Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Riggins v. Nevada

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NO. i’ == eh

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 19_/

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DAVID E. RIGGINS, Petitioner

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Respectfully submitted,

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY, ESQ.

520 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 384-5563

Attorney for Petitioner

RECEIVE”

jun 12 1991

oFFice ~ Trt ween

SUPREME court, U.S.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether forced medication during tria

defendant’s constitut

1 violates a

ional right to a full and fair trial.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINION OF NEVADA SUPREME COURT. - + + + * * * * * * * *

JURISDICTION .«2«e«ee2er8878 8 8 © *

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED. -.-++ + + *

STATEMENT OF CASE. --++-+*e***** * * & & * *

STATEMENT OF PACTS .--+**e**ee2e2ee88 9 8 8

;UTHORITY AND ARGUMENT .. +++ ** * © * © & *

a, a A lle

i.VPENDIX (Exhibits fs & B) . . . io . . . . . - . .

rere v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (1984) . Toe ee Ck a wee

2d 437 (1983)

conronwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.

creqq_v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). - + +++:

Gregg vy. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) Georgia Code Section

17-10-30 * . . . eo _ . . . . * * -_ . . . . . .

Harper _v,. State, 110 Wash.2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988). - ++»

+. Zz; wh «

1975)

In_re Prey, 133 Vt. 253, 257-258, 336 A.2d 174, 17°

Jerek vy. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). + «+ «© « »

Large v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d 399 (1986). . -

Matter of Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64 (Il1l.App 4 Dist. 1988). - +--+:

Pledger v. United States, 272 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1959). - +++ »

Proffitt v. Florida, 490 U.8. 3462 (2976) «-2«2«ee2r78 28 8

State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 101, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971)

State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 766-767, 355 P.2d 323,

327 (1960). +--+ + «+ = Ca os i a a a

een

. o . °

U.S. v,. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).

U.S. v, Watson, 893 F. 2d 970 (8th Cir. 1990) . . . .

Washington vy. Harper, 110 S.Ct 1028 (1990).

foungberg vy, Romeo, 102 S.Ct 2452 (1982).

Zant _v, Stephens, 462 U.S.

LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

Fentiman, Whose Right is it Anyway?: Rethinking Competency

to Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane

Insanity Defendant, 40 U. Miami L.Rev. 1109 (1986) .

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Fifth Amendment

Eighth Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment

861,

877 (1983)

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NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBE: TERM, 19___

eseeereeeereeereree

DAVID E. RIGGINS, Petitioner

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

David E. Riggins petitions for a Writ of Certiorari

to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nevada.

The Order of the Nevada Supreme Court is attached to

this Petition as Exhibit "A".

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court was entered

March 28, 1991 (Exhibit +a") ieslilfitessn,. Por.we of

Certiorari was filed within thee ppmocer shed time

period after a Mction To Stay Remittitur pending a Writ of

Certiorari was granted by the Nevada Supreme Court on April 15,

1991 (Exhibit "B"). The Court also granted a motion extending

the Stay until June 15, 1991 (Exhibit “c"). This Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1257(3).

iii

MACE J YAMPOLSAY

ATTOQNEY aT Law

880 Bourn 41s Srecer

48 VEGAS NEVADA 889101 ese3

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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in relevant part:

-nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal

case to be a wintness against himself, nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law.

2. The Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution demands that cruel and unusual punishment shall

not be inflicted.

Re The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in relevant part:

-nor shall any State deprive any person oft

life, liberty, or property without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF CASE

DAVID EDWARD RIGGINS was arrested on November 20,

1987. Shortly after his a

milligrams of Mellaril per day under advisement of the prison

psychiatrist. On December 14, 1987, Mace J. Yampolsky, Esq.,

was appointed as Counsel for Defendant (ROA 277). DAVID

RIGGINS was charged, by information filed April 5, 1988, with

Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, N.R.S. 200.380, N.R.S.

193.165, and Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon, N.R.S.

200.010, N.R.S. 200.030, N.R.S. 193.265 (ROA 48). A

1988 before the

Preliminary Hearing was held March 25,

ATTORNEY at Law

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Honorable Daniel E. Ahlstrom, Justice of the Peace (ROA 295).

Defendant was bound over on two counts, Robbery with Use of a

Deadly Weapon, and Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon to

District Court (ROA 399).

On January 20, February 17, 18, 19, 24 and March 9,

1988, Defendant’s Arraignment was held before the Honorable

Judge James Brennan in the Clark County District Court (ROA

47).' On March 9, 1988, after being examined by three

psychiatrists, defendant RIGGINS was found competent to stand

trial. Dr. Jack Jurasky opined that defendant RIGGINS was

incompetent, but Dr. William O’Gorman and Dr. Franklin Master

decided DAVID RIGGINS was competent. He was being medicated

with Mellaril at the time he was examined.

A Motion for Individual Sequestered Voir Dire was

filed on June 9, 1988, but was denied (ROA 52, 108). On June

10, 1988, defense counsel submitted a notice of insanity

defense. Also on June 10, 1988, a Motion to Terminate the

Administration of Medication was filed, and denied, and an Ex

Parte Motion to Allow Defendant to Wear?Civilian, Clothes During

the Trial was filed, and granted (ROA 63). In addition, an Ex

Parte Motion for an Order Appointing Co-Counsel was filed

September 30, 1988, and was denied (ROA 124, 127).

A jury trial was held November 7, 8, 9, 14, and 15,

1988 before the Honorable Judge James Brennan (ROA 512-919).

Defendant RIGGINS was convicted of Robbery with Use of a Deadly

Weapon, and Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (ROA 275). The

penalty hearing was held November 16 and 17, 1988, and the jury

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sentenced the Defendant to DEATH by lethal injection (ROA 276).

Defendant RIGGINS was sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection

for Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon. Defendant was further

sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for Robbery, and

fifteen years imprisonment for the Use of Deadly Weapon. The

two sentenced in Count I were ordered to run consecutively but

concurrently to the sentence imposed in Count II (ROA 276).

The instant appeal is from the Defendant’s judgment

of conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Early in the morning at 1:30 a.m. on Friday, the 20th

of November, 1987, DAVID RIGGINS spoke to Paul Wade on the

telephone to arrange a meeting to purchase some cocaine (ROA

529). Soon thereafter, RIGGINS asked his roommate, Lowell

Pendrey, if he could borrow Pendrey’s car to go to a friend’s

house. Pendrey would not allow RIGGINS to borrow his car, but

offered to provide transportation tc the friend’s house (ROA

528). At approximately 2:00 ani ind’ Pendrey drove to

Paul Wade’s apartment. RIGGINS went in alone, and left Pendrey

waiting in the car (ROA 531). RIGGINS was in the apartment

approximately 20 minutes, and returned to Pendrey’s car with no

change in his demeanor (ROA 534). Later that morning at

approximately 3:00 a.n., Patricia Bezian, Paul Wade’s

girlfriend and roommate took her scheduled lunch break from

work, and went home to find out why Wade was not answering the

telephone (ROA 530). She found Wade lying on his stomach, dead

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in a pool of blood (ROA 530). Paul Wade died of multiple cut

and stab wounds to the head, trunk, and limbs (ROA 546). There

were 32 stab wounds in all (ROA 533).

DAVID RIGGINS testified that he has been hearing

voices since he was four years old, and that originally he

thought they were aliens, but later found out from his minister

that they were the devil, trying to possess his body (ROA 711).

RIGGINS stated on the morning of the incident, he had gone over

to Paul Wade’s to buy some cocaine, and once inside the

apartment, Wade began attacking RIGGINS with the knife. After

Wade had been injured seriously, he told RIGGINS to leave and

take his jacket with him (ROA 723).

RIGGINS stated that the homicide was justified

because Wade had killed two little girls in the past, and had

also tried to kill RIGGINS before by putting fiberglass in his

water supply and by squirting his AIDS infected blood on

cocaine before selling it to RIGGINS. Fiberglass in water to

be used for shooting cocaine would cause blood clots and death

(ROA 716, 723). | oe “

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RIGGINS stated that. he had been admitted to a mental

institution six months eeier te ~ nae a and had been

given medication for his condition (ROA 740). RIGGINS stated

that he was not on any prescription medications on the morning

of the incident, but at trial was taking 800 milligrams of

Mellaril per day (ROA 741).

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MACE J YAMPOLSKY

av Law

ATTORNEY

820 Goutnw 4t~ Svacer

LAS VEGAG NEVADA 680101 6809

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT

This case is important to Petitioner because he was

medicated against his will which did not allow the jury to see

his “true" demeanor. As a result or the denial of his

constitutional rights he now faces death by lethal injection.

The death penalty may not be imposed in an arbitrary

and capricious manner. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, (1976).

Instead, the statutory scheme “must genuinely narrow the class

of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably

justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the

defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant vy.

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). The Court has allowed each

state to fashion its own statute as long as these gencral

principles are followed. See, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262

1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).

VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A “FULL ANO FAIR" TRAIL»

Prior to jury selection, defense counsel filed a Motion to

Terminate the Administration of Medication. Defendant RIGGINS

was under the influence of 800 milligrams of Mellaril per day.

Mellaril is an antipsychotic drug, one of four major classes o!

This

psychotropic drugs used to treat mental iliness.

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medication violated DAVID RIGGINS’ right to be free from bodily

restraint, and ultimately his right to a "full and fair” trial.

The medication denied DAVID RIGGINS the ability to assist in

His demeanor, appearance and attitude were

and sanitized for the jury.

his defense.

chemically cauterized

This is a case of first impression in Nevada, therefore,

law on the subject. However,

there is no applicable state case

there are several other jurisdictions that have ruled on the

2subject.

Several cases have held that an individual has 4 due

ess right to freedom from arbitrary forcible administration

of chemical restraints. Youngberg v. Romeo 102 S.Ct. 2458

(1982), Large v. Superior Court 148 Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d 399,

y.S, vy. Watson 893 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 19S~)- The United States

Supreme Court in Youngberg vy. Romeo, Id. at 2458,

restraint as well as liberty from chemical

core liberty

proc

held that

liberty from bodily

restraint, has always been recognized as the

protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary government

This interest survives’ éfininal’t¢onviction and

A similar decisionwas,rendered in Large vy.

Superior Court, Id. at 406, where the Supreme Court of Arizona

action.

incarceration.

stated:

“Notwithstanding his status as 4a convicted prisoner,

petitioner retains the right to due process protection

against arbitrary government action. Liberty from

arbitrary chemical restraint survives criminal conviction

and incarceration just as liberty from arbitrary bodily

restraint survives both civil and involuntary commitment.”

Defendant RIGCINS should not have been forced to take

medication against his will, as his freedom from chemical

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-AS VEGAS. NEVADA 8910!.6808

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LAW OFFICE oF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

ATTORNEY

(702)

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restraint is protected by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

This court further stated:

"The medical nature of the procedure does not justify

dispensing with due process requirements. The mere fact

that a doctor authorized the forcible administration of

the drugs is not conclusive. Due process requires that

courts ‘make certain’ that proper professional judgment

was ‘in fact’ exercised in the denial of a liberty

interest."

Although the administration of Mellaril to defendant

RIGGINS was authorized by a psychiatrist, this does not

ameliorate the fact that he was denied a liberty interest

provided to him by the Fourteenth Amendment.

There are also at least two separate Fifth Amendment

violations present in a state’s decision to compel one who is

presenting an insanity defense to be medicated in order to

Stand trial. First, such medication and the altered demeanor

that accompanies it compels the defendant to be the instrument

of his own conviction, thus Violating the privilege against

self-incrimination. Second, by effectively mandating the

presentation of this altered demeanor, the state considerably

lightens its own burden at trial, violating the fundamental

precept of our adversarial system of justice that the state

must shoulder the burden of proving its case against the

individual. Fentiman, Whose Right is it Anyway?: Rethinking

Competency to Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane

Insanity Defendant, 40 U. Miami L.Rev. 1161.

By forcing DAVID RIGGINS to be medicated in order to stand

trial, the State of Nevada violated his privilege against self-

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incrimination, while at the same time reduced its own burden to

refute the insanity defense at trial.

An individuai cannot be _ forcibly medicated with

antipsychotic drugs unless he is a danger to himself or others,

or unless there is an emergency situation. In Washington v.

Harper 110 S.Ct. 1039 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court held that,

given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due

Process Clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who

has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against

his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and

the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest. This is

consistent with the decision of U.S. Court of Appeals in Bee v.

Greaves 744 F.2d 1394 (1984), that due process requires that a

qualified professional determine that the forcible

administration of medication is, in his or her opinion,

necessary to assure everyone’s safety.

In the instant case the reason DAVID RIGGINS was medicated

was never provided. He was medicated immediately after being

taken into custody. There is no evidence defendant RIGGINS

threatened to harm himself or anyone else. He appeared like a

zombie to the jury throughout the entire trial.

Many courts have held that freedom from psychotropic

medication is a right protected by the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals

in U.S. v. Watson 893 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), agreed with other

courts that the substantive right to be free from unwanted

bodily restraint includes the right to refuse psychotropic

LAW OFFICE OF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

ATTORNEY AT LAW

4TH Sreeer

820 SouTH

89101 6883s

VEGAS. NEVADA

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(702) 384.5563

medications. Defendant RIGGINS had the right to refuse the

medication, and by disregarding his request, the State of

Nevada violated his Due Process rights.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

includes liberty interest in the right to privacy, including

the right to make one’s own decisions about fundamental

matters, the rights to personal dignity and bodily integrity,

and the right to communicate ideas freely. Bee v. Greaves

744 F.2d 1391 (1984). The decision whether to accept

treatment with antipsychotic drugs is of sufficient

importance to fall within the category of privacy interests

protected by the Constitution. DAVID RIGGINS was refused

this right to make decisions regarding his body. He

requested that the administration of medication be

discontinued, and his request was denied.

According to the United States Court of Appeals in U.S.

v. Charters 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.

1987), the government may

not force an unconsenting individual to hazard the present

danger of antipsychotic medication upon a mere supposition

that at some future time the individual may become dangerous.

Furthermore, unless it is determined that, without

medication, a patient presents an immediate threat of

violence that cannot be avoided through the use of less

restrictive alternatives, there is no justification for the

intrusion into fundamental liberties that forcible medication

represents. No other alternatives were ever offered to

defendant RIGGINS. Upon arrest he was immediately medicated

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VEGAS, NEVADA 89101-6895

LAW OFFICE oF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

ATTORNEY AT LAW

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with Mellaril and his dosages have been periodically

increased, to the outrageous level of 800 milligrams of

Mellaril per day.

If one is medicated throughout one’s trial, while

forcible medication of

claiming an insanity defense,

psychotropic drugs may alter one’s demeanor in such a way

that it would lead to misimpressions by the jurors. For

instance, in U.S. v. Charters 829 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1987),

the court held that if a defendant is heavily medicated

during the trial, the jury may get a false impression of the

defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime. We

believe that to be the case here. Defendant RIGGINS was

medicated so heavily that he almost appeared comatose. Dr.

Jack Jurasky, the defense psychiatrist, testified that DAVID

RIGGINS consumed “enough Mellaril to tranquilize an

elephant." (ROA 752).

Just as medication can create misimpressions about the

defendant’s insanity at the time of the crime, its effects

can also cause other important misimpressions about the

defendant’s mental state. Two common side effects of

antipsychotic drugs are akinesia which makes the defendant

apathetic and unemotional, and akathisia which makes him

agitated and restless. As a result, the jury may be misled

by the demeanor of a defendant who appears not to care about

the crime, the victim, or the proceedings or who appears

overly anxious at particular moments.

Defendant RIGGINS exhibited akinesia. Throughout the

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trial he appeared apathetic and unemotional. This had a

powerful effect on the jury. This was a man on trial for

violently murdering someone, who had stabbed someone

repeatedly, and it appeared to the jurors that he just didn’t

care. This image would remain in the juror’s minds and did

not support his insanity defense. This obviously prejudiced

DAVID RIGGINS.

Some courts hold that an instruction to the jury as to

the effects of the medication the defendant is currently

being administered reduces the problem of the jury not seeing

the defendant’s “true” demeanor.

However, as held by the

U.S. Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Charters 829 F.2d 494 n.20

(4th Cir. 1987), a jury instruction cannot ameliorate the

negative impact of antipsychotic drugs on a defendant’s

ability to consult with counsel.

Although this type of

instruction to the jury reduces the problem of the jury not

seeing defendant RIGGINS’ true demeanor, it still does not

abolish any misimpressions or prejudices they may create

about him.

The Supreme Court of Washington in Harper v. State 110

Wash.2d 876, 759 P.2d 361 (1988) recognized that competent

adults have a right to determine what shall be done to their

bodies. This right should extend to DAVID RIGGINS as he was

adjudicated (chemically) competent to stand trial. He should

have been competent to make decisions regarding his own body,

but he was deprived of that right.

The Supreme Court of Washington also held in State v.

LAW OFFICE OF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

AT LAW

ATTORNEY

820 SouTH 4TH

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VEGAS, NEVADA 8910!1.6595

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Murphy, 56 Wash.2d 761, 766-67, 355 P.2d 323, 327 (1960),

"that a new trial be granted in the event of a showing by the

accused, of a reasonable possibility that his attitude,

appearance, and demeanor, as observed by the jury, have been

substantially influenced or affected by circumstances over

which he had no real control." A new trial should be granted

in this case as well, because the amount of medication

defendant RIGGINS was administered has been clearly

demonstrated to have a tranquilizing effect, which altered

his demeanor and appearance in front of the jury.

The courts of the state of Washington also ruled on this

subject in State v. Maryott, where the court stated that:

"If the State may administer tranquilizers to a

defendant who objects, the State then is, in effect,

permitted to determine what the jury will see or will

not see of the defendant’s case by medically altering

the attitude, appearance and demeanor of the defendant,

when they are relevant to the jury’s consideration of

his mental condition." 6 Wash.App 96, 101, 492 P.2d 239,

242 (1971).

The State of Nevada, by medicating DAVID RIGGINS against

his will, altered his demeanor and determined what the jury

would see. As a result, the State of Nevada permitted the

jury to see defendant RIGGINS in his medicated state only.

The Maryott court also stated that, "when mental

competence is at issue, the right to offer testimony involves

more than mere verbalization. The demeanor in court of one

who has raised the issue of sanity is of probative value to

the trier of fact." Id. The jury in the instant case never

saw DAVID RIGGINS in his "normal" undrugged condition.

Sanity was the only issue in the present case, and the triers

LAW OFFICE OF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

AT LAW

ATTORNEY

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VEGAS. NEVADA 89101-68058

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(702) 384.5563

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of fact only saw the defendant’s altered demeanor.

Consequently, they were never exposed to his insanity which

eventually resulted in his receiving a DEATH sentence.

The Maryott court also stated that "it is difficult to

see a legitimate state interest in imposing drugs on a

defendant who asks to be free from them." Id.

at 103, 492

P.2d at 243. The court then went on to say that if

controlling a possibly obstreperous defendant is the motive,

two alternatives are suggested,

"First, no control should be

imposed until its need has been demonstrated. Second, the

control which is imposed should insure an orderly trial with

the least interference with a defendant’s rights." Id.

In the present case, the court ignored both

alternatives. No need was ever demonstrated for imposing the

medication, and substantial interference with the defendant’s

rights occurred when the State inundated RIGGINS with "enough

Mellaril to tranquilize an elephant." (ROA 752).

The State administered 800 milligrams of Mellaril per

day during the trial against RIGGINS’ will (ROA 740).

Psychiatrist Jack Jurasky, an expert witness, testified that

800 milligrams per day is enough to tranquilize an elephant

(ROA 752). Courts have held that an accused may not be tried

when he is so drugged, because he is in effect, not there at

all. Pledger v. United States, 272 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1959).

Defendant RIGGINS’ eyes were open, but nobody was home.

The Supreme Court of Vermont remanded the case of In Re

Prey 133 Vt. 253,

257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975) for a new

LAW CFFICE OF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 8910!1.65095

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trial where the defendant had been heavily drugged during the

trial, and it was held that “it may well have been necessary,

in view of the critical nature of the issue, to expose the

jury to the undrugged, unsedated Gary Prey, at least insofar

as safety and trial progress might permit." The jury in the

present case should have been exposed to the “undrugged,

unsedated" DAVID RIGGINS as far as safety and trial progress

would have permitted, especially since his defense was his

insanity at the time of the offense.

The facts of Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453

N.E.2d 437 (1983), are similar to the present case. In

Louraine, the defendant was not taking antipsychotic

medication at the time of the homicide, but while in custody,

was receiving antipsychotic medication in various forms and

doses, among which was Mellaril. At trial, the defendant was

under the influence of “heavy" or “maximum" dosages of

Stelazine, another antipsychotic medication utilized for the

management of the manifestations of psychotic disorders. Id.

at 33, 453 N.E.2d at 441.

In Louraine, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts cited

the “universally accepted rule that, when a defendant’s

san.icy is at issue, the trier of fact is entitled to consider

the defendant’s demeanor in court." Id. at 34, 453 N.E.2d at

442. The court further stated, "if the defendant appears

calm and controlted at trial, the jury may well discount any

testimony that the defendant lacked at the time of the crime,

substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of

LAW OFFICE OF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

ATTORNEY AT LAW

4% Greeer

VEGAS. NEVADA 89101-6505

820 GouTH

LAS

(702) 384.8563

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his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of

the law." Id. This appears to have occurred in the present

case. DAVID RIGGINS looked apathetic and unemotional to the

jurors. Therefore, they discounted testimony that he lacked

the capacity at the time of the crime to appreciate the

wrongfulness of his conduct. As a result, they sentenced him

to DEATH by lethal injection, rather than providing him an

opportunity for rehabilitation to overcome his mental

illness.

According to the court in Matter of Orr 531 N.E.2d 73

(Il1l.App. 4 Dist. 1988), a recipient may refuse medication

absent an emergency situation unless under the parens patriae

doctrine he has been adjudicated incompetent in a separate

proceeding. Defendant RIGGINS was never found incompetent,

although he was examined on defense’s request. He was placed

on medication and then examined and found to be competent to

stand trial.

DAVID RIGGINS had no control over the antipsychotic

medication being administered to him because his Motion to

Terminate the Administration of Medication was denied. He

was medicated against his will. There is no doubt that his

attitude, appearance and demeanor were affected by the

medication.

When the state insists on the medication of the insanity

defendant as a condition of his being "competent" to stand

trial, such compulsory medication lightens the state’s

evidentiary burden at trial, making it easier for the state

#9101.6595

(702) 384.5563

LAW OFFICE oF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

ATTORNEY AT LAW

520 GouTH 4TH SrReeT

VEGAS. NEVADA

Las

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to rebut the defendant’s contention that he was insane at the

time of the offense. This medication denies the defendant

the evidence he needs to demonstrate convincingly his

insanity, and deprives him of his right to be the master of

his own fate, violating the basic constitutional precept of

deference to personal autonomy. Fentiman, Whose Right is it

Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial in the Light of

the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant. 40 U. Miami L.Rev.

1168 (1986).

During trial, DAVID RIGGINS was under the influence of

800 milligrams of Mellaril per day. This medication violated

his right to a "full and fair" trial by denying him the

ability to assist in his defense, and by prejudicing his

demeanor, appearance, and attitude to the jury.

refusal of DAVID RIGGINS’

The court’s Motion to

Terminate the Administration of Medication, violated his

right to a “full and fair" trial because the jury never saw

his actual demeanor, which could have demonstrated his

insanity. The overwhelming majority of case law supports

this view.

LAW OFFICE OF

MACE J. YAMPOLSKY

ATTORNEY AT LAW

4 Sreecr

VEGAS, NEVADA 89101. 6808

$20 GouTH

Las

(702) 384.5565

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CONCLUSION

The State of Nevada drugged defendant RIGGINS into an

unnatural state of chemical competency. The trial court

allowed the State to drug defendant RIGGINS against his will

into zombie-like competency, thereby depriving him of his

right to a full and fair trial. This court should reverse

the court below, and remand this case to the trial court and

order a new trial of DAVID RIGGINS in an unmedicated state.

prongs Submitted,

Pee 4 if)

MACE J. POLSKY, ESQ.

Nevada nae No. 001945

520 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 384-5563

Attorney for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.