Respondents Brief — Bennett v. Spear
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No. 95-813 -
(ta LL ESR
= a i e |
Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1995
BRAD BENNETT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MICHAEL SPEAR, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
WALTER DELLINGER
Acting Solicitor General
LoIs J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
ANNE 8S. ALMY
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
EVELYN S. YING
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20520
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Petitioners, two ranchers and two water irrigation
districts, brought the present action challenging a
biological opinion issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA). 16 U.S.C. 1536. on the
effects of the Bureau of Reclamation’s long-term
operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project on two
endangered species of fish. The Ql , tions present qd
are as follows:
Whether vetitioners have
‘le III of the Constitution.
it ° cet ea FNitag , .
ae
Whether petitions rs’ challe
inion Is cognizable under either the A‘
. } - : ‘ ‘ -
‘ocedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seg., or t
-
\
S10n oOo} re JP if}
“ ( 1540
acti tih HAIALE ETE AY ENT TB Ss A I IN.
ae
sie Nees
—
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OpiMioNs DELOW ...........cccccceeeceeeeeeeeeeessceceeeeeeevsnsesecceseceevens
JUTISAICLION ......ccccccecceeceeeseeeeesseeesescersecerenseeesceeseseeeeeeees
Statutory provisions involved ................ccccccceceeeeeeeeeeeeees
RRRGTIBE, ccccccecccvccceveccesscoscosonoeascesoreorcocossosevescoseosorsosowees
Summary of argument .0..000000..00ccccccccceccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseveeeen
A
II.
The allegations of petitioners’ complaint fail
to satisfy the requirements for standing under
Article III of the Constitution ......000000000000000000000.
A. Petitioners have failed to allege facts which,
if taken as true, would demonstrate that
they have suffered injury in fact .................
B. Any injury suffered by petitioners is not
fairly traceable to the FWS’s issuance of
the biological opinion ..........000...00ccc cee ceeeeceeeee
(. Any injury suffered by petitioners is not
redressable by a favorable judicial ruling .....
Even if petitioners met the requirements of
Article III, their suit could not go forward,
because their claims are not cognizable under
either the Administrative Procedure Act or
the ESA citizen suit provision ............0000.00........
A. Petitioners’ suit cannot proceed under the
Administrative Procedure Act because the
issuance of a biological opinion is not a re-
viewable “final agency action” ....................
B. The citizen suit provision of the Endangered
Species Act provides no basis for adjudica-
tion of petitioners’ suit. ..........0..ccccccceceeeeeeeees
1. The Service's issuance of the biological
opinion in this case did not constitute a
failure to perform a nondiscretionary
duty under 16 U.S.C. 1533 oo...
(IIL)
Page
17
19
20
26
ww
Bib
37
IV
Argument—Continued: Page
2. Issuance of an inadequate or erroneous
biological opinion would not place the
Secretary “in violation of ” the ESA or
implementing regulations ....................... 38
(. Alternative avenues exist by which a court
may review claims that the Service has
recommended unreasonably severe restric-
tions on the use of natural resources ............ 46
re re nie a er ie RS ee 50
EE cccerantersainnneeaniainitiniiiiataidannsdininsiiininarintinapisiazentiie la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
ASARCO, Ine. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) ...... 27
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
SOUND diibeirribatintcintimeiitanciiiatiia iia en Oa 34
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) 2.0.0.0... 12, 18
Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) .00.........ccccccceeeeseeeeees 10
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon, 115 8. Ct. 2407 (1995) ...000 3, 20
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist... 475
ees ee CENTER seatcisedisessiesaenniasisindenlaiednaniadiiasiaebemrinntettentaaineabeaetn 17
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson,
685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ..............cccceceeeeeeeeeees 45
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) ... 7
Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark,
741 F.2d 257 (Oth Cir. 1984) .........cccscsececcecessseseseess 7
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) .0.........cccccccceseceeees 32
Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388
GEIDPUD eresinsincscsntninnsiehsipainiiaentiaiercihteidiaeaaiiaiiaatin i ceiimaaaaeicetis 50
Dalton v. Specter, 1148. Ct. 1719 (1994) ......... 12, 32, 33
Cases-——Continued: Page
Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
PE ddenahdtntaiddiiinieiantemanentaen 17
Environmental Coalition of Broward County v.
Myers, 831 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1987) .................... 45
Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F 2d
892 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989) ...... 37
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of
Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984)... 23
FTC vy. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S.
A I iccasihenhctibiscaticiintamenita da 35
FW/PBS Ine. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 7s
GUE aisiticbimeienabaiana TE 8 12. 31, 32, 33, 35
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation.
er Or ct 40
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20
Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870 (1984)... 40
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F 2d 1349
UE ETE TIIIIITIE netncnnieribichndeasitcidashdaenicenaimemeusesmeeesne 43
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
SUE CUIIITTIE? ccsecictistarnecstpmectapbeuineiesitidiasetttitediaesitaiicanimeapeattatiadasen 49
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555
Se are a ee 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 27. 29
Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) 2000000000000... 23
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1984) ................ 17
Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F 2d 272
ne Sl PINE netacnicnmaaiaeaainsaannei tk 37
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359
359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979
FRIED <decinciinpntniipiniieibaiinareasiagetiaiatciaceairiianaataass 4, 20, 21, 34
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 115 S. Ct. 1933 (1995) ....... 2s
O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 672 (1995) oo... cccccccccceee 7
VI
Cases—Continued: Page
Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d
ee st) Hats STINE arceceeatiniatesesiaritnetaniecihaenebeniaesssibenailenniat 43
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) ............. 49
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.. 113 S. Ct.
a CITEIUTEEY . dencaseatiliehecintnceitasinsieshanendebiiieetbhiiidbiersciatnasdabenatictens 34
Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d
ee 4, 21
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) .. 43
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (Sth Cir.
a Ee eae a 4.21
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) ........... 19
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.
STTEITIIDY assiseietciaeidendeninceehdinidaaieibatmieahapenmetatoia insaalaaiaidianabiaietadeidiateiin sl 37
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (Sth Cir.
IID tesciaciecichacetababeneeedineleadbianenaeniiaiiaaamenaiananiiataeininahiieas 45
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Orgq.,
ee ans See TEED : tehctensniiannnnaeanaininmeeeanteiedians 12, 18, 27
TVA v. Hill, 487 U.S. 158 (1978) .........ccccccccccseceeees 47
Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989) ... 4, 21
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) ...... 30
United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 378 (1995) .....0.000000... 7
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
ee Seieiieiieeipeiiaiihaiaiabdiaidiiacitadhietianniciiieliiaiaiaiias 18, 27
Village of False Pass vy. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th
Ei TET acchisnnondendesennniitipiasignsentiaddmmnttinnamennmnaiinds 45
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) .................... Is
Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal,
Be ee re GE GL, GD cterecieintcptnvstionisemaninnscentoncanes 2s
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) ......... 17
Constitution, statutes and regulations:
Spee: EIN, Us HIITED cevcatinbiienssindassintnerinstinnaaniesinninidneransitainninen passim
Act of Feb. 9, 1905, ch. 567, 33 Stat. 714 .................. 6
Vil
Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seg.. 9, 12
SP. Rais SUN sicebohibisveneniisssiiasinbiintiennmenmietanbinnaininiiataies 12, 30, 35
OP i: CU: sidecitaceicaa ie haclashieiaacecicala atinciicteietia 28
Cormeen Zoek, GB TETAS. BORGES cccccccceconcntecsecenssccnsecesees 31
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
Fe Se te SE tieteleatinisienihiecnindiiincininninsidiinasic 36, 41
Oe ee CITI iictenieesestntcnmsiessitbinialiamatemieunaten 42
Se Rs, IIE sicnisncihichitsnscetiiinieinimieinsisinenictiisianians 42, 43
iy II cachetanichtiihectchccccecicatcceniiihacnttnaantn 42
ee ls I etariiiendiiaiichatainiidaliniiittinsinesiiiaie 42
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-510, Tit. XXIX, 104 Stat. 1808 ...... 32
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1531
et seq.:
BG eae 2
eB ee 49
$ 3(15), 16 U.S.C. 1582015) ...........cccreceeseseeneeees 2
eR ee 3
Be i! S| 2, 36, 37, 39, 43
§ 4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(3) oe eeceeeees 38
§ 4(bx2), 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)2) ..........cccccceeeseeees 38
Bm 8 4A en naenen 2
DB: Say Gilt MINI III encnvndiitsensennsutniieseinsesendeans 7, 37, 42
§ aX), 16 U.S.C. 153G(aX(1) ......................... 49
§ Ta(2), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) .................. 2, 4, 21
25, 26, 40, 45, 47
BB FF oe es 3, 20
§ 7(b\3)(A), 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(3)(A) ... 3, 21, 24, 46
§ 7(b)(4), 16 U.S.C. 1586(b)(4) 00... 3
§ 7(b)(4)i), 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4)(i) .........0...0... - 4, 25
§ 7(b)\4)(ii), 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4)(ii) ............ 4, 7, 25
§ 7(b)\4)iv), 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4)(iv) .......... 4, 7, 25
RA 3,7
> A Bee SE: BEI cinsnsecensonsnssensvtensveonenns 41
$ ToX2), 16 U.S.C. 153G(OM2) ................eceeeeees 4, 25
Be 8 nee 2, 4, 25, 26
$ Ma)(1), 16 U.S.C. 15B8(a)(1) 200... eeeeeeees 2
© BER, Be Cie BO casensscscevicencecensevcccesens 5
S BRD, 1G UBC. BEGRID) coccccccccccscscvccsscccecescess 5
Vill
Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
§$ 11(e)6), 16 U.S.C. 1540(e)(6) .............ccceeeeeees 5
Be ee 2, 41
§ 11(g)(1), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)1) 0... eee 5, 9, 36
§$ 11(g)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A) ........ passim
§$ 11(g)1)(B), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)1)(B) ............. 5
§$ 1MgKC), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)1 KC) ......... 6, 13, 37
§$ 11g) 2A), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)2)(A) ............ 49
§ 11(g)2) Adi), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)( AD) ..... 5, 40
§ 11(g)2) Aji), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)( ANTI) ... = 5, 40
§ 11(g)2) AD iii), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)( ANI). 5, 40
§ 11(g2XC), 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2K(C) ............ 6
§$ 11(g)4), 16 U.S.C. 1540024)... cece eeeeee eee 49
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 7(2), 96 Stat. 1425 .............0. 39
Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481,
ek, GE; BS GR TED cocenenensevncrscnccecenssscessonsssssscseces 49
BB UBL. BERRTEUAD wcecccscvcecsesevsevessevescevesvcses 49
BB UBL. BERRI) cccccerscvvcvssccvsesesceccccesesenes 49
Federal Power Act, § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. 797(e) ............ 23
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
GEE GB BD. cncesiennenecncnveannececsssnsnesesnsececcsssesesencesesecenee 9
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 4901 ef seq.:
Ge TE. GIS ectcaeicenteeristanianssnnrinnneatntnsnnimnven 44
Se is GD cireintecniseiteiinanianinninnn 44
Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. 372 et seq. ......... 6
Resource and Conservation Recovery Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. 6901 ef seq.:
— et een 44
Se I, OEE dteettrienertirnnninimeienmenninn 44
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.:
Oe ras He | eaceaiccnerneniictrenssennenteinseemeerese — 44
GD is Se ceneeseeeicetsininnnmneninen 44
Toxie Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2601 ef seq.:
Oe tits GID ceerececeetentsiesinenemenniniemnnionnnsian 44
Oh Fe GRUP ercedicntnttensctsanseiaticnsemeniesiniusenieinsien 44
BD Die TR cnctnnencenceneserteniennnnientonentininnnninnniinsen 31
BD Tile GE cenecierecsensnssessenenstnenmonimesonsuseneesvinestom 9
BD WK. FES ccersesscveccescnsevessescossesvscvensesccevonsecenonses 9
IX
Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
nearer 42
Fe ER IID ehiiceibediieidie daeeete eS tee 2s
50 C.F.R.:
Pt. 17:
SII, ITE cnsihiesnbineenicenepnanintibieinthdetticalainmatiiatiatintetllcs 2
dS Ee eee SA aeee as he nS 3
SIIIIN TUTE snstiiccenicsnastcusesnentunidentatetiemmisiesidentintiniidliaite
Pt. 222:
i 2
SUIT TITITIITD . cicssiscinscenatesicinsicisieniesidigiieetenidenbiaisiabiieiiaainebato 2
ks: TEE” teccehelestaibsiiinidnipentedinamsibnidsieseeiaeiaaietnanamantimiaaed 3
III iniciccnscinc csbdeslacsesisanssinnniennternienmnmieaiie 2
TTT vcsriiecrescicisiainesi iteatieteeatihbahlinintiealabimiabaniabeannindn 3, 46
OCIS SERIA) CIGTE) occcccesccsccsoscescscoccoscvccsesees 22
intelli ial arn 3, 7
I IED .cnscccnnsuantiensoiinecnstiiewomumeneas 46
I 4, 22
ET ee nae ee s
Miscellaneous:
117 Cong. Rec. 30,852 (1971) .............cc0cccesseesseeseeseees 41
Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Il Administrative Law Treatise (3d ed. 1994) ...... 34
Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of
Environmental Law, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 339 (1990) ... 36
Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal
Pollution Control Laws Part I, 13 Envtl. L. Rptr.
EE CIEIEE. suisnesunemsnnenstmnesensiessenisnssgbiannienitnecesene 36
ie EE I TUTE GUID rcs nccnincidnchasinisecinnabenieenesnsticetees 22
51 Fed. Reg. (1986):
i, TTT edesiathddaciaiientiniabentienanininiinbiiaaabiaeienininseredbmnaneen 3S
| ae ey een 4, 22
i Getto ttiaieinaeeniiieisibaninnadanlidntebeiiens 4, 20, 21, 23
Se ML SER MUNI ccescecesenesenbeocictendeccescnsennten 2
59 Fed. Reg. 61,744 (1994) ...........cccccecsecsessscscesserseees 3s
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
SSIETEEEY siisetieeeapebidiatemisaiaedibiaiiiiidiinabiialintiaiiiamakianecnees 43
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 697, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
I TITEIET sinicinineieelelasenicianididiceieaiadatinidahinslinsidetaenipeneammebinnataiihaneien 20
X
Miscellaneous—C ontinued: Page
H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) ......... 41
H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) ..... 20, 21
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ............ 42
S. Rep. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) ...... 26, 39-40
In the Supreme Court of the Anited States
OcTOBER TERM, 1995
No. 95-813
BRAD BENNETT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MICHAEL SPEAR’, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-18) is
reported at 68 F.3d 915. The order of the district court
(Pet. App. 19-29) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
August 24, 1995. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on November 21, 1995, and was granted on March 25,
1996 (116 S. Ct. 1316). The jurisdiction of this Court rests
on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
! On July 4, 1994, Michael Spear replaced Marvin Plenert as
Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
(1)
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Sections 7(a)(2) and 11(g) of the Endangered Specics Act
of 1973, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) and 1540(g), are
set forth at App., infra, la-4a.
STATEMENT
1. Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA or Act) to protect and conserve endangered and
threatened species. 16 U.S.C. 1531(b). To accomplish that
goal, Congress directed the Secretaries of Commerce and
the Interior to list threatened and endangered species and
designate their critical habitats. See 16 U.S.C. 1533.° The
listed species at issue in this case are the Lost River
sucker and the shortnose sucker, two fish that were listed
as endangered on July 18, 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130.
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that “[{elach Federal
agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance
of the Secretary [of Commerce or the Interior, see note 2:
supra}, insure that any action authorized, funded or
carried out by such agency * * * is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2).°
* The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce
share responsibility for listing species and for other ESA duties. See
16 U.S.C. 1532(15). The Secretary of the Interior, who implements the
ESA through the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or Service), has
responsibility for the endangered species of fish at issue in this case.
See 50 C.F.R. 17.11, 402.01(b). The Nationa! Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) administers the Act with respect to the species under the juris-
diction of the Secretary of Commerce. See 50 C.F.R. 222.23(a), 227.4.
* In addition, Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the taking of any
endangered species within the United States. 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1).
Section 4(d) of the Act authorizes the Secretary to promulgate reg-
ulations for the conservation of species listed as threatened, see 16
U.S.C. 1533(d), and the prohibitions included in Section 9 have been
3
Regulations promulgated jointly by the two Secretaries
furnish a structure for consultation. See 50 C.F.R. Pt.
402; see also 16 U.S.C. 1536(b) and (c). Under the regula-
tions, the agency proposing the action (the action agency)
determines in the first instance whether a proposed action
“may affect” a listed species. 50 C.F.R. 402.14. If the
action agency determines that the proposed action “may
affect” a listed species, it is then to enter into formal
consultation with the Service, unless the action agency
has concluded through preparation of a biological assess-
ment or informal consultation that the action is not likely
to adversely affect the listed species. bid.
Following formal consultation, the Service issues a
biological opinion stating whether the proposed action is
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the listed
species. 16 U.S.C. 1536(b); 50 C.F.R. 402.14. If the Service
concludes that jeopardy is likely, it must suggest any
reasonable and prudent alternatives that it believes would
avoid jeopardy. 16 U.S.C. 1536(b\(3)(A). If the opinion is
“no jeopardy” or “jeopardy with reasonable and prudent
alternatives,” and if the proposed action or reasonable and
prudent alternative will nevertheless effect an “incidental
taking” of a listed species,’ the biological opinion is accom-
panied by an incidental take statement. See 16 U.S.C.
1536(b)(4). That statement details the anticipated impacts
to the listed species through incidental takings, specifies
reasonable and prudent measures to minimize that impact,
extended by regulation to threatened species, see 50 C.F.R. 17.31, 17.21.
The ESA defines “take” to mean “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. 1532(19); see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities fora Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
4 “Incidental takings” are “takings that result from, but are not the
purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity.” 50 C.F.R.
402.02.
and sets forth terms and conditions (including reporting
requirements) that must be complied with by the action
agency to implement those measures. 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)
(4\(i), (ii) and (iv). If the action agency complies with the
terms and conditions of the incidental take statement, any
takings that result from its action are exempt from the
taking prohibition of Section 9. See 16 U.S.C. 1536(0)(2).
After engaging in formal consultation, the action
agency must determine “whether and in what manner to
proceed with the action,” in light of the Service's _bio-
logical opinion and any other relevant information. 50
C.F.R. 402.15(a). Given the Secretary’s “primary respon-
sibility” for implementation of the Act, National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 979 (1976), an agency that chooses to deviate from
the Service’s recommendations bears the burden of “arti-
culat{ing] in its administrative record its reasons for dis-
agreeing with the conclusions of a biological opinion.” 51
Fed. Reg. 19,956 (1986) (preamble to FWS/NMFS regula-
tions). In the government’s experience, action agencies
very rarely choose to engage in conduct that the Service
believes will jeopardize a listed species. As a legal matter,
however, the action agency retains the ultimate respon-
sibility for determining whether, and in what manner, a
proposed action can proceed in compliance with Section
7(a\(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate. See, e.g., Tribal Village of
Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193-1194 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989); Roosevelt Campobelio
Int'l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (Ist Cir. 1982),
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303-1304 (8th Cir.
1976); National Wildlife Fed’n, 529 F.2d at 371; 51 Fed.
Reg. 19,928 (1986) (preamble to FWS/NMFS regulations
explains that the consulting agency performs an “advisory
function under section 7” and that the action agency
“makes the ultimate decision as to whether its proposed
action will satisfy the requirements of section 7(a)(2)”);
pages 21-22, infra.
Primary responsibility for enforcement and implemen-
tation of the ESA is entrusted to officials of the federal
government. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 1540(a), (b) and (e)(6). The
Act also contains a provision for “citizen suits.” That pro-
vision states that
any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf —
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States
and any other governmental instrumentality or agency
* * * who is alleged to be in violation of any provision
of [the Act] or regulation issued under the authority
thereof; or
x* * * * *
(C) against the Secretary [of Commerce or the
Interior] where there is alleged a failure * * * to
perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title
which is not discretionary with the Secretary.
16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1).2 A suit under Section 1540(g)(1)(A)
may not be commenced “prior to 60 days after written
notice of the violation has been given to the Secretary, and
to any alleged violator of any such provision or
regulation.” 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(A)G). Such suits are
also barred if the Secretary has commenced civil enforce-
ment proceedings, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(A)Gi), or if the
United States is “diligently prosecuting a criminal
action” to redress the alleged violation, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)
(2)(A)(iii). Citizen suits against the Secretary under
5 A third class of citizen suits is now obsolete. See 16 U.S.C.
1540(g)(1)(B) (authorizing suits to compel the Secretary to impose
prohibitions on takings during the 15 months that followed the
enactment of the ESA in 1973).
Section 1540(g)(1)(C) for failure to perform nondiscre-
tionary duties may not be brought “prior to sixty days
after written notice has been given to the Secretary,”
unless the suit involves “an emergency posing a signifi-
cant risk to the well-being of any species of fish or wildlife
or plants.” 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(C).
2. The Secretary of the Interior authorized the crea-
tion of the Klamath Irrigation Project in 1905 in accor-
dance with the Reclamation Act of 1902, 48 U.S.C. 372 et
seq., and the Act of February 9, 1905, ch. 567, 38 Stat. 714.
Administered by the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau or
BOR), which is located within the Department of the
Interior, the Project is composed of lakes, rivers, dams,
and irrigation canals in southern Oregon and northern
California. The Klamath Project currently serves ap
proximately 240,000 irrigable acres. Gov't D. Ct. Br. Exh.
1, at 1.
Klamath Project water is stored primarily in Upper
Klamath Lake and in other reservoirs in the Lost River
system, including the Gerber Reservoir in Oregon and the
Clear Lake Reservoir in California. Gov't D. Ct. Br. Exh.
1, at 1. The Project delivers water via a system of canals
to lands within the Klamath Basin. Delivery operations
begin in January, when water from the Klamath River is
delivered to lands throughout the Lower Klamath area.
Id. at 2. Typically, diversions from Upper Klamath Lake
run from March or early April through October, and water
is released from the Gerber and Clear Lake Reservoirs
from mid-April until early October. /d. at 2-3. Normal
lake elevations, river flows, and diversions of water within
the Klamath Project system can be modified by flood or
drought conditions. /d. at 3.
The volume of Klamath Project water provided to a
water user is based on a number of factors, including the
nature and extent of the state-based water rights, the
terms and conditions of the applicable contracts, the flood
or drought conditions in the Klamath Basin, and the avail-
able water supply. See generally California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); O'Neill v. United States, 50
F.3d 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 672 (1995);
Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741
F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984). A state-initiated adjudication of
water rights is currently ongoing to determine claims to
surface water in the Klamath Basin in Oregon. See
United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 116 S, Ct. 378 (1995). The Bureau is also in the
process of developing a long-term operating plan for the
Klamath Project. Pending completion of that plan, the
allocation of water from the Klamath Project proceeds on
a year-to-year basis.
3. In February 1992, the BOR completed and forwarded
to the FWS a biological assessment of the effects of the
long-term operation of the Klamath Project on listed
species. See 16 U.S.C. 1536(c). The Bureau determined,
inter alia, that the Project's operation might affect the
Lost River and shortnose suckers. The Bureau therefore
requested formal consultation with the FWS pursuant to
16 U.S.C. 1586 and 50 C.F.R. 402.14. Pet. App. 3; Gov't C.A.
Br. 7-9.
In July 1992, the FWS issued a biological opinion. See
J.A. 18-117. The FWS concluded that the “long-term
operation of the Klamath Project was likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of the Lost River and shortnose
suckers.” Pet. App. 3. The FWS identified reasonable and
prudent alternatives that it believed would avoid jeopardy,
including the imposition of minimum lake levels for the
Upper Klamath Lake and the Clear Lake and Gerber
Reservoirs. /bid.; see J.A. 86-92. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C.
1536(b)(4)\(ii) and (iv), the biological opinion also identified
reasonable and prudent measures intended to minimize the
8
extent of incidental takings associated with the operation
of the Project, and terms and conditions for implementing
those measures. J.A. 92-96. The Bureau notified the FWS
that it intended to adopt the FWS’s recommendations.
Pet. App. 3.° The record contains no information concern-
ing the effect, if any, that this statement of intention had
on the operation of the Klamath Project for the balance of
1992 and/or any subsequent year.
4. Petitioners are twe individual ranch operators and
two irrigation districts in the State of Oregon. They
receive Klamath Project water, including water stored in
the Gerber and Clear Lake Reservoirs. In March 1993, .
petitioners filed the present action, seeking to compel the
FWS to withdraw portions of its 1992 biological opinion.
Pet. App. 31-44. Petitioners named as defendants two FWS
officials and the Secretary of the Interior. /d. at 31-32.
Neither the Bureau of Reclamation nor any of its officials
was named as a defendant, and the Secretary was identified
© Subsequently, the Bureau reinitiated formal consultation on the
Clear Lake Reservoir operations of the Klamath Project, based in part
on its determination that the reasonable and prudent alternatives
presented in the July 1992 biological opinion were not logistically
feasible and that the Bureau had new information regarding the
operation of the Clear Lake Reservoir. Gov't D. Ct. Reply Br. Exh. 2;
see 50 C.F.R. 402.16. Based on a new operations model for Clear Lake
Reservoir, the Bureau proposed the establishment of lower minimum
lake levels than those suggested in the biological opinion and concluded
that its revised proposed action was not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of the listed fish. In August 1994, the FWS issued
a supplemental biological opinion, which included the establishment of
such lower minimum lake levels with respect to the Clear Lake
Reservoir as a modification of the reasonable and prudent alternatives
set forth in the biological opinion. Gov't C.A. Br. 9n.7. In addition, the
Bureau has reinitiated formal consultation on the long-term operations
of the entire Klamath Project. No biological opinion resulting from
this latest consultation has yet been issued by the FWS.
9
only as the official “empowered by the ESA to make jeop-
ardy determinations concerning threatened and endan-
gered species.” Jd. at 35.
Petitioners asserted jurisdiction under the citizen suit
provision of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1), and the federal
question and declaratory judgment provisions of the
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 2201. Pet. App.
33. Their complaint alleged that the defendants (respon-
dents in this Court) had violated the ESA and imple-
menting regulations by (1) “improperly concluding * * *
that the [Bureau’s] continued operation of the Klamath
Project * * * is likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of the Lost River and shortnose suckers,” id. at
40-41; (2) “improperly imposing restrictions on the with-
drawal of irrigation water from Clear Lake and Gerber
reservoirs,” id. at 41; and (3) “implicitly determining
critical habitat for the Lost River suckers and the short-
nose suckers in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs * * *
without considering the economic impact of that deter-
mination,” id. at 42.’
5. The government moved to dismiss the complaint.
The government pointed out that the Bureau rather than
the FWS retained final authority over the allocation of
Klamath Project water, and argued that petitioners’
failure to name the BOR as a defendant or to challenge any
action by the Bureau precluded their suit from going
forward. See Gov't D. Ct. Br. 10-15. The district court
granted the government's motion to dismiss. Pet. App. 19-
’ Petitioners’ complaint also alleged related claims attacking the
biological opinion under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
701 et seq. Pet. App. 40-42. In addition, their complaint alleged that
respondents had violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C, 4331 et seq., by failing to perform an environmental analysis on
the biological opinion's alleged de facto designation of critica! habitat.
Pet. App. 42-43.
10
29. The court observed that “the Secretary's biological
opinion is advisory in nature and does not compel com-
pliance with its recommendations or require agencies to
act or refrain from acting in any particular manner.” /d.
at 24. It concluded that petitioners’ interest in utilizing
Klamath Project water “conflict{ed] with the Lost River
and shortnose suckers’ interest in using the water for
habitat,” and that petitioners “do not have standing under
ESA based on an interest which conflicts with the in-
terests sought to be protected by the Act.” /d. at 27. The
@urt also concluded that the biological opinion did not
constitute ade facto determination of critical habitat for
the endangered suckers. /d. at 28 n.4.
6. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-18. The
court framed the question before it as “whether [peti-
tioners’] action is precluded by the zone of interests test”
—i.e., the requirement first articulated in actions under
the APA that a plaintiff challenging administrative
agency action “must show that ‘the interest sought to be
protected by [him was] arguably within the zone of in-
terests vo be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question.’” Jd. at 4-5 (quoting
Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)) (brackets in original). The court
determined that a zone of interests test applies to suits
brought under the ESA's citizen suit provision, Pet. App.
6-11, and that “only plaintiffs who allege an interest in the
preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of
interests protected by the ESA,” id. at 11. The court
observed that petitioners’ complaint “belies any assump-
tion that they seek compliance with the statute in order
to further the goal of species preservation.” /d. at 16.
Rather, the court continued, petitioners “claim a com-
peting interest—an interest in using the very water that
the government believes is necessary for the preservation
11
of the species.” Jbid. Accordingly, the court held that
petitioners lacked standing to bring their claims under the
ESA, id. at 17, and it affirmed the district court’s dis-
missal of the complaint, id. at 18.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Even if the allegations of petitioners’ complaint are
taken as true and are generously construed, petitioners
have failed to satisfy the standing requirements of Article
Ill of the Constitution. To invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he has
suffered an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant and (3) is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial ruling. See, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).
Petitioners’ complaint fails to satisfy any of those three
requirements. Their complaint alleged that the Bureau's
acceptance of the FWS’s recommendations would reduce
the aggregate amount of water available from the Klamath
Project. Petitioners did not allege, however, that accep-
tance of those recommendations would reduce the amount
of water that they would receive. Absent such an allega-
tion, petitioners’ complaint fails adequately to allege in-
jury in fact. Even if petitioners had adequately alleged a
concrete injury, their complaint would not satisfy the
other requirements for standing. The FWS’s biological
opinion did not legally compel the BOR to alter the
manner in which it allocated Klamath Project water. Any
injury that petitioners may have suffered is therefore
traceable not to the FWS’s issuance of the biological
opinion, but to the Bureau’s decisions regarding the allo-
cation of Project water; yet petitioners failed either to
name the Bureau as a defendant or to identify any action
by the Bureau causing them harm. Any injury suffered by
petitioners also would not be redressable by a favorable
12
judicial decision, since the Bureau would remain free to
adopt the same water allocation policies, based on con-
siderations wholly independent of the ESA, even if the
FWS's biological opinion were withdrawn. Petitioners
have therefore failed to satisfy the constitutional require-
ments for standing. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-44 (1976); Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 568-571 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
Il. Even if petitioners satisfied the requirements of
Article III, their present claims against the Service could
not go forward, since no statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity authorizes their suit.
A. The usual avenue for obtaining judicial review of
federal agency action is the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seqg., which authorizes review of
“final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. 704. This Court’s decisions
make clear, however, that an agency’s recommendation to
another governmental decisionmaker is not reviewable
“final agency action.” See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788 (1992); Dalton v. Specter, 1148. Ct. 1719 (1994). A
biological opinion issued by the Service does not con-
clusively determine whether and how an agency may
proceed with a project or other action. That determination
is left to the action agency. In the instant case, the final
decisions regarding the amounts and recipients of water
releases from the Klamath Project were made by the
Bureau of Reclamation. The biological opinion at issue in
this case therefore is not subject to review under the
APA, except in the context of a challenge to some final
action taken by the Bureau in reliance upon the opinion.
B. Nor are petitioners’ claims cognizable under the
ESA citizen suit provision. That provision authorizes
“any person” to commence a civil action “to enjoin any
13
person * * * who is alleged to be in violation of” the Act
or implementing regulations, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A), or
against the Secretary of Commerce or the Interior for
failure to perform certain nondiscretionary duties relat-
ing to the process of listing endangered and threatened
speews, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1(C). Petitioners’ suit is not
cognizable under the latter provision, since petitioners
have not alleged the breach of any such nondiscretionary
duty. For two reasons, petitioners’ suit is also not cog-
nizable under Section 1540(g)(1)(A).
First, the text and history of the citizen suit provision
make clear that Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is not a mechanism
for judicial review of the Secretary’s administration of the
ESA. Section 1540(g)(1)(C), which authorizes citizen suits
where the Secretary is alleged to have failed to perform
certain nondiscretionary duties, would be superfluous if
errors made by the Service in its implementation of the
ESA were redressable under Section 1540(g)(1)(A) as
“violations” of the Act. The history of the ESA citizen
suit provision, and its relationship to similar provisions in
other environmental statutes, provide further evidence
that Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is inapplicable here. Section
1540(g)(1)(A) furnishes a means by which private plaintiffs
may enforce the ESA against regulated parties—not a
mechanism for challenging the Secretary’s performance of
his administrative duties under the Act, including the
furnishing of biological opinions.
Even if Section 1540(g)(1)(A) could sometimes provide a
basis for a suit challenging the Secretary’s implementa-
tion of the ESA, it would not apply here. Any review under
the citizen suit provision should be conducted in accor-
dance with traditional principles of administrative law—
and, in particular, with the rule that agency action is
reviewable only when it is final and has a concrete impact
on the challenging party. Because neither the text nor
14
the history of Section 1540(g)(1)(A) suggests that Con-
gress intended to dispense with traditional requirements
of finality and ripeness, that provision may not be used to
attack the biological opinion in isolation from any action
hy the Bureau.
C. Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the non-cogni-
zability of their current claims does not insulate a bio-
logical opinion from allegations that it recommended un-
reasonable restrictions on the use of natural resources.
Decisions made by an action agency in reliance upon a
biological opinion may be challenged either by persons
asserting an interest in listed species or by persons as-
serting a competing interest in the resources in question.
In either type of suit, a reviewing court may scrutinize
the Service’s biological opinion and may vacate the action
agency's decision if it concludes that the biological opinion
is arbitrary and capricious.
ARGUMENT
The ESA citizen suit provision authorizes “any person”
to file a civil action “to enjoin any person, including the
United States * * *, who is alleged to be in violation
of” the Act or implementing regulations. 16 U.S.C.
1540(g)(1)(A). Petitioners have invoked that provision in a
suit directly against the FWS to challenge a biological
opinion issued by the FWS, arguing that the Service’s con-
clusions were unsupported by the pertinent scientific data.
Petitioners assume that the biological opinion could have
been challenged in a suit directly against the FWS under
Section 1540(g)(1)(A) by an environmental organization or
other plaintiff claiming that the opinion was based on
inadequate scientific evidence or analysis and was insuffi-
ciently protective of listed species. They argue that
resource-users should have an equivalent right to invoke
the citizen suit provision. As framed by petitioners, the
—
15
questions presented in this case are (1) whether a “zone of
interests” test governs standing under the ESA citizen
suit provision, and (2) if so, whether resource-users fall
within that “zone of interests.”
The government views this case from a fundamentally
different perspective. We agree with the court of appeals
that petitioners’ challenge to the biological opinion is not
cognizable under the citizen suit provision. We do not be-
lieve, however, that the proper disposition of this case
involves the application of zone of interests standing prin-
ciples. Rather, we believe that the basic premise of peti-
tioners’ argument is wrong: in our view, the biological
opinion at issue here would not have been subject to chal-
lenge by plaintiffs asserting an interest in the protection
of listed species, except within the context of a suit
against the Bureau of Reclamation challenging actions it
has taken in reliance on the Service’s recommendations.
A biological opinion provides the Service’s views as to
whether and how a federal agency may proceed with a
proposed action in a manner that does not jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species. Although the
action agency typically gives very substantial weight to
the Service’s recommendations, it is not legally obligated
to accept the Service’s advice. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the biological opinion therefore is not
“final agency action” subject to a direct judicial challenge.
Nothing in the ESA citizen suit provision authorizes a
legal challenge to non-final administrative action (here.
the issuance of the biological opinion) that is unreviewable
under traditional principles of administrative law. When
the action agency acts on the recommendations of the
Service, however, the action agency’s conduct is subject to
judicial challenge, either by plaintiffs who assert an
interest in the preservation of listed species, or by those
who allege that the agency has imposed unreasonable
16
constraints on the use of natural resources. In reviewing
such challenges, moreover, a court may scrutinize the
biological opinion and its underlying administrative record
(including the scientific evidence it contains) in order to
assess the reasonableness of its conclusions.
The rule that a biological opinion may be challenged
only within the context of a suit against the action agency
imposes no special disability upon plaintiffs, like peti-
tioners, who assert an economic interest in the use of
natural resources. Rather, that rule applies equally to
environmental plaintiffs alleging that the opinion is
insufficiently protective of listed species. Plaintiffs seek-
ing to challenge biological opinions have generally named
action agencies as defendants and have identified specific
actions taken (or intended to be taken) in reliance upon the
biological opinions. Petitioners, by contrast, declined to
name the Bureau as a defendant, and they failed to identify
any action by the Bureau having a concrete impact upon
their interests. Thus, the question in this case is not
whether users of natural resources comprise a disfavored
class of plaintiffs. The question instead is whether peti-
tioners may evade the force of generally applicable rules
governing the mode and timing of judicial review of federal
agency action. We believe that that question should be
answered in the negative, and that petitioners’ suit was
therefore properly dismissed.
In Part I below, we explain why petitioners lack stand-
ing under Article III to challenge the Service’s issuance of
the biological opinion. In Part II, we show that this suit
should be dismissed even if petitioners are found to satisfy
the constitutional requirements for standing, because
17
their claims directly against the FWS are not cognizable
under either the APA or the ESA citizen suit provision.”
I. THE ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS’ COM-
PLAINT FAIL TO SATISFY THE REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR STANDING UNDER ARTICLE III OF
THE CONSTITUTION
Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to actual “cases” and “controversies,”
and “the doctrine of standing serves to identify those
disputes which are appropriately resolved through the
judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
155 (1990). In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992), this Court reviewed the principles governing stand-
ing to sue in the context of an ESA case. The Court
reiterated that plaintiffs seeking to invoke a federal
court’s jurisdiction must establish (1) that they have
suffered an “injury in fact”—an “invasion of a legally-
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti-
eal,” id. at 560 (citations and internal quotation marks
* Those arguments are properly before the Court. The government
argued below that claims that federal agencies have done more than
necessary to avoid jeopardy to a protected species are not cognizable
under the ESA citizen suit provision; that the FWS’s biological opinion
itself had no direct impact on petitioners; that it therefore was
questionable that the biological opinion constituted final agency action;
and that petitioners’ suit would instead properly lie against the Bureau
of Reclamation. Gov't C.A. Br. 22 n.15, 23-26 & n.17. A respondent “is
entitled under [the Court's] precedents to urge any grounds which
would lend support to the judgment below,” Dayton Board of Educ. v.
Brinkman , 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977), and the Court in any event has an
independent obligation “to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction,
but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,’” Bender v.
Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (quoting
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)).
18
omitted); (2) that their injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of
the “independent action of some third party not before
the court,” ibid. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)); and (3) that
it is “ ‘likely’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that their
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision,” De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 38). See also,
e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Those
three elements are the “irreducible minimum,” Valley
Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472, required by
Article III.
“For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss,
both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint, and must construe
the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); ef. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 561 (stating that, on a motion to dismiss, the
court presumes that general factual allegations embrace
those specific facts necessary to support the claim). Even
at the pleading stage, however, “[iJt is the responsibility of
the complainant clearly to allege facts demonstrating that
he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the
dispute and the exercise of the court’s remedial powers.”
Warth, 422 U.S. at 518; see FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). Thus, petitioners must “allege
* * * facts essential to show jurisdiction. If they fail to
make the necessary allegations, they have no standing.”
Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In
the present case, the allegations of petitioners’ complaint,
even if liberally construed, satisfy none of the three
elements of standing.
* * *
19
A. Petitioners Have Failed To Allege Facts Which, If
Taken As True, Would Demonstrate That They Have
Suffered Injury In Fact
The complaint in this case alleges that petitioners
Bennett and Giordano receive irrigation water from Clear
Lake Reservoir, Pet. App. 33; that petitioners Horsefly
Irrigation District and Langell Valley Irrigation District
receive irrigation water from Clear Lake Reservoir via
Lost River “pursuant to contracts with the United
States,” id. at 34; that “the BOR will abide by the restric-
tions imposed by the Biological Opinion,” id. at 32; and
that “[t]he restrictions on lake levels imposed in the Bio-
logical Opinion adversely affect [petitioners] by sub-
stantially reducing the quantity of available irrigation
water,” id. at 40. Petitioners have adequately alleged that
the recommendations contained in the biological opinion, if
adopted by the Bureau, would reduce the aggregate amount
of water available from the Klamath Project. Petitioners
have not alleged, however, that they have received, or can
be expected to receive, less water than would otherwise
have been allocated to them. Petitioners’ complaint fo-
cuses on the biological opinion prepared by the FWS; it
contains no allegations regarding the Bureau’s water
allocation practices beyond the assertion that “the BOR
will abide by the restrictions imposed by the Biological
Opinion.” Pet. App. 32. The biological opinion, however,
recommends the maintenance of minimum lake levels but
does not address the manner in which available water is to
be divided among interested parties. See J.A. 86-92.
“(T]he ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury
to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seek-
ing review be himself among the injured.” Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734-735 (1972)). Because petitioners have not
20
alleged that they will receive reduced quantities of water,
their complaint fails to satisfy the injury in fact require-
ment of Article III.
B. Any Injury Suffered By Petitioners Is Not Fairl,
Traceable To The FWS’s Issuance Of The Biological
Opinion
The Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce exercise
“primary responsibility” for implementation of the ESA.
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). Cf. Babbitt vy.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416 (1995) (Secretary's inter-
pretation of ESA provision is entitled to deference in light
of “(t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enfore-
ing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory
expertise necessary to its enforcement”). The require-
ment that the Service prepare a biological opinion
promptly upon request, see 16 U.S.C. 1586(b), would be
largely superfluous if action agencies were expected
routinely to duplicate the Service's efforts to assess the
likely impact of proposed actions on listed species. The
statutory scheme thus presupposes that the biological
opinion will play a central role in the action agency's
decisionmaking process, and that it will typically be based
on an administrative record that is fully adequate for the
action agency’s decision insofar as ESA issues are
concerned. And because a reviewing court will give
substantial deference to the Service's views,’ a federal
® See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 697, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1979)
(noting with approval that “[cjourts have given substantial weight to
[the Service's] biological opinions as evidence of an [action] agency's
compliance with Section 7(a)”); H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1978); 51 Fed. Reg. 19,956 (1986) (“Federal courts have
accorded Service biological opinions great deference.”).
21
agency that chooses to deviate from the recommendations
contained in a biological opinion bears the burden of
“articulat({ing] in its admimistrative record its reasons for
disagreeing with the conciusions of a biological opinion.”
51 Fed. Reg. 19,956 (1986). In the government's experi-
ence, action agencies very rarely choose to engage in con-
duct that the Service has concluded is likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of a listed species.
As a legal matter, however, the action agency retains
the ultimate responsibility for determining whether and
how a proposed action may go forward in compliance with
Section 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate. See 16 U.S.C.
1536(b\(3)(A); Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d
1185, 1198-1994 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 873
(1989); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. EPA. 684 F.2d
1041, 1049 (ist Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534
F.2d 1289, 1303-1304 (8th Cir. 1976); National Wildlife
Fed'n, 529 F.2d at 371. When Congress amended the ESA
in 1978, substantially revising the consultation process,
the House Committee observed that
[aJny determination by the Fish and Wildlife Service
that the activity may jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of listed species does not necessarily mandate
any particular action by the acting agency. The
section 7 regulations make it clear that it is the
responsibility of the acting agency to determine
whether to proceed with the activity or program as
planned in light of its Section 7 obligations.
H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978). Regu-
lations published jointly by the FWS and the NMFS in
1986 state that, “(following the issuance of a biological
opinion, the Federal agency shall determine whether and
in what manner to proceed with the action in light of its
section 7 obligations and the Service’s biological opinion.”
22
50 C.F.R. 402.15(a). The preamble to those regulations
explains that the Service performs an “advisory function
under section 7” and that the action agency “makes the
ultimate decision as to whether its proposed action will
satisfy the requirements of section 7(a)(2).” 51 Fed. Reg.
19,928 (1986). The biological opinion at issue in the
instant case therefore did not compel the Bureau to adopt
higher lake levels. That opinion, moreover, contains no
recommendations at all regarding the allocation of avail-
abie water among potential recipients. If petitioners have
suffered injury, the proximate cause of their harm is an
(as yet unidentified) decision by the Bureau regarding the
volume of water allocated to petitioners, not the biological
opinion itself.
This does not mean that the biological opinion is
shielded from judicial scrutiny. If an action agency adopts
the Service’s recommendations, or proceeds with a pro-
posed action in reliance on the Service's no-jeopardy deter-
mination, the propriety of its actions will ultimately
depend upon the rationality of the Service's analysis.
Accordingly, judicial review of the action agency's conduct
properly may include review of the analysis and recom-
mendations contained in the biological opinion, and of the
" The Services have consistently recognized that the action agency
retains the legal authority to accept or reject the recommendations
contained in a biological opinion. Thus, joint FWS/NMFS regulations
issued in 1978 stated that, “[uJpon receipt and consideration of the
biological opinion and recommendations of the Service, it is the
responsibility of the Federal agency to determine whether to proceed
with the activity or program as planned in light of its section 7
obligations.” 50 C.F.R. 402.04(g) (1978). The preamble to those
regulations confirmed that once consultation has taken place, “the
ultimate responsibility for determining agency action in light of section
7 still rests with the particular Federal agency that was engaged in
consultation.” 43 Fed. Reg. 871 (1978).
23
scientific evidence before the Service, in order to deter-
mine whether the opinion is supported by sufficient
evidence to satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review. Cf. Escondido Mutual Water Co. vy. La Jolla
Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 778 (1984)."" If the
court finds the recommendations contained in the bio-
logical opinion to be arbitrary and capricious, the appropri-
ate relief would be to vacate the action agency's decision
and remand to the action agency for further consideration,
perhaps informed by renewed consultation with the Ser-
vice. Thus, while petitioners are not entitled to challenge
the FWS'’s biological opinion in isolation from any action
by the Bureau, the opinion would ultimately be reviewable
'" In Escondido, the Court held that Section 4(e) of the Federal
Power Act required the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to
accept without modification any conditions that the Secretary of the
Interior directed to be included in licenses for hydroelectric facilities
located on or near Indian reservations. 466 U.S. at 772-779. Judicial
review of the license, the Court observed, would include consideration
of whether those conditions were reasonable, consistent with the
statute, and supported by substantial evidence. /d. at 778. Thus, while
the challenged order would be that of the Commission (/.¢., the issuance
of the license), the reviewing court would scrutinize the determinations
made by the Secretary under the same (deferential) standard that
would apply to direct review of the Secretary's conduct. Jhid.; ef.
Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (court reviewing an order of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission gives deference
to the Secretary of Labor's construction of an ambiguous regulation).
Where an action agency adopts the recommendations contained in a
biological opinion, we believe that a similar mode of judicial review is
appropriate. If the action agency chooses to deviate from the Service's
recommendations, by contrast, review should focus on the rea-
sonableness of and evidentiary support for that decision. Cf. 51 Fed.
Reg. 19,956 (1986) (where action agency deviates from the Service's
recommendations, it is “incumbent upon [the action] agency to
articulate in its administrative record its reasons for disagreeing with
the conclusions of a biological opinion”).
24
within the context of a legal challenge to the Bureau’s
allocation of water.”
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions (Br. 42, 43), we do
not contend that “there is no connection between the bio-
logical opinion issued by the USFWS and re-operation of
the Klamath Project by the Bureau,” or that the biological
Judicial assessment of the biological opinion would be based on
the administrative record compiled by the Service, even though that
record would not routinely be provided in its entirety to the action
agency. See 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)3)A) (“Promptly after conclusion of
consultation * * *, the Secretary shall provide to the Federal agency
* * * a written statement setting forth the Secretary's opinion, and a
summary of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing
how the agency action affects the species or its critical habitat.”)
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs challenging agency actions taken in
reliance on the Service's biological opinions frequently name the
Service or the Secretary as a co-defendant. The Department of Justice
does not object to that practice. In our view, however, the presence or
absence of the Service as a defendant should not affect the manner in
which the district court record is compiled or the standard by which the
court reviews the action agency's conduct. Where an action agency
adopts the recommendations contained in a biological opinion, we
believe that a court reviewing the action agency's conduct should (1)
admit into evidence the Service's administrative record supporting the
biological opinion and (2) vacate the action agency's decision if the
court found the analysis or recommendations contained in the biological
opinion to be arbitrary and capricious, whether or not the Service or the
Secretary was named as a defendant. If a court disagreed, however,
and concluded that the Service’s administrative record would be
admissible into evidence only if the Service itself were a party, the
proper response would be to join the Service as a defendant—not to
decline to consider its administrative record. Both as a legal and a
practical matter, meaningful judicial review of the biological opinion
would be impossible if the court was foreclosed from examining the
materials from which that opinion was derived. Our point is simply
that the ultimate basis and focus of judicial review is a challenge to
action taken by the action agency in reliance on the biological opinion,
not the biological opinion standing alone.
25
opinion should be regarded “as a meaningless piece of
paper.” The statutory and regulatory scheme unquestion-
ably presupposes that action agencies will give substantial
weight to the views of the Service. The consultation pro-
cess, however, is not an end in itself: it is a means of
assisting federal agencies to fulfill their substantive
obligations under Section 7(a)(2) of the Act to ensure that
their actions will not jeopardize the continued existence of
a listed species. The Bureau, not the FWS, is ultimately
responsible for ensuring that the Klamath Project is
operated in compliance with the ESA’s requirements, and
the Bureau retains legal authority to accept or reject the
Service’s recommendations. If the Bureau adopts the
recommendations contained in the biological opinion, its
actions are subject to judicial review at the behest of
persons injured by them, and the court in conducting such
review may assess the adequacy of the biological opinion—
with deference, of course, to the scientific judgments of
the expert agency. Review of the biological opinion is
available, however, only after the Bureau has acted, and
only within the context of a challenge to specific actions
taken by the Bureau in reliance on that opinion.”
' Where the Secretary concludes that a proposed action is likely to
result in the incidental taking of a protected species, the biological
opinion is accompanied by an incidental take statement that identifies
the level of anticipated taking associated with the agency action,
specifies “reasonable and prudent measures” to minimize that taking,
and sets forth terms and conditions to implement those measures. 16
U.S.C. 1536(b)(4)(i), (ii), and (iv). Those takings that are in compliance
with the terms and conditions specified under Section 1536(b)(4)iv) are
exempt from the takings prohibition of Section 9. See 16 U.S.C.
1536(0 (2).
Even where a biological opinion is accompanied by an incidental
take statement, neither the biological opinion nor the incidental take
statement legally compels or prohibits any conduct by the action
agency. Actions inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the
26
©. Any Injury Suffered By Petitioners Is Not Redres-
sable By A Favorable Judicial Ruling
Petitioners have not sought any relief directed against
the Bureau’s operation of the Klamath Project. Rather,
they have requested a judicial order setting aside the
biological opinion. See Pet. App. 43-44. Petitioners’ re-
quest for such a ruling fails to satisfy the redressability
requirement of Article III.
The fact that a contemplated agency action will not
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species does
not mean that the agency is required to carry out that
action. In the present case, a variety of factors wholly
apart from ESA concerns may affect the Bureau’s deci-
incidental take statement are not per se unlawful: they simply “remain
subject to the prohibition against takings that is contained in section 9.”
S. Rep. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982). As a practical matter,
an action agency is very unlikely to risk Section 9 liability by
deviating from the terms and conditions set forth in the incidental take
statement, since an incidental take statement is issued only when the
Service believes that a taking is likely. The action agency remains
legally free, however, to carry out the proposed action without con-
forming to those terms and conditions if it concludes that the action
will not in fact cause a taking—subject to the risk that a reviewing
court will determine that an unauthorized taking has occurred or can be
expected to occur, and that the agency is therefore in violation of
Section 9,
In the present case, moreover, the aspect of the biological opinion
document that is the subject of petitioners’ challenge—namely, the
Service's identification of “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that
included maintenance of higher water levels at the Clear Lake and
Gerber reservoirs, see Pet. App. 39-40—is separate and distinct from
the incidental take statement. See J.A. 86-92 (reasonable and prudent
alternatives), 92-96 (incidental take statement). Thus, so long as the
BOK tuilfilled its obligations under Section 7(a)(2) by operating the
Project in a manner that did not jeopardize listed species, the Bureau
Was not required to maintain the higher lake levels in order to comply
with the terms and conditions of the incidental take statement.
27
sions regarding the storage, distribution, and delivery of
irrigation water within the Klamath Basin. The ultimate
effect of a judicial decision invalidating the biological
opinion is therefore dependent upon the actions of the
Bureau, “whose exercise of broad and legitimate discre-
tion the courts cannot presume either to control or to
predict.” ASARCO, Ine. vy. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615
(1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 43; Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 568-571 (opinion of Scalia, J.). If the Bureau of
Reclamation allocates water in a manner that injures
petitioners, and its action is determined to be unlawful,
petitioners’ injury would be redressable by an appropriate
judicial order directed against the Bureau. But in the
absence of any challenge to a final decision by the BOR, it
is purely speculative whether a judicial order running
against the Service would enable petitioners to obtain
additional water.
* * * k &
The requirement that plaintiffs establish injury, causa-
tion, and redressability “tends to assure that the legal
questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in
the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a con-
crete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation
of the consequences of judicial action.” Valley Forge
Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472. Petitioners’ suit
directly implicates those pragmatic concerns. At the time
this suit was filed, it was possible (insofar as can be
determined from the allegations of the complaint) that the
Bureau would decline to adopt the recommendations con-
tained in the biological opinion; that those recommenda-
'! By the time the complaint in this case was filed, the Bureau had
informed the Service that it intended to act in accordance with the
28
tions, even if implemented, would have no effect on the
volume of water available to petitioners; or that the
Bureau would assert an independent justification for
adopting the higher lake levels recommended by the
Service. If any of those events had occurred, the court’s
resolution of petitioners’ challenge to the biological opin-
ion would have had no concrete impact on petitioners’
interests.
Once the Bureau arrived at a final decision concerning
the allocation of Klamath Project water, petitioners could
have sought judicial review of that decision under the APA
(if the decision caused them injury) by alleging that the
Bureau's refusal to release additional water was arbitrary
and capricious. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Westlands
Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667 (9th Cir.
1993). Alternatively, petitioners might have contended
that some other provision of law required the Bureau to
allocate additional water. See 48 U.S.C. 390uu; ef.
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 115 S. Ct. 1933, 1942, 1944-1945
(1995) (recognizing that challenges to operation of recla-
mation projects may be brought in federal district court).
If the Bureau had then defended its actions by relying on
the biological opinion, judicial review of the Bureau's
conduct would focus on whether the recommendations
proffered by the Service were arbitrary and capricious.
That review would include an assessment of the scientific
evidence and analyses on which the Service relied. See
pages 22-23, supra. Thus, dismissal of petitioners’ com-
plaint would not permanently insulate the biological
opinion from judicial scrutiny. It would simply ensure
analysis and recommendations contained in the biological opinion. See
Gov't D. Ct. Br. Exh. 6. The record contains no information, however,
regarding whether and when the Bureau actually altered its water
allocation practices in response to the biological opinion.
29
that such scrutiny would not occur unless and until the
Bureau acted upon the Service’s recommendations in a
manner that caused petitioners harm, and that it would
occur within the context of a suit between petitioners and
the agency directly responsible for their alleged injury.”
In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court observed that “(t]he person
who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy.” 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. The
Court explained that “one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the
licensing agency's failure to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the
Statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even
though the dam will not be completed for many years.” /Jbid. For three
reasons, that principle does not control this case.
First, the hypothetical case described in Defenders of Wildlife
involved a procedural breach committed by the same agency whose
actions were ultimately responsible for the plaintiffs injury. The Court
did not cast doubt on the rule that standing is ordinarily absent where
the nexus between the unlawful conduct and the plaintiff's injury
involves independent action by a third party not before the court.
Second, a right to insist upon particular procedures would often be
substantially undermined if it could be asserted only where the outcome
of those procedures could be forecast with certainty. The premise of an
EIS requirement, for example, is that the environmental consequences
(and thus the propriety) of a particular project cannot accurately be
determined without an EIS. In the present case, by contrast, any legal
challenge petitioners may have to the Bureau's final decisions
regarding the allocation of Klamath Project water can be asserted
after those decisions have been made.
Finally, the Court in Defenders of Wildlife did not dispense with the
requirement that plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact. The
hypothetical plaintiff in Defenders of Wildlife was described as living
next to the dam site; there was no question that the challenged federal
action (construction of the dam) would ultimately (although not
immediately) cause that plaintiff injury, and likewise no question that
an injunction barring construction unless an EIS were prepared would
30
il. EVEN IF PETITIONERS MET THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF ARTICLE III, THEIR SUIT COULD
NOT GO FORWARD, BECAUSE THEIR CLAIMS
ARE NOT COGNIZABLE UNDER EITHER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OR THE
ESA CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION
For the foregoing reasons, petitioners fail to satisfy the
requirements of Article III. Even if this Court holds to
the contrary, however, it would not follow that petitioners’
suit can go forward. A determination that petitioners
meet the requirements of Article III would mean only that
Congress could authorize the adjudication of this lawsuit
by the federal courts—not that it has done so. “It is
elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is im-
mune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United
State v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). Even if petitioners are
found to have Article III standing to bring this action, no
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity authorizes their
challenge to the Service’s biological opinion outside the
context of a suit against the action agency challenging
that agency’s conduct.
A. Petitioners’ Suit Cannot Proceed Under The Admin-
istrative Procedure Act Because The Issuance Of
A Biological Opinion Is Not A Reviewable “Final
Agency Action”
The usual avenue for obtaining judicial review of federal
agency action is the APA, which provides, inter alia, for
judicial review of “final agency action for which there is
no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. 704. Issu-
redress that injury (albeit perhaps only temporarily). In the present
case, by contrast, petitioners have failed to allege that they have
received (or can be expected to receive) less water than they desire.
31
ance of the biological opinion in this case was not “final
agency action” because it did not conclusively determine
the manner in which Klamath Project water would be
allocated. Rather, the final decisions regarding the
amounts and recipients of water releases were made by the
Bureau of Reclamation. The Service’s issuance of the
biological opinion therefore was not subject to review
under the APA, except within the context of a challenge to
the Bureau’s ultimate decisions regarding the allocation
of water.
This Court considered a similar issue in Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). Under the Census
Act, the Secretary of Commerce is required to report to
the President “(t]he tabulation of total population by
States.” 13 U.S.C. 141(b); see 505 U.S. at 792. The Presi-
dent is then required to “transmit to the Congress a state-
ment showing the whole number of persons in each State,
* * * and the number of Representatives to which each
State would be entitled.” 2 U.S.C. 2a(a); see 505 U.S. at
792. Although no President has ever transmitted to the
Congress census figures different from those reported to
him by the Secretary, see id. at 812-813 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment), the
Court construed the pertinent statutes as authorizing the
President to do so, see id. at 796-800.
Because the President retained legal authority to
amend the figures reported by the Secretary, the Court
held, the Secretary's report was not “final agency action”
reviewable under the APA. 505 U.S. at 796-800." In
© Four Justices would have held that the Secretary's report
constituted reviewable “final agency action.” See 505 U.S. at 808-816
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Those
Justices concluded that the President's role under the statutory scheme
was purely ministerial, and that the President lacked the legal
authority to amend the figures reported to him by the Secretary. See
32
determining whether particular conduct constitutes “final
agency action,” the Court explained, “[tJhe core question
is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking
process, and whether the result of that process is one that
will directly affect the parties.” Jd. at 797." “Because the
Secretary’s report to the President carries no direct con-
sequence for the reapportionment,” the Court concluded,
that report was “not final and therefore not subject
to review.” Jd. at 798 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Cf. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc.
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 108, 112-113 (1948)
(“administrative orders are not reviewable unless and
until they impose an obligation, deny a right or fix some
legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative
process”).
The Court reiterated that principle two Terms later in
Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719 (1994). Dalton involved
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-510, Tit. XXIX, 104 Stat. 1808. Under that
Act, the Secretary of Defense was required to submit
id. at 810-813. The concurring Justices did not suggest, however, that a
non-binding agency recommendation to another decisionmaker would
constitute “final agency action.”
'’ The Court's disposition of the case makes clear that both halves of
that question must be answered in the affirmative before an agency
pronouncement will be regarded as “final agency action.” The
Department of Commerce had clearly “completed its decisionmaking
process” when it issued its report to the President. That report was
nevertheless deemed not to be “final agency action” that would
“directly affect the parties,” since the President retained the final
authority to accept or reject the figures contained therein. Similarly
here, the biological opinion represented the FWS’s concluded view
regarding the Klamath Project's likely impact upon listed species, but
it was not “final agency action” within the meaning of the APA, since
the Bureau retained ultimate legal authority over the allocation of
Project water.
33
recommendations concerning the closure of military in-
stallations to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission, an independent body. 114 S. Ct. at 1722. The
Commission would then submit a report to the President,
who was given two weeks in which to decide whether to
approve or disapprove, in their entirety, the Commission's
recommendations. /bid. Plaintiffs sought review of the
recommendations submitted by the Secretary and the
Commission. The Court held that “[a] straightforward
application of Franklin” foreclosed review of those rec-
ommendations under the APA, id. at 1724, explaining
that “the President, not the Commission, takes the final
action that affects the military installations,” id. at 1725
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Under Franklin and Dalton, the Service’s issuance of a
biological opinion is not “final agency action.” Whatever
the practical likelihood that the BOR would adopt the
reasonable and prudent alternatives (including the higher
lake levels) identified by the Service, the Bureau was not
legally obligated to do so. Even if the Bureau decided to
adopt the higher lake levels, moreover, nothing in the
biological opinion would constrain the BOR’s discretion as
to how the available water should be allocated among
potential users. Like the reports at issue in Franklin and
Dalton, the biological opinion therefore “carries no direct
consequence” for the release of water to petitioners or
other users. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798; Dalton, 114 S. Ct.
at 1724. It is the Bureau, not the FWS, that “takes the
final action that affects” the allocation of water from the
Klamath Project. /d. at 1725. Thus, even if petitioners
met the requirements of Article III, they could not obtain
34
APA review of the biological opiinion, except in the context
of a challenge to actions by the BOR."
The insusceptibility of the biological opinion to a
judicial challenge independent of a decision by the action
agency is further supported by the pragmatic considera-
tions underlying the doctrine of ripeness.” The “basic
rationale” of ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of prematwre adjudication, from en-
tangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies
from judicial interference until an administrative decision
has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way
by the challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967); see also National
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 891. Judicial review of a
biological opinion independent of any challenge to the
action agency’s decision would cause the disruption and
Unlike Franklin, the instant case involves a recommendation
submitted by one co-equal agency to another, not a recommendation
submitted by a subordinate to a superior within the same chain of
command. Nothing in Franklin suggests, however, that the Court
found dispositive the general subordimacy of the Secretary of Com-
merce to the President. The Court’s analysis focused instead on the
President's legal authority to reject the Secretary's recommendation
with respect to a particular matter.
'% Although ripeness doctrine and tthe APA requirement of “final
agency action” serve complementary purposes, they are not identical.
“An agency action can be final, wiith no further administrative
remedies available to a petitioner, and yet it can still fail to be ‘ripe’
for judicial review. The best example of this situation is an agency
rule that is worded so broadly that a court cannot determine whether,
or to what extent, it will cause harm to the petitioner or raise the lega!
issues the petitioner has asked the court to address.” Kenneth Culp
Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Il Administrative Law Treatise 361 (3d
ed. 1994). See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Imc., 113 S. Ct.
2485, 2495-2496 (1993); National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 891-898.
35
inefficiency that ripeness principles are intended to
prevent. Until the Bureau has considered the biological
opinion, in conjunction with other factors bearing upon its
water allocation decisions, there can be no certainty as to
what those decisions will be, how they will affect particu-
lar parties, or what alternative bases might underlie the
Bureau's actions. As we explain above, we believe that
this uncertainty is fatal to petitioners’ efforts to establish
standing under Article III]. But whether or not those
considerations are of constitutional moment, under well-
established principles of administrative law they should
preclude judicial review in the absence of a clear con-
gressional directive to permit it.”
B. The Citizen Suit Provision Of The Endangered
Species Act Provides No Basis For Adjudication Of
Petitioners’ Suit
Although petitioners’ complaint relied in part on the
APA, see Pet. App. 40-43, they place principal reliance on
the ESA citizen suit provision. That provision states in
relevant part that
any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf —
* As we explain above, see pages 22-23, supra, the biological
opinion would be subject to judicial scrutiny in the context of a legal
challenge to actions taken by the Bureau in reliance upon that opinion.
That mode of review is consistent with the text of the APA. which
provides that “[a) preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the
review of the final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. 704; see FTC v. Standard
Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 245 (1980). That avenue for re
viewing a non-binding recommendation was not available in Franklin
and Dalton: because the final decisionmaker (the President) was not an
“agency” within the meaning of the APA, see Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-
801, there was no “final agency action” to review.
36
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United
States and any other governmental instrumentality or
agency * * *, who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of [the Act] or regulation issued under the
authority thereof; or
(C) against the Secretary [of Commerce or the
Interior] where there is alleged a failure * * * to
perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title
which is not discretionary with the Secretary.
16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1).
The ESA citizen suit provision does not apply to peti-
tioners’ claims. The Service’s issuance of the biological
opinion at issue here was not a failure to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under 16 U.S.C. 1533. Issuance of
what a court might find to be an unpersuasive or in-
adequately supported biological opinion, moreover, would
*! As this Court noted in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S.
20, 23 & n.1 (1989), a number of federal environmental statutes contain
citizen suit provisions patterned after the citizen suit provision of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat.
1706. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environ-
mental Law, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 339, 347 n.29 (1990) (citizen suit provisions
of various environmental statutes “are virtually identical, largely
because they were ‘lifted’ from the frst such provision in the 1970 Clean
Air Act”); Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution
Control Laws Part 1,13 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10,309, 10,311 (1983) (“There are
perhaps no sections of the environmental statutes where precedent
under one statute so clearly applies to others.”). The citizen suit
provisions typically “authorize ‘any person’ to commence suit to enforce
the requirements of the acts against ‘any person’ alleged to violate
them or to require the government to perform a mandatory duty under
the acts.” /d. at 10311-10312 (footnotes omitted). The ESA citizen suit
provision conforms to that pattern.
37
not place the Secretary “in violation of” the Endangered
Species Act or its implementing regulations.
B. The Service's issuance of the biological opinion in
this case did not constitute a failure to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under 16 U.S.C. 1533
The conduct complained of in this case was not “a
failure * * * to perform any act or duty under section
1533 of [Title 16] which is not discretionary with the
Secretary.” 16 U.S.C. 1540(g\(1)(C). Petitioners have not
contended that the Service failed to issue a biological
opinion—only that the conclusions articulated in the
opinion were unsupported by the pertinent scientific
data.* In any event, Section 1540(g1)(C) applies only
where the Secretary fails to perform a nondiscretionary
duty “under section 1533” of Title 16. The consultation
process (including the issuance of biological opinions) is
governed by Section 1536 of Title 16. Indeed, while
petitioners’ complaint cites Section 1540(g)1)C) as a
basis for district court jurisdiction, see Pet. App. 41, 42,
neither the complaint, the petition, nor petitioners’ brief
2 The nondiscretionary duty sections of the various citizen suit
provisions have been given a narrow construction. See. €4..
Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F 2d 272, 276 n3 (4th Cir. 1993)
(citing cases); Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F 2d 892.
899 (2d Cir.) (“the district court has jurisdiction * * * to compel the
Administrator to perform purely ministerial acts”), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 991 (1989); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“In order to impose a clear-cut nondiscretionary duty, we believe
that a duty of timeliness must categorically mandate that all specified
action be taken by a date-certain deadline.”) (brackets and interna!
quotation marks omitted). Cf. id. at 792 (“We long ago rejected * * *
the convoluted notion that EPA is under a nondiscretionary duty—for
purposes of [the Clean Air Act citizen suit provision}—not to abuse its
discretion.”).
38
on the merits identifies any nondiscretionary duty that
the Service is alleged to have failed to perform.”
2. Issuance of an inadequate or erroneous biological
opinion would not place the Secretary “in violation
of” the ESA or implementing regulations
Petitioners’ principal contention is that judicial review
of the biological opinion is available under 16 U.S.C.
1540(g)(1)(A), which authorizes injunctive actions against
2% Petitioners’ complaint alleged that the Secretary had violated 16
U.S.C. 1533(b)2) and its implementing regulations by “implicitly
determining critical habitat for the Lost River suckers and the
shortnose suckers * * * without considering the economic impact of
that determination.” Pet. App. 42. Even if that claim had merit, it
would not be cognizable under Section 1540(gX1\(C), since even an
arbitrary and capricious designation of critical habitat would not
constitute a failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. See note 22,
supra.
In any event, petitioners’ claim has no basis in law. Critical
habitat may be designated only through notice and comment rule-
making under Section 4(aX(3) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(3).
(Pursuant to Section 4(a)(3), the Secretary of the Interior has proposed
a rule designating critical habitat for the endangered Lost River
sucker and shortnose sucker. See 59 Fed. Reg. 61,744 (1994).) The
requirement that the Secretary “tak[e] into consideration the economic
impact * * * of specifying any area as critical habitat,” 16 U.S.C.
1533(b\(2), applies only to the official designation of critical habitat
pursuant to Section 4(a3). Contrary to petitioners’ apparent premise,
the Service's conclusion that use or destruction of particular natural
resources would jeopardize a listed species does not represent an
“implicit” designation of critical habitat. See 51 Fed. Reg. 19,927
(1986) (“An action could jeopardize the continued existence of a listed
species through the destruction or adverse modification of its habitat,
regardless of whether that habitat has been designated as ‘critical
habitat.’”). Indeed, the Service is not permitted—let alone required—
to consider economic impacts in making the scientific determination
whether a proposed action will or will not jeopardize the continued
existence of a listed species.
39
any person “who is alleged to be in violation of” the ESA
or its implementing regulations. For two reasons, peti-
tioners’ reliance on Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is misplaced.
a. In addition to the requirements and prohibitions ap-
plicable to persons whose on-the-ground conduct may
harm a listed species, the ESA and its implementing regu-
lations contain numerous provisions governing the Sec-
retary’s implementation of the Act. Conduct by the
Secretary that is inconsistent with such provisions might
in a sense be said to constitute a “violation” of the Act or
regulations. The text and history of the ESA citizen suit
provision indicate, however, that Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is
not intended to serve as an alternative avenue for judicial
review of the Secretary’s implementation of the statute.
Section 1540(g)(1)(A) furnishes a means by which non-
federal actors may enforce the provisions of the ESA
against regulated parties—not an additional mechanism
for challenging the Secretary’s performance of his duties
as administrator of the Act.
i. The strongest textual evidence on this point is Sec-
tion 1540(g)(1)(C), which authorizes citizen suits in cases
where the Secretary is alleged to have failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under Section 1533. See pages 37-
38, supra. That provision would be superfluous if errors
by the Secretary in his implementation of the ESA
were subject to challenge under Section 1540(g)(1)(A) as
“violations” of the Act.” The citizen suit provision also
4 Section 1540(g1C) was added to the ESA in 1982, together with
amendments to Section 1533 that imposed timetables for action by the
Secretary on petitions to list threatened or endangered species. See
Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 7(2), 96 Stat. 1425. The Senate Report accompany-
ing the 1982 amendments explained that Section 1540(g)1)C) “would
amend the citizen suit provision of the Act to authorize actions against
the Secretary for failure to perform the acts and duties that are
imposed by” other provisions of those amendments. 3S. Rep. No. 418,
40
states that an action under Section 1540(g)(1)(A) may not
be brought “prior to sixty days after written notice of the
violation has been given to the Secretary and to any
alleged violator of any such provision or regulation,” 16
U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(A)G), or if civil or criminal enforcement
proceedings are ongoing, see 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(2)(A)(ii)
and (iii). The requirement that notice be given separately
to the Secretary and to the “violator,” and the bar on
commencement of citizen suits during the pendency of
federal enforcement proceedings, suggest that Section
1540(g)(1)(A) is directed at on-the-ground “violations” of
the Act’s substantive provisions—not at the Secretary’s
administration of the Act.” Thus, the “sense of the
statute,” ef. Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 879 (1984),
is that an erroneous biological judgment by the Service is
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982). That language from the Senate Report
reflects the assumption that the Secretary's failure to comply with the
new statutory requirements governing the listing process would not
otherwise be subject to challenge under the citizen suit provision.
® This conclusion is supported by two other textual features of 16
U.S.C. 1540(g)1)(A). First, that Section provides for a suit against a
person “who is alleged to be in violation” of a provision of the Act or
regulations. The phrase “to be in violation” does not extend to
allegations of past, completed actions. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). Once the FWS furnishes a
biological opinion to an action agency, its role in that consultation is
completed. There is no ongoing conduct by which the FWS could be
said to continue “to be in violation” of the Act. Second, Section
1540(g) 1A) states that the “person{s]” whose violations are covered
include “the United States and any other governmental instrumental-
ity or agency.” Thus, in referring to “violations” by governmental
agencies, the citizen suit provision refers to the agency itself, not the
officer who is the head of the agency. See also 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2)
(referring to the no-jeopardy obligation of each “Federal agency”). By
contrast, the citizen suit provision uses the term “the Secretary” when
referring to actions taken in administering the Act.
41
not the sort of “violation” that was intended to be
cognizable under Section 1540(g)(1)(A).”
ii. The historical development of the ESA and similar
citizen suit provisions reinforces that conclusion. As
noted above, see note 21, supra, a number of federal envi-
ronmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions pat-
terned after the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1706.” The pertinent Clean Air
Act provision authorized citizen suits
(1) against any person (including (i) the United
States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumental-
ity or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be
in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Ad-
ministrator or a State with respect to such a standard
or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged
a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or
*® The ESA also provides that decisions of the Endangered Species
Committee granting or denying exemptions for proposed activities are
subject to “judicial review, under chapter 7 of title 5.” 16 U.S.C.
1536(n). That provision further supports the inference that adminis-
trative decisions concerning the implementation of the ESA are to be
reviewed under the APA—subject to the terms and conditions (¢.g., the
requirement of “final agency action”) that the APA imposes—rather
than under the citizen suit provision.
“| The House Report accompanying the ESA stated that the
language of Section 1540(g) as originally enacted was “parallel to that
contained in the recent Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972 [MPRSA\], and is to be interpreted in the same fashion.”
H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1973). The MPRSA
provision was intended, in turn, to “parallel{] that adopted by the
Congress * * * in the Clean Air Act.” 117 Cong. Rec. 30,852 (1971)
(statement of Rep. Dingell).
42
duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator.
42 U.S.C. 1857h-2(a) (1970) (recodified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 7604(a)).”
The text and history of the Clean Air Act make clear
that suits against the Administrator challenging her
1aplementation of that Act are not cognizable under
Section 7604(a)(1). The Clean Air Act requires that
challenges to the Administrator’s actions be brought
directly in the court of appeals, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b), and
states that “[nJothing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize judicial review of regulations or orders of the
Administrator under this chapter, except as provided in
this section,” 42 U.S.C. 7607(e). The legislative history
2% Section 7604(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, like Section 1540(g)(1)(A)
of the ESA, specifically identifies the United States and other
governmental entities as potential defendants in a citizen suit. The
Senate Report accompanying the Clean Air Act explained that
“Federal facilities generate considerable air pollution. Since Federal
agencies have been notoriously laggard in abating pollution and in
requesting appropriations to develop control measures, it is important
to provide that citizens can seek, through the courts, to expedite the
government performance specifically directed under” other provisions
of the Act. S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970). The
inclusion of federal entities as permissible defendants in Section
7604(a)(1) suits thus reflects Congress’s recognition that federal
agencies’ on-the-ground activities may place them “in violation of”
applicable emission standards. It does not suggest that Congress
conceived of errors by the EPA in its administration of the Act as
“violations” within the meaning of Section 7604(a)(1). The same
principle applies in the ESA context: Section 1540(g)(1)(A) citizen suits
may properly be brought to prevent federal land management
activities from jeopardizing listed species, for example, but not against
the Secretary based on alleged errors in his administration of the Act,
including the furnishing of biological opinions in the consultation
process under Section 7.
43
confirms that citizen suits under the Clean Air Act may
be brought against the Administrator only where the
plaintiff alleges a failure to perform a nondiscretionary
duty. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56
(1970) (“Suits against the Administrator are limited to
alleged failure to perform mandatory functions to be
performed by him. Suits against violators, including the
United States and other government agencies to the ex-
tent permitted by the Constitution, would also be author-
ized.”). The ESA citizen suit provision should likewise
be construed not to apply to the Secretary’s administra-
tion of the Act (except for the failure to perform nondis-
cretionary duties under Section 1533). Cf. Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682-683 n.1 (1983) (Court’s in-
terpretation of the word “appropriate” in Clean Air Act
attorney’s fee provision governs construction of parallel
provisions in other environmental statutes).”
® See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349, 1353
(9th Cir. 1978) (“the nondiscretionary duty requirement imposed by [the
Clean Air Act citizen suit provision] must be read in light of the
Congressiona] intent to use this phrase to limit the number of citizen
suits which could be brought against the Administrator”); Oljato
Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(purpose of nondiscretionary duty requirement was “to limit citizen
suits against the Administrator to a chosen few”).
® The ESA citizen suit provision concededly covers a broader range
of “violations” than does the analogous provision of the Clean Air Act.
Compare 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A) (authorizing suit to enjoin “any person
* * * who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter
or regulation issued under the authority thereof”) with 42 U.S.C.
7604(a)(1) (authorizing suit “against any person * * * who is alleged
to * * * be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation”). For three
reasons, however, that change in language in the ESA does not reflect
congressional intent to transform the citizen suit into an alternative
44
b. In light of the strong evidence that Section 1540(g)
(1)(A) does not apply to the Secretary’s administration of
the Act at all, it would be particularly inappropriate to
read that Section as an unusually expansive judicial
review provision, permitting attacks on non-final action
that would not be reviewable under the APA. As the
courts of appeals have recognized, application of the ESA
to federal defendants should be governed by traditional
principles of administrative law. In determining whether
an action agency’s conduct complies with the substantive
mechanism for judicial review (outside the context of nondiscretionary
duties) of the Secretary’s administration of the Act.
First, other language in the ESA citizen suit provision itself—most
notably the express authorization of suits to compel performance of
nondiscretionary duties—reflects the premise that suits alleging
secretarial errors in the administration of the Act would not be
cognizable under Section 1540(g)(1)A). See pages 39-40, supra.
Second, the pertinent legislative history contains no evidence of
congressional intent to depart from the scheme established in the Clean
Air Act, whereby agency implementation of the statute was subject to
challenge under the citizen suit provision only in cases involving
failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. To the contrary, that
history indicates that Congress attempted to model subsequent citizen
suit provisions after the Clean Air Act. See notes 21 and 27, supra.
Finally, the ESA citizen suit provision, although broader than the
analogous section of the Clean Air Act, is not unique. Other en-
vironmental statutes contain broadly worded citizen suit provisions
very similar to Section 1540(g)1)(A), while containing separate
provisions governing judicial review of agency administration. See,
e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 6972
(citizen suits), 6976 (judicial review); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. 300j-8 (citizen suits), 300j-7 (judicial review); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2619 (citizen suits), 2618 (judicial review); Noise
Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 4911 (citizen suits), 4915 (udicial
review). Those statutes indicate that Congress has not historically
regarded errors by the implementing agency as “violations” of a
statute within the meaning of the various citizen suit provisions.
45
no-jeopardy mandate of Section 7(a)(2), for example, a
reviewing court should apply an arbitrary-and-capricious
standard reflecting deference to agency expertise. The
D.C. Circuit has explained:
Appellants in effect seek to have the trial court sub-
stitute its views regarding environmental impacts for
those of the agencies which are charged with imple-
menting the ESA. The Act provides no support for
such a sweeping r2sult. The citizen suit provision of
the Act, relied on by appellants, merely provides a
right of action to challenge the agency action alleged
to be in violation of the Act or to compel agency
compliance with the requirements of the Act. It does
not direct trial courts to conduct de novo review in
adjudicating such actions and we decline to read such a
requirement into the Act.
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678,
685 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citation, footnote, and internal quo-
tation marks omitted). The court concluded that “the
appropriate standard of review under the ESA is the
arbitrary and capricious standard provided by the APA.”
Id. at 686. Accord, e.g., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d
429, 439 (5th Cir. 1991); Environmental Coalition of
Broward County v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984, 987 (11th Cir.
1987); Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 609 (9th
Cir. 1984).
Similar reasoning applies to the instant case. The APA
requirement of “final agency action,” and the decisions of
this Court applying principles of finality and ripeness,
reflect considered judgments regarding the appropriate
timing of legal challenges to the conduct of federal
agencies. Nothing in the text or history of Section
1540(g)(1)(A) suggests an intent to depart from those
background rules. Thus, even if Section 1540(g)(1)(A) is
46
\
construed to provide an‘alternative mechanism for judicial
review of the Secretary’s implementation of the ESA, it
would not authorize a challenge to the non-final action at
issue here.
C. Alternative Avenues Exist By Which A Court May
Review Claims That The Service Has Recommended
Unreasonably Severe Restrictions On The Use Of
Natural Resources
A central theme of petitioners’ argument is that if their
current claims are not cognizable, there will be no avenue
by which a court can review allegations that the Secretary
has recommended unreasonably severe restrictions on the
use of natural resources. That premise is incorrect. As
we explain above, any actions taken by the Bureau in
reliance upon the biological opinion are subject to judicial
review at the behest of persons injured by them. Persons
whose requests for water are denied as a result of the
Bureau’s adoption of the Service’s recommendations would
be appropriate plaintiffs to challenge the BOR’s actions.”
3! As we explain in the text, plaintiffs may obtain vacatur of an
action agency’s decision by showing that it was based on a biological
opinion that failed to satisfy the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of
review. A plaintiff may not prevail, however, simply by persuading a
court that the Service identified, or the Bureau adopted, alternatives to
a proposed action that go beyond the minimum required to avoid
jeopardy to listed species. As noted above, see page 3, supra, if
the Service concludes that a proposed action is likely to jeopar-
dize the continued existence of a listed species, its biological opinion
must identify “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the proposed
action, or else state that no such alternatives exist. See 16 U.S.C.
1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. 402.02, 402.14(h)(3). But the “reasonable and
prudent alternatives” identified in a biological opinion need not embody
the absolute minimum biological requirements needed to maintain the
species on the razor’s edge of survival and extinction. See 50 C.F.R.
402.02 (definition of “reasonable and prudent alternatives”). The
47
And in the course of reviewing the Bureau’s conduct, the
court can examine the biological opinion and the evidence
on which it was based. In reviewing the scientific judg-
ments embodied in the biological opinion, moreover, the
court would employ the same arbitrary-and-capricious
standard applicable to suits brought by environmental
plaintiffs contending that actions taken in reliance upon a
biological opinion were likely to jeopardize listed species.
Thus, the scientific judgments embodied in a biological
opinion may be challenged in court within the context of a
suit against an action agency, either by plaintiffs who
allege that the opinion is insufficiently protective of listed
species, or by plaintiffs who allege that the opinion recom-
mends unreasonably severe constraints on the use of
natural resources. The timing and standard of review
would be the same in both contexts; the two types of
actions would differ only in that they would rest on
distinct jurisdictional bases. A plaintiff alleging that an
action agency’s conduct would jeopardize the continued
existence of a listed species could invoke the citizen suit
provision of the ESA. That provision identifies the United
States and other governmental entities as potential de
fendants, see 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A), and conduct by an
action agency that would jeopardize a listed species is
properly characterized as a “violation” of the Act. See,
e.g., TVA v. Hill, 4837 U.S. 158, 172, 174 (1978) (Court
concluded that Tennessee Valley Authority would “be in
violation of the Act if it completed and operated the Tellico
Service therefore does not engage in unlawful “over-regulation” (Pet.
Br. 48) simply by identifying reasonable and prudent alternatives that
go beyond the minimum steps necessary to avoid jeopardy, particularly
in light of the action agency’s duty to “insure” that its actions are not
likely to jeopardize the species. 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). Nor does an
action agency violate the law simply by doing more to protect listed
species than the Act requires. See pages 48-49, infra.
48
Dam as planned,” because “TVA’s proposed operation of
the dam * * * [would cause] the eradication of an
endangered species”) (emphasis omitted).*
Petitioners, by contrast, allege that the FWS’s bio-
logical opinion recommends unreasonably severe limita-
tions on the use of natural resources. If the BOR had
denied petitioners’ requests for water in reliance upon
that opinion, petitioners could have challenged that denial,
and could have obtained judicial review of the biological
opinion in the course of their suit against the Bureau.
The BOR’s refusal to release the water would not
constitute a violation of the ESA, however, even if it was
premised on a biological opinion that was found to be
arbitrary and capricious. Nothing in the ESA requires a
federal resource management agency to permit the use of
natural resources, or to authorize other activities, up to
the point at which its actions will jeopardize the continued
existence of a listed species.® Petitioners therefore could
2 In our view, the difficult “zone of interests” questions under the
ESA citizen suit provision involve situations very far removed from
the present one. Suppose, for example, that the owner of land adjacent
to government property complained that logging on the federal land
caused dust and noise and thereby hindered his enjoyment of his own
land. He might contend in addition that the logging jeopardized the
continued existence of an endangered bird species. The property owner
might expressly disavow any personal interest in the fate of the bird
but argue that he was nonetheless entitled to invoke the ESA citizen
suit provision, on the ground that he had suffered injury in fact from
the same government conduct that was alleged to violate the ESA.
That allegation would surely satisfy Article III; the question is
whether the fortuitous relationship between the landowner’s injury and
the values protected by the ESA would trigger the application of
prudential standing requirements.
3 To the contrary, the ESA requires all federal agencies to “utilize
their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by
carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and
49
not invoke the ESA citizen suit provision as the basis for a
challenge to the Bureau’s refusal to release additional
water. Cf. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149, 152-153 (1908) (case is not one “arising under”
federal law, within the meaning of a federal jurisdictional
statute, where resolution of a state-law action turns on
the merits of an anticipated federal defense). Rather, their
suit would arise under the APA, or under any federal
statute that was alleged to require that the water be
released.”
threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(1). The Act prov'des that “[t}he
terms ‘conserve’, ‘conserving’, and ‘conservation’ mean to use and the
use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary.”
16 U.S.C. 1532(3). The ESA thus contains an affirmative (albeit
generalized) requirement that federal agencies should attempt to
improve the condition of listed species, not simply avoid threats to their
continued existence.
* The practical differences between an ESA citizen suit and an APA
action are of modest significance. The plaintiff in an ESA citizen suit
must generally give 60 days’ notice prior to filing his complaint, see 16
U.S.C. 1540(g)2)(A); the APA imposes no such requirement. On the
other hand, an award of attorney's fees appears to be more readily
available in a citizen suit than in an APA action. Compare 16 U.S.C.
1540(g)(4) (“The court * * * may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever
the court determines such award is appropriate.”) with 28 U.S.C.
2412(d)(1)A) (absent a specific statutory provision governing attorney's
fees, fees are to be awarded to a prevailing party in a suit against the
United States under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) “unless
the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified”), see Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-568 (1988).
EAJA fees may not be awarded, moreover, to prevailing parties who
exceed the statute’s limits on net worth and number of employees. See
28 U.S.C. 2412(d2B). In either an APA action or a citizen suit,
however, the court will apply the same arbitrary-and-capricious stan-
50
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
WALTER DELLINGER
Acting Solicitor General
Lots J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
ANNE 8S. ALMY
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
EVELYN 8S. YING
Attorneys
JULY 1996
dard of review, giving deference to ine scientific and technical
judgments of the expert agencies. See pages 46-47, supra.
A suit under the APA challenging the Bureau's water allocation
decisions would be governed by zone of interests principles, since the
zone of interests test is “a gloss on the meaning of § 702” of the APA.
Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 395 (1987). The
inquiry would focus, however, on whether a potential plaintiff's claim
fell within the zone of interests protected by federal statutes governing
the Bureau's allocation of water. Petitioners would clearly satisfy that
requirement.
APPENDIX
1. Section 1536 of Title 16 of the United States
Code provides in pertinent part:
§ 1536. Interagency cooperation
(a) Federal agency actions and consultations
*_*e* *& * *
(2) Each Federal agency shall, in consultation
with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to
as an “agency action”) is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such species which
is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless
such agency has been granted an exemption for such
action by the Committee pursuant to subsection (h) of
this section. In fulfilling the requirements of this
paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific
and commercial data available.
* * eK *
(la)
2a
2. Section 1540 of Title 16 of the United States
Code provides in pertinent part:
§ 1540. Penalties and enforcement
* ** * *
(g) Citizen suits
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection any person may commence a civil suit on
his own behalf—
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United
States and any other governmental instrumental-
ity or agency (to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is
alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter or regulation issued under the authority
thereof; or
(B) to compel the Secretary to apply, pursuant
to section 1535(g)(2)(B)(@ii) of this title, the pro-
hibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to
section 1533(d) or 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title with
respect to the taking of any resident endangered
species or threatened species within any State; or
(C) against the Secretary where there is
alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any
act or duty under section 1533 of this title which
is not discretionary with the Secretary.
The district courts shal! have jurisdiction, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizen-
ship of the parties, to enforce any such provision or
regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such
act or duty, as the case may be. In any civil suit
commenced under subparagraph (B) the district court
3a
shall compel the Secretary to apply the prohibition
sought if the court finds that the allegation that
an emergency exists is supported by substantial
evidence.
(2A) No action may be commenced under sub-
paragraph (1)(A) of this section—
(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of
the violation has been given to the Secretary, and
to any alleged violator of any such provision or
regulation;
(ii) if the Secretary has commenced action to
impose a penalty pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section; or
(iii) if the United States has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a criminal action in a court
of the United States or a State to redress a
violation of any such provision or regulation.
(B) No action may be commenced under sub-
paragraph (1)(B) of this section—
(i) prior to sixty days after written notice has
been given to the Secretary setting forth the
reasons why an emergency is thought to exist
with respect to an endangered species or a
threatened species in the State concerned; or
(ii) if the Secretary has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting action under section
1535(g)(2)(B)(ii) of this title to determine whether
any such emergency exists.
(C) No action may be commenced under subpara-
graph (1)(C) of this section prior to sixty days after
written notice has been given to the Secretary;
4a
except that such action may be brought immediately
after such notification in the case of an action under
this section respecting an emergency posing a
significant risk to the well-being of any species of fish
or wildlife or plants.
(3A) Any suit under this subsection may be
brought in the judicial district in which the violation
occurs.
(B) In any such suit under this subsection in which
the United States is not a party, the Attorney Gen-
eral, at the request of the Secretary, may intervene
on behalf of the United States as a matter of right.
(4) The court, in issuing any final order in any suit
brought pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) to any party,
whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.
(5) The injunctive relief provided by this subsec-
tion shall not restrict any right which any person (or
class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Secretary or a State agency).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.