Opposition Brief — Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley

Supreme Court brief1997

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

a FILE fy

SEP 27 i996

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1996

METRO-NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL BUCKLEY,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Charles C. Goetsch

CAHILL, GOETSCH & DIPERSIA, P.C.

Attorneys for Respondent

43 Trumbull Street

New Haven, Connecticut 06511

(203) 777-1000

Virgil Mountain, Inc. (212) 779-4046 (L3614)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the practical effect of this FELA case is confined

to the unique facts concerning the Snowmen of Grand

Central Terminal, a handful of 141 railroad workers who,

due to the Railroad’s negligent violation of OSHA

asbestos regulations in GCT during the late 1980s, now

have a significant increased risk of death from cancer as a

result of ingesting into their lungs massive amounts of

carcinogenic asbestos fibers on a daily basis for three

years, and whose prolonged massive asbestos exposure

will never be experienced by any other employees so long

as employers comply with OSHA’s mandatory regula-

tions for asbestos in the workplace.

Whether there is any conflict between the Third Circuit’s

1985 decision in Schweitzer, which held that FELA

claims for physical asbestos injuries are not dischargeable

bankruptcy claims until they become physically manifest,

and the Second Circuit’s decision in this case, which

applied this Court’s 1994 Goftshall standard for FELA

negligently inflicted emotional distress claims to the

unique facts concerning the Snowmen of Grand Central

Terminal’s massive exposure to asbestos and resulting

significant increased risk of death from cancer.

Whether the Second Circuit was correct in ruling that a

railroad worker’s negligently unprotected ingestion of

massive amounts of carcinogenic asbestos fibers into his

lungs on a daily basis for three years resulting in a signifi-

cant increased risk of death from cancer constitutes a

“physical impact” under this Court’s Goftshall standard

sufficient to support a FELA negligent infliction of

emotional distress claim.

4. Whether the Second Circuit was correct in ruling that

when a railroad worker suffers negligently inflicted emo-

tional distress as a result of a physical impact with bodily

harm, the resulting emotional distress need not be severe

to be recoverable under the FELA.

. Whether the Second Circuit was correct in ruling that

given their significant increased risk of developing

asbestos-related disease as a result of their ingestion of

massive amounts of asbestos fibers into their lungs on a

daily basis over three years, the Snowmen of Grand

Central Terminal can recover damages for the cost of

future medical monitoring to ensure the early detection

and treatment of any asbestos-related disease they

develop.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Oe Fe iiicicicicciiematiiatidiale i, iv

I I certatientiintititithiiet ees i

gE ee. l

Reasons For Denying The WTit................cccccccccseseseeeseseseees 5

I. The Practical Effect Of This FELA Case Is

Confined To The Unique Facts Concerning

The Snowmen Of Grand Central Terminal ............. 7

Il. There ls No Conflict Between This Case

And The Third Circuit’s 1985 Decision In

Ill. The Second Circuit Correctly Applied

Gottshall’s Physical Impact Test .....000.00000..0.0.000.-.. 11

IV. The Second Circuit Correctly Ruled That

FELA Negligently Inflicted

Emotional Distress Need Not Be Severe

When It Results From A Physical Impact

|, EEE Sy Lo 14

V. The Second Circuit Correctly Ruled That

Medical Monitoring Costs Are An

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE(S)

Amendola v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.

699 F.Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 1988) .......c.cccccccecceceseeere 18

Buckley v. Metro-North Com. RR.

79 F.3d 1337 (2 Cir. 1996) oo... cccccececceeeee 9, 11, 14, 18, 20

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall

114 S.Ct. 2396 (1994)

ieee L i, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12,13, 14, 15, 17, 18

Flynn v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.

eR 13

In Re Paoli R.R. PCB Litigation

916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

499 U.S. 961, 111 S.Ct. 1584 (1991) [Paoli I],

35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

115 S.Ct. 1253 (1995) [Paoli U0) ..............0.sc0ececceccececceceeees 21

Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 507 N.E. 2d 476 (Ohio 1987)......... 15

Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co.

oN 14

Marchica v. Long Island Railroad Co.

31 F.3d 1197 (2™ Cir. 1994), cert. denied,

I a Ra 13, 14, 19, 20

Mellon v. Goodyear

gE 13

Morton v. Stack

122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) 0000 ee 14

Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna Western Railroad Co.

73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) 00.0... ccccccceccccceseececceseenees 14

Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

i a a i, 6,9, 10

United States v. Mendenhall

ES Sr A ee 13

Williams v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.

907 F.Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1995) 00 ce ceeeeees 18

Youakim v. Miller

SERS MEY SE ne ne 13

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Federal Employers’ Liability Act

CS ee passim

Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted

Emotional Harm -- A Comment on the Nature of

Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 477 (1982). ............... 12

Restatement (Second) of Torts................ 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns one of the Snowmen of Grand Central

Terminal, a handful of 141 railroad workers who were

exposed to massive amounts of asbestos fibers while working

in the miles of steam tunnels beneath Grand Central Terminal

during the late 1980s. They were called Snowmen because

every day after working on the old pipe insulation in the

tunnels, they would emerge covered from head to toe with

white pipe insulation dust [App. lla; “App.” refers to the

Appendix in the Petition]. Despite the fact the Railroad

knew the insulation was asbestos, for years the Railroad

ordered the Snowmen to physically handle and remove the

insulation without telling them it was asbestos and without

providing them with any protection from the asbestos, in

gross violation of OSHA’s mandatory regulations for asbes-

tos in the workplace. The Railroad now admits that it

knowingly and negligently exposed the Snowmen to the

carcinogenic asbestos fibers without warning or protecting

them.

The plaintiff respondent Michael Buckley is one of the

Snowmen. A pipefitter employed by the defendant Metro-

North Commuter Railroad, he is a married 42-year-old father

of two with a 10" grade education [JA 447-50; “JA” refers to

the Joint Appendix filed with the Second Circuit]. For three

years from 1985 to 1988 he was exposed to massive amounts

of carcinogenic asbestos fibers on a daily basis, and as a

result he now has a significantly increased risk of dying from

cancer.

There are only 140 other Snowmen, and the nature of

their asbestos exposure is now unique: although such pro-

longed unprotected exposure occurred prior to 1970, by the

late 1980s there were laws and OSHA regulations in place

that prevented employers from exposing unprotected workers

to asbestos [JA 252-54]. And indeed, since the OSHA

asbestos regulations went into effect in the mid-1970s, there

has been no other reported group of workers with the

prolonged massive amount of exposure suffered by the

Snowmen [JA 254].' This action was brought to address the

Snowmen’s unique situation by providing them with ap-

propriate medical monitoring and an opportunity to obtain

Just compensation for the Railroad’s negligent infliction of

emotional distress.

Asbestos fibers are microscopic, needle sharp, and vir-

tually indestructible. When a person inhales air containing

asbestos fibers, the fibers form into a longitudinal arrange-

ment parallel with the direction of the wind stream and pass

directly into the lungs [JA 113-14]. The fibers are swept into

the lungs’ tubes and parenchyma, where they impale the tis-

sue and become permanently embedded [JA 140]. The fibers

provoke irritation and initiate harmful biological changes in

the lung tissue [JA 684-89]. Those changes include the acti-

vation of macrophages which attempt to detoxify the em-

bedded asbestos fibers [JA 153-55]. While attempting to

engulf the asbestos fibers the macrophages die and release

enzymes that further damage the lung tissue [JA 246-51].

Among other things, this process impairs the lungs’ ability to

clean themselves. Accumulated asbestos fibers also can be

carried from the lungs to other parts of the body through the

bloodstream or lymphatic system [JA 140}.

| Asbestos is a known carcinogen that is active in many

sites in the human body. It causes mesothelioma (a cancer of

the lining of the lungs), lung cancer, and colon cancer, as

well as scarring of the lungs [JA 280-81]. Many of these

"The Snowmen’s exposure is equivalent to the asbestos exposure of

shipyard workers during the years of World War II [JA 252-53].

2

conditions can be beneficially treated if detected early enough

through medical monitoring [JA 136; 688-89].

Asbestos-related diseases can be entirely prevented by

controlling the release of asbestos in the workplace or by

providing workers with proper protective equipment. Em-

ployers who comply with OSHA’s workplace asbestos regu-

lations do not expose their employees to any significant

amount of asbestos fibers [JA 143; 287; 251; 689].

The Record established that Buckley inhaled massive

amounts of asbestos fibers into his lungs on a daily basis over

three years [JA 294-97; 305-06; 460-65]. His lung tissue was

impaled by the sharp asbestos fibers, damaging the tissue and

the ability of his lungs to clean themselves [JA 153-55]. The

asbestos fibers also physically contacted his hair, ears, nose,

and mouth as well as the skin of his face and hands [JA 460-

61].

The expert who testified regarding the degree of

Buckley’s increased risk, Dr. William J. Nicholson, is the

risk assessor the United States Environmental Protection

Agency relied on for its asbestos standards, and he also did

the risk assessment for OSHA on which OSHA's occupa-

tional asbestos exposure standards are based [JA 273; 276-

77]. He established that on a daily basis from 1985 to 1988

Buckley was exposed to enormously high concentrations of

asbestos fibers “far in excess” of OSHA’s Permissible

Exposure Limit [JA 304].

In the field of risk assessment, a .001% increased risk of

dying is a “highly significant” increased risk that should be

eliminated where possible [JA 297-98]. OSHA considers an

increased risk of death from asbestos exposure in the work-

place of even 1% to be “substantial” and an increased risk of

death of 5% to be “totally unacceptable.” [JA 276-77]. Asa

result of his asbestos exposure, Buckley now has an increased

risk of dying from asbestos-related cancer of between 1% to

5%, ranging from “substantial” to “totally unacceptable” and

10 to 50 times greater than “highly significant.” [JA 300-02].

As a result of his exposure, his total risk of dying from cancer

now has increased by up to 25% [JA 348-49], and his risk of

developing pleural scarring and fibrosis has increased by

10% [JA 162; 302-03].

Buckley has a reasonable scientific basis to fear that he

will develop a fatal asbestos-related cancer, and that basis

will continue for the rest of his life [JA 310-11]. Clinical

evidence of asbestos disease does not begin to appear until at

least 10 years after the first exposure [JA 263-64]. It is now

10 years since Buckley’s first exposure, and his asbestos

medical expert recommends that Buckley begin medical

monitoring on an annual basis for the rest of his life [JA 167-

68; 234-35; 244-46]. Many asbestos diseases can be

beneficially treated if detected early enough, and the purpose

of the medical monitoring is to detect and treat any asbestos

disease as early as possible [JA 230-31; 245-46; 263-64].

The annualized cost of the medical monitoring examinations

and tests is $950 [JA 168-70].

Buckley is aware that he has ingested a massive amount

of carcinogenic asbestos fibers into his lungs resulting in a

significant increased risk of dying from asbestos-related

cancer [JA 204; 398]. He is aware that his increased risk will

continue for the remainder of his life. He is aware that there

is no way to remove the asbestos fibers he has ingested and

no way to undo the harmful biological process set in motion

by those fibers [JA 487; 513-14]. He is aware that no amount

of medication or psychiatric treatment will change this reality

(JA 513-14]. In effect, the Railroad has placed a ticking time

bomb in his chest which may never go off but which he has

to live with for the rest of his life.

Buckley has and will continue to experience for the rest

of his life an appropriate level of distress in the form of anger

over what the Railroad has done to him and fear of the harm-

ful changes in his body resulting from his massive asbestos

exposure. His treating asbestos medical expert, Dr. Stephen

Markowitz, confirmed that Buckley has an appropriate

degree of fear and concern regarding the long-term effects of

his asbestos exposure [JA 266a] . Buckley’s anger over what

the Railroad has done to him was corroborated by the

testimony of his co-workers and by his complaints to his

supervisors and to the offices of the MTA Inspector General

and the New York Attorney General (which issued a Joint

Report confirming the Snowmen’s asbestos exposure resulted

from Metro-North’s violation of OSHA’s asbestos

regulations) [JA 487-91; 740-50].

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Contrary to the Railroad’s characterization, this is not a

case of “mere exposure” to asbestos that will unleash a

“flood of trivial suits” if left undisturbed. The Second

Circuit did not hold that “mere exposure” to asbestos is

sufficient to recover under the FELA. Rather, the Circuit

Court carefully applied this Court’s Goftshall test to the

unique facts of this FELA case and held that Buckley’s

“massive, lengthy, and tangible” exposure to asbestos fibers

resulting in a significant increased risk of death from cancer

constitutes a sufficient “physical impact” under Gottshall to

> Apparently the various amicus curiae are laboring under the

misapprehension that this is a case of “mere” or “trivial” exposure to

asbestos of the kind experienced by millions of people. The facts in the

Record prove otherwise. Indeed, after closely reviewing the Record, the

Second Circuit stressed that “Buckley and the other ‘snowmen’ present

what we believe is an unusual case, as Buckley’s exposure to asbestos was

massive, lengthy, and tangible.” [App. 23a].

support a FELA negligent infliction of emotional distress

claim [App. 22a-23a].

The Snowmen of Grand Central Terminal’s massive

prolonged asbestos exposure was a singular aberration, and

will never be experienced by any other workers on or off the

railroads so long as employers comply with OSHA’s

mandatory regulations for controlling asbestos in the

workplace. This “unusual case” [App. 23a] can have no

practical effect beyond the narrow category of the FELA, and

even within the FELA it will not expand liability as long as

railroads fulfill their legal duty to comply with OSHA’s

mandatory asbestos regulations.

There is no conflict with the Third Circuit’s decision in

Schweitzer, which preceded this Court’s landmark Gottshall

decision by nine years and which was not even a FELA

negligent infliction of emotional distress case. And damages

for the costs of future medical monitoring are appropriate

given Metro-North’s negligent, massive exposure of Buckley

to a known carcinogen resulting in his significant increased

risk of developing asbestos-related disease.

Metro-North’s incantation of a parade of horribles is

nothing more than an attempt to divert this Court’s attention

away from the unique magnitude of the wrong it committed

against the 141 Snowmen of Grand Central Terminal, a

wrong that will never be repeated as long as employers abide

by OSHA’s asbestos regulations but which Michael Buckley

will have to live with for the rest of his life.

1. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS FELA CASE

IS CONFINED TO THE UNIQUE FACTS CON-

CERNING THE SNOWMEN OF GRAND

CENTRAL TERMINAL

Metro-North makes the unsupported claim that this case

will open the courtroom door to “tens of thousands” of

plaintiffs with “extraordinary economic consequences” upon

“government and non-government” entities “under other fed-

eral statutes and the common law.” [Petition at pgs. 6, 12].

This argument has no foundation in reality, and is based on

two false premises: that this FELA case constitutes binding

precedent on all non-FELA state and federal tort cases; and

that the type of massive daily exposure to enormous amounts

of asbestos fibers over a three year period resulting in a

significant increased risk of death from cancer suffered by the

Snowmen of Grand Central Terminal is a common everyday

occurrence throughout the nation.

The FELA only applies to a narrow class of railroad

workers who are negligently injured on the job. It does not

apply to non-railroad workers or to the public at large.

Gottshall at 2412, 2418. The number of railroad workers

who can bring a negligent infliction of emotional distress

claim under the FELA is further limited by the test set forth

by this Court in Gottshall. And a FELA case simply does not

apply to or have any precedential effect on state common law

cases or on non-FELA federal statutory cases.

The facts of this case are unique, and will never recur as

long as employers comply with OSHA’s mandatory regula-

tions for controlling asbestos in the workplace. Indeed,

neither Metro-North nor Buckley has found a parallel fact

situation in any reported cases, state or federal. This is not

Surprising given that Metro-North’s gross violation of

OSHA’s asbestos regulations at Grand Central Terminal

during the late 1980s was an aberrant episode that even

Metro-North has not repeated. The asbestos medical expert

confirmed the medical literature does not contain any reports

of such massive prolonged exposure occurring since OSHA’s

asbestos regulations went into effect in the early 1970s. It is

not surprising there is a lack of similar fact situations because

OSHA’s asbestos regulations are designed to eliminate any

such exposure and employers are legally obligated to comply

with OSHA’s regulations.

Where then, will these “tens of thousands” of plaintiffs

suing “government and non-government” entities come

from? Non-railroad workers are covered by workmen’s

compensation statutes and are legally barred from suing their

employer. Members of the public simply do not have the

type of massive direct exposure to asbestos on a daily basis

for years at a time that is required to develop a significant

increased risk of death from asbestos-related cancer. This

FELA case does not even apply to railroad workers unless

they have that type of massive prolonged exposure. And

employers routinely comply with OSHA’s asbestos regula-

tions, completely eliminating any unprotected exposure to

asbestos fibers, much less the type of massive prolonged

exposure suffered by the Snowmen here.

Any railroad that fulfills its legal duty to comply with

OSHA’s asbestos regulations has nothing to fear from this

case. Conversely, any railroad that grossly violates OSHA’s

asbestos regulations by subjecting its workers to the type of

massive prolonged exposure suffered by the Snowmen of

Grand Central Terminal must face the consequences of such

egregiously negligent conduct, and deservedly so. Such

aberrant behavior has never recurred anywhere else, however.

If the importance of a case depends on how many other

persons apart from the litigants will be affected, then this

case is of no importance at all.

There is no injustice here, for the Second Circuit simply

applied Gottshall to provide an appropriate remedy for the

handful of Metro-North employees who had the singular

misfortune of being massively exposed to carcinogenic

asbestos fibers on a daily basis over a three year period in

gross violation of OSHA’s asbestos regulations and who as a

result now must live with a significant increased risk of dying

from asbestos-related cancer. There can and will be no

“flood of litigation” generated by this unusual case.

i. THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THIS CASE

AND THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S 1985 DECISION IN

SCHWEITZER

Schweitzer was a pre-Gottshall bankruptcy case that did

not concern a FELA claim for negligently inflicted emotional

distress. The issue decided by Schweitzer was “whether

plaintiffs, who allege that they were exposed to asbestos prior

to their employer’s [Bankruptcy Act] reorganization and did

not manifest any injury until after the relevant consummation

dates, had ‘claims’ that were discharged in the reorganization

proceedings.” Schweitzer at 941. Schweitzer merely followed

the obvious rule that a FELA claim for a physically

manifested physical injury does not accrue until the physical

manifestation occurs. By contrast, this case concerns a post-

Gottshall FELA negligent infliction of emotional distress

claim, which by definition does not involve or require a

physically manifested injury. There is no conflict because

Buckley and Schweitzer address two entirely different claims.

Metro-North confuses post-Goftshall FELA claims for

the negligent infliction of emotional distress (which do not

require any manifest physical injury) with more typical FELA

claims based on a physically manifested injury. There is a

sharp difference between the two types of claims. The classic

FELA claim is for a physical injury that is physically

manifest, and naturally such a claim does not accrue until the

physical injury becomes physically manifested (the same

holds true for occupational disease physical injury claims).

But a post-Gottshall FELA claim for the negligent

infliction of emotional distress is quite different. It does not

require any physical injury at all. In fact, that is what

differentiates a FELA claim for negligently inflicted

emotional distress: it is a cause of action for emotional

distress that accrues even though there is no manifest

physical injury (“The injury we deal with here is mental or

emotional harm (such as fright or anxiety) that is caused by

the negligence of another and that is not directly brought

about by a physical injury, but that may manifest itself in

physical symptoms.” Gottshall at 2405 [emphasis added}).

The legal issue confronting the Second Circuit in this

case was radically different from the bankruptcy issue con-

fronting the Third Circuit in Schweitzer. There, the Third

Circuit’s task was to decide whether non-manifested physical

injury claims were dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act.

Schweitzer did not address or decide anything regarding a

FELA claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Indeed, it was not until nine years later that the standard

applicable to such purely emotional distress FELA claims

was set forth by this Court’s 1994 landmark Goftshall deci-

sion.

Here, the Second Circuit’s task was to apply Goftshall’s

FELA negligent infliction of emotional distress standard to

the unique set of facts concerning the Snowmen of Grand

Central Terminal and their massive negligent exposure to

asbestos over a three year period resulting in a significani in-

creased risk of death. Schweitzer was a case concerning

FELA claims for manifest physical injuries, decided at a time

10

when Gofttshail did not even exist. Buckley is a FELA negli-

gent infliction of emotional distress case controlled by

Gottshall. There is and can be no conflict between the two.

i. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED

GOTTSHALL’S PHYSICAL IMPACT TEST

In Gottshall, this Court for the first time declared the

standard to apply to FELA negligent infliction of emotional

distress claims: “the zone of danger test limits recovery for

emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical

impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or who

are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that

conduct.” Gottshall at 2406 [emphasis added]. By definition,

a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim does not

require or involve a manifest physical injury. The focus is on

“physical impact” or “risk of physical harm,” not on physical

injury.

As this Court noted in Goftshaill, the zone of danger test

is less restrictive than the common law physical impact test

because it embraces claims based on threatened physical

impact as well as on actual physical impact. Goftshall at

2410-11. The physical impact test, in other words, is

subsumed within the broader zone of danger test. (“The

physical impact test, of course, would achieve many of the

same ends as the zone of danger test. We see no reason,

however, to allow an employer to escape liability for

emotional injury caused by the apprehension of physical

impact simply because of the fortuity that the impact did not

occur.” Gottshall at 2411). Metro-North’s mistaken reading

of the phrase “those within the zone of danger of physical

impact,” Gottshall at 2406, as excluding workers who sustain

a physical impact violates common sense: a railroad worker

within the zone of danger of the physical impact.

An application of Gottshall’s physical impact test to the

facts of this case reveals the following. Metro-North admits

that for years it knowingly and negligently exposed the

respondent Michael Buckley to carcinogenic asbestos fibers

without warning, training, or protecting him. Buckley’s body

sustained a physical impact from the asbestos fibers, and in

particular the needle-like fibers have become embedded in

the tissue of his lungs, causing bodily harm and initiating a

harmful biological process that cannot be reversed. As a

result of that physical impact, Buckley now has a

significantly increased risk of dying from asbestos-related

cancer. Clearly, Buckley has been physically impacted by the

asbestos fibers and now is able to recover for emotional

distress caused by his anger over what was done to him and

his fear of developing asbestos-related disease and death.

Metro-North simply ignores the fact that this is a FELA

negligent infliction of emotional distress case controlled by

Gottshall’s physical impact standard. Instead, Metro-North

pretends this is a run-of-the-mill occupational disease case

injury in order to be recoverable. But Buckley is not seeking

any FELA damages for a physically manifest occupational

disease. He merely is seeking recovery under the FELA for

negligently inflicted emotional distress resulting from his

* Contrary to Metro-North’s argument, the law review article quoted by

this Court in Gottshall did not exclude plaintiffs who sustain a physical

impact from the “zone of danger of physical impact” rule. Pearson,

Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm -- A

— eee

12

massive physical impact with asbestos, a ._.own carcinogen,

that has significantly increased his risk of dying from cancer.“

Moreover, Metro-North completely ignores the leading

post-Gottshall case relied on by the Second Circuit:

Marchica v. Long Island Railroad Co., 31 F.3d 1197 (2™ Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 727 (1995). Marchica also

applied Gortshall’s physical impact test to an unusual set of

facts, and allowed a railroad worker to recover under the

FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress when his

hand was pricked by a discarded hypodermic needle under

circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to

develop a fear of AIDS. In Marchica, the Second Circuit

thoroughly surveyed the common law concerning emotional

distress for fear of developing a future disease in the light of

Gottshall’s FELA physical impact test, and properly adopted

the view most consistent with the FELA’s remedial ~ ure:

“Thus, a FELA plaintiff who has suffered a physical impact

may recover for a fear of developing AIDS if the impact

caused by the defendant's negligence occurred under

circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to de-

velop a fear of AIDS.” Marchica at 1206.

* Although Metro-North refers in passing to “claim-splitting” [Petition at

pgs. 10-11], Metro-North’s failure to raise or address that issue at the trial

court or court of appeals levels eliminates it as an issue before this Court

(“this Court does not decide questions not raised or involved in the lower

court.” Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976); United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551-52 n. 5 (1980)). Nevertheless, the cases

relied on by Metro-North - Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 344

(1928), and Flynn v. New York, N.H. & H. R Co., 283 U.S. 53, 56 (1931)

-- concerned the right of widows to bring a belated FELA death claim

long after the settlement of the underlying FELA physical injury claim,

and are inapposite here. A FELA claim for the negligent infliction of

emotional distress is separate and distinct from a FELA manifest physical

13

As it did in Marchica, the Second Circuit in Buckley

applied Gottshall’s physical impact standard to the unusual

facts concerning the Snowmen’s massive prolonged daily

ingestion of the needle-like carcinogenic asbestos fibers, and

properly held that “a jury, presented with the evidence in this

case, may find that Buckley suffered an impact that would

cause fear in a reasonable person.” [App. 23a]. Given the

extraordinary circumstances surrounding the Snowmen’s

massive asbestos exposure, there is nothing erroneous or

radical about such a holding. If anything, Buckley and

Marchica merely demonstrate the ongoing ability of this

Court’s Gottshall test to justly resolve a wide variety of

unusual fact situations.

Iv. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY RULED

THAT FELA NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS NEED NOT BE SEVERE

WHEN IT RESULTS FROM A _ PHYSICAL

IMPACT WITH BODILY HARM

After reviewing the common law and Restatement

(Second) of Torts, the Second Circuit found that “emotional

distress must be ‘severe’ only when a plaintiff has not

suffered a physical impact.” [App. 24a].° It is only where

* This is fully consistent with the common law physical impact standard

Court's Gottshall standard. See, for example: Porter v. Delaware,

Lackawanna Western Railroad Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906)

(dust in the eyes sufficient physical impact to allow recovery for fright);

Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of

smoke during apartment fire sufficient physical impact to allow recovery

for nervousness and trouble sleeping for several weeks thereafter); Laxton

v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 433-34 (Tenn. 1982)

(where defendant negligently permitted carcinogenic chlordane to

infiltrate family’s household water supply, family members’ consumption

of water containing chlordane in excess of State Department of Water

Quality Control safe limits constitutes sufficient physical impact to allow

recovery for anxiety that did not physically manifest itself and was not so

14

there is no physical impact that the severity of the emotional

distress must serve to guarantee the genuineness of the claim.

Since Buckley has suffered a physical impact here, he is

“entitled to all damages flowing from the impact, including

his reasonable emotional distress.” [App. 24a]

Metro-North, however, argues that to be recoverable,

emotional distress must be so severe as to manifest itself

physically (“severe emotional distress is accompanied or

followed by shock, illness, or other bodily harm.” Restate-

ment at Section 46 Comment k). However, Metro-North

ignores this Court’s own definition of negligently inflicted

emotional distress, which specifically states that manifest

physical symptoms are not necessary: “The injury we deal

with here is mental or emotional harm (such as fright or

anxiety) that is caused by the negligence of another and that

is not directly brought about by a physical injury, but that

may manifest itself in physical symptoms.” Goftshall at 2405

{emphasis added]. Clearly, it is not a prerequisite that FELA

negligently inflicted emotional distress be so severe as to

manifest itself physically.

this case: Michael Buckley not only has suffered a massive

physical impact from the asbestos fibers, he also has suffered

and will continue to suffer “bodily harm” in the form of harm

to his lung tissue that has set in motion an irreversible

harmful biological process. As the Restatement confirms, the

presence of such “bodily harm” from physical impact entitles

severe as to require medical treatment); Lavelle v. Owens-Corning

Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 507 N.E. 2d 476, 480-81 (Ohio

1987) (prolonged extensive physical contact with asbestos fibers resulting

in increased statistical likelihood of developing asbestos-related cancer

sufficient physical impact to allow recovery for increased fear of cancer).

15

Buckley to recover for his emotional distress with or without

a showing of “severe” emotional distress.

It is a basic principle of tort law that when a plaintiff has

suffered some “bodily harm” as a result of a defendant’s

negligent conduct, the plaintiff “is entitled to recover dam-

ages for past or prospective bodily harm and emotional dis-

tress [and] ... reasonable medical and other expenses.” Re-

statement at Section 924. The Restatement defines “bodily

harm” as “any physical impairment of the condition of

another’s body.” Restatement at Section 15. “Impairment” is

defined accordingly: “There is an impairment of the physical

condition of another’s body if the structure or function of any

part of the other’s body is altered to any extent even though

the alteration causes no other harm.” Restatement at Section

15 Comment a.

The record here establishes that Michael Buckley has suf-

fered “bodily harm” as a result of Metro-North’s negligent

conduct in exposing him to massive amounts of asbestos

fibers on a daily basis over a period of three years. That ex-

posure has caused him to ingest massive amounts of car-

cinogenic asbestos fibers into his lungs, where they have

become impaled and embedded in his lung tissue, altering the

structure of the tissue and setting in motion an irreversibly

harmful biological process. That is “bodily harm” within the

meaning of the Restatement.

The Second Circuit correctly read Section 436A of the

Restatement as not being applicable to the facts of this case.

Section 436A is entitled “Negligence Resulting in Emotional

Disturbance Alone,” and states: “If the actor’s conduct is

negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either

bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it

results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily

harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for

16

such emotional disturbance.” [emphasis added]. Section

436A only applies to situations where there is no bodily harm

caused by the negligent conduct. That is, it only applies to

instances where the negligent conduct does not cause initial

bodily harm, but rather only causes emotional disturbance

which itself does not generate any bodily harm. Where, as

here, the defendant’s negligent conduct does produce “bodily

harm,” the defendant is liable for any emotional disturbance

flowing from the negligent conduct even if the emotional dis-

turbance itself does not produce any additional bodily harm

(i.e., even if the emotional distress is not “severe’’).

This is demonstrated by Section 436A’s Illustration,

which concerns a plaintiff who while eating negligently

manufactured cottage cheese finds her mouth full of glass.

The entire example is predicated on the fact that the plaintiff

“is not cut or otherwise physically injured, and she succeeds

in removing the glass without bodily harm.” By contrast, if

she had suffered some bodily harm from the glass, she then

would be entitled to recover for whatever emotional distur-

bance flows from the negligent conduct, even if the emo-

tional disturbance is not severe, physically manifest, or

medically verified.

The fallacy in Metro-North’s argument is its failure to

acknowledge the fact established in the Record that Buckley

has indeed suffered a “bodily harm” that entitles him to

recover for whatever emotional disturbances flow from

Metro-North’s negligent conduct. The Second Circuit was

corre.. in ruling that Buckley, who suffered a negligent

physical impact causing bodily harm, does not have to show

“severe” emotional distress in order to recover for the emo-

tional disturbances flowing from Metro-North’s negligent

conduct. This is entirely consistent with Gottshall’s physical

impact rule and the common law of torts as distilled by the

Restatement (Second) of Torts.

17

Metro-North misreads the pre-Gottshall Amendola v.

Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 699 F.Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo.

1988), case as requiring “physical injury” rather than merely

some “physical harm.” Amendola held that “a plaintiff

seeking recovery under the FELA for the negligent infliction

of emotional distress must introduce evidence that he or she

has suffered physical harm as a result of the conduct which

caused the emotional distress.” Amendola at 1410. The

Amendola court carefully distinguished between “physical

injury” and “physical harm,” holding that in order to recover

for negligently inflicted emotional distress, “physical injury”

was not required, only some “physical harm.” Amendola at

1410-11. Thus Amendola’s “physical harm” is synonymous

with the Restatement’s “bodily harm.” There is no conflict

between Amendola and Buckley because the Record here

establishes that as a result of Metro-North’s negligent

conduct Buckley has suffered “bodily or physical harm”

within the meaning of both the Restatement and Amendola.®

Metro-North’s argument that Buckley’s emotional dis-

tress is “temporary,” “evanescent,” and “trivial” [Petition at

p. 23] is contradicted by the Record. Although it is uniquely

peculiar to Buckley’s unusually massive asbestos exposure,

the emotional distress stemming from his life-long wait to see

if the enormous amount of carcinogenic asbestos fibers he

has ingested will blossom into a fatal cancer is not temporary

or evanescent or trivial. In effect, Metro-North has placed a

ticking time bomb in Buckley’s chest, and his understandable

* Metro-North’s reliance on Williams v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 907

F.Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1995), is misplaced. Williams was a non-FELA

and non-Jones Act case decided by a Magistrate Judge. Because there

was no physical impact involved and no bodily harm proved, the

Magistrate Judge applied Section 436A of the Restatement (which only

applies to non-physical impact cases). Here, by contrast, there is proof of

physical impact and “bodily harm,” and Section 436A is inapplicable.

anger, fear, and distress over when and if that time bomb will

explode will continue for the rest of his life. Buckley knows

there is nothing he can do to remove those carcinogenic

fibers from his lungs or to reverse the harmful biological

process they have set in motion. All he can do is to wait for a

cancer to surface clinically and hope that medical monitoring

will detect it early enough to maximize his prognosis. His

resulting anger and fear, however, have become an

understandably permanent part of his life.

The Second Circuit did require objective evidence of

Buckley’s emotional distress, and found it in the Record

{App. 23a-25a]. Buckley’s treating asbestos medical expert

confirmed that Buckley exhibited an appropriate degree of

anger and concern over his massive exposure and

significantly increased risk of death by cancer. The amount

of objective evidence was “slim” only because the trial court

improperly limited Buckley from introducing evidence

establishing the full basis and context of his emotionai

distress [Plaintiff's Second Circuit Brief at pgs. 25-27], and

the retrial will allow a fuller record to be developed.

The Second Circuit was careful to note that speculative or

frivolous claims will be avoided by application of the test

used in Marchica, namely whether the impact would cause

fear in a reasonable person: “To make this determination, a

jury must take into account the nature of the toxic substance,

its method of transmission into the body, the extent of the

exposure to the substance and how the disease develops in

response to the presence of the toxic substance in the body.”

[App. 21a]

This standard is not, as Metro-North argues, “inherently

imprecise and unworkable.” [Petition at p. 10]. For example,

OSHA’s asbestos regulations contain a Permissible Exposure

Limit for asbestos fibers beyond which workers cannot safely

19

be exposed. Where, as here, the Record establishes that a

railroad worker has been exposed to carcinogenic asbestos

fibers “far in excess” of OSHA’s Permissible Exposure Limit

every day for three years, there is a sufficient objective basis

for a reasonable person to fear developing asbestos disease.

By contrast, exposure below OSHA’s Permissible Exposure

Limit would not cause a significant increased risk and not

provide a basis for fear in a reasonable person.

The reasonable person test applied by the Second Circuit

in Marchica and Buckley allows the unique nature of asbestos

exposure and disease to be taken into account while

screening out any speculative or frivolous claims based on

“mere” or “trivial” exposure to asbestos without significant

increased risk. Here, the Second Circuit reviewed the Record

and properly found that “Given the evidence of Buckley’s

prolonged and pronounced exposure to asbestos, a jury may

find that he suffered an impact that would cause fear in a

reasonable person.” [App. 21a].

v. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY RULED

THAT MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS ARE AN

APPROPRIATE ELEMENT OF DAMAGES IN

THIS CASE

_As the Second Circuit noted, the recovery of reasonable

medical expenses flowing from a defendant’s negligent con-

duct has always been an element of common law and FELA

tort law. The Restatement (Second) of Torts confirms that a

tort plaintiff who has suffered negligently inflicted “bodily

harm” is “entitled to recover damages for past or prospective

... Teasonable medical and other expenses.” Restatement

(Second) of Torts at Section 924.

For a medical monitoring claim, the “injury” is the fact

the plaintiff suffered a significant negligent exposure to a

20

proven toxic substance, resulting in a significant increased

risk of contracting a serious latent disease that makes peri-

odic diagnostic medical examinations and testing reasonably

necessary and beneficial. Jn Re Paoli R.R. PCB Litigation,

916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961,

111 S.Ct. 1584 (1991) [Paoli I], 35 F.3d 717, 787 (3d Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1253 (1995) [Paoli II}.

Because it is a plaintiff's significant exposure to a proven

hazardous substance that justifies the need for medical

monitoring, proof of a present or future physical injury is not

a prerequisite for a medical monitoring claim.

Metro-North ignores the fact that this Court twice has

declined to alter the standard for medical monitoring claims

set forth in the Paoli cases. Indeed, Metro-North fails to

address or even cite the Paoli cases, the leading precedent in

the field, or the various common law cases upholding

medical monitoring claims cited and discussed by the Second

Circuit. [App. 26a-27a]. The Circuit Court in Paoli was not

concerned about provoking a flood of medical monitoring

claims because only claims based on significant exposure

with significant increased risk are allowed and because the

cost of medical monitoring is not high. Paoli II at 788.

Here, the respondent Michael Buckley satisfies each of

the elements for a medical monitoring claim. Metro-North

admitted that it negligently exposed Buckley to asbestos, a

known carcinogen, for many years. The medical experts es-

tablished that Buckley was exposed to a massive amount of

asbestos on a daily basis for several years and as a result has

a significant increased risk of developing asbestos-related

diseases. The experts also confirmed that those diseases can

be treated beneficially if caught early enough through peri-

of such medical monitoring for Buckley is $950.

21

There is no question that Buckley has suffered bodily

harm from his negligent ingestion of massive amounts of

carcinogenic asbestos fibers. The needle-like fibers have

embedded themselves in his lung tissue, damaging the tissue

and initiating a harmful biological process that is irreversible.

Such toxic exposure with bodily harm producing significant

increased risk of disease is a sufficient basis for recovery of

medical monitoring costs. Indeed, the whole point of

medical monitoring is to provide an early warning of illness

that may develop as a result of significant toxic exposure, and

thus a current diagnosed disease or physical injury is not

required.

Michael Buckley is precisely the type of plaintiff who can

benefit from medical monitoring: he has had a significant

exposure to asbestos with a significant increased risk of

developing asbestos-related diseases, but he has not yet

developed a clinically diagnosed asbestos disease and can

benefit from the early detection and treatment of any such

disease. The Second Circuit was correct in ruling there is a

reasonable basis for a medical monitoring claim in this case.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

Charles C. Goetsch

Cahill, Goetsch & DiPersia, P.C.

43 Trumbull Street

New Haven, CT 06511

(203) 777-1000

22

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.