of Cross-Appellant Milberg Weiss, at 25. Defend-

ants seem to think that section 1404(a) merely requires that a

case be transferred from one court to another.

This argument makes no linguistic sense because section 1404 (a)

provides that “a district court may transfer any civil action to any

other district ....” 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (emphasis added). The

phrase “any other district,” which specifies the receiving court,

stands in contrast to the earlier phrase “a district court,” which

refers to the court making the transfer. Or, to put it differently,

the term “other district” must relate back to the term “district”

within the same sentence. Thus, the court making the transfer

cannot, under the terms of section 1404(a), be the same as the

court receiving the transfer.

43a

that Congress considered giving federal courts but ex-

pressly rejected. See p. 15805 supra.

This, then, is not a case where Congress passed two

laws at different times and forgot to harmonize them.

Congress, rather, made a deliberate choice to leave trial

of cases subject to the MDL process in the district where

they were filed. Given section 1407(a)’s explicit com-

mand that cases be remanded for trial in the district where

they were filed, and legislative history making it clear

that this was a deliberate choice, I don’t’ see how we can

possibly fudge section 1404(a) to make it authorize

self-transfer.

This question was not raised in Pfizer and no other

federal court of appeals has ever considered it. The issue

has been noted by commentators, and they have all con-

cluded that self-transfer is not authorized by section

1404(a). See, e.g., Rhodes, 140 U. Penn. L. Rev. at

740-41 (arguing that using section 1404(a) in this way

amounts to “creat[ing] a new ‘venue’ statute sua sponte.”).

Even if we could overcome these first two hurdles,

there is a third, equally daunting, one. Section 1404(a),

at least as interpreted outside the MDL context, carries

a strong presumption that plaintiff's choice of forum will

not be disturbed. The presumption can be overcome only

by a compelling showing that the convenience of parties

and witnesses will be served by the transfer. See 15

Wright et al., § 3848, at 383. This interpretation of

section 1404(a) is consistent with the traditional rule,

which gave plaintiffs almost complete power to select the

forum, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508

(1947) (“[T]he plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely

be disturbed.”), and a judicial recognition that, by pass-

ing section 1404(a), Congress intended to disturb the

plaintiff's choice of forum only for very strong reasons.”

% The Supreme Court in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29

(1955), upheld a section 1404(a) transfer away from a plaintiff's

44a

In the MDL context, the traditional forum deference

afforded plaintiffs disappears entirely. It's as if MDL

courts are applying a mutated version of section 1404(a),

one where a plaintiff's right to pick its venue has de-

volved to the significance of a tailbone or an appendix.

Thus, MDL courts seldom even consider the rights of

plaintiffs to their chosen forums, much less give this

factor controlling weight. See, e.g., Transgrud, 70 Cor-

nell L. Rev. at 809 (“When confronted with section

1404(a) motions, transferee courts have denied transfers

only where those transfers would have put the parties in

an improper venue or were requested prematurely.”).

Instead, concerns for judicial economy trump all others:

“Since [a section 1404(a) transfer in the MDL context]

involve[s] multiple cases, the rights, interests, and con-

venience of the individual parties [are] swept aside in

the drive toward apparent judicial economy.” Levy, 40

Fordham L. Rev. at 65; see also 15 Wright et al., § 3867,

at 626 (when granting section 1404(a) transfers “notions

of party and witness convenience, which typically are at

the heart of transfer motions under Section 1404(a), may

be subordinated to the type of judicial economy concerns

that are central to Section 1407”); Richard A. Chesley &

Kathleen W. Kolodgy, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient

Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 467,

525 (1985) (“[T)he efficiency standards of section 1407

many times overshadow the important individual con-

cerns that the courts examine under section 1404.”).

home forum, which would have been impermissible under the tradi-

tional forum non conveniens doctrine. The Court reasoned that

section 1404(a) was intended to broaden the power of courts to

order venue transfers. “{N]evertheless it has been consistently

held since that decision that plaintiff's choice of a forum will not

be disturbed unless the balance of convenience weighs heavily in

favor of defendant.” Franklin v. Blaylock, 218 F. Supp. 261, 262

(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Blaylock v. McLean, 319 F.2d 533

(2d ed. 1968) (citations omitted) ; see also Stephen C. Yeazell et al.,

Civil Procedure 198 (8d ed. 1992).

45a

Section 1404(a), thus, has not only been conscripted

by the federal courts to serve ends Congress never had

in mind for it, it has also been stripped of the prudential

constraints designed to protect plaintiff's choice of forum.

What this means in practice is that self-transfers are not

occasional, isolated events based on an unusually strong

showing of judicial economy; they are the norm. The

simple reality is that once a case is sucked into the MDL

vortex, it seldom comes back. See In re Korean Air Lines

Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d at 1178 (D.H. Gins-

burg, J., concurring) (“In practice, the vast majority of

transferred cases are so resolved, and do not return to

the transferor courts.”); In re New York City Municipal

Secs. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978) (“{H]istory

has indicated that once the limited transfer has occurred,

the transferor district is not likely to see the case

again.” ).”

No case better illustrates the dangers of this practice

than the one now before us. Applying normal 1404(a)

standards, a venue transfer of this case from Chicago to

Arizona would never have been granted; the convenience

of the parties and witnesses would not have been served

by such a transfer, much less clearly outweighed plain-

tiffs’ right to choose their forum. Of the four witnesses

who testified at trial, two were from Chicago, none from

Arizona.” Plaintiffs were from Chicago, defendants from

California but represented by a lawyer from Chicago.

The only connection between this case and Arizona was

the trial judge.

Nor was the “interest of justice” clearly served by trans-

fer to Arizona for trial. The trial lasted only five days

1! I’ve found no case where an MDL court has been reversed for

transferring a case to itself for trial.

“Of the 42 witnesses whose depositions had been noticed or

taken at the time the request for remand was filed by Lexecon,

only one was from Arizona. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand at

9. A very fine witness, to be sure, but still only one.

46a

and turned on Illinois law. See Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss,

884 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Az. 1995) (applying Illinois law

to Lexecon’s defamaticn claim). Any advantage Judge

Roll might have enjoyed in dealing with the facts was

offset by the advantage a Chicago district judge would

have had in instructing the jury as to Illinois law.”

No matter how you jiggle these factors, it’s hard to

come up with a plausible argument that trial in Arizona

was more appropriate than trial in Chicago. Yet, as

section 1404(a) is normally interpreted, a plaintiff's

choice of forum can only be overcome if the transferee

district is clearly more advantageous than the transferor

district. Plaintiff's selection of its own home forum, when

that forum is related to the subject matter of the suit, is

entitled to even greater deference because both plaintiff

and the community have an interest in resolving the con-

troversy at home. See, e.g., General Foam Plastics Corp.

v. Kraemer Export Corp., 806 F. Supp. 88, 89 (E.D.

Va. 1992); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Air-

lines, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1392, 1395-96 (S.D. Tex.

1992).* Instead, Lexecon was forced to trial in a forum

18 This was not even a situation where the parties and witnesses

were already going to trial on related claims so it would have been

convenient to try this case at the same time. C/f. In re Fine Paper,

685 F.2d at 820 (“[P)laintiffs’ convenience was outweighed by the

comparative economy of trying one case in the Eastern District

rather than several actions in the [plaintiffs’] home districts.”).

All other cases involving Lincoln Savings had long since been

14 The rationale behind this rule is brought home by considering

whether a Chicago or Arizona jury would better appreciate the

ee een See oF ee eee ow Oe

47a

where there was much popular feeling against Lincoln

Savings, Charles Keating and those (like plaintiffs) who

were associated with them.” It was also a forum where

a respected district judge felt so strongly that plaintiffs’

claim was unjustified that he found it necessary to recuse

himself. See maj. op. at 15781."

thinking maybe about what is happening out here, and wonder-

ing: Will Lexecon continue to be the kind of fine organization

that Dan Fischel built it to be? Will they have a future?

RT at 234-85 (July 31, 1995).

18 Not surprisingly, defense counsel peppered his arguments with

references to Charles Keating’s misdeeds and defendants’ attempts

to recover money for the victims, whom counsel described as “those

retired people, the 23,000 people who got robbed, raped and peltered

[sic] by Charles Keating.” RT at 187 (July 81, 1991). Defense

counsel also made much of the fact that, by settling the Lincoln

Savings case, Lexecon avoided the verdict of an Arizona jury, and

then ran off to Chicago and filed suit. See id. at 215 (“Now, as

I said [before], if Lexecon wanted vindication, it could have taken

its case to the jury. It did not. It paid $700,000. That is fine.

But then it shouldn’t have gone back to Chicago and thrown that

$15 million brick at [defendants by filing suit]. It shouldn’t have

done that.”’).

1¢ As the majority notes, Judge Bilby went so far as to amend

the record in the earlier proceeding by entering an order explicat-

ing his view of the settlement and deriding Lexecon for having

brought this lawsuit. Judge Bilby no doubt was sincere in his

views but his order amounted to little more than testimony about

his perception of the settlement. As this statement was not subject

to the normal safeguards applicable to witnesses—such as cross-

examination and impeachment—lI find it troubling that the majority

relies on it in characterizing Lexecon’s case. See maj. op. at 15781-

83.

Although Judge Roll had nothing to do with this order, he may

have been influenced by his colleague’s strong feelings, and thus

“we [might] consider prior judicial experience in such a situation

more a negative than an affirmative reason for transfer.” Codez

Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 558 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1977). Moreover, defense counsel repeatedly

referred to the sentence from Judge Bilby’s order characterizing

Lexecon’s complaint as “a false description of the conditions under

which [it] was dismissed from [the Lincoln Savings] case.” De-

48a

In ordering the self-transfer, the district court did not

consider any of the traditional section 1404(a) factors.

The court simply noted its familiarity with the case and

concluded that it would be wasteful to have another judge

conduct the trial. See Order, May 2, 1995. Such con-

siderations of judicial economy—standing alone—have

never before been sufficient to justify a section 1404(a)

transfer. See, e.g., Warrick v. General Electric Co., 70

F.3d 736, 740 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (judicial

economy “is not alone sufficient” to justify a transfer);

Wash. Pub. Util. Group, 843 F.2d at 326 (“[A] federal

court may not order transfer under section 1404(a) solely

for its convenience.”); Codex Corp., 553 F.2d at 739

(“{W]e have found no case where [the desire for consoli-

dation] has carried the day against factors pointing in the

other direction.”); Max Planck v. General Ele. Co.,

858 F. Supp. 380, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that

court expertise with the subject matter of a case is an

“irrelevant” consideration under section 1404(a)). [If

familiarity with the case in a five-day, four-witness, one-

horse trial is sufficient to justify a section 1404(a) trans-

fer, the case simply does not exist where judicial economy

will not trump a plaintiff's right to a trial in his home

district.

The majority points to JPML Rule 14(b) as authority

for Judge Roll’s action. See maj. op. at 15789-90 n. 7.

But the rule governs only the internal procedures of the

JPML, not the authority of the district court. See J.P.M.L.

R. Proc. 14(b) (“In the event that the transferee judge

so transfers an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or

1406, no further action of the Panel shall be necessary

to authorize further proceedings including trial.”). Nor

could it, since section 1407(f) only empowers the JPML

fense counsel made sure the jury understood just who Judge Bilby

was: “Judge Bilby learned of this lawsuit and Judge Bilby entered

an order. The judge sitting across the street, the former Chief

Judge of this district.” RT at 198 (July 31, 1996).

49a

“to prescribe rules for the conduct of its business.” 28

U.S.C. § 1407(f) (emphasis added).”

But even if Rule 14(b) somehow purported to do what

the majority ascribes to it, we would still have to con-

sider what weight to attribute to it. JPML rules are not

subject to the rigorous promulgation process of the Rules

Enabling Act: They are not voted upon by the Judicial

Conference of the United States; they are not adopted

by the Supreme Court; they are not put before Congress

for possible modification or rejection. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2072-74. Nor do they have the dignity of executive

branch regulations promulgated pursuant to a substantive

grant of rule-making authority. Sse Chevron U.S.A. v.

NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). The JPML’s rules

have the force of local district court rules, which are au-

thorized by a statute almost identical to section 1407(f).

See 28 U.S.C. §2071(a) (“[A]ll courts established by

Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules

for the conduct of their business.”). As such, they are

entitled to deference only to the extent they cover the

JPML’s business; they cannot broaden the transferee

court’s authority to act under section 1404(a). See 12

Wright et al., § 3153, at 228 (“[{A] local rule is invalid

if it makes ‘basic procedural innovations’ that should be

left to the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court,

surrounded, as that is, by statutory procedures that ensure

mature consideration of informed opinion.” (quoting

17 The JPML itself takes the position that it has no authority to

tell MDL transferee courts what actions to take in the cases en-

transfers. See, ¢.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 476

F. Supp. at 450 (“{T]he Panel has neither the authority nor the

desire to control decisions of the transferee judge made in the

actual conduct of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings| ,

including section 1404(a) determinations].”); Jn re Westinghouse

Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., 486 F. Supp. 990, 996

has neither the power nor the inclina-

the manner in which judges process

50a

Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960)); see also

Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of the Federal Rule-making

Process, 63 A.B.A. J. 47, 47 (1977) (“There is no real

opportunity even to challenge [local] rules in litigation

since the judges who will decide the case are often the

ones who adopted the rules.”).

The majority also takes comfort from the fact that it

reaches a result that is consistent with current practice—

which must be the case given how seldom cases are re-

turned for trial in the original district once they become

ensnared in the MDL web. But a practice unsupported

(1946), and at worst “a canard.” Johnson v. Transpor-

tation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ;

see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,

175 n.1 (1989) (pointing out the “danger of placing

undue reliance on the concept of congressional ‘ratifica-

tion’”). If acquiescence by silence can ever carry the

day, it can do so only in areas such as the tax law where

Congress exercises vigorous oversight or amends the stat-

ute frequently. Neither is the case here. Congress has

amended the MDL statute only once in almost thirty

years“ and there is no indication any of its com-

mittees exercises oversight in this area.” To the contrary,

it did when

The MDL statute, it will be recalled, in-

child of the federal judiciary: The Coordinating Com.

mittee for Multiple Litigation in the U.S. District Courts

established by the Judicial Conference of the United

States, brought the problem to the attention of Congress

wrote the statute, lobbied for its adoption and explained

to Congress exactly how it would See H.R. 1130

in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1899. The Coordinating Com.

mittee eschewed the possibility of trial in the transferee

court, and never mentioned self-transfer as even a re-

mote possibility.“ Congress clearly understood the limited

tive Office of the United States Courts nor the Federal J

udicial

Center keeps track. All we know is that lots of cases are subjected

*1The Coordinating Committee explained that section 1407

“would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude transfer

ing New Section 1407, Title 28 (Mar. 2, 1965), 298 F. Supp. at

499. By using the phrase “prior to or at the conclusion of pre-trial

proceedings,” the Committee clearly indicated that a venue trans-

52a

nature of the and invited the federal judges to

return if at a for consolidated trials became

necessary. See id. at 1902. The judges never bothered to

return; instead, they seized the power by prescription.

/” *” 2 *

Despite the complicated nature of these proceedings,

the question before us is rather straight-forward: Did the

district court abuse its discretion in transferring the case

to itself under section 1404(a)? It clearly did because

MDL courts have no authority to pass on venue transfer

motions, because section 1404(a) doesn’t authorize self-

transfer and because the factors favoring transfer are far

too weak to overcome plaintiffs’ right to a trial in their

home district. We must therefore vacate that order and

all subsequent orders entered by the district court, includ-

ing, of course, the final judgment entered after trial.

The case should then be in a posture where plaintiffs

would finally be free to petition the MDL panel for trans-

fer back to the Northern District of Illinois. By approving

this transfer, we complete the judicial arrogation of power

in this area and put the last coffin nail into the experi-

ment Congress started in 1968 when it gave the federal

courts only a limited MDL authority. I will not be one

of the pallbearers. I dissent.

fer would only be available before or after, but not while, the case

was in the MDL court. See Comment, Consolidation of Pretrial

Proceedings, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 562.

2 In point of fact, at the time Lexecon made its first request for

remand on August 5, 1994, all coordinated and/or consolidated pre-

beyond its authority as they did not relate to the limited purpose

for which the case was transferred under section 1407(a). See

note 7 supra. These orders, particularly the summary judgment

granted on April 24, 1995, should be vacated.

53a

APPENDIX B

[Filed Aug. 7, 1995]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MDL Docket No. 834

No. CIV-93-1087-PHX (JMR)

Judge John M. Roll

IN RE AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION /

LINCOLN SAVINGS & LOAN SECURITIES LITIGATION.

LEXECON INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MILBERG WEIss BERSHAD Hynes

& LeERACH and Kevin P. Roppy,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

XXX JURY VERDICT. This action came before the

Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been

tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

DECISION BY THE COURT. This action came

under consideration before the Court. The issues

have been considered and a decision has been

rendered.

THE JURY FINDS IN FAVOR OF DEFEND-

ANTS KEVIN P. RODDY AND MILBERG

54a

WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH AND

AGAINST PLAINTIFF LEXECON INC,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT JUDGMENT

IS ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

JURY VERDICT AND THAT THIS CASE IS

DISMISSED.

Aug. 1, 1995

55a

APPENDIX C

[Filed Jul. 21, 1995]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-70380

DC # CV-93-1087-PHX

LEXECON INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

United States District COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA,

Respondent,

and

MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD Hynes & LERACH,

et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

in the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 17, 1995

San Francisco, California

56a

Before: FLETCHER, KOZINSKI and THOMPSON,

Circuit Judges

MEMORANDUM*

In this petition for writ of mandamus, petitioners ask

this court to: (1) vacate the district court’s order which

permanently transferred the above-entitled case to the

District of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a);

and (2) direct the district court to remand this case to

the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1407. Petitioners also have filed a motion to stay the

district court proceedings pending our decision. We deny

the petition for writ of mandamus and deny the motion

to stay as moot.

This court considers five factors in deciding whether a

case is appropriate for mandamus relief: (1) whether the

petitioner has no other adequate means, such as a direct

appeal, to attain the relief desired; (2) whether the peti-

tioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not cor-

rectable on appeal; (3) whether the district court’s order

is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the

district court’s order is an oft-repeated error; and (5)

whether the district court’s order raises new and impor-

tant problems, or issues of first impression. Bauman v.

United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir.

1977). The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be

invoked only in extraordinary situations. Wash. Pub.

Util. Group v. U.S. Dist. Court, 843 F.2d 319, 323 (9th

Cir. 1987) (“WPPSS”).

Here, as to the first factor, we are not satisfied that

petitioners cannot attain the relief they request on direct

appeal. The case is scheduled for trial on July 25, 1995.

The trial, we understand, will be of short duration. The

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may

not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided

by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

57a

transfer order can be appealed immediately along with

other issues in the event the petitioners lose on the merits.

As to the second factor, petitioners contend the ex-

pense and inconvenience of what may be an unnecessary

trial in the District of Arizona meets the second Bauman

factor. They rely on Sunshine Beauty Supplies for the

proposition that “the prejudice that results from an erro-

neous transfer order is of a type not correctable on ap-

peal.” Sunshine Beauty Supplies v. U.S. Dist. Court,

872 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1989).

Petitioners’ reliance on Sunshine Beauty Supplies is

misplaced. There, the district court’s transfer order

would have required the plaintiff, who sought confirma-

tion of an arbitration award in the district court in Cali-

fornia, to travel to Texas to present its claim. Here, the

parties are already before the federal district court in

Arizona and have been for more than a year as they

pursued discovery. The district court’s order transferring

the present case to itself for trial simply leaves the parties

where they are. It does not force them to go to another

district to try their case. Petitioners have not shown how

they would be prejudiced by conducting what is sched-

uled to be a four-day trial in the district where they have

been litigating for more than a year. Cf. Varsic v. U.S.

Dist. Ct., 607 F.2d 245, 252 (9th Cir. 1979) (substan-

tial prejudice shown by plaintiff who would have had to

travel some 3,000 miles to prosecute his action).

As to the third factor, we cannot say the district court's

order transferring this case to itself for trial is clearly

erroneous as a matter of law. A question of law is clearly

erroneous if we are left with the definite and firm convic-

tion that a mistake has been made. United States v.

Harper, 729 F.2d 1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 1984). Here,

petitioners contend the district court clearly erred by:

(1) ignoring 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which instructs that the

case be remanded for trial! to the Northern District of

58a

Illinois; and (2) transferring the case to itself under 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a).

We are not prepared to say that these contentions lack

merit. However, despite what appears to be a clear statu-

tory mandate, Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(b) ex-

plicitly authorizes a transferee court to transfer the action

to itself for trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and

the district court’s decision is supported by case law. See

In Re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810,

820 (3rd Cir. 1982); Pfizer v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 125

(2d Cir. 1971); see also WPPS at 326 (transferee court

has authority to sua sponte change venue). Further,

petitioners have cited no case law to the contrary. Al-

though upon review on direct appeal, we might well reach

the opposite result, it is not possible for us to hold at

this juncture that the district court’s decision is clearly

erroneous. See Harper, 729 F.2d at 1222. In any direct

appeal the merits panel is free to examine all of the

issues.

Although there may be oft-repeated error in other

Circuits, petitioners do not demonstrate how the fourth

Bauman factor applies in this circuit. While the fifth

factor may be met, we conclude that in this case resolu-

tion is available on direct appeal in a setting more condu-

cive to adequate briefing and full deliberation. We see

no emergent need for instant resolution.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is

DENIED. The motion to stay is denied as moot.

Kozinski, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I would grant the writ to correct an egregious, oft-

repeated error in the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §$§ 1404,

1407. Section 1407(a) authorizes the Multidistrict Panel

to transfer cases for pretrial proceedings; after those pro-

ceedings are completed, and before trial, “[eJach action

so transferred shall be remanded by the panel.” (emphasis

59a

udded). It’s hard to imagine a clearer statutory command,

or one more widely ignored.

Starting with the Second Circuit’s summary treatment

in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir.

1971), the federal courts have simply disregarded the

statutory mandate Pfizer and a few subsequent cases have

recognized they weren’t following the statute, but justified

their departure on grounds of policy or convenience.

See, eg., Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 124-25 (rejecting as absurd

a result that would delay section 1404(a) motions until

after remand); Jn re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover,

New Hampshire, 342 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.N.H. 1971)

(“I must recognize candidly that there is nothing in the

language of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) or 1404(a) which di-

rectly allows, or even suggests, that the transferee judge

has the power to transfer cases to his district, or any

district, for purposes of trial.”), Most have simply taken

their place at the head of an ever-growing string cite. The

Multidistrict Panel went so far as to enshrine this un-

lawful practice into one of its rules, J.P.M.L.R.P. 14(b),

and the Federal Judicial Center’s Manual for Complex

Litigation (Third) § 21.61 (1995), mentions it as a

standard option. Seldom have so many been so con-

sistently wrong.

The time has come to put a stop to this illicit practice

by saying loud and clear that the Multidistrict Panel as-

signs cases only for pretrial proceedings; it doesn’t grant

proprietary rights in them. Indeed, I consider it unseemly

for district judges who have been entrusted cases for lim-

ited purposes to routinely glom onto them. It’s true that

section 1407(a) gives transferee courts power over pre-

trial proceedings and venue transfer motions under section

1404(a) fall under that general heading. But this pre-

sents no irreconcilable conflict between sections 1404 and

1407: Pretrial proceedings under 1407 are obviously

limited to those raising issues common to other cases,

primarily discovery; that’s the entire point of the multi-

60a

district process. Under section 1407, the Multidistrict

Panel retains the power to transfer the case and that

power is carefully limited to accomplish the statute’s

purpose. This precludes use of the general transfer section

by district judges to subvert the panel’s responsibility.

Section 1407 reflects an important policy choice: Cases

may be transferred to remote locations, but only for the

duration of pretrial procedures. When it comes to con-

ducting a trial (and resolving other dispositive matters)

plaintiffs retain their ancient right to select the forum.

Had Congress meant to empower the Multidistrict Panel

to reassign cases for resolution of dispositive matters, in-

cluding trial, it would have drafted the statute much dif-

ferently. This is a policy choice federal judges are bound

to respect, regardless of their views of efficiency or their

fondness for particular cases.

Petitioners here were dragged hundreds of miles from

their home district in Illinois to appear before a judge in

Arizona who had no familiarity with the case or expertise

in the issues; they participated in no common proceedings;

they benefitted from no coordinated discovery; and they

are now forced to go to trial in the remote district be-

cause, having needlessly been required to spend so much

time in Arizona, it makes no sense to send them back.

There’s a warped logic to each step in this process, but

the net effect is to undercut the important policy of sec-

tion 1407. That the matter comes up on appeal so seldom

—and will likely be washed out by trial or settlement

before it can come to us again in this case—makes it the

more urgent for us to resolve the issue and put an end

to an illicit practice that has developed willy-nilly during

the last quarter century. If not we, who? If not now,

when?

6la

APPENDIX D

[Filed May 5, 1995]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

(CIVIL ORDER—GENERAL )

MDL 834 PHX RMB

Civil Case No. CV93-1087 PHX JMR

LEXECON

Vv.

MILBERG WEISS

Date: May 2, 1995

HONORABLE JOHN M. ROLL

Pending before the Court are cross-motions relating to

venue, Milberg Weiss’ motion for sanctions, and plaintiffs’

motion to strike amended interrogatory response.

As to venue, plaintiffs argue that the MDL statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1407, requires this Court to transfer this case to

the MDL panel so that it may return to the Northern Dis-

trict of Illinois. Plaintiffs admit that no court has so

construed that statute. Substantial authority exists to the

contrary. Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(b); In re Fine

Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1982); In re

Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, 476 F. Supp.

445 (J.P.M.L. 1979). Under this authority, the Court

concludes that it has the power to transfer this action to

itself or any other court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406.

Under § 1404(a)’s balancing test, the Court finds that

the interest of justice is best served by transferring this

action to itself. In light of the one claim which remains in

62a

this case for trial, judicial economy heavily weighs in

favor of this Court continuing to exercise jurisdiction over

this case.

On the remaining motions in this matter, the Court finds

that plaintiffs’ motion to strike is moot and concludes that

defendant’s motion is not properly before the Court be-

cause Local Rule 1.10(j) requires that counsel first confer

in an effort to resolve the dispute prior to seeking the

Court’s intervention. Furthermore, as to the merits, the

imposition of sanctions is unwarranted.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’

motion to refer the case back to the Multidistrict Litigation

Panel IS DENIED and Milberg Weiss’ motion to transfer

the case to this Court IS GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to

strike amended interrogatory response IS DENIED as

moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Milberg Weiss’ mo-

tion for sanctions IS DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a pretrial conference

is hereby set in this matter for Tuesday, May 30, 1995 at

4:00 p.m. Counsel are directed to submit a joint proposed

pretrial order by May 22, 1995, in accordance with the

form attached.

/s/ John M. Roll

JOHN M. ROLL

United States District Judge

63a

{Filed Jan. 7, 1995}

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MDL Docket No. 834

CV 93-1087 PHX JMR

IN RE AMERICAN CONTINENTAL/LINCOLN SAVINGS &

LOAN SECURITIES LITIGATION.

LEXECON INc. and DANIEL R. FISCHEL,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD Hynes & LERACH, ef al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

The Court having previously granted summary judg-

ment in favor of defendants Cotchett, Illston & Pitre, Joseph

Cotchett, and Susan IlIston, and there being no just reason

for delay of entry of a final judgment in their favor pur-

suant to Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ claims

against said defendants ARE DISMISSED WITH PREJ-

UDICE.

Dated this 2nd day of June, 1995.

/s/ John M. Roll

Joun M. ROLL

United States District Judge

64a

APPENDIX E

[Filed Apr. 24, 1995]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MDL Docket No. 834

CV 93-1087 PHA JMR

IN RE AMERICAN CONTINENTAL/LINCOLN SAVINGS &

LOAN SECURITIES LITIGATION.

Lexecon, Inc. and DANIEL R. FISCHEL,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD Hynes & LERACH, a partnership;

CoTcHETT, ILLSTON & Pitre, a partnership; and

PATRICK COUGHLIN, WILLIAM S. LERACH, KEVIN P.

Roppy, LEONARD B. Smmon, MELvyN I. WEISS, Pa-

TRICIA HYNES, MICHAEL C. SPENCER, STEPHEN STEIN-

BERG, JosePpH CoTCHETT, and SUSAN ILLSTON, indi-

vidually, Defendants.

Pending before the Court are defendants’ motions for

summary judgment in connection with the remaining

claims of plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the

Milberg Weiss defendants’ counterclaims. Defendants are

the law firm of Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes and

Lerach, and certain individually named firm members

(“Milberg Weiss”), and the law firm of Cotchett, Illston

and Pitre and partners Joseph Cotchett and Susan IllIston

(“Cotchett, Ilston and Pitre”).

65a

Factual and Procedural Background

The factual background concerning this matter is set

forth in a previous Order issued by this Court. In re

American Continental Corp./Lincoln S&L Sec. Lit.: Lexe-

con, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss, 845 F. Supp. 1377 (D.Ariz.

1993). That Order resulted in the dismissal of malicious

prosecution and abuse of process claims of plaintiffs and

the dismissal of most defamation claims. Still pending

are (1) plaintiffs’ defamation claim against all defendants

arising from the distribution of the proposed Sixth

Amendment Complaint; (2) plaintiffs’ defamation claim

against the Milberg Weiss defendants based upon the

Roddy letter to the National Law Journal; (3) plaintiffs’

tortious interference and commercial disparagement claims

against the Milberg Weiss defendants; and (4) the Milberg

Weiss defendants’ counterclaims. This Order addresses the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to all of

these remaining clais of plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ motion

to dismiss the Mil’erg Weiss defendants’ counterclaims.

Sixth Amended Complaint

The Court previously denied defendants’ motion to dis-

miss plaintiffs’ defamation claim arising from Milberg

Weiss’ dissemination of the proposed Sixth Amended

Complaint.

Facts

On March 26, 1990, defendants disseminated to the

service list a proposed Fifth Amended Complaint in the

Lincoln Savings litigation, adding Lexecon and Daniel

Fischel as defendants. The proposed complaint was ac-

companied by a motion for leave to file. The Hon.

Richard M. Bilby, the judge to whom the Lincoln Savings

case was assigned, denied without prejudice the motion

to file that complaint as it related to Lexecon and Fischel.

Thereafter, the decision was made by class counsel to

again attempt to sue Lexecon and/or Daniel Fischel. The

66a

task of writing that portion of the proposed Sixth

Amended Complaint relating to Lexecon fell to Milberg

Weiss partner Kevin Roddy. Soliciting input from Mil-

berg Weiss partners Leonard Simon and William Lerach

14, 1990, Roddy, working alone in Milberg Weiss’ Los

Angeles office, determined that the complaint was finalized

and sent it to all the attorneys g on the MDL 834

with the District Court of Arizona.

When Simon, the class counsel responsible for that por-

tion of the case dealing with Lexecon, learned of Roddy’s

dissemination of the proposed Sixth Amended Com-

not to file the

ments. On December 18, 1990, only four days

Roddy had disseminated the proposed complaint, a re-

vised Sixth Amended Complaint which named Lexecon

as a defendant but deleted Fischel as a party \

with the court and disseminated to the service list.

Discussion a

Plaintiffs maintain that dissemination of proposed

Sixth Amended Complaint by Roddy on December 14,

1990, listing Fischel as a defendant, constitutes an inten-

67a

tional and deliberate defamatory act by defendants in fur-

therance of a conspiracy to destroy them. Because an

attorney from the firm of Cotchett, Illston and Pitre

signed the aborted Roddy complaint and that firm was co-

lead counsel with Milberg Weiss in Lincoln Savings,

Cotchett, Illston and Pitre are also alleged to have been

participants in this conspiracy.

In support of their allegations, plaintiffs point to a

disturbing history of acrimonious statements made by

members of the Milberg Weiss firm concerning Fischel.

These statements are set forth in detail in the discussion

below concerning plaintiffs’ tortious interference and com-

mercial disparagement claims.

The December 14, 1990 proposed Sixth Amended

Complaint must be considered in context. Plaintiffs main-

tain that inclusion of Fischel as a defendant in that com-

plaint was intended to defame. The Fifth Amended Com-

plaint, however, also listed Fischel as a defendant and

identified the same alleged conduct by Fischel. Further-

more, the revised Sixth Amended Complaint that was ulti-

mately filed on December 18, 1990, contained virtually

all of the allegations against Fischel set forth in the

aborted Sixth Amended Complaint. The only sign

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