Respondents Brief — Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn.

Supreme Court brief1992

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

_ (7?) ~~ en"

Lt” Court, U.S.

cle FILED

No. 90-1676

™ 1992

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

Mary GADE, Director of the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,

» Petitioner,

NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

DONALD T. BLISS *

ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.

WILLIAM M. SAGE

O’MELVENY & MYERS

555 18th Street, N.W.

Of Counsel: Washington, D.C. 20004-1109

BRUCE J. PARKER (202) 383-5331

NATIONAL SOLID WASTES

MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

Suite 1000

1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 200386

(202) 659-4613

JOHN T. VAN GESSEL

CHEMICAL WASTE

MANAGEMENT, INC.

3003 Butterfield Road

Oak Brook, Illinois 60521

(708) 218-1688 * Counsel of Record

WILSON - Epgs Printing Co., Inc. - 769-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

BEST AVAILABLE COPY!

QUESTION PRESENTED

May Illinois avoid the procedure for state participation

expressly established by Congress in Section 18 of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.

£$ 651-668 (1988 and Supp. 1991), and enact “supple-

mental” state legislation which directly, clearly and sub-

stantially intrudes upon federal regulation of occupa-

tional safety and health merely by asserting a state leg-

islative purpose which extends beyond the purposes of

the federal enactment?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE........... ts AO sae Be ]

Federal Occupational Health and Safety Regula-

tion of Hazardous Waste Operations 2

Subsequent Illinois Regulation of Hazardous

Ne icccecceneenescerences 5

The District Court Proceedings Below ....... 6

The Decision of the United States Court of Appeals

a ee eeweens GAPCUIL................................. &

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........... 1. eS 4)

Ee ements tO 12

I IN THE ABSENCE OF AN APPROVED

STATE PLAN, SECTION 18 OF THE OSH

ACT PREEMPTS REDUNDANT AND “SUP-

PLEMENTAL” STATE LEGISLATION 12

A. Section 18 Expresses Congress’ Intent To

Allow States to Enact Standards Such as

the Illinois Acts Only Upon Approval of an

Adequate State Plan... . | 13

B. SARA and the OSH Act Express Congress’

Intent to Eliminate Duplicative Regulation

of Hazardous Waste Workers 21

C. The Legislative Context of the OSH Act

Demonstrates that Congress Deliberately

Crafted Section 18 So As to Preclude “‘Sup-

plemental” State Regulation | 23

D. The Occupational Safety and Health Ad-

ministration Interprets Section 18 as Pre-

empting Duplicative or Supplemental State

Regulation GANS a ‘ 26

(iii)

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Ek. The Contested Provisions of the Illinois Acts

Duplicate, Supplement and Conflict With

OSHA’s Final Rule and Frustrate the Pur-

poses of the Federal Legislative Scheme

Il. THE TEST APPLIED BY THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT PROVIDES AN OBJECTIVE AND

WORKABLE STANDARD FOR APPLYING

SECTION 18 OF THE OSH ACT

A. Congress May Expressly Preempt State

Laws That Interfere With the Valid Exer-

cise of Federal Legislative Power Regard-

less of the Purpose of the State Enactment.

B. The First, Second and Third Circuits Incor-

rectly Concluded That Preemption Should

Depend on the Additional Purposes or Effects

of the State Enactment Rather Than on the

Direct Effect of the State Enactment on the

Federal Legislative Scheme...

C. The Seventh Circuit Test Avoids Requiring

Federal Judges to Probe the Minds of State

Legislatures

D. The Seventh Circuit Standard Would Not

Threaten States’ Licensing and _ Police

Powers

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29

U.S.C. $$ 651-668

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 1986, Hazardous Waste Operations, Pub. L.

99-499, Title I, §$ 126(a)-(f), Oct. 17, 1986, 100

Stat. 1690, as amended Pub. L. 100-202, § 101 (f)

[Title I1], Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1329-198

Page

33

33

38

la

la

Vv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Proposed Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970, S. 2788, 9ist Cong., Ist Sess. .

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,

Public Law 91-173 .

Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act,

Public Law 89-577

29 C.F.R. § 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations

and Emergency Response

Preamble, Hazardous Waste Operations & Emer-

gency Response Final Rule 54 Fed. Reg. 9294,

9315-9316 (1989)

State of Illinois 85th General Assembly House of

tepresentatives Transcription Debate-Certified

State of Illinois 85th General Assembly Senate

Transcription Debate-Certified

Pave

Ba

9a

LOa

lla

lda

18a

27a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

AFL-CIO y, Marshall, 570 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.

197%) i 12

Alessi et al. v. Rayhestos-Manhattan, Ine. et al.,

451 U.S. 504 (1981) Renn eee REO Ne eee 36

American Tertile Mirs. Institute, Ine. v. Donovan,

452 U.S. 490 (1981) 15

Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991) 13

Associated Indus. Of Massachusetts +. Snow, 898

F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990) 12, 40-4]

California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock ¢ a.

480 U.S. 572 (1987) 42

California v. ARC America Corp., 499 US. 93

(1989) 35

Capital Cities Cabh . Ine. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 69]

(1984) 13

Cherray SA, Ine. v. National Resources Defense

Couneil, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 26

City of New York: v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988) 28

( Olumbus Cuute d Fahvics y. lndustrial Com my of

Ohio, 1 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1361 (S.D. Ohio

1973) 12

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 48] U.S.

69 (1987) 30-31

De Bartolo Corp. ¥, Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. A:

Construction Trades Couneil, 485 U.S. 56%

(19) 24)

Buglish v. Gene ral EFleetric ('o., 110 S. Ct. 22°70)

(1990) 13, 35, 37-39, 42

KRnvironmental Kucopsulating Corp. v. New Yor/:

City, 855 F.2d 4-8 (2d Cir. 198) 12, 29-40

Evrron Corp. v, Hunt, AT US. 355 (1986) of

FMC Corp, v, Holliday, 1118. (Ct. 403 (1990) 14

Farmworker Justios Fund, Ine. v. Brock, 81] F.2d

612, Option avd judaqme wt racated as moot, %17

F.2d 8960 (D.C. Cir. 197) 12, 21

Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n r. De la

Cuesta, 458 U.S. 14} (1982) 15, 28, 35

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Five Migrant Farmworkers v. Hotiman, 345 A.2d

378 (NJ. Super. 1975) 13

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Ine. v. Paul,

373 U.S. 132 (1963) 13, 29, 36, 38, 41

Franchise Tar Bd. of Ca. v. Construction Laborers

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. ] (1983). ; 45

Gibbous wv, Ogden, 9 US. 1 Wheat.) 1 (1824) 39

Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lahb..,

Ine., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) 26, 28-30

Hines v, Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) 13, 31, 36

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 44} U.S. 322 (1979). 4?

luternational Paper Co. v. Ouellette et al., A479 U.S.

481 (1987) . 36

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 US. 919 (1977) ..31, 32, 35

Kassel v. Consolidated Frye ightways Corp., 450

U.S. 662 (1987) 12

Lacoste v. Louisiana Dept. of Conservation. 262

U.S. 545 (1924) 42

Lechmere, Ine. ve. NLRB. No. 90-970, 1992 U.S.

LEXIS 555 (Jan. 27, 1992) 27

Lepore v. Nat'l Tool and Miq. Co., 540 A.2d 1296

(App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 557 A.2d 1371, cert. de-

nied, 493 US. 954 (1989) 12

Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 USS.

355 (1986) 28

Mallard v. US. Dist. Court for Southern District

of lowa, 490 U.S, 296 (1989) 13

Martin v. Occupational Safe ty avd Health Review

Commission, 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991) 29

Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex rel.

Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) 26

Moshkal v. U.S. 111 8. Ct. 461 (1990) 15

Napier wv. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605

(1926) 36

National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Kil-

lian, 918 F.2d 67" (7th Cir, 1990). cert. granted

sub nom. Gade +». NSWMA,. 111 S. Ct. 2650

(1991)... 8, 9, 12, 31, 34

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v.

Hughey, T74 F.2d 587 (1985), appeal after re-

mana, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492

U.S. 920 (1989) ....... ore i a ate be Rae ee 12, 38-40

New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. State of New

Jersey, 653 F. Supp. 1453 (D.N.J. 1987)...

New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413

cs 30

Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824

(6th Cir. 1986), appeal dismissed and cert. de-

12

nied, 484 U.S. 801 (1987) ............ bare Sans BE 12

Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Re-

sources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) 31, 36, 37,

39, 40, 42

Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir.

1991), cert. denied, 117 L.Ed.2d 154 (1992)... 12

People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d

gt , RRS ree 44

People v. Heqgedus, 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich 1989). 12

People v. Pymm, 561 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. 1990),

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 958 (1991).................... 12

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) _. 36

Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)... —s«<215»—, 21

Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, Nos. 90-711,

90-712, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 554 (Jan. 27, 1992). 26

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 29

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218

(1947) .. ctaiind aoa ..13, 29, 31, 36

Sabine Consolidated, Ine. State of Texas, 756

S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Crim. pd SES eee 12

Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293

RIUEE ccccomickens - 20

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Ine., 463 U. S. 85 (1983) . 13, 14,

35

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238

(1984) 44

Southeastern Com munity ( ‘ollege v. Davi: is, 442 USS.

item a A RR an ARR SEO TO Saal 26

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Stanislawski v. Industrial Comm'n, 457 N.b.2d

399 (Ill. 1983)

State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 425 N.W.2d 21

(Wis. 1988)

Thornock v. State, 745 P. 2d 324 (Mont. 1987)

United States v. Menasche, 75 8S. Ct. 513 (1959)

United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO-CL(

Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985)

United Airlines, Inc. v. Occupational Satety &

Health Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1982)

Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 5. ©

2476 (1991) .

Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941)

STATUTES & REGULATIONS

|} | Saas

128.110

29 C.F.R.

$1905

1910 ef seq.

Ss 1951-1960.18

21 U.S.C. § 360k

33 U.S.C. : 1370

42 U.S.C. $§ 7416, 7545

Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (k)

Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 2075

Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29

U.S.C. § 1144(a) .

Executive Order 12612 of October 26, 1987, 52 Fed.

rey. 41,685 (1987).

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,

Pub. L. No. 91-1738 .............---. 23

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act

(“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 136v (a) 17

Federal Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Act,

Act of Sept. 16, 1966, ch. 21, 80 Stat. 772, -

pealed by Act Nov. 9, 1977. P.L. 95-164, Title

SRY SK I IF

111 §306(a), 91 Stat. 1322 O23 94

Hazardous Substance Superfund Amendment, 11

Stat. 1329-198 (1987)

$ 1902 et seq. 14,16, 1%

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Illinois Publie Act 85-1195, codified at Ill. Ann.

Stat. ch. 111 paras. 7701 et seq. (Smith-Hurd,

eee istiaiaamisammnuecdcsmecs see Re 5, 6, 19, 32, 44

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-

tion Act, 33 U.S.C. §941 00 25

Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. $$ 953-

eet iiatianansndsisaenendactanin Mieeeesai ec 24, 25

OSHA Electrical Standards: Final Standards, 46

Fed. Reg. 4034 (1981) (codified at 29 C.F.R.

Fass 6006)............. bsdescihcasenienehanienniacbekalamsiieatcestecassd 46

gency Response: Interim Final Rule, 51 Fed.

Reg. 45,654 (1986) 00000 OD

OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emer-

gency Response: Notice of Proposed Rulemak-

ing and Public Hearings, 52 Fed. Reg. 29,620

ITD cscs oe sauannpidenbainieaiedeiameadecmiepnanancincli cies tae nc erie San 3

OSHA Hazard Communication Standard: Final

Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852 (1987) (codified at

29 C.F.R. Parts 1910, 1915, 1917. 1918, 1926

Ee te Ads eo kets hs Aad ae ET IN 25, 26, 28

OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emer-

gency Response: Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 9294

(1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 1910.120) .. 3-5, 20, 27,

32, 34

OSHA Accreditation of Training Programs for

Hazardous Waste Operations: Notice of Pro-

posed Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg. 2776 (1990) 32

OSHA Occupant Protection in Motor Vehicles:

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg.

EY NI Og FP Oo eh ie Dg 4, 20, 29

OSHA Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne

Pathogens: Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004

(1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 1910.1030) 46

U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29

oo A eat ad Sine el oe) pessim

CONSTITI TIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Constitution, Art. VI,cl.2.. es 13

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL

116 Cong. Rec. H1460, reprinted in Legislative

History of the Occupational Safety and Health

Act of 1970 (1971) hathlos tN aise EES

H.R. 13373 and S. 2788, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. $14,

reprinted in Legislative History of the Occupa-

tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (1971) ..

H.R. Comm. Rep. No. 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1966) rp sadnceliy tastoioedtoes ne ee

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 761, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.

(1969), reprinted in Legislative History of Fed-

eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969

Intention to Call, reprinted in Legislative His-

tory of the Occupational Safety and Health

Act of 1970 (1971)

S. Rep. No. 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)

OTHER

Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA

Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for

Industrial Accidents, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 535

(1987)

OSH Act Instruction STP 2-1.10A, Mar. 15, 1981,

reprinted in 1984 CCH Employment Safety &

Health Guide * 5008

State of Illinois, 85th General Assembly, House of

Representatives Transcription Debate, July 1,

1988

State of Illinois, 85th General Assembly, Senate

Transcription Debate, July 1, 1988

Stephen Bokat & Horace Thompson, II], Oceupa-

tional Safety and Health Law (1988)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 90-1676

MARY GADE, Director of the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,

~ Petitioner,

NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of various

provisions of two Ijlinois laws regulating the training

and competency of some—but not all—hazardous waste

workers in the State of Illinois.

Respondent, the National Solid Wastes Management

Association (“NSWMA”), is a trade organization whose

members include companies engaged in cleaning up haz-

ardous wastes in both planned and emergency situations.

These firms operate nationally and employ a variety of

personnel, including crane and hoist operators and gen-

eral laborers, who are trained and certified pursuant to the

Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response

Standard (‘the “Final Rule”) promulgated by the Occu-

pational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA’’).

2

NSWMA challenged the Ilinois laws in December 1988

on the grounds that they violate the Supremacy and Com-

merce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Since

training, certification and competency of hazardous waste

workers are comprehensively addressed in the Final Rule,

NSWMA contended that Illinois was precluded from

regulating in this aren without having in effect a state

lan approved by the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”).

The District Court held that, because the Illinois laws

purported to serve other purposes in addition to occupa-

tional health and safety, only a provision that training be

conducted “within Hlinois’” was preempted. The Court of

Appeals vacated the District Court decision, holding spe-

cifically that a requirement that hazardous waste crane

and heist operators provide a certified record of 4,000

hours of experience on such equipment was preempted

because it directly, clearly and substantially relates to the

OSHA standard. The case was remanded to the District

Court for reconsideration of respondent’s claims as to the

other provisions of the Illinois laws. Illinois petitioned

this Court for review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision,

and certiorari was granted on December 16, 1991.

Federal Occupational Health and Safety Regulation of

Hazardous Waste Operations.

The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

of 1986, P.L. 99-499, £126, 100 Stat. 1690 (1986)

(“SARA”) (codified at 29 U.S.C. £655 nete!, directs the

Secretary to promulgate standards pursuant to the Occu-

pational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 651-668

(1988 and Supp. 1991) «the “OSH Act”), for the protec-

tion of hazardous waste workers engaged in planned and

emergency operations. SARA requires that OSHA regula-

tions address requirements for appropriate levels of

training, 29 U.S.C. $655 note at ‘bi, and specifies fur-

ther that the OSHA training standards for “general site”

hazardous waste workers shall apply to equipment opera-

tors and general laborers, and shall include a minimum

w

of 40 hours of initial offsite instruction and a minimum

of three days of actual supervised field experience. 29

U.S.C. $655 note at (d). However, SARA directs that

such initial training requirements are not to be applied

to general site workers who have already received the

equivalent of such training. Id. SARA also requires

OSHA to provide for certification and enforcement of

these training requirements. Jd.

On December 19, 1986, the Department of Labor pub-

lished an interim final rule, effective immediately, en-

titled “Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Re-

sponse,” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (1991) (51 Fed. Reg.

45,654 (1986)) (the “Interim Final Rule’). The In-

terim Final Rule required that all hazardous waste em-

ployees be thoroughly trained in specific topics, receive

the offsite instruction and field experience required by

SARA, and be certified by their instructor as having

completed the required training. Several provisions of

the Interim Final Rule relied on the use of the “buddy _

system,” which is a system of organizing employees wear-

ing protective equipment into work groups that are able

to observe each other’s activities, communicate through

hand signals and render quick assistance in the event of

an emergency.

On August 10, 1987, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

and public hearing was published in the Federal Regis-

ter. 52 Fed. Reg. 29,620 (1987). Over 40 witnesses testi-

fied. and over 155 written comments, including comments

from the International Union of Operating Engineers,

were received. On March 6, 1989, less than two months

before the hearing of this case in the district court,

OSHA promulgated the Final Rule, which became effec-

tive March 6, 1990. 54 Fed. Reg. 9294 (1989).

The Final Rule introduced additional flexibility to en-

sure appropriate levels of training for the skills required

in different waste operations. See 54 Fed. Reg. 9294,

9304-9305, 9309-9310 (1989). For example, for certain

4

workers who visit sites “only on occasion” or who are

limited to work areas with hazardous exposures that are

below permissible limits, the Final Rule replaced the 40-

hour 3-day requirement with a requirement of 24 hours

of training with one day of supervision. 54 Fed. Reg.

9294, 9304-9305 (1989); 29 CLFLR. 1910.1201e) (3) Gil);

see also 29 C.F.LR. $ 1910.1201q) (4) (| s|killed support

personnel”); 29 C.F.R. $ 1910.1201q)(5) (“specialist

employees”). Furthermore, the Final Rule expanded spe-

cific criteria for training, certification and trainer quali-

fication,’ 54 Fed. Reg. 9294, 9305 (1989); 29 C.F.R.

S$ 1910.1201e) (51-16), required specified annual refresher

training, 29 C.F.R. £ 1910.120/e) (8), added eight hours

of specialized management training for supervisors, 29

C.F.R. £ 1910.1201e) (4), and provided that documented

equivalent “work experience,” “academic training,” and or

“training . .. from actual hazardous waste site work

experience’ would be accepted in lieu of the 40-hour

initial training requirement on the condition that “site

specific training” and appropriate field supervision

are provided. 29 C.F.R. $ 1910.120(e) (9).

The preamble to the Final Rule expressly provided that

states “with occupational safety and health plans ap-

proved by OSHA under section 18 of the OSH Act...

would not be preempted by this final regulation and would

be able to address special, local conditions within the

framework provided by this performance oriented stand-

ard while ensuring that their standards are at least as

effective as the Federal standard.” 54 Fed. Reg. 9294,

9316 (1989) (emphasis added). On the other hand, the

preamble states that “Section 18 of the OSH Act also ex-

presses Congress’ clear intent to preempt state laws relat-

ing to issues with respect to which Federal OSHA has

promulgated occupational safety or health standards.”

'On January 26, 1990, OSHA published proposed rules te comnly

with an emendment to Section 126(d) of SARA directing the Secre-

tury to provide for OSHA certification of hazardous waste training

programs. 10] Stat. at 1329-198 (1987); 55 Fed. Reg. 28,728 (1990).

5

Id. at 9315. A “state can avoid preemption only if it sub-

mits, and obtains Federal OSHA approval of, a plan

feaw “oan

Subsequent Illinois Regulation of Hazardous

Waste Workers.

Illinois has never had in effect a state plan which was

approved pursuant to Section 18 On August 23, 1988,

nearly 20 months after the promulgation of the Interim

Final Rule, the Governor of Illinois signed Public Act

85-1195, codified at Hl. Ann. Stat. ch. 111 ‘hereinafter

“Tl, Stat.”), para. 7701 ef seq. (Smith-Hurd, 1978),

which took effect on March 1, 1989.

Public Act 85-1195 includes two bills that were added

by a conference committee appointed on June 28, 1988 and

passed by both houses three days later: (1) the Hazard-

ous Waste Crane and Hoisting Equipment Operators Li-

censing Act ‘the “Operators Act”) and (2) the Hazardous

Waste Laborers Licensing Act (the “Laborers Act”). Both

the Operators Act and the Laborers Act (collectively, the

“Tlinois Acts”) stated that their purpose was “to promote

job safety and to protect life, limb and property.” Ill.

Stat. at paras. 7702, 7802.

The Operators Act requires that persons who operate

certain equipment at hazardous waste facilities possess

operator’s licenses and that persons who assist in such

operation possess apprentice’s licenses, II], Stat. at para.

7704 (a)-(b); the Laborers Act requires that persons per-

forming general hazardous waste work possess laborer’s

licenses. II], Stat. at para. 7804‘a).° Both laws require

The Illinois licensing provisions do not apply to all workers

handling substantial quantities of hazardous wastes. Rather,

they are required only for workers at specific listed facilities,

particularly contractors engaged in hazardous waste cleanup, who

are also covered by the OSHA standard. II]. Stat. at paras. 7704,

7201. Because the Hlinois Acts do not apply to “voluntary clean-up

;

sites” or “emergency response sites,” they do not extend to all

6

a license applicant to provide a certified record of at least

iM) hours of training conducted “within the State of Ili-

nois,” which has been approved by either the EPA or the

Hingis Environmental Protection Agency (“IEPA”),

MW, wt paras. T7056), T1066), TROD LE), to pass a writ-

ten examination prescribed by the IEPA, id. at paras.

M9561, T7OG(d), T805'd) and to pass an annual re-

fresher course of at least eight hours of instruction, id,

at paras. T707(bs, TXO6(b»,

In addition, the Operators Act requires applicants for

an operator's license to submit a certified record showing

Operation of equipment used in hazardous waste handling

for a minimum of 4,000 hours. Hl. Stat. at para, T705(d),

The linois Acts do not provide for the substitution

of equivalent ‘reining or expertise for the certified records

required,

The Illinois Acts impose fines for business offenses

upon unlicensed workers, and fines for misdemeanors

Upon employers, contractors and agents who knowingly

employ unlicensed workers, Il, Stat. at paras. 7715 (a)-

(hi, 771Gtar-tbi, 7l4(ar-tbs. The [linois Acts are

administered by Licensing Boards consisting of represent-

atives of the operating engineers union and the hazardous

Waste reroodiion and disposal industry, and one publie

member. Id. at paras. 7709, T#OK.

The District Court Proceedings Below.

NSWMA filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois on December 2%

—ary

( ~~ . bd } ‘ ; ‘ ‘ } } : |

19é*) challen ving the training and experience provisions

hazardou., waste sites in Mlinois that are covered by the OSILA

Htandard. Ul Stat xt paras, T7O2(f THOM Ce For reasons that

are not epparent, neither the Operators Act nor the Laborers Act

applies to operators of forklifts or bobcats handling hazardous

waste, Tl Stat. at paras. 7704/e), TROA(b). Nor do they apply

to workers in certain industrie such as local manufacturing foeili.

hes, miming operations, ayriculture, or railronds. Id. at para, T7603

fe -(f),

7

of the Illinois Acts on the grounds that they are pre-

empted by the OSH Act and its regulations, and that

they constitute an unreasonable burden on free commerce

amony the states. Ilinois responded that the Illinois Acts

were not preempted because they also served public

safety and environmental purposes, and that the Com-

merce Clause challenge was premature,

The District Court found that NSWMA’s members are

required to train, qualify and certify their hazardou-

Wwuete remediation workers in secordencee with the Final

Rule, which resulates, jvfer alia, training, field ex-

perience, annual refresher courses, and competency stand-

ards for equipment operators and laborers. (Pet. App.

at 4%.)' The court further concluded that the Illinois

Acts reoulate the same matters (and therefore the same

employees! as the Final Rule. (Pet. App. at 49.)

The Distriet Court held that the provision in the Ili-

nois Acts requiring 40 hours of training within [Minors

Was preempted since there was not even « “scintilla (of

a scintilla) of evidence” to show that compliance with

the “within Hingis” provision will further either public

safety or environmental protection. (Pet. App. at 97-5%.)

Iinois did not appeal this decision,

With respect to the 4,000-hour requirement of equip-

ment operators, the District Court found that Ilinois had

introduced no evidence at trial that would arguably tend

to show that this requirement would reduce the risk of

danger to the publie or employees or the environment.

(Pet. App. at 19; 58-59.) Indeed, there was testimony

that there was “some possibility” that the requirement

* References to the Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari are

cited as (Pet, App, at _ References to the Appendix to this Brief

are cited as (App. at . Refercnees to the Distriet Court Hearing

Transcript, contained in the record below, are cited as (Tr. at —>.

Keferences to the Brief for Petitioner are cited as (Pet. Br. at A;

8

would “inerease such risk.” ' (Pet. App. at 50.) None-

theless, the court reasoned that operators with 4,000

hours of experience on heavy lifting equipment would

likely have fewer accidents and hence pose less risk to

public safety and the environment. (Pet. App. at 59.)

The court therefore concluded that the 4,000-hour require-

ment is not preempted. (/d.) The District Court also

held that the Commerce Clause challenge was not ripe for

adjudication since Illinois had not promulgated regula-

mth (7d, at 61.) NSWMA appealed to the Seventh

Ircult.

The Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed

and remanded. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n

v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. granted

sub. nom. Gade v. NSWMA, 111 S. Ct. 2850 (1991). The

court concluded that “section 18’s express preemptive ef-

fect appears to be unambiguous,” id. at 678, and there-

fore that Illinois may not promulgate occupational safety

and health standards for hazardous waste workers. The

court then rejected the “dual-purpose” preemption tests

of other circuit courts and the district court, and in

stead applied a two-step inquiry. Jd. at 679. First, does

the challenged state law constitute, in a direct, clear one

substantial way, regulation of worker health and safety?

Second, if so, is it possible to sever from the state law

provisions regulating worker health and safety? If sey-

erance is not possible, then the state law must be inval-

' The District Court recognized that the Illinois Acts “could result

in increased risk” by diminishing “the pool of workers available to

clean up hazardous waste sites” and that the Illinois training

certification, and experience requirements potentially “could ate

trate an empl: yer’s attempt to respond to environmental emergen-

_ and “disrupt the operation of the federally-endorsed Buddy

system” hy “impairing emplovers from developing effective work

Se ee employees bused in other states, some of

moti e not qualified to be licensed in Illinois. (Pet. App. at

G

‘dated even if it serves a dual purpose. Id. at 679 &

n.8. Applying this analysis, the court struck down the

4.000-hour requirement of the Operators Act, and re-

manded the case to the district court for reconsideration

of the other challenged provisions in light of its decision.

The court noted that other provisions might well dupli-

cate or even conflict with the Final Rule. Id. at 679.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The OSH Act constitutes a carefully crafted charter

for federal-state cooperation in fostering “safe and health-

ful working conditions.” In the first instance, it directs

OSHA to develop, issue and enforce urgently needed occu-

pational safety and health standards for particular in-

dustries or work environments. In areas where such

federal standards are not yet in effect, state governments

are permitted, indeed encouraged, independently to pro-

mote occupational safety and health. But where a federal

standard is in effect, states may regulate only pursuant

to a state plan that is approved by the Secretary of Labor.

Upon submission of a state plan, the Secretary works

closely with the state to ensure that, in her judgment,

the state standards are at least as effective as the fed-

eral stondard and, in the case of products distributed in

‘nierstate commerce, the state standards are “required

by compelling local conditions” and do not “unduly bur-

den interstate commerce.” Approved state plans are sub-

ject to a probationary period before federal enforcement

is withdrawn, although federal oversight continues.

In short, Section 18 of the OSH Act presents states

with two choices when a federal standard is in effect:

either defer to federal regulation, or assume complete

responsibility for regulating by obtaining federal approval

of a state plan. Section 18 reflects Congress’ judgment

that it would be confusing and counterproductive to per-

mit federal and state standards on a single issue to coexist.

The State of Illinois asserts that it has a third choice:

to superimpose on existing federal standards selective,

10

additional stave standards not part of a federally ap-

proved state plan. Illinois moreover has enacted its “sup-

plemental” standards in an area of particular concern to

Congress. SARA explicitly directed OSHA to issue, on an

urgent basis, a comprehensive standard protecting the

health and safety of workers in hazardous waste opera-

tions. SARA specified in unusual! detail requirements for

worker training, competency and certification that were

soon thereafter incorporated into OSHA’s Hazardous

Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard.

Illinois nevertheless contends that notwithstanding the

existence of OSHA’s national standard and the absence

of an approved state plan, it should be free to enact piece-

meal state standards that apply specifically and inflexibly

to certuin hazardous waste workers already protected by

OSHA, Iilinvis also contends, apparently in the alterna-

tive, that its occupational safety and health standards are

permissible because they purport to advance additiona!

state levislative interests such as public safety and en-

vironmental protection. Both arguments must fail.

The express language, structure and purpose of the

OSH Act demonstrate Congress’ unmistakable intent to

prohibit states from unilaterally “supplementing” a fed-

eral standard in the absence of an approved state plan.

This has also been the consistent and often expressed

interpretation of the agency charged with administering

the law. In addition, the legislative history of Section

1% shows that Convress rejected language that would

have expressly allowed states to supplement OSHA stand-

ards. The lower courts, including six federal circuit

courts, have agreed, holding uniformiy that Section 1X

preempts such state regulation. The OSH Act expressly

preserves certain siate laws in Sections 4(b) 11), 4¢bi 44)

and Itai, Section 1S'a) in particular provides that

states ure iree to regulate worker health and safety

Where wo applicable federal standards exist. Section 18 (b)

establishes a process for states to assume responsibility

1]

in areas where federal standards exist by submitting a

state plan for approval by OSHA. Viewed in its entire:

Section 1& leaves no room jor a state to tinker with a fed-

eral stundard. The Illinois Acts contravene the express r

quirements of Section 18 and frustrate achievement of

the full purposes and objectives of Congress to coordi-

nate state and federal regulation of worker health and

safety and to ensure efficient and effective enforcement.

The court below properly rejected Illinois’ contention

that because the Illinois Acts assert a non-occupational

purpose, they are beyond the reach of federal preemption.

In contrast to the other. circuits that have addressed

so-called “dual purpose” state regulation, the court be-

low properly focused on the precise reach of Congre-

intended preemption and the direct effect of the state

statute on the operation of federal law, thereby avoiding

an unbounded and ultimateiy irrelevant search for “leyit-

imate” state legislative purposes or effects unconnected

with the federal enaciment. Under its test, subject to

state law sevcrability analysis, only those provisions that

directly, clearly and substantially affect employee-em-

ployer obligations in the workplace would be invalidated

The court therefore preempted the Illinois requirement

that a hazardous waste crane operator present a certified

record of 4,000 hours of experience, and remanded the

Acts that duplicate, supplement, frustrate, or even con-

flict with requirements of the OSHA standard.

Nothing in the preemption test applied by the court

below precludes [linois from exercising its traditions

powers to license occupations or protect the environ-

ment. However, by enacting the regulatory statutes con-

tested in this case, Illinois has chosen to achieve its pur-

poses by intruding in a direct, clear and = substantia!

manner upon an established scheme of federal regulation

Illinois may do so only within the framework expres)

established by Congress in Section 18 of the OSH Aer.

namely the adoption of an approved state plan.

12

ARGUMENT

I. IN THE ABSENCE OF AN APPROVED STATE

PLAN, SECTION 18 OF THE OSH ACT PREEMPTS

REDUNDANT AND “SUPPLEMENTAL” STATE

LEGISLATION.

Illinois’ threshold argument raises a question that has

never been resolved in Illinois’ favor—whether Congress

in the OSH Act intended to preempt states without ap-

proved state plans from enacting occupational health

and safety legislation that duplicates and supplements

a comprehensive OSHA standard. The court below stated

that “|wle have discovered no case contradicting the

view that section 18 expressly prohibits states without

federally approved state plans from exercising jurisdic-

tion over an occupational health and safety matter as to

which OSHA has already duly promulgated a federal

standard.” Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 678 (7th Cir. 1990).°

5 Ser also Pedraza +. Shell O1 Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir.

1991), cert. denied, 117 lL. Ed. 2d 154, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 694;

Associated Industrics of Massachusetts +». Snow, 898 F.2d 274A,

278 (ist Cir. 1990); Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v«. New

York City, 855 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1988); Farmworker Justice

Fund, Ine. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 626, opinion and judgment

vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n

v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 828 (6th Cir. 1986), appeal dis-

missed and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 801 (1987); New Jersey State

Chamber of Commerce vc. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587, 593 (1985), appeal

after remend, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S.

920 (1989): United Stee'worlers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC ve.

Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 7234 (3d Cir. 1985); People v. Pymm, 561

N.Y.S.2d 687, 694 (Ct. Ap. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 958

(1991); New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. State of New Jersey,

653 F. Supp. 1453, 1462 (D.N.J. 1987); AFL-CIO +. Marshall, 570

F.2d 1030, 1027 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Columbus Coated Fabrics

v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 1 OSM. Cas. (BNA) 1361, 1365

(S.D. Ohio 1973); People v. Heqgedus, 443 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Mich.

1989); Thornock v. State, TA5 P.2d 224, 327 (Mont. 1987); Lepore

v. National Tool and Mfg. Co., 510 A.2d 1296, 1306 (App. Div.

1988), aff'd, 557 A.2d 1371, cert. denied, 492 US. 954 (1989);

Sabine Consolidated, Ine. v. State of Texas, 756 S.W.2d 865

(Tex. Crim. App. 1988), reversed on other grounds, 806 S.W.2d

13

Application of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Constitu-

tion, Art. VI, cl. 2, “is guided by familiar and well-

established principles.” Capital Cities Cable Inc. v. Crisp,

467 U.S. 691, 698 (1984). First and foremost, “| p|re-

emption fundamentally is a question of congressional in-

tent, and when Congress has made its intent known

through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is

an easy one.” English v. General Electric Co., 110 8S. Ct.

2270, 2275 (1990) ‘citation omitted).

In the absence of explicit statutory language, con-

gressional intent may be implied from a pervasive “scheme

of federa! regulation. ...” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 11917), where compliance with

both federal and state laws is physically impossible, Flor-

ida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132.

142-143 (1963), or where state law “stands as an obsta-

cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-

poses and objectives of Congress.” Hines +. Davidowitz,

312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).

A. Section 18 Expresses Congress’ Intent To Allow

States to Enact Standards Such as the Illinois Acts

Only Upon Approval of an Adequate State Plan.

Determining the intent of Congress “must begin with a

statute’s language,” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for

Southern District of lowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989), for

there is a “ ‘strong presumption’” that the “plain lan-

guage of the statute expresses congressional intent.”

Ardestani v. INS, 112 8. Ct. 515, 520 (1991); ef. Shaw vr.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). Here,

that task is greatly simplified because Congress has ex-

pressly addressed the question of federal preemption of

533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 425

N.W.2d 21, 24 «Wis. 1988): Stanislawski v. Induatrial Comn'n,

197 N.E.2d 399, 400 (Ml. 1983); United Air Lines, Ine. v. Ocenpa-

tronal Satety and Health Appeals Roard, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387, 34

(1982); Five Migrant Farmicorkers +. Hoffman, 345 A.2d 378,

380 (NJ. Super. 1975).

14

state worker health and safety legislation in Section 18,

29 U.S.C. § 667.

Section 18 establishes ‘a scheme of administratively

controlled preemption,” Stephen Bokat & Horace Thomp-

son III, Occupational Safety and Health Law, 681 (1988),

that must be examined in its entirety. Section 18(a)

expresses Congress’ intent not to prevent states from en-

acting occupational health and safety laws in areas where

OSHA has not promulgated standards. While Section

18(a) expressly authorizes states to regulate worker

health and safety, it explicitly limits that authority to

areas not subject to an OSHA standard. States are not,

however, entirely powerless to regulate in areas subject

to OSHA standards. Sections 18(b) and (ec) establish a

mechanism for states to assume administration, subject

to federal approval and oversight, of occupational safety

and health in those areas. If states wish to assume re-

sponsibility for developing standards “relating to any

occupational safety or health issue” covered by an OSHA

standard,® they “shall submit a state plan for the develop-

ment of such standards” to the Secretary, who shall

approve it if it meets certain criteria set forth in Section

18ic) ‘emphasis added).

The three subsections of Section 18 read together com-

pel the conclusion that Congress intended (1) that ulti-

mately one level of government, federal or state, would

regulate any occupational safety and health issue at any

® “Relate to” has been construed broadly by this Court as meaning

having “a connection with or reference to.” FMC Corp. v. Holliday.

111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. In the present

case, the “issue” addressed by the Final Rule is at a minimum the

protection of worker health and safety in the hazardous waste in-

dustry. See 29 CFR § 1902.2:c)(1) (1999) (“la]nm issue is con-

sidered to be an industrial, occupational or hazard grouping”); see

also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120, Subpart H, Hasardous materials. State

standards duplicating or supplementing hazardous waste worker

training, competency and certification requirements addressed in the

Final Rule unquestionably “relate to” the broader issue of protect-

ing the health and safety of hazardous waste workers.

15

one time, (2) that the approval of a state plan would be

the sole mechanism by which states might regulate an

issue With respect to which an OSHA standard exists, and

(3) that the federal and state governments would coordi-

nate the transfer of responsibility to develop and enforce

standards. Cf. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713

(1975) ‘courts should “not be guided by a sinele sentence

or member of a sentence”) ‘citation omitted).

Illinois argues that, under Section 18(b), Congress in-

tended to allow states to legislate piecemeal despite the

existence of an OSHA standard, and to require an ap-

proved plan only if a state sought wholly to displace fed-

eral enforcement authority. (Pet. Br. at 14-15.) If this

were correct, the language of Section 18(a) would be

superfluous: why would Congress limit a savings clause

to areas not subject to OSHA standards if it also in-

tended to save state laws in areas subject to OSHA stand-

ards? A reviewing court would either be required to treat

all sf Section 18‘a) as surplusage or would have to con-

strue Section 18/a! as if the last fifteen words of that

section—“‘with respect to which no standard is in effect

under Section 655 of this title’—-were not there. Either

approach would violate a fundamental tenet of statutory

construction that seeks to give effect, if possible, “to every

clause and word of a statute.”* Moskal v. U.S., 1118S. Ct.

461, 466 (1990) ‘quoting United States v». Menasche,

75 S. Ct. 513, 519-520 (195511: see Fidelity Federal

Savings and Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,

163 (1982); American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Ine. v.

Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981).

Moreover, the state plan mechanism is an integral part

of the OSH Act that encourages states to assume compre-

* The only possible interpretation that would not render Section

IX(a) superfluous would be that Congress gave OSHA discretion to

preempt state laws in areas where it chose to adopt standards, in

which case the Illinois Acts would be preempted because of OSHA’s

intent to preempt as clearly stated in the preamble to the Final

Rule.

16

hensive responsibility for occupational safety and health

issues subject to federal supervision. At the present time,

23 states and 2 territories have OSHA-approved state

plans in effect. See 29 C.F.R. $$ 1952, 1956. Under

Illinois’ interpretation of Section 18, states would have

less incentive to assume jurisdiction pursuant to the man-

datory plan approval process set forth in Sections 18(b)

and ‘¢} because they would not have to comply with that

process in order to supplement federal standards.“

The correct interpretation of Section 18 is reinforced

by Section 18'¢c'‘2) which requires the Secretary to ap-

prove a state plan if, in her judgment, “the state stand-

ards are or will be at least as effective’ as OSHA's

standards. Illinois’ piecemeal regulation would subvert the

careful process contemplated by Sections 18(b) and ic)

to avoid arbitrary exclusions of groups of employers and

employees, to ensure full participation in the development

of complex technical standards by all interested parties

and experts, and to coordinate ‘the transfer of enforce-

ment authority from one level of government to the other

efficiently.”

* This would be contrary to Congress’ express desire to encourage

states to develop and submit state plans. Because of initial federal

funding of up to ninety percent of the cost of developing state

plans, excellent models for state plans now exist and new plans can

be developed at comparatively little cost. 29 U.S.C. § 672(a) (2),

(f). Grants continue to be available for up to fifty percent of the

annual cost of implementing state plans. 29 U.S.C. $672(g); 29

C.F.R. §§ 1951.10, 1951.22.

* A state plan must be “at least as comprehensive” as the OSHA

standard unless it “show)s] good cause why any group or groups

of employers or employees should be excluded.” 29 C.F.R. § 1902.2

(c). Furthermore, in demonst»ating effectiveness, the state must

show, inter alia, that it has :ddressed the same specific issues as

effectively, has relicd upon the best available research and expert

technical knowledge, and has conducted hearings involving employ-

ees, employers, and the public. 20 C.F.R. §1902.4(b) (2). Once the

plan is approved, OSHA has establ’shed an ongoing procedure for

evaluating, monitoring and permitting changes to state plans. 29

C.F.R. $$ 1953, 1954. The Secretary must wait at least three years

17

Concurrent enforcement of different yet overlap-

ping state and federal requirements may well be less

effective than a unitary or coordinated enforcement

scheme, particularly where the federal standard is care-

fully crafted to incorporate needed flexibility to respond

to special or emergency circumstances. To accept Illinois’

argument is to accept the fallacy that more regulation

is always more effective regulation. Moreover, because

the overall effectiveness of concurrent regulation would

be beyond the Secretary’s control, Illinois’ interpretation

negates her statutory obligation to determine such effec-

tiveness in her sole “judgment.” 29 U.S.C. § 667(c¢).

Even more compelling is the requirement of Section

18ic) (2) that the Secretary determine, prior to approving

a state plan, that state standards relating to products

in interstate commerce “are required by compelling local

conditions and do not unduly burden interstate commerce.”

29 U.S.C. § 6671c) (2). If states were privileged under

Section 18 to “supplement” federal standards without

filing state plans, the Secretary’s authority to prevent

undue interference with interstate commerce would be

easily circumvented.

Illinois relies heavily upon Wisconsin Public Intervenor

», Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991), to suggest that an

inference of preemption should never be drawn from

statutory language that authorizes state legislation. (Pet.

Br. at 16-17.) Mortier does not assert so broad a propo-

sition. In that ease, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,

and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) expressly allowed states

to regulate the sale or use of pesticides so long as the

state reculation does not permit a sale or use prohibited

by the Act, 7 U.S.C, £ 136via). The question presented

was whether the statute’s silence with respect to /ocal

overnmental regulation of pesticide use indicated that

local governments were excluded, even though local gov-

ernments are political subdivisions of states. This Court

before relinquishing concurrert federal jurisdiction, and may re-

instate such jurisdiction if necessary. 20 U.S.C. § 667(e); 29 C.PF.R.

$$ 1902.1 (c) (1)-(2), 1902.36-1902.53.

18

concluded that “{mJere silence, in this context, cannot

suffice to establish a ‘clear and manifest purpose’ to pre-

empt local authority.” Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2483 (cita-

tions omitted).

Here, the facts are very different. Unlike FIFRA,

which was completely silent as to regulation by local

government, Section 18 of the OSH Act deals expressly

and in detail with state regulations, such as the Illinois

Acts, which duplicate federal regulations.” In concluding

that, in FIFRA, the term “state” includes its political

subdivisions, this Court adopted both a positive and a

negative inference. On the one hand, local governments,

like the state of which they are a part, could regulate the

sale or use of pesticides. On the other hand, by negative

inference, local governments could “not permit any sale

or use prohibited” by federal regulation. 7 U.S.C.

s 136v(a). Similarly, a proper construction of Section 18

allows both positive and negative inferences. States may

duplicate or supplement federal standards if they file a

state plan in accordance with the explicit requirements

of Section 18(b), but they may not do so if they do not

file such a plan.

Illinois also argues that the OSH Act does not contain

the breadth of preemptive language found in the Em-

ployee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.

s 1144(a). (Pet. Br. at 15 n. 3.) Unlike ERISA, however,

the OSH Act offers the states an option to exercise their

traditional authority even in areas governed by federal

law. Congress may express its intent to preempt through

a scheme of cooperative federalism just as clearly as it

may express its intent to preempt all related state laws

absolutely and in all circumstances. To insist on specific

prohibitory words would penalize Congress for creating

a flexible scheme that encourages and accommodates state

participation.

The validity of local regulation of occupational safety and

health in the absence of a state plan is not at issue in this case.

19

Illinois further contends that the Illinois Acts are

not “standards.” (Pet. Br. at 32-33.) The OSH Act

and OSHA regulations define “standard” as “requir|ing]

conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices,

means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably neces-

sary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employ-

ment and places of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 652(8);

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1(f). Illinois argues that licensing is

a precondition to employment and therefore does not con-

stitute a “condition” of employment. (Pet. Br. at 32-33.)

Illinois presumably concedes that the Illinois Acts are

“reasonably necessary or appropriate” to achieve their

stated goal of worker safety. Moreover, the trial judge

entered a finding of fact that “|t|he Illinois Acts regu-

late the same matter (and therefore the same employees)

as Part 1910.120.” (Pet. App. at 49). OSHA’s only regu-

latory authority in this area is to issue “standards”: if

worker certification requirements are standards when

promulgated by OSHA, then they must be standards when

enacted by Illinois, at least for the purpose of federal

preemption analysis."

The AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae, suggests that the IIli-

nois Acts are not “standards” because they regulate em-

ployees while OSHA regulates employers. (AFL-CIO Brief

at 18-19.) Neither characterization is entirely accurate.

Both Illinois Acts impose penalties on employers who

knowingly utilize unlicensed workers. IJ]. Stat. at paras.

7715(b)}, 7716(b), 7814(b). In addition, Congress em-

powered OSHA to regulate employee as well as employer

behavior. 29 U.S.C. §651(b)(2) (“by providing that

employers and employees have separate but dependent

responsibilities and rights”) (emphasis added) ; 29 U.S.C.

§ 654(b) (“Each employee shall comply with occupational

' Congress also disagrees with Illinois. Section 126 of SARA

directed the Secretary to promulgate “standards” that included

training requirements for workers “before such workers are per-

mitted to engage in hazardous waste operations” and to provide

for “certification” of such workers. 29 U.S.C. § 655 note, at (a),

(b)(2) and (¢)(3) (emphasis added).

20

safety and health standards”) (emphasis added) : sce also

29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1).

The AFL-CIO observes that OSHA has interpreted its

proposed standard for Occupant Protection in Motor

Vehicles as not preempting generally applicable state laws

regarding use of safety belts and motorcycle helmets.

5) Fed. Reg. 28,728, 28,739 (1990): (AFL-CIO Brief at

18-19). OSHA has noted that “the proposed standard has

been carefully worded to regulate a safety and health

issue distinct from the subject matter addressed by these

state laws.” 55 Fed. Reg. 28,728, 28,739 (1990). If any-

thing, this demonstrates OSHA's consistent desire to limit

preemptive effect to state standards that directly relate

to the specific issue addressed by the federal standard in

accordance with Section 18. See also, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg.

9294, 9315 (1989) (“OSHA has used its regulatory pre-

emption of State law to the minimum level necessary to

achieve the objectives of the OSH Act and section 126 of

SARA”). Unlike states’ general motor safety laws, which

govern conduct beyond the workplace, the Illinois Acts

regulate the competency and training of only one group—

the hazardous waste remediation and disposal industry—

Which is also the group directly subject to an OSHA

standard that addresses the same issue." Cf. Schneide-

wind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 308 & n.11

(1988),

'? The AFL-CIO also refers to a statement that OSHA would

not take any formal or legal action to preempt inspections by state

and focal fire marshals. However, OSHA cautioned that “States

which carry out these enforcement activities without an approved

I8(b) plan covering the standards would be subject to challenge on

appeal by employers.” OSH Act Instruction STP 2-1.10A, Mar. 13,

IYS1, reprinted in 1984 CCH Employment Safety & Health Guide

* 5008.71; see also OSHA Policy Statement, April 1972. reprinted

im 1984 CCH Employment Safety & Health Guide © 5008.81; (AFL-

C10 Brief at 18.) OSHA apparently relied on the longstanding and

widespread employment of fire marshals to in fer that Congress did

not intend to halt their activity. OSHA Policy Statement, April

1972, reprinted in 1984 CCH Employment Safety & Health Guide

* 5008.81.

21

B. SARA and the OSH Act Express Congress’ Intent

to Eliminate Duplicative Regulation of Hazardous

Waste Workers.

Statutory language must be interpreted in light of the

entire statute. Philbrook, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975).

The OSH Act read as a whole compels the conclusion

that Congress intended that regulation of occupational

health and safety should not be duplicative and there-

fore that the states must submit a plan to the fed-

eral government in order to regulate in areas in which

OSHA has promulgated standards. Cf. Farmworker

Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 641, opinion

and judgment vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (“Section 18(a)’s preemption rule serves the use-

ful function of protecting employers from conflicting

standards and a double dose of enforcement agents.”).

When Congress intended to reserve specific powers to

the states in the OSH Act, it said so explicitly and pre-

cisely. As noted above, Section 18(a) expressly allows

state regulation in areas not covered by a federal stand-

ard."’ Section 4{b) (4) expressly disclaims preemption of

State worker compensation and tort laws. 29 U.S.C. § 653

(bi (4). Section 4b) (1) reserves state powers to regu-

late, in conjunction with Federal law, the occupational

safety and health of nuclear energy employees. 29 U.S.C.

+ 653'bii1). The absence of language in the OSH Act

reserving to the states the authority to duplicate or sup-

plement federal standards is especially significant in light

of the many other federal statutes in which Congress has

included analogous language."

13 Section 18(h) expressly allowed state regulation in areas cov-

ered by an OSHA standard to remain in effect upon agreement with

the Secretary, but only during an interim period of not more than

two years from the enactment of the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. $ 667(h).

This provision also undermines Illinois’ position since it makes no

allowance for “supplementary” standards beyond the two-year

period,

"See, ea. 156 U.S.C. $2075 (states prohibited from having

product safety standards that overlap with federal standards unless

22

Regulatory consistency and coordination was a special

concern of Congress in Section 126 of SARA. Since state

and local employees are excluded from OSHA jurisdiction,

Section 126‘f) of SARA requires the EPA to promulgate

standards “identical to those promulgated by the Secre-

tary of Labor” which “shall apply to employees of State

and local governments in each State which does not have

in effect an approved State plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 655 note

at (f) (emphasis added).

Other provisions of the OSH Act demonstrate that

Congress sought to avoid overlapping occupational safety

und healt» regulation by more than one federal or state

agency. Section 4(b)(1) prohibits the application of

OSHA standards to employees of other federal and cer-

tain state agencies with authority to regulate occupational

safety or health, and Section 4‘(b) (3) directs the Secre-

tary “to avoid unnecessary duplication and to achieve

coordination” between OSHA and other federal laws. 29

U.S.C. $ 6531b) (1) & (3); see also 29 U.S.C. § 657(d)

(“information . . . shall be obtained with a minimum

burden upon employers .... Unnecessary duplication .. .

shall be reduced to the maximum extent feasible.”) Co-

ordination with respeet to the employees of other federal

agencies iv achieved through OSHA regulations that are

analogous to the procedure for federal-state cooperation

they provide a “significantly higher degree of protection” from risk

of injury, and do not “unduly burden interstate commerce”); 21

U.S.C. £ 360k (states may not have standards for “device!s] in-

tended for human use” that differ from federal standards, but

exceptions may be granted if state requirements are more stringent

than the feders! standard, and are required by “compelling local

conditions”); 23 U.S.C. § 1370 (states may not adopt water pollu-

tion standards that are less stringent than overlapping federal

standards): 42 U.S.C. © 7416 (state air pollution standards may not

be Jess stringent than standards established under applicable fed-

eral law); 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (states may adopt motor vehicle emis-

sion standards pricr to « certain date if they are “at least as pro-

tective of public health” as the federal standards and are required

to “meet compelling ond extraordinary conditions”).

23

provided in Section 18 and require similar supervision by

OSHA."

C. The Legislative Context of the OSH Act Demon-

strates that Congress Deliberately Crafted Section

18 So As to Preclude “Supplemental” State Regula-

tion.

The legislative history of the OSH Act demonstrates

that Congress chose not to include language that would

have saved more stringent state legislation relating to

worker safety and health issues subject to a federal

standard. Not only did Congress reject such language in

legislation proposed by the Nixon Administration, but it

also rejected savings language contained in other occupa-

tional safety and health legislation that the same Con-

gress had previously enacted.

The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969

ithe “Mine Safety Act”) was enacted by the same Con-

gress and reported by the same committees as the OSH

Act.'* Both laws sought to expand federal efforts to

regulate occupational safety and health. The Mine

Safety Act followed an earlier Federal Metal and Non-

metallic Mine Safety Act (‘the “Metal Mine Act”),

Act of Sept. 16, 1966, 80 Stat. 772, repealed by Act of

Nov. 9, 1977, P.L. 95-164, Title III § 306(a), 91 Stat.

1322. These two prior statutes show that the scheme for

submitting state plans to federal authorities was not an

innovation of the OSH Act, and that when Congress in-

Agency heads are required by Section 19 to establish and

maintain standards identical to OSHA's or obtain OSHA approval.

29 U.S.C. § 668; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1960.1, 1960.17. In areas “for which

there exists no appropriate OSHA standards,” agency heads are

required to adopt additional standards “as necessary and appropri-

ate to working conditions of agency employees ...,” which may be

disallowed by OSHA if “inconsistent with OSHA standards.” 29

C.F.LR. § 1960.18(a)-(b) (emphasis added ).

' See, e.g., Colloquy among Sen, Dominick, Sen. Saxbe, and

Sen. Williams, in Comm, on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong.,

Ist Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health

Act of 1970, at 340-341 (1970) (‘Legislative History”).

24

tended to permit more stringent state regulation in areas

covered by a federal standard, it said so explicitly. In

the Metal Mine Act, Congress chose to employ state plans

but to allow more stringent state legislation.’ H.R.

Comm. Rep. No. 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13-15

(1966). Subsequently, in the Mine Safety Act, Congress

chose not to employ state plans, but still to a/low more

stringent state legislation. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 761, 91st

Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), reprinted in Legislative History

of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969

As Amended Through 1974, at 1537, 1627 (1975).'* In

the OSH Act, Congress again utilized the state plan mech-

anism but did wot allow more stringent “supplemental”

17 The Metal Mine Act provided in pertinent part:

$16(a) Any State which . . . desires to develop and enforce

health and safety standards in mines... shall submit... a State

plan for the development of such standards and their enforcement.

$19(a) No state... law... shall be superseded by any pro-

vision of this Act, cxcept insofar as such State or territorial law is

in conflict with this Act, or with orders issued pursuant to this

Act.

(b) Provisions in any State .. . law... which provide for

greater safety of persons in a mine es defined in this Act, than

do provisions of this Att; which relate to the same phase of such

operations, shell not be construed or held to be in conflict with

this Act.

Act of Sept. 16, 1966, ch. 21, 80 Stat. 772, 782-781, repealed by

Act of Nov, 9, 1977, O1 Stat. 1822: see Senate Comm. on Labor and

Public Welfare, Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act,

S. Rep. No, 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14 (1966).

Sia) No State law... shall be superseded by any .. . order

issued or any mandatory health or safety standard, except insofar

as such State law is in contlict ... with any order issued or any

mandatory health or safety standard.

(b) The provisions of any State law or regulation . . . whiclt

provide for more stringent health and safety standards applicable

to coal or other mines than do the provisions of this chapter or

any order issued or any mandatory health or safety standard shall

not thereby be construed or held to be in conflict with this chapter.

30 U.S.C. § 955 (a) and (b).

Lo

state regulation except as part of an approved state

plan.’ 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)-'b).

Convress easily could have incorporated the language

contained in the Nixon Administration’s version of

OSH Act, which explicitly saved more stringent “supy e-

mental” state regulation from preemption." But Con-

gress rejected such language, and OSHA itself has cited

Congress’ rejection of this language to confirm that the

OSH Act preempts legislation by states without approved

plans that relates to issues subject to a federal standard,

“without regard to whether the state law would con-

flict with. complement, or supplement the Federal stand-

ard....” Hazard Communication, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,552,

31,860 (1987).

1% [}linois’ selective quotation of members of Congres. actu

supports the conclusion that Congress by enacting the OSH Act

departed from previous laws which aliowed tor more string

state regulation. Wlinois quotes Rep. Dent as saying, “Federe:

legislation has mever yet superseded State legislation wher

state law is superior to the provisions of the Federal law” Ils

Cong. Rec. P1460, reprinted in Legislative History at 1020. Be

Dent, however, then goes on to say. “We took care of that

Mine Safety Law. For instance, two areas where we have Fe

legislation . . . are the Mine Safety Act and the Longshoremer

Safety Act.” Jd. at 1029-20. Examination of these tu

reveals regulatory schemes that, unlike the OSH Act, expressiy |

vide for concurrent federal-state regulation. See, Federal Coal M:

Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175 | codity

amended at 30 U.S.C. $$ 953, 955 (1988)), and Longshoremens :

Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § O41 | 19s-

2” Section 14(b)(1) of the Administration's bill, S. 2788 anc THEE

13373, O1st Cong., Ist Sess., provided that, “No state ager

health standard in effect upon the effective date of this Actor wt

may become effective thereafter, shall be superseded by any standarc

promulgated under this Act except imsofar as such State safer

or health standard is in conflict with this Act.” See. lib 2

provided that, “Any State safety or health standard in effect

the effective date of this Act, or which may become effective thy

after, which affords employees significantly greater protection tha

a safety or health standard promulgated under this Act sha

thereby be construed or held to be in conflict.”

26

D. The Occupational Safety and Health Administra-

tion Interprets Section 18 as Preempting Duplica-

tive or Supplemental State Regulation.

OSHA has consistently interpreted Section 18 as pre-

empting supplemental state laws unless OSHA has ap-

proved a state plan.“’ An administrative agency’s inter-

pretation of its enabling legislation has been accorded

great weight by this Court. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida

Gulf Coast Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S.

968, 574 (1988); Hillsborough County v. Automated

Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-715 (1985); Chev-

ron USA Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467

U.S. 837, 843 (1984); Southeastern Community College

v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979): see also Missis-

sippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487

U.S. 354 (1988) ‘Sealia, J., concurring). While the

preemptive effect of Section 18 is quite explicit, to the

extent that there is any ambiguity in the statutory lan-

guage, it should be reselved by deference to the agency in-

terpretation. Sve Presley + Etowah County Comm'n,

Nos. 90-711, 90-712, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 554 (Jan. 27,

*! An OSHA Instruction confirms OSHA's “view ... that the

intention of Congres. under Section 18(a) of the Act was to pre-

empt States without an approved 18(b) State plan from enforcing

standards covering occupational safety and health hazards for

which Federal standards are in effect. SOSH Act Instruction STP

2-1.10A, Mar. 13, 1981, + printed in 1984 CCH Employment Safety

& Health Guide © 5008.71. Since 1987, OSHA and other federal

agencies have been required by executive order to consider the

effect on federalism of their proposed rules. Section 4(a) of

Executive Order 12612 instructs executive departments to “con-

strue, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt

State law only when the statute contains an express preemption

provision or there is some other firm and palpable evidence com-

pelling the conclusion that Congress intended preemption of State

law, or when the excrcise of State authority directly conflicts with

the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute.” Exec-

utive Order 12612 of October 26, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685, 41,686

(1987). See, ¢.g., Hazard Communication Standard, 52 Fed. Reg.

31,852, 21,860 (1987).

27

1992); Lechmere, luc. ve. NLRB, No. 90-970, 1992 U.S.

LEXIS 555 (Jan. 27, 1992).

In the preamble to the Final Rule, OSHA confirmed

“Congress’ clear intent to preempt state laws relating to

issues with respect to which Federal OSHA has promul-

gated occupational safety or health standards.” 54 Fed.

Reg. 9294, 9315 (1989). The preamble further provides

that “|tlo the extent that there are state vu. regional pe-

culiarities caused by the types of hazardous waste opera-

tions ... states with occupational safety and health plans

approved by OSHA under section 18 of the OSH Act

would be able to develop their own state standards to

address any special problems.” Jd. (emphasis added).

The preamble advises that “if a state develops its own

OSHA approved state program, it could make additional

requirements in its standards.” /d. at 9316. These state-

ments show unequivocally that OSHA interprets the

OSH Act a» precluding states without state plans from

enacting legislation directly relating to issues addressed

by federal standards.**

“2 By contrast, Illinois points only to a non-mandatory note in

the Final Rule, stating that safety and health programs developed

to meet other federal, state or local regulations may be retained

if properly supplemented to conform to OSHA’s requirements, as

evidence that OSHA permits supplemental state regulation. (Pet.

Br. at 29), 29 C.F.R. §1910.120(b) note. Iinois misinterpret

OSHA's intent. In the preamble to the Final Rule, OSHA notes

that several commentors had suggested that OSHA’s requirements

“were somewhat duplicative of the contingency plans and emer-

gency response plans required by the E.P.A. for its permit require-

ments, . . . OSHA does not intend to require the duplication of

efforts made to meet other governmental regulations. 54 Fed. Reg.

9294, 9302 (1989). This allowance was made by OSHA to avoid

duplicative regulation, largely required by federal entities, and to

reduce the burden on employers, in the narrow setting of pre-eris’-

ing written safety programs, not to permit states subsequently to

enact duplicative and burdensome piecemeal legislation affecting

the regulated area.

28

Illinois also questions OSHA’s intent to preempt,”

arguing that, because a statement regarding preemption

was included only in the preamble to the Final Rule and

not in the text of the Final Rule itself, OSHA did not

intend the Final Rule to have preemptive effect.“' (Pet.

Br. at 26.) As this Court has recognized, however, pre-

ambles are one of the “variety of means {through which |

. We can expect that |agencies| will make their inten-

tions clear if they intend for their regulations to be ex-

clusive.” Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 718; ef. Fidelity Fed-

eral Savings and Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.

141, 147, 158 (1982).°°

“8 1f the OSH Act were silent as to preemption, OSHA itself

would have the authority to preempt related state laws. Express

preemption by an administrative agency has been accorded effect

equal to express preemption by Congress itself. City of New York

ew FCC, 1486 US. 57, 63-64 (1988); Lowisiana Public Service

Comm'n v. FOC, ATG US, 855, 369 (1986). Therefore, if this Court

concludes, despite the explicit preemptive language of Section 18,

that Congress intended to delegate preemptive discretion to OSHA,

the Court should defer to OSHA's clear expressign of the preemp-—

tive reach of the Final Rule.

“"Tllinois argues that the inclusion of express preemptive lan-

guage in the text of OSHA's Hoezard Communication Standard, 20

C.F.R. §1910.1200(a)(2) (1991), and the omission of such lan-

guage from the text of other final standards, including the Final

Rule, demonstrates lack of preemptive intent. (Pet. Br. at 27).

Ilinois apparentivy rejects the maxim erpressio unius est exrclus/o

alteriue—+n porsing the express language of Section 18, but adopts

it wholehoartedly in ana:vzing the long history of OSHA rulemak-

ing. Moreover, Illinois’ a guments are contradictory. Mlineis has

argued that Section IS reflects Congress’ express intent not to

delegate preemptive discretion to OSHA but to allow states to

enact supplemental legislation in all eases. How could the Hazard

Communication Standard demonstrate OSHA's decision to preempt

in just that one instance if OSHA had no delegated authority to

preempt at all?

“In addition, where OSHA has intended that a standard not

interfere with particular state laws not substantially affecting oc-

cupationasl health and safety or with the application of state laws

to certain groups of employees not subject to federal regulation,

OSHA has followed Section 18 by framing the issue addressed by

its standard narrowly and stating so plainly in its regulations.

29

E. The Contested Provisions of the Illinois Acts

Duplicate, Supplement and Conflict With OSHA’s

Final Rule and Frustrate the Purposes of the led-

eral Legislative Scheme.

Illinois has chosen not to submit the state plan called

for by Section 18(b), but has nevertheless enacted li-

censing requirements which include competency stand-

ards that duplicate, supplement and conflict with the

Final Rule. Illinois’ rejection of the explicit process for

federal-state cooperation created by Congress overcomes

any “presumption that state or local regulation of mat-

ters related to health and safety is not invalidated under

the Supremacy Clause,” Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 715.

The cases cited by IHlinois do not support its claim

that states may enact “supplemental” regulations for

occupational safety and health without regard to Section

18." In Hillshorough, 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (Pet. Br.

See, o.9., 29 CFR. § 128.110(a) (Field Sanitation Standard limited

to agricultural establishments with more than ten employees); 55

Fed. Reg. 28,728, 28,739 (1990) Cissue of Occupant Protection in

Motor Vehicles framed so as not broadly to preempt general state

motor vehicle laws). See aleo Martin v. Occupational Safety and

Health Review Commission, 1118. Ct. 1171, 1175-1176 (1991) Cen

ageney’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substan-

tial deference.) (citation omitted).

*“ [llinois makes much of the fact that the OSH Act is described

as establishing “minimum requirements.” (Pet. Br. at 18-19.) To

the extent Illinois’ criticism of “minimum requirements” suggests

that OSHA chould frame, for example, a training requirement as

an absolute or maximum number, the argument is frivolous. (See

Pet. Br. at 29.) To the extent Ilinois sugvests merely that states

are allowed to do more, the sensible interpretation is again evident

from Section 18. States are invited to enact standards “at least as

effective” as OSHA standards and thereby to build upon the “fed-

eral floor” by assuming responsibility for developing and enforcing

occupational safety and health standards in federally regulated

areas, but only upon approval of a state plan filed pursuant to

Section 18(b). See Ray v, Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 168

n. 19 (1978) (la) statutory reference to ‘minimum standards’ .

[does not furnish! a litmus paper test for resolving issues of pre-

emption”); Florida Lime, 272 U.S. at 171 (White, J., dissenting

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S, 218, 236 (1947).

30

at 28), this Court held that local ordinances and regula-

tions governing blood plasma centers were not impliedly

preempted by £ 351 of the Public Health Service Act and

Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations.

Congress had not expressed an intent to preempt such

local regulations and the FDA had expressly disavowed

preemptive intent, a factor given substantial deference

by the Court. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 714-715. By

contrast, Section 18 sets forth explicitly those areas in

which a state may not regulate without an approved plan,

which OSHA has repeatedly invoked in its rulemaking.

New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S.

405 (1973) (Pet. Br. at 21), addressed whether eligibil-

ity criteria enacted by New York in furtherance of the

federal government’s Aid to Families With Dependent

Children (“AFDC”) program were consistent with the

provisions of the Work Incentive Program (“WIN”), a

federal program also within AFDC. Dublino, however,

“|did| not involve arguable federal pre-emption of a

wholly independent state program dealing with the same

or a similar problem.” Dublino, 413 U.S. at 411 n.9.

The Court noted that Congress had not expressed any

intention that WIN should supersede state AFDC imple-

mentation, that the responsible federal agency never con-

sidered the WIN legislation preemptive and that “WIN

is a partial program which stops short of providing

adequate job and training opportunities.” Jd. at 416,

419-20. By contrast, OSHA’s Final Rule is comprehensive

and has been interpreted by OSHA as preempting state

enactments on the same issue.

In CTS Corp, v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.

69 (1987) (Pet. Br, at 21), this Court held that an

Indiana Act regulating the acquisition of voting control

following a tender offer was not impliedly preempted by

the federal Williams Act. Relying on the absence of ex-

press preemptive language in the Williams Act, the Court

concluded that “if Congress had intended to pre-empt all

state laws that delay the acquisition of voting control

following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly.”

31

481 U.S. at 85-86. Unlike the OSH Act, the Williams

Act had not expressly delineated areas in which the states

might regulate or provided a specific mechanism for state

regulation in other areas.

Illinois’ reliance on these implied preemption decisions

disregards the expressed intent of Congress to prohibit

redundant or supplemental state legislation except in con-

junction with an approved state plan. Moreover, the im-

plied preemption jurisprudence developed by this Court

would not save the Illinois Acts even if Congress had

been completely silent with respect to state regulation

of occupational safety and health. The Illinois legislation

“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-

tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941): see alse

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Rice v.

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). In SARA,

Congress mandated a comprehensive OSHA program for

the protection of hazardous waste workers. The Illinois

Acts require that these workers undergo an IEPA or

EPA approved training course for 40 hours, pass an

IEPA prescribed written test and, in the case of crane

and hoist operators, show that they have worked with

such equipment for at least 4,000 hours. The court below

concluded that some of these provisions “might well dup-

licate ‘or even conflict witht OSHA’s training require-

ments.” Killian, 918 F.2d at 678. In fact, the Illinois

Acts do create duplication and conflict that frustrates

the purpose of Congress; therefore, the Illinois Acts may

not stand. Cf. Pacific Gas & Electric Co, v. State Energy

Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220-221 (1983).

For example, the Illinois Acts do not permit workers

with training or experience equivalent to the 40-hour

requirement to obtain licenses. In contrast, Section

126(d) (1) of SARA specifically directs that the hour-

based training requirements for non-emergency workers

“shall not apply to any general site worker who has

received the equivalent of such training.” ** 29 U.S.C.

“7 SARA’s provision for equivalent training affirms a basic tenet

of OSHA regulation: the need for flexibility in designing and en-

»”

S55 note at ‘d) 1) ‘emphasis added}. Furthermore,

by requiring trainin fan EPA or IEPA approved pro-

gram, the Illinois Acts would conflict with SARA’s diree-

tion that OSHA regulate accreditation of training pro-

grams for hazardous waste operations and with OSHA’s

proposed rules on that subject. Ill. Stat. at paras. 7705

fe}, 7805; 101 Stat. at 1329-198 (1987); 55 Fed. Reg.

2776, 2778-2779 (1990). In addition, the Illinois Acts

do not permit any flexibility in emergency operations at

covered facilities, which conflicts with OSHA’s recogni-

tion that “emergency actions necessary to protect the

public safety and health {should not] be prevented be-

cause in a particular circumstance it is not feasible to

carry out particular requirements of this standard in the

time needed to respond to the emergency.” 51 Fed. Reg.

45,654, 45,662 (1986); see also 29 C.FLR. § 1910.120(e),

(previ, (8) cilih, (qri4e-(8); 54 Fed. Reg. 9294,

9328-20 (1989),

The 4,000-hour requirement of the Operators Act has

no parallel in the Final Rule. Any employer wishing to

employ hazardous waste crane operators in Illinois would

be forced to hire persons possessing Illinois credentials.

The trial judge found that the Illinois Acts would dimin-

ish the pool of workers available to clean Up hazardous

Waste sites, which could be critical in an emergency re-

sponse situation * «Pet. App. at 501. See also, e.g., (Tr.

at 35).

forcing standards. Sve 29 U.S.C. £655(d) (variances): 29 U.S.C.

§$655(b)(6)(A) (temporary variances); 29 C.F_R. § 1905. This

Court has held that a lack of provision for variation in a state

standard where such variation was essentiel te the federal scheme

Was sufficient to imply preemption even without express statutory

language such as exists in Section 18, Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,

430 U.S. 519, 542-543 (1977).

*\ Efficient emergeney operations by national enterprises would

be frustrated if other states followed suit by enacting redundant,

inconsistent and state-speec'fic requirements for hazardous waste

workers. The filing of a brief amieus curiae in support of Mlinois

by nine other states suggests the possibility of such state legis-

lation. Because specialized hazardous waste operations in southern

33

The Illinois Acts also would interfere with the opera-

tion of the “buddy system” by forcing interstate waste

management companies to select workers meeting specific

state requirements rather than being able to transport,

immediately and to any place in the country, an expert

team accustomed to handling a particular type of haz-

ardous material. (Tr. at 73.) The buddy system works

effectively only when workers have developed familiar-

ity with each other’s skills and practices. See, ¢.g., 29

C.F.R. § 1910.120'(a113) (“The purpose of the buddy

system is to provide rapid assistance to employees in the

event of an emergency.”); 29 C.F.R. §$ 1910.1201q) 13)

(‘y) (in an emergency response to a hazardous substance

release, “operations in hazardous areas shall be per-

formed using the buddy system in groups of two or

more”).

Il. THE TEST APPLIED BY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

PROVIDES AN OBJECTIVE AND WORKABLE

STANDARD FOR APPLYING SECTION 18 OF THE

OSH ACT.

A. Congress May Express!y Preempt State Laws That

Interfere With the Valid Exercise of Federal Legis-

lative Power Regardless of the Purpose of the

State Enactment.

This case presents an opportunity for this Court to

resolve a difference of opinion among the circuit courts

with respect to the preemption of what has been called

“dual purpose” state legislation. ‘Dual purpose” describes

a state enactment which furthers two state interests, only

one of which is identical to the purpose of the overlapping

federal legislative scheme. The Final Rule is unchallenged

as a valid exercise of OSHA’s authority to regulate occu-

pational safety and health.*’ Despite the existence of the

illinois are covered by teams from Missouri and central Illinois

from Indiana, the Illinois Acts potentially would delay cleanup in

parts of Illinois for up to six hours until less specialized workers

arrived from Chicago. (Tr. at 31-32.)

““OSHA itself noted the dual impact of its requirements on

safety and the environment: “The training requirement will assure

34

federal] standard, Illinois enacted overlapping legislation

ostensibly for both worker health and safety and public

health and safety. The court below recognized that it

would “defeat the purpose of Section 1%” if a state could

enact worker safety standards “simply by asserting a non-

secupational purpose for the legislation.” Killian, 91%

F.2d at 679. Such “unauthorized state regulation” could

result “in duplication and unwarranted additional costs

‘yg workers and employers” as well as interfere with the

operation of federa) law. Id. at 676, 679.

To address preemption in this context, the court below

formulated a two-step test that focuses precisely on the

effects of the state law on the federal regulation by iden-

tifying and invalidating only those provisions that “relate

to worker health and safety in a direct, clear and sub-

stantial way,” subject to severability analysis under state

law." Id. at €79. The court coneluded that “Ilinois’

4000-hour rule directly, clearly and substantially impli-

cates worker “health and safety as well as public health

and safety, and it is impossible to modify the provision

“0 as to delete matter serving the impermissible worker

health and safety goal without also eliminating the per-

missible public health and safety goal.” Jd. at 6&3. The

court therefore held that Section 1% of the OSH Act pre-

empted the challenged provision regardless of its addi-

tional asserted purpose.

tite activities will he carried out by qualified personnel, with

the mnowedge and atility to fulfill their job functions in a safe

and responsible manner. To the extent that this oecurs, there wil]

te a potential benefit te the environment.” 54 Fed. Rey. 9294.

W41%-9214 (198%

"The severability analysia applied hy the Seventh Cireuit com-

ts with the decisions of this Court. which have held that sever

ability of a etate statute in a question of state law. Bvrcon Corp 4

Hunt ATS US. 355, 276 (1986,: Wateon v. Buck, 313 US. 287.

1-36, (194) Ly preserving a challenged state enactment to the

extent compatible with state wseverahilitv law the eourt below In

‘ tle roi on the oy firnate exvercian -« f tate power

35

The test applied below is directly derived from the

holding of this Court in Lnglish v. General Electric Co,,

110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990). In English, the Court preserved

a claim under state tort law for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, observing that “for a state law to fall

within the preempted zone, it must have some direct and

substantial effect on the decisions made by those who

build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological

safety levels.” 1105S. Ct. at 227% n. 7 (emphasis added) ;

ef. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Ine., 463 US. #5, 100 n, 21

(1983, (“Some state actions may affect employee benefit

plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to

warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.”)

Fidelity Federal Savings avd Loan Agen v. De la Cuesta,

45% U.S. 141, 171-172 (19%2) (O’ Connor, J., concurring).

The decisions of this Court do not support states’ un-

limited authority to interfere with federal law by assert-

ing an additional purpose for their actions. Despite the

deference accorded traditional state powers, see Califor-

nia v. ARC America Corp., 490 US. 93,101 (19%9), this

Court has held since the early days of the republic that

Congress may expressly preempt a state law enacted

pursuant to its police power that has a direct and sub-

stantial effeet on the valid exercise of federal authority.

Gibbons +. Ogden, 9 US. (1 Wheat.) 1, 271 (1824) (“the

act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law

of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not

controverted, must yield to it.”) (emphasis added).”

"! Evaluation of the validity of #tate lawe in federally regulated

areas must be an effecte-oriented rather than «a purpose-oriented in-

quiry. If it were otherwise, the goal of the Supremacy Clause, to

protect federal leygi«lation from frustration, would itself be frus-

trated whenever a etate or local government asserted a purpose

derived from ite broad residual powers rather than the federal!

yoverpmne c's narrow er roernted newer. pt. J. ne ; Prati Park.

nad ("a 10 ¢ £1% S45 1977 her ne jist J eoncurring in part

nd dissenting in part Preemption, ther f it in te exiat at all

in thie cave, must exixt because the operation of the state Act in-

exorably conflicts with the purposes underlying the Federal Act”

*

‘initial emphasis added

36

The standard applied by this Court to cases in which

neither Congress nor an administrative agency has ex-

pressed preemptive intent demonstrates most clearly the

effects-oriented nature of the Supremacy Clause. Implied

preemption has been found where Congress intended to

“oecupy the field” or where there exists an actual conflict

between the state and federal laws, either in the sense

that it would be impossible to comply with both laws

simultaneously or in the sense that the existence’ of the

state law would frustrate the purpose of the federal legis-

lative scheme. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-143; Rice v.

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 2380 (1947);

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). These tests

look to the effect of the state law on the federal enact-

ment, not to the purpose of the state law.

In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S, 687, 651-52 (1971),

this Court concluded:

We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doc-

trine of Kesler and Reitz tnat state law may frus-

trate the operation of federal law as long as the

state legislature in passing its law had some purpose

in mind other than one of frustration. Apart from

the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken

in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a

doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify

nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply

publishing a legislative committee report articulating

some state interest or policy—other than frustration

of the federal objective—that would be tangentially

furthered by the proposed state law.

See also Intl Paper Co, v, Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498-

499 n.19 (1987) ‘citing Perez for the proposition that

“effect rather than purpose of a state statute governs pre-

emption analysis’); Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216-217 n.28;

Alessi et al. v. Rayhestos-Manhattan, Ine., 451 U.S, 504

(1981): Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142 (1963); Napier

», Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605, 612 (1926).

Illinois’ reliance on Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213,

is misplaced. In that case, the Court affirmed the de-

ee Se

37

cision of the Ninth Circuit that a state moratorium

on the certification of new nuclear power plants was

not impliedly preempied by the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954. There was no express preemptive language in

that statute. To the contrary, Congress expressly made

the state’s purpose the issue by providing that noth-

ing “shall be construed to affect the authority of

any State or local agency to regulate activities for

purposes other than protection against radiation haz-

ards,” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k). Not surprisingly, the Court

accepted the evidence offered by California that there was

a non-safety-related, economic rationale for the chal-

lenged moratorium, Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213. More

significantly, however, the effect of the state moratorium

on the federal statute was indirect. The Court observed

that “the statute does not seek to regulate the construc-

tion or operation of a nuclear powerplant.” Id. at 212

Furthermore, the Court continued, “{i]t would clearly

be impermissible for California to attempt to do so, for

such regulation, even if enacted out of nonsafety con-

cerns, would nevertheless directly conflict with the NRC’s

exclusive authority over plan construction and operation.”

Id. (emphasis added). This reasoning plainly demon-

strates that, even where Congress expressly raises the

issue of state purpose, a permissible purpose will not save

a state law with an impermissible effect.”

*2 Subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that Pacifie Gas

does not exempt state laws from preemption based on their asserted

purposes, In English v. General Blectrie Co., 110 S.Ct, 2270 61990),

the Court observed:

[T}he Court [in Pacific Gas! did not suggest that a finding of

safety motivation was necessary to place a state law within the

preempted field. On the contrary, it took great pains to make

clear that state regulation of matters directly affecting the

radiological safety of nuclear-plant construction and operation,

‘even if enacted ont of nonsafety concerns, would nevertheless

linfringe upen!| the NRC's exclusive authority. 461 U.S. at

212, 108 S.Ct., at 1726. Thus, even as the Court [in Pacific

Gas| sugyested that part of the pre-empted field is defined by

reference to the purpose of the state law in question, it made

38

The preemption analysis of a “dual purpose” state law

should therefore be no different from that applied to other

state enactments. The suggestion “that the coexistence of

federal and state regulatory legislation should depend upon

whether the purposes of the two laws are parallel or di-

vergent” tends to “obscure more than aid in the solution

of the [preemption] problem.” Florida Lime, 373 U.S.

at 141-142. The deference due states’ exercise of their

pohce power applies whenever Congress enters a field

traditionally occupied by the states, including regulation

of occupational safety and health, and does not gather im-

portance because the state asserts additional powers in

areas not entered by the federal government. The stand-

ard applied by the court below correctly recognizes tradi-

tional state authority to enact worker safety and public

safety legislation, but correctly disregards Illinois’ sug-

gestion that the existence of such residual state authority

automatically overrides clear congressional intent to pre-

empt overlapping state laws.

B. The First, Second and Third Circuits Incorrectly

Concluded That Preemption Should Depend on the

Additional Purposes or Effects of the State Enact-

ment Rather Than on the Direct Effect of the State

Enactment on the Federal Legislative Scheme.

In New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. H ughey,

774 F.2d 587 (1985), appeal after remand, 868 F.2d

621 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989),

the Third Circuit invoked the traditional framework

for analyzing the preemptive-reach of the OSH Act and

the Hazard Communication Standard, but based its con-

clusions as to the viability of certain provisions of the

New Jersey Worker and Community Right to Know Act

on the “primary purpose” of those provisions. Jd. at 595.

On appeal after remand, New Jerse y State Chamber of

Commerce v. Hughey, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir.). cert. *

denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989) (“Hughey II’), the court

clear that another part of the field is defined by the state law's

actual effect on nuclear safety.

110 S.Ct. at 2278 (emphasis in original).

39

reaffirmed its “primary purpose” test and held that a

labeling requirement was “addressed to a concern other

than occupational health and safety and |wal|s therefore

not expressly preempted by Section 18/a) of the OsH

Act.” Id. at 627. Despite the fact that New Jersey con-

ceded certain “obvious areas of overlap between the state

and federal requirement,” id. at 626, the court then up-

held the decision of the lower court on remand “that the

New Jersey Act was not an obstacle to the accomplish-

ment of the purposes of the federal standard and conse-

quently ... that the Act was not impliedly preempted.”

Id. at 622.

This analysis does not comport with the established

precedents of this Court. Preemption is a question of con-

gressional intent; “express” and “implied” are merel)

indicators of the manner in which congressional inten’

has been elucidated. CF. English vw. General Electric Co.,

110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 n.5 (1990). The Third Circuit

saved the state legislation in question from express pre-

emption not because Section 18 is ambiguous, but because

the state had asserted a primary purpose different from

that of the federal law. The Third Circuit then invoked

the traditional test for implied preemption as if Congress

had been entirely silent as to the preemptive reach of the

OSH Act. But Congress was not silent. In effect, the

Third Circuit standard allows a state to defeat the ex-

pressed intent of Congress.

In Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New Yor

City, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit

evaluated a*preemption challenge to New York City’s

asbestos abatement program. The Second Circuit rejected

the Third Circuit’s test, observing that “ ‘primary’ is an

ambiguous word, and to adopt its use leads down an un-

marked avenue of inquiry into legislative motive, which

is ‘often an unsatisfactory venture.’” 855 F.2d at 57

(quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216). Instead, the

court held that “in order to avoid preemption the City

must demonstrate only that ... there is a legitimate and

substantial purpose apart from protecting asbestos work-

4U

ers.” dd. at o7. Applying this extremely permissive

standard to the challenged legislation, the Second Cireuit

upheld a variety of provisions relating to worker educa-

tion based on the city’s asserted “legitimate and substan-

tial purpose to promote public safety and health,” even if

the only arguable effect on safety and health other than

that of workers was on workers’ immediate families."

Id. at 57.

The Second Circuit reached this conclusion by removing

these provisions from the express preemptive reach of

Section IS based on an additional state purpose while

nonetheless admitting that if the city law were impliedly

preempted as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and

execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-

gress,” preemption would be justified “regardless of the

state's legitimate purpose.” 855 F.2d at 59 (eiting Pacific

Gras, MOL US. at 216 n.28). As is the ease with the Third

Circuit's decision in Hughey 11, such reasoning adheres

to the form but misinterprets the substance of this

Court's preemmtion jurisprudence by considering “ex-

press” and “implied” preemption as unrelated categories

rather than as alternative methods of determining con-

cressional intent,

In Associated Industries of Massachusetts vv. Snow.

SOS Pld 274 dst Cir. 1990), the First Circuit held that

most of Massachusetts’ asbestos abatement scheme was

not preempted by OSHA's Hazard Communication Stand-

ard. The First Cireuit test “look[s] .. . to the effect of

the regulatory scheme” in addition to worker health and

safety. Jd. at 27% The court concluded that “lif! the

effect (of! ... the Massachusetts standards .. . is to pro-

tect the public, the state regulation is not preempted. If

the effect is solely to protect workers, the OSHA Standard

‘The court upheld educational requirements relating to the fol.

lowing: the physical characteristics and aerodynamic qualities of

asbestos, the health hazards and effects of asbestos and routes of

exposure, workers personal hygicne, personal protective equipment

on-the-job work practices, air monitoring, remediation methods,

decontamination and airflow direction, and safety hazards

Eee

41

prevails and the state regulation falls. If the effect is

to protect the public by regulating workers and work

places, the regulation stands because its ultimate effect

is protection of the public.” /d, at 279-280.

The First Circuit test avoids divining state legislative

purpose, but indiscriminately protects a// legislation that

furthers any exercise of state residual powers regardless

of congressional intent. This stands the Supremacy Clause

on its head. Where a federal and a state law regulate

exactly the same matter, such as training requirements

for hazardous waste workers, and the effects of such

regulation further the exercise of both a federal and a

state power, the First Circuit standard would deny Con-

gress its constitutional ability to preempt the = state

enactment.

The decisions of the circuit courts relied upon. by

Illinois render express preemption analysis and there-

fore the expressed intent of Congress irrelevant so long

as a legitimate additional state purpose or effect exists.

As convenient as these “bright-line” rules appear at first

glance, they incorrectly interpret the Supremacy Clause,

deny Congress its preemptive power, and disregard the

decisions of this Court. By contrast, the Seventh Cir-

cult’s test recognizes that there is no easy substitute for

a case-by-case inquiry as to the expressed scope of con-

gressional preemptive intent. Cf. Florida Lime, 373

U.S. 1382, 142 11963) ("There is not—-and from the very

nature of the problem there cannot be—any rigid formula

or rule...

Only the effects-oriented test of the Seventh Circuit

focuses on the impairment of the federal enactment rather

than on the characteristics of the state enactment, whether

“purpose” or “effect.” What creates an obstacle to a

federal legislative scheme is not a state law with a “dual

purpose” but one with a direct and substantial effect

on federal law. Whatever the articulated goals of a

state law and whatever its effects in other regulatory

spheres, the overriding concern to a federal court hearing

an express preemption challenge is whether the state

42

law has a “direct and substantial effect” on the oper-

ation of federal law. Cf. English, 110 S. Ct. at 2278 n.7.

C. The Seventh Circuit Test Avoids Requiring Federal

Judges to Probe the Minds of State Legislatures.

Unlike the purpose-oriented tests of the Second and

Third Cireuits, the Seventh Circuit standard avoids in-

quiring into the intent of state legislatures. If the valid-

ity of state legislation were to depend on its purposes,

federal judges would become the inquisitors of state

legislatures, divining correctly or incorrectly the “true”

motives behind state legislative action. Although this

may be « necessary task in other constitutional arenas, it

is of little value in the evaluation of a claim of express

preemption. Congressional intent to preempt state law

is essential to the analysis of a preemption claim: state

legislative intent should be irrelevant.

The assessment of state legislative intent by a federal

court is unpredictable. Cf. Paeitie Gas, 461 U.S. 190, 216

(1983). Beeause asserted purposes may be unreli-

able, “this Court is not bound by ‘[t]he name, de-

scription or characterization given [a challenged statute |

by the legislature or the courts of the State,’ but will deter-

mine for itself the practical impact of the law.” Hughes v.

Oklahoma, AAL U.S. 822, 386 11979) (quoting Lacoste v,

Louisiana Dh pt.of Conservation, 263 U.S, O45, 550 (19245):

see alse California Coastal Comm'n v, Granite Rock Co., 480

U.S. 572, G07 (1987) tSealia, J., dissenting). In addition,

individual legislators may vote in favor of the same bil]

for different reasons. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways

Corp, 450 US. 662, 703 41981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-

in). State legislators could exercise their historic powers

with greater confidence knowing that only legislation with

a direct, clear and substantial effect on an expressly pre

empted federal legislative area is forbidden. To provide

such guidance should be a goal of the courts. Jd. at 706

‘Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

The difficulty of evaluating the nature and legitimacy

of state legislative intent is aptly demonstrated in this

—swT

43

ease."' Moreover, apart from their clear interference with

OSHA’s regulatory scheme, the effects of the Illinois Acts

are speculative.” The title of the Illinois Acts character-

“4 The legislative history of the Illinois Acts creates serious doubts

as to the legitimacy of the state purposes asserted by Illinois. Be-

cause the Illinois Acts were not added to HB-3100 until a few days

before the bill was passed, official transcripts reveal only brief de-

bate in both houses regarding worker licensing. State of Illinois,

85th General Assembly, Senate Transcription Debate, July 1, 1988

(App. at 27a); State of Illinois, 85th General Assembly, House of

Representatives Transcription Debate, July 1, 1988 (App. at 18a).

Comments by the bill's proponents suggest that the Illinois Acts

were reintroduced at the eleventh hour at labor union behest because

hazardous waste disposal companies were bringing in skilled work-

ers from out-of-state. State Senator Rock, arguing in support of

the Illinois Acts, observed that “we have been discussing for a num-

ber of vears the licensure of those members of the laborers union

and the crane operators who dealt in hazardous waste sites. Z/f ts ex-

tremely important if we are to retain jobs in Illinois that this pro-

Vision, in fact, be included.” (emphasis added). Remarks of Sen.

Rock, State of Ilinois, 85th General Assembly, Senate Transcription

Debate, July 1, 1988 at 18 (App, at 38a). Representative Wenn

lund, speaking in support of passage of the entire package bill,

remarked that “] realize that some of the provisions with respect

to the crane operators licensing may be somewhat offensive,” but

nevertheless concluded that “I strongly urge a ‘yes’ vote even if

you have to hold your nose with respect to the crane operators.”

Remarks of Rep. Wennlund, State of Illinois, 85th General As-

sembly, House of Representatives Transcription Debate, July 1,

1988 at 5S (App. at 22a)

“ The 4,000-hour requirement, for example, relates only to ex-

perience with the fypes of equipment that may be used for waste

handling, not to experience actually handling hazardous waste, and

benefits most directly union members who have kept records of

such operations, Incredibly, both the Operators Act and the Labor-

ers Act exempt hazardous waste workers using small-capacity

lifters such as forklifts and bobcats. This leads to the irrational

result that the laborer who shovels hazardous waste into barrels,

the operator who picks up a large but empty tank with a crane,

and the worker who sweeps up afterwards all must have valid

licenses under the Illinois Acts, but the operator who moves rust-

ing barrels with a forklift or removes hazardous waste from a

trench with a bebeat (cand who does not belong to the union tn-

volved in drafting the Illinois Acts) may remain unlicensed. In

addition, the Illinois Acta exempt workers in various industries and

44

izes them as “in relation to environmental protection,”

Public Act 85-1195, codified at Ill. Stat. at para. 7701-

7717, while the text describes them as necessary “to

promote job safety and... protect life, limb and prop-

erty.” Ill. Stat. at paras. 7702, 7802. However, the trial

judge found (1) that the IEPA did not even participate

in the drafting of the Illinois Acts, while Local 150 of

the Operating Engineers’ union did (Pet. App. at 49),

and (2) that Illinois introduced no evidence at trial that

would arguably show that the 4,000-hour requirement

would reduce the risk of danger to the public or employees

or the environment. (Pet. App. at 19, 58-59.) Given

these circumstances, the purpose tests of the Second and

Third Circuits and the additional effect test of the First

Circuit would require judicial telepathy and would argu-

ably produce random results.

D. The Seventh Circuit Test Would Not Threaten

States’ Licensing and Police Powers.

Illinois claims that application of the Seventh Circuit

standard would broadly preempt a variety of important

state laws, ranging from licensing of healthcare work-

ers to local building codes. (Pet. Br. at 35-36.) NSWMA

must regrettably rain on Illinois’ parade of horribles.

The point of the Seventh Circuit’s test is that the detri-

mental effect of the state enactment on the federal scheme

must be direct, clear and substantial.*® This conclusion

workers who are employed by manufacturers rather than hazardous

waste contractors. This sieve of coverage hardly supports a ration-

ale of public safety or environmental benefit.

%6 The test employed by the court below would recognize, for

example, that most tort and criminal laws of general applicability

do not affect in a direct, clear and substantial manner employer-

employee obligations with respect to health and safety matters in

the workplace. Cf. People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534

N.E.2d 962, 967 (1989); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

464 U.S. 238 (1984). These laws apply with hindsight to those who

have caused worker injury, illness or death, and therefore differ

conceptually from the OSHA Final Rule and the Illinois Acts,

which prospectively prescribe conduct necessary or appropriate to

avoid such unfortunate outcomes. See Note, Getting Away with

el la

45

may only be reached with reference to the scope of Con-

gress’ expressed intent to preempt. Section 18 of the OSH

Act does not reflect a broad intent to supersede state law

comparable to ERISA. Cf. Franchise Tax Bd. of Califor-

nia v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,

24 n.26 (1983). On the contrary, Congress’ intent to pre-

empt under the OSH Act is limited. Certain powers are ex-

pressly reserved to the states in Sections 4(b) (1), 4' b) 4 ]

and 18(a), and states may assume exclusive responsibil-

ity for developing and enforcing standards under an

approved state plan. All that is preempted is state regu-

lation of worker health and safety relating to an issue

covered by a federal standard in the absence of a state

plan. Moreover, the court below requires a showing that

the state regulation directly, clearly and substantially

affects employer-employee obligations in the workplace.

Thus, the interaction between the intent of Congress and

the effect of the state law must be evaluated on a case-by-

case basis. Finally, by severing and preserving the por-

tions of the state law that do not interfere with federal

legislation, the test applied below respects states’ enforce-

ment responsibilities. The practical application of this

test will not iead to wholesale abrogation of states’ gen-

eral police powers. Rather, it will remain focused on the

workplace and the attainment of the OSH Act’s vision of

cooperative federalism.

Under the Seventh Circuit standard, Illinois is free to

license medical personnel.*’ Illinois is free as well to

Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecu-

tions for Industrial Accidents, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 535, 542-543

(1987).

37 The OSHA bloodborne pathogen standard contains several

provisions which preserve a variety of state and local laws, so that

such laws would never be viewed as directly, clearly and substan-

tially affecting the federal scheme. See, ¢.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004,

64,147 (1991) (permitting disposal of regulated waste in accord-

ance with applicable federal, state and local regulations) ; 56 Fed.

Reg. 64,004, 64,154 (1991) (recognizing state accreditation of

laboratories); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,157-64,158, 64,179 (1991)

46

license electricians and enact local electrical codes.* Ili-

nois may even establish detailed certification standards

for hazardous Waste workers as part of a comprehensive

program for the regulation of occupational safety and

health upon approval by the Seeretary of a state plan

filed pursuant to Section 18tb) of the OSH Act. Illinois,

however, has declined to follow the procedure designed

by Congress for doing so. ITilinois is therefore not free

under the OSH Act and the United States Constitution

to adopt the contested provisions of the Illinois Acts.”

respecting confidentiality-of-source provisions of state or local

law . 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,170 (1991) (“This standard does not

abridge, enlarge, or alter any existing ethical or statutory code

with respect to confidentiality of medical records |.” )

‘In the preamble to the revision of its Part 5 Electrical Stand

ards, OSHA describes the National Electrical Code “NEC") as

“the cornerstone of electrical safety in the United States,” provid

ing “important assistance to OSHA in its mission to afford elec-

trical safety an the workplace.” 46 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4036 (1981

ev ales 29 CFR. §$1910-301-1910441. The same preamble ex

plains that the 1081] revisions “streamlined the existing standard,

which incorporated by reference the whole 1971 NEC, by deleting

portions of the NEC which were not directly related to employee

safety.” 46 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4087 (1981

’ Other provisions of the Illinois Acts initially challenged bys

NSWMA but not ruled upon by the trial judge likely also would

not survive application of the Seventh Circuit's test

47

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, NSWMA respectfully

submits that the decision of the court of appeals should

be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

DONALD T. BLIss *

ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.

WILLIAM M. SAGE

O'MELVENY & MYERS

555 13th Street, N.W.

Of Counsel: Washington, D.C. 20004-1109

BRUCE J. PARKER (202) 383-5331

NATIONAL SOLID WASTES

MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

Suite 1000

1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 659-4613

JOHN T. VAN GESSEL

CHEMICAL WASTE

MANAGEMENT, INC.

3003 Butterfield Road

Oak Brook, Illinois 60521

(708) 218-1638 * Counsel of Record

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT,

29 U.S.C, $$ 651-658

TITLE 29—LABOR

$ 652. Definitions

* . + .

(5) The term “employer” means a person engaged in

a business affecting commerce who has employees, but

does not include the United States or any State or po-

litical subdivision of a State.

* 7 * o

(8) The term “occupational safety and health stand-

ard” means a standard which requires conditions, or the

adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,

operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appro-

priate to provide safe or healthful employment and places

of employment.

(if) Federal share.

The Federal share for each State grant under subsec-

tion ‘a! or th! of this section may not exceed 90 per

centum of the total cost of the application. In the event

the Federal share for all States under either such sub-

section is not the same, the differences among the States

shall be established on the basis of objective criteria.

iy: Administration and enforcement of programs con-

tained in approved State plans; Federal share

The Secretary is authorized to make grants to the States

to assist them in administering and enforcing programs

for occupational safety and health contained in State

plans approved by the Secretary pursuant to section 667

of this title. The Federal share for each State grant un-

der this subsection may not exceed 50 per centum of the

total cost to the State of such a program. The last sen-

tence of subsection (f) of this section shall be applicable

in determining the Federal share under this subsection,

2a

£653. Geographic applicability; judicial enforcement;

applicability to existing standards; report to Con-

gress on duplication and coordination of Federal

laws; workmen’s compensation law or common

law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of

employcrs and employees unaffected

(b) 11) Nothing in this chapter shall apply to working

conditions of employees with respect to which other Fed-

eral agencies and State agencies acting under section

2021 of title 42. exercise statutory authority to prescribe

or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational

safety or health.

* * * *

(4) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to super-

sede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensa-

tion law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other

manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or

liabilities of employers and employees under any law with

respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising

out of, or in the course of, employment.

* * * *

~ 667. State jurisdiction and plans

ia! Assertion of State standards in absence of applicable

Federal standards

Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency

or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over

any occupational safety or health issue with respect to

which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this

title.

‘hb: Submission of State plan for development and en-

forcement of State standards to preempt applicable

Federal standards

Any State which, at any time, desires to assume re-

sponsibility for development and enforcement therein of

3a

occupational safety and health standards relating to any

eccupational safety or health issue with respect to which

a Federal standard has been promulgated under section

655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the develop-

ment of such standards and their enforcement.

(¢} Conditions for approval of plan

The Secretary shall approve the plan submitted by a

State under subsection (b) of this section, or any modifi-

cation thereof, if such plan in his judgment—

(1) designates a State agency or agencies as the

agency or agencies responsible for administering t.

plan throughout the State,

(2) provides for the development and enforcement

of safety and health standards relating to one or

more safety or health issues, which standards ‘and

the enforcement of which standards) are or will be

at least as effective in providing safe and healthful

employment and places of employment as the stand-

ards promulvated under section 655 of this title

which relate to the same issues, and which stand-

ards, when applicable to products which are dis-

tributed or used in interstate commerce, are required

by compelling local conditions and do not unduly

burden interstate commerce,

(3) provides for a right of entry and inspection of

all workplaces subject to this chapter which is at

least as effective as that provided in section 657 of

this title, and includes a prohibition on advance

notice of inspections,

(4) contains satisfactory assurances that such

agency or agencies have or will have the legal au-

thority and qualified personne] necessary for the

enforcement of such standards,

(5) gives satisfactory assurances that such State

will devote adequate funds to the administration and

enforcement of such standards,

4a

(6) contains satisfactory assurances that such

State will, to the extent permitted by its law, estab-

lish and maintain an effective and comprehensive

occupational safety and health program applicable to

all employees of public agencies of the State and its

political subdivisions, which program is effective as

the standards contained in an approved plan,

(7) requires employers in the State to make re-

ports to the Secretary in the same manner and to the

same extent as if the plan were not in effect, and

(8) provides that the State agency will make such

reports to the Secretary in such form and containing

such information, as the Secretary shall from time to

time require.

* * . .

(h) Temporary enforcement of State standards

The Secretary may enter into an agreement with a

State under which ihe State will be permitted to continue

to enforce one or more occupational health and safety

standards in effect in such State until final action is

taken by the Secretary with respect to a plan submitted

by a State under subsection (b) of this section, or two

years from December 29, 1970, whichever is earlier.

5a

SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND

REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986,

PUBLIC LAW 99-499

Hazardous Waste Operations. Pub.L. 99-499, Title I,

§ 126(a)-(f), Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1690, as amended

PubL. 100-202, § 101(f) [Title II], Dec. 22, 1987, 101

Stat. 1329-198, provided that:

“(a) Promulgation.—Within one year after the date

of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Labor

shall, pursuant to section 6 of the Occupational Safety

and Health Act of 1970, promulgate standards for the

health and safety protection of employees engaged in

hazardous waste operations.

“(b) Proposed standards.—The Secretary of Labor

shall issue proposed regulations on such standards which

shall include, but need not be limited to, the following

worker protection provisions:

“(1) Site analysis——Requirements for a formal

hazard analysis of the site and development of a

site specific plan for worker protection.

“(2) Training.—Requirements for contractors to

provide initial and routine training of workers be-

fore such workers are permitted to engage in hazard-

ous waste operations which would expose them to

toxic substances.

“(d) Specific training standards.—

“(1) Offsite instruction; field experience.—Stand-

ards promulgated under subsection (a) shall include

training standards requiring that general site work-

ers (such as equipment operators, general laborers,

and other supervised personnel) engaged in hazardous

substance removal or other activities which expose

or potentially expose such workers to hazardous sub-

stances receive a minimum of 40 hours of initial in-

struction off the site, and a minimum of three days

6a

of actual field experience under the direct supervi-

sion of a trained, experienced supervisor, at the time

of assignment. The requirements of the preceding

sentence shall not apply to any general site worker

who has received the equivalent of such training.

Workers who may be exposed to unique or special

hazards shall be provided additional training.

“(2) Training of supervisors.—Standards prom-

ulgated under subsection (a) shall include training

standards requiring that onsite managers and super-

visors directly responsible for the hazardous waste

operations (such as foremen) receive the same train-

ing as general site workers set forth in paragraph

(1) of this subsection and at least eight additional

hours of specialized training on managing hazardous

waste operations. The requirements of the preceed-

ing sentence shall not apply to any person who has

received the equivalent of such training.

“(3) Certification; enforcement.—Such training

standards shall contain provisions for certifying that

general site workers, onsite managers, and super-

visors have received the specified training and shall

prohibit any individual who has not received the

specified training from engaging in hazardous waste

operations covered by the standard. The certifica-

tion procedures shall be no less comprehensive than

those adopted by the Environmental Protection

Agency in its Model Accreditation Plan for Asbestos

Abatement Training as required under the Asbestos

Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1886 [Pub. L.

99-519].

_“(4) Training of emergency response personnel.—

Such training standards shall set forth requirements

for the training of workers who are responsible for

responding to hazardous emergency situations who

may be exposed to toxic substances in carrying out

their responsibilities.

7a

“(e) Interim regulations—The Secretary of Labor

shall issue interim final regulations under this section

within 60 days after the enactment of this section which

shall provide no less protection under this section for

workers employed by contractors and emergency response

workers than the protections contained in the Environ-

mental Protection Agency Manual (1981) “Health and

Safety Requirements for Employees Engaged in Field

Activities” and existing standards under the Occupational

Safety and Health Act of 1970 found in subpart C of

part 1926 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Such interim final regulations shall take effect upon is-

suance and shall apply until final regulations become

effective under subsection (c).

“(f) Coverage of certain State and local employees.—

Not later than 90 days after the promulgation of final

regulations under subsection (a), the Administrator shall

promulgate standards identical to those promulgated by

the Secretary of Labor under subsection (a). Standards

promulgated under this subsection shall apply to employ-

ees of State and local governments in each State which

does not have in effect an approved State plan under

section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970 providing for standards for the health and safety

protection of employees engaged in hazardous waste

operations.”

8a

PROPOSED OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND

SAFETY ACT OF 1970

S. 2788, 91ST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP

2" >

(b) (1) No State safety or health standard in effect

upon the effective date of this Act or which may become

effective thereafter, shall be superseded by any standard

promulgated under this Act except insofar as such State

safety or health standard is in conflict with this Act.

(2) Any State safety or health standard in effect upon

the effective date of this Act, or which may become effec-

tive thereafter, which affords employees significantly

greater protection than a safety or health standard prom-

ulgated under this Act shall not thereby be construed or

held to be in conflict.

(c) Any State which, at any time, desires to assume

responsibility for development and enforcement in such

State of occupational safety or health standards relating

to any occupational safety or health issue with respect

to which a Federal standard has been promulgated under

section 4 shall submit a State plan for the development of

such standards and their enforcement.

+ * 7 *

9a

FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY

ACT OF 1969, PUBLIC LAW 91-173

EFFECT ON STATE LAWS

Sec. 506. (a) No State law in effect on the date of

enactment of this Act or which may become effective

thereafter shall be superseded by any provision of this

Act or order issued or any mandatory health or safety

standard, except insofar as such State law is in conflict

with this Act or with any order issued or any mandatory

health or safety standard.

(b) The provisions of any State law or regulation in

effect upon the operative date of this Act, or which may

become effective thereafter, which provide for more strin-

gent health and safety standards applicable to coal mines

than do the provisions of this Act or any order issued or

any mandatory health or safety standard shall not thereby

be construed or held to be in conflict with this Act. The

provisions of any State law or regulation in effect on the

date of enactment of this Act, or which may become effec-

tive thereafter, which provide for health and safety stand-

ards applicable to coal mines for which no provision is

contained in this Act or in any order issued or any

mandatory health or safety standard, shall not be held to

be in conflict with this Act.

10a

FEDERAL METAL AND NONMETALLIC MINE

SAFETY ACT, PUBLIC LAW 89-577

STATE PLANS

Sec. 16. (a) In order to promote sound and effective

coordination in Federal and State activities within the

field covered by this Act, the Secretary shall cooperate

with the official mine inspection or safety agencies of the

several States.

(b) Any State which, at any time, desires to develop

and enforce health and safety standards in mines located

in the State which are subject to this Act shall submit,

through a State mine inspection or safety agency, a State

plan for the development of such standards and their

enforcement.

EFFECT ON STATE LAWS

SEc. 19. (a) No State or territorial law in effect upon

the effective date of this Act or which may become ef-

fective therafter, shall be superseded by any provision

of this Act, except insofar as such State or territorial

law is in conflict with this Act, or with orders issued

pursuant to this Act.

(b) Provisions in any State or territorial law in effect

upon the effective date of this Act, or which may become

effective thereafter, which provide for greater safety of

persons in a mine as defined in this Act, than do pro-

visions of this Act, which relate to the same phase of

such operations, shall not be construed or held to be in

conflict with this Act. Provisions in any State or terri-

torial law in effect upon the effective date of this Act,

or which may become effective thereafter, which pro-

vide for the safety of persons in a mine as defined in this

Act concerning which no provision is contained in this

Act, shall not be construed or held to be superseded by

this Act.

lla

29 C.F.R. §1910.120 Hazardous waste operations and

emergency response.

(3) Definitions—“Buddy system means a system of or-

ganizing employees into work groups in such a manner

that each employee*of the work group is designated to be

observed by at least one other employee in the work

group. The purpose of the buddy system is to provide

rapid assistance to employees in the event of an emer-

gency.

(e) Training—(1) General. (i) All employees work-

Ing on site (such as but not limited to equipment opera-

tors, general laborers and others) exposed to hazardous

substances, health hazards, or safety hazards and their

supervisors and management responsible for the site shall

receive training meeting the requirements of this para-

graph before they are permitted to engage in hazardous

waste operations that could expose them to hazardous

substances, safety, or health hazards, and they shall re-

ceive review training as specified in this paragraph.

(ii) Employees shall not be permitted to participate

in or supervise field activities until they have been trained

to a level required by their job function and responsibility.

(2) Elements to be covered. The training shall

thoroughly cover the following:

(i) Names of personnel and alternates responsible for

site safety and health;

(ii) Safety, health and other hazards present on the

site;

(iii) Use of personal protective equipment;

. (iv) Work practices by which the employee can min-

imize risks from hazards;

12a

(3) Initial training. (i) General site workers (such

as equipment operators, general laborers and supervisory

personnel) engaged in hazardous substance removal or

other activities which expose or potentially expose work-

ers to hazardous substances and health hazards shall re-

ceive a minimum of 40 hours of instruction off the site,

and a minimum of three days actual field experience

under the direct supervsion of a trained, experienced

supervisor.

(ii) Workers on site only occasionally for a specific

limited task (such as, but not limited to, ground water

monitoring, land surveying, or geo-physical surveying)

and who are unlikely to be exposed over permissible ex-

posure limits and published exposure limits shall receive

a minimum of 24 hours of instruction off the site, and

the minimum of one day actual field experience under the

direct supervision of a trained, experienced supervisor.

(iii) Workers regularly on site who work in areas

which have been monitored and fully characterized indi-

cating that exposures are under permissible exposure

limits and published exposure limits where respirators

are not necessary, and the characterization indicates that

there are no health hazards or the possibility of an emer-

gency developing, shall receive a minimum of 24 hours

of instruction off the site and the minimum of one day

actual field experience under the direct supervision of a

trained, experienced supervisor.

(iv) Workers with 24 hours of training who are cov-

ered by paragraphs (e) (3) (ii) and (e) (3) (iii) of this

section, and who become general site workers or who are

required to wear respirators, shall have the additional 16

hours and two days of training necessary to total the

training specified in paragraph (e) (3) (i).

(4) Management and supervisor training. On-site man-

agement and supervisors directly responsible for, or who

supervise employees engaged in, hazardous waste opera-

tions shall receive 40 hours initial training, and three

13a

days of supervised field experience (the training may be

reduced to 24 hours and one day if the only area of their

responsibility is employees covered by paragraphs (e)

(3) (ii) and (e) (3) (iii)) and at least eight additional

hours of specialized training at the time of job assign-

ment on such topics as, but not limited to, the employer’s

safety and health program and the associated employee

training program, personal protective equipment pro-

gram, spill containment program, and health hazard mon-

itoring procedure and techniques.

* - om *

(9) Equivalent training. Employers who can show by

documentation or certification that an employee’s work

experience and/or training has resulted in training equiv-

alent to that training required in paragraphs (e) (1)

through (e) (4) of this section shall not be required to

provide the initial training requirements of those para-

graphs to such employees and shall provide a copy of the

certification or documentation to the employee upon re-

quest. However, certified employees or employees with

equivalent training new to a site shall receive appropriate,

site specific training before site entry and have appro-

priate supervised field experience at the new site. Equiv-

alent training includes any academic training or the train-

ing that existing employees might have already received

from actual hazardous waste site work experience.

~ * . *

l4a

Hazardous Waste Operations & Emergency Response

Final Rule

54 Fed. Reg. 9294, 9315-9316

IX. Federalism

This final regulation has been reviewed in accordance

with Executive Order 12612 (52 FR 41685; October 30,

1987) regarding Federalism. Executive Order 12612 re-

quires that agencies, to the extent possible, refrain from

limiting state policy options, consult with states prior to

taking any actions that would restrict state policy op-

tions, and take such actions only when there is clear

constitutional authority and the presence of a problem of

national scope. The Executive Order provides for pre-

emption of state law only if there is a clear Congressional

intent for the Agency to do so. Any such preemption 1s

to be limited to the extent possible.

During the development of this rule, OSHA has, to the

extent possible, refrained from limiting state policy op-

tions by developing a rule that permits flexibility on the

part of the States through the use of performance lan-

guage. We have also consulted with the States, in par-

ticular those states with approved state OSHA plans,

during the public hearings and comment period called for

in the notice of proposed rulemaking for this rule. We

will continue to work with the States that have state

occupational safety and health plans approved under sec-

tion 18 of the OSHA Act to encourage those states to

develop their own policies to achieve program objectives

and continue to work with appropriate state: officials as

they present their state standards for approval.

This rulemaking is directed by Congress under the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986

(SARA). The Constitutional authority and Congressional

intent for Federal action in the area of worker protec-

tion standards for employees engaged in hazardous waste

operations is mandated clearly in section 126 of SARA.

lda

Congress therefore has identified the protection of em-

ployees engaged in hazardous waste operations and emer-

gency response as a problem of national scope through

the enactment of SARA.

Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act

(OSH Act), permits any state to develop its own inde-

pendent state occupational safety and health program.

Any state may develop and submit to OSHA, for approval

and use, a state occupational safety and health program

that provides, among other things, worker protection “at

least as effective as” that protection provided under the

Federal program.

With respect to Section 4 of Executive Order 12612,

Section 18 of the OSH Act also expresses Congress’ clear

intent to preempt state laws relating to issues with re-

spect to which Federal OSHA has promulgated occupa-

tional safety or health standards. Under the OSH Act,

a state can avoid preemption only if it submits, and ob-

tains Federal OSHA approval of, a plan for the develop-

ment of such standards and their enforcement as men-

tioned above. Occupational safety and health standards

developed by such approved Plan-States must, among

other things, be as least as effective in providing safe and

healthful employment and places of employment as the

Federal standards.

OSHA has used its regulatory preemption of State

law to the minimum level necessary to achieve the objec-

tives of the OSH Act and section 126 of SARA.

Section 126 of SARA, under paragraph (f), requires

that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

provide those state and local government workers who

are not covered by the protections of approved OSHA

state plans with protection that is identical to that pro-

vided under the Federal OSHA standards. Non-state

and local government employees would be regulated by

the Federal OSHA standard. State and local government

l6a

workers, employed in 25 non-OSHA state plan states,

would not normally be covered by standards promulgated

under Federal OSHA or approved state OSHA programs.

OSHA has worked with EPA in the development of this

final rule to assure that the protections provided to all

state and local government employees is consistent with

that provided by the Federal OSHA standard and the

OSH Act. EPA as the regulatory authority for the non-

OSHA state plan states will address their actions with

respect to worker protection policies that have federalism

implications in their rulemaking.

This final rule is written so that employees engaged

in hazardous waste operations and related emergency re-

sponse operations in every state, including those state

and local government employees in states regulated by

EPA, would be protected by general, performance

oriented standards. To the extent that there are state

or regional peculiarities caused by the types of hazardous

waste operations, including the types of related emer-

gency response provided, states with occupational safety

and health plans approved by OSHA under section 18 of

the OSH Act would be able to develop their own state

standards to address any special problems. This would

assure the compatibility of state or local emergency re-

sponse plans developed independently by state or local

emergency planning committees under Title III of SARA

with Federal worker protection standards issued by

OSHA and EPA.

And, under the OSH Act, if a state develops its own

OSHA approved state program, it could make additional

requirements in its standards. States that will be cov-

ered by regulations issued by EPA under paragraph

126(f) of SARA will be provided the same option.

Moreover, the performance nature of this final rule, of

and by itself, allows for flexibility by states and owners

or operators of hazardous wastes sites or providers of

emergency response to provide as much safety as pos-

17a

sible using varying methods consonant with the condi-

tions in each state.

In summary, there is a clear national problem, iden-

tified by Congress, related to occupational safety and

health in hazardous waste operations and related emer-

gency response. While the individual states, if all acted

collectively, might be able to deal with the safety prob-

lems involved, most have not elected to do so in the seven-

teen years since the enactment of the OSH Act. Those

States which have elected to participate under section

18 of the OSH Act, would not be preempted by this final

regulation and would be able to address special, local con-

ditions within the framework provided by this perform-

ance oriented standard while ensuring that their stand-

ards are at least as effective as the Federal standard.

State comments were invited on the proposal and those

that were submitted to the record were fully considered

prior to promulgation of this Final Rule.

The agency certifies that this document has been as-

sessed in light of the principles, criteria, and require-

ments stated in sections 2 through 5 of Executive Order

12621. There are no provisions of this rulemaking that

are inconsistent with the principles, criteria, and re-

quirements stated in sections 2 through 5 of Executive

Order 12621. States which have approved state occu-

pational safety and health plans may incur additional

costs associated with standards development and enforce-

ment as a result of this rulemaking. Funding for these

approved state plan programs is available from OSHA

under section 18 of the OSH Act. This rulemaking would

not change the State’s ability to discharge traditional

State governmental functions or other aspects of State

sovereignty.

18a

STATE OF ILLINOIS

85TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE—CERTIFIED

| STATE SEAL]

State of Illinois

Executive Department

CERTIFICATE

To All To Whom These Presents Shall Come, Greeting:

I, GEORGE H. RYAN, Secretary of State of the State

of Illinois, do hereby certify that the attached is a true

copy of debate on H.B. 3100 (P.A. 85-1195) in the House

on April 27, May 10, June 23 and July 1 and in the

Senate on June 14, June 15, June 27 and July 1.

[SEAL]

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I hereto set

my hand and cause to be affixed the Great

Seal of the State of Illinois. Done at the City

of Springfield, February 21, 1992.

/s/ George H. Ryan

Secretary of State

19a

127 Legislative Day July 1, 1988

Speaker McPike: “Representative Mays to close. Repre-

sentative Leverenz to close. Representative Leverenz

to close.”

Leverenz: “On... House Bill 3205, I now move that

the First Conference Committee Report be adopted

inasmuch as it was adopted in the Senate who has

the same concern by a vote of 57 to 0.”

Speaker McPike: “Question is, ‘Shall the House adopt

the First Conference Committee Report to House Bill

3205?’ All those in favor vote ‘aye’, opposed vote

‘no’. Have all voted? Have all voted? Have all voted

who wish? Clerk will take the record. On this Mo-

tion there are 107 ‘ayes’ 5 ‘nos’, and 1 voting ‘pres-

ent’. The House does adopt First Conference Com-

mitte Report to House Bill 3205. And this Bill

having received the required three fifths Constitu-

tional Majority is hereby declared passed. House

Calendar Supplemental #3, appears House Bill

3100, Representative Breslin.”

Breslin: “Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentle

men. I rise to inform the Body that we have been

able to reach an agreement with regard to tipping

fees in order to secure funding for the hazardous

waste disposal fund for both the State and Local

Government. The agreement is contained in House

Bill 3100. The following are the highlights of that

agreement. First of all, it has been agreed that there

will be a cap of seventy cents on the DuPage County

Forest Preserve District that landfills that are cur-

rently in existence. There are two. It is also agreed

that the language in this Bill with regard to this

issue will have no effect on the current suit dealing

with the Constitutionality challenging the Constitu-

20a

tionality of that DuPage County seventy cent tax.

The second part of the agreement is that the states

surcharge, tipping fee, shall be sixty cents for the

next three years and then it will drop down to forty

five cents. That will generate for the State of IIli-

nois, approximately sixteen million dollars for the

first three years and then will drop down to about

twelve million dollars thereafter. For the locals, the

surcharge will be forty-five cents for the first three

years and then will go up to sixty cents. The reason

for this change is and for the flipping of the fees

between the state and the locals is because at the

beginning of this process, the State will have the

major responsibility for helping locals in giving plan-

ning grants so the state is going to need more money.

After three years pass, the locals are going to be

ready to start implementing their plans. They are

going to need money to buy landfill space. They are

going to need money in order to start their incin-

erator to start their recycling programs etc. So, we

want to encourage implementation after this point.

The Bill refers to waste which is permanently dis-

posed of in landfills, not just that which is trans-

ferred. A local unit of Government is defined in the

Act as that which is defined under the Local Solid

Waste Disposal Abt and it must be located, the

facility must be . . . the charge can be placed only

where the disposal facility is located. It should be

noted that there are three units of Local Government

which could impose this tax. The county in which it

is located, the municipality in which it is located or

a joint action agency. It is up to the local communi-

ties to decide how and what they will charge. The

cap, however, is that it can not exceed forty five cents

for the next three years and sixty cents thereafter.

So it is possible, that should you have a municipal

landfill in a municipality. The Municipality may de-

cide to charge twenty cents and the county twenty

2la

five cents, and that will get them up to their forty

five cents. It is left in this Bill up to those individual

entities to make the determination. The Bill also

addresses the Constitutional questions that previously

held the previous Bill unconstitutional. Last but not

least, there is an additional provision in the Bill

which establishes a licensing system for crane op-

erators and for laborers who work with hazardous

waste materials only. The purpose of this licensing

requirement is to promote job safety and to protect

the life and health of our citizens. I don’t know if

you realize that, but I became familiar with this

issue when I was working on the hazardous—on the

household hazardous waste issue. We, as you know

last year passed a Bill that would require—or allow

municipalities to establish local collection programs

for their household hazardous waste. And it came to

my attention that this was a very tricky issue be-

cause we were having people who were untrained in

the handling of hazardous materials, actually going

out and doing the collecting. It was a concern with

regard to liability and it was a concern with regard

to the EPA and ENR as to how they should be main-

tained. We did build into that system, a requirement

that EPA and ENR set the operating standards for

such collection programs and we had to exempt people

from liability under. Well here are laborers and

crane operators, citizens of our state, taxpayers of

our state who can be put in hazardous positions,

handling hazardous waste material removal and clean

up, with no training whatsoever. This Bill would

establish a licensing procedure for both. I have—I

stand ready to answer any question that you might

have and I move for the adoption of the First Con-

ference Committee Report on House Bill 3100.”

Speaker McPike: ‘“You’ve heard the Lady’s Motion, and

on that Representative Wennlund,”

22a

Wennlund: “Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gen-

tlemen of the House. I rise in support of House Bill

3100. The State of Illinois can no longer wait to

implement tipping fees to fund recycling programs in

Illinois, composting programs in Illinois and waste

reduction in Illinois, The barge will not leave the

State of Illinois, its got to be dealt with now. The

time is now. I realize that some of the provisions

with respect to the crane operators licensing may be

somewhat offensive, but as Representative Breslin

said, they are limited to only hazardous waste. These

are the people who drive the bulldozers and the cranes

wearing white and yellow uniforms with masks on.

That’s all there is to it. We cannot afford to vote

‘no’ on this issue and see another New Jersey or

New York barge be rejected. The time is now in

Illinois, recycling is now in I}linois, composting is now

in Illinois, reduction of solid waste is now in Illinois

and the only way it’s going to get funded is through

this mechanism. It has been agreed to by all parties

with respect to the fees, DuPage County Forest

Preserve District is taken care of. Everything is in

place, we can no longer wait. I strongly urge a ‘yes’

vote even if you have to hold your nose with respect

to the crane operators. But remember it’s only those

operators dealing with hazardous waste, the time is

now, I urge all my colleagues on both sides of the

aisle, please vote ‘yes’ on this issue and let’s get it

out and get it implemented.”

Speaker McPike: “Representative Didrickson.”

Didrickson: “Thank you, Mr. Speaker, would the Spon-

sor yield for some questions please?”

Speaker McPike: ‘Yes she will.”

Didrickson: “Representative Breslin, the statement has

been made that there is some very fine and good

aspects to this Bill and the time has come and I

28a

may concur on that. But there are also a number

of us that are concerned about the licensure crane

operators. Why at the twelfth hour has this been

put into the Conference Committee Report? Has

there been a Bill going through the system, this

legislative year or has there been public debate on

this particular licensure of crane operators?”

Breslin: “There was public debate on this issue earlier

in the House in this Session. At that time, the Bill

as considered was poorly drafted, there were not a lot

of details worked out on it between the various oppos-

ing parties and it was defeated in the House Com-

mittee. Since that time, a great number of meetings

have taken place. The language has been cleaned up

dramatically and a number of compromises have been

reached. So the Bill that comes to you today is much

improved over that which failed in House Committee

earlier this year.”

Didrickson: “The second question that I would have for

those that are concerned about the licensure of the

crane operators is the fact that you’re licensing the

big crane operators, but what about the smaller lift

crane operators? Why are you excluding them?”

Breslin: “It is my understanding that the type of crane

that is used in the removal of hazardous waste ap-

plies to the larger crane. And we did not intend to

include the forklift or the bobcat, the thing that—

runs around the average manufacturing plant, we

wanted to confine it only to the large crane that is

typically used in this process and so this restriction

was put in, I believe in order to satisfy the concerns

of the business community of this state.”

Didrickson: “Well, it’s my understanding that the lan-

guage you have here has been drafted so broadly that

it does not do what you just said and so that’s the

line of my questioning here and that indeed it is so

ib |

24a

broad that there is concern now that you are also

going to be licensing cleaning ladies at these plants

because of the overly broad language.”

Breslin: “I disagree. This is a strict construction for the

definition for crane, hoist, laborer, hazardous waste

and the facility in which this applies. In addition to

that, there are several exemptions. The following are

those exemptions. Operators of forklifts or bobcats.

Operators of graining . . . grading, drainage, field

tile and irrigation equipment. Operators of agricul-

tural farming equipment. Persons involved in activi-

ties associated with the excavation for discovery,

development or production of minerals, coals or other

substances and oil, gas and water. Employees of a

railroad who operate a crane or a hoist. And any

employee of the owner, operator or principal re-

sponsible party of the manufacturing facility under-

going cleanup providing the employee has undergone

the required training by OSHA, hazardous waste

operations.”

Didrickson: “I think you just mentioned the fact that

it also requires those regarding clean up is that

correct?”

Breslin: “It exempts any employee of the owner, op-

erator or principal responsible party of manufactur-

ing facilities undergoing cleanup provided the em-

ployee has had some training under the OSHA haz-

ardous waste operations. I just gave you an exemp-

tion not an inclusion.”

Didrickson: “Well ... what you’re saying and reading

into the record here is correct. I just would like to

caution for those who are concerned about the li-

censure of crane operators and the potential future

licensure of the trades, which is really what we’re

opening the door for here, that this has been drafted

as I am told very broadly and that will include what

25a

it is that you are saying it doesn’t. I hope you’re

correct. I just want to raise the flag on that and

express those concerns of the business community.”

Speaker McPike: “Representative McCracken.”

McCracken: “Thank you, Mr. Speaker, I move the previ-

ous question.”

Speaker McPike: ‘The Gentleman moves the previous

question. The question is, ‘Shall the previous question

be put?’ All those in favor say ‘aye’, opposed ‘no’, the

‘ayes’ have it and the previous question is put. Rep-

resentative Breslin to close.”

Breslin: “I repeat, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the

tipping fee Bill. It has the agreement of DuPage

County, the City of Chicago, downstate, ENR, the

EPA, the Environmental Community. It has the sup-

port of laborers and the trades people and the crane

operators, so I ask for adoption of the First Con-

ference Committee Report.”’

Speaker McPike: “The Lady moves for the adoption of

the report. The question is, ‘Shall the House adopt

the Conference Committee Report to House Bill 3100?

All in favor vote ‘aye’, opposed ‘no’. Have all voted?

Have all voted who wish? Representative Hultgren,

did you wish to explain your ‘no’ vote?”’

Hutlgren: “Yes, if I may.”

Speaker McPike: ‘Proceed sir.”

Hultgren: “In the debate, I heard much discussion about

the licensing of crane operators. I think omitted

from the discussion, at least from the question and

answer, apparently the provision also licenses labor-

ers and if that makes a difference to some, just—it

would appear that a basic laborer would have to

maintain a license under the Conference Committee

Report. I wanted to point that out.”

- 26a

Speaker McPike: ‘Have all voted? Have all voted who

wish? The Clerk will take the record. On this Motion

there are 95 ‘ayes’, 15 ‘nos’ and 5 voting ‘present’.

The House does adopt the First Conference Commit-

tee Report to House Bill 3100, and this Bill having

received the required three fifths Constitutional Ma-

jority is hereby declared passed. The vote has been

taken and the Bill has been declared passed. If some-

one wishes to add, they can be journalized. The Clerk

has a mechanical problem with this roll, we will dump

the Roll Call and vote again. Question is, ‘Shall

the House adopt the First Conference Committee Re-

port to House Bill 3100? All those in favor vote ‘aye’,

opposed vote ‘no’. Have all voted? Have all voted

who wish? Clerk will take the record. Representa-

tive Dunn would like to change from ‘aye’ to ‘no’.

Mr. Dunn from ‘aye’ to ‘no’. On this Motion there

are 91 ‘ayes’, 16 ‘nos’ and 8 voting ‘present’. The

House does adopt the First Conference Committee

Report to House Bill 3100, and this Bill having re-

ceived the required three fifths Constitutional Ma-

jority is hereby declared passed. Turning to Supple-

mental + 2, House Bill 3227, Representative Mays,

Mr. Mays.”

Mays: “Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and

Gentlemen of the House. This is the operations and

new appropriations for the Department of Trans-

portation spends a billion, nine hundred and twenty

million, six hundred and seventeen thousand total of

which nineteen million, eight hundred and sixty five

thousand, six hundred dollars is general funds. I

would move for adoption of the Conference Commit-

tee Report.”

27a

STATE OF ILLINOIS

85TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SENATE

TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE—CERTIFIED

PRESIDENT :

Senator Savickas.

SENATOR SAVICKAS:

Yes, the amendment did not even bring the cost into it.

The amendment just was put on primarily so that it

can go into a conference committee and then the cost

would be put on. That is not happening, so we’ll remove

it, let it go out and let them work on it next. . . Session.

PRESIDENT:

Further discussion? Further discussion? If not, the

question is, shall the Senate recede from Senate Amend-

ment No. 1 to House Bill 849. Those in favor will vote

Aye. Opposed vote Nay. The voting is open. Have all

voted who wish? Have all voted who wish? Have all

voted who wish? Take the record. On that question,

there are 55 Ayes, no Nays, none voting Present. The

Senate does recede from Amendment—Senate Amend-

ment No. 1 to House Bill 849 and the bill having received

the required constitutional majority is declared passed.

Now, on page 7—Senator Smith, for what purpose do you

arise?

SENATOR SMITH:

Would you be kind and register me as voting Aye on

that, please? I’m so sorry.

PRESIDENT:

All right, the record will so reflect. Middle of page 7,

ladies and gentlemen. We'll go right through the Con-

ference Committee Reports as filed, then we will go to

28a

the Order of Secretary’s Desk Resolutions and by then, I

hope, we will have a supplemental Calendar to address.

On the Order of Conference Committee Reports, Madam

Secretary, the Conference Committee Report on House

Bill 3100.

SECRETARY:

First Conference Committee Report on House Bill 3100.

PRESIDENT:

Senator Welch.

SENATOR WELCH:

Thank you, Mr. President. The Conference Committee

Report on House Bill 3100 reflects initially an agreement

that has been worked out over two years. As many of

you recall, the Solid Waste Management Act was de-

clared unconstitutional in 1987 because the court decided

that money was collected without regard to discretion

as to categories that were included or excluded. This bill

now reaches an agreement between the major parties who

were involved. There is only one group, a waste disposal

industry, that is opposed to this part of that bill. In

addition to that, this also enacts a bill . . . legislation

that will create the Hazardous Waste Crane and Hoisting

Equipment Operators Licensing Act. Let me explain the

part of the bill that affects the settlement between Du-

Page County, Cook County and the rest of the state to

reenact the Solid Waste Management Act. The major

dispute between the party was the

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.