Amicus Curiae Brief — Lewis v. Casey

No. 94-1511

Supreme Court of the Uniteé

October Term, 1994 .-

e

SAMUEL LEWIS, et al.,

Petitioners,

FLETCHER CASEY, JR., et al.,

Respondents.

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Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

S

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATES OF

CALIFORNIA, ALASKA, FLORIDA, HAWAII,

IDAHO, KENTUCKY, MASSACHUSETTS,

MICHIGAN, MINNESOTA, MONTANA, NEVADA,

NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK, OHIO, OREGON,

RHODE ISLAND, UTAH AND VERMONT

IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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DanieL E. LUNGREN,

Attorney General

Peter J. SIGGINs,

Sr. Asst. Atty. Genl.

Morris LENK,

Sr. Supv. Atty. Genl.

Kart S. MAYER

Bruce M. SLavin*

Deputy Attorneys General

455 Golden Gate Ave.,

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 703-2841

Attorneys for Amici States

*Counsel of Record

AMICUS STATES

Re: Lewis v. Casey

ALASKA

Bruce M. BoTELHO

Attorney General of the

State of Alaska

Office of the Attorney

General

123 4th Street, 6th Floor

Juneau, AK 99801

Phone: 907/465-3600

FLORIDA

Rosert A. BUTTERWORTH

Attorney General of the

State of Florida

Office of the Attorney

General

The Capitol, PL 01

Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050

Phone: 904/487-1963

HAWAII

Rosert A. Marks

Attorney General of the

State of Hawaii

Office of the Attorney

General

425 Queen Street

Honolulu, HI 96813

Phone: 808/586-1282

IDAHO

ALLEN G. LANCE

Attorney General of the

State of Idaho

Office of the Attorney

General

Statehouse

Boise, ID 83720-1000

Phone: 208/334-2400

KENTUCKY

Curis GORMAN

Attorney General of the

State of Kentucky

Suite 116

Capitol Building

Frankfurt, KY 40601

Phone: 502/564-7600

MASSACHUSETTS

Scott HARSHBARGER

Attorney General of the

State of Massachusetts

Office of the Attorney

General

One Ashburton Place

Boston, MA 02108-1698

Phone: 617/727-2200

MICHIGAN

FRANK J. KELLEY

Attorney General of the

State of Michigan

Office of the Attorney

General

P. O. Box 30212

525 West Ottawa Street

Lansing, MI 48909-0212

Phone: 517/373-1110

MINNESOTA

Husert H. Humpnurey III

Attorney General of the

State of Minnesota

Office of the Attorney

General

State Capitol, Suite 102

St. Paul, MN 55155

Phone: 612/296-6196

MONTANA

Joe MazuReKk

Attorney General of the

State of Montana

Office of the Attorney

General

Justice Building

215 North Sanders

Helena, MT 59620-1401

Phone: 406/444-2026

NEVADA

FRANKIE Sue Det Papa

Attorney General of the

State of Nevada

Office of the Attorney

General

Old Supreme Court

Building

198 South Carson

Carson City, NV 89710

Phone: 702/687-4170

NEW JERSEY

DesoraH T. Poritz

Attorney General of the

State of New Jersey

25 Market Street

CN080

Trenton, NJ 08625

Phone: 609/292-4925

NEW YORK

Dennis C. Vacco

Attorney General of the

State of New York

Office of the Attorney

General

Department of Law

120 Broadway, 25th Floor

New York, NY 10271

Phone: 212/416-8050

OHIO

Betry MONTGOMERY

Attorney General of the

State of Ohio

Office of the Attorney

General

State Office Tower

30 East Broad Street

Columbus, OH 43266

Phone: 614/466-3376

OREGON

THEODORE R. KULONGOSKI

Attorney General of the

State of Oregon

400 Justice Building

Salem, OR 97310

Phone: 503/378-4402

RHODE ISLAND

Jerrrey B. Pine

Attorney General of the

State of Rhode Island

72 Pine Street

Providence, RI 02903

Phone: 401/274-4400

UTAH '

JAN GRAHAM

Attorney General of the

State of Utah

Office of the Attorney

General

236 State Capitol

Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Phone: 801/538-1326

VERMONT

JEFFREY AMESTOY

Attorney General of the

State of Vermont

109 State Street

Montpelier, UT 05609-1001

Phone: 802/828-3171

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court’s order in this “access to

courts” case, which greatly expanded the State of Ari-

zona’s financial and administrative burdens and shifted

much of the management of the state’s prison system to

the federal judiciary, exceeds the constitutional require-

ments set forth in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED.......... 10 Ah neeananes i

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE............... 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION....... 4

NOE goon cxcccssdedeeuescacadetcacesteess 4

CORRS occ vvcvcncccessovesccencensousuaeens 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397 (10th Cir.

Sa ae RUASs oa atu aw aks AREA e CORONER ee Shu dud es 10

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).................. 12

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)............ passim

Carter v. Fair, 786 F.2d 433 (1st Cir. 1986)........... 10

Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1994)

PodhucesaCeukasdeeceeekecesaveenn dies. 7&9 0,

Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1980) .......... 9

Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986)........... 5.8

Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) ................ 6

Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, Knop v. McGinnis, __ U.S. __, 113

eS. i ca ak uuned aca benwass.esae deen nes 8

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).............. 6

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)........... 6

Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988)....... 11

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)............ 6

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) .................. 5

Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1989)........ 11

Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1992) ....... 11

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987)............ y

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)............ 9, 10, 12

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Valentine v. Beyer, 850 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1988)........ G

Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 1994)....... 1]

Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978),

cert. denied, 441 U.S. 911 (1979)................4.. )

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)........ 5, 6, 10

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

This brief in support of the Petition for Writ of Cer-

tiorari filed by prison officials of the Arizona Department

of Corrections, is submitted on behalf of the State of

California and the other signature States (“the Amici

States”) through their Attorneys General pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 37.5. The Amici States have an

important interest in this case because they all operate

correctional facilities in which they must assist the per-

sons whom they incarcerate in obtaining access to courts.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has

affirmed an order of the District Court of Arizona which

would dramatically expand the physical access to law

libraries that states must allow prisoners, the legal mate-

rials they must be provided, and the legal assistance from

highly qualified individuals which must be available to

all prisoners, even literate prisoners who have physical

access to a law library. Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d 1261 (9th

Cir. 1994). This is based in part on the lower courts’

failure to limit the scope of access to courts to the filing of

habeas corpus petitions and civil rights complaints. The

lower courts’ decisions are explicitly based only on the

language used by this Court in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.

817, 828 (1977) that requires prison officials to “assist

inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal

papers... . ” (emphasis added).

As noted by petitioners, in order to provide “mean-

ingful” access Arizona prison officials have been ordered

to:

Open their law libraries between 50 to 80 hours

per week, including night and weekend hours,

regardless of demand;

Provide fully equipped law libraries at every

prison unit that has a capacity of 150 or more

inmates;

Hire full-time, professionally trained librarians

with law or paralegal degrees for every law

library;

Provide extensively trained inmate legal assis-

tants to all inmates, even if the inmates are

literate and have physical access to a law

library;

Provide a legal assistant training program,

including a legal research course of approx-

imately 60 hours in length to be taught by law-

yers, law students, or trained paralegals at each

law library twice a year;

Provide a weekly minimum of three 20-minute

telephone calls to an attorney, an attorney repre-

sentative, or a legal organization;

Purchase a complete up-to-date set of regional

reporters and digests, in addition to state reporters

and digests, for each law library;

Allow inmates to regulate the time, place and

manner in which they gain access to and utilize

the law library and legal assistants; and

Allow inmates direct access to browse in the

library stacks, unless prison officials can first

document an actual security risk.

In California alone there are currently 29 prisons

border to border across a state of 159,000 square miles.

The state incarcerates more than 126,000 inmates. To com-

ply with the order affirmed by the Court of Appeals in

this case, California would have to add an unprecedented

amount of library facilities and staff and make substantial

operation changes, all at a significant cost and risk to

prison security.

A typical California prison houses approximately

4,000 inmates in about four semi-autonomous facilities.

To meet the library access requirement approximately

four new full libraries would have to be opened at every

prison for a total of at least 116 prison libraries. An equal

number of qualified librarians would also have to be

hired. California already has difficulty finding a sufficient

number of qualified librarians to staff its existing

libraries. Opening these additional libraries would likely

require the conversion of existing inmate program space.

If these libraries were to be open five days a week they

would have to be available for inmate use 24 hours per

day to fulfill the requirements of the order in this case.

The inmate legal assistance program prescribed by

the lower courts would severely threaten prison security

by placing the inmate assistanis in a position of power

and influence over the inmates they are assisting. The

program also gives inmates power over the administra-

tors by providing them with labor rights similar to prison

employees.

Allowing inmates direct access to the library stacks

may adversely affect the availability of books because

they can more readily be destroyed by inmates without

any way of accounting for which inmate may have been

responsible. Direct access also presents security problems

in that inmates can easily pass notes to each through the

unchecked use of the library books.

While the numbers may not be as great in the other

Amici States, the impact of being compelled to comply

with the standards set forth by the lower courts in this

case would be proportionately severe on all Amici States,

especially given that the number of cases filed in 1993

rose by 14 percent and inmate filings rose by 10 percent

even without the solicitude shown by the Ninth Circuit in

the instant case. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the

Federal Judiciary (1994) at 5, fn. 2.

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Introduction

This case presents important questions of federal law

which have not been, but should be, settled by this Court

concerning the scope of the duties of prison officials

under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817. In addition, many

portions of the decision of the Court of Appeals conflict

with this Court’s decision in Bounds.

Dissenting in Bounds, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote

that the majority’s analysis “places questions of prisoner

access on a ‘slippery slope. ...’” Id. at 837. While the

present case clearly represents the extreme, the divergent

views of the courts in cases decided after Bounds demon-

strate the need for further clarification and analysis.

In Bounds, this Court held that “the fundamental

constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison

authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing

of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with

adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from per-

sons trained in the law.” Id. at 828. “ ‘Meaningful access’

to the courts is the touchstone.” Id. at 823, quoting Ross v.

Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). The Court noted that its

“main concern” was “ ‘protecting the ability of an inmate

to prepare a petition or complaint.’” Id. at 828, n.17,

quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974).

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit aptly

noted that “Bounds was a limited decision” which was the

“culmination of a series of cases holding that imprison-

ment should not deprive persons of access to courts.”

Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1985),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986). Summarizing Bounds and

the decisions on which it was based, the Eleventh Circuit

stated:

All of these decisions simply removed barriers

to court access that imprisonment or indigency

erected. They in effect tended to place prisoners

in the same position as non-prisoners and indi-

gent prisoners in the same position as non-indi-

gent prisoners.

Id. at 1436.

The decision in the current case is the complete

antithesis of a “limited” decision. Seizing on the word

“meaningful,” the Ninth Circuit greatly expands the right

of access to courts for prisoners beyond anything either

held or suggested in the Bounds opinion.’ Certiorari

should be granted to address the following issues of great

importance:

1. The opinion in Bounds states repeatedly that the

right of access to courts encompasses only the filing of

habeas corpus petitions and civil rights complaints. See

id. at 823 (discussing holding in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.

483, 489 (1969) that ban on inmate assistance effectively

prevented some prisoners from preparing petitions to

challenge legality of their confinement and extension of

that holding to civil rights actions in Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. at 577-580); 825 (“inquiry is rather whether law

libraries or other forms of legal assistance are needed to

give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to pre-

sent claimed violations of fundamental constitutional

rights to the courts” and discussion of basic requirements

for filing of habeas corpus petition or civil rights com-

plaint); 827 (“in this case, we are concerned in large part

1 The expansive nature of the order in this case concerning

access to courts involves the federal judiciary in a broad range

of prison operational issues. In Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1,

11 (1989), this Court noted that the constitutional origin of the

right of access to courts is still shadowy. “The prisoner’s right of

access has been described as a consequence of the right to due

process of law, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974),

and as an aspect of equal protection, see Pennsylvania v. Finley,

481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987).” Id. at 11, n.6. Indeed, in Bounds, each of

the dissenting opinions questioned whether there was any con-

stitutional right of access to court. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 834-835

(Burger, C.J., dissenting), 836-837 (Stewart, J., dissenting),

837-841 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Amici submit that a constitu-

tional right of such questionable underpinnings and scope

should not form the basis of such a gross intrusion into prison

administration.

with original actions seeking new trials, release from

confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights”

and emphasizing that “habeas corpus and civil rights

actions are of ‘fundamental importance . . . in our consti-

tutional scheme...’ ”); 828 n.17 (“our main concern here

is ‘protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition

or complaint.’ ”).

The decision in this case fails to recognize the limited

scope of the constitutional right of access to courts. While

the Court of Appeals never expressly states that the right

encompasses more than the filing of petitions for writs of

habeas corpus and civil rights complaints, its expansive

view is implicit throughout the opinion. For example it

affirms the district court’s requirement that defendants

offer a 30-40 hour videotape instruction course for all

prisoners. The district court required that

Doctrinal areas of most concern to prisoners

should be covered, including 42 U.S.C. Section

1983 and other major civil rights laws; prison

practices, including disciplinary and classifica-

tion measures; relevant tort and civil law,

including immigration and family issues, and

relevant areas of criminal procedure, including

appeals, collateral attacks, Habeas Corpus and

time computations.

Casey, 43 F.3d at 1277 (emphasis added).

This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the criti-

cal issue of the scope of the right of access to courts.

2. In Bounds, this Court expressly held that prison

officials could satisfy their duty of providing access to

courts either by providing access to an adequate law

library or by providing prisoners with assistance from

persons trained in the law. Discretion was to be afforded

prison officials in choosing whether to select one of those

alternatives or some combination of books and trained

staff. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 830-831. The decision in this

case obliterates that discretion and micro-manages the

prisons in the name of access to courts. It requires that

every library employ staff who possess a law or a parale-

gal degree. Casey, 43 F.3d at 1268, 1275. These highly

trained professionals must be available to assist all

inmates.? Id. at 1267-1268.

In Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d at 1436, the Court of

Appeals stated that the facts that many prisoners are

illiterate and that non-lawyers cannot provide those

inmates with the same level of assistance as lawyers are

so obvious that “[i]t presses credulity to contend that the

Supreme Court in Bounds intended that there would be a

constitutional right to legal counsel, if it were found that

some prisoners were illiterate and that non-lawyers could

not use the libraries as well as lawyers.” Nevertheless the

Ninth Circuit in this case, as well as several other courts,

have found that prison officials must provide inmates

with assistance from persons trained in the law. See gener-

ally, Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1006 (6th Cir. 1992),

cert. denied, Knop v. McGinnis, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1415

2 The Court of Appeals takes a very broad view of illiteracy,

including within that category not only inmates who cannot

read but also inmates who cannot read at a high school level.

The Court of Appeals found that 35 percent of the inmates

cannot read English above a seventh grade level and that 14.5

percent cannot speak English. Id. at 1270. Thus, under the deci-

sion in this case, prison officials must provide specialized legal

assistance to as many as 50 percent of the prisoners.

(1993); Valentine v. Beyer, 850 F.2d 951, 956-957 (3d Cir.

1988); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 (5th Cir. 1980). The

conflicting decisions of the appellate courts as well as the

importance of this issue necessitate granting the petition

in this case.

3. This Court has consistently recognized that even

prisoners’ constitutional rights must yield to the legiti-

mate penological interests of prison administrators. E.g.,

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In this case, the

Court of Appeals failed to consider the legitimate inter-

ests of prison administrators in the safe and orderly

running of the prisons when it uncritically upheld every

aspect of an order that requires that all prisoners, with

the exception of those found guilty of specific acts of

misconduct, must not only be able to go to the law library

but that prisoners must also be able to browse through

the library stacks. Casey, 43 F.3d at 1266-1267.

There are two fundamental flaws in this holding.

First, nothing in Bounds suggests that the use of a law

library requires that a prisoner be physically present in

the library itself. It is the access to the books themselves,

not the physical plant, which is the key to meaningful

access. Moreover, assuming that inmates must be allowed

to visit the library, the requirement that they be allowed

to browse through the stacks is nonsensical. Previous

decisions of the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have

found that “legal research often requires browsing

through various materials in search of inspiration. .. . ”

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1110 (9th Cir. 1986),

cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987), quoting Williams v. Leeke,

584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.

911 (1979) (emphasis added). Browsing through materials

10

is quite different from browsing through library stacks.

While a person may need to review a number of digests

or case reporters to discover and develop a legal theory,

this is not accomplished by strolling the aisles of a library.

Thus, there is simply no basis for the order requiring

prison officials to permit inmates the freedom to roam

through the library stacks.

Assuming arguendo that a right might be found to go

to the library and to browse through the stacks, the Ninth

Circuit erred when it failed to consider any reasonable

security or operational concerns of prison officials as

required under Turner. This Court should grant certiorari

to determine with unmistakable clarity 1) whether

inmates have a right to physical access to a law library; 2)

if so, whether that right includes browsing through the

library stacks; and 3) if these rights exist, whether they

are outweighed by prison officials’ legitimate security

concerns.

4. The prior decisions of this Court have not recog-

nized that prison officials have some constitutional duty

to assist inmates in obtaining access to courts beyond

preparing a petition or complaint. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828,

n.17; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576. Accordingly, at least two

circuits have held that the state’s affirmative obligation to

assist prisoners in the preparation of legal papers ends

after the filing of an initial petition or complaint. Bee v.

Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397, 398-399 (10th Cir. 1987);

Carter v. Fair, 786 F.2d 433, 435-436 (1st Cir. 1986). The

decision of the Court of Appeals in this case fails to

recognize any limits on the constitutional duty of state

prison officials to assist state prisoners to file lawsuits

11

against the same state officials. This Court should grant

certiorari to resolve this important issue of law.

5. Several circuits, including two prior panels of the

Ninth Circuit, have held that prisoners challenging the

adequacy of a legal access policy bear the burden of

showing that the prison’s policies resulted in an instance

in which the prisoner was actually denied access to a

court. Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994);

Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289, 292-293 (7th Cir. 1992);

Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Peterkin

v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1041 (3d Cir. 1988). The Court of

Appeals in this case, for reasons left unknown, stated that

the issue of actual injury was not before it, although the

issue had been raised by the prison officials. Casey, 43

F.3d at 1267 n.3. In the cases cited above, however, the

courts were of the view that for any access issue other

than the core issues of Bounds —- adequacy of the library or

legal assistance — the prisoner always bears the burden of

proving an actual injury. Certiorari should be granted to

resolve the issue of whether proof of a violation of access

to courts — other than the core Bounds issues - always

requires that the prisoner demonstrate that he or she has

actually been denied access to courts.

6. Critical to this Court’s affirmance of the lower

court’s judgment in Bounds was its observation that, fol-

lowing a finding that the prison administrators had vio-

lated the inmates’ right of access to courts, “the courts

below scrupulously respected the limits in their role.” 430

U.S. at 832. This Court noted that the district court in

Bounds

12

did not thereupon thrust itself into prison

administration. Rather, it ordered petitioners

themselves to devise a remedy for the violation,

strongly suggesting that it would prefer a plan

providing trained legal advisors. Petitioners

chose to establish law libraries, however, and

their plan was approved with only minor objec-

tions over the strong objections of respondents.

Id. at 832-833. In the years since Bounds was decided, this

Court has continually reaffirmed the deference owed to

prison officials in the administration of this nation’s

prisons. E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89; Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979).

The courts in this case have also expressed a clear

preference for the use of legal assistants. Casey, 43 F.3d at

1268. Rather than defer to the discretion of prison admin-

istrators, however, they have fully directed the operation

of virtually all aspects of the administrators’ law library

program.? The district court’s order in this case involves

it in such minutiae as setting the hours in which libraries

must be open, including evening and weekend hours;

procedures for the collection of legal access requests;

3 In noting what it sees as the advantage of having legal

assistance over libraries alone, the Court of Appeals refers to

the possibility of mediation of prisoner complaints that cur-

rently place a burden on it. Jd. at 1268 n.6. Amici States are well

aware of the burdens placed on them and on the courts in which

they practice by the ceaseless growth of inmate litigation. What-

ever the merits of a proposal to control the burden on the courts,

it simply cannot form any basis for an injunction arrogating to

the federal courts the discretion properly vested in prison offi-

cials.

13

preparation of written guides for use of the library; cre-

dentials for a law librarian; strict selection and retention

criteria for trained legal assistants; and minimum times

and durations of telephone calls to attorneys. Id. at

1272-1283.

It appears that the entire basis for the Court of

Appeals’ affirmance of the district court’s order is that

the provisions of that order are required to provide mean-

ingful access to courts under Bounds. It is not clear from

the opinion whether the Court of Appeals has determined

that each and every aspect of the district court’s order is

required to provide meaningful access under Bounds or

whether the Court of Appeals determined that once a

court finds that inmates have been denied access to

courts it is free to choose whatever remedy will most

easily maximize access. This Court should grant certiorari

to clarify that the components of a legal access system

ordered by the lower courts are not required by Bounds.

This Court should also clarify that even a violation of

prisoners’ right of access to courts does not divest prison

officials of all discretion to develop and implement an

adequate system of access.

14

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, the Petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Daniet E. LUNGREN,

Attorney General

Peter J. SIGGINs,

Sr. Asst. Atty. Genl.

Morris LENK,

Sr. Supv. Atty. Genl.

Kart S. MAYER

Bruce M. Siavin*

Deputy Attorneys General

455 Golden Gate Ave.,

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 703-2841

Attorneys for Amici States

*Counsel of Record

April 13, 1995