Amicus Curiae Brief — Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
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MOTION FILED
FEB 24 U
No. 92-1292
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
LUTHER R. CAMPBELL, a/k/a LUKE SKYYWALKER,
CHRISTOPHER WONGWON, a/k/a FRESH KID ICE,
MARK Ross, a/k/a BROTHER MARQUIS,
DAVID HoBBS, a/k/a MR. MIxx;
professionally known as THE 2 LIVE CREw;
LUKE SKYYWALKER RECORDS,
e Petitioners,
ACUFF-RosE Music, INC.,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
AND BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
CAPITOL STEPS PRODUCTIONS, INC.
AND MARK RUSSELL
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
— —— —
WILLIAM C. LANE *
DAVID CHARLES MASSELLI
MASSELLI & LANE, P.C.
8260 Greensboro Drive
Suite 260
McLean, Virginia 22102
(703) 556-9550
Counsel for Capitol Steps
Production, Inc. and Mark
Russell
* Counsel of Record
WILSON - Eras Printine Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
— — >
—
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-1292
LUTHER R. CAMPBELL, a/k/a LUKE SKYYWALKER,
CHRISTOPHER WONGWON, a/k/a FRESH KID ICE,
MARK Ross, a/k/a BROTHER MARQUIS,
Davip Hosss, a/k/a Mr. MIxx;
professionally known as THE 2 LIVE CREW;
LUKE SKYYWALKER RECORDS,
0 Petitioners,
AcuFF-RosE Music, INC.,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
Pursuant to Rule 37.2 of this Honorable Court, Capitol
Steps Products, Inc. (“The Capitol Steps“) and Mark
Russell move for leave to submit briefs as amici curiae
in support of the Petitioner in this matter. Their brief
in support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari focuses
on the effect which the Sixth Circuit’s holding in this case
will have on the art of musical parody, and provides in-
formation not contained in the Petitioner’s brief regard-
ing the significance of musical parody to the nation. Be-
cause both Mr. Russell and The Capitol Steps are, as
more fully described below, directly engaged in the busi-
ness of musical parody, they will be directly and person-
ally affected by the Court’s decision in this case. Both of
them participated as amici curiae in proceedings before
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this matter.
The Petitioner has granted permission for the filing of
this brief, which consent is on file, but the Respondent
has refused permission.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
Your amici curiae have a significant interest in the
outcome of this case. The Capitol Steps have been per-
forming, in Washintgon, D.C. and nationally, for eleven
years. Declaration of William A. Strauss, hereinafter
“Strauss Dec.,” attached to the brief as Appendix A, at
77 1-2. A Capitol Steps performance consists primarily
of song parodies, principally of copyrighted songs. The
parodies, which generally have a high current political
content, range in length from a few bars to an entire
parody rendition. Recent examples keyed to the Presi-
dential campaign were “I Wanna Be Your Pander Bear,”
and „I've Taken Stands on Both Sides Now,” satirical
jabs at President Clinton and former President Bush, re-
spectively. Strauss Dec. . 3.
Mark Russell has been performing parody in the Wash-
ington, D.C. area and nationally for nearly 40 years. He
regularly appears on national network radio and televi-
sion. For the past 18 years, he has hosted his own “Mark
Russell Comedy Specials” on public television. Declara-
tion of Alison K. Russell, hereinafter Russell Dec.,“ at-
tached to the brief as Appendix B, at ff 2-3. Along with
spoken material, Mark Russell performs song parodies
to both copyrighted and original melodies. One of his
recent parodies of a copyrighted work is “We’re Just
Wild About Harry” to the tune of “I’m Just Wild About
Harry,” a satirical look at how both President Clinton
and former President Bush invoked the name of Harry
Truman during the campaign. Russell Dec. { 5.
Neither The Capitol Steps nor Mark Russell seek or
obtain licenses from copyright owners for their song
parodies. They take this position for several reasons:
First, both have been advised that their parodies of copy-
righted songs constitute a “fair use” of the copyrighted
materials. Strauss Dec. 14; Russell Dec. J 6. Second,
the very nature of social and political satire makes it
impossible to obtain timely permission. Both perform
topical political satire based on current political events;
the process of asking for and receiving permission would
make it impossible for them to perform the kind of cur-
rent repertoire which their audiences have come to expect.
Russell Dec. J 7; Strauss Dec. J 8.
Finally, asking permission would also be interpreted
by music publishers as a request for an endorsement of
the political ideas contained within the lyrics. Since the
political views contained within a sing are solely those
of the parodist, no endorsement is needed or wanted.
Obviously, there may be copyright holders who do not
endorse the political views expressed in a specific Mark
Russell or Capitol Steps song parody. Moreover, many
copyrights are owned by large corporations with exten-
sive interests and involvement in the national political
process. These corporations are generally reluctant to
appear to endorse a song which embarrasses the current
administration, or a powerful Senator or Member of Con-
gress. A requirement that political parodists obtain, or
attempt to obtain permission before signing or recording
a particular song would make it nearly impossible to
perform political song parody. Russell Dec. J 6-8;
Strauss Dec. M 6-8; Strauss Dec. 4-7.
In view of the above facts, the interest of amici in the
pending proceeding is clear: if it is u lawful for 2 Live
Crew to sing the song parody “Pretty Woman” except
with the permission of the copyright owners to the under-
lying work, then it may be unlawful for the Capitol Steps
to sing “I’ve Taken Stands on Both Sides Now” without
permission from the copyright owner of “I’ve Looked at
Life from Both Sides Now,” or for Mark Russell to sing
„We're Just Wild About Harry” without permission from
the copyright owner of “I’m Just Wild About Harry.” In
fact, under the ruling of the Court below, it would be ef-
fectively impossible for the amici or any of the other hun-
dreds of well known and less well known parodists operat-
ing in the musical genre to perform at all, thereby
impoverishing the world of both music and political dis-
course. Accordingly, amici have a strong and direct in-
terest in the granting of this Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari.
Dated: February 24, 1993
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM C. LANE *
DAVID CHARLES MASSELLI
MASSELLI & LANE, P.C.
8260 Greensboro Drive
Suite 260
McLean, Virginia 22102
(703) 556-9550
Counsel for Capitol Steps
Production, Inc. and Mark
Russell
* Counsel of Record
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ee ——
STATEMENT OF INTEREST TT
— 1
I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION
Il.
OF THE FAIR USE STATUTORY FACTORS
IS AT ODDS WITH THE SETTLED LAW
REGARDING PARODIES, PARICULARLY
AS THAT LAW HAS BEEN TRADITION-
ALLY FORMULATED IN THE SECOND AND
1 —
A. The Sixth Circuit Erred in Finding That
the Commercial Nature of a Parody Was
Dispositive of the First Statutory Fair Use
Factor
B. The Sixth Circuit Misapplied the Substan-
tiality Test as It Pertains to Song Parodies..
C. The Sixth Circuit Erred in Its Evaluation of
the Fourth Statutory Fair Use Factor by
Creating an Irrebuttable Presumption That
a Commercial Parody Will Harm the Copy-
e .
D. The Argument That a Parody Interferes
With the Right of a Copyright Owner to
Profit From Its Own Parodies Is Without
K
THE FORMULATION OF FAIR USE
ADOPTED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT WOULD
MAKE POLITICAL SONG PARODY DAN-
GEROUS OR IMPOSS IBI
— —— — —
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Declaration of William A. Strauss
Appendix B: Declaration of Alison K. Russell.
Appendix C: Declaration of William A. Strauss.
11
13
16
1a
5 8
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541
II K es OS ae 2,5
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 482
F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), af d 623 F.2d 252
ee... q . ee ee 2, 5, 8
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1986) 2, 5, 8
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC
D tntniniaannttieetatnnnitaiiih tetas 12
Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 589 (1988)))))))))) 6, 7,9, 10, 12
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) 4
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) 10
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 416,
ot GF fe 10
Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., ONeill
v. Walt Disney Productions, 489 U.S. 1132
a ere ae ee ee ee 4
STATUTES
K 2, 4, 6, 11
— . NTE 2
r qq ALA 9, 10
TREATISES
3 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05 [C] (19927 18
10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore’s Federal Practice
5301.04 [4.1] (2d ed. 1988) . 10
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ......................... 6
G. Smith, Joe Hill, Salt Lake City, University of
Utah Press (19699 14, 15
V. Lawrence, Music for Patriots, Politicians, and
Presidents, New York, McMillan (19759 15
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1990 15
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-1292
LUTHER R. CAMPBELL, a/k/a LUKE SKYYWALKER,
CHRISTOPHER WONGWON, a/k/a FRESH KM Ick,
MARK Ross, a/k/a BROTHER MARQUIS,
Davip Hosss, a/k/a MR. MIxx;
professionally known as THE 2 LIVE CREW;
LUKE SKYYWALKER RECORDS,
. Petitioners,
ACUFF-ROSsE Music, INC.,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF OF CAPITOL STEPS PRODUCTIONS, INC. AND
MARK RUSSELL AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Capitol Steps and Mark Russell submit this brief
as amici curiae, and respectfully suggest that this Court
grant the Petition, and reverse the decision below.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Statement of Interest is included in the Motion for
Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, ante.
2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To prevent copyright protection of intellectual property
from becoming a straightjacket, courts and the Congress
have developed the doctrine of fair use,“ which provides
that copyrighted material may be quoted or copied ver-
batim under certain conditions. “Fair use” status has
regularly been granted to those who quote from copy-
righted works to explain or critique them, and to those
who parody copyrighted works.
The song parodist routinely appropriates more of a
work than other beneficiaries of the fair use doctrine.
Anyone is free to record a copyrighted song by paying
the statutory mechanica! copyright fee. But the parodist
who, by definition, modifies the lyric (and sometimes the
tune) to make his point cannot qualify for the compulsory
license provided by Section 115 of the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. 8115. Thus, unless the parody is treated as a
“fair use,” the parodist must obtain permission from the
copyright owner. Such permission is rarely granted.
A line of decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits—
home to major entertainment centers—have found paro-
dies to be “fair use.” See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v.
Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Fisher v. Dees, 794
F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Berlin v. E.C. Publications,
Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964). These Second
and Ninth Circuit opinions have for many years consti-
tuted the “bill of rights” for song parodists.
The “fair use” doctrine is now codified at 17 U.S.C.
107, which provides in relevant part that:
Section 115 provides for the so-called “mechanical license,“ which
allows anyone to make a copy of a phonorecord, subject only to the
requirement that pre-set royalties be paid. The right to use Section
115 is limited; while “arrangements” are allowed, “the arrangement
may not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the
work.” 11 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
3
In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of commercial nature or is for
nonprofi, educational purposes:
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work ;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
In this case, the Sixth Circuit has found that a song
parody did not constitute fair use. It made this deter-
mination almost entirely on the basis of a finding that
the parody was recorded for a “commercial” purpose. The
test applied by the Sixth Circuit effectively rendered the
four factor test embodied in the statute moot by holding
that the “commercial” nature of the parody was disposi-
tive. In particular, the Court below impermissibly es-
tablished an irrebuttable presumption that the “commer-
cial” purpose of a parody mandated a finding that the
parody caused economic harm to the copyright holder.
This emphasis on “comercial” purpose disregards the
statutory language, and renders the statutory balancing
tests meaningless. The new test applied by the Sixth Cir-
cuit would bring an end to musical political parody as it
has existed since the time of the Revolution, and allows
censorship by copyright of protected speech.
1
ARGUMENT
I. THE SIXTH CIRCUTTS INTERPRETATION OF
THE FAIR USE STATUTORY FACTORS IS AT
ODDS WITH THE SETTLED LAW REGARDING
PARODIES, PARTICULARLY AS THAT LAW HAS
BEEN TRADITIONALLY FORMULATED IN THE
SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS.
In any fair use case involving an asserted parody, the
first question is whether the song or other work in ques-
tion is a parody at all. Here the Sixth Circuit answered
that question in the affirmative, as did the District Court.
Petition App. A at 10a; Petition App. B at 42a. Accord-
ingly, those cases in which courts have found that parody
(or another form of fair use) did not exist, including
MCA, Ine. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981); and
Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied sub nom., O'Neill v. Walt Disney
Productions, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979), are inapposite to this
case. Instead, the Court was required to examine the
statutory fair use factors set forth at 17 U.S.C. § 107,
and such other factors as it found relevant, to determine
whether the parody by 2 Live Crew of Acuff-Roe’s song
was “fair.” This the Court did; however, at least in ap-
plying the first, third, and fourth factors, it established
tests which are both impossible to meet for any commer-
cial song parody, and squarely at odds with those factors
as enunciated by the Second and Ninth Circuits.
The analysis used by the Sixth Circuit, particularly
with respect to the first and fourth statutory fair use
factors, would mandate a finding of no fair use for any
commercial parody, not just 2 Live Crew’s parody of
“Pretty Woman.”
5
A. The Sixth Circuit Erred in Finding That the Com-
mercial Nature of a Parody Was Dispositive of the
First Statutory Fair Use Factor.
The first of the four fair use factors is:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.
Both the majority and the dissent in this case concluded
that the purpose of the 2 Live Crew song “Pretty
Woman” was parody, and that its character was com-
mercial. Petition App. A. at 10a-12a and App. B. at
40a-42a. The difference between them lies in whether the
fact of commercial use was treated as dispositive for pur-
poses of utilizing this factor: the majority held that once
a commercial use was found, the status of the work as
parody was irrelevant; the dissent held that commercial
use, per se, did not determine whether this fair use factor
was present or absent.
Traditionally, real song parodies, nearly all of which
are done in part for a commercial purpose, are accorded
no less respect for that reason than hypothetical, non-
commercial parodies. Indeed, the cases governing parody
as a fair use all involve commercial parodies. See, e..
Elsmere (parody by commercial television network found
to be fair use) ; Fisher (parody by commercial radio sta-
tion personality found to be fair use) ; and Berlin (parody
by commercial magazine found to be fair use). These de-
cisions by the Second and Ninth Circuits have uniformly
held that the commercial nature of the parody, by itself,
wouid not act to bar the fair use defense.
2 While the Court below discussed balancing purpose and char-
acter, it found “that the admittedly commercial nature of the deriva-
tive work—the purpose of the work being no less important than its
character in the Act’s formulation—requires the conclusion that the
first factor weighs against a finding of fair use.” Petition App. A
at 13a. (Emphasis in original).
6
The Sixth Circuit’s holding below rejects this long-
standing treatment of parody as fair use, and establishes
what amounts to a bright line test—if a parody is pro-
duced for a commercial purpose, it is not a fair use. Had
Congress intended the result reached by the majority, it
could have simply written the first factor as “whether
such use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit edu-
cational purposes.” It did not do so.
In formulating the statutory fair use doctrine contained
in 17 U.S.C. 8 107, Congress appears to have focused on
the degree to which copyrighted works could be mechan-
ically or electronically copied and used without payment
of royalties. Much of the discussion centered on whether
a schoolteacher could copy portions of a book for use by
her class. The dependent clause referencing the commer-
cial or non-profit nature of a use was added largely to
expand “fair use” to this area, not to limit the prior scope
of fair use treatment:
The Committee has amended the first of the criteria
to be considered“ the purpose and character of the
use”—to state explicitly that this factor includes a
consideration “whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.“
This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as
any sort of not-for-profit limitation on educational
uses of copyrighted works. It is an expressd recogni-
tion that, as under the present law, the commercial of
non-profit character of an activity, while not con-
clusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighted along with other factors in fair use
decisions.
Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
In reaching its unprecedented decision to afford con-
trolling weight to the commercial character of a parody,
the majority opinion relied heavily on Harper & Row
Pubishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
7
Vet nothing in this Court's decision in that case compels,
or even suggests, an intent to overturn prior law on this
point.
The Court weighed three factors in Harper & Row to
determine the nature and character of the challenged use:
the fact that the challenged use entailed news reporting;
the fact that The Nation was a commercial magazine;
and the fact that it had “the intended purpose of sup-
planting the copyright holder’s valuable right of first
publication.” Jd. at 562. (Emphasis in original.) It was
clearly this last fact, and not the second, which tilted this
Court’s decision on the first fair use factor toward Har-
per & Row: “In evaluating character and purpose we
cannot ignore The Nation’s stated purpose of scooping
the forthcoming hardcover and Time abstracts.” Id. By
contrast, in this case, no such intention to supplant or
“scoop” the original melody of “Oh, Pretty Woman” has
been found on the record of this case, or has even been
alleged.
B. The Sixth Circuit Misapplied the Substantiality
Test as It Pertains to Song Parodies.
The third statutory factor is:
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work a as
Whole.
The use of this statutory factor in the case of parody
is, as the dissent has recognized, “problamatical.” Peti-
tion App. A at 29a. A parody, by its nature, must “con-
jure up” a sufficient portion of the copyrighted work to
be recognizable as parody.
In the specific case of song parodies, the Second Circuit
has endorsed a view of the “substantiality” factor which
differs markedly from the restrictive view of the majority
opinion in this case:
[T]he concept of “conjuring up” an original came
into the copyright law not as a limitation on how
8
much of an original may be used, but as a recognition
that a parody frequently needs to be more than a
fleeting evocation of an original in order to make its
humorous point. Columbus Pictures Corp. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal.
1955). A parody is entitled at least to “conjure up”
the original. Even more extensive use would still be
fair use, provided the parody builds upon the orig-
inal, using the original as a known element of mod-
ern culture and contributing something new for
humorous effect.
Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1. Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit has recognized a “special need for accuracy,” in
song parodies, where a change of a few notes can make
the melody unrecognizable, and destroy the intended musi-
cal joke. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d at 439.
The majority opinion simply makes no sense when ap-
plied to a song parody. While it gives lip service to the
above quotation from Elsmere, it also holds that the use
of a substantial portion of a copyrighted work is evidence
against fair use, and further that:
The qualitative degree of the copying is even more
critical than the quantitative, and we ask what de-
gree of the essence of the original is copied in rela-
tion to its whole. [Citation omitted] We conclude
that taking the heart of the original and making it
the heart of a new work was to purloin a substantial
portion of the essence of the original.
Petition App. A at 15a-16a.
The difficulty with this formulation is that every song
has a recognizable tune. That time constitutes its true
“heart” or “essence.” It is impossible to parody the song
without musically quoting its tune. On the other hand,
according to the majority opinion, once one does quote
this “heart,” one loses (or at least does not win) on this
factor of the fair use test. It appears that such a formu-
lation would cut the “heart” out of the fair use doctrine,
9
insofar as parody is concerned, and once again places the
Sixth Circuit’s formulation of the law squarely at odds
with that enunciated by the Second and Ninth Circuits.
C. The Sixth Circuit Erred in Its Evaluation of the
Fourth Statutory Fair Use Factor by Creating an
Irrebuttable Presumption That a Commercial Par-
ody Will Harm the Copyrighted Work.
The fourth statutory factor is:
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or the value of the copyrighted work.
This Court has called this forth factor “undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use.” Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 566. Despite the importance of this
factor, the copyright holders presented no evidence that
the petitioners’ parody had any effect on the market for
their copyrighted work.“ But the Court below determined
that there was no need for evidence. Having found that
2 Live Crew’s use of the copyrighted work was “wholly
commercial,” the Court “presume[d] that a likelihood
of future harm to Acuff-Rose exists.” Petition App. A
at 16a.
In reaching this rather startling presumption, the ma-
jority opinion relied upon Harper & Row. However, an
evidentiary presumption, such as that created by this
Court in Harper & Row, has only a limited effect. Under
Fed. R. Evid. 301, “a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward
with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does
not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense
On the other hand, 2 Live Crew presented evidence that their
parody did not constitute either a present or future danger to sales
of “Oh, Pretty Woman.” Petitioners made this showing through
the unrebutted affidavits of Oscar Brand and M. William Krasilovsky,
which are attached as Appendices to the Petition. Both experts
testified that the potential customers for the 2 Live Crew parody
and the original Acuff-Rose song are entirely different and distinct.
10
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout
the trial on the party on whom it was originally cast.”
The federal courts, through Rule 301, have adopted the
“bursting bubble” approach te presumptions, under which
the presumption vanishes, and has no further probative
effect, once it has been rebutted. 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix,
Moore’s Federal Practice § 301.04(4.-1] (2d ed. 1988).
This Court found its “commercial use“ presumption to
be rebuttable in the very case in which it created that
presumption. In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 416, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984), the Court first said
that, “every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege which belongs to the owners of the copyright.”
464 U.S. at 451. The Court, however, went on to hold
that the presumption had been rebutted by the respond-
ents, through evidence showing that their commercial
video technology had uses which would not unfairly ex-
ploit this privilege. The “commercial use” presumption of
Sony and Harper & Row was not intended to, nor did
it, overrule sotto voce the traditional fair use protection
afforded commercial song parodies.
When the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court
on this issue, it effectively declared the existence of an
irrebuttable presumption that commercial use must al-
ways result in injury to the market for the copyrighted
work.“ This had the effect of collapsing yet another of the
In fact, the other case principally relied upon by the majority
below, Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992), reached a
contrary conclusion. In that case, the Second Circuit expressly rec-
ognized that the nature of the intended audience of even a direct
copy of a work could require that it be treated as a fair use. Ac-
cording to the Court, “fair use permits lyrics or music to be copied
in a literary magazine, but where the same material is published in
a song sheet magazine, purchased for playing and not simply for
reading, it is an unfair use.” 960 F.2d at 312. This distinction is
similar to the conclusion reached by the Petitioners’ expert, Oscar
11
four factors into a simple statement that commercial
benefit is inconsistent with fair use.“ Had Congress in-
tended this simple and simplistic result, it could have
simply stated so.
D. The Argument That a Parody Interferes With the
Right of a Copyright Owner to Profit From Its Own
Parodies Is Without Merit.
A crucial link in the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit
that parodies must always cause economic harm to a
copyright owners was its argument that the 2 Live Crew
parody would impair the market for parodies by the
copyright holder. The core of the Circuit Court’s reason-
ing on this issue was its argument that 1) copyright
owners have rights in derivative works as well as the
original work; and 2) parodies are derivative works;
therefore 3) copyright owners have rights in parodies of
their own work which will be injured by the issuance of
unlicensed parodies. Petition App. A at 17a.
However, the second element of this syllogism is false;
parodies are, under section 107, not derivative works, but
rather “comment” and “criticism” on a work. The weak-
Brand, who concluded that the 2 Live Crew parody was intended for
an entirely different audience than the original work, and could not
“affect the sales or popularity of the Orbison song, except to stimu-
late interest in the original.” Petition App. D at { 19.
5 The Court below actually linked the first and fourth factors and
decided them both on the basis of the presumption. When discussing
the first factor, the Court implied the existence of a factual test
which it later resolved by the presumption of harm:
Therefore, in analyzing the purpose and character of 2 Live
Crew’s use of the copyrighted song, the facts in the record
require that we start from the position that the use is unfair.
We are asked then to consider whether 2 Live Crew met its
burden to rebut the presumption by a defense, we note, requir-
ing the court to be convinced that the “parody does not unfairly
diminish the economic value of the original.”
Petition App. A at 13a.
12
ness of the Court’s formulation can be seen if one sub-
stitutes musical or theatrical criticism for parody. As-
sume that the New York Times writes a criticism of a
copyrighted play. Clearly, this criticism is prepared and
published for commercial purposes, t. e., to sell newspapers
and newspaper advertising. Could it then be said that
the Times review was a copyright infringement because
it unfairly interfered with the author’s right to criticize
his own work? This would truly be a remarkable result;
yet it seems to be the result mandated by the majority’s
opinion.
Of course, a different issue would arise if a reviewer or
parodist simply intended to appropriate the original
work, and this distinction was expressly adopted in Harper
& Row:
As early as 1841, Justice Story gave judicial recog-
nition to the [fair use] doctrine in a case that con-
cerned the letters of another former President,
George Washington.
A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the
original work, if his design be really and truly
to use the passages for the purposes of fair and
reasonable criticism. On the other hand, it is as
clear, that if he thus cites the most important
parts of the work, with a view, not to criticize,
but to supersede the use of the original work,
and substitute the review for it, such a use will
be deemed in law a piracy.” Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342, 344-345 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass.)
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550. But this issue does not
arise here, since the majority opinion of the Court below
has already determined 2 Live Crew’s intent to be parody,
not piracy. Petition App. A at 10a.
In summary, a consideration of the statutory factors
with an eye to the nature of parody leads inexorably to
the conclusion that the parody in question was a fair use.
The Sixth Circuit’s contrary conclusion is insupportable
on this record.
13
II. THE FORMULATION OF FAIR USE ADOPTED BY
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT WOULD MAKE POLITICAL
SONG PARODY DANGEROUS OR IMPOSSIBLE.
As the dissent in the Court below pointed out, there
may be factors not listed in the statutory schema which
“merit consideration by the courts in determining when
parody constitutes fair use.” Petition App. A at 33a.
One such factor is that the Sixth Circuit’s decision may,
for all practical purposes, make the art of song parody
impossible—or, at a minimum, very risky. For the rea-
sons set forth in the Statement of Interest, it is virtually
impossible to perform topical, political song parodies if
one seeks permission for the use of copyrighted works.
See Strauss Dec. 1 7; Russell Dec. V 6-9. As Professor
Nimmer has stated, a satire of a copyrighted song, “by
its very nature is unlikely to be the subject of a license
from the author of a serious work. Only by the recogni-
iton of a fair use defense is society likely to reap the
benefit of this socially useful literary genre.” 3 Nimmer
on Copyright § 13.05 [C] (1992). The instant case high-
lights this perceptive conclusion; here a license was re-
quested—the Petitioners offered to pay statutory royalties
—yet the request was refused.
It is also a fact, of which this Court may take note,
that all song parodies—like all songs—that attain popu-
lar currency have some commercial aspect. Today, scores
of companies, groups, and individuals write, perform, and
record political parody songs of copyrighted material, re-
lying on the fair use doctrine for their protection from
claims of copyright infringement. See Petition at 20.
Whenever the song gains more than a purely local audi-
ence, these parodies are presented in part for commercial
purposes. They are played on commercial radio stations,
broadcast on commercial television networks, performed
at concerts for which admission is charged, or recorded
on tapes or dises which are sold to the public. There is
simply no other route into the popular culture than
14
through the marketplace; even were the parodists them-
selves to perform the work gratis, the act of transmitting
this source of political discourse to the public is neces-
sarily suffused with commercialism.
Yet the Sixth Circuit’s opinion appears to say that
anyone performing or recording song parodies for money
must first seek permission. Such a result would destroy
an art form which has existed longer than the nation.
Filed herewith as Exhibit 1 to Appendix C is a recent
Capitol Steps recording, “From Yankee Doodle to Pander
Bear,” in which the group traces the art of song parody
throughout American history.* As musically depicted in
this Exhibit, song parodies have been a staple of Ameri-
can political life since the nation’s beginnings, and have
been used by union organizers, war resisters, war sup-
porters, abolitionists, suffragettes, Whigs, Democrats, Re-
publicans, and many others to express their views on the
polities of the day. “Yankee Doodle,” the “Star Spangled
Banner,” and “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” all
began as song parodies—a placing of new and coniro-
versial words to a then popular song.
The political song is not merely a musical confection;
it is, in the words of I. W. W. songwriter and activist Joe
Hill, an unsurpassed instrument of political dialogue and
organization:
A pamphlet, no matter how good, is never read more
than once, but a song is learned by heart and re-
peated over and over; and I maintain that if a per-
son can put a few cold, common sense facts into a
song and dress them up in a cloak of humor to take
the dryness off them, he will succeed in reaching a
great number of workers who are too unintelligent or
too indifferent to read a pamphlet or an editorial on
economic science.
Letter from Joe Hill to Solidarity (Dec. 12, 1914), cited
in G. Smith, Joe Hill 19 (1969). Professor Smith noted
that:
* Copies of this Exhibit have been lodged with the Court.
15
Joe Hill, parodist and songsmith, was translator and
scribe for the migrant workers and hobos of America,
turning into lyrical expression their everday experi-
ence of disillusionment, hardship, bitterness, and in-
justice. His lyrics, for the most part, are tough,
hard-bitten and scornful. ... Hill wrote the music
for his lyrics in only a few instances, usually setting
his words to popular tunes of the time.
Id. at 15-16."
At the other end of the political speetrum, the Wall
Street Journal has called political song parody, “a time-
honored tradition .. Americans are the kind of people
who appreciate this kind of thing.” Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 5, 1990 at Al4, col. 3. The article discusses numer-
ous song parodies related to the Gulf War (such as
“Bomb, Bomb, Bomb . . . Bomb Bomb Iraq”) which were
recorded and played by disc jockeys on commercial radio
stations.
In modern America, political song parodists continue to
serve the same purpose historian Vera Brodsky Lawrence
ascribed to them during the Civil War:
People on both sides of the battle lines placed great
reliance on the songs, finding in them a source of
strength, courage. hope, much-needed laughter, and
a general escape valve for the unbearable tensions of
their lives.
V. Lawrence, Music for Patriots, Politicians, and Presi-
dents 341 (1975).
Denying parodists the protection of the fair use provision
of the copyright law could force them either to cease
doing what they do, or to continue performing and re-
cording, while seeking the protection of the First Amend-
ment. The former course would musically impoverish the
nation; the latter would produce unnecessary constitu-
7 Excerpts from Joe Hill songs are contained in “From Yankee
Doodle to Pander Bear,” the tape filed as Exhibit 1 to Appendix C.
16
tional litigation, the threat of which would no doubt
deter many a would-be parodist.
2 Live Crew and the amici undoubtedly purvey strik-
ingly different versions of satire and parody. But legal
interpretations which may seem viable when aimed at
unconventional or peripheral behavior must be evaluated
in light of their potential impact on behavior which is at
the heart of the zone of protected political discourse.
However offensive the lyrics of “Pretty Woman” may
strike some, it is not possible to subject them to censor-
ship by copyright without imperiling a vibrant source of
political speech which has flourished since the founding
of the Republic.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set
forth in the Petition for a Writ of Certiroari, this Court
should grant the Petition, and reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM C. LANE *
DAVID CHARLES MASSELLI
MASSELLI & LANE, P.C.
8260 Greensboro Drive
Suite 260
McLean, Virginia 22102
(708) 556-9550
Counsel for Capitol Steps
Production, Inc. and Mark
Russell
Dated: February 24,1993 * Counsel of Record
APPENDICES
2
la
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Cincinnati, Ohio
Case No. 91-6225
ACUFF-ROSE Music, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellunt
v.
LUTHER R. CAMPBELL, et al.,
Defendants-A ppellees
On appeal from a decision of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM A. STRAUSS
1. My name is William A. Strauss. I am an officer
and Director of Capitol Steps Productions, Inc., a Vir-
ginia corporation, and the paid, full time artistic director
and co-lyricist for “The Capitol Steps,” the company’s
musical and theatrical troupe. I have been with the
troupe since its inception at a Christmas party in the
U.S. Senate, and have been a director and officer of the
corporation since its formation. I am also an attorney
and a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia.
2. The Capitol Steps have been performing in the
Washington, D.C. area and nationally for eleven years.
The troupe regularly performs on national network radio
and television, including on such shows as “All Things
2a
Considered,” “Nightline” and “Good Morning America,”
and at live shows around the country, including in the
states of the Sixth Circuit. The Capitol Steps produce
and sell recordings of their songs and live performances.
The troupe has performed for, and at the invitation of
President Reagan and President Bush (five times). We
have also performed for Governor Clinton, Senator Gore,
judicial conferences, and probably three quarters of all
current Members of Congress.
3. A Capitol Steps performance consists primarily of
song parodies, principally of copyrighted songs. The
parodies, which generally have a high current political
content, range in length from a few bars to an entire
parody rendition. Recent examples are “I Wanna Be
Your Pander Bear,” and “I’ve Taken Stands on Both
Sides Now,” which are satirical jabs at Governor Clinton
and President Bush, respectively. Song parodies are an
integral part of musical political satire because they pro-
vide musical hooks, puns and other cultural reference
points that add to the humor while making it easier for
audiences to grasp (and remember) the political mes-
sages. Many educators have told us of the usefulness
of our song parodies in high schools and college civies
classes. Government officials have frequently brought vis-
iting foreign officials to the group’s shows as a jovial
way of demonstrating the role of free speech in the
American political process. Before the Soviet collapse,
Capitol Steps songs were broadcast throughout the world
on the Voice of America.
4. The Capitol Steps do not seek or obtain licenses
from copyright owners for two reasons. First, we have
been advised by counsel that our songs constitute a “fair
use” of the copyrighted material we use, and for which
we give full credit to the original authors and com posers.
Second, we have found that, in the business of social or
political satire, obtaining permissions from song publish-
ers is, for all practical purposes, impossible.
3a
5. On one occasion, the producers of a network televi-
sion show, against our advice, tried to get publisher per-
mission to perform seven of our songs. After much time
and discussion, permission was denied in six of the seven
cases.
6. Asking permission for such uses is interpreted by
music publishers as, in effect, seeking their endorsement
of the political ideas contained in our lyrics. Many copy-
rights are controlled by large corporations, such as Sony
or Walt Disney, which have ongoing issues and relation-
ships in Washington. These companies have no interest
in endorsing barbed political satire directed at Members
of Congress, the President, or even the federal judiciary.
Nor do we wish to submit our lyrics to them for censor-
ship. If we do not seek or obtain permission, then the
ideas and lyrics of our songs—g od or bad—are solely
ours. And no one has claimed to be injured in the proc-
ess; in our entire history, no one has ever sued us for
copyright infringement.
7. We have frequentiy been contacted by other politi-
cal parodists around the country who have described how
they do not seek and can not obtain permission from
music publishers for the use of copyrighted works for
the reasons set forth in paragraph 4 and 6 above.
8. In our experience, song parodies cause no real or
discernible harm to song publishers. People who book
Capitol Steps shows, sit in our audiences, or buy our
albums and tapes are interested in political satire, not
in listening to melodies. We have never heard of anyone
booking our show, or buying our albums, in lieu of book-
ing performances or buying albums of the erformers
whose songs we parody. Similarly, it is impossible for
me to imagine someone who would be dissuaded from
buying the original version of “Oh, Pretty Woman” be-
cause he already owned the 2 Live Crew parody of that
song.
4a
9. I have carefully read the opinion issued by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in this action. Unless this opin-
ion is reconsidered, I would be personally quite fearful
of having The Capitol Steps perform at any location
within the Sixth Circuit, or of permitting our albums
and tapes to be sold in those states. I am also fearful of
having the group appear on national television or radio
shows which are broadcast within that Circuit. Even
more fundamentally, I am fearful that this opinion, un-
less reconsidered, would energize those who for whatever
reason—including distaste for controversial ideas and
opinions—may wish to quash song parodies as a popular
form of political expression.
10. The Capitol Steps only learned that the Sixth Cir-
cuit had reversed the District Court’s decision in the 2
Live Crew case on Tuesday, September 15, 1992, when
we were informed of this fact by our attorney. I also
learned at that time that 2 Live Crew had filed a Petition
for Rehearing. Since we did not know before that date
that a decision had been rendered, it was impossible for
us to file a timely brief in support of the Petition for
Rehearing under the Circuit’s Local Rules. I do not
believe that our filing a brief at this time would prejudice
any party.
I make the foregoing declaration under penalty of per-
jury this 21 day of September, 1992.
/3/ William A. Strauss
WILLIAM A. STRAUSS
5a
APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Cincinnati, Ohio
Case No. 91-6225
ACUFF-ROSE Music, INC.,
Plaintiff-A ppellant
V.
LUTHER R. CAMPBELL, et al.,
Defendants-A ppellees
On appeal from a decision of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
DECLARATION OF ALISON K. RUSSELL
1. My name is Alison K. Russell. I am Vice President
of DAR, Inc., a Washington, D.C. corporation. I am
also the paid, full-time business manager for the political
satirist, Mark Russell. In addition, I am his wife, and in
a unique position to comment on his career.
2. Mark Russell has been performing in the Wash-
ington, D.C. area and nationally for nearly 40 years. He
regularly appears on national network radio and tele-
vision. For the past 18 years, he has hosted his own
“Mark Russell Comedy Specials” on public television. He
has appeared on nearly every national news show. He is
a regular contributor to “Good Morning America,” and
was a co-star of the NBC show “Real People.”
6a
3. Mark Russell also appears in concert around the
country. In 1992 alone, he will perform nearly 130 shows
in 30 states, including those of the Sixth Circuit. He
has appeared before the American Bar Association, the
National Association of broadcasters, and the Federal
Communications Commission. He has appeared before,
and at the behest of nearly every President and Vice
President since Lyndon Johnson. He has also appeared
at events at the request of former Chief Justice Warren
Burger, numerous members of Congress, presidential can-
didates, governors, and state representatives of both po-
litical parties.
4. Mark Russell traces his start in political satire to
the suggestion of members of Congress and their staffs.
In 1958, he was performing the works of others, includ-
ing Tom Lehrer and Charlie Drew, in the Carrol] Arms
Hotel, in Washington. Since it was the closest bar to the
Hill, it was where many congressmen and their staffs
adjourned at the end of the day. It was here that he
began singing and talking about the events in Congress.
As he wrote in the introduction to his book Presenting
Mark Russell (Everest House Publishers, 1981), “my act
is basically the same as it has been since 1961; only the
names, as they say, have been changed to protect the
retired and deceased.”
5. Along with spoken material, Mark Russell performs
song parodies, to both copyrighted and original melodies.
A current parody of a copyrighted work is We're Just
Wild About Harry” to the tune of “I’m Just Wild About
Harry,” which is a satirical look at how Governor Clinton
and President Bush are invoking the name of Harry
Truman. Another is “The Quest,” a song about Ross
Perot to the tune of “The Impossible Dream.“
6. Mark Russell does not seek or obtain license from
copyright owners for several reasons. First, he has been
advised that his use of copyrighted songs constitutes “fair
use” of the copyrighted materials. Second, the very na-
7a
ture of social and political satire makes it impossible to
obtain timely permission. When, for instance, it is an-
nounced that the Pentagon is spending $600 for the pur-
chase of a screwdriver, it is not possible to wait more
than the few hours necessary to write and memorize
“Wrench for Sale,” to the tune of “Love for Sale.” When
the video tape of the Rodney King beating became known,
it was not possible to wait more than the few hours neces-
sary to write and memorize “On the Streets of LA” to
the tune of “On the Street Where You Live.”
7. It is not possible to wait for permission because at
7 or 8 p.m. on a Friday evening there is no way to get
in touch with someone who might be able to get in touch
with someone from whom permission might be obtained;
the story may not last more than one day—in which case
the exercise of getting permission would be moot; and
because audiences have come to expect comment in song
on the topic of the day from Mark Russell. To wait for
permission means to disappoint the audience—something
a professional performer would try never to do.
8. Asking permission would also be interpreted by
music publishers as a request for an endorsement of the
political ideas contained within the lyrics. Since the po-
litical views contained within a song are Mark Russell’s,
no endorsement is needed or wanted. In his nearly 40-
year career, Mark Russell has never been sued for copy-
right infringement; nor has anyone ever claimed to be
injured by what he has said or sung.
9. I see no real or discernable harm to song publish-
ers from my husband’s performances. People who book
Mark Russell, or purchase a ticket to one of his concerts,
or tune into his television show, do so because they want
to hear what he is saying or singing about the current
political scene. They are less interested in the song he
parodies; other than perhaps some may get the intended
pun. Rather, they are interested in what he is saying
with his lyrics. On the other hand, through the use of
8a
older, non-standard songs, I believe Mark Russell may
have helped reintroduce tunes such as “Put on Your Old
Grey Bonnet,” whose copyright dates back to 1909, when
he parodied it with his “AARP Fight Song.” And I be-
lieve that the parodies may remind the audience that they
always liked the original, and perhaps cause them to pur-
chase it.
10. I have carefully read the opinion issued by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in this action. I am grate-
ful that Mark Russell has no concerts scheduled within the
Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction between now and the end of
the year. I am concerned that this opinion compromises
future scheduled appearances within the Sixth Circuit’s
jurisdiction. I am also concerned that this opinion may
cause those colleges and organizations within the Sixth
Circuit’s jurisdiction who have booked Mark Russell to
consider cancelling their contracts rather than take the
chance of becoming embroiled in a legal controversy.
11. I only learned about the Sixth Circuit opinion in
this case last week, through a conversation with Bill
Strauss of The Capitol Steps; prior to that time, I did not
even know that an appeal was pending. I also learned
last week that 2 Live Crew had filed a Petition for Re-
hearing. Since neither Mark Russell nor I knew before
last week that a decision had been rendered, it was im-
possible for him to file a timely brief in support of the
Petition for Rehearing under the Circuit’s Local Rules.
I do not believe that his filing a brief at this time would
prejudice any party.
I make the foregoing declaration under penalty of per-
jury, this 20 day of September, 1992.
/s/ Alison K. Russell
ALISON K. RUSSELL
9a
APPENDIX C
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1992
No. 92-1292
LUTHER R. CAMPBELL, a/k/a LUKE SKYYWALKER,
CHRISTOPHER WONGWON, a/k/a FRESH KID ICE,
MARK Ross, a/k/a BROTHER MARQUIS,
Davip Hosss, a/k/a MR. MIxx;
professionally known as THE 2 LVR CREW;
LUKE SKYYWALKER RECORDS,
Petitioners,
vs.
ACUFF-ROosE Music, INC.,
Respondent.
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM A. STRAUSS
1. My name is William A. Strauss. I am an officer
and director of Capital Steps Productions, Inc., and the
full time artistic director and co-lyricist for “The Capi-
tol Steps,” the company’s musical and theatrical troupe.
On September 21, 1992, I executed a declaration which
was attached as Appendix A to the amicus brief filed in
this action by The Capitol Steps and Mark Russell be-
fore the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. On September
20, 1992, Allison K. Russell, Mark Russell’s wife and
business manager, executed a declaration which was filed
as Appendix B to that brief. Copies of these declarations
are attached as Appendices A and B, respectively, to the
10a
amicus brief which Mark Russell and we are now filing
with the Supreme Court in this matter.
2. I have also caused to be lodged with the Clerk of
this Court, as Exhibit 1 to this declaration, a recording
produced by The Capitol Steps entitled “From Yankee
Doodle to Pander Bear: A History of American Musical
Parody.” The recording contains excerpts from 66 of our
nation’s most memorable and historically significant musi-
cal parodies. We produced the tape as a tribute to those
who wrote and sang these songs, and as a teaching aid
for teachers of American history in secondary schools and
colleges. I personally researched, collated, and edited
the sung and spoken material documented on this tape,
and know it to be accurately based on reliable and verifi-
able historical sources. (I am familiar with such sources,
having co-authored three books regarding American his-
tory, including Generations: The History of America’s
Future, William Morrow/Quill, 1991.)
I make the foregoing declaration under penalty of per-
jury, this 21st day of February, 1993.
/s/ William A. Strauss
WILLIAM A. STRAUSS
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.