Petitioners Brief — County of Allegany, New York v. United States (Nos. 91-558, 91-543, 91-563)
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Nos. 91-543; 91-558: 91-563
—_ . rd
IN THE 1 1% 3099
Supreme Court of the United States. Es CLERK
——— tee
October Term, 1991
THE STATE OF NEW YORK; THE COUNTY OF ALLEGANY; and THE
COUNTY OF CORTLAND.
Petitioners,
against
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JAMES D. WATKINS. as Secretary of
Energy: IVAN SELIN, as Chairman of the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS-
SION; ADMIRAL JAMES B. BUSEY, IV, as Acting Secretary of Transporta-
tion; and WILLIAM P. BARR, as United States Attorney General,
Respondents,
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, THE STATE OF NEVADA; and THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Intervenors-Respondents.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER STATE OF NEW YORK
ROBERT ABRAMS
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Petitioner
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
(518) 473-0330
JERRY BOONE
Solicitor General
PETER H. SCHIFF
Deputy Solicitor General
and Counsel of Record
JOHN MCCONNELL
Assistant Attorney General
Of Counsel
Dated: February 13, 1992
THE REPORTER Company. INC —Walton. NY 13856—S800-252-718]
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(1779—LCS5-588—-1992)
L.
Question Presented
Whether Congress, consistent with the limits imposed by
the Constitution and especially the Tenth Amendment, may
compel a State to “be responsible for’ and develop a plan for
the disposal of low-level radioactive waste produced by pri-
vate, state, and some federal generators within the State’s
borders, and may require the State to take utle to, assume
possession of, and be legally liable tor such waste if it fails to
develop such a plan.
il.
List of Parties in Proceeding Below
With the exception of Ivan Selin, James B. Busey, and
William P. Barr, the parties listed on the caption are identical
to those in the proceeding below. Mr. Selin has been substi-
tuted for Kenneth M. Carr as Chairman of the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner. Mr. Busey has been substi-
tuted for Samuel K. Skinner as (Acting) Secretary of Transpor-
tation. Mr. Barr as been substituted for Richard Thornburgh as
United States Attorney General.
ill.
Table of Contents.
rinse wastes ccs cette eens
List of Parties in Proceeding Below .......
EE OO ee
Citation of Opinions and Judgments Below ..........
Statement of Grounds for Jurisdiction...............
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ......
Brief tor Petitioner State of New York ..............
ESE
SE cc cece eee
ARGUMENT:
PoINnT Il. This Court should subject the 1985 Act to
substantive review under the Tenth Amend-
Point Il. The 1985 Act should be declared uncon-
EO
CONCLUSION. The 1985 Act should be declared uncon-
EEE ee
Appendix. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 (Pub. L. 99-240, Title I, Jan. 15,
EEE ons sce cc ces ce sec cee
tl
10
1V,
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.
Page
CASES:
Brown v EPA, 521 F2d 827 (9th Cir 1975), vacated and
remanded for consideration of mootness sub nom.
EPA v Brown, 431 US 99 (1977) ............ 16
Champlin Refining Co. v Corporation Commission of
Oklahoma, 286 US 210 (1932)............... 3]
Coyle v Oklahoma, 221 US 559 (1911). ........ Vo Bae ED
District of Columbia v Train, 521 F2d 971 (DC Cir
1975), vacated and remanded for consideration of
mootness sub nom. EPA v Brown, 431 US 99
GONNA cov ke vecccuss sates iewanuekes bau 17, 24
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v
Wyoming, 460 US 226 (1983) ..........0...., 14
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) v Mis-
sissippi, 456 US 742 (1982)............. passim
Fry v United States, 421 US 542 (1975)............. 13
Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
a We ARIE ore Cane Naku oeeeae: passim
Gregory v Ashcroft, US 111 S Ct 2395, 11S L
Ene Veire P passim
Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Rec. Assn., 452 US
UR 54 awed cee re heen es eee passim
Illinois v City of Milwaukee, 406 US 91 (1972) ...... 30
v.
Page
INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) ............-555: 31
Lane County v Oregon, 74 US 71 (1868)............ 13
Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US
Ge Se koa ce seeakveehedkees eet hee ies 26
Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ..... 20
Maryland v EPA, 530 F2d 215 (4th Cir 1975), vacated
and remanded for consideration of mootness sub
nom. EPA v Brown, 431 US 99 (1977)........ 16
Maryland v Wirtz, 392 US 183 (1968) ...........--- 25
National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833
COT 55.60.0456 5081S OT NERLEN SETS 11, 14
Pennsylvania v EPA, 500 F2d 246 (3d Cir 1974)...... 17
South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505 (1988). .... 7, 18, 19
Testa v Katt, 330 US 386 (1947)... .......-..-0 05s 30
Texas v White, 74 US 700 (1868) .............5555: 13
Wyoming v Colorado, 259 US 419 (1922) ........--: 30
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
Mg dae sep ees dca 6enerns 26
|. fF. rrr errr re rire ere passim
i EE nn. ek cua Melee oh eth eeres 6, 7
Vi.
Page
FEDERAL STATUTES:
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).............. 8, 10, 25
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No.
cea ang MOE tay BL oi gS RL daa echlin b ES passim
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments,
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, Title I, 99
ee Ne at alee yore ae eee passim
Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Com-
pact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, Title I, 99
Sitar art hag ede Mata payits Sakae ek Aah el 3, 34
Public Uulity Regulatory Policies Act of 1978........ 17
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pomment)........ eee aeehevumans aaa s 18
5 oe Gace tle bacon eetaceecantawice 26
PI BSc awe ou ulvecess Conuddewes 26
Se ee ND 5-4 55.600 bobs nse de seecurca 3
IES oss 5 cc b4-enne veces seunne passim
DE ne o.vk 6a kiacscaeuen de nenveune 26
DIN Sia ie5s Ce hed aks eeeserraiac es 25
FEDERAL REGULATIONS:
SPIN C5. 5 ov g's vs wack euoas ve ceecueeneva 30
a reer rr ee ree 3
DEEN ses Wed wee Cu OK ee cece 3
Vil.
Page
NeW YORK STATUTES:
Os EE IE ROR ee (eee aon nk Aa BP 5,29 n 18
SS ) Se SON ec |
RE (occ cS aco Beet ee ile? Dk ao 5
1990 McKinney's Session Laws of New York, Vol II,
p 2430 (State Executive Department Memoran-
ee ED CIE 5-6-6 ok eek Me se hee os 29
MISCELLANEOUS:
131 Cong Rec H38115-38118 (Dec. 19, 1985). ..... 32, 34
131 Cong Rec $38403-38410 (Dec. 19, 1985)... ... 32, 34
131 Cong Rec $38414 (Dec. 19, 1985)...0..00...... 33
i131 Cong Rec 338420 (Dec. 19, 19G5).............. 34
1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp 3005-3006 2
Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: “Neither a
National nor a Federal Constitution, but a Compo-
sition of Both”, 86 Yale LJ 1273 (1977)....... 15
The Federalist, Nos. 1, 2, 9, 14, 37, 39, 40, 43,45 and46 14
Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 Yale LJ 1019
i See PTO ee Tee roe err 15
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
Ces Ee Ge COS ee wc cue ccawuseseoxs 15
Jefferson, Letter to Gideon Granger, August 13, 1800.. 14
LaPierre, Political Accountability in the National Polit-
cal Process—The Alternative to Judicial Review
of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw U L Rev 577 (1985) — 15
Vill.
Lippman, The Essential Lippman, 220-221 (1963)... ..
Memorandum trom the Congressional Research Service
to the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and
Power, House Committee on Energy and Com.
merce, “Constitutional Issues Raised by the
Imposition of Liabilities on the State Under a
Proposed Amendment to the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Act of 1980", December 16,
Pe cow ease eee
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Fed-
eralism for a Third Century, 88 Colum L Rev |
(gre has P ly gee Sat Ge bile Shay A
Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National
League of Cities in Perspective, 198! S Ct Rev 81
Tocqueville, Democracy tn America, 158-163 (Anchor
I, Sn ee ee Ce AL Baca a oor aie
Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich
L Rev 1709 (1985) ..
1S
14
1X.
Citation of Opinions and Judgments Below
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-1 /a)! 1s
reported at 942 F.2d 114. The opinion of the district court (Pet.
App. 18a-26a) is reported at 757 F.Supp. 10.
Pet. App.” reters to the appendix to the petition tor writ of cer
tiorart tiled in this matter by the State of New York (No 91-543)
X.
Statement of Grounds for Jurisdiction
Invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 USC §§ 1331, 1337,
1346, 2201 and 2202, petitioner State of New York and other
petitioners brought this suit in the United State District Court
for the Northern District of New York. On December 7, 1990,
the District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the
complaint.
On plaintiffs’ appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit on August 8, 1991 entered a judgment and opinion
affirming the District Court's order.
Invoking this Court's jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1254(1}.
petitioner State of New York filed its petition for a writ of
certiorari on September 30, 1991. Certiorari was granted by
the Court on January 10, 1992.
XI.
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
United States Constitution, Tenth Amendment:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
United States Constitution, Article IV, § 4:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Applica-
tion of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic vio-
lence.
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985 (42 USC §§ 2021b-2021)):
See Appendix.
Nos. 91-543: 91-558: 91-563
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OcCTORER TERM, 1991
THE STATE OF NEW YORK; THE COUNTY OF ALLEGANY:
and THE COUNTY OF CORTLAND,
Petitioners,
against
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JAMES D. WATKINS, as
Secretary of Energy: IVAN SELIN, as Chairman of the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission; THE UNITED
STATES NUCLEAR RFGULATORY COMMISSION; ADMIRAL
JAMES B. Busey, IV, as Acting Secretary of Transportation;
and WILLIAM P. BARR. as United States Attorney General,
Respondents,
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON: THE STATE OF NEVADA; and
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Intervenors-Respondents.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER STATE OF NEW YORK
2
Statement of the Case
This appeal addresses the constitutionality of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L.
pp nto (the 1985 Act, LLRWPAA), incorporated in 42 USC
§ 2021b et seg. The statute was a congressional effort to deal
comprehensively with one of the most difficult problems of
nuclear technology: the secure disposal of low-level radio-
active waste. In this brief, the State of New York will argue
that this Statute, though enacted by a well-intentioned Con-
BTess, is constitutionally deficient in its imposition of uniquely
intrusive affirmative obligations upon sovereign state gov-
ernments.
Since 1978, only three commercial sites have been available
for low-level radioactive waste disposal in the United States:
Beatty, Nevada; Barnwell, South Carolina; and Hanford
Washington. 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp
3005-3006. Safety concerns and plans to limit and ultimately
discontinue waste disposal at these facilities prompted C on-
gress to pass the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980, Pub. L. 96-573 (the 1980 Act)
| That legislation set forth a federal policy that each State, in
Its Capacity as sovereign State, be responsible for providing for
the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its
borders by private, state, and certain federal producers. It did
not, however, require a State to accept such responsibility. The
1980 Act also encouraged States to form interstate compacts to
meet these duties and specifically provided that compact
States might bar use of compact facilities for the disposal of
waste generated outside the compact region after January |
1986. Pub. L. 96-573, §§4(a)(1), 4(a(2)(B), |
*Low-level radioactive waste was defi ‘tas “radi
active waste not classified ms pote ac pe Sonate petted
ae spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct material as defined in section
e.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954." Pub. L. 96-573 § 2(2)
3
While a majority of States joined or proposed to join com-
pacts in the years following the passage of the 1980 Act, no
new state or regional disposal facilities were projected to
become operational until the early 1990s. Consequently, the
exclusion provision of the 1980 Act posed a problem: congres-
sional ratification of proposed compacts whose members oper-
ated existing disposal sites (Washington, Nevada, and South
Carolina) would have denied access to the only possible dis-
posal sites to all waste from States which were not in those
compacts. Accordingly, Congress enacted the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (42 USC
§§ 2021b-2021j) to permit ratification of proposed compacts,
spur further compact formation, and grant all States continued
limited access to existing disposal sites.*
The 1985 Act differed from its predecessor in several sig-
nificant respects. It directly assigned to the States in their
sovereign capacity responsibility? for the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste.’ It conditionally guaranteed access to dis-
Title 1 of Public Law 99-240, 99 Stat 1842, constituting the
LLRWPAA, was incorporated in 42 USC §§ 2021b-2021). Public Law
99-240, Title I, 91 Stat 1859, constituting the Omnibus Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, granted Congress's consent
to seven proposed regional compacts.
4Section 3(a) of the 1985 Act (42 USC § 2021c{a}[1}) provides that
“feJach State shall be responsible for providing, either by itself or in
cooperation with other States, for the disposal of... low-level radioactive
waste generated within the State... .”
SThe 1985 Act defines low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) as radio-
active material that: (a) is not “high-level” radioactive waste, spent
nuclear fuel, or by-product material as defined at 42 USC § 2014(e)(2); and
(b) is classified as LLRW by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Nation-
wide, about 90% of the volume and 97% of the tota! radioactivity of LLRW
for which the 1985 Act assigns disposal responsibility to the States comes
from nuclear power plants and other industrial sources, the remainder is
generated by research laboratories, hospitals, and medical centers.
The Act requires the States to be responsible for disposal of Class A
and Class B waste (containing radioactivity which will diminish to a level
acceptable for inadvertent exposure within 100 years {10 CFR §
61.7(b\4)}), and Class C waste (requiring protection against inadvertent
exposure tor 500 years (10 CFR § 61.7(b)(5))). Class C Waste comprises
less than 1S of volume but constitutes over 65% of the radioactivity of all
LILRW
posal sites in Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina for
low-level radioactive waste from all States between January |,
1986 and December 31, 1992, and set forth a detailed transi-
tion scheme, with incentives and penalties, designed to
encourage compact formation and force disposal site develop-
ment. 42 USC § 202le. By specific dates within that period,
States and compacts were directed to comply with a number of
regulatory requirements, including ratification of compact leg-
islation or indication of an individual State’s intent to develop
a separate low level waste disposal facility for waste generated
in-state, developme« 4 sting plan, and application for a
facility license to tm® Succar Regulatory Commission or
appropriate agency of an agreement State (2021e[e][1]). Fail-
ure to meet this schedule nught result in added surcharges
upon waste generators by disposal site operators, denial of
access to the Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina sites,
and loss of certain surcharge rebates to the States (2021e{d],
le]).
The most novel and intrusive of the affirmative directives in
the 1985 Act. however, was set forth in 42 USC § 202 1e(d) (2)
(C):
It a State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in
which low-level radioactive waste is generated 1s
unable to provide for the disposal of all such waste
generated within such State or compact region by Janu-
arv 1, 1996, each State in which such waste 1s gener-
ated, upon the request of the generator or owner of the
waste, shail take title to the waste, be obligated to take
possession of the waste, and shail be liable for all
damages directly or indirectly incurred by such genera-
tor or owner as a consequence of the failure of the State
to take possession of the waste as soon after January |,
1996, as the generator or owner notifies the State that
the waste is available tor shipment.
A)
With this so-called “take ttle’ provision, Congress
decisively altered the method and impact of prior legislation
regulating low-level radioactive waste disposal through
encouragement and voluntary incentives. The new Act cou-
pled “responsibility” for such waste with a mandate that each
State develop and carry out a program for the disposal of
waste generated within its borders by private and other genera-
tors, including some federal generators. It strengthened this
mandate through the command that States assume ownership
and possession of, as well as legal liability for, such waste if
they fail to comply with the federal scheme and timetable of
regulation.
New York State's congressional delegation participated in
the enactment of both the 1980 and the 1985 Acts. In addition,
various national lobbying groups, including the National Gov-
ernors’ Association, contributed “= ae and advice to Con-
gressional Committees in the carly stages of each enactment.
To comply with the deadlines and other constraints of the
1985 Act, New York State enacted Chapter 673 of the Laws of
1986. Among its many provisions, this legislation called for
(1) the promulgation of standards of site selection and disposal
of low-level waste by the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation; (2) the creation of a Siting Com-
mission to select a disposal site and methodology; and (3)
coustrucuon of a disposal facility by the New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority.© To date, the
Siting Commission created under Chapter 673 has identified
five potential disposal sites within the State. Three of these
Sites are located in Allegany County; the remaining two sites
are in Cortland County.
®Laws of New York 1986. chap. 673 was subsequently amended by
Laws of New York 1990. chap 368 (providing that utle to low-level
radioactive waste shall at all times remain in the generator of such waste-—
even after such time as the waste has been accepted at the disposal facility ),
and Laws ot New York 1990. chap 913 (expanding membership and tasks
of the Siting Commission)
6
In February, 1990, the State of New York, together with the
Counties of Allegany and Cortland, commenced an action in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York against various federal defendants, seeking a decla-
ration that the LLRWPAA’s imposition of broad new affirm-
ative duties upon the States violated the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, as well as the Due Process and Guarantec
Clauses of the United States Constitution. The States of Wash-
ington, Nevada, and South Carolina subsequently joined the
action as intervenors in support of defendants.
The District Court (Cholakis, J.) granted defendants’
motion for summary judgment and dismissai of the complaint
in a bench decision issued in December, 1990. Reciting this
Court's statement in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Tran-
sit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985), that “judicial review of
Congressional enactments founded on Commerce Clause
powers should be limited primarily to inquiry of whether the
political process has failed,” the district court held that Tenth
Amendment review was proper only to discern “problems
which may have had an untoward effect on a particular law's
enactment or its subsequent political review” (Pet. App. 25a).
Finding that the 1985 Act imposed no restriction on New
York's “ability to operate in the political arena and to chal-
lenge the law,” the court found judicial review unwarranted
on grounds of a failure of the political process (Pet. App. 25a).
While recognizing that Garcia left open the possibility of
judicial review of the substantive impact of federal action
under the Commerce Clause in exceptional cases, the court
ruled that such exceptions arose only “when constitutional
equality among the states has been jeopardized” by the federal
act (Pet. App. 23a). Finding no such jeopardy, nor other
grounds for constitutional attack, in the 1985 Act, the court
dismissed the State’s and counties’ complaint (Pet. App. 26a).
/
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed. In its decision, the court observed that, in light of
Congress's traditional role in nuclear regulation, “appellants
undertake an unusually burdensome task” in challenging the
1985 Act (Pet. App. 10a). The court held that ‘both the 1980
Act and its 1985 Amendments are paragons of legislative
success’ (Pet. App. 13a), and rejected any claim that the Act
or its take title provision was the product of a failure in the
political process.
The court found unpersuasive appellants’ argument that
Garcia permitted review of congressional mandates, such as
the take utle provision, which significantly limited the States’
role in the federal system and thereby altered the federal
consutuuonal structure. While the court neither confirmed nor
denied that such review is permissible, it endorsed the district
court's holding that such review, if permissible, should con-
sider only whether the federal act upset the “equality in
dignity and power” among the several States (Pet. App. 15a;
citing Coyle v Oklahoma, 221 US 559 [1911]). The 1985 Act,
it held, had no such effect. “In sum,” the court noted (Pet.
App. 16a),
we are sausfied that the take utle provision does not
undermine the constitutional structure. Neither does it
violate principles of federalism as recently explained
in Garcia; and *{w]here, as here, the national political
process Gid not operate in a defective manner, the
Tenth Amendment is not implicated.” [South Carolina
v/ Baker, 485 U.S. [S05 (1988)] at 513 (emphasis in
original).
The court also dismissed challenges to the Act based upon
the Eleventh Amendment and the Guarantee Clause (Pet. App.
l6a-1 7a), and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to
defendants.
8
New York, Allegany and Cortland filed separate petitions
for writs of certiorari to this Court on September 27, October
2, and October 3, 1991. The petitions were consolidated and
certiorari was granted on January 10, 1992.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court in Garcia, while stating that in most instances it
would not entertain Tenth Amendment challenges to federal
acts, recognized that statutes impairing the constitutional
structure might require review but declined to identify when
such review was appropriate. We argue in the first point that
this case, where the challenged Act imposes unconditional
affirmative obligations on States and only on States, presents
the quintessential situation where judicial review is needed
under the Tenth Amendment and the principles of federalism
inherent in the federal constitutional structure. Unlike the
LLRWPAA, the Fair Labor Standards Act at issue in Garcia
applied alike to private entities and States and imposed duties
where the States had voluntarily undertaken the activity
addressed by the federal regulatory scheme. Neither Garcia
nor cases reviewed by the Court there involved laws enacted
under the Commerce Clause to compel state governments to
engage in a particular activity without their consent. While
this Court has never squarely addressed this type of law, it has
on a number of occasions expressed serious reservations about
the constitutional authority for Congress to take such an
action. The opportunity for the State to act through its legisla-
ture in deciding whether to participate in a federal program 1s
an essential element of the structure of the federal system.
Since the sovereignty of States, which is critical to the pres-
ervation of the federal system, 1s severely compromised absent
such an opportunity, it would appear that this Court in Garcia
must have contemplated review of this type of act by the
courts.
9
We also argue that if this Court's holding in Garcia cannot
be interpreted to permit such review, that holding should be
clarified or modified to authorize unequivocally substantive
Tenth Amendment review of federal acts which, like the
LLRWPAA, impose significantly intrusive and unavoidable
demands solely upon the sovereign States in the furtherance of
a federal regulatory scheme.
In Point I] we argue that, upon such substantive review, the
imposition by Congress of unconditional affirmative duties
upon States, and solely on the States, for the decentralized
disposal of low-level radioactive waste under the LLRWPAA
violates the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause of
the Constitution.
The present Act differs materially from all federal actions
previously reviewed by the Court under the Tenth Amend-
ment. In the past Congress has either applied legislative stand-
ards under the Commerce Clause alike to the States and to
non-governmental entities or has induced States to undertake
desired activities through threat of preemption or the commit-
ment of federal funds. The present Act is in sharp contrast. It
simply declares that the States are responsible for the perma-
nent disposal of most specified low-level radioactive waste
generated within their borders in accordance with various
federal requirements and that if all requirements are not met by
January 1, 1996, the States will be required to take title to all
such waste proffered them and be liable for any damages
incurred by private generators where the State has failed to
take possession. In this way, the Congress has commandeered
the States’ sovereign authority to deal with a national concern
and deprived the States of any independent opportunity to
decide whether to participate in such a federally mandated
program. This means of dealing with a problem of admitted
national concern is unacceptable because it totally undermines
the existence of States as independent sovereign entities.
10
Acceptance of such an approach would relegate States to a
Status of mere departments of the federal government.
Finally, we argue that, contrary to the position of the federal
government below, the take title provision cannot properly be
severed from the rest of the Act. The proponents of the 1985
Act viewed the threat of the take title provision as essential to
assure States’ compliance with the other provisions of the Act.
Thus, it is unrealistic to assume Congress would have enacted
the LLRWPAA without that provision. Accordingly, the entire
1985 Act must be declared unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
This Court should subject the 1985 act to substantive
review under the Tenth Amendment.
Although this Court determined in 1985 that the primary
protection of state sovereign interests in the federal system lay
with the federal political process, Garcia v San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985), it stated then
that its holding did not preclude all substantive review of
Congressional action against Tenth Amendment challenges.
At that time, the Court chose not to delineate what particular
issues might remain open to such review. The LLRWPAA
presents such an issue.
In Garcia, the Court was asked to determine whether the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), with its overtime,
recordkeeping, and other requirements, was applicable to pub-
licly owned mass transit systems, just as it was to other
employers in the private sector. The San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority argued that its status as a public authority
performing a “traditional government function” vested it with
constutuuonal immunity from the Act's provisions under
National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1977). This
Court did not agree. Though it recognized the enduring quality
of state sovereign authority in the federal system (469 US at
549), the Court specifically rejected the notion that “free-
Standing conceptions of state sovereignty” could be employed
to differentiate among various state affirmative acts for pur-
poses of Commerce Clause analysis. Such conceptions, the
Court observed, had proved analytically inadequate and had
too often provided past courts with the opportunity to intrude
into States’ affairs (469 US at 546, emphasis added):
The essence of our federal system is that within the
realm of authority left open to them under the Consti-
tution, the States must be equally free to engage in any
activity that their ciuzens choose for the common weal,
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone
else—including the judictarv—deems state involve-
ment to be. Any rule of state immunity that looks to the
“tradiuional,” “integral,” or “necessary” nature of
governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected
federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. “The
science of government... is the science of experi-
nent,” Anderson v Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821),
and the States cannot serve as laboratories for social
and economic experiment, see New State Ice Co. v
Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), if they must pay an added price when they
meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up
functions that an earlier day and a different society had
left in private hands
’ Under National League, a tederal act violated the Tenth Amendment
if it (1) regulated “states as states”, (2) addressed indisputable attributes of
Mate sovereignty, (3) directly impaired States’ operations in traditional
government functions, and (4) did not reflect a federal interest which
justified State submission to the tederal action. Hodel v Virginia Surface
Vinine & Rec Assn, 482 US 264. 87-788 n 29 (19RD)
12
The Garcia holding, therefore, expressed this Court's dis-
satisfaction with the prospect of ongoing judicial assessment
of whether a State’s activity in the modern economy was a
sovereign one. Once a State has chosen to act in a sphere
subject to federal regulation, the State’s susceptibility to such
regulation was a matter to be left, in a majority of cases, to the
federal legislative and political process.
While this majority view in Garcia induced vigorous and
well-reasoned dissents,* both the context and the express
terms of the holding make it clear that even the majority was
unwilling to permit unconstrained federal regulation of States
through the Commerce Clause. Neither Garcia nor the cases
reviewed there addressed the propriety of federal laws which,
under the powers of the Commerce Clause, compelled state
governments to engage in a particular activity against their
will; which limited the States’ right to withdraw from activity
in a particular field; or which required States to participate as
regulatory agents in a scheme of federal regulation. Moreover,
this Court in Garcia expressly recognized that additional
Tenth Amendment protection might be available to the States
in cases where federal action, though not the product of a
defective political process, was more intrusive than that
reviewed in Garcia or its antecedents, stating (469 US at 556):
These cases do not require us to identify or define what
affirmative limits the constitutional structure might
impose on federal action affecting the States under the
Commerce Clause. See Coyle v Oklahomu, 221 U.S
559 (1911).
“See, 469 US at 557 (Powell, J, dissenting), 469 US at 579 (Rehn
quist, J. , dissenting), and 469 US at 580 (O'Connor, J, dissenting ).
13
The benefits and importance of the constitutional structure
referred to in Garcia have been set forth by this Court in
numerous opinions.” Most recently, in Gregory v Ashcroft,
US ___, 111 S Ct 2395, 2399-2400, 115 L Ed 2d 410,
422-423 (1991), the Court stated:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns pre-
serves to the people numerous advantages. It assures a
decentralized government that will be more sensitive
to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it
"See, e.g., Lane County v Oregon, 74 US 71, 76 (1868) (“*[I}n many
articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and,
within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is
distinctly recognized. To them nearly the whole charge of interior regula-
tion is committed or left; to them and to the people all powers not expressly
delegated to the national government are reserved.” ); Texas v White, 74 US
700, 725 (1868) (“Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the Consti-
tution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the
States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the
design and care of the Constituuon as the preservation of the Union and the
maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its
provision, looks to an indestructible union, composed of indestructible
States.”’); Coyle v Oklahoma, 221 US 559, 567 (1911) (* ‘This Union’
was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution itself.”’), Fry v United States, 421 US 542, 557
(1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Both [the Tenth and the Eleventh]
Amendments are simply examples of the understanding of those who
drafted and ratified the Constitution that the States were sovereign in many
respects, and that although their legislative authority could be superseded
by Congress in many areas where Congress was competent to act, Con-
gress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it were just another
individual or business enterprise subject to regulation.”’ ); Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) v Mississippi, 456 US 742, 777 (O’Con-
nor, J., dissenting in part) (“State legisiative and administrative bodies are
not field offices of the national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks to
which Congress may assign problems for extended study. Instead, each
State Is sovereign within its own domain, governing its citizens and
providing for their general welfare. While the Constitution and federal
Statutes define the boundaries of that domain, they do not harness state
power for nauonal purposes.” )
14
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in demo-
cratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government, and it makes govern-
ment more responsive by putting the States in competi-
tion for a mobile citizenry... .
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system
is a check on abuses of government power. . . . Just as
the separation and independence of the coordinate
Branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent
the accumulation of excessive power in any one
Branch, a healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Governinent will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse trom either front... .
In the tension between federal and state power lics
the promise of liberty.
These advantages inherent within the constitutional struc-
ture of the federal system are of fundamental importance to
our nation and its citizens. They reflect the clear intent of the
Constitutional Framers; '° they have been a focal point of high
regard for the American constitutional system for two
centuries.'!
See, the historical precis contained in Justice O'Connor's partial
dissent from the majority opinion in Federal Energy Regulatory Commis
sion (FERC) «. Mississippi, 486 US 742, 795-796 (1982). See also, Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US at 568-579 (1985S)
(Powell, J. dissenting), EEOC vy Woming, 460 US 226, 265 (1983)
(Powell, J., dissenting), National League of Cittes v Usery, 426 US 833,
842-845 (1976) (Rehnquist, J). In light of these thorough discussions of
the subject, we shall not essay in this briet an historical treatment of the
Framers’ or this Court’s views of these federalist principles
''See, e.g., The Federalist, Nos. |, 2, 9, 14, 37, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46.
Jefferson, Letter to Gideon Granger, August 13, 1800, Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 158-163 (Anchor Books, 1969), Lippman, The
Essential Lippman 220-221 (1963). Scholarly literature addressing the
importance of some or all aspects of the federal system ts vast, significant
(Footnote continued on next page )
hd
While the precise extent of the Court's concern for the
consttuuional structure has never been fully articulated, at
least two features of that structure have repeatedly been the
focus of review of federal action under the Commerce Clause
by the Court: (1) the ability of state governments to make
independent policy choices about whether to engage in state
government activities, and (2) the power of state governments
to enact or decline to enact legislation. Several significant
Tenth Amendment cases decided by this Court in recent years
clearly reflect these concerns. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Recl. Assn., 452 US 264 (1981), this Court consid-
ered a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which established a
two-stage program tor the nationwide regulation of surface
coal mining. The Act empowered the Department of the Inte-
rior tO promulgate and enforce regulations; States were
afforded the opportunity to operate their own regulatory pro-
grams so long as such programs complied with federal regula-
tory standards. 452 US at 268-272. Reversing a lower court
determination that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment
under National League, this Court held unobjectionable the
Congress's power to displace state regulation of private activi-
lies affecting interstate commerce in a way which “curtails or
prohibits” the States” prerogatives to make legislative choices.
452 US at 290. It noted (452 US at 280) that the Surface
Mining Act merely established
(Footnote continued. )
recent statements include Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 Colum. L. Rey. 489 (1954); Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
Value: National League ot Cities in Perspective, 1981 S.Ct. Rev. 81:
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. | (1988); Friendly, Federalism: A
horeword, 86 Yale LJ. 1019, 10341977); Van Alstyne, The Second Death
of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709 (1985); Diamond, The Federalist on
Pederalism: “Neither a National nor a Federal Constitution, but a Compo-
sion of Both’, 86 Yale 1J) 1273 (1977), La Pierre, Political Accoun
tabiiity in the National Political Process—the Alternative to Judicial
Review of Federalism Issues, SO Nw. U_L-Rev. 557, 635ff (1985).
16
a program of cooperative federalism that allows the
States, within limits established by federal minimum
standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory
programs, structured to meet their own particular
needs.
This Court in Hodel distinguished the Surface Mining Act's
establishment of federal minimum regulatory standards upon
private activity in the States from the imposition of regulatory
obligations upon state governments, which would raise more
difficult constitutional questions (452 US at 288):
[T)}he States are not compelled to enforce the steep-
slope standards, to expend any state funds, or to partic-
ipate in the federal regulatory program in any manner
whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a pro-
posed permanent program that complies with the Act
and implementing regulations, the full regulatory bur-
den will be borne by the Federal Government. Thus,
there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers
the legislative process of the States by directly compel-
ling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.
While the Commerce Clause permitted limitations on States
which chose to regulate a field concurrently regulated by the
federal government, Congressional acts compelling States to
regulate remained constitutionally suspect.!
'2In Hodel, the Court specifically distinguished three prior cases
where a federal regulation appeared to commandeer the legislative proc-
esses of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program. 452 US at 288-289. See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA
530 F2d 215 (4th Cir 1975), vacated and remanded for consideration of
mootness sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 43\ US 99 (1977) (per curiam) (EPA
regulations compelling states to establish and fund automobile inspection
programs under penalty of criminal and civil sanctions upon non-com-
plying States violate Tenth Amendment), Brown v EPA, 521 F2d 827 (9th
(Footnote continued on next page.)
17
This holding in Hodel was reaftirmed in FERC v. Missis-
sippi, 456 US 742 (1982), in which the Court addressed a
Tenth Amendment challenge to certain sections of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Among that
Act’s many provisions were requirements that state utility
regulatory authorities (1) consider implementation of certain
specific regulatory standards regarding electricity and gas
services; (2) hold public hearings on such standards; and (3)
implement rules promulgated by FERC for encouraging
development of cogeneration facilities. The Act also provided
that private parties could compel consideration of the federal
standards through a state court action.
Noting at one point that the case appeared to present an
issue of first impression—-the review of legislation in which
“the Federal Government attempts to use state regulatory
machinery to advance federal goals,” 456 US at 759—this
Court in FERC upheld each of these provisions against Tenth
Amendment attack. While deeming the requirements that
States hold public hearings and consider implementation of
certain regulatory practices to be merely a minor infringement
upon state sovereignty, the Court held that even this infringe-
ment could be avoided by States which chose to decline to
regulate the field. 456 US at 764. It further stated (456 US at
765-766):
(Footnote continued. )
Cir 1975). vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness sub nom.
EPA v. Brown, 431 US 99 (1977) (per curiam) (same), District of Columbia
\. Train, $21 F2d 971 (D.C. Cir 1975), vacated and remanded for consid-
eration of mootness sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 US 99 (1977) (per
curtam) (same). Contra, Pennsylvania v. EPA, SOO F2d 246 (3rd Cir 1974).
After the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in three EPA cases in 1976,
the EPA rescinded some of the regulations and conceded that others were
invalid unless modified. The Court consequently vacated and remanded
these cases without ruling on the constitutionality of the regulations. 431
US at 103-04
18
While the condition here is affirmative in nature—that
is, it directs the States to entertain proposals—nothing
in this Court’s cases suggests that the nature of the
condition makes it a constitutionally improper one.
There is nothing in PURPA “directly compelling” the
States to enact a legislative program. In short, because
the two challenged Titles simply condition continued
state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consid-
eration of federal proposals, they do not threaten the
States’ “separate and independent existence”’ [cita-
tions omitted], and do not impair the ability of the
States “to function effectively in a federal system.”
[citations omitted. }
Thus FERC, like Hodel, clearly suggested that federal com-
pulsion of a state action under the Commerce Clause remained
constitutionally suspect insofar as it was unrelated to an activ-
ity which the State chose to undertake or continue.
While the majority in South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505
(1988), left open the possibility that the teachings of FERC on
this issue might to some degree have been modified by Garcia
(485 US at 513), this Court did not address the issue as such
because it was unnecessary to do so. The federal act chal-
lenged in Baker—section 310(b) (1) of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)}—removed federal
income tax exemptions for interest earned on new bonds
issued by state and local governments unless the bonds were
issued in registered form. Designed to provide a strong incen-
live to encourage governments to issue registered bonds, this
portion of the Act merely provided that bondholders of States
which did not comply with the federal regulatory scheme
would forfeit the tax benefits previously extended to them by
the tederal government. As this Court noted in rejecting a
claim that the effect of TEFRA was to commandeer South
Carolina's legislative process (485 US at 514-15, emphasis
added)
1Y
Such “commandeering™ ts .. . an inevitable conse-
quence of regulating a state activity. Any federal regu-
lation demands compliance. That a State wishing to
engage in certain activity must take administrative and
sometimes legislative action to comply with federal
standards regulating that activity is a commonpiace
that presents no constitutional detect.
Once again, the Court recognized that permissible federal
mandates to States as sovereigns were always linked to a
State’s willing participation in the particular activity involved.
It is clear from this brief review of Baker, FERC and Hodel,
as well as an examination of the EPA cases, that federal
regulation of voluntary state activities based upon the Com-
merce Clause or federal inducements to States to take action
have engendered a lesser degree of constitutional! concern than
the imposition of affirmative duties on the States which, by
requiring States to initiate new programs or continue to be
involved in programs that they had already undertaken, curtail
their ability to make independent policy or legislative choices.
In this respect, the differences between the LLRWPAA and
each of the federal Acts examined by this Court in Hodel,
FERC, Garcia, and Baker are significant. Unlike the FLSA
and TEFRA, which extended to state and local governments
various “generally applicable regulations” (Baker, 485 US at
515), the 1985 Act imposed various requirements solely upon
the States as sovereigns. Unlike the regulatory activities urged
upon the States under the Surface Mining Act or PURPA,
which could be avoided by a State’s decision to withdraw from
the regulatory field, the 1985 Act imposes upon the States an
unconditional affirmative obligation to participate in the fed-
eral regulatory scheme. That type of obligation seriously
impinges on the basic constituuonal structure by divesting the
States of the decision-making authority inherent in our federal
system. Accordingly, legislation such as the LLRWPAA must
20
be subject to review to protect the States’ essential role in the
federal system. We believe that review comes within the scope
of Garcia.
The opportunity for the State to act through its legislature in
determining whether or not to participate in a federal program
is an essential aspect of the structure of the federal system.
Without such opportunity that structure is severely compro-
mised. Absent the ability to abstain from administering federal
regulatory schemes which invoke the States’ sovereign
powers, state governments may be forced to become unwilling
subordinate agents to Congressional dictates. Without the
power to choose alternative actions, States are sharply con-
strained in their function, noted in Garcia and repeated in
Ashcroft, to serve as laboratories for social and economic
experiment, or “to engage in any activity that their citizens
choose for the common weal.” 469 US at 546. Without such
choices, not only may States be compelled to participate in
federal regulatory schemes by inescapable congressional fiat,
but they may also be obliged to assume responsibility for the
full financial and administrative burden of such schemes.
Consequenily, if this Court were to find that the language of
its Garcia ruling did not contemplate Tenth Amendment
review of laws such as the 1985 Act, we urge the Court to
clarify or modify Garcia to establish the propriety of such
review. As we have set forth supra, the federal framework
incorporated within the Constitution provides the fundamental
structure for balanced and effective representative government
both in the States and at the federal level. This Court’s power
to review federal action affecting this structure, acknowledged
since Marbury v Madison, (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is as vital a
safeguard to national liberty as the text of the Constitution
itself. Unless that power is exercised by this Court in the
present context, the opportunity of the Congress to compel
involuntary state activity and to commandeer state govern
2)
ment resources and operations through the Commerce Clause
would appear to be unlimited.
POINT II
The 1985 Act should be declared unconstitutional.
A,
Upon substantive review, this Court should find that the
1985 Act impermissibly alters the balance of federal-state
relations by its imposition of affirmative obligations for the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste upon the States and
should declare the Act unconstitutional in its entirety.
The 1985 Act differs tundamentally from all federal actions
previously reviewed by this Court under the Tenth Amend-
ment. While it 1s not the first congressional act which seeks to
jaye the States exercise their sovereign powers for federal
purposes, it appears to be the first to impose upon each State
an atfirmative duty to exercise sovereign powers of legislation
and other action within the State, in accordance with a federal
regulatory scheme, without the State’s consent, and with no
option for the State’s withdrawal from the role of regulator or
actor in the field. The imposition is threefold: the broad
assignment to the States of “responsibility” for a federal
regulatory concern; the establishment of parameters and a
tumetable for compliance with that assignment of action; and
the attachment of draconian, affirmative obligations on the
States for a refusal or failure to meet that regulatory respon-
sibility or tmetable.'*> By congressional fiat and without
The constituuional implications of these obligations were not lost
upon commentators at the ume of the Act's passage. As one reviewer
noted:
Certainly, the Congress, as is each state, is free to exercise its
powers to designate sites and to construct and operate low-level
waste disposal facilities. But for the Congress to mandate that the
states must undertake the burden of providing waste facilities
without any provision tor federal tunding or tact obligations,
(Footnote continued on next page )
regard for current or past state desire or practice, the Act
declares individual state governments to be responsible for a
problem which Congress has determined to be of national
concern.
Moreover, the duties imposed upon the States under the Act
are neither minimal nor short-lived. Instead, they require the
States to undertake a commitment to provide for permanent
disposal of hazardous materials—a Commitment which by its
terms will endure for five centuries. The Act provides States
with no opportunity to decline or withdraw from. this
obligation.
Furthermore, the Act attributes to the States responsibility
for waste problems which are principally caused by private
generators regulated by the federal government. Although
State power plants, hospitals, and research facilities generate
low-level radioactive waste, and although agreement States
may voluntarily impose some regulations upon certain radio-
active materiais and wastes within their borders, the federal
government nonetheless retains tirm control over health and
safety regulation of nuclear power and by-products which are
responsible for the overwhelming majority of low-level radio-
active wastes. The ability of the States to limit the creation of
radioactive wastes for which the Act makes them responsible,
therefore, is sharply constrained.
(Footnote continued. )
liabilities, or any other sanctions imposed under federal law may
raise 10th Amendment problems. There does not appear to be
pertinent judicial precedent that has upheld in the face of 10th
Amendment objections a federal mandate as intrusive on state
sovereignty as the one at issue here.
Memorandum from the Congressional Research Service to the Sub-
committee on Energy Conservation and Power, House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, “Constitutional Issues Raised By the Imposition of
Liabilities on the State Under a Proposed Amendment to the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980." December 16, 1985
; 4
23
Most significantly, under the 1985 Act, after January 1,
1996, States which do not provide for disposal of low-level
radioactive waste generated within their borders are made
responsible by the Federal government for all such waste
generated by private producers and some federal producers
throughout the State. In a manner to our knowledge unprece-
dented, the take ttle provision transfers by congressional edict
the ownership obligations of federal and private parties to the
State. States are compelled by this provision to exercise their
sovereign powers as agents of federal regulation, not as a
consequence of reflection and decision by state legislative and
execuuive bodies, but by fiat of the Federal government. These
duties and obligations are not imposed upon the State in its
capacity as a generator of low-level waste like any other
economic actor.'* Rather, they are imposed solely in light of
the State’s sovereign capacity.
These features of the Act pose a sharp challenge to the
constituuonal structure of the federalist system and deprive
States and their citizens of the various advantages assured by
that structure. States and state citizens are denied the oppor-
tunity to decide, through their state governmental process,
whether state fiscal and legislative resources should be
devoted to the problem of low-level waste disposal. Faced
with the imminent burden of the take title provision, States are
limited in their ability to experiment with alternative systems
of waste disposal; pressed by the deadline of that provision,
''The New York State Power Authority currently operates two
nuclear power plants within the State, and waste materials are produced at
various state hospitals and research facilities. Moreover, with federal
encouragement the State voluntarily participated in an experimental pro- -
yram for nuclear waste management at West Valley, New York between
1963 and 1975; ultimately the program was terminated because of health
and safety concerns. However, at no time prior to the 1980 and 1985 Acts
was the State's role as a generator or manager of low-level waste an
obligatory burden imposed by the federal government. That role was
determined by the State Legislature and Executive, in the exercise of their
sovereign authority
24
they are forced to adopt current technologies at a pace set by
the federal Congress. Though States are left with some appear-
ance of flexibility in choosing the details of compliance with
federal demands—e.g., whether or not to join a compact; how
such a compact might be organized; whether or not a compact
should exclude wastes from non-member States; etc.—they
are driven to these decisions not by the independent exercise
of spirited legislative investigation and debate, but by the
irresistible dictates of the national government.
If the Commerce Clause may be employed to authorize such
mandates, then the “healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government” described in Ashcroft
(111 S Ct at 2400; 410 L Ed 2d at 422) cannot prevail. Nor can
there continue that “tension between federal and state power
[in which] lies the promise of liberty.”’ /d. In their stead stands
a constitutional structure which, by permitting the States to
become mere departments!> of the federal government and
'SAs the District of Columbia Circuit noted in its instructive opinion
in District of Columbia v Train, 52\ F2d 971, 992 (D.C. Cir 1975), vacated
and remanded for consideration of mootness sub nom. EPA v Brown, 431
US 99 (1977) (per curiam) (reviewing regulations promulgated by the EPA
under the Clean Air Act imposing affirmative obligations upon several
States to adopt a vehicle inspection and maintenance program and to
require the retrofit of certain classes of vehicles with pollution control
devices):
{T}he [EPA] Administrator, in the exercise of federal power based
solely on the commerce clause, cannot against a state's wishes
compel it to become involved in administering the details of the
regulatory scheme promulgated by the Administrator. For exam-
ple, the attempt to require the state to “establish” [retrofit pro-
grams] is an impermissible encroachment on state sovereignty and
goes beyond “regulation” by the Congress. It seeks, under the
guise of the commerce power, to substitute compelled state regu-
lation for permissible federal regulation. If the federal government
wants to impose a program under federal authority, it is limited by
the restrictions applicable thereto
(Footnote continued on next page.)
tv
hn
agents of the federal will, lacks all benefits of the American
federalist system described by this Court in Garcia, Ashcroft,
and elsewhere. In this respect, the 1985 Act is a dangerous
precedent and should be declared unconstitutional.
While the take title provision contained in the 1985 Act may
be avoided by compliance with other regulatory requirements,
this fact renders it neither acceptable nor comparable to prior
federal acts approved by this Court. Whether States adopt a
program regulating the disposal of all in-state generated low-
level radioactive waste in accordance with federal require-
ments or assume complete ownership responsibility for such
wastes, including the liability that would otherwise rest with
the non-state government generators under state law, the 1985
Act directly compels the States to take some type of extensive
sovereign action to manage private and federal low-level
(Footnote continued.)
In essence, the Administrator is here attempting to comman-
deer the regulatory powers of the states, along with their person-
nel and resources, for use in administering and enforcing a federal
regulatory program against the owners of motor vehicles. . .
Under the regulations here, the states are to function merely as
departments of the EPA, following EPA guidelines and subject to
federal penalties if they refuse to comply or if their regulation of
vehicles is ineffective. We are aware of no decisions of the
Supreme Court which hold that the federal government may
validly exercise its commerce power by directing unconsenting
States to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce, and we
doubt that any exist.
We bring this opinion to this Court's attention because we believe that
it is an insightful examination by a lower court of federai action which
closely approaches the affirmative duties imposed upon States by the
LLRWPAA. Since Train was decided before both Garcia and National
League, it reflects judicial considerations at a time when the scope of the
Tenth Amendment was viewed quite narrowly, under this Court's holding
in Maryland » Wirtz, 392 US 183 (1968) (Fair Labor Standards Act
applicable to public hospitals, nursing homes, and educational institutions).
See alvo, the several other EPA cases set forth inn 12, supra.
26
radioactive waste. This is an unprecedented and unconstitu-
tional exercise of federal power.!®
While Congress has in the past used the Commerce Clause
as a basis for strongly encouraging state participation in fed-
eral regulatory schemes, such schemes have provided for vol-
untary state action in lieu of federal regulation (e.g., Clean Air
Act, 42 USC §§ 7401[a][3], 7407[a]; Clean Water Act. 33
USC § 1251[b]), or have made receipt of federal funds contin-
gent upon voluntary compliance (e.g., 23 USC § 154 [regula-
tion of travel speed on public highways]). In cases where
Congress directs that federal funding be contingent upon state
participation in a federal regulatory scheme, States are left
with the choice of whether the state interests advanced by such
funding outweigh the burden upon the state governmental
structure in fulfilling the federal regulatory functions imposed
upon it. A similar choice is available to state sovereigns in
cases where a federal regulatory scheme offers States the
Opportunity to participate in lieu of federal regulators. In all
such cases, although the choice may be difficult, and the
realistic probability that the State will elect not to participate
in the federal regulatory scheme may be small, the choice
exists nonetheless.
None of the arguments raised below in support of the 1985
Act 1s sufficient to justify its broad infringement upon state
government powers. The claim that the LLRWPAA merely
. *lronically, if this federal mandate had been imposed on a private
entity, it would constitute a taking which, under the Fifth Amendment
would entitle the entity to just compensation. See, Loretto v Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419 (1982). While the federal govern-
ment might be free to “take” from the States authority to regulate in a
given area by exercise of its power under the Supremacy Clause, its
imposition On States of responsibility to enter or remain in an area against
their will effectively commandeers the States’ governmental processes in
service of the federal government. Absent the protection of the Tenth
Amendment, sovereign States would be left with fewer protections against
federal intrusions than would private entities under the Fifth Amendment.
27
‘was intended to salvage [the] approach” of the 1980 Act,
which had been “unanimously endorsed by the States them-
selves’’ (US Br in Opp, p 16)!’ is both overstated and irrele-
vant. The 1985 Act differed substantially from its predecessor.
Although New York does not concede that either Act was
“endorsed” by the States, that question is of little interest
here: New York’s challenge to the later Act rests in the belief
that even a federal act which has been supported by States’
congressional delegations and promoted by various state inter-
est groups such as the NGA may be defective insofar as it
infringes upon the constitutional structure of the federal sys-
tem. We submit that an essential premise of the federal system
is the indispensability of State government policymaking. The
federal legislative process, far removed from local problems
and subject to the vagaries of sophisticated lobbying practices
and other institutional pressures, simply cannot supply ade-
quate long-term protection to that system of self-government.
As Justice Powell noted in his dissent in Garcia (469 US at
576):
One must compare realistically the operation of the
state and local governments with that of the Federal
Government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view
of the hundreds of bills introduced at each session of
Congress and the complexity of many of them, it is
virtually impossible for even the most conscientious
legislators to be truly familiar with many of the statutes
enacted.
The participation of a State’s congressional delegation can-
not sanction federal action which by its terms undermines the
federal structure. That structure is mutable only by constitu-
tional amendment pursuant to Article V, in cooperation with
the States.
'? References to “US Br in Opp” are to the United States respond-
ents’ Brief in Opposition to the Petitions for Writs of Certiorari.
28
Equally unavailing is the argument that the federal interest
advanced under the Act justifies its terms (US Br in Opp, pp
17-18). The federal government has argued (US Br in Opp, p
18):
[T]he subject matter involved—furnishing a safe
method for long-term disposal of radioactive wastes—
is one that, by its nature, is impressed with a public
interest that makes participation by state governments
especially appropriate, since the States will have to
respond to any long-term problems the waste may
produce.
This argument addressed several distinct issues. There is no
question that waste disposal is a significant public problem.
As such, it is a matter that many States might choose to
address. Inasmuch as the disposal issue affects interstate com-
merce, certain federal action in the field is also appropriate,
and state action may be subject to constraint by principles of
preemption. In this respect, the “‘nature”’ of waste disposal is
comparable to the problems of water or air pollution,
addressed by federal statutes. Yet the importance of the issue
to the States, or the preemptability of the field by Congress,
does not justify the impressment of all States, even those that
would not voluntarily participate, into the service of a federal
program. Cf. FERC v Mississippi, 456 US at 785-786 (O’Con-
nor, dissenting) (the fact that Congress ‘“‘could have reached
the same destination by a different route”’ is irrelevant to the
Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment examination of a federal
act). Participation in a federal scheme by willing States is
entirely appropriate, as respondents suggest; but the
LLRWPAA does not cal! for such willing participation.
The claim that New York’s legislative decision to provide
for the siting of a low-level waste facility within its borders
sanctions the 1985 Act (US Br in Opp, p 19) is baseless. In
29
fact, that legislation was enacted only in response to the
requirements of the LLRWPAA.'®
Moreover, New York’s past actions, either as a regulator of
certain nuclear wastes or as a generator of wastes through New
York State Power Authority nuclear power plants and state
hospitals and research facilities, cannot justify the new
encroachments on state sovereignty contained in the 1985 Act,
in spite of the federal government’s contrary suggestion (US
Br in Opp, p 19). While New York has been involved in the
field of radioactive materials regulation in the past as an
“agreement State’’ under § 274 of the Atomic Energy Act (42
USC § 2021), the Agreement States Program applies a federal
health and safety regulatory scheme that is altogether distinct
from the LLRWPAA. It involves the willing participation of
States, requires that voluntary state participants enact regula-
tions consistent with federal standards, permits state partici-
pants to withdraw from the program, and provides a federal
regulatory mechanism for those States which choose not to
participate (42 USC § 2021{d]). At no time has the option of
voluntary state participation in the Agreement States Program
included the requirement that States enter into or remain in the
business of disposing of low-level radioactive waste. Further-
more, as we have noted elsewhere, status as an agreement
State offers New York only limited opportunity to regulate the
generation of waste for which the 1985 Act makes it respon-
sible, and to which the take title provision seeks to compel it to
one day hold ttle. While New York could reduce its own share
of the generation of low-level waste, it may limit generation of
'SSee, Rappleyea Affidavit, JA 80a-81a. See also, Laws of New York
1986, chap. 673, § 2. Indeed, the New York Legislature has indicated its
disagreement with the provisions of the Act through the passage of Laws of
New York 1990, chap. 368, which, by providing that title to low-level
waste shal! at all times remain in the generator of such waste, directly
contravenes certain sections of the take title provision. See, 1990 McKin-
ney’s Sessions Laws of New York, vol. Il, p 2430 (State Executive
Department Memorandum to chap. 368)
+)
waste from other sources only insofar as the federal govern-
ment permits under 42 USC § 2021. The majority of low-level
waste stems from nuclear reactor facilities over which the
NRC maintains exclusive health and safety regulatory author-
ity. 1O CFR 50.2.
Contrary to the federal government's suggestion (US Br in
Opp, pp 20-21), the provisions of the 1985 Act are not analo-
gous to those involved in prior decisions of this Court uphold-
ing impositions of affirmative obligations upon State govern-
ments. Neither the duty of state trial courts of general
jurisdiction to hear certain federal law claims (Testa v Katt,
330 US 386 [1947]), nor the susceptibility of state govern-
ments or agencies to federal judicial decree in particular cases
(Illinois v City of Milwaukee, 406 US 91 [1972]; Wyoming v
Colorado, 259 US 419 [1922]) imply a federal power to draft
state governments into the service of tederal regulatory
schemes. See, FERC, 456 US at 784-785, 784 n 13 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting 1n part)
Finally, the federal government provides no foundation for
its Claim that the responsibilities that devolve upon States
under the 1985 Act are “less burdensome” than those imposed
by the FLSA or the sections of TEFRA addressed by this
Court in Baker (US Br in Opp, pp 21-22). To our knowledge,
the relative economic impact of these various Acts is
unknown. More importantly, this claim ignores the principal
point of New York’s argument: it is the nature and quality of
the federal intrusion under the LLRWPAA which is constitu-
uonally offensive, rather than the ultimate material cost of
compliance with the Act. Unlike the FLSA, TEFRA, or any
other federal action under the Commerce Clause previously
scruunized by this Court in light of the Tenth Amendment, the
burden under the 1985 Act is uniquely imposed upon state
governments and mandates the exercise of state sovereign
power in accordance with a federal regulatory scheme. As this
Court noted in FERC (456 US at 770, n 33)
3]
{I]n a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional
activity, “the determinative factor. . . [1s] the nature of
the federal action, not the ultimate economic impact on
the States.”’ Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Recl.,
Ass., Inc., 452 U.S., at 292, n. 33.
For reasons described above, we submit that the nature of
the federal action exemplified in the take title provision and
section 3(a) of the Act exceeds the scope of congressional
power delegated in the Constitution. Consequently, that action
should be annulled and the 1985 Act stricken as unconst!
tutional.
Moreover, the Act should be declared unconstitutional in its
entirety. Courts have long recognized a presumption of sever-
ability of unconstitutional from constitutional sections of leg-
islative acts, “‘[uJnless it is evident that the legislature would
not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not... .”’. Champlin Refining
Co. v Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 US 210,
234 (1932). See also, INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 931-32
(1983). In our view, it seems ciear that Congress would not
have enacted the remaining portions of the 1985 Act without
the take title provision. Accordingly, a finding that this provi-
sion violates the Tenth Amendment renders the entire Act null
and void.
As its legislative history makes clear, the 1985 Act was an
intricate legislative compromise in which Congress sought to
balance a multitude of disparate interests. During final debates
on bill HR 1083, which upon enactment became the
LILRWPAA, the measure was described by legislators as “a
tenuous settlement” (Udall), “a delicately crafted compro-
mise’’ (Bonker), “a reasonable compromise” (Markey), and
an
ty
‘a fundamental compromise” (Dingell) 131 Cong Rec
H38115-38118 (Dec. 19, 1985) Similar remarks attesting to
the lengthiness of negotiation over the measure, and the deli-
cate nature of the balance of interests represented by the
compromise bill, abounded in Senate tloor debate on the
measure. 131 Cong Rec $38403-38410 (December 19, 1985).
Both Senator Thurmond and Senator Hollings of South Caro-
lina recommended adoption of the bill, stressing the impor
tance of the strict umetable for disposal site development as
incentive to South Carolina, Washington and Nevada to con-
tinue to operate their sites. 131 Cong Ree $38407-38410
(December 19, 1985). As Senator Hollings observed (131
Cong Rec S38409)
Last January, our Governor announced that he would
shut our facility, if necessary, unless this issue were
resolved in a form acceptable to South Carolina. | and
every other member of the South Carolina congres-
sional delegation supported him. But Governor Riley
also went the extra mile, and said that he would hold
good-faith discussions with those of the country that
lack disposal capacity
The bill now before the Senate is the result of those
discussions. It does not give the three sited States
everything we would like. In fact, it is only barely
acceptable. But it protects South Carolina’s most
important interests, and we will support it. The legisla-
tion gives the regions withoui sites continued access to
our three waste facilities, in return for surcharges and,
most importantly, a strict schedule by which other
States must build their own facilities. The last point 1s
crucial. We don’t want this whole tssue to resurface
again in another few years.
33
The indispensable role of the take tite provision in this
compromise as a means of assuring States’ compliance with
the statutory timetable for development of regional or state
disposal facilities was clearly attested by various members of
the Senate. Senator Johnston, who together with several other
senators proposed amendments to the bill which included the
take ttle provision, expressed the importance of the concept in
his description of the proposal (131 Cong Rec $38414 [Dec.
19, 1985]:)
The substitute before us today is a compromise
between the approach taken by the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, which involves tough,
enforceable milestones for State action over the next 7
years to deal with low-level radioactive waste disposal,
and the approach of the Environment and Public
Works Committee, which involves considerable more
flexibility in the near term and a potentially very tough
requirement at the end of the 7-year period that any
State has failed to provide for the disposal of its low-
level radioactive waste must take ttle to, and assume
possession of, that waste.
At my suggestion, all the Senators involved agreed that
this sanction would be considerably strengthened if we
also made such a State liable for the consequential
damages resulting trom the failure of the State to
comply with these two requirements. . . .
In my opinion, this language is essential to provide the
teeth to the more flexible Environment and Public
Works approach. We need this language to ensure that
we are not faced in the 1990’s with the same situation
we face today—inaction by a few generating States
and no available leverage to force action.
34
Senator McClure, also among the sponsors of the amended
bill, stressed the importance of the stiffer milestones and
penalties in the compromise proposal; he also took great care
to assure that the take title provision applied to each of the
regional compacts approved in Title II of the Act. 131 Cong
Rec $38420 (Dec. 19, 1985). But see, Cong Rec H38117
(remarks of Representative Markey).
In light of these strong statements in support of the strict
timetable and heavy burden of noncompliance with the Act,
together with the difficult and tenuous nature of the compro-
mise which the Act represented, it is evident that the Congress
would not have passed the 1985 Act without the take title
provision. Various legislators clearly expressed the dissatisfac-
tion of South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada with milder
forms of compulsion directed at waste generators, and their
insistence that the States themselves be bound by statute to
comply with the Act or suffer severe consequences. This
legislative history strongly suggests that the principal incen-
tives to compliance in addition to the take title provision—
higher surcharges upon generators, and the power to exclude
waste from non-complying States—would have been insuffi-
cient to meet these concerns.
Moreover, any presumption of severability of the take title
provision is cast into doubt by the Congres:’s decision to
approve individual regional compacts with express sever-
ability clauses under Title II of the Act. 131 Cong Rec $38410
(Dec. 19, 1985). The decision to approve severability clauses
in seven separate sections of Title II while excluding such a
clause in Title I strongly suggests that the provisions of Title I
must stand or fall together.
35
CONCLUSION
The 1985 Act should be declared unconstitutional in its
entirety.
Dated: Albany, New York
February 13, 1992
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT ABRAMS
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Petitioner State of New York
JERRY BOONE
Solicitor General
PETER H. SCHIFF
Deputy Solicitor General
JOHN MCCONNELL
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel
la
Appendix. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985.
(Pub. L. 99-240, Title I, Jan. 15, 1986, 99 Stat. 1842)
§ 2021b. Definitions respecting low-level radioactive waste
policy.
For purposes of sections 2021b to 2021j of this title:
(1) Agreement State
The term ‘“‘agreement State” means a State that—
(A) has entered into an agreement with the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission under section 2021 of this title; and
(B) has authority to regulate the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste under such agreement.
(2) Allocation
The term ‘allocation’ means the assignment of a specific
amount of low-level radioactive waste disposal capacity to a
commercial nuclear power reactor for which access is required
to be provided by sited States subject to the conditions spec-
ified under sections 2021b to 2021) of this ttle.
(3) Commercial nuclear power reactor
The term “commercial nuclear power reactor’ means any
unit of a civilian light-water moderated utilization facility
required to be licensed under section 2133 or 2134(b) of this
title.
(4) Compact
The term ‘“‘compact”’ means a compact entered into by two
or more States pursuant to sections 2021b to 2021) of this title.
(5) Compact commission
The term “compact region” means the area consisting of all
States that are members of a compact.
(6) Compact region
The term “compact commission” means the regional com-
mission, committee, or board established in a compact to
administer such compact.
(7) Disposal
The term “disposal” means the permanent isolation of low-
level radioactive waste pursuant to the requirements estab-
lished by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under applica-
ble laws, or by an agreement State if such isolation occurs in
_ such agreement State.
(8) Generate
The term “generate”, when used in relation to low-level
radioactive waste, means to produce low-level radioactive
waste.
(9) Low-level radioactive waste
The term “‘low-level radioactive waste’’ means radioactive
material that-—
(A) is not high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel,
or byproduct material (as defined in section 2014(e)(2) of this
title); and
(B) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, consistent with
existing law and in accordance with paragraph (A), classifies
as low-level radioactive waste.
(10) Non-sited compact region
The term “‘non-sited compact region’’ means any compact
region that is not a sited compact region.
(11) Regional disposal facility
The term “regional disposal facility’ means a non-Federal
low-level radioactive waste disposal facility in operation on
January 1, 1985, or subsequently established and operated
under a compact.
(12) Secretary
The term “*Secretary’’ means the Secretary of Energy.
(13) Sited compact region
The term “sited compact region” means a compact region
in which there is located one of the regional disposal facilities
at Barnwell, in the State of South Carolina; Richland, in the
State of Washington; or Beatty, in the State of Nevada.
(14) State
The term ‘State’? means any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
3a
§ 2021c. Responsibilities for disposal of low-level radioac-
tive waste
(a)(1) Each State shall be responsible for providing, either
oy itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal
of—
(A) low-level radioactive waste generated within the State
(other than by the Federal Government) that consists of or
contains class A, B, or C radioactive waste as defined by
section 61.55 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, as in
effect on January 26, 1983;
(B) low-level radioactive waste described in subparagraph
(A) that is generated by the Federal Government except such
waste that is—
(i) owned or generated by the Department of Energy;
(ii) owned or generated by the United States Navy as a
result of the decommissioning of vessels of the United
States Navy; or
(iii) owned. or generated as a result of any research,
development, testing, or production of any atomic
weapon; and
(C) low-level radioactive waste described in subparagraphs
(A) and (B) that is generated outside of the State and accepted
for disposal in accordance with sections 2021e or 2021f of this
title.
(2) No regional disposal facility may be required to accept
for disposal any material—
(A) that is not low-level radioactive waste as defined by
section 61.55 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, as in
effect on January 26, 1983, or
(B) identified under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial
Action Program.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to prohibit a
State, subject to the provisions of its compact, or a compact
4a
region from accepting for disposal any material identified in
subparagraph (A) or (B).
(b)(1) The Federal Government shall be responsible for the
disposal of—
(A) low-level radioactive waste owned or generated by the
Department of Energy;
(B) low-level radioactive waste owned or generated by the
United States Navy as a result of the decommissioning of
vessels of the United States Navy:
(C) low-level radioactive waste owned or generated by the
Federal Government as a result of any research, development,
testing, or production of any atomic weapon, and
(D) any other low-level radioactive waste with concentra-
tions of radionuclides that exceed the limits established by the
Commission for class C radioactive waste, as defined by
section 61.55 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, as in
effect on January 26, 1983.
(2) All radioactive waste designated a Federal respon-
sibility pursuant to subparagraph (b)(1)(D) that results from
activities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, [42
U.S.C.A § 2011 et seq.], shall be disposed of in a facility
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the Com-
mission determines is adequate to protect the public health and
safety.
(3) Not later than 12 months after January 15, 1986, the
Secretary shal] submit to the Congress a comprehensive report
setting forth the recommendations of the Secretary for ensur-
ing the safe disposal of all radioactive waste designated a
Federal responsibility pursuant to subparagraph (b)(1)(D).
Such report shall include—
(A) an identification of the radioactive waste involved,
including the source of such waste, and the volume, concentra-
tion, and other relevant characteristics of such waste;
(B) an identification of the Federal and non-Federal options
for disposal of such radioactive waste:
Sa
(C) a description of the actions proposed to ensure the safe
disposal of such radioactive waste;
(D) a description of the projected costs of undertaking such
actions:
(E) an identification of the options for ensuring that the
beneficiaries of the activities resulting in the generation of
such radioactive wastes bear all reasonable costs of disposing
of such wastes; and
(F) an identification of any statutory authority required for
disposal of such waste.
(4) The Secretary may not dispose of any radioactive waste
designated a Federal responsibility pursuant to paragraph
(b)(1)(D) that becomes a Federal responsibility for the first
time pursuant to such paragraph until ninety days after the
report prepared pursuant to paragraph (3) has been submitted
to the Congress.
§ 2021d. Regional compacts for disposal of low-level
radioactive waste
(a) In general
(1) Federal policy
It is the policy of the Federal Government that the respon-
sibilities of the States under section 2021Ic of this title for the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste can be most safely and
effectively managed on a regional basis.
(2) Interstate compacts
To carry out the policy set forth in paragraph (1), the States
may enter into such compacts as may be necessary to provide
for the establishment and operation of regional disposal facili-
ties for low-level radioactive waste.
(b) Applicability to Federal activities
(1) In general
(A) Activities of the Secretary
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), no compact or
action taken under a compact shall be applicable to the trans-
6a
portation, management, or disposal of any low-level radioac-
live waste designated in section 2021c(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) of this
ttle.
(B) Federal low-level radioac:ive waste disposed of at
non-Federal facilities
Low-level radioactive waste owned or generated by the
Federal Government that is disposed of at a regional disposal!
facility or non-Federal disposal facility within a State that is
not a member of a compact shall be subject to the same
conditions, regulations, requirements, fees, taxes, and sur-
charges imposed by the compact commission, and by the State
in which such facility is located, in the same manner and to the
same extent as any low-level radioactive waste not generated
by the Federal Government.
(2) Federal low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities
Any low-level radioactive waste disposal facility estab-
lished or operated exclusively for the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste owned or generated by the Federal Govern-
ment shall not be subject to sed compact or any action taken
under a compact.
(3) Effect of compacts on Federal law
Nothing contained in sections 2021b to 2021) of this title or
any compact may be construed to confer any new authority on
any compact commission or State—
(A) to regulate the packaging, generation, treatment, stor-
age, disposal, or transportation of low-level radioactive waste
in a manner incompatible with the regulations of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission or inconsistent with the regulations of
the Department of Transportation;
(B) to regulate health, safety, or environmental hazards
irom source material, byproduct material, or special nuclear
material;
(C) to inspect the facilities of licensees of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,
(D) to inspect security areas or operations at the site of the
generation of any low-level radioactive waste by the Federal
Ta
Government, or to inspect classified information related to
such areas or operations, or
(E) to require indemnification pursuant to the provisions of
chapter 171 of Title 28, (commonly referred to as the Federal
Tort Claims Act) [28 U.S.C.A § 2671 et seq.], or section 170
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210) (com-
monly referred to as the Price-Anderson Act), whichever 1s
applicable.
(4) Federal authority
Except as expressly provided in secttons 2021b to 2021) of
this title, nothing contained in sections 2021b to 2021; of this
title or any Compact may be construed to limit the applicability
of any Federal law or to diminish or otherwise impair the
jurisdiction of any Federal agency, or to alter, amend, or
otherwise affect any Federal law governing the judicial review
of any action taken pursuant to any compact.
(5) State authority preserved
Except as expressly provided in sections 2021b to 2021) of
this utle, nothing contained in sections 2021b to 2021) of this
title expands, diminishes, or otherwise affects State law.
(c) Restricted use of regional disposal facilities
Any authority in a compact to restrict the use of the regional
disposal facilities under the compact to the disposal of low-
level radioactive waste generated within the compact region
Shall not take effect before each of the following occurs:
(1) January 1, 1986; and
(2) the Congress by law consents to the compact.
(d) Congressional review
Each compact shall provide that every 5 years after the
compact has taken effect the Congress may by law withdraw
its consent.
Sa
§ 2021e. Limited availability of certain regional disposal
facilities during transition and licensing periods
(a) Availability of disposal capacity
(1) Pressurized-water and boiling water reactors
During the seven-year period beginning January |, 1986
and ending December 31, 1992, subject to the provisions of
subsections (b) through (g) of this section, each State in which
there is located a regional disposal facility referred to in
paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (b) of this section,
shall make disposal capacity available for low-level radioac-
tive waste generated by pressurized water and boiling water
commercial nuclear power reactors in accordance with the
allocations established in subsection (c) of this section.
(2) Other sources of low-level radioactive waste
During the seven-year period beginning January 1, 1986
and ending December 31, 1992, subject to the provisions of
subsections (b) through (g) of this section, each State in which
there is located a regional disposal facility referred to in
paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (b) of this section
shail make disposal capacity available for low-level radioac-
live waste generated by any source not referred to in paragraph
(1).
(3) Allocation of disposal capacity
(A) During the seven-year period beginning January |.
1986 and ending December 31, 1992, low-level radioactive
waste generated within a sited compact region shall be
accorded priority under this secuon in the allocation of avail-
able disposal capacity at a regional disposal facility referred to
in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (b) of this section
and located in the sited compact region in which such waste 1s
generated.
(B) Any State in which a regional disposal facility referred
to in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (b) of this
secuon 1s located may, subject to the provisions of its compact,
prohibit the disposal at such tacility of low-levei radioactive
waste generated outside of the compact region if the disposal
94
of such waste in any given calendar year, together with all
other low-level radioactive waste disposed of at such facility
within that same calendar year, would result in that facility
disposing of a total annual volume of low-level radioactive
waste in excess of 100 per centum of the average annual
volume for such facility designated in subsection (b) of this
secuon: Provided, however, That in the event that all three
States in which regional disposal facilities referred to in para-
graphs (1) through (3) of subsection (b) of this section act to
prohibit the disposal of low-level radioactive waste pursuant to
this subparagraph, cach such State shall, in accordance with
any applicable procedures of its compact, permit, as necessary,
the disposal of additional quantities of such waste in incre-
ments of 10 per centum of the average annual volume for each
such facility designated in subsection (b) of this section.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph shall require any disposal
facility or State referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) of
subsection.(b) of this section to accept for disposal low-level
radioactive waste 1 excess of the total amounts designated in
subsecuon (b) of this section.
(4) Cessation of operation of low-level radioactive waste
disposal facility
No provision of this section shall be construed to obligate
any State referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsec-
tion (b) of this section to accept low-level radioactive waste
from any source in the event that the regional disposal facility
located in such State ceases operations.
(b) Limitations
The availability of disposal capacity tor low-level radioac-
live waste from any source shall be subject to the following
limitations:
(1) Barnwell, South Carolina
The State of South Carolina, in accordance with the provi-
sions Of its Compact, may limit the volume of low-level radio-
ucuive waste accepted for disposal at the regional disposal
facility located at Barnwell, South Carolina to a total of
Oa
8,400,000 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste during the
7-year period beginning January |, 1986, and ending Decem
ber 31, 1992 (as based on an average annual volume of
1,200,000 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste).
(2) Richland, Washington
The State of Washington, in accordance with the provisions
of its compact, may limut the volume of low-level radioactive
waste accepted for disposal at the regional disposal facility
located at Richland, Washington to a total of 9,800,000 cubic
feet of low-level radioactive waste during the 7-year period
beginning January |, 1986, and ending December 31, 1992 (as
based on an average annual volume of 1,400,000 cubic feet of
low-level radioactive Waste)
(3) Beatty, Nevada
The State of Nevada, in accordance with the provisions of
its compact, may limit the volume of low-level radioactive
waste accepted for disposal at the regional disposal facility
located at Beatty, Nevada to a total of 1400,000 cubic feet of
low-level radioactive waste during the 7-year period begin-
ning January 1, 1986, and ending December 31, 1992 (as
based on an average annual volume of 200,000 cubic feet of
low-level radioactive waste).
(c) Commercial nuclear power reactor allocations
(1) Amount
Subject to the provisions of subsections (a) through (g) of
this section each commercial nuclear power reactor shall upon
request receive an allocation of low-level radioactive waste
disposal capacity (in cubic feet) at the facilities referred to in
subsection (b) of this section during the 4-year transition
period beginning January |, 1986, and ending December 31,
1989, and during the 3-year licensing.period beginning Janu-
ary |, 1990, and ending December 31, 1992, in an amount
calculated by multiplying the appropriate number from the
following table by the number of months remaining in the
applicable period as determined under paragraph (2).
lla
4-year Transition 3-year Licensing
Period Period
Reactor In Sited All Other In Sited All Other
Type Region Locations Region Locations
PWR 1027 X71 934 685
BWR 2300 19S] 2091 1533
(2) Method of calculation
For purposes of calculating the aggregate amount of dis-
posal capacity available to a commercial nuclear power reactor
under this subsection, the number of months shall be com-
puted beginning with the first month of the applicable period,
or the sixteenth month after receipt of a full power operating
license, whichever occurs later.
(3) Unused allocations
Any unused allocation under paragraph (1) received by a
reactor during the transition period or the licensing period may
be used at any time after such reactor receives its full power
license or after the beginning of the pertinent period, which-
ever 1s later, but not in any event after December 31, 1992, or
after commencement of operation of a regional disposal facil-
ity in the compact region or State in which such reactor is
located, whichever occurs first.
(4) Transferability
Any commercial nuclear power reactor in a State or com-
pact region that is in compliance with the requirements of
subsection (e) of this section may assign any disposal capacity
allocated to it under this subsection to any other person in each
State or compact region. Such assignment may be for valuable
consideration and shall be in writing, copies of which shall be
filed at the affected compact commissions and States, along
with the assignor’s unconditional written waiver of the dis-
posal capacity being assigned.
(5) Unusual volumes
(A) The Secretary may, upon petition by the owner or
operator of any commercial nuclear power reactor, allocate to
such reactor disposal capacity in excess of the amount calcu-
l2a
lated under paragraph (1) if the Secretary finds and states in
writing his reasons for so finding that making additional
capacity available for such reactor through this paragraph is
required to permit unusual or unexpected operating, mainte-
nance, repair or safety activities.
(B) The Secretary may not make allocations pursuant to
subparagraph (A) that would resu!t in the acceptance for
disposal of more than 800,000 cubic feet of low-level radioac-
tive waste or would result in the total of the allocations made
pursuant to this subsection exceeding 11,900,000 cubic feet
over the entire seven-year interim access period.
(6) Limitation
During the seven-year interim access period referred to in
subsection (a) of this section, the disposal facilities referred to
in subsection (b) of this section shall not be required to accept
more than 11,900,000 cubic feet of low-level radioactive
waste generated by commercial nuclear power reactors.
(d)(1) Surcharges
The disposal of any low-level radioactive waste under this
section (other than low-level radioactive waste generated in a
sited compact region) may be charged a surcharge by the State
in which the applicable regional disposal facility is located, in
addition to the fees and surcharges generally applicable for
disposal of low-level radioactive waste in the regional disposal
facility involved. Except as provided in subsection (e)(2) of
this section, such surcharges shall not exceed—
(A) in 1986 and 1987, $10 per cubic foot of low-level
radioactive waste;
(B) in 1988 and 1989, $20 per cubic foot of low-level
radioactive waste; and
(C) in 1990, 1991, and 1992, $40 per cubic foot of low-
level radioactive waste.
(2) Milestone incentives
(A) Escrow account
Twenty-five per centum of all surcharge fees received by a
State pursuant to paragraph (1) during the seven-year period
l3a
referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall be transferred
on a monthly basis to an escrow account held by the Secretary.
The Secretary shall deposit all funds received in a special
escrow account. The funds so deposited shall not be the
property of the United States. The Secretary sha!i act as trustee
for such funds and shall invest them in interest-bearing United
States Government Securities with the highest available yield.
Such funds shall be held by the Secretary until—
(i) paid or repaid in accordance with subparagraph
(B) or (C); or
(ii) paid to the State collecting such fees in accord-
ance with subparagraph (F).
(B) Payments
(i) July 1, 1986
The twenty-five per centum of any amount collected by a
State under paragraph (1) for low-level radioactive waste
disposed of under this section during the period beginning on
January 15, 1986, and ending June 30, 1986, and transferred to
the Secretary under subparagraph (A), shall be paid by the
Secretary in accordance with subparagraph (D) if the mile-
stone described in subsection (e)(1)(A) of this section is met
by the State in which such waste originated.
(ii) January 1, 1988
The twenty-five per centum of any amount collected by a
State under paragraph (1) for low-level radioactive waste
disposed of under this section during the period beginning
July 1, 1986 and ending December 31, 1987, and transferred
to the Secretary under subparagraph (A), shall be paid by the
Secretary in accordance with subparagraph (D) if the mile-
stone described in subsection (e)(1)(B) of this section is met
by the State in which such waste originated (or its compact
region, where applicable).
(iii) January 1, 1990
The twenty-five per centum of any amount collected by a
State under paragraph (1) tor low-level radioactive waste
disposed of under this section during the period beginning
l4a
January 1, 1988 and ending December 31, 1989, and trans-
ferred to the Secretary under subparagraph (A), shall be paid
by the Secretary in accordance with subparagraph (D) if the
milestone described in subsection (e)(1)(C) of this section is
met by the State in which such waste originated (or its com-
pact region, where applicable).
(iv) The twenty-five per centum of any amount collected by
a State under paragraph (1) for low-level radioactive waste
disposed of under this section during the period beginning
January |, 1990 and ending December 31, 1992, and trans-
ferred to the Secretary unde: subparagraph | (A), shall be paid
by the Secretary in accordance with subparagraph (D) if, by
January |, 1993, the State in which such waste originated (or
its compact region, where applicable) is able to provide for the
disposal of all low-level radioactive waste generated within
such State or compact region.
(C) Failure to meet January 1, 1993 deadline
If, by January 1, 1993, a State (or, where applicable, a
compact region) in which low-level radioactive waste is gener-
ated is unable to provide for the disposal of all such waste
generated within such State or compact region—
(i) each State in which such waste is generated, upon
the request of the generator or owner of the waste, shall
take title to the waste, shall be obligated to take posses-
sion of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages
directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner
as a consequence of the failure of the State to take
possession of the waste as soon after January 1, 1993 as
the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is
available for shipment; or
(ii) if such State elects not to take title to, take posses-
sion of, and assume liability for such waste, pursuant to
clause (i), twenty -five per centum of any amount col-
lected by a State under paragraph (1) for low-level
radioactive waste disposed of under this section during
the period beginning January |, 1990 and ending Decem-
ber 31, 1992 shall be repaid, with interest, to each genera-
1Sa
tor trom whom such surcharge was collected. Repay-
ments made pursuant to this clause shall be made on a
monthly basis, with the first such repayment beginning
on February |, 1993, in an amount equal to one thirty-
sixth of the total amount required to be repaid pursuant to
this clause, and shall continue until the State (or, where
applicable, compact region) in which such low-level
radioactive waste is generated is able to provide for the
disposal of all such waste generated within such State or
compact region or until January |, 1996, whichever is
earlier.
If a State in which low-level radioactive waste is generated
elects to take title to, take possession of, and assume liability
for such waste pursuant to clause (1), such State shall be paid
such amounts. as are designated in subparagraph (B)(iv). If a
State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in which low-
level radioactive waste is generated provides for the disposal
of such waste at any time after January 1, :993 and prior to
January 1, 1996, such State (or, where applicable, compact
region) shall be paid in accordance with subparagraph (D) a
lump sum amount equal to twenty-five per centum of any
amount collected by a State under paragraph (1): Provided,
however, That such payment shall be adjusted to reflect the
remaining number of months between January 1, 1993 and
January 1, 1996 for which such Siate (or, where applicable,
compact region) provides for the disposal of such waste. If a
State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in which low-
level radioactive waste is generated is unable to provide for the
disposal of all such waste generated within such State or
compact region by January |, 1996, each State in which such
waste 1s generated, upon the request of the generator or owner
of the waste, shall take utle to the waste, be obligated to take
possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages
directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or Owner as a
consequence of the failure of the State to take posession of the
l6a
waste as soon after January |, 1996, as the generator or owner
notifies the State that the waste is available for shipment.
(D) Recipients of payments
The payments described in subparagraphs (B) and (C) shall
be paid within thirty days after the applicable date—
(i) if the State in which such waste originated is not a
member of a compact region, to such State;
(ii) if the State in which such waste originated is a
member of the compact region, to the compact commis-
sion serving such State.
(E) Uses of payments
(i) Limitations
Any amount paid under subparagraphs (B) or (C) may
only be used to—
(I) establish low-level radioactive waste disposal
facilities;
(II) mitigate the impact of low-level radioactive
waste disposal facilities on the host State;
(IIT) regulate low-level radioactive waste disposal
facilities; or
(IV) ensure the decommissioning, closure, and care
during the period of institutional control of low-level
radioactive waste disposal facilities.
(ii) Reports
(I) Recipient
Any State or compact commission receiving a pay-
ment under subparagraphs (B) or (C) shall, on Decem-
ber 31 of each year in which any such funds are
expended, submit a report to the Department of Energy
itemizing any such expenditures.
l7a
(Il) Department of Energy
Not later than six months after receiving the reports
under subclause (1), the Secretary shall submit to the
Congress a summary of all such reports that shall
include an assessment of the compliance of each such
State or compact commission with the requirements of
clause (1).
(F) Payment to States
Any amount collected by a State under paragraph (1) that is
placed in escrow under subparagraph (A) and not paid to a
State or compact commission under subparagraphs (B) and (C)
or not repaid to a generator under subparagraph (C) shall be
paid from such escrow account to such State collecting such
payment under paragraph (1). Such payment shall be made not
later than 30 days after a detemination of ineligibility for a
refund is made.
(G) Penalty surcharges
No rebate shall be made under this subsection of any sur-
charge or penalty surcharge paid during a period of noncom-
pliance with subsection (¢)(1) of this section.
(e) Requirements for access to regional disposal facilities
(1) Requirements for non-sited compact regions and
non-member States
Each non-sited compact region, or State that is not a mem-
ber of a compact region that does not have an operating
disposal facility, shall comply with the — following
requirements:
(A) By July 1, 1986, each such non-member State shall
ratify compact legislation or by the enactment of legislation or
the certification of the Governor, indicate its intent to develop
a Site for the location of a low-level radioactive waste disposal
facility within such State.
18a
(B) By January 1, 1988.—
(i) each non-sited compact region shall identify the
State in which its low-level radioactive waste disposal
facility is to be located, or shall have selected the devel-
oper for such facility and the site to be developed, and
each compact region or the State in which its low-level]
radioactive waste disposal facility is to be located shall
develop a siting plan for such facility providing detailed
procedures and a schedule for establishing a facility loca
tion and preparing a facility license application and shall
delegate authority to implement such plan;
(ii) each non-member State shall develop a siting plan
providing detailed procedures and a schedule for estab-
lishing a facility location and preparing a facility license
application for a low-level radioactive waste disposal
facility and shall delegate authority to implement such
plan; and
(iii) The siting plan required pursuant to this para-
graph shall include a description of the optimum way to
attain operation of the low-level radioactive waste dis-
posal facility involved, within the ume period specified
in sections 2021b to 2021) of this title. Such plan shall
include a description of the objectives and a sequence of
deadlines for all entities required to take action to imple-
ment such plan, including, to the extent practicable, an
identification of the activities in which a delay in the
Start, or completion, of such activities will cause a delay
in beginning facility operation. Such plan shall also iden-
ufy, to the extent practicable, the process for (1) screen-
ing for broad siting areas; (2) identifying and evaluating
specific candidate sites, and (3) characterizing the prefer-
red site(s), completing all necessary environmental
assessments, and preparing a license application for sub-
mission to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or an
Agreement State.
1YVa
(C) By January 1, 1990.—
(i) a complete application (as determined by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the appropriate
agency of an agreement State) shall be filed for a license
to operate a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility
within each non-sited compact region or within each non-
member State; or
(ii) the Governor (or, for any State without a Gover-
nor, the chief executive officer) of any State that is not a
member of a compact region in compliance with clause
(1), or has not complied with such clause by its own
actions, shall provide a written certification to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that such State will be
- capable of providing for, and will provide for, the storage,
disposal, or management of any low-level radioactive
waste generated within such State and requiring disposal
after December 31, 1992, and include a description of the
actions that will be taken to ensure that such Capacity
CXists.
(D) By January 1, 1992, a complete application (as deter-
mined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the appropri-
ate agency of an agreement State) shall be filed for a license to
operate a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility within
each non-sited compact region of within each non-member
State.
(E) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall transmit any
cerufication received under subparagraph (C) to the Congress
and publish any such certification in the Federal Register.
(F) Any State may, subject to all applicable provisions, if
any, Of any applicable compact, enter into an agreement with
the compact commission of a region in which a regional
disposal facility is located t» provide for the disposal of all
low-level radioactive waste generated within such State. and.
by virtue of such agreement, may. with the approval of the
State in which the regional disposal facility 1s located, be
20a
deemed to be in compliance with subparagraphs (A), (B), (C),
and (D).
(2) Penalties for failure to comply
(A) By July 1, 1986
If any State fails to comply with subparagraph (1)(A)—
(i) any generator of low-level radioactive waste within
such region or non-member State shall, for the period
beginning July 1, 1986, and ending December 31, 1986,
be charged 2 times the surcharge otherwise applicable
under subsection (d) of this section; and
(ii) on or after January |, 1987, any low-level radioac
live waste generated within such region or non-member
State may be denied access to the regional disposal facili-
ties referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsec-
tion (b) of this section.
(B) By January 1, 1988 7
If any non-sited compact region or non-member State fails
to comply with paragraph (1)(B)—
(i) any generator of low-level radioactive waste within
such region or non-member State shall—
(I) tor the period beginning January |, 1988, and
ending June 30, 1988, be charged 2 times the surcharge
otherwise applicable under subsection (d) of this sec-
tion; and
(Il) for the period beginning July |, 1988, and end-
. ing December 31, 1988, be charged 4 umes the sur-
charge otherwise applicable under subsection (d) of
this section, and
(ii) on or after January |, 1989, any low-level radioac-
live waste generated within such region or non-member
State may be denied access to the regional disposal facili-
2la
ties referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsec-
tion (b) of this section.
(C) By January 1, 1990
If any non-sited compact region or non-member State fails
to comply with paragraph (1)(C), any low-level radioactive
waste generated within such region or non-member State may
be denied access to the regional disposal facilities referred to
in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (b) of this section.
(D) By January 1, 1992
If any non-sited compact region or non-member State fails-
to comply with paragraph (1)(D), any generator of low-level
radioactive waste within such region or non-member State
shall, for the period beginning January 1, 1992 and ending
upon the filing of the application described in paragraph
(1)(D), be charged 3 times the surcharge otherwise applicable
under subsection (d) ef this section.
(3) Denial of access
No denial or suspension of access to a regional disposal
facility under paragraph (2) may be based on the source, class,
or type of low-level radioactive waste.
(4) Restoration of suspended access; penalties for fail-
ure to comply
Any access to a regional disposal facility that is suspenced
under paragraph (2) shall be restored after the non-sited com-
pact region or non-member State involved complies with such
requirement. Any payment of surcharge penalties pursuant to
paragraph (2) for failure to comply with the requirements of
subsection (¢) of this section shall be terminated after the non-
sited Compact region or non-member State involved complies
with such requirements.
(f(1) Administration
Each State and compact commission in which a regional
disposal facility reterred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) of
subsection (b) of this section 1s located shall have authority—
22a
(A) to monitor compliance with the limitations, allocations,
and requirements established in this section; and
(B) to deny access to any non-Federal low-level radioactive
waste disposal facilities within its borders to any low-level
radioactive waste that—
(i) is in excess of the limitations or allocations estab-
lished in this section; or
(ii) 1s not required to be accepted due to the failure of a
compact region or State to comply with the requirements
of subsection (e)(1) of this section.
(2) Availability of information during interim access
period
(A) The States of South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada
may require information from disposal facility operators, gen-
erators, intermediate handlers, and the Department of Energy
that is reasonably necessary to monitor the availability of
disposal capacity, the use and assignment of allocations and
the applicability of surcharges.
(B) The States of South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada
may, after written notice followed by a period of at least 30
days, deny access to disposal capacity to any generator or
intermediate handler who fails to provide information under
subparagraph (A).
(C) Proprietary information.—
(i) Trade secrets, proprietary and other confidential
information shall be made available to a State under this
subsection upon request only if such State-—
(I) consents in writing to restrict the dissemination
of the information to those who are directly involved in
monitoring under subparagraph (A) and who have a
need to know,
(II} accepts liability for wrongful disclosure, and
23a
(IIT) demonstrates that such information is essential to
such monitoring.
(ii) The United States shall not be liable for the wrong-
ful disclosure by any individual or State of any informa-
tion provided to such individual or State under this sub-
secuon.
(iii) Whenever any individual or State has obtained
possession of information under this subsection, the indi-
vidual shall be subject to the same provisions of law with
respect to the disclosure of such information as would
apply to an officer or employee of the United States or of
any department or agency thereof and the State shall be
Subject to the same provisions of law with respect to the
disclosure of such information as would apply to the
United States or any department or agency thereof. No
State or State officer or employee who receives tre te
secrets, proprietary information, or other confidential
information under sections 2021b to 2021) of this title
may be required to disclose such information under State
law.
(g) Nondiscrimination
Except as provided in subsections (b) through (e) of this
section, low-level radioactive waste disposed of under this
section shall be subject without discrimination to all applica-
ble legal requirements of the compact region and State in
which the disposal facility is located as if such low-level
radioactive waste were generated within such compact region.
§ 2021f. Emergency access
(a) In general
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission may grant emergency
access to any regional disposal facility or non-Federal disposal
facility within a State that is not a member of a compact for
es Nae
24a
specific low-level radioactive waste, if necessary to eliminate
an immediate and serious threat to the public health and safety
or the common defense and security. The procedure for grant-
ing emergency access shall be as provided in this section.
(b) Request for emergency access
Any generator of low-level radioactive waste, or any Gover-
nor (or, for any State without a Governor, the chief executive
officer of the State) on behalf of any generator or generators
located in his or her State, may request that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission grant emergency access to a regional
disposal facility or a non-Federal disposal facility within a
State that is not a member of a compact for specific low-level
radioactive waste. Any such request shall contain any informa-
tion and certifications the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
may require.
(c) Determination of Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(1) Required determination
Not later than 45 days after receiving a request under
subsection (b) of this section, the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission shall determine whether—
(A) emergency access is necessary because of an immedi-
ate and serious threat to the public health and safety or the
common defense and security, and
(B) the threat cannot be mitigated by any alternative con-
sistent with the public health and safety, including storage of
low-level radioactive waste at the site of generation or in a
storage facility obtaining access to a disposal facility by volun.
tary agreement, purchasing disposal capacity available for
assignment pursuant to section 202 le(c) of this ttle or ceasing
activities that generate low-level radioactive waste.
(2) Required notification
If the Nuclear Regulatory Commission makes the deter-
munations required in paragraph (1) in the affirmative, it shall
designate an appropriate non-Federal disposal facility or facil-
ites, and noufy the Governor (or chief executive officer) of
the State in which such facility 1s located and the appropriate
25a
compact commission that emergency access is required. Such
notification shall specifically describe the low-level radioac-
live waste as to source, physical and radiological characteris-
tics, and the minimum volume and duration, not exceeding
180 days, necessary to alleviate the immediate threat to public
health and safety or the common defense and security. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall also notify the Gover-
nor (or chief executive officer) of the State in which the low-
level radioactive waste requiring emergency access was gener-
ated that emergency access has been granted and that, pursuant
to subsection (e) of this section, no extension of emergency
access may be granted absent diligent State action during the
period of the initial grant.
(d) Temporary emergency access
Upon determining that emergency access is necessary
because of an immediate and serious threat to the public health
and safety or the common defense and security, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission may at its discretion grant temporary
emergency access, pending its determination whether the
threat could be mitigated by any alternative consistent with the
public health and safety. In granting access under this subsec-
tion, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall provide the
same notification and information required under subsection
(c) of this section. Absent a determination that no alternative
consistent with the public health and safety would mitigate the
threat, access granted under this subsection shall expire 45
days after the granting of temporary emergency access under
this subsection.
(e) Extension of emergency access
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission may grant one exten-
sion of emergency access beyond the period provided in sub- :
section (c) of this section, if it determines that emergency
access continues to be necessary because of an immediate and
serious threat to the public health and safety or the common
detense and security that cannot be mitigated by any alterna
live consistent with the public health and safety, and that the
26a
generator of low-level radioactive waste granted emergency
access and the State in which such low-level radioactive waste
was generated have diligently though unsuccessfully acted
during the period of the initial grant to eliminate the need for
emergency access. Any extension granted under this subsec-
tion shall be for the minimum volume and duration of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission finds necessary to eliminate
the immediate threat to public health and safety or the com-
mon defense and security, and shall not in any event exceed
180 days.
(f) Reciprocal access |
Any compact region or State not a member of a compact
that provides emergency access to non-Federal disposal facili-
ties within its borders shall be entitled to reciprocal access to
any subsequently operating non-Federal disposal facility that
serves the State or compact region in which low-level radioac-
live waste granted emergency access was generated. The com-
pact commission or State having authority to approve importa-
tion of low-level radioactive waste to the disposal facility to
which emergency access was granted shall designate for recip-
rocal access an equal volume of low-level radioactive waste
having similar characteristics to that provided emergency
access. _
(g) Approval by compact commission 7
Any grant of access under this section shall be submitted to
the compact commission for the region in which the desig
nated disposal tacility 1s located for such approval as may be
required under the terms of its compact. Any such compact
commission shall act to approve emergency access not later
than 15 days after receiving notification from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, or reciprocal access not later than 1S
days after receiving notification trom the appropriate authority
under subsection (f) of this sect
(h) Limitations
No State shall be required to provide emergency or recipro
| 9 ; ’ ath \ ~
cal access to any regional disposal within its borders
dla
for low-level radioactive waste pot meeting criteria estab-
lished by the license or license agreement of such facility, or in
excess of the approved capacity of such facility, or to delay the
closing of any such facility pursuant to plans established
before receiving a request for emergency or reciprocal access.
No State shall, during any 12-month period, be required to
provide emergency or reciprocal access to any regional dis-
posal facility within its borders for more than 20 percent of the
total volume of low-level radioactive waste accepted for dis-
posal at such facility during the previous calendar year.
(i) Volume reduction and surcharges
Any low-level radioactive Waste delivered for disposal
under this section shall be reduced in volume to the maximum
extent practicable and shall be subject to surcharges estab-
lished in sections 2021b to 2021) of this title.
(j) Deduction from allocation
Any volume of low-level radioactive waste granted emer-
gency or reciprocal access under this section. if generated by
any commercial nuclear power reactor, shall be deducted from
the low-level radioactive waste volume allocable under section
202le(c) of this title.
(k) Agreement States
Any agreement under section 2021 of this title shall not be
applicable to the determinations of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission under this section
§ 20212. Responsibilities of Department of Energy
(a) Financial and technical assistance
The Secretary shall, to the extent provided in appropriations
Act, provide to those compact regions, host States, and non-
member States determined by the Secretary to require assist-
ance for purposes of carrying out sections 2021b to 2021) of
this title
(1) continuing technical assistance to assist them in fulfill-
ing their responsibilitics under sections 2021b to 2021) of this
title. Such technical assistance shall include. but not he limited
28a
to, technical guidelines for site selection, alternative technolo-
gies for low-level radioactive waste disposal, volume reduc-
tion options, management techniques to reduce low-level
waste generation, transportation practices for shipment of low-
level wastes, health and safety considerations in the storage,
shipment and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes, and
establishment of a computerized database to monitor the man-
agement of Low-level radioactive wastes, and
(2) through the end of fiscai year 1993, financial assistance
to assist them in fulfilling their responsibilities under sections
2021b to 2021} of this utle.
(b) Reports
The Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Congress on
an annual basis a report which (1) summarizes the progress of
low-level waste disposal siting and licensing activities within
each compact region, (2) reviews the available volume reduc-
tion technologies, their applications, effectiveness, and costs
on a per unit volume basis, (3) reviews interim storage facility
requirements, costs, and usage, (4) summarizes transportation
requirements for such wastes on an inter- and intra-regional
basis, (5) summarizes the data on the total amount of low-level
waste shipped for disposal on a yearly basis, the proportion of
such wastes subjected to volume reduction, the average vol-
ume reduction attained, and the proportion of wastes stored on
an interim basis, and (6) projects the interim storage and final
disposal volume requirements anticipated for the following
year, on a regional basis.
§ 2021h. Alternative disposal methods
(a) Not later than 12 months after January 15, 1986, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall, in consultauien with
the States and other interested persons, identify methods for
the disposal of Low-level radioactive waste other than shallow
land burial, and establish and publish technical guidance
regarding licensing of facilities that use such methods
29a
(b) Not later than 24 months after January 15, 1986, the
Commission Shall, in consultation with the States and other
interested persons, identify and publish all relevant technical
information regarding the methods identified pursuant to sub-
section (a) of this section that a State or compact must provide
to the Commission in order to pursue such methods, together
with the technical requirements that such facilities must meet,
in the judgment of the Commission, if pursued as an alterna-
tive to shallow land burial. Such technical information and
requirements shall include, but need not be limited to, site
Suitability, site design, facility operation, disposal site closure,
and environmental monitoring, as necessary to meet the per-
formance objectives established by the Commission for a
licensed low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. The
Commission shall specify and publish such requirements in a
manner and form deemed appropriate by the Commission.
§ 2021i. Licensing review and approval
In order to ensure the timely development of new low-level
radioactive waste disposal facilities, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission or, as appropriate, agreement States, shall con-
sider an application for a disposal facility license in accord-
ance with the laws applicable to such application, except that
the Commission and the agreement state! shall—
(1) not later than 12 months after January 15, 1986, estab-
lish procedures and develop the technical capability for proc-
essing applications for such licenses;
(2) to the extent practicable, complete all activities associ-
ated with the review and processing of any application for
such a license (except for public hearings) no later than 15
months efter the date of receipt of such application; and
(3) to the extent practicable, consolidate all required techni-
cal and environmental reviews and public hearings.
30a
§ 2021j. Radioactive waste below regulatory concern
(a) Not later than 6 months after January 15, 1986, the
Commission shall establish standards and procedures, pur-
suant to existing authority, and develop the technical capa-
bility for considering and acting upon petitions to exempt
specific radioactive waste streams from regulation by the
Commission due to the presence of radionuclides in such
waste streams in sufficiently low concentrations or quantities
as to be below regulatory concern.
(b) The standards and procedures established by the Com-
mission pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall set forth
all information required to be submitted to the Commission by
licensees in support of such petitions, including, but not lim-
ited to—
(1) a detailed description of the waste materials, including
their origin, chemical composition, physical state, volume, and
mass; and
(2) the concentration or contamination levels, half-lives,
and identities of the radionuclides present.
Such standards and procedures shall provide that, upon receipt
of a petition to exempt a specific radioactive waste stream
from regulation by the Commission, the Commission shall
determine in an expeditious manner whether the concentration
Or quantity of radionuclides present in such waste stream
requires regulation by the Commission in order tc protect the
public health and safety. Where Commission deterimines that
regulation of a radioactive waste stream is not necessary to
protect the public health and safety, the Commission shall take
such steps as may be necessary, in an expeditious manner, to
exempt the disposal of such radioactive waste from regulation
by the Commission.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.