Respondents Brief — Bennett v. Spear

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No. 95-813 -

(ta LL ESR

= a i e |

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

BRAD BENNETT, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

MICHAEL SPEAR, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

WALTER DELLINGER

Acting Solicitor General

LoIs J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Deputy Solicitor General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

ANNE 8S. ALMY

ROBERT L. KLARQUIST

EVELYN S. YING

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20520

(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioners, two ranchers and two water irrigation

districts, brought the present action challenging a

biological opinion issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service, pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered

Species Act of 1973 (ESA). 16 U.S.C. 1536. on the

effects of the Bureau of Reclamation’s long-term

operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project on two

endangered species of fish. The Ql , tions present qd

are as follows:

Whether vetitioners have

‘le III of the Constitution.

it ° cet ea FNitag , .

ae

Whether petitions rs’ challe

inion Is cognizable under either the A‘

. } - : ‘ ‘ -

‘ocedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seg., or t

-

\

S10n oOo} re JP if}

“ ( 1540

acti tih HAIALE ETE AY ENT TB Ss A I IN.

ae

sie Nees

—

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OpiMioNs DELOW ...........cccccceeeceeeeeeeeeeessceceeeeeeevsnsesecceseceevens

JUTISAICLION ......ccccccecceeceeeseeeeesseeesescersecerenseeesceeseseeeeeeees

Statutory provisions involved ................ccccccceceeeeeeeeeeeeees

RRRGTIBE, ccccccecccvccceveccesscoscosonoeascesoreorcocossosevescoseosorsosowees

Summary of argument .0..000000..00ccccccccceccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseveeeen

A

II.

The allegations of petitioners’ complaint fail

to satisfy the requirements for standing under

Article III of the Constitution ......000000000000000000000.

A. Petitioners have failed to allege facts which,

if taken as true, would demonstrate that

they have suffered injury in fact .................

B. Any injury suffered by petitioners is not

fairly traceable to the FWS’s issuance of

the biological opinion ..........000...00ccc cee ceeeeceeeee

(. Any injury suffered by petitioners is not

redressable by a favorable judicial ruling .....

Even if petitioners met the requirements of

Article III, their suit could not go forward,

because their claims are not cognizable under

either the Administrative Procedure Act or

the ESA citizen suit provision ............0000.00........

A. Petitioners’ suit cannot proceed under the

Administrative Procedure Act because the

issuance of a biological opinion is not a re-

viewable “final agency action” ....................

B. The citizen suit provision of the Endangered

Species Act provides no basis for adjudica-

tion of petitioners’ suit. ..........0..ccccccceceeeeeeeees

1. The Service's issuance of the biological

opinion in this case did not constitute a

failure to perform a nondiscretionary

duty under 16 U.S.C. 1533 oo...

(IIL)

Page

17

19

20

26

ww

Bib

37

IV

Argument—Continued: Page

2. Issuance of an inadequate or erroneous

biological opinion would not place the

Secretary “in violation of ” the ESA or

implementing regulations ....................... 38

(. Alternative avenues exist by which a court

may review claims that the Service has

recommended unreasonably severe restric-

tions on the use of natural resources ............ 46

re re nie a er ie RS ee 50

EE cccerantersainnneeaniainitiniiiiataidannsdininsiiininarintinapisiazentiie la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

ASARCO, Ine. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) ...... 27

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136

SOUND diibeirribatintcintimeiitanciiiatiia iia en Oa 34

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) 2.0.0.0... 12, 18

Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc.

v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) .00.........ccccccceeeeseeeeees 10

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for

a Great Oregon, 115 8. Ct. 2407 (1995) ...000 3, 20

Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist... 475

ees ee CENTER seatcisedisessiesaenniasisindenlaiednaniadiiasiaebemrinntettentaaineabeaetn 17

Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson,

685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ..............cccceceeeeeeeeeees 45

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) ... 7

Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark,

741 F.2d 257 (Oth Cir. 1984) .........cccscsececcecessseseseess 7

Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman

S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) .0.........cccccccceseceeees 32

Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388

GEIDPUD eresinsincscsntninnsiehsipainiiaentiaiercihteidiaeaaiiaiiaatin i ceiimaaaaeicetis 50

Dalton v. Specter, 1148. Ct. 1719 (1994) ......... 12, 32, 33

Cases-——Continued: Page

Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.

PE ddenahdtntaiddiiinieiantemanentaen 17

Environmental Coalition of Broward County v.

Myers, 831 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1987) .................... 45

Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F 2d

892 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989) ...... 37

Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of

Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984)... 23

FTC vy. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S.

A I iccasihenhctibiscaticiintamenita da 35

FW/PBS Ine. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 7s

GUE aisiticbimeienabaiana TE 8 12. 31, 32, 33, 35

Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation.

er Or ct 40

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20

Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870 (1984)... 40

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F 2d 1349

UE ETE TIIIIITIE netncnnieribichndeasitcidashdaenicenaimemeusesmeeesne 43

Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.

SUE CUIIITTIE? ccsecictistarnecstpmectapbeuineiesitidiasetttitediaesitaiicanimeapeattatiadasen 49

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555

Se are a ee 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 27. 29

Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) 2000000000000... 23

Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1984) ................ 17

Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F 2d 272

ne Sl PINE netacnicnmaaiaeaainsaannei tk 37

National Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359

359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979

FRIED <decinciinpntniipiniieibaiinareasiagetiaiatciaceairiianaataass 4, 20, 21, 34

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 115 S. Ct. 1933 (1995) ....... 2s

O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 672 (1995) oo... cccccccccceee 7

VI

Cases—Continued: Page

Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d

ee st) Hats STINE arceceeatiniatesesiaritnetaniecihaenebeniaesssibenailenniat 43

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) ............. 49

Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.. 113 S. Ct.

a CITEIUTEEY . dencaseatiliehecintnceitasinsieshanendebiiieetbhiiidbiersciatnasdabenatictens 34

Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d

ee 4, 21

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) .. 43

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (Sth Cir.

a Ee eae a 4.21

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) ........... 19

Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.

STTEITIIDY assiseietciaeidendeninceehdinidaaieibatmieahapenmetatoia insaalaaiaidianabiaietadeidiateiin sl 37

Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (Sth Cir.

IID tesciaciecichacetababeneeedineleadbianenaeniiaiiaaamenaiananiiataeininahiieas 45

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Orgq.,

ee ans See TEED : tehctensniiannnnaeanaininmeeeanteiedians 12, 18, 27

TVA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 158 (1978) .........ccccccccccseceeees 47

Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989) ... 4, 21

United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) ...... 30

United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 378 (1995) .....0.000000... 7

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United

for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.

ee Seieiieiieeipeiiaiihaiaiabdiaidiiacitadhietianniciiieliiaiaiaiias 18, 27

Village of False Pass vy. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th

Ei TET acchisnnondendesennniitipiasignsentiaddmmnttinnamennmnaiinds 45

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) .................... Is

Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal,

Be ee re GE GL, GD cterecieintcptnvstionisemaninnscentoncanes 2s

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) ......... 17

Constitution, statutes and regulations:

Spee: EIN, Us HIITED cevcatinbiienssindassintnerinstinnaaniesinninidneransitainninen passim

Act of Feb. 9, 1905, ch. 567, 33 Stat. 714 .................. 6

Vil

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seg.. 9, 12

SP. Rais SUN sicebohibisveneniisssiiasinbiintiennmenmietanbinnaininiiataies 12, 30, 35

OP i: CU: sidecitaceicaa ie haclashieiaacecicala atinciicteietia 28

Cormeen Zoek, GB TETAS. BORGES cccccccceconcntecsecenssccnsecesees 31

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,

Fe Se te SE tieteleatinisienihiecnindiiincininninsidiinasic 36, 41

Oe ee CITI iictenieesestntcnmsiessitbinialiamatemieunaten 42

Se Rs, IIE sicnisncihichitsnscetiiinieinimieinsisinenictiisianians 42, 43

iy II cachetanichtiihectchccccecicatcceniiihacnttnaantn 42

ee ls I etariiiendiiaiichatainiidaliniiittinsinesiiiaie 42

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-510, Tit. XXIX, 104 Stat. 1808 ...... 32

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1531

et seq.:

BG eae 2

eB ee 49

$ 3(15), 16 U.S.C. 1582015) ...........cccreceeseseeneeees 2

eR ee 3

Be i! S| 2, 36, 37, 39, 43

§ 4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(3) oe eeceeeees 38

§ 4(bx2), 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)2) ..........cccccceeeseeees 38

Bm 8 4A en naenen 2

DB: Say Gilt MINI III encnvndiitsensennsutniieseinsesendeans 7, 37, 42

§ aX), 16 U.S.C. 153G(aX(1) ......................... 49

§ Ta(2), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) .................. 2, 4, 21

25, 26, 40, 45, 47

BB FF oe es 3, 20

§ 7(b\3)(A), 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(3)(A) ... 3, 21, 24, 46

§ 7(b)(4), 16 U.S.C. 1586(b)(4) 00... 3

§ 7(b)(4)i), 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4)(i) .........0...0... - 4, 25

§ 7(b)\4)(ii), 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4)(ii) ............ 4, 7, 25

§ 7(b)\4)iv), 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4)(iv) .......... 4, 7, 25

RA 3,7

> A Bee SE: BEI cinsnsecensonsnssensvtensveonenns 41

$ ToX2), 16 U.S.C. 153G(OM2) ................eceeeeees 4, 25

Be 8 nee 2, 4, 25, 26

$ Ma)(1), 16 U.S.C. 15B8(a)(1) 200... eeeeeeees 2

© BER, Be Cie BO casensscscevicencecensevcccesens 5

S BRD, 1G UBC. BEGRID) coccccccccccscscvccsscccecescess 5

Vill

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

§$ 11(e)6), 16 U.S.C. 1540(e)(6) .............ccceeeeeees 5

Be ee 2, 41

§ 11(g)(1), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)1) 0... eee 5, 9, 36

§$ 11(g)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A) ........ passim

§$ 11(g)1)(B), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)1)(B) ............. 5

§$ 1MgKC), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)1 KC) ......... 6, 13, 37

§$ 11g) 2A), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)2)(A) ............ 49

§ 11(g)2) Adi), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)( AD) ..... 5, 40

§ 11(g)2) Aji), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)( ANTI) ... = 5, 40

§ 11(g)2) AD iii), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)( ANI). 5, 40

§ 11(g2XC), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2K(C) ............ 6

§$ 11(g)4), 16 U.S.C. 1540024)... cece eeeeee eee 49

Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982,

Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 7(2), 96 Stat. 1425 .............0. 39

Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481,

ek, GE; BS GR TED cocenenensevncrscnccecenssscessonsssssscseces 49

BB UBL. BERRTEUAD wcecccscvcecsesevsevessevescevesvcses 49

BB UBL. BERRI) cccccerscvvcvssccvsesesceccccesesenes 49

Federal Power Act, § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. 797(e) ............ 23

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.

GEE GB BD. cncesiennenecncnveannececsssnsnesesnsececcsssesesencesesecenee 9

Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 4901 ef seq.:

Ge TE. GIS ectcaeicenteeristanianssnnrinnneatntnsnnimnven 44

Se is GD cireintecniseiteiinanianinninnn 44

Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. 372 et seq. ......... 6

Resource and Conservation Recovery Act of 1976,

42 U.S.C. 6901 ef seq.:

— et een 44

Se I, OEE dteettrienertirnnninimeienmenninn 44

Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.:

Oe ras He | eaceaiccnerneniictrenssennenteinseemeerese — 44

GD is Se ceneeseeeicetsininnnmneninen 44

Toxie Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2601 ef seq.:

Oe tits GID ceerececeetentsiesinenemenniniemnnionnnsian 44

Oh Fe GRUP ercedicntnttensctsanseiaticnsemeniesiniusenieinsien 44

BD Die TR cnctnnencenceneserteniennnnientonentininnnninnniinsen 31

BD Tile GE cenecierecsensnssessenenstnenmonimesonsuseneesvinestom 9

BD WK. FES ccersesscveccescnsevessescossesvscvensesccevonsecenonses 9

IX

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

nearer 42

Fe ER IID ehiiceibediieidie daeeete eS tee 2s

50 C.F.R.:

Pt. 17:

SII, ITE cnsihiesnbineenicenepnanintibieinthdetticalainmatiiatiatintetllcs 2

dS Ee eee SA aeee as he nS 3

SIIIIN TUTE snstiiccenicsnastcusesnentunidentatetiemmisiesidentintiniidliaite

Pt. 222:

i 2

SUIT TITITIITD . cicssiscinscenatesicinsicisieniesidigiieetenidenbiaisiabiieiiaainebato 2

ks: TEE” teccehelestaibsiiinidnipentedinamsibnidsieseeiaeiaaietnanamantimiaaed 3

III iniciccnscinc csbdeslacsesisanssinnniennternienmnmieaiie 2

TTT vcsriiecrescicisiainesi iteatieteeatihbahlinintiealabimiabaniabeannindn 3, 46

OCIS SERIA) CIGTE) occcccesccsccsoscescscoccoscvccsesees 22

intelli ial arn 3, 7

I IED .cnscccnnsuantiensoiinecnstiiewomumeneas 46

I 4, 22

ET ee nae ee s

Miscellaneous:

117 Cong. Rec. 30,852 (1971) .............cc0cccesseesseeseeseees 41

Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,

Il Administrative Law Treatise (3d ed. 1994) ...... 34

Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of

Environmental Law, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 339 (1990) ... 36

Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal

Pollution Control Laws Part I, 13 Envtl. L. Rptr.

EE CIEIEE. suisnesunemsnnenstmnesensiessenisnssgbiannienitnecesene 36

ie EE I TUTE GUID rcs nccnincidnchasinisecinnabenieenesnsticetees 22

51 Fed. Reg. (1986):

i, TTT edesiathddaciaiientiniabentienanininiinbiiaaabiaeienininseredbmnaneen 3S

| ae ey een 4, 22

i Getto ttiaieinaeeniiieisibaninnadanlidntebeiiens 4, 20, 21, 23

Se ML SER MUNI ccescecesenesenbeocictendeccescnsennten 2

59 Fed. Reg. 61,744 (1994) ...........cccccecsecsessscscesserseees 3s

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

SSIETEEEY siisetieeeapebidiatemisaiaedibiaiiiiidiinabiialintiaiiiamakianecnees 43

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 697, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.

I TITEIET sinicinineieelelasenicianididiceieaiadatinidahinslinsidetaenipeneammebinnataiihaneien 20

X

Miscellaneous—C ontinued: Page

H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) ......... 41

H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) ..... 20, 21

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ............ 42

S. Rep. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) ...... 26, 39-40

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1995

No. 95-813

BRAD BENNETT, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

MICHAEL SPEAR’, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-18) is

reported at 68 F.3d 915. The order of the district court

(Pet. App. 19-29) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

August 24, 1995. The petition for a writ of certiorari was

filed on November 21, 1995, and was granted on March 25,

1996 (116 S. Ct. 1316). The jurisdiction of this Court rests

on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

! On July 4, 1994, Michael Spear replaced Marvin Plenert as

Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

(1)

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Sections 7(a)(2) and 11(g) of the Endangered Specics Act

of 1973, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) and 1540(g), are

set forth at App., infra, la-4a.

STATEMENT

1. Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of

1973 (ESA or Act) to protect and conserve endangered and

threatened species. 16 U.S.C. 1531(b). To accomplish that

goal, Congress directed the Secretaries of Commerce and

the Interior to list threatened and endangered species and

designate their critical habitats. See 16 U.S.C. 1533.° The

listed species at issue in this case are the Lost River

sucker and the shortnose sucker, two fish that were listed

as endangered on July 18, 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130.

Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that “[{elach Federal

agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance

of the Secretary [of Commerce or the Interior, see note 2:

supra}, insure that any action authorized, funded or

carried out by such agency * * * is not likely to

jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered

species or threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2).°

* The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce

share responsibility for listing species and for other ESA duties. See

16 U.S.C. 1532(15). The Secretary of the Interior, who implements the

ESA through the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or Service), has

responsibility for the endangered species of fish at issue in this case.

See 50 C.F.R. 17.11, 402.01(b). The Nationa! Marine Fisheries Service

(NMFS) administers the Act with respect to the species under the juris-

diction of the Secretary of Commerce. See 50 C.F.R. 222.23(a), 227.4.

* In addition, Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the taking of any

endangered species within the United States. 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1).

Section 4(d) of the Act authorizes the Secretary to promulgate reg-

ulations for the conservation of species listed as threatened, see 16

U.S.C. 1533(d), and the prohibitions included in Section 9 have been

3

Regulations promulgated jointly by the two Secretaries

furnish a structure for consultation. See 50 C.F.R. Pt.

402; see also 16 U.S.C. 1536(b) and (c). Under the regula-

tions, the agency proposing the action (the action agency)

determines in the first instance whether a proposed action

“may affect” a listed species. 50 C.F.R. 402.14. If the

action agency determines that the proposed action “may

affect” a listed species, it is then to enter into formal

consultation with the Service, unless the action agency

has concluded through preparation of a biological assess-

ment or informal consultation that the action is not likely

to adversely affect the listed species. bid.

Following formal consultation, the Service issues a

biological opinion stating whether the proposed action is

likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the listed

species. 16 U.S.C. 1536(b); 50 C.F.R. 402.14. If the Service

concludes that jeopardy is likely, it must suggest any

reasonable and prudent alternatives that it believes would

avoid jeopardy. 16 U.S.C. 1536(b\(3)(A). If the opinion is

“no jeopardy” or “jeopardy with reasonable and prudent

alternatives,” and if the proposed action or reasonable and

prudent alternative will nevertheless effect an “incidental

taking” of a listed species,’ the biological opinion is accom-

panied by an incidental take statement. See 16 U.S.C.

1536(b)(4). That statement details the anticipated impacts

to the listed species through incidental takings, specifies

reasonable and prudent measures to minimize that impact,

extended by regulation to threatened species, see 50 C.F.R. 17.31, 17.21.

The ESA defines “take” to mean “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,

wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any

such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. 1532(19); see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter

of Communities fora Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).

4 “Incidental takings” are “takings that result from, but are not the

purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity.” 50 C.F.R.

402.02.

and sets forth terms and conditions (including reporting

requirements) that must be complied with by the action

agency to implement those measures. 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)

(4\(i), (ii) and (iv). If the action agency complies with the

terms and conditions of the incidental take statement, any

takings that result from its action are exempt from the

taking prohibition of Section 9. See 16 U.S.C. 1536(0)(2).

After engaging in formal consultation, the action

agency must determine “whether and in what manner to

proceed with the action,” in light of the Service's _bio-

logical opinion and any other relevant information. 50

C.F.R. 402.15(a). Given the Secretary’s “primary respon-

sibility” for implementation of the Act, National Wildlife

Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 979 (1976), an agency that chooses to deviate from

the Service’s recommendations bears the burden of “arti-

culat{ing] in its administrative record its reasons for dis-

agreeing with the conclusions of a biological opinion.” 51

Fed. Reg. 19,956 (1986) (preamble to FWS/NMFS regula-

tions). In the government’s experience, action agencies

very rarely choose to engage in conduct that the Service

believes will jeopardize a listed species. As a legal matter,

however, the action agency retains the ultimate respon-

sibility for determining whether, and in what manner, a

proposed action can proceed in compliance with Section

7(a\(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate. See, e.g., Tribal Village of

Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193-1194 (9th Cir. 1988),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989); Roosevelt Campobelio

Int'l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (Ist Cir. 1982),

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303-1304 (8th Cir.

1976); National Wildlife Fed’n, 529 F.2d at 371; 51 Fed.

Reg. 19,928 (1986) (preamble to FWS/NMFS regulations

explains that the consulting agency performs an “advisory

function under section 7” and that the action agency

“makes the ultimate decision as to whether its proposed

action will satisfy the requirements of section 7(a)(2)”);

pages 21-22, infra.

Primary responsibility for enforcement and implemen-

tation of the ESA is entrusted to officials of the federal

government. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 1540(a), (b) and (e)(6). The

Act also contains a provision for “citizen suits.” That pro-

vision states that

any person may commence a civil suit on his own

behalf —

(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States

and any other governmental instrumentality or agency

* * * who is alleged to be in violation of any provision

of [the Act] or regulation issued under the authority

thereof; or

x* * * * *

(C) against the Secretary [of Commerce or the

Interior] where there is alleged a failure * * * to

perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title

which is not discretionary with the Secretary.

16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1).2 A suit under Section 1540(g)(1)(A)

may not be commenced “prior to 60 days after written

notice of the violation has been given to the Secretary, and

to any alleged violator of any such provision or

regulation.” 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(A)G). Such suits are

also barred if the Secretary has commenced civil enforce-

ment proceedings, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(A)Gi), or if the

United States is “diligently prosecuting a criminal

action” to redress the alleged violation, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)

(2)(A)(iii). Citizen suits against the Secretary under

5 A third class of citizen suits is now obsolete. See 16 U.S.C.

1540(g)(1)(B) (authorizing suits to compel the Secretary to impose

prohibitions on takings during the 15 months that followed the

enactment of the ESA in 1973).

Section 1540(g)(1)(C) for failure to perform nondiscre-

tionary duties may not be brought “prior to sixty days

after written notice has been given to the Secretary,”

unless the suit involves “an emergency posing a signifi-

cant risk to the well-being of any species of fish or wildlife

or plants.” 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(C).

2. The Secretary of the Interior authorized the crea-

tion of the Klamath Irrigation Project in 1905 in accor-

dance with the Reclamation Act of 1902, 48 U.S.C. 372 et

seq., and the Act of February 9, 1905, ch. 567, 38 Stat. 714.

Administered by the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau or

BOR), which is located within the Department of the

Interior, the Project is composed of lakes, rivers, dams,

and irrigation canals in southern Oregon and northern

California. The Klamath Project currently serves ap

proximately 240,000 irrigable acres. Gov't D. Ct. Br. Exh.

1, at 1.

Klamath Project water is stored primarily in Upper

Klamath Lake and in other reservoirs in the Lost River

system, including the Gerber Reservoir in Oregon and the

Clear Lake Reservoir in California. Gov't D. Ct. Br. Exh.

1, at 1. The Project delivers water via a system of canals

to lands within the Klamath Basin. Delivery operations

begin in January, when water from the Klamath River is

delivered to lands throughout the Lower Klamath area.

Id. at 2. Typically, diversions from Upper Klamath Lake

run from March or early April through October, and water

is released from the Gerber and Clear Lake Reservoirs

from mid-April until early October. /d. at 2-3. Normal

lake elevations, river flows, and diversions of water within

the Klamath Project system can be modified by flood or

drought conditions. /d. at 3.

The volume of Klamath Project water provided to a

water user is based on a number of factors, including the

nature and extent of the state-based water rights, the

terms and conditions of the applicable contracts, the flood

or drought conditions in the Klamath Basin, and the avail-

able water supply. See generally California v. United

States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); O'Neill v. United States, 50

F.3d 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 672 (1995);

Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741

F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984). A state-initiated adjudication of

water rights is currently ongoing to determine claims to

surface water in the Klamath Basin in Oregon. See

United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 116 S, Ct. 378 (1995). The Bureau is also in the

process of developing a long-term operating plan for the

Klamath Project. Pending completion of that plan, the

allocation of water from the Klamath Project proceeds on

a year-to-year basis.

3. In February 1992, the BOR completed and forwarded

to the FWS a biological assessment of the effects of the

long-term operation of the Klamath Project on listed

species. See 16 U.S.C. 1536(c). The Bureau determined,

inter alia, that the Project's operation might affect the

Lost River and shortnose suckers. The Bureau therefore

requested formal consultation with the FWS pursuant to

16 U.S.C. 1586 and 50 C.F.R. 402.14. Pet. App. 3; Gov't C.A.

Br. 7-9.

In July 1992, the FWS issued a biological opinion. See

J.A. 18-117. The FWS concluded that the “long-term

operation of the Klamath Project was likely to jeopardize

the continued existence of the Lost River and shortnose

suckers.” Pet. App. 3. The FWS identified reasonable and

prudent alternatives that it believed would avoid jeopardy,

including the imposition of minimum lake levels for the

Upper Klamath Lake and the Clear Lake and Gerber

Reservoirs. /bid.; see J.A. 86-92. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C.

1536(b)(4)\(ii) and (iv), the biological opinion also identified

reasonable and prudent measures intended to minimize the

8

extent of incidental takings associated with the operation

of the Project, and terms and conditions for implementing

those measures. J.A. 92-96. The Bureau notified the FWS

that it intended to adopt the FWS’s recommendations.

Pet. App. 3.° The record contains no information concern-

ing the effect, if any, that this statement of intention had

on the operation of the Klamath Project for the balance of

1992 and/or any subsequent year.

4. Petitioners are twe individual ranch operators and

two irrigation districts in the State of Oregon. They

receive Klamath Project water, including water stored in

the Gerber and Clear Lake Reservoirs. In March 1993, .

petitioners filed the present action, seeking to compel the

FWS to withdraw portions of its 1992 biological opinion.

Pet. App. 31-44. Petitioners named as defendants two FWS

officials and the Secretary of the Interior. /d. at 31-32.

Neither the Bureau of Reclamation nor any of its officials

was named as a defendant, and the Secretary was identified

© Subsequently, the Bureau reinitiated formal consultation on the

Clear Lake Reservoir operations of the Klamath Project, based in part

on its determination that the reasonable and prudent alternatives

presented in the July 1992 biological opinion were not logistically

feasible and that the Bureau had new information regarding the

operation of the Clear Lake Reservoir. Gov't D. Ct. Reply Br. Exh. 2;

see 50 C.F.R. 402.16. Based on a new operations model for Clear Lake

Reservoir, the Bureau proposed the establishment of lower minimum

lake levels than those suggested in the biological opinion and concluded

that its revised proposed action was not likely to jeopardize the

continued existence of the listed fish. In August 1994, the FWS issued

a supplemental biological opinion, which included the establishment of

such lower minimum lake levels with respect to the Clear Lake

Reservoir as a modification of the reasonable and prudent alternatives

set forth in the biological opinion. Gov't C.A. Br. 9n.7. In addition, the

Bureau has reinitiated formal consultation on the long-term operations

of the entire Klamath Project. No biological opinion resulting from

this latest consultation has yet been issued by the FWS.

9

only as the official “empowered by the ESA to make jeop-

ardy determinations concerning threatened and endan-

gered species.” Jd. at 35.

Petitioners asserted jurisdiction under the citizen suit

provision of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1), and the federal

question and declaratory judgment provisions of the

Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 2201. Pet. App.

33. Their complaint alleged that the defendants (respon-

dents in this Court) had violated the ESA and imple-

menting regulations by (1) “improperly concluding * * *

that the [Bureau’s] continued operation of the Klamath

Project * * * is likely to jeopardize the continued

existence of the Lost River and shortnose suckers,” id. at

40-41; (2) “improperly imposing restrictions on the with-

drawal of irrigation water from Clear Lake and Gerber

reservoirs,” id. at 41; and (3) “implicitly determining

critical habitat for the Lost River suckers and the short-

nose suckers in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs * * *

without considering the economic impact of that deter-

mination,” id. at 42.’

5. The government moved to dismiss the complaint.

The government pointed out that the Bureau rather than

the FWS retained final authority over the allocation of

Klamath Project water, and argued that petitioners’

failure to name the BOR as a defendant or to challenge any

action by the Bureau precluded their suit from going

forward. See Gov't D. Ct. Br. 10-15. The district court

granted the government's motion to dismiss. Pet. App. 19-

’ Petitioners’ complaint also alleged related claims attacking the

biological opinion under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

701 et seq. Pet. App. 40-42. In addition, their complaint alleged that

respondents had violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42

U.S.C, 4331 et seq., by failing to perform an environmental analysis on

the biological opinion's alleged de facto designation of critica! habitat.

Pet. App. 42-43.

10

29. The court observed that “the Secretary's biological

opinion is advisory in nature and does not compel com-

pliance with its recommendations or require agencies to

act or refrain from acting in any particular manner.” /d.

at 24. It concluded that petitioners’ interest in utilizing

Klamath Project water “conflict{ed] with the Lost River

and shortnose suckers’ interest in using the water for

habitat,” and that petitioners “do not have standing under

ESA based on an interest which conflicts with the in-

terests sought to be protected by the Act.” /d. at 27. The

@urt also concluded that the biological opinion did not

constitute ade facto determination of critical habitat for

the endangered suckers. /d. at 28 n.4.

6. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-18. The

court framed the question before it as “whether [peti-

tioners’] action is precluded by the zone of interests test”

—i.e., the requirement first articulated in actions under

the APA that a plaintiff challenging administrative

agency action “must show that ‘the interest sought to be

protected by [him was] arguably within the zone of in-

terests vo be protected or regulated by the statute or

constitutional guarantee in question.’” Jd. at 4-5 (quoting

Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp,

397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)) (brackets in original). The court

determined that a zone of interests test applies to suits

brought under the ESA's citizen suit provision, Pet. App.

6-11, and that “only plaintiffs who allege an interest in the

preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of

interests protected by the ESA,” id. at 11. The court

observed that petitioners’ complaint “belies any assump-

tion that they seek compliance with the statute in order

to further the goal of species preservation.” /d. at 16.

Rather, the court continued, petitioners “claim a com-

peting interest—an interest in using the very water that

the government believes is necessary for the preservation

11

of the species.” Jbid. Accordingly, the court held that

petitioners lacked standing to bring their claims under the

ESA, id. at 17, and it affirmed the district court’s dis-

missal of the complaint, id. at 18.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Even if the allegations of petitioners’ complaint are

taken as true and are generously construed, petitioners

have failed to satisfy the standing requirements of Article

Ill of the Constitution. To invoke the jurisdiction of a

federal court, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he has

suffered an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct of the defendant and (3) is likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial ruling. See, e.g., Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).

Petitioners’ complaint fails to satisfy any of those three

requirements. Their complaint alleged that the Bureau's

acceptance of the FWS’s recommendations would reduce

the aggregate amount of water available from the Klamath

Project. Petitioners did not allege, however, that accep-

tance of those recommendations would reduce the amount

of water that they would receive. Absent such an allega-

tion, petitioners’ complaint fails adequately to allege in-

jury in fact. Even if petitioners had adequately alleged a

concrete injury, their complaint would not satisfy the

other requirements for standing. The FWS’s biological

opinion did not legally compel the BOR to alter the

manner in which it allocated Klamath Project water. Any

injury that petitioners may have suffered is therefore

traceable not to the FWS’s issuance of the biological

opinion, but to the Bureau’s decisions regarding the allo-

cation of Project water; yet petitioners failed either to

name the Bureau as a defendant or to identify any action

by the Bureau causing them harm. Any injury suffered by

petitioners also would not be redressable by a favorable

12

judicial decision, since the Bureau would remain free to

adopt the same water allocation policies, based on con-

siderations wholly independent of the ESA, even if the

FWS's biological opinion were withdrawn. Petitioners

have therefore failed to satisfy the constitutional require-

ments for standing. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-44 (1976); Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 568-571 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Allen

v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).

Il. Even if petitioners satisfied the requirements of

Article III, their present claims against the Service could

not go forward, since no statutory waiver of sovereign

immunity authorizes their suit.

A. The usual avenue for obtaining judicial review of

federal agency action is the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seqg., which authorizes review of

“final agency action for which there is no other adequate

remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. 704. This Court’s decisions

make clear, however, that an agency’s recommendation to

another governmental decisionmaker is not reviewable

“final agency action.” See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505

U.S. 788 (1992); Dalton v. Specter, 1148. Ct. 1719 (1994). A

biological opinion issued by the Service does not con-

clusively determine whether and how an agency may

proceed with a project or other action. That determination

is left to the action agency. In the instant case, the final

decisions regarding the amounts and recipients of water

releases from the Klamath Project were made by the

Bureau of Reclamation. The biological opinion at issue in

this case therefore is not subject to review under the

APA, except in the context of a challenge to some final

action taken by the Bureau in reliance upon the opinion.

B. Nor are petitioners’ claims cognizable under the

ESA citizen suit provision. That provision authorizes

“any person” to commence a civil action “to enjoin any

13

person * * * who is alleged to be in violation of” the Act

or implementing regulations, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A), or

against the Secretary of Commerce or the Interior for

failure to perform certain nondiscretionary duties relat-

ing to the process of listing endangered and threatened

speews, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1(C). Petitioners’ suit is not

cognizable under the latter provision, since petitioners

have not alleged the breach of any such nondiscretionary

duty. For two reasons, petitioners’ suit is also not cog-

nizable under Section 1540(g)(1)(A).

First, the text and history of the citizen suit provision

make clear that Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is not a mechanism

for judicial review of the Secretary’s administration of the

ESA. Section 1540(g)(1)(C), which authorizes citizen suits

where the Secretary is alleged to have failed to perform

certain nondiscretionary duties, would be superfluous if

errors made by the Service in its implementation of the

ESA were redressable under Section 1540(g)(1)(A) as

“violations” of the Act. The history of the ESA citizen

suit provision, and its relationship to similar provisions in

other environmental statutes, provide further evidence

that Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is inapplicable here. Section

1540(g)(1)(A) furnishes a means by which private plaintiffs

may enforce the ESA against regulated parties—not a

mechanism for challenging the Secretary’s performance of

his administrative duties under the Act, including the

furnishing of biological opinions.

Even if Section 1540(g)(1)(A) could sometimes provide a

basis for a suit challenging the Secretary’s implementa-

tion of the ESA, it would not apply here. Any review under

the citizen suit provision should be conducted in accor-

dance with traditional principles of administrative law—

and, in particular, with the rule that agency action is

reviewable only when it is final and has a concrete impact

on the challenging party. Because neither the text nor

14

the history of Section 1540(g)(1)(A) suggests that Con-

gress intended to dispense with traditional requirements

of finality and ripeness, that provision may not be used to

attack the biological opinion in isolation from any action

hy the Bureau.

C. Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the non-cogni-

zability of their current claims does not insulate a bio-

logical opinion from allegations that it recommended un-

reasonable restrictions on the use of natural resources.

Decisions made by an action agency in reliance upon a

biological opinion may be challenged either by persons

asserting an interest in listed species or by persons as-

serting a competing interest in the resources in question.

In either type of suit, a reviewing court may scrutinize

the Service’s biological opinion and may vacate the action

agency's decision if it concludes that the biological opinion

is arbitrary and capricious.

ARGUMENT

The ESA citizen suit provision authorizes “any person”

to file a civil action “to enjoin any person, including the

United States * * *, who is alleged to be in violation

of” the Act or implementing regulations. 16 U.S.C.

1540(g)(1)(A). Petitioners have invoked that provision in a

suit directly against the FWS to challenge a biological

opinion issued by the FWS, arguing that the Service’s con-

clusions were unsupported by the pertinent scientific data.

Petitioners assume that the biological opinion could have

been challenged in a suit directly against the FWS under

Section 1540(g)(1)(A) by an environmental organization or

other plaintiff claiming that the opinion was based on

inadequate scientific evidence or analysis and was insuffi-

ciently protective of listed species. They argue that

resource-users should have an equivalent right to invoke

the citizen suit provision. As framed by petitioners, the

—

15

questions presented in this case are (1) whether a “zone of

interests” test governs standing under the ESA citizen

suit provision, and (2) if so, whether resource-users fall

within that “zone of interests.”

The government views this case from a fundamentally

different perspective. We agree with the court of appeals

that petitioners’ challenge to the biological opinion is not

cognizable under the citizen suit provision. We do not be-

lieve, however, that the proper disposition of this case

involves the application of zone of interests standing prin-

ciples. Rather, we believe that the basic premise of peti-

tioners’ argument is wrong: in our view, the biological

opinion at issue here would not have been subject to chal-

lenge by plaintiffs asserting an interest in the protection

of listed species, except within the context of a suit

against the Bureau of Reclamation challenging actions it

has taken in reliance on the Service’s recommendations.

A biological opinion provides the Service’s views as to

whether and how a federal agency may proceed with a

proposed action in a manner that does not jeopardize the

continued existence of a listed species. Although the

action agency typically gives very substantial weight to

the Service’s recommendations, it is not legally obligated

to accept the Service’s advice. Under the Administrative

Procedure Act, the biological opinion therefore is not

“final agency action” subject to a direct judicial challenge.

Nothing in the ESA citizen suit provision authorizes a

legal challenge to non-final administrative action (here.

the issuance of the biological opinion) that is unreviewable

under traditional principles of administrative law. When

the action agency acts on the recommendations of the

Service, however, the action agency’s conduct is subject to

judicial challenge, either by plaintiffs who assert an

interest in the preservation of listed species, or by those

who allege that the agency has imposed unreasonable

16

constraints on the use of natural resources. In reviewing

such challenges, moreover, a court may scrutinize the

biological opinion and its underlying administrative record

(including the scientific evidence it contains) in order to

assess the reasonableness of its conclusions.

The rule that a biological opinion may be challenged

only within the context of a suit against the action agency

imposes no special disability upon plaintiffs, like peti-

tioners, who assert an economic interest in the use of

natural resources. Rather, that rule applies equally to

environmental plaintiffs alleging that the opinion is

insufficiently protective of listed species. Plaintiffs seek-

ing to challenge biological opinions have generally named

action agencies as defendants and have identified specific

actions taken (or intended to be taken) in reliance upon the

biological opinions. Petitioners, by contrast, declined to

name the Bureau as a defendant, and they failed to identify

any action by the Bureau having a concrete impact upon

their interests. Thus, the question in this case is not

whether users of natural resources comprise a disfavored

class of plaintiffs. The question instead is whether peti-

tioners may evade the force of generally applicable rules

governing the mode and timing of judicial review of federal

agency action. We believe that that question should be

answered in the negative, and that petitioners’ suit was

therefore properly dismissed.

In Part I below, we explain why petitioners lack stand-

ing under Article III to challenge the Service’s issuance of

the biological opinion. In Part II, we show that this suit

should be dismissed even if petitioners are found to satisfy

the constitutional requirements for standing, because

17

their claims directly against the FWS are not cognizable

under either the APA or the ESA citizen suit provision.”

I. THE ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS’ COM-

PLAINT FAIL TO SATISFY THE REQUIRE-

MENTS FOR STANDING UNDER ARTICLE III OF

THE CONSTITUTION

Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction

of the federal courts to actual “cases” and “controversies,”

and “the doctrine of standing serves to identify those

disputes which are appropriately resolved through the

judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,

155 (1990). In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555

(1992), this Court reviewed the principles governing stand-

ing to sue in the context of an ESA case. The Court

reiterated that plaintiffs seeking to invoke a federal

court’s jurisdiction must establish (1) that they have

suffered an “injury in fact”—an “invasion of a legally-

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti-

eal,” id. at 560 (citations and internal quotation marks

* Those arguments are properly before the Court. The government

argued below that claims that federal agencies have done more than

necessary to avoid jeopardy to a protected species are not cognizable

under the ESA citizen suit provision; that the FWS’s biological opinion

itself had no direct impact on petitioners; that it therefore was

questionable that the biological opinion constituted final agency action;

and that petitioners’ suit would instead properly lie against the Bureau

of Reclamation. Gov't C.A. Br. 22 n.15, 23-26 & n.17. A respondent “is

entitled under [the Court's] precedents to urge any grounds which

would lend support to the judgment below,” Dayton Board of Educ. v.

Brinkman , 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977), and the Court in any event has an

independent obligation “to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction,

but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,’” Bender v.

Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (quoting

Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)).

18

omitted); (2) that their injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of

the “independent action of some third party not before

the court,” ibid. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)); and (3) that

it is “ ‘likely’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that their

injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision,” De-

fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Eastern

Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 38). See also,

e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge

Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of

Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Those

three elements are the “irreducible minimum,” Valley

Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472, required by

Article III.

“For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss,

both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all

material allegations of the complaint, and must construe

the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v.

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); ef. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 561 (stating that, on a motion to dismiss, the

court presumes that general factual allegations embrace

those specific facts necessary to support the claim). Even

at the pleading stage, however, “[iJt is the responsibility of

the complainant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that

he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the

dispute and the exercise of the court’s remedial powers.”

Warth, 422 U.S. at 518; see FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas,

493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). Thus, petitioners must “allege

* * * facts essential to show jurisdiction. If they fail to

make the necessary allegations, they have no standing.”

Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In

the present case, the allegations of petitioners’ complaint,

even if liberally construed, satisfy none of the three

elements of standing.

* * *

19

A. Petitioners Have Failed To Allege Facts Which, If

Taken As True, Would Demonstrate That They Have

Suffered Injury In Fact

The complaint in this case alleges that petitioners

Bennett and Giordano receive irrigation water from Clear

Lake Reservoir, Pet. App. 33; that petitioners Horsefly

Irrigation District and Langell Valley Irrigation District

receive irrigation water from Clear Lake Reservoir via

Lost River “pursuant to contracts with the United

States,” id. at 34; that “the BOR will abide by the restric-

tions imposed by the Biological Opinion,” id. at 32; and

that “[t]he restrictions on lake levels imposed in the Bio-

logical Opinion adversely affect [petitioners] by sub-

stantially reducing the quantity of available irrigation

water,” id. at 40. Petitioners have adequately alleged that

the recommendations contained in the biological opinion, if

adopted by the Bureau, would reduce the aggregate amount

of water available from the Klamath Project. Petitioners

have not alleged, however, that they have received, or can

be expected to receive, less water than would otherwise

have been allocated to them. Petitioners’ complaint fo-

cuses on the biological opinion prepared by the FWS; it

contains no allegations regarding the Bureau’s water

allocation practices beyond the assertion that “the BOR

will abide by the restrictions imposed by the Biological

Opinion.” Pet. App. 32. The biological opinion, however,

recommends the maintenance of minimum lake levels but

does not address the manner in which available water is to

be divided among interested parties. See J.A. 86-92.

“(T]he ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury

to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seek-

ing review be himself among the injured.” Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,

405 U.S. 727, 734-735 (1972)). Because petitioners have not

20

alleged that they will receive reduced quantities of water,

their complaint fails to satisfy the injury in fact require-

ment of Article III.

B. Any Injury Suffered By Petitioners Is Not Fairl,

Traceable To The FWS’s Issuance Of The Biological

Opinion

The Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce exercise

“primary responsibility” for implementation of the ESA.

National Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). Cf. Babbitt vy.

Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great

Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416 (1995) (Secretary's inter-

pretation of ESA provision is entitled to deference in light

of “(t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enfore-

ing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory

expertise necessary to its enforcement”). The require-

ment that the Service prepare a biological opinion

promptly upon request, see 16 U.S.C. 1586(b), would be

largely superfluous if action agencies were expected

routinely to duplicate the Service's efforts to assess the

likely impact of proposed actions on listed species. The

statutory scheme thus presupposes that the biological

opinion will play a central role in the action agency's

decisionmaking process, and that it will typically be based

on an administrative record that is fully adequate for the

action agency’s decision insofar as ESA issues are

concerned. And because a reviewing court will give

substantial deference to the Service's views,’ a federal

® See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 697, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1979)

(noting with approval that “[cjourts have given substantial weight to

[the Service's] biological opinions as evidence of an [action] agency's

compliance with Section 7(a)”); H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d

Sess. 12 (1978); 51 Fed. Reg. 19,956 (1986) (“Federal courts have

accorded Service biological opinions great deference.”).

21

agency that chooses to deviate from the recommendations

contained in a biological opinion bears the burden of

“articulat({ing] in its admimistrative record its reasons for

disagreeing with the conciusions of a biological opinion.”

51 Fed. Reg. 19,956 (1986). In the government's experi-

ence, action agencies very rarely choose to engage in con-

duct that the Service has concluded is likely to jeopardize

the continued existence of a listed species.

As a legal matter, however, the action agency retains

the ultimate responsibility for determining whether and

how a proposed action may go forward in compliance with

Section 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate. See 16 U.S.C.

1536(b\(3)(A); Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d

1185, 1198-1994 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 873

(1989); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. EPA. 684 F.2d

1041, 1049 (ist Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534

F.2d 1289, 1303-1304 (8th Cir. 1976); National Wildlife

Fed'n, 529 F.2d at 371. When Congress amended the ESA

in 1978, substantially revising the consultation process,

the House Committee observed that

[aJny determination by the Fish and Wildlife Service

that the activity may jeopardize the continued exis-

tence of listed species does not necessarily mandate

any particular action by the acting agency. The

section 7 regulations make it clear that it is the

responsibility of the acting agency to determine

whether to proceed with the activity or program as

planned in light of its Section 7 obligations.

H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978). Regu-

lations published jointly by the FWS and the NMFS in

1986 state that, “(following the issuance of a biological

opinion, the Federal agency shall determine whether and

in what manner to proceed with the action in light of its

section 7 obligations and the Service’s biological opinion.”

22

50 C.F.R. 402.15(a). The preamble to those regulations

explains that the Service performs an “advisory function

under section 7” and that the action agency “makes the

ultimate decision as to whether its proposed action will

satisfy the requirements of section 7(a)(2).” 51 Fed. Reg.

19,928 (1986). The biological opinion at issue in the

instant case therefore did not compel the Bureau to adopt

higher lake levels. That opinion, moreover, contains no

recommendations at all regarding the allocation of avail-

abie water among potential recipients. If petitioners have

suffered injury, the proximate cause of their harm is an

(as yet unidentified) decision by the Bureau regarding the

volume of water allocated to petitioners, not the biological

opinion itself.

This does not mean that the biological opinion is

shielded from judicial scrutiny. If an action agency adopts

the Service’s recommendations, or proceeds with a pro-

posed action in reliance on the Service's no-jeopardy deter-

mination, the propriety of its actions will ultimately

depend upon the rationality of the Service's analysis.

Accordingly, judicial review of the action agency's conduct

properly may include review of the analysis and recom-

mendations contained in the biological opinion, and of the

" The Services have consistently recognized that the action agency

retains the legal authority to accept or reject the recommendations

contained in a biological opinion. Thus, joint FWS/NMFS regulations

issued in 1978 stated that, “[uJpon receipt and consideration of the

biological opinion and recommendations of the Service, it is the

responsibility of the Federal agency to determine whether to proceed

with the activity or program as planned in light of its section 7

obligations.” 50 C.F.R. 402.04(g) (1978). The preamble to those

regulations confirmed that once consultation has taken place, “the

ultimate responsibility for determining agency action in light of section

7 still rests with the particular Federal agency that was engaged in

consultation.” 43 Fed. Reg. 871 (1978).

23

scientific evidence before the Service, in order to deter-

mine whether the opinion is supported by sufficient

evidence to satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standard

of review. Cf. Escondido Mutual Water Co. vy. La Jolla

Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 778 (1984)."" If the

court finds the recommendations contained in the bio-

logical opinion to be arbitrary and capricious, the appropri-

ate relief would be to vacate the action agency's decision

and remand to the action agency for further consideration,

perhaps informed by renewed consultation with the Ser-

vice. Thus, while petitioners are not entitled to challenge

the FWS'’s biological opinion in isolation from any action

by the Bureau, the opinion would ultimately be reviewable

'" In Escondido, the Court held that Section 4(e) of the Federal

Power Act required the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to

accept without modification any conditions that the Secretary of the

Interior directed to be included in licenses for hydroelectric facilities

located on or near Indian reservations. 466 U.S. at 772-779. Judicial

review of the license, the Court observed, would include consideration

of whether those conditions were reasonable, consistent with the

statute, and supported by substantial evidence. /d. at 778. Thus, while

the challenged order would be that of the Commission (/.¢., the issuance

of the license), the reviewing court would scrutinize the determinations

made by the Secretary under the same (deferential) standard that

would apply to direct review of the Secretary's conduct. Jhid.; ef.

Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (court reviewing an order of the

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission gives deference

to the Secretary of Labor's construction of an ambiguous regulation).

Where an action agency adopts the recommendations contained in a

biological opinion, we believe that a similar mode of judicial review is

appropriate. If the action agency chooses to deviate from the Service's

recommendations, by contrast, review should focus on the rea-

sonableness of and evidentiary support for that decision. Cf. 51 Fed.

Reg. 19,956 (1986) (where action agency deviates from the Service's

recommendations, it is “incumbent upon [the action] agency to

articulate in its administrative record its reasons for disagreeing with

the conclusions of a biological opinion”).

24

within the context of a legal challenge to the Bureau’s

allocation of water.”

Contrary to petitioners’ assertions (Br. 42, 43), we do

not contend that “there is no connection between the bio-

logical opinion issued by the USFWS and re-operation of

the Klamath Project by the Bureau,” or that the biological

Judicial assessment of the biological opinion would be based on

the administrative record compiled by the Service, even though that

record would not routinely be provided in its entirety to the action

agency. See 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)3)A) (“Promptly after conclusion of

consultation * * *, the Secretary shall provide to the Federal agency

* * * a written statement setting forth the Secretary's opinion, and a

summary of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing

how the agency action affects the species or its critical habitat.”)

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs challenging agency actions taken in

reliance on the Service's biological opinions frequently name the

Service or the Secretary as a co-defendant. The Department of Justice

does not object to that practice. In our view, however, the presence or

absence of the Service as a defendant should not affect the manner in

which the district court record is compiled or the standard by which the

court reviews the action agency's conduct. Where an action agency

adopts the recommendations contained in a biological opinion, we

believe that a court reviewing the action agency's conduct should (1)

admit into evidence the Service's administrative record supporting the

biological opinion and (2) vacate the action agency's decision if the

court found the analysis or recommendations contained in the biological

opinion to be arbitrary and capricious, whether or not the Service or the

Secretary was named as a defendant. If a court disagreed, however,

and concluded that the Service’s administrative record would be

admissible into evidence only if the Service itself were a party, the

proper response would be to join the Service as a defendant—not to

decline to consider its administrative record. Both as a legal and a

practical matter, meaningful judicial review of the biological opinion

would be impossible if the court was foreclosed from examining the

materials from which that opinion was derived. Our point is simply

that the ultimate basis and focus of judicial review is a challenge to

action taken by the action agency in reliance on the biological opinion,

not the biological opinion standing alone.

25

opinion should be regarded “as a meaningless piece of

paper.” The statutory and regulatory scheme unquestion-

ably presupposes that action agencies will give substantial

weight to the views of the Service. The consultation pro-

cess, however, is not an end in itself: it is a means of

assisting federal agencies to fulfill their substantive

obligations under Section 7(a)(2) of the Act to ensure that

their actions will not jeopardize the continued existence of

a listed species. The Bureau, not the FWS, is ultimately

responsible for ensuring that the Klamath Project is

operated in compliance with the ESA’s requirements, and

the Bureau retains legal authority to accept or reject the

Service’s recommendations. If the Bureau adopts the

recommendations contained in the biological opinion, its

actions are subject to judicial review at the behest of

persons injured by them, and the court in conducting such

review may assess the adequacy of the biological opinion—

with deference, of course, to the scientific judgments of

the expert agency. Review of the biological opinion is

available, however, only after the Bureau has acted, and

only within the context of a challenge to specific actions

taken by the Bureau in reliance on that opinion.”

' Where the Secretary concludes that a proposed action is likely to

result in the incidental taking of a protected species, the biological

opinion is accompanied by an incidental take statement that identifies

the level of anticipated taking associated with the agency action,

specifies “reasonable and prudent measures” to minimize that taking,

and sets forth terms and conditions to implement those measures. 16

U.S.C. 1536(b)(4)(i), (ii), and (iv). Those takings that are in compliance

with the terms and conditions specified under Section 1536(b)(4)iv) are

exempt from the takings prohibition of Section 9. See 16 U.S.C.

1536(0 (2).

Even where a biological opinion is accompanied by an incidental

take statement, neither the biological opinion nor the incidental take

statement legally compels or prohibits any conduct by the action

agency. Actions inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the

26

©. Any Injury Suffered By Petitioners Is Not Redres-

sable By A Favorable Judicial Ruling

Petitioners have not sought any relief directed against

the Bureau’s operation of the Klamath Project. Rather,

they have requested a judicial order setting aside the

biological opinion. See Pet. App. 43-44. Petitioners’ re-

quest for such a ruling fails to satisfy the redressability

requirement of Article III.

The fact that a contemplated agency action will not

jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species does

not mean that the agency is required to carry out that

action. In the present case, a variety of factors wholly

apart from ESA concerns may affect the Bureau’s deci-

incidental take statement are not per se unlawful: they simply “remain

subject to the prohibition against takings that is contained in section 9.”

S. Rep. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982). As a practical matter,

an action agency is very unlikely to risk Section 9 liability by

deviating from the terms and conditions set forth in the incidental take

statement, since an incidental take statement is issued only when the

Service believes that a taking is likely. The action agency remains

legally free, however, to carry out the proposed action without con-

forming to those terms and conditions if it concludes that the action

will not in fact cause a taking—subject to the risk that a reviewing

court will determine that an unauthorized taking has occurred or can be

expected to occur, and that the agency is therefore in violation of

Section 9,

In the present case, moreover, the aspect of the biological opinion

document that is the subject of petitioners’ challenge—namely, the

Service's identification of “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that

included maintenance of higher water levels at the Clear Lake and

Gerber reservoirs, see Pet. App. 39-40—is separate and distinct from

the incidental take statement. See J.A. 86-92 (reasonable and prudent

alternatives), 92-96 (incidental take statement). Thus, so long as the

BOK tuilfilled its obligations under Section 7(a)(2) by operating the

Project in a manner that did not jeopardize listed species, the Bureau

Was not required to maintain the higher lake levels in order to comply

with the terms and conditions of the incidental take statement.

27

sions regarding the storage, distribution, and delivery of

irrigation water within the Klamath Basin. The ultimate

effect of a judicial decision invalidating the biological

opinion is therefore dependent upon the actions of the

Bureau, “whose exercise of broad and legitimate discre-

tion the courts cannot presume either to control or to

predict.” ASARCO, Ine. vy. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615

(1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see Eastern Kentucky

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 43; Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 568-571 (opinion of Scalia, J.). If the Bureau of

Reclamation allocates water in a manner that injures

petitioners, and its action is determined to be unlawful,

petitioners’ injury would be redressable by an appropriate

judicial order directed against the Bureau. But in the

absence of any challenge to a final decision by the BOR, it

is purely speculative whether a judicial order running

against the Service would enable petitioners to obtain

additional water.

* * * k &

The requirement that plaintiffs establish injury, causa-

tion, and redressability “tends to assure that the legal

questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in

the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a con-

crete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation

of the consequences of judicial action.” Valley Forge

Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472. Petitioners’ suit

directly implicates those pragmatic concerns. At the time

this suit was filed, it was possible (insofar as can be

determined from the allegations of the complaint) that the

Bureau would decline to adopt the recommendations con-

tained in the biological opinion; that those recommenda-

'! By the time the complaint in this case was filed, the Bureau had

informed the Service that it intended to act in accordance with the

28

tions, even if implemented, would have no effect on the

volume of water available to petitioners; or that the

Bureau would assert an independent justification for

adopting the higher lake levels recommended by the

Service. If any of those events had occurred, the court’s

resolution of petitioners’ challenge to the biological opin-

ion would have had no concrete impact on petitioners’

interests.

Once the Bureau arrived at a final decision concerning

the allocation of Klamath Project water, petitioners could

have sought judicial review of that decision under the APA

(if the decision caused them injury) by alleging that the

Bureau's refusal to release additional water was arbitrary

and capricious. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Westlands

Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667 (9th Cir.

1993). Alternatively, petitioners might have contended

that some other provision of law required the Bureau to

allocate additional water. See 48 U.S.C. 390uu; ef.

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 115 S. Ct. 1933, 1942, 1944-1945

(1995) (recognizing that challenges to operation of recla-

mation projects may be brought in federal district court).

If the Bureau had then defended its actions by relying on

the biological opinion, judicial review of the Bureau's

conduct would focus on whether the recommendations

proffered by the Service were arbitrary and capricious.

That review would include an assessment of the scientific

evidence and analyses on which the Service relied. See

pages 22-23, supra. Thus, dismissal of petitioners’ com-

plaint would not permanently insulate the biological

opinion from judicial scrutiny. It would simply ensure

analysis and recommendations contained in the biological opinion. See

Gov't D. Ct. Br. Exh. 6. The record contains no information, however,

regarding whether and when the Bureau actually altered its water

allocation practices in response to the biological opinion.

29

that such scrutiny would not occur unless and until the

Bureau acted upon the Service’s recommendations in a

manner that caused petitioners harm, and that it would

occur within the context of a suit between petitioners and

the agency directly responsible for their alleged injury.”

In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court observed that “(t]he person

who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete

interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal

standards for redressability and immediacy.” 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. The

Court explained that “one living adjacent to the site for proposed

construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the

licensing agency's failure to prepare an Environmental Impact

Statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the

Statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even

though the dam will not be completed for many years.” /Jbid. For three

reasons, that principle does not control this case.

First, the hypothetical case described in Defenders of Wildlife

involved a procedural breach committed by the same agency whose

actions were ultimately responsible for the plaintiffs injury. The Court

did not cast doubt on the rule that standing is ordinarily absent where

the nexus between the unlawful conduct and the plaintiff's injury

involves independent action by a third party not before the court.

Second, a right to insist upon particular procedures would often be

substantially undermined if it could be asserted only where the outcome

of those procedures could be forecast with certainty. The premise of an

EIS requirement, for example, is that the environmental consequences

(and thus the propriety) of a particular project cannot accurately be

determined without an EIS. In the present case, by contrast, any legal

challenge petitioners may have to the Bureau's final decisions

regarding the allocation of Klamath Project water can be asserted

after those decisions have been made.

Finally, the Court in Defenders of Wildlife did not dispense with the

requirement that plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact. The

hypothetical plaintiff in Defenders of Wildlife was described as living

next to the dam site; there was no question that the challenged federal

action (construction of the dam) would ultimately (although not

immediately) cause that plaintiff injury, and likewise no question that

an injunction barring construction unless an EIS were prepared would

30

il. EVEN IF PETITIONERS MET THE REQUIRE-

MENTS OF ARTICLE III, THEIR SUIT COULD

NOT GO FORWARD, BECAUSE THEIR CLAIMS

ARE NOT COGNIZABLE UNDER EITHER THE

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OR THE

ESA CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioners fail to satisfy the

requirements of Article III. Even if this Court holds to

the contrary, however, it would not follow that petitioners’

suit can go forward. A determination that petitioners

meet the requirements of Article III would mean only that

Congress could authorize the adjudication of this lawsuit

by the federal courts—not that it has done so. “It is

elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is im-

mune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United

State v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted). Even if petitioners are

found to have Article III standing to bring this action, no

statutory waiver of sovereign immunity authorizes their

challenge to the Service’s biological opinion outside the

context of a suit against the action agency challenging

that agency’s conduct.

A. Petitioners’ Suit Cannot Proceed Under The Admin-

istrative Procedure Act Because The Issuance Of

A Biological Opinion Is Not A Reviewable “Final

Agency Action”

The usual avenue for obtaining judicial review of federal

agency action is the APA, which provides, inter alia, for

judicial review of “final agency action for which there is

no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. 704. Issu-

redress that injury (albeit perhaps only temporarily). In the present

case, by contrast, petitioners have failed to allege that they have

received (or can be expected to receive) less water than they desire.

31

ance of the biological opinion in this case was not “final

agency action” because it did not conclusively determine

the manner in which Klamath Project water would be

allocated. Rather, the final decisions regarding the

amounts and recipients of water releases were made by the

Bureau of Reclamation. The Service’s issuance of the

biological opinion therefore was not subject to review

under the APA, except within the context of a challenge to

the Bureau’s ultimate decisions regarding the allocation

of water.

This Court considered a similar issue in Franklin v.

Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). Under the Census

Act, the Secretary of Commerce is required to report to

the President “(t]he tabulation of total population by

States.” 13 U.S.C. 141(b); see 505 U.S. at 792. The Presi-

dent is then required to “transmit to the Congress a state-

ment showing the whole number of persons in each State,

* * * and the number of Representatives to which each

State would be entitled.” 2 U.S.C. 2a(a); see 505 U.S. at

792. Although no President has ever transmitted to the

Congress census figures different from those reported to

him by the Secretary, see id. at 812-813 (Stevens, J., con-

curring in part and concurring in the judgment), the

Court construed the pertinent statutes as authorizing the

President to do so, see id. at 796-800.

Because the President retained legal authority to

amend the figures reported by the Secretary, the Court

held, the Secretary's report was not “final agency action”

reviewable under the APA. 505 U.S. at 796-800." In

© Four Justices would have held that the Secretary's report

constituted reviewable “final agency action.” See 505 U.S. at 808-816

(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Those

Justices concluded that the President's role under the statutory scheme

was purely ministerial, and that the President lacked the legal

authority to amend the figures reported to him by the Secretary. See

32

determining whether particular conduct constitutes “final

agency action,” the Court explained, “[tJhe core question

is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking

process, and whether the result of that process is one that

will directly affect the parties.” Jd. at 797." “Because the

Secretary’s report to the President carries no direct con-

sequence for the reapportionment,” the Court concluded,

that report was “not final and therefore not subject

to review.” Jd. at 798 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Cf. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc.

v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 108, 112-113 (1948)

(“administrative orders are not reviewable unless and

until they impose an obligation, deny a right or fix some

legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative

process”).

The Court reiterated that principle two Terms later in

Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719 (1994). Dalton involved

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-510, Tit. XXIX, 104 Stat. 1808. Under that

Act, the Secretary of Defense was required to submit

id. at 810-813. The concurring Justices did not suggest, however, that a

non-binding agency recommendation to another decisionmaker would

constitute “final agency action.”

'’ The Court's disposition of the case makes clear that both halves of

that question must be answered in the affirmative before an agency

pronouncement will be regarded as “final agency action.” The

Department of Commerce had clearly “completed its decisionmaking

process” when it issued its report to the President. That report was

nevertheless deemed not to be “final agency action” that would

“directly affect the parties,” since the President retained the final

authority to accept or reject the figures contained therein. Similarly

here, the biological opinion represented the FWS’s concluded view

regarding the Klamath Project's likely impact upon listed species, but

it was not “final agency action” within the meaning of the APA, since

the Bureau retained ultimate legal authority over the allocation of

Project water.

33

recommendations concerning the closure of military in-

stallations to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment

Commission, an independent body. 114 S. Ct. at 1722. The

Commission would then submit a report to the President,

who was given two weeks in which to decide whether to

approve or disapprove, in their entirety, the Commission's

recommendations. /bid. Plaintiffs sought review of the

recommendations submitted by the Secretary and the

Commission. The Court held that “[a] straightforward

application of Franklin” foreclosed review of those rec-

ommendations under the APA, id. at 1724, explaining

that “the President, not the Commission, takes the final

action that affects the military installations,” id. at 1725

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under Franklin and Dalton, the Service’s issuance of a

biological opinion is not “final agency action.” Whatever

the practical likelihood that the BOR would adopt the

reasonable and prudent alternatives (including the higher

lake levels) identified by the Service, the Bureau was not

legally obligated to do so. Even if the Bureau decided to

adopt the higher lake levels, moreover, nothing in the

biological opinion would constrain the BOR’s discretion as

to how the available water should be allocated among

potential users. Like the reports at issue in Franklin and

Dalton, the biological opinion therefore “carries no direct

consequence” for the release of water to petitioners or

other users. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798; Dalton, 114 S. Ct.

at 1724. It is the Bureau, not the FWS, that “takes the

final action that affects” the allocation of water from the

Klamath Project. /d. at 1725. Thus, even if petitioners

met the requirements of Article III, they could not obtain

34

APA review of the biological opiinion, except in the context

of a challenge to actions by the BOR."

The insusceptibility of the biological opinion to a

judicial challenge independent of a decision by the action

agency is further supported by the pragmatic considera-

tions underlying the doctrine of ripeness.” The “basic

rationale” of ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts,

through avoidance of prematwre adjudication, from en-

tangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies

from judicial interference until an administrative decision

has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way

by the challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967); see also National

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 891. Judicial review of a

biological opinion independent of any challenge to the

action agency’s decision would cause the disruption and

Unlike Franklin, the instant case involves a recommendation

submitted by one co-equal agency to another, not a recommendation

submitted by a subordinate to a superior within the same chain of

command. Nothing in Franklin suggests, however, that the Court

found dispositive the general subordimacy of the Secretary of Com-

merce to the President. The Court’s analysis focused instead on the

President's legal authority to reject the Secretary's recommendation

with respect to a particular matter.

'% Although ripeness doctrine and tthe APA requirement of “final

agency action” serve complementary purposes, they are not identical.

“An agency action can be final, wiith no further administrative

remedies available to a petitioner, and yet it can still fail to be ‘ripe’

for judicial review. The best example of this situation is an agency

rule that is worded so broadly that a court cannot determine whether,

or to what extent, it will cause harm to the petitioner or raise the lega!

issues the petitioner has asked the court to address.” Kenneth Culp

Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Il Administrative Law Treatise 361 (3d

ed. 1994). See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Imc., 113 S. Ct.

2485, 2495-2496 (1993); National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 891-898.

35

inefficiency that ripeness principles are intended to

prevent. Until the Bureau has considered the biological

opinion, in conjunction with other factors bearing upon its

water allocation decisions, there can be no certainty as to

what those decisions will be, how they will affect particu-

lar parties, or what alternative bases might underlie the

Bureau's actions. As we explain above, we believe that

this uncertainty is fatal to petitioners’ efforts to establish

standing under Article III]. But whether or not those

considerations are of constitutional moment, under well-

established principles of administrative law they should

preclude judicial review in the absence of a clear con-

gressional directive to permit it.”

B. The Citizen Suit Provision Of The Endangered

Species Act Provides No Basis For Adjudication Of

Petitioners’ Suit

Although petitioners’ complaint relied in part on the

APA, see Pet. App. 40-43, they place principal reliance on

the ESA citizen suit provision. That provision states in

relevant part that

any person may commence a civil suit on his own

behalf —

* As we explain above, see pages 22-23, supra, the biological

opinion would be subject to judicial scrutiny in the context of a legal

challenge to actions taken by the Bureau in reliance upon that opinion.

That mode of review is consistent with the text of the APA. which

provides that “[a) preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency

action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the

review of the final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. 704; see FTC v. Standard

Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 245 (1980). That avenue for re

viewing a non-binding recommendation was not available in Franklin

and Dalton: because the final decisionmaker (the President) was not an

“agency” within the meaning of the APA, see Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-

801, there was no “final agency action” to review.

36

(A) to enjoin any person, including the United

States and any other governmental instrumentality or

agency * * *, who is alleged to be in violation of any

provision of [the Act] or regulation issued under the

authority thereof; or

(C) against the Secretary [of Commerce or the

Interior] where there is alleged a failure * * * to

perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title

which is not discretionary with the Secretary.

16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1).

The ESA citizen suit provision does not apply to peti-

tioners’ claims. The Service’s issuance of the biological

opinion at issue here was not a failure to perform a

nondiscretionary duty under 16 U.S.C. 1533. Issuance of

what a court might find to be an unpersuasive or in-

adequately supported biological opinion, moreover, would

*! As this Court noted in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S.

20, 23 & n.1 (1989), a number of federal environmental statutes contain

citizen suit provisions patterned after the citizen suit provision of the

Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat.

1706. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environ-

mental Law, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 339, 347 n.29 (1990) (citizen suit provisions

of various environmental statutes “are virtually identical, largely

because they were ‘lifted’ from the frst such provision in the 1970 Clean

Air Act”); Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution

Control Laws Part 1,13 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10,309, 10,311 (1983) (“There are

perhaps no sections of the environmental statutes where precedent

under one statute so clearly applies to others.”). The citizen suit

provisions typically “authorize ‘any person’ to commence suit to enforce

the requirements of the acts against ‘any person’ alleged to violate

them or to require the government to perform a mandatory duty under

the acts.” /d. at 10311-10312 (footnotes omitted). The ESA citizen suit

provision conforms to that pattern.

37

not place the Secretary “in violation of” the Endangered

Species Act or its implementing regulations.

B. The Service's issuance of the biological opinion in

this case did not constitute a failure to perform a

nondiscretionary duty under 16 U.S.C. 1533

The conduct complained of in this case was not “a

failure * * * to perform any act or duty under section

1533 of [Title 16] which is not discretionary with the

Secretary.” 16 U.S.C. 1540(g\(1)(C). Petitioners have not

contended that the Service failed to issue a biological

opinion—only that the conclusions articulated in the

opinion were unsupported by the pertinent scientific

data.* In any event, Section 1540(g1)(C) applies only

where the Secretary fails to perform a nondiscretionary

duty “under section 1533” of Title 16. The consultation

process (including the issuance of biological opinions) is

governed by Section 1536 of Title 16. Indeed, while

petitioners’ complaint cites Section 1540(g)1)C) as a

basis for district court jurisdiction, see Pet. App. 41, 42,

neither the complaint, the petition, nor petitioners’ brief

2 The nondiscretionary duty sections of the various citizen suit

provisions have been given a narrow construction. See. €4..

Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F 2d 272, 276 n3 (4th Cir. 1993)

(citing cases); Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F 2d 892.

899 (2d Cir.) (“the district court has jurisdiction * * * to compel the

Administrator to perform purely ministerial acts”), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 991 (1989); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (“In order to impose a clear-cut nondiscretionary duty, we believe

that a duty of timeliness must categorically mandate that all specified

action be taken by a date-certain deadline.”) (brackets and interna!

quotation marks omitted). Cf. id. at 792 (“We long ago rejected * * *

the convoluted notion that EPA is under a nondiscretionary duty—for

purposes of [the Clean Air Act citizen suit provision}—not to abuse its

discretion.”).

38

on the merits identifies any nondiscretionary duty that

the Service is alleged to have failed to perform.”

2. Issuance of an inadequate or erroneous biological

opinion would not place the Secretary “in violation

of” the ESA or implementing regulations

Petitioners’ principal contention is that judicial review

of the biological opinion is available under 16 U.S.C.

1540(g)(1)(A), which authorizes injunctive actions against

2% Petitioners’ complaint alleged that the Secretary had violated 16

U.S.C. 1533(b)2) and its implementing regulations by “implicitly

determining critical habitat for the Lost River suckers and the

shortnose suckers * * * without considering the economic impact of

that determination.” Pet. App. 42. Even if that claim had merit, it

would not be cognizable under Section 1540(gX1\(C), since even an

arbitrary and capricious designation of critical habitat would not

constitute a failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. See note 22,

supra.

In any event, petitioners’ claim has no basis in law. Critical

habitat may be designated only through notice and comment rule-

making under Section 4(aX(3) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(3).

(Pursuant to Section 4(a)(3), the Secretary of the Interior has proposed

a rule designating critical habitat for the endangered Lost River

sucker and shortnose sucker. See 59 Fed. Reg. 61,744 (1994).) The

requirement that the Secretary “tak[e] into consideration the economic

impact * * * of specifying any area as critical habitat,” 16 U.S.C.

1533(b\(2), applies only to the official designation of critical habitat

pursuant to Section 4(a3). Contrary to petitioners’ apparent premise,

the Service's conclusion that use or destruction of particular natural

resources would jeopardize a listed species does not represent an

“implicit” designation of critical habitat. See 51 Fed. Reg. 19,927

(1986) (“An action could jeopardize the continued existence of a listed

species through the destruction or adverse modification of its habitat,

regardless of whether that habitat has been designated as ‘critical

habitat.’”). Indeed, the Service is not permitted—let alone required—

to consider economic impacts in making the scientific determination

whether a proposed action will or will not jeopardize the continued

existence of a listed species.

39

any person “who is alleged to be in violation of” the ESA

or its implementing regulations. For two reasons, peti-

tioners’ reliance on Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is misplaced.

a. In addition to the requirements and prohibitions ap-

plicable to persons whose on-the-ground conduct may

harm a listed species, the ESA and its implementing regu-

lations contain numerous provisions governing the Sec-

retary’s implementation of the Act. Conduct by the

Secretary that is inconsistent with such provisions might

in a sense be said to constitute a “violation” of the Act or

regulations. The text and history of the ESA citizen suit

provision indicate, however, that Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is

not intended to serve as an alternative avenue for judicial

review of the Secretary’s implementation of the statute.

Section 1540(g)(1)(A) furnishes a means by which non-

federal actors may enforce the provisions of the ESA

against regulated parties—not an additional mechanism

for challenging the Secretary’s performance of his duties

as administrator of the Act.

i. The strongest textual evidence on this point is Sec-

tion 1540(g)(1)(C), which authorizes citizen suits in cases

where the Secretary is alleged to have failed to perform a

nondiscretionary duty under Section 1533. See pages 37-

38, supra. That provision would be superfluous if errors

by the Secretary in his implementation of the ESA

were subject to challenge under Section 1540(g)(1)(A) as

“violations” of the Act.” The citizen suit provision also

4 Section 1540(g1C) was added to the ESA in 1982, together with

amendments to Section 1533 that imposed timetables for action by the

Secretary on petitions to list threatened or endangered species. See

Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 7(2), 96 Stat. 1425. The Senate Report accompany-

ing the 1982 amendments explained that Section 1540(g)1)C) “would

amend the citizen suit provision of the Act to authorize actions against

the Secretary for failure to perform the acts and duties that are

imposed by” other provisions of those amendments. 3S. Rep. No. 418,

40

states that an action under Section 1540(g)(1)(A) may not

be brought “prior to sixty days after written notice of the

violation has been given to the Secretary and to any

alleged violator of any such provision or regulation,” 16

U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(A)G), or if civil or criminal enforcement

proceedings are ongoing, see 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(A)(ii)

and (iii). The requirement that notice be given separately

to the Secretary and to the “violator,” and the bar on

commencement of citizen suits during the pendency of

federal enforcement proceedings, suggest that Section

1540(g)(1)(A) is directed at on-the-ground “violations” of

the Act’s substantive provisions—not at the Secretary’s

administration of the Act.” Thus, the “sense of the

statute,” ef. Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 879 (1984),

is that an erroneous biological judgment by the Service is

97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982). That language from the Senate Report

reflects the assumption that the Secretary's failure to comply with the

new statutory requirements governing the listing process would not

otherwise be subject to challenge under the citizen suit provision.

® This conclusion is supported by two other textual features of 16

U.S.C. 1540(g)1)(A). First, that Section provides for a suit against a

person “who is alleged to be in violation” of a provision of the Act or

regulations. The phrase “to be in violation” does not extend to

allegations of past, completed actions. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake

Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). Once the FWS furnishes a

biological opinion to an action agency, its role in that consultation is

completed. There is no ongoing conduct by which the FWS could be

said to continue “to be in violation” of the Act. Second, Section

1540(g) 1A) states that the “person{s]” whose violations are covered

include “the United States and any other governmental instrumental-

ity or agency.” Thus, in referring to “violations” by governmental

agencies, the citizen suit provision refers to the agency itself, not the

officer who is the head of the agency. See also 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2)

(referring to the no-jeopardy obligation of each “Federal agency”). By

contrast, the citizen suit provision uses the term “the Secretary” when

referring to actions taken in administering the Act.

41

not the sort of “violation” that was intended to be

cognizable under Section 1540(g)(1)(A).”

ii. The historical development of the ESA and similar

citizen suit provisions reinforces that conclusion. As

noted above, see note 21, supra, a number of federal envi-

ronmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions pat-

terned after the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.

No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1706.” The pertinent Clean Air

Act provision authorized citizen suits

(1) against any person (including (i) the United

States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumental-

ity or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh

Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be

in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation

under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Ad-

ministrator or a State with respect to such a standard

or limitation, or

(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged

a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or

*® The ESA also provides that decisions of the Endangered Species

Committee granting or denying exemptions for proposed activities are

subject to “judicial review, under chapter 7 of title 5.” 16 U.S.C.

1536(n). That provision further supports the inference that adminis-

trative decisions concerning the implementation of the ESA are to be

reviewed under the APA—subject to the terms and conditions (¢.g., the

requirement of “final agency action”) that the APA imposes—rather

than under the citizen suit provision.

“| The House Report accompanying the ESA stated that the

language of Section 1540(g) as originally enacted was “parallel to that

contained in the recent Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries

Act of 1972 [MPRSA\], and is to be interpreted in the same fashion.”

H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1973). The MPRSA

provision was intended, in turn, to “parallel{] that adopted by the

Congress * * * in the Clean Air Act.” 117 Cong. Rec. 30,852 (1971)

(statement of Rep. Dingell).

42

duty under this chapter which is not discretionary

with the Administrator.

42 U.S.C. 1857h-2(a) (1970) (recodified as amended at 42

U.S.C. 7604(a)).”

The text and history of the Clean Air Act make clear

that suits against the Administrator challenging her

1aplementation of that Act are not cognizable under

Section 7604(a)(1). The Clean Air Act requires that

challenges to the Administrator’s actions be brought

directly in the court of appeals, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b), and

states that “[nJothing in this chapter shall be construed to

authorize judicial review of regulations or orders of the

Administrator under this chapter, except as provided in

this section,” 42 U.S.C. 7607(e). The legislative history

2% Section 7604(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, like Section 1540(g)(1)(A)

of the ESA, specifically identifies the United States and other

governmental entities as potential defendants in a citizen suit. The

Senate Report accompanying the Clean Air Act explained that

“Federal facilities generate considerable air pollution. Since Federal

agencies have been notoriously laggard in abating pollution and in

requesting appropriations to develop control measures, it is important

to provide that citizens can seek, through the courts, to expedite the

government performance specifically directed under” other provisions

of the Act. S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970). The

inclusion of federal entities as permissible defendants in Section

7604(a)(1) suits thus reflects Congress’s recognition that federal

agencies’ on-the-ground activities may place them “in violation of”

applicable emission standards. It does not suggest that Congress

conceived of errors by the EPA in its administration of the Act as

“violations” within the meaning of Section 7604(a)(1). The same

principle applies in the ESA context: Section 1540(g)(1)(A) citizen suits

may properly be brought to prevent federal land management

activities from jeopardizing listed species, for example, but not against

the Secretary based on alleged errors in his administration of the Act,

including the furnishing of biological opinions in the consultation

process under Section 7.

43

confirms that citizen suits under the Clean Air Act may

be brought against the Administrator only where the

plaintiff alleges a failure to perform a nondiscretionary

duty. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56

(1970) (“Suits against the Administrator are limited to

alleged failure to perform mandatory functions to be

performed by him. Suits against violators, including the

United States and other government agencies to the ex-

tent permitted by the Constitution, would also be author-

ized.”). The ESA citizen suit provision should likewise

be construed not to apply to the Secretary’s administra-

tion of the Act (except for the failure to perform nondis-

cretionary duties under Section 1533). Cf. Ruckelshaus v.

Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682-683 n.1 (1983) (Court’s in-

terpretation of the word “appropriate” in Clean Air Act

attorney’s fee provision governs construction of parallel

provisions in other environmental statutes).”

® See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349, 1353

(9th Cir. 1978) (“the nondiscretionary duty requirement imposed by [the

Clean Air Act citizen suit provision] must be read in light of the

Congressiona] intent to use this phrase to limit the number of citizen

suits which could be brought against the Administrator”); Oljato

Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1975)

(purpose of nondiscretionary duty requirement was “to limit citizen

suits against the Administrator to a chosen few”).

® The ESA citizen suit provision concededly covers a broader range

of “violations” than does the analogous provision of the Clean Air Act.

Compare 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A) (authorizing suit to enjoin “any person

* * * who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter

or regulation issued under the authority thereof”) with 42 U.S.C.

7604(a)(1) (authorizing suit “against any person * * * who is alleged

to * * * be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation

under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a

State with respect to such a standard or limitation”). For three

reasons, however, that change in language in the ESA does not reflect

congressional intent to transform the citizen suit into an alternative

44

b. In light of the strong evidence that Section 1540(g)

(1)(A) does not apply to the Secretary’s administration of

the Act at all, it would be particularly inappropriate to

read that Section as an unusually expansive judicial

review provision, permitting attacks on non-final action

that would not be reviewable under the APA. As the

courts of appeals have recognized, application of the ESA

to federal defendants should be governed by traditional

principles of administrative law. In determining whether

an action agency’s conduct complies with the substantive

mechanism for judicial review (outside the context of nondiscretionary

duties) of the Secretary’s administration of the Act.

First, other language in the ESA citizen suit provision itself—most

notably the express authorization of suits to compel performance of

nondiscretionary duties—reflects the premise that suits alleging

secretarial errors in the administration of the Act would not be

cognizable under Section 1540(g)(1)A). See pages 39-40, supra.

Second, the pertinent legislative history contains no evidence of

congressional intent to depart from the scheme established in the Clean

Air Act, whereby agency implementation of the statute was subject to

challenge under the citizen suit provision only in cases involving

failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. To the contrary, that

history indicates that Congress attempted to model subsequent citizen

suit provisions after the Clean Air Act. See notes 21 and 27, supra.

Finally, the ESA citizen suit provision, although broader than the

analogous section of the Clean Air Act, is not unique. Other en-

vironmental statutes contain broadly worded citizen suit provisions

very similar to Section 1540(g)1)(A), while containing separate

provisions governing judicial review of agency administration. See,

e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 6972

(citizen suits), 6976 (judicial review); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42

U.S.C. 300j-8 (citizen suits), 300j-7 (judicial review); Toxic Substances

Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2619 (citizen suits), 2618 (judicial review); Noise

Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 4911 (citizen suits), 4915 (udicial

review). Those statutes indicate that Congress has not historically

regarded errors by the implementing agency as “violations” of a

statute within the meaning of the various citizen suit provisions.

45

no-jeopardy mandate of Section 7(a)(2), for example, a

reviewing court should apply an arbitrary-and-capricious

standard reflecting deference to agency expertise. The

D.C. Circuit has explained:

Appellants in effect seek to have the trial court sub-

stitute its views regarding environmental impacts for

those of the agencies which are charged with imple-

menting the ESA. The Act provides no support for

such a sweeping r2sult. The citizen suit provision of

the Act, relied on by appellants, merely provides a

right of action to challenge the agency action alleged

to be in violation of the Act or to compel agency

compliance with the requirements of the Act. It does

not direct trial courts to conduct de novo review in

adjudicating such actions and we decline to read such a

requirement into the Act.

Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678,

685 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citation, footnote, and internal quo-

tation marks omitted). The court concluded that “the

appropriate standard of review under the ESA is the

arbitrary and capricious standard provided by the APA.”

Id. at 686. Accord, e.g., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d

429, 439 (5th Cir. 1991); Environmental Coalition of

Broward County v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984, 987 (11th Cir.

1987); Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 609 (9th

Cir. 1984).

Similar reasoning applies to the instant case. The APA

requirement of “final agency action,” and the decisions of

this Court applying principles of finality and ripeness,

reflect considered judgments regarding the appropriate

timing of legal challenges to the conduct of federal

agencies. Nothing in the text or history of Section

1540(g)(1)(A) suggests an intent to depart from those

background rules. Thus, even if Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is

46

\

construed to provide an‘alternative mechanism for judicial

review of the Secretary’s implementation of the ESA, it

would not authorize a challenge to the non-final action at

issue here.

C. Alternative Avenues Exist By Which A Court May

Review Claims That The Service Has Recommended

Unreasonably Severe Restrictions On The Use Of

Natural Resources

A central theme of petitioners’ argument is that if their

current claims are not cognizable, there will be no avenue

by which a court can review allegations that the Secretary

has recommended unreasonably severe restrictions on the

use of natural resources. That premise is incorrect. As

we explain above, any actions taken by the Bureau in

reliance upon the biological opinion are subject to judicial

review at the behest of persons injured by them. Persons

whose requests for water are denied as a result of the

Bureau’s adoption of the Service’s recommendations would

be appropriate plaintiffs to challenge the BOR’s actions.”

3! As we explain in the text, plaintiffs may obtain vacatur of an

action agency’s decision by showing that it was based on a biological

opinion that failed to satisfy the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of

review. A plaintiff may not prevail, however, simply by persuading a

court that the Service identified, or the Bureau adopted, alternatives to

a proposed action that go beyond the minimum required to avoid

jeopardy to listed species. As noted above, see page 3, supra, if

the Service concludes that a proposed action is likely to jeopar-

dize the continued existence of a listed species, its biological opinion

must identify “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the proposed

action, or else state that no such alternatives exist. See 16 U.S.C.

1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. 402.02, 402.14(h)(3). But the “reasonable and

prudent alternatives” identified in a biological opinion need not embody

the absolute minimum biological requirements needed to maintain the

species on the razor’s edge of survival and extinction. See 50 C.F.R.

402.02 (definition of “reasonable and prudent alternatives”). The

47

And in the course of reviewing the Bureau’s conduct, the

court can examine the biological opinion and the evidence

on which it was based. In reviewing the scientific judg-

ments embodied in the biological opinion, moreover, the

court would employ the same arbitrary-and-capricious

standard applicable to suits brought by environmental

plaintiffs contending that actions taken in reliance upon a

biological opinion were likely to jeopardize listed species.

Thus, the scientific judgments embodied in a biological

opinion may be challenged in court within the context of a

suit against an action agency, either by plaintiffs who

allege that the opinion is insufficiently protective of listed

species, or by plaintiffs who allege that the opinion recom-

mends unreasonably severe constraints on the use of

natural resources. The timing and standard of review

would be the same in both contexts; the two types of

actions would differ only in that they would rest on

distinct jurisdictional bases. A plaintiff alleging that an

action agency’s conduct would jeopardize the continued

existence of a listed species could invoke the citizen suit

provision of the ESA. That provision identifies the United

States and other governmental entities as potential de

fendants, see 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A), and conduct by an

action agency that would jeopardize a listed species is

properly characterized as a “violation” of the Act. See,

e.g., TVA v. Hill, 4837 U.S. 158, 172, 174 (1978) (Court

concluded that Tennessee Valley Authority would “be in

violation of the Act if it completed and operated the Tellico

Service therefore does not engage in unlawful “over-regulation” (Pet.

Br. 48) simply by identifying reasonable and prudent alternatives that

go beyond the minimum steps necessary to avoid jeopardy, particularly

in light of the action agency’s duty to “insure” that its actions are not

likely to jeopardize the species. 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). Nor does an

action agency violate the law simply by doing more to protect listed

species than the Act requires. See pages 48-49, infra.

48

Dam as planned,” because “TVA’s proposed operation of

the dam * * * [would cause] the eradication of an

endangered species”) (emphasis omitted).*

Petitioners, by contrast, allege that the FWS’s bio-

logical opinion recommends unreasonably severe limita-

tions on the use of natural resources. If the BOR had

denied petitioners’ requests for water in reliance upon

that opinion, petitioners could have challenged that denial,

and could have obtained judicial review of the biological

opinion in the course of their suit against the Bureau.

The BOR’s refusal to release the water would not

constitute a violation of the ESA, however, even if it was

premised on a biological opinion that was found to be

arbitrary and capricious. Nothing in the ESA requires a

federal resource management agency to permit the use of

natural resources, or to authorize other activities, up to

the point at which its actions will jeopardize the continued

existence of a listed species.® Petitioners therefore could

2 In our view, the difficult “zone of interests” questions under the

ESA citizen suit provision involve situations very far removed from

the present one. Suppose, for example, that the owner of land adjacent

to government property complained that logging on the federal land

caused dust and noise and thereby hindered his enjoyment of his own

land. He might contend in addition that the logging jeopardized the

continued existence of an endangered bird species. The property owner

might expressly disavow any personal interest in the fate of the bird

but argue that he was nonetheless entitled to invoke the ESA citizen

suit provision, on the ground that he had suffered injury in fact from

the same government conduct that was alleged to violate the ESA.

That allegation would surely satisfy Article III; the question is

whether the fortuitous relationship between the landowner’s injury and

the values protected by the ESA would trigger the application of

prudential standing requirements.

3 To the contrary, the ESA requires all federal agencies to “utilize

their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by

carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and

49

not invoke the ESA citizen suit provision as the basis for a

challenge to the Bureau’s refusal to release additional

water. Cf. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211

U.S. 149, 152-153 (1908) (case is not one “arising under”

federal law, within the meaning of a federal jurisdictional

statute, where resolution of a state-law action turns on

the merits of an anticipated federal defense). Rather, their

suit would arise under the APA, or under any federal

statute that was alleged to require that the water be

released.”

threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(1). The Act prov'des that “[t}he

terms ‘conserve’, ‘conserving’, and ‘conservation’ mean to use and the

use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any

endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the

measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary.”

16 U.S.C. 1532(3). The ESA thus contains an affirmative (albeit

generalized) requirement that federal agencies should attempt to

improve the condition of listed species, not simply avoid threats to their

continued existence.

* The practical differences between an ESA citizen suit and an APA

action are of modest significance. The plaintiff in an ESA citizen suit

must generally give 60 days’ notice prior to filing his complaint, see 16

U.S.C. 1540(g)2)(A); the APA imposes no such requirement. On the

other hand, an award of attorney's fees appears to be more readily

available in a citizen suit than in an APA action. Compare 16 U.S.C.

1540(g)(4) (“The court * * * may award costs of litigation (including

reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever

the court determines such award is appropriate.”) with 28 U.S.C.

2412(d)(1)A) (absent a specific statutory provision governing attorney's

fees, fees are to be awarded to a prevailing party in a suit against the

United States under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) “unless

the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially

justified”), see Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-568 (1988).

EAJA fees may not be awarded, moreover, to prevailing parties who

exceed the statute’s limits on net worth and number of employees. See

28 U.S.C. 2412(d2B). In either an APA action or a citizen suit,

however, the court will apply the same arbitrary-and-capricious stan-

50

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

WALTER DELLINGER

Acting Solicitor General

Lots J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

Deputy Solicitor General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

ANNE 8S. ALMY

ROBERT L. KLARQUIST

EVELYN 8S. YING

Attorneys

JULY 1996

dard of review, giving deference to ine scientific and technical

judgments of the expert agencies. See pages 46-47, supra.

A suit under the APA challenging the Bureau's water allocation

decisions would be governed by zone of interests principles, since the

zone of interests test is “a gloss on the meaning of § 702” of the APA.

Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 395 (1987). The

inquiry would focus, however, on whether a potential plaintiff's claim

fell within the zone of interests protected by federal statutes governing

the Bureau's allocation of water. Petitioners would clearly satisfy that

requirement.

APPENDIX

1. Section 1536 of Title 16 of the United States

Code provides in pertinent part:

§ 1536. Interagency cooperation

(a) Federal agency actions and consultations

*_*e* *& * *

(2) Each Federal agency shall, in consultation

with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure

that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by

such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to

as an “agency action”) is not likely to jeopardize the

continued existence of any endangered species or

threatened species or result in the destruction or

adverse modification of habitat of such species which

is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as

appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless

such agency has been granted an exemption for such

action by the Committee pursuant to subsection (h) of

this section. In fulfilling the requirements of this

paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific

and commercial data available.

* * eK *

(la)

2a

2. Section 1540 of Title 16 of the United States

Code provides in pertinent part:

§ 1540. Penalties and enforcement

* ** * *

(g) Citizen suits

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this

subsection any person may commence a civil suit on

his own behalf—

(A) to enjoin any person, including the United

States and any other governmental instrumental-

ity or agency (to the extent permitted by the

eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is

alleged to be in violation of any provision of this

chapter or regulation issued under the authority

thereof; or

(B) to compel the Secretary to apply, pursuant

to section 1535(g)(2)(B)(@ii) of this title, the pro-

hibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to

section 1533(d) or 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title with

respect to the taking of any resident endangered

species or threatened species within any State; or

(C) against the Secretary where there is

alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any

act or duty under section 1533 of this title which

is not discretionary with the Secretary.

The district courts shal! have jurisdiction, without

regard to the amount in controversy or the citizen-

ship of the parties, to enforce any such provision or

regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such

act or duty, as the case may be. In any civil suit

commenced under subparagraph (B) the district court

3a

shall compel the Secretary to apply the prohibition

sought if the court finds that the allegation that

an emergency exists is supported by substantial

evidence.

(2A) No action may be commenced under sub-

paragraph (1)(A) of this section—

(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of

the violation has been given to the Secretary, and

to any alleged violator of any such provision or

regulation;

(ii) if the Secretary has commenced action to

impose a penalty pursuant to subsection (a) of this

section; or

(iii) if the United States has commenced and is

diligently prosecuting a criminal action in a court

of the United States or a State to redress a

violation of any such provision or regulation.

(B) No action may be commenced under sub-

paragraph (1)(B) of this section—

(i) prior to sixty days after written notice has

been given to the Secretary setting forth the

reasons why an emergency is thought to exist

with respect to an endangered species or a

threatened species in the State concerned; or

(ii) if the Secretary has commenced and is

diligently prosecuting action under section

1535(g)(2)(B)(ii) of this title to determine whether

any such emergency exists.

(C) No action may be commenced under subpara-

graph (1)(C) of this section prior to sixty days after

written notice has been given to the Secretary;

4a

except that such action may be brought immediately

after such notification in the case of an action under

this section respecting an emergency posing a

significant risk to the well-being of any species of fish

or wildlife or plants.

(3A) Any suit under this subsection may be

brought in the judicial district in which the violation

occurs.

(B) In any such suit under this subsection in which

the United States is not a party, the Attorney Gen-

eral, at the request of the Secretary, may intervene

on behalf of the United States as a matter of right.

(4) The court, in issuing any final order in any suit

brought pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,

may award costs of litigation (including reasonable

attorney and expert witness fees) to any party,

whenever the court determines such award is

appropriate.

(5) The injunctive relief provided by this subsec-

tion shall not restrict any right which any person (or

class of persons) may have under any statute or

common law to seek enforcement of any standard or

limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief

against the Secretary or a State agency).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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