Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Conroy v. Aniskoff

j

®1-1353

CASE NO. | OFFICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

THOMAS F. CONROY, PETITIONER

v.

WALTER S. ANISKOFF, JR.,

THE INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN

OF DANFORTH, MAINE, AND

H.C. HAYNES, INC., RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PETER A. ANDERSON

Counsel of record for Thomas F. Conroy

202 Exchange Street, Suite 200

Bangor, Maine 04401

Tel. (207) 947-0303

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether §525 of the Soldiers' and

Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as

amended, 50 U.S.C. Appendix §525,

protects a member of the United States

Armed Forces, during military service,

from seizure and sale of his real

property by a municipal taxing

authority for unpaid taxes on that real

property levied during the period of

military service without a showing of

prejudice resulting from that military

service.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES,

STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES ... Page

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND

UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF

OPINIONS IN THE INSTANT

CASE seeeeeeeneteeneeneeneeneneeeeee#e Page

JURISDICTION *eeeteenteee#teeeeee Page

THE STATUTE INVOLVED ....... Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....- Page

ARGUMENT *eenteeeeeeneeneeeneeeeee# # Page

APPENDIX *“ree@eeeneeeneteeeeeentee ee *# *# @ Page

CASE NO.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

THOMAS F. CONROY, PETITIONER

v.

WALTER S. ANISKOFF, JR.,

THE INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN

OF DANFORTH, MAINE, AND

H.C. HAYNES, INC., RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PETER A. ANDERSON

Counsel of record for Thomas F. Conroy

202 Exchange Street, Suite 200

Bangor, Maine 0440]

Tel. (207) 947-0303

TABLE OF CASES,

STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES

Le Maistre v. Leffers,

et.al. 333 U.S. 1 (1948) .. Page

Mouradian v. The John

Hancock Companies,

930 F.2d 972

(lst Cir. 1991) ........... Page

Townsend v. Secretary

of Air Force,

947 F.2d 942

(4th Cir. 1991) .........2+. Page

Mason v. Texaco, Inc.,

862 F.2d 242

(10th Cir. 1988) .......... Page

Bickford Ve U.S.,

656 F.2d 636

(Ct. Cl. 1981) eoeeeeeeeeenee Page

Pannell v. Continental

Can Company, Inc.,

554 F.2d 216

(Sth Cir. 1977) ....eee200- Page

Ricard v. Birch,

529 F.2d 214

(4th Cir. 1975) wwscceeeees Page

Ray v. Porter,

464 F.2d 452

(6 Cir. 1972) ceccccccccces Page

14, 22

16

15

15

16

15, 16

Wolf v. C.I.R., Day v. Jones,

264 F.2d 82 187 P.2d 181

(3rd Cir. 1959) .........2.2. Page 15 (Ut. 1947) wcaceeeseseeeeese Page 17

Peace v. Bullock,

40 So.2d 82

(Ala. 1949) eeeteeeeeeseee#8eeteee#€e’?. Page 17

King v. First Nat Bank STATUTES

of Fairbanks,

647 P.2d 596

(Ak. 1982) eeeeoeeoeeoeeeeee00 Page 17 P.L. 102-12 eevee eeeeeeeveee Page 20

Syzemore v. County of 50 U.S.C. App. §520 ....... Page 17

Sacramento, 127 Cal. Pptr.

741 (1976) eeeeeeevoeveeee ere Page 17 50 U.S.C. App. §521 eee eeee Page 17, 20

King Ve Zagorski, 50 U.S.C. A . §522 eee eee Pa 17

207 So.2d 61 _ "7 “a

(Pla. 1968) eeeeveveeeeeeeeee Page 16 50 mF App. §523 eee05eee Page 17

Illinois Nat. Bank of 50 U.S.C. App. §525 ....... Page 7, ll,

Springfield v. Gwinn, 12, 14,

61 N.E.2d 249 15, 17

(IT11. 1945) wwneseeeeeeeees Page 17 18, 19,

21

Donaghy v. Leighton,

351 A.2d 125 50 U.S.C. App. §526 .....+. P 7

(Me. 1976) *enerieeneteeneteee#nseeee#ee#e Page 10 PP . —- :

50 De® eCe A . l se © ft fe © @ 7

McCance v. Lindau, ~ wages

492 A.2d 1352 50 U.S.C. ; ; ee

(Md. 1985) eoeeeeeneeneneeneeeee Page 17, 18 ° . APP $992 , stat rage ss

36 MoR.S.A. $943 wrsccccces Page 10

Bailey v. Barranca,

488 P.2d 725

(N.Mex. 1971) ..... TeTTTTT Page 16

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL

REPORTS OF OPINIONS IN THE INSTANT CASE

The opinion of the Superior

Court of the State of Maine was

rendered on November 6, 1990, and is

contained in the Appendix. The opinion

of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

was rendered on November 27, 1991, and

is contained in the Appendix. It may be

found at 599 A.2d 426 (Me. 1991).

JURISDICTION

On November 27, 1991, the

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,

entered a judgment affirming the

decision of the Maine Superior Court

entered on February 19, 1991.

This Court has jurisdiction to

grant a Writ of Certiorari because the

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the

court of last resort in the State of

Maine, has decided a federal question

in a way that conflicts with the

decisions of other state courts of last

resort and with the decisions of

several United States Courts of

Appeals. Further, this Honorable Court

has jurisdiction because the Supreme

Judicial Court of Maine, has decided an

important question of federal law ina

-5-

way which conflicts with the applicable

decision of this Court.

28 U.S.C. §1257 confers

jurisdiction on this Court to review

the judgment in question by Writ of

Certiorari.

THE STATUTE INVOLVED

§525. Statutes of limitations as

affected by period of service

The period of military service

shall not be included in computing any

period now or hereafter to be limited

by any law, regulation, or order for

the bringing of any action or

proceeding in any court, board, bureau,

commission, department, or other agency

of government by or against any person

in military service or by or against

his heirs, executors, administrators,

Or assigns, whether such cause of

action or the right or privilege to

institute such action or proceeding

shall have accrued prior to or during

the period of such service, nor shall

any part of such period which occurs

oFe

after the date of enactment of the

Soldiers’ and Sailors' Civil Relief Act

Amendments of 1942 be included in

computing any period now or hereafter

provided by any law for the redemption

of real property sold or forfeited to

enforce any obligation, tax, or

assessment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner was on active

duty with the United States Army from

November 26, 1966, through the date of

trial, without interruption. He owned

two lots in the Town of Danforth,

Maine, on which minimal taxes were

assessed. Despite the Petitioner's

keeping the Town of Danforth advised of

his changing addresses, he received no

tax bills for the years 1984, 1985, and

1986. The Town of Danforth had

continued to send them to an earlier

address and they did not reach him at

his many duty stations throughout the

world. The Town of Danforth then seized

his land for taxes and sold it pursuant

to the law of the State of Maine. Under

Maine law, a lien is placed on the

-9-

property and the owner has 18 months in

which to redeem before title ripens in

the municipality. 36 M.R.S.A. §943.

The Maine statute provides a procedure,

employed by the Town of Danforth, by

which the municipality's tax title may

be perfected and the owner's right to

redeem the property may be foreclosed

without actual notice to the property

owner, provided notice is mailed to the

property owner's "last known address."

Such notice was mailed, in this

instance, to Petitioner's former

address as reported to the Town of

Danforth in 1983. Upon foreclosure,

title vests absolutely in the

municipality, and the municipality is

not required to account for any

proceeds from its sale or use of the

property. Donaghy v. Leighton, 351 A.2d

-10-

125 (Me. 1976). At trial the parties

Stipulated that all of the Maine

statutory proceedings allowing the Town

to acquire property for non-payment of

taxes were properly followed and that,

were it not for §525 of The Soldiers'

and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940,

as amended, the Town would have

perfected title in this case.

The Town of Danforth acted

despite the provisions of The Soldiers'

and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940,

50 U.S.C. App. §50i et. seg.

Respondents, Walter Aniskoff, Jr. and

H. C. Haynes, Inc., purchased the non-

existent interest of the Town of

Danforth and each received a guitclaim

Geed therefor. Despite subsequent

notice of the Petitioner's ownership

and lack of consent, H.C. Haynes, Inc.

-ll-

clear-cut timber on the land and

carried it away.

The Petitioner's action sought

restoration of his title in the land

and statutory damages and costs for

trespass. The Petitioner raised the

applicability of §525 of The Soldiers'

and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act in his

complaint. The Maine Superior Court

held that §525 of The Soldiers' and

Sailors’ Civil Relief Act did not apply

to protect the Petitioner from the

seizure and sale of his land unless he

could demonstrate that his military

service caused him some hardship which

rendered him unable to pay his taxes.

On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court

of Maine, the only issue raised by the

Petitioner, was the protection afforded

him by §525 of The Soldiers’ and

Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. The Supreme

o) 2e

Judicial Court of Maine, on November

27, 1991, affirmed the decision of the

Maine Superior Court.

ol3<

In Le Maistre v. Leffers, et.

al., 333 U.S. 1 (1948), this Court held

that the provisions of §525 of The

Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act

of 1940, as amended, protected a

serviceman who owned land in Florida on

which taxes became delinquent from

seizure and sale of the property by

local taxing authorities for delinquent

taxes while he was on active duty in

the United States Navy. This Court

stated that the provisions of §525 were

clear and unequivocal and protected a

serviceman from seizure of his real

estate for taxes and the subsequent

sale to pay those tdxes. Despite this

decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of

Maine held to the contrary and ruled

=)

that §525 did not offer your Petitioner

that protection.

The United States Courts of

Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth,

Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as

the United States Claims Court, have

held that §525 is absolute and no

showing of prejudice is required. The

mere status of being on active duty in

the United States Armed Forces is all

that is required. Mouradian y. The John

Hancock Companies, 930 F.2d 972 (lst

Cir. 1991) (dictum); Mason v. Texaco,

Ince, 862 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1988);

Ricard vy. Birch, 529 F.2d 214 (4th Cir.

1975); Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452 (6th

Cir. 1972); Wolf v. C,I.R., 264 F.2d 82

(3rd Cir. 1959); Bickford v. U.S., 656

F.2d 636 (Ct. Cl. 1981). The United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

-15-

Circuit has held to the contrary and

required of the serviceman a showing

that his military service prejudiced

him in his ability to attend to his

private business. Pannell v.

Continental Can Company, Inc., 554 F.2d

216 (5th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, in a

recent unpublished opinion, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit apparently overruled Ricard v.

Birch without referring to it. Townsend

vy. Secretary of Air Force, 947 F.2d 94?

(4th Cir. 1991) (text on Westlaw).

In addition, two state court

decisions have had held that a showing

of prejudice by the service member was

necessary. Bailey vy. Barranca, 488 P.2d

725 (N.Mex. 1971) and King v. Zagorski,

207 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1968). Other state

courts have held precisely the

-16-

contrary, that is, that no showing of

prejudice is necessary. See e.g.

Peace vy. Bullock, 40 So.2d 82 (Ala.

1949); King v. First Nat Bank of

Fairbanks, 647 P.2d 596 (Ak. 1982);

Syzemore vy. County of Sacramento, 127

Cal. Rptr. 741 (1976); Illinois Nat.

Bank of Springfield vy. Gwinn, 61

N.E.2d 249 (I11. 1945); McCance vy.

Lindau, 492 A.2d 1352 (Md. 1985); Day

vy. Jones, 187 P.2d 181 (Ut. 1947).

If other sections of The

Soldiers’ and Sailors' Civil Relief Act

make “hardship” a relevant factor, then

it is significant that §525 does not.

Por example, attention is respectfully

invited to §§520, 521, 522, 523, 526,

and 531. Since Congress made hardship a

factor in all of those sections,

Congress could have made hardship a

olJe

factor in §525. That it chose not to do

so is of extreme importance.

The opinion in McCance v.

Lindau, 492 A.2d 1352 (Md. 1985),

contains a detailed analysis of the

history of §525 and comes to the

conclusion that if the United States

Congress had intended to require the

servicemen to demonstrate hardship

under §525, it would have been a simple

matter for Congress to have added that

provision. As the Court in McCance

pointed out, more than sixty years have

elapsed since §525 was first enacted.

If there had been any discontent with

the application of that section,

Congress could have either repealed or

amended it. Congress has declined to do

so, however, despite its revisions of

The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief

oi 8-

Act numerous times since its enactment.

On March 18, 1991, President

Bush signed the Soldiers' and Sailors'

Civil Relief Act Amendment of 1991.

Pub. L. No. 102-12, 102d Congress, lst

Sess. 105 Stat.32. As a result of the

Persian Gulf War, Congress once again

considered §525. Once again it left it

untouched except for substituting

"October 6, 1942" for "the date of

enactment of The Soldiers' and Sailors'

Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942."

Since Congress changed §525 slightly,

the omission of a further amendment

requiring a demonstration of hardship

Clearly was not through oversight.

Indeed, Congress enacted two new

provisions to protect service personnel

which require no showing of hardship.

In addition to the existing protection

o}9-

of §521 concerning stays of actions,

Congress provided that all civil

actions then pending involving members

of the armed forces were stayed until

June 30, 1991, without any requirement

to demonstrate hardship. P.L. 102-12,

§6(a). Congress further enacted a new

section which provides that those

personnel providing professional

services will be eligible to have their

professional liability policies

suspended during active service without

regard to hardship. Under this

provision liability insurance carriers

may not charge premiums for

professional liability coverage during

active service by the insured. Carriers

must either refund any premiums paid

for future coverage or credit the

premiums toward premiums to be paid

o20-

after active service ends. 50 U.S.C.

App. §592. Again Congress required no

demonstration of hardship just as it

has required no showing of hardship to

invoke the benefits of §525.

Congress is certainly aware

that some provisions of The Soldiers'

and Sailors' Civil Relief Act require a

showing of hardship and some do not;

nonetheless, Congress has left §525

intact and essentially unchanged.

Section 525 is triggered by the status

of the service member. Section 525 has

never contained a requirement of

hardship and does not now contain such

a requirement. If Congress had wished

to overturn the majority rule and

require a demonstration of hardship to

invoke the protection of §525, it would

have done so. That it has chosen not to

o2l«

do so must not be lightly disregarded.

In view of the foregoing,

Petitioner respectfully submits that it

is entirely appropriate for this

Honorable Court to grant his petition

for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme

Judicial Court of the State of Maine in

order that this Court may resolve the

conflicts which exist between the

United States Circuit Courts of Appeals

on this issue and between the decision

of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and

this Honorable Court's decision in Le

Maistre v. Leffers and in order to

afford Petitioner the protection

granted by the statutes of the United

States embodied in The Soldiers' and

Sailors' Civil Relief Act. The

Petitioner therefore respectfully

requests that this Honorable Court

o22<

grant his Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter A. Anderson

Counsel of record for Thomas F. Conroy

202 Exchange Street, Suite 200

Bangor, Maine 04401

Tel. (207) 947-0303

=23<

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

WASHINGTON, ss. CIVIL ACTION

Docket No. CV-88-04

Thomas F. Conroy,

Plaintiff

DECISION AND

ORDER

Vs.

Walter Aniskoff, Jr.

and

The Inhabitants of the

Town of Danforth

Defendants

Docket No. CV-88-04

Thomas F. Conroy,

Plaintiff

DECISION AND

ORDER

VS.

H.C. Haynes, Inc.,

eee eee eee ee

Defendant

This matter comes before this

Court as two separate causes

consolidated together, pursuant to M.R.

Civ. P. 42(a), for the purposes of the

present jury waved trial. Trial was

held before this Court on September 26,

1990, at which time all four parties

o2ée

appeared through their respective

counsel. All parties submitted to this

Court appropriate memoranda of law in

support of their respective positions.

After consideration of the entire

record, as well as all the evidence

submitted, including pertinent

stipulations, this Court finds as

follows.

PACTS

The parties to this matter do not

Significantly dispute the pertinent

facts.

Plaintiff, Thomas Conroy, is a

Colonel in the United States Army. He

has been on continuous active duty with

the Army since November 26, 1966. To

date, plaintiff is still on active

duty. Since entering the Army,

plaintiff has been stationed at the

following locations:

a -

Fort Campbell ......... 11/67-9/67

Republic of Vietnam ... 11/67-11/68

Eglin AFB, FL .....+--+- 12/68-10/70

Fort Benning, GA ...... 10/70-7/71

Fort Devens, MA ....... 8/71-7/73

Boston Army Base, MA .. 7/73-6/75

Fort Leavenworth, KS .. 7/75-7/76

Republic of Korea ..... 8/76-8/77

Fort Devens MA ........ 9/77-5/80

Westover AFB MA ....... 6/80-7/82

Fort Devens MA ........ 8/82-1/86

Rome, Italy .....+++e+++ 1/86-8/86

Brunssum, Netherlands . 8/86-present

On or about May 1, 1973, while

stationed at Fort Devens, MA.,

plaintiff purchased the real estate at

issue here and located in Danforth,

Maine. Plaintiff paid all real estate

taxes due on the property from the date

of purchase until 1984. Significantly,

plaintiff paid said taxes while

~26<

stationed in Korea. Though stationed at

Fort Devens, Ma., during~two of the

years in question, plaintiff claims

that he did not receive the tax bills

assessed and due on his Danforth

property for the years of 1984 and

1985. Concerned, plaintiff claims that

in late 1985 he forwarded written

correspondence to Danforth regarding

these two bills but never received a

reply. Upon his move overseas,

plaintiff took no further action in

1986.

Due to expired tax liens assessed

against plaintiff's property for the

years of 1984, 1985, and 1986, Danforth

sold said property to Defendants

Aniskoff and Haynes, Inc. The record

amply demonstretes that Danforth did

send notices to plaintiff at his Fort

Devens address regarding the tax bills

o2t~

for these three years; all were

returned as "undeliverable as addressed

and unable to forward." The Town never

received notice that plaintiff had

changed his address. The Town also sent

plaintiff notices of tax liens and

impending automatic foreclosure which

were also returned as undelivered. The

Town, on or about December 22, 1986,

sold plaintiff's property to said

defendants.

The following stipulation entered

into on September 29, 1990, by all

parties is also significant:

It is hereby

stipulated that all the

statutory proceedings

allowing the Town to

acauire property for non-

payment of taxes were

properly followed in this

@28<

particular instance,

including notice and

recording requirements; and

that were it not for the

Soldiers and Sailors Civil

Relief Act, the Town title

would have been perfected

in this particular

instance.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's sole claim in this

action is that the acquisition of this

property by the Town and subsequent

sale of said property to defendants

herein is void pursuant to 50 U.S.C.

App. § 525. He claims that because §

525 tolls the redemption period

provided by state law, the Town could

not acquire valid title to his

property. This Court notes that the

o2%e

issue regarding the interpretation and

application of 50 U.S.C. App. § 525 to

the facts underlying this matter is

both novel and one of first impression

within this federal circuit and this

state.

Title 50 U.S.C. App. § 525, § 205

of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil

Relief Act (SSCRA), reads in pertinent

part:

Statutes of Limitations as

affected by period of

service.

The period of military

service shall not be

included in computing any

period now or hereafter to

be limited by law...for th>

bringing of any proceeding

in any court, board,

bureau. commission,

=30<

department or other agency

of government...against any

person in military

service...whether such

cause of action or the

right or privilege to

institute such action or

proceeding shall have

accrued prior to or during

the period of such service,

nor shall. any part of such

period which occurs after

the date of enactment of

[this Act] be included in

computing any period now or

hereafter provided by any

law for the redemption of

real property sold or

forfeited to enforce any

obligation, tax, or

assessment.

This Court notes that judicial

interpretation of this statute has

developed a split of authority. Some

courts have interpreted the relevant

language as creating an absolute bar to

the running of any limitations period;

military service of any kind tolls any,

limitations period, the pendency of

which period then runs again from the

date that military service is

terminated. See, e.g., Le Maistre v.

Leffers, 333 U.S. 1 (1948); Mason v.

Texaco, Inc., 862 F.2d 242 (10th Cir.

1988); Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452 (6th

Cir. 1972); Bickford v. United States,

656 F.2d 636 (Ct.Cl. 1981); McCance v.

Lindau, 492 A.2d 1352 (Md.App. 1985);

Syzemore v. County of Sacramento, 127

Cal.Rptr. 741 (Cal.App.3d 1976). The

interpretation of § 525 adopted in this

line of cases is founded on the general

@32<

principle of statutory interpretation

providing that where the language of a

statute is clear, it is to be applied

according to its plain meaning; courts

should not re-write statutes no matter

how absurd the result. See, e.g.,

McCance, 492 A.2d at 1356-57.

Other courts decline to adopt this

rigid interpretation and instead hold

that, with respect to career military

servicemen, no limitations period is

tolled merely because of military

service status; limitations periods may

be tolled upon a showing that said

military service resulted in hardship

excusing timely legal action. See,

@.g., Pannell v. Continental Can Co.,

Inc., 554 F.2d 216 (5th Cir 1977);

Bailey v. Barranca, 488 P.2d 725 (N.M.

1971); King v. Zagorski, 207 So.2d 61

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). The

o33<

interpretation of § 525 adopted in this

line of cases is alternatively based on

the fact that the SSCRA was only

intended to provide relief for one

subject to military service by

conscription who is called away from

civilian life to distant lands and

faced with threats of war. See, e.g.,

King v. Zagorski, 207 So.2d at 64-65.

These courts find the tolling of

limitations periods applicable to

career military servicemen not

handicapped by their military status to

be absurd and illogical. See, e.g., id.

at 67; Bailey, 488 P.2d at 728.

This Court discerns another

critical difference between the two

juxtaposed line of cases. The former

can all be distinguished factually from

the latter cases. In the former line of

cases, with the exception of Le

o34<

Maistre, § 525 is used as a shield to

protect the serviceman from the

application against him of limitations

periods which would have barred him

from asserting otherwise untimely non-

real estate related causes of action.

See Mason, 862 F.2d at 242 (products

liability case involving personal

injury and wrongful death claims); Ray,

464 F.2d at 452 (automobile collision

resulting in personal injury);

Bickford, 656 F.2d at 636 (military

back-pay and allowances); McCance, 492

A.2d at 1352 (assault, assault and

battery, and negligence claims);

Syzemore, 127 Cal.Rptr. at 741

(personal injury claim against city).

This Court also believes that Le

Maistre is distinguishable from the

instant case on the basis of its facts.

See 333 U.S. at 1. Although the case

-35-

clearly involved the application of §

525 to a limitation of redemption

period, it also just as clearly

involved a non-career military

serviceman. Id. at 3. The petitioner

there was on active duty from August

18, 1942, until only December 18, 1945.

Id. Said duty occurred during times of

actual war. This Court interprets La

Maistre to rest firmly on the fact that

it involved a non-career military

serviceman who was called to defend his

country during war ; "(T]he Act must be

read with an eye friendly to those who

dropped their affairs to answer their

country's call." Id. at 6.

This Court is persuaded by the

cardinal rule of statutory construction

that demands that statutes be

interpreted to avoid absurd,

unreasonable or illogical results. See

=36-

e.g., State v. Rand, 430 A.2d 808, 817

(Me. 1981). As the Bailey and King

courts have so forcefully recognized:

Mr. Bailey's

contention, distilled to

its essence, is that

regardless of all other

factual and legal

considerations, by virtue

of the above quoted

statute, he must

automatically prevail. If

his position be

meritorious, it would mean

that a career service

person could buy real

estate, ignore and

disregard his tax

responsibilities for

perhaps thirty years and

then at his leisure during

o37e

the redemption period

following discharge,

reclaim the property.

Bailey, 488 P.2d at 728.

To permit a tax

delinquent to finally

redeem under such

circumstances would be

tantamount to giving a

license to a career service

man to acquire real

property and then with

impunity refuse to pay

taxes thereon for so long

as he should elect to

remain in the service, plus

six months thereafter;

while casually weighing

whether his investment was

worthwhile....Such

interpretation would give a

-38-

career man an unwarranted

weapon not intended by the

act.

King, 207 So.2d at 67. Even the McCance

court recognized the absurdity created

by its interpretation:

In holding that § 525

is to be applied

unconditionally to those on

active military duty, we

are cognizant of the

possibility that absurd

results may ensue.

Conceivably, a career

military serviceman could

for any reason or for no

reason at all wait 30 years

or more before filing a law

suit. The Damoclean sword,

suspended by a single

section of the SSCRA over

-39-

the head of the civilian

populace, was placed there

by Congress. It is for

Congress to sheath or

remove that sword, if it so

desires.

McCance, 592 A.2d at 1357.

Accordingly, this Court interprets

§ 525 to be of limited applicability.

In the case of a career military

serviceman, § 525 will toll the running

of a redemption period only where the

serviceman can show a hardship caused

by active duty in the military. In the

present case, this Court finds that

plaintiff is a career military

serviceman. As such, plaintiff has made

no such hardship allegation. Nor did he

present any evidence from which this

Court might infer that active duty in

the military created such a hardship.

-40-

Accordingly, SSCRA § 525 affords

plaintiff no relief from the Town's

acquisition and subseguent sale of his

Danforth, Maine, property.

WHEREFORE, the entry is:

This Court finds in favor of

defendants in both matters CV-88-04 and

CV-88-78. Accordingly, both CV-88-04

and CV-88-78 are dismissed.

DATED: Nov. 6, 1990

/s/

—_——

Eugene W. Beaulieu

Justice, Superior Court

-4l-

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Reporter of Decisions

Decision No. 6005

Law Docket No. WAS-90-575

THOMAS F. CONROY

TOWN OF DANFORTH et al.

Argued September 3, 1991

Decided November 27, 1991

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS,

WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, and

COLLINS, JJ.

-42-

PER CURIAM

Thomas F. Conroy, who is now a

colonel in the United States Army and

has been on continuous active duty

since 1966, brought the present action

in the Superior Court (Washington

County, Beaulieu, J.) seeking to quiet

title to certain land in Danforth that

the Town of Danforth had purported to

acquire from him by statutory

foreclosure of a tax lien mortgage for

nonpayment of taxes. In the action,

which also sought damages for trespass,

Conroy joined as additional defendants

two private parties to whom the Town

had sold the land by quitclaim deed

after the statutory 18-month period of

redemption had expired. For the purpose

of this action, the parties made the

following stipulation:

[A]ll of the statutory

-43-

proceedings allowing the 7 judgment for the Town of Danforth and

Town to acquire property the other defendants.

for nonpayment of taxes As the sole issue on his appeal

were properly followed in to this court, Conroy challenges the

this particular instance, Superior Court's interpretation of the

including notice and Soldiers' and Sailor's Civil Relief

recording requirements; Act. We are evenly divided on that

and...were it not for the issue.

Soldiers'and Sailors' Civil Accordingly, the entry is:

Relief Act [of 1940, as Judgment for defendants

amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ affirmed by an evenly

501-591 (1988)], the Town's divided court.

title would have been

Al "

perfected in this 1 concurring

Attorney for the Appellant:

particular instance. fetes i. cebeonen.’ ten. tocethet

0 ;

Rejecting Conroy's contention, a Ang = eae St

B re) Mai 04401

the court ruled in a full opinion that angor, maine

Attorneys for the Appellees:

the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Kevin M. Cuddy, Esq. (orally)

; CUDDY & LANHAM

Act did not protect Conroy from the Building 4 West - Suite C

, ; 700 Mt. Hope Ave.

running of the 18-month redemption Bangor, Maine 04401

(for H.C. Haynes, Inc.)

period. The court accordingly entered Y 4

-45-

-44-

John A. Mitchell, Esq. (orally)

273 Main St.

Calais, Maine 04619

(for Walter Aniskoff, Jr.)

Torrey A. Sylvester, Esq. (orally)

64 Main St.

Houlton, Maine 04730

(for Town of Danforth)

-46-