Respondents Brief — Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn.
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Lt” Court, U.S.
cle FILED
No. 90-1676
™ 1992
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Mary GADE, Director of the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
» Petitioner,
NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
DONALD T. BLISS *
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
WILLIAM M. SAGE
O’MELVENY & MYERS
555 18th Street, N.W.
Of Counsel: Washington, D.C. 20004-1109
BRUCE J. PARKER (202) 383-5331
NATIONAL SOLID WASTES
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Suite 1000
1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 200386
(202) 659-4613
JOHN T. VAN GESSEL
CHEMICAL WASTE
MANAGEMENT, INC.
3003 Butterfield Road
Oak Brook, Illinois 60521
(708) 218-1688 * Counsel of Record
WILSON - Epgs Printing Co., Inc. - 769-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
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QUESTION PRESENTED
May Illinois avoid the procedure for state participation
expressly established by Congress in Section 18 of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
£$ 651-668 (1988 and Supp. 1991), and enact “supple-
mental” state legislation which directly, clearly and sub-
stantially intrudes upon federal regulation of occupa-
tional safety and health merely by asserting a state leg-
islative purpose which extends beyond the purposes of
the federal enactment?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED i
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........... ts AO sae Be ]
Federal Occupational Health and Safety Regula-
tion of Hazardous Waste Operations 2
Subsequent Illinois Regulation of Hazardous
Ne icccecceneenescerences 5
The District Court Proceedings Below ....... 6
The Decision of the United States Court of Appeals
a ee eeweens GAPCUIL................................. &
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........... 1. eS 4)
Ee ements tO 12
I IN THE ABSENCE OF AN APPROVED
STATE PLAN, SECTION 18 OF THE OSH
ACT PREEMPTS REDUNDANT AND “SUP-
PLEMENTAL” STATE LEGISLATION 12
A. Section 18 Expresses Congress’ Intent To
Allow States to Enact Standards Such as
the Illinois Acts Only Upon Approval of an
Adequate State Plan... . | 13
B. SARA and the OSH Act Express Congress’
Intent to Eliminate Duplicative Regulation
of Hazardous Waste Workers 21
C. The Legislative Context of the OSH Act
Demonstrates that Congress Deliberately
Crafted Section 18 So As to Preclude “‘Sup-
plemental” State Regulation | 23
D. The Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration Interprets Section 18 as Pre-
empting Duplicative or Supplemental State
Regulation GANS a ‘ 26
(iii)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Ek. The Contested Provisions of the Illinois Acts
Duplicate, Supplement and Conflict With
OSHA’s Final Rule and Frustrate the Pur-
poses of the Federal Legislative Scheme
Il. THE TEST APPLIED BY THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT PROVIDES AN OBJECTIVE AND
WORKABLE STANDARD FOR APPLYING
SECTION 18 OF THE OSH ACT
A. Congress May Expressly Preempt State
Laws That Interfere With the Valid Exer-
cise of Federal Legislative Power Regard-
less of the Purpose of the State Enactment.
B. The First, Second and Third Circuits Incor-
rectly Concluded That Preemption Should
Depend on the Additional Purposes or Effects
of the State Enactment Rather Than on the
Direct Effect of the State Enactment on the
Federal Legislative Scheme...
C. The Seventh Circuit Test Avoids Requiring
Federal Judges to Probe the Minds of State
Legislatures
D. The Seventh Circuit Standard Would Not
Threaten States’ Licensing and _ Police
Powers
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. $$ 651-668
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986, Hazardous Waste Operations, Pub. L.
99-499, Title I, §$ 126(a)-(f), Oct. 17, 1986, 100
Stat. 1690, as amended Pub. L. 100-202, § 101 (f)
[Title I1], Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1329-198
Page
33
33
38
la
la
Vv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Proposed Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, S. 2788, 9ist Cong., Ist Sess. .
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
Public Law 91-173 .
Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act,
Public Law 89-577
29 C.F.R. § 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations
and Emergency Response
Preamble, Hazardous Waste Operations & Emer-
gency Response Final Rule 54 Fed. Reg. 9294,
9315-9316 (1989)
State of Illinois 85th General Assembly House of
tepresentatives Transcription Debate-Certified
State of Illinois 85th General Assembly Senate
Transcription Debate-Certified
Pave
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9a
LOa
lla
lda
18a
27a
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
AFL-CIO y, Marshall, 570 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.
197%) i 12
Alessi et al. v. Rayhestos-Manhattan, Ine. et al.,
451 U.S. 504 (1981) Renn eee REO Ne eee 36
American Tertile Mirs. Institute, Ine. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1981) 15
Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991) 13
Associated Indus. Of Massachusetts +. Snow, 898
F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990) 12, 40-4]
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock ¢ a.
480 U.S. 572 (1987) 42
California v. ARC America Corp., 499 US. 93
(1989) 35
Capital Cities Cabh . Ine. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 69]
(1984) 13
Cherray SA, Ine. v. National Resources Defense
Couneil, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 26
City of New York: v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988) 28
( Olumbus Cuute d Fahvics y. lndustrial Com my of
Ohio, 1 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1361 (S.D. Ohio
1973) 12
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 48] U.S.
69 (1987) 30-31
De Bartolo Corp. ¥, Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. A:
Construction Trades Couneil, 485 U.S. 56%
(19) 24)
Buglish v. Gene ral EFleetric ('o., 110 S. Ct. 22°70)
(1990) 13, 35, 37-39, 42
KRnvironmental Kucopsulating Corp. v. New Yor/:
City, 855 F.2d 4-8 (2d Cir. 198) 12, 29-40
Evrron Corp. v, Hunt, AT US. 355 (1986) of
FMC Corp, v, Holliday, 1118. (Ct. 403 (1990) 14
Farmworker Justios Fund, Ine. v. Brock, 81] F.2d
612, Option avd judaqme wt racated as moot, %17
F.2d 8960 (D.C. Cir. 197) 12, 21
Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n r. De la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 14} (1982) 15, 28, 35
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Five Migrant Farmworkers v. Hotiman, 345 A.2d
378 (NJ. Super. 1975) 13
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Ine. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132 (1963) 13, 29, 36, 38, 41
Franchise Tar Bd. of Ca. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. ] (1983). ; 45
Gibbous wv, Ogden, 9 US. 1 Wheat.) 1 (1824) 39
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lahb..,
Ine., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) 26, 28-30
Hines v, Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) 13, 31, 36
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 44} U.S. 322 (1979). 4?
luternational Paper Co. v. Ouellette et al., A479 U.S.
481 (1987) . 36
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 US. 919 (1977) ..31, 32, 35
Kassel v. Consolidated Frye ightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662 (1987) 12
Lacoste v. Louisiana Dept. of Conservation. 262
U.S. 545 (1924) 42
Lechmere, Ine. ve. NLRB. No. 90-970, 1992 U.S.
LEXIS 555 (Jan. 27, 1992) 27
Lepore v. Nat'l Tool and Miq. Co., 540 A.2d 1296
(App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 557 A.2d 1371, cert. de-
nied, 493 US. 954 (1989) 12
Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 USS.
355 (1986) 28
Mallard v. US. Dist. Court for Southern District
of lowa, 490 U.S, 296 (1989) 13
Martin v. Occupational Safe ty avd Health Review
Commission, 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991) 29
Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex rel.
Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) 26
Moshkal v. U.S. 111 8. Ct. 461 (1990) 15
Napier wv. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605
(1926) 36
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Kil-
lian, 918 F.2d 67" (7th Cir, 1990). cert. granted
sub nom. Gade +». NSWMA,. 111 S. Ct. 2650
(1991)... 8, 9, 12, 31, 34
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v.
Hughey, T74 F.2d 587 (1985), appeal after re-
mana, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 920 (1989) ....... ore i a ate be Rae ee 12, 38-40
New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. State of New
Jersey, 653 F. Supp. 1453 (D.N.J. 1987)...
New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413
cs 30
Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824
(6th Cir. 1986), appeal dismissed and cert. de-
12
nied, 484 U.S. 801 (1987) ............ bare Sans BE 12
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Re-
sources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) 31, 36, 37,
39, 40, 42
Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 117 L.Ed.2d 154 (1992)... 12
People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d
gt , RRS ree 44
People v. Heqgedus, 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich 1989). 12
People v. Pymm, 561 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 958 (1991).................... 12
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) _. 36
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)... —s«<215»—, 21
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, Nos. 90-711,
90-712, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 554 (Jan. 27, 1992). 26
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 29
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1947) .. ctaiind aoa ..13, 29, 31, 36
Sabine Consolidated, Ine. State of Texas, 756
S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Crim. pd SES eee 12
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293
RIUEE ccccomickens - 20
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Ine., 463 U. S. 85 (1983) . 13, 14,
35
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
(1984) 44
Southeastern Com munity ( ‘ollege v. Davi: is, 442 USS.
item a A RR an ARR SEO TO Saal 26
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Stanislawski v. Industrial Comm'n, 457 N.b.2d
399 (Ill. 1983)
State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 425 N.W.2d 21
(Wis. 1988)
Thornock v. State, 745 P. 2d 324 (Mont. 1987)
United States v. Menasche, 75 8S. Ct. 513 (1959)
United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO-CL(
Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985)
United Airlines, Inc. v. Occupational Satety &
Health Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1982)
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 5. ©
2476 (1991) .
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941)
STATUTES & REGULATIONS
|} | Saas
128.110
29 C.F.R.
$1905
1910 ef seq.
Ss 1951-1960.18
21 U.S.C. § 360k
33 U.S.C. : 1370
42 U.S.C. $§ 7416, 7545
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (k)
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 2075
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) .
Executive Order 12612 of October 26, 1987, 52 Fed.
rey. 41,685 (1987).
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-1738 .............---. 23
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 136v (a) 17
Federal Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Act,
Act of Sept. 16, 1966, ch. 21, 80 Stat. 772, -
pealed by Act Nov. 9, 1977. P.L. 95-164, Title
SRY SK I IF
111 §306(a), 91 Stat. 1322 O23 94
Hazardous Substance Superfund Amendment, 11
Stat. 1329-198 (1987)
$ 1902 et seq. 14,16, 1%
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Illinois Publie Act 85-1195, codified at Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 111 paras. 7701 et seq. (Smith-Hurd,
eee istiaiaamisammnuecdcsmecs see Re 5, 6, 19, 32, 44
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act, 33 U.S.C. §941 00 25
Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. $$ 953-
eet iiatianansndsisaenendactanin Mieeeesai ec 24, 25
OSHA Electrical Standards: Final Standards, 46
Fed. Reg. 4034 (1981) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
Fass 6006)............. bsdescihcasenienehanienniacbekalamsiieatcestecassd 46
gency Response: Interim Final Rule, 51 Fed.
Reg. 45,654 (1986) 00000 OD
OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emer-
gency Response: Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing and Public Hearings, 52 Fed. Reg. 29,620
ITD cscs oe sauannpidenbainieaiedeiameadecmiepnanancincli cies tae nc erie San 3
OSHA Hazard Communication Standard: Final
Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852 (1987) (codified at
29 C.F.R. Parts 1910, 1915, 1917. 1918, 1926
Ee te Ads eo kets hs Aad ae ET IN 25, 26, 28
OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emer-
gency Response: Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 9294
(1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 1910.120) .. 3-5, 20, 27,
32, 34
OSHA Accreditation of Training Programs for
Hazardous Waste Operations: Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg. 2776 (1990) 32
OSHA Occupant Protection in Motor Vehicles:
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg.
EY NI Og FP Oo eh ie Dg 4, 20, 29
OSHA Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne
Pathogens: Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004
(1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 1910.1030) 46
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
oo A eat ad Sine el oe) pessim
CONSTITI TIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Constitution, Art. VI,cl.2.. es 13
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL
116 Cong. Rec. H1460, reprinted in Legislative
History of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (1971) hathlos tN aise EES
H.R. 13373 and S. 2788, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. $14,
reprinted in Legislative History of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (1971) ..
H.R. Comm. Rep. No. 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966) rp sadnceliy tastoioedtoes ne ee
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 761, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969), reprinted in Legislative History of Fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
Intention to Call, reprinted in Legislative His-
tory of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (1971)
S. Rep. No. 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)
OTHER
Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA
Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for
Industrial Accidents, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 535
(1987)
OSH Act Instruction STP 2-1.10A, Mar. 15, 1981,
reprinted in 1984 CCH Employment Safety &
Health Guide * 5008
State of Illinois, 85th General Assembly, House of
Representatives Transcription Debate, July 1,
1988
State of Illinois, 85th General Assembly, Senate
Transcription Debate, July 1, 1988
Stephen Bokat & Horace Thompson, II], Oceupa-
tional Safety and Health Law (1988)
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1991
No. 90-1676
MARY GADE, Director of the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
~ Petitioner,
NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of various
provisions of two Ijlinois laws regulating the training
and competency of some—but not all—hazardous waste
workers in the State of Illinois.
Respondent, the National Solid Wastes Management
Association (“NSWMA”), is a trade organization whose
members include companies engaged in cleaning up haz-
ardous wastes in both planned and emergency situations.
These firms operate nationally and employ a variety of
personnel, including crane and hoist operators and gen-
eral laborers, who are trained and certified pursuant to the
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
Standard (‘the “Final Rule”) promulgated by the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA’’).
2
NSWMA challenged the Ilinois laws in December 1988
on the grounds that they violate the Supremacy and Com-
merce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Since
training, certification and competency of hazardous waste
workers are comprehensively addressed in the Final Rule,
NSWMA contended that Illinois was precluded from
regulating in this aren without having in effect a state
lan approved by the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”).
The District Court held that, because the Illinois laws
purported to serve other purposes in addition to occupa-
tional health and safety, only a provision that training be
conducted “within Hlinois’” was preempted. The Court of
Appeals vacated the District Court decision, holding spe-
cifically that a requirement that hazardous waste crane
and heist operators provide a certified record of 4,000
hours of experience on such equipment was preempted
because it directly, clearly and substantially relates to the
OSHA standard. The case was remanded to the District
Court for reconsideration of respondent’s claims as to the
other provisions of the Illinois laws. Illinois petitioned
this Court for review of the Seventh Circuit’s decision,
and certiorari was granted on December 16, 1991.
Federal Occupational Health and Safety Regulation of
Hazardous Waste Operations.
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986, P.L. 99-499, £126, 100 Stat. 1690 (1986)
(“SARA”) (codified at 29 U.S.C. £655 nete!, directs the
Secretary to promulgate standards pursuant to the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 651-668
(1988 and Supp. 1991) «the “OSH Act”), for the protec-
tion of hazardous waste workers engaged in planned and
emergency operations. SARA requires that OSHA regula-
tions address requirements for appropriate levels of
training, 29 U.S.C. $655 note at ‘bi, and specifies fur-
ther that the OSHA training standards for “general site”
hazardous waste workers shall apply to equipment opera-
tors and general laborers, and shall include a minimum
w
of 40 hours of initial offsite instruction and a minimum
of three days of actual supervised field experience. 29
U.S.C. $655 note at (d). However, SARA directs that
such initial training requirements are not to be applied
to general site workers who have already received the
equivalent of such training. Id. SARA also requires
OSHA to provide for certification and enforcement of
these training requirements. Jd.
On December 19, 1986, the Department of Labor pub-
lished an interim final rule, effective immediately, en-
titled “Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Re-
sponse,” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (1991) (51 Fed. Reg.
45,654 (1986)) (the “Interim Final Rule’). The In-
terim Final Rule required that all hazardous waste em-
ployees be thoroughly trained in specific topics, receive
the offsite instruction and field experience required by
SARA, and be certified by their instructor as having
completed the required training. Several provisions of
the Interim Final Rule relied on the use of the “buddy _
system,” which is a system of organizing employees wear-
ing protective equipment into work groups that are able
to observe each other’s activities, communicate through
hand signals and render quick assistance in the event of
an emergency.
On August 10, 1987, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and public hearing was published in the Federal Regis-
ter. 52 Fed. Reg. 29,620 (1987). Over 40 witnesses testi-
fied. and over 155 written comments, including comments
from the International Union of Operating Engineers,
were received. On March 6, 1989, less than two months
before the hearing of this case in the district court,
OSHA promulgated the Final Rule, which became effec-
tive March 6, 1990. 54 Fed. Reg. 9294 (1989).
The Final Rule introduced additional flexibility to en-
sure appropriate levels of training for the skills required
in different waste operations. See 54 Fed. Reg. 9294,
9304-9305, 9309-9310 (1989). For example, for certain
4
workers who visit sites “only on occasion” or who are
limited to work areas with hazardous exposures that are
below permissible limits, the Final Rule replaced the 40-
hour 3-day requirement with a requirement of 24 hours
of training with one day of supervision. 54 Fed. Reg.
9294, 9304-9305 (1989); 29 CLFLR. 1910.1201e) (3) Gil);
see also 29 C.F.LR. $ 1910.1201q) (4) (| s|killed support
personnel”); 29 C.F.R. $ 1910.1201q)(5) (“specialist
employees”). Furthermore, the Final Rule expanded spe-
cific criteria for training, certification and trainer quali-
fication,’ 54 Fed. Reg. 9294, 9305 (1989); 29 C.F.R.
S$ 1910.1201e) (51-16), required specified annual refresher
training, 29 C.F.R. £ 1910.120/e) (8), added eight hours
of specialized management training for supervisors, 29
C.F.R. £ 1910.1201e) (4), and provided that documented
equivalent “work experience,” “academic training,” and or
“training . .. from actual hazardous waste site work
experience’ would be accepted in lieu of the 40-hour
initial training requirement on the condition that “site
specific training” and appropriate field supervision
are provided. 29 C.F.R. $ 1910.120(e) (9).
The preamble to the Final Rule expressly provided that
states “with occupational safety and health plans ap-
proved by OSHA under section 18 of the OSH Act...
would not be preempted by this final regulation and would
be able to address special, local conditions within the
framework provided by this performance oriented stand-
ard while ensuring that their standards are at least as
effective as the Federal standard.” 54 Fed. Reg. 9294,
9316 (1989) (emphasis added). On the other hand, the
preamble states that “Section 18 of the OSH Act also ex-
presses Congress’ clear intent to preempt state laws relat-
ing to issues with respect to which Federal OSHA has
promulgated occupational safety or health standards.”
'On January 26, 1990, OSHA published proposed rules te comnly
with an emendment to Section 126(d) of SARA directing the Secre-
tury to provide for OSHA certification of hazardous waste training
programs. 10] Stat. at 1329-198 (1987); 55 Fed. Reg. 28,728 (1990).
5
Id. at 9315. A “state can avoid preemption only if it sub-
mits, and obtains Federal OSHA approval of, a plan
feaw “oan
Subsequent Illinois Regulation of Hazardous
Waste Workers.
Illinois has never had in effect a state plan which was
approved pursuant to Section 18 On August 23, 1988,
nearly 20 months after the promulgation of the Interim
Final Rule, the Governor of Illinois signed Public Act
85-1195, codified at Hl. Ann. Stat. ch. 111 ‘hereinafter
“Tl, Stat.”), para. 7701 ef seq. (Smith-Hurd, 1978),
which took effect on March 1, 1989.
Public Act 85-1195 includes two bills that were added
by a conference committee appointed on June 28, 1988 and
passed by both houses three days later: (1) the Hazard-
ous Waste Crane and Hoisting Equipment Operators Li-
censing Act ‘the “Operators Act”) and (2) the Hazardous
Waste Laborers Licensing Act (the “Laborers Act”). Both
the Operators Act and the Laborers Act (collectively, the
“Tlinois Acts”) stated that their purpose was “to promote
job safety and to protect life, limb and property.” Ill.
Stat. at paras. 7702, 7802.
The Operators Act requires that persons who operate
certain equipment at hazardous waste facilities possess
operator’s licenses and that persons who assist in such
operation possess apprentice’s licenses, II], Stat. at para.
7704 (a)-(b); the Laborers Act requires that persons per-
forming general hazardous waste work possess laborer’s
licenses. II], Stat. at para. 7804‘a).° Both laws require
The Illinois licensing provisions do not apply to all workers
handling substantial quantities of hazardous wastes. Rather,
they are required only for workers at specific listed facilities,
particularly contractors engaged in hazardous waste cleanup, who
are also covered by the OSHA standard. II]. Stat. at paras. 7704,
7201. Because the Hlinois Acts do not apply to “voluntary clean-up
;
sites” or “emergency response sites,” they do not extend to all
6
a license applicant to provide a certified record of at least
iM) hours of training conducted “within the State of Ili-
nois,” which has been approved by either the EPA or the
Hingis Environmental Protection Agency (“IEPA”),
MW, wt paras. T7056), T1066), TROD LE), to pass a writ-
ten examination prescribed by the IEPA, id. at paras.
M9561, T7OG(d), T805'd) and to pass an annual re-
fresher course of at least eight hours of instruction, id,
at paras. T707(bs, TXO6(b»,
In addition, the Operators Act requires applicants for
an operator's license to submit a certified record showing
Operation of equipment used in hazardous waste handling
for a minimum of 4,000 hours. Hl. Stat. at para, T705(d),
The linois Acts do not provide for the substitution
of equivalent ‘reining or expertise for the certified records
required,
The Illinois Acts impose fines for business offenses
upon unlicensed workers, and fines for misdemeanors
Upon employers, contractors and agents who knowingly
employ unlicensed workers, Il, Stat. at paras. 7715 (a)-
(hi, 771Gtar-tbi, 7l4(ar-tbs. The [linois Acts are
administered by Licensing Boards consisting of represent-
atives of the operating engineers union and the hazardous
Waste reroodiion and disposal industry, and one publie
member. Id. at paras. 7709, T#OK.
The District Court Proceedings Below.
NSWMA filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois on December 2%
—ary
( ~~ . bd } ‘ ; ‘ ‘ } } : |
19é*) challen ving the training and experience provisions
hazardou., waste sites in Mlinois that are covered by the OSILA
Htandard. Ul Stat xt paras, T7O2(f THOM Ce For reasons that
are not epparent, neither the Operators Act nor the Laborers Act
applies to operators of forklifts or bobcats handling hazardous
waste, Tl Stat. at paras. 7704/e), TROA(b). Nor do they apply
to workers in certain industrie such as local manufacturing foeili.
hes, miming operations, ayriculture, or railronds. Id. at para, T7603
fe -(f),
7
of the Illinois Acts on the grounds that they are pre-
empted by the OSH Act and its regulations, and that
they constitute an unreasonable burden on free commerce
amony the states. Ilinois responded that the Illinois Acts
were not preempted because they also served public
safety and environmental purposes, and that the Com-
merce Clause challenge was premature,
The District Court found that NSWMA’s members are
required to train, qualify and certify their hazardou-
Wwuete remediation workers in secordencee with the Final
Rule, which resulates, jvfer alia, training, field ex-
perience, annual refresher courses, and competency stand-
ards for equipment operators and laborers. (Pet. App.
at 4%.)' The court further concluded that the Illinois
Acts reoulate the same matters (and therefore the same
employees! as the Final Rule. (Pet. App. at 49.)
The Distriet Court held that the provision in the Ili-
nois Acts requiring 40 hours of training within [Minors
Was preempted since there was not even « “scintilla (of
a scintilla) of evidence” to show that compliance with
the “within Hingis” provision will further either public
safety or environmental protection. (Pet. App. at 97-5%.)
Iinois did not appeal this decision,
With respect to the 4,000-hour requirement of equip-
ment operators, the District Court found that Ilinois had
introduced no evidence at trial that would arguably tend
to show that this requirement would reduce the risk of
danger to the publie or employees or the environment.
(Pet. App. at 19; 58-59.) Indeed, there was testimony
that there was “some possibility” that the requirement
* References to the Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari are
cited as (Pet, App, at _ References to the Appendix to this Brief
are cited as (App. at . Refercnees to the Distriet Court Hearing
Transcript, contained in the record below, are cited as (Tr. at —>.
Keferences to the Brief for Petitioner are cited as (Pet. Br. at A;
8
would “inerease such risk.” ' (Pet. App. at 50.) None-
theless, the court reasoned that operators with 4,000
hours of experience on heavy lifting equipment would
likely have fewer accidents and hence pose less risk to
public safety and the environment. (Pet. App. at 59.)
The court therefore concluded that the 4,000-hour require-
ment is not preempted. (/d.) The District Court also
held that the Commerce Clause challenge was not ripe for
adjudication since Illinois had not promulgated regula-
mth (7d, at 61.) NSWMA appealed to the Seventh
Ircult.
The Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n
v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. granted
sub. nom. Gade v. NSWMA, 111 S. Ct. 2850 (1991). The
court concluded that “section 18’s express preemptive ef-
fect appears to be unambiguous,” id. at 678, and there-
fore that Illinois may not promulgate occupational safety
and health standards for hazardous waste workers. The
court then rejected the “dual-purpose” preemption tests
of other circuit courts and the district court, and in
stead applied a two-step inquiry. Jd. at 679. First, does
the challenged state law constitute, in a direct, clear one
substantial way, regulation of worker health and safety?
Second, if so, is it possible to sever from the state law
provisions regulating worker health and safety? If sey-
erance is not possible, then the state law must be inval-
' The District Court recognized that the Illinois Acts “could result
in increased risk” by diminishing “the pool of workers available to
clean up hazardous waste sites” and that the Illinois training
certification, and experience requirements potentially “could ate
trate an empl: yer’s attempt to respond to environmental emergen-
_ and “disrupt the operation of the federally-endorsed Buddy
system” hy “impairing emplovers from developing effective work
Se ee employees bused in other states, some of
moti e not qualified to be licensed in Illinois. (Pet. App. at
G
‘dated even if it serves a dual purpose. Id. at 679 &
n.8. Applying this analysis, the court struck down the
4.000-hour requirement of the Operators Act, and re-
manded the case to the district court for reconsideration
of the other challenged provisions in light of its decision.
The court noted that other provisions might well dupli-
cate or even conflict with the Final Rule. Id. at 679.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The OSH Act constitutes a carefully crafted charter
for federal-state cooperation in fostering “safe and health-
ful working conditions.” In the first instance, it directs
OSHA to develop, issue and enforce urgently needed occu-
pational safety and health standards for particular in-
dustries or work environments. In areas where such
federal standards are not yet in effect, state governments
are permitted, indeed encouraged, independently to pro-
mote occupational safety and health. But where a federal
standard is in effect, states may regulate only pursuant
to a state plan that is approved by the Secretary of Labor.
Upon submission of a state plan, the Secretary works
closely with the state to ensure that, in her judgment,
the state standards are at least as effective as the fed-
eral stondard and, in the case of products distributed in
‘nierstate commerce, the state standards are “required
by compelling local conditions” and do not “unduly bur-
den interstate commerce.” Approved state plans are sub-
ject to a probationary period before federal enforcement
is withdrawn, although federal oversight continues.
In short, Section 18 of the OSH Act presents states
with two choices when a federal standard is in effect:
either defer to federal regulation, or assume complete
responsibility for regulating by obtaining federal approval
of a state plan. Section 18 reflects Congress’ judgment
that it would be confusing and counterproductive to per-
mit federal and state standards on a single issue to coexist.
The State of Illinois asserts that it has a third choice:
to superimpose on existing federal standards selective,
10
additional stave standards not part of a federally ap-
proved state plan. Illinois moreover has enacted its “sup-
plemental” standards in an area of particular concern to
Congress. SARA explicitly directed OSHA to issue, on an
urgent basis, a comprehensive standard protecting the
health and safety of workers in hazardous waste opera-
tions. SARA specified in unusual! detail requirements for
worker training, competency and certification that were
soon thereafter incorporated into OSHA’s Hazardous
Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard.
Illinois nevertheless contends that notwithstanding the
existence of OSHA’s national standard and the absence
of an approved state plan, it should be free to enact piece-
meal state standards that apply specifically and inflexibly
to certuin hazardous waste workers already protected by
OSHA, Iilinvis also contends, apparently in the alterna-
tive, that its occupational safety and health standards are
permissible because they purport to advance additiona!
state levislative interests such as public safety and en-
vironmental protection. Both arguments must fail.
The express language, structure and purpose of the
OSH Act demonstrate Congress’ unmistakable intent to
prohibit states from unilaterally “supplementing” a fed-
eral standard in the absence of an approved state plan.
This has also been the consistent and often expressed
interpretation of the agency charged with administering
the law. In addition, the legislative history of Section
1% shows that Convress rejected language that would
have expressly allowed states to supplement OSHA stand-
ards. The lower courts, including six federal circuit
courts, have agreed, holding uniformiy that Section 1X
preempts such state regulation. The OSH Act expressly
preserves certain siate laws in Sections 4(b) 11), 4¢bi 44)
and Itai, Section 1S'a) in particular provides that
states ure iree to regulate worker health and safety
Where wo applicable federal standards exist. Section 18 (b)
establishes a process for states to assume responsibility
1]
in areas where federal standards exist by submitting a
state plan for approval by OSHA. Viewed in its entire:
Section 1& leaves no room jor a state to tinker with a fed-
eral stundard. The Illinois Acts contravene the express r
quirements of Section 18 and frustrate achievement of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress to coordi-
nate state and federal regulation of worker health and
safety and to ensure efficient and effective enforcement.
The court below properly rejected Illinois’ contention
that because the Illinois Acts assert a non-occupational
purpose, they are beyond the reach of federal preemption.
In contrast to the other. circuits that have addressed
so-called “dual purpose” state regulation, the court be-
low properly focused on the precise reach of Congre-
intended preemption and the direct effect of the state
statute on the operation of federal law, thereby avoiding
an unbounded and ultimateiy irrelevant search for “leyit-
imate” state legislative purposes or effects unconnected
with the federal enaciment. Under its test, subject to
state law sevcrability analysis, only those provisions that
directly, clearly and substantially affect employee-em-
ployer obligations in the workplace would be invalidated
The court therefore preempted the Illinois requirement
that a hazardous waste crane operator present a certified
record of 4,000 hours of experience, and remanded the
Acts that duplicate, supplement, frustrate, or even con-
flict with requirements of the OSHA standard.
Nothing in the preemption test applied by the court
below precludes [linois from exercising its traditions
powers to license occupations or protect the environ-
ment. However, by enacting the regulatory statutes con-
tested in this case, Illinois has chosen to achieve its pur-
poses by intruding in a direct, clear and = substantia!
manner upon an established scheme of federal regulation
Illinois may do so only within the framework expres)
established by Congress in Section 18 of the OSH Aer.
namely the adoption of an approved state plan.
12
ARGUMENT
I. IN THE ABSENCE OF AN APPROVED STATE
PLAN, SECTION 18 OF THE OSH ACT PREEMPTS
REDUNDANT AND “SUPPLEMENTAL” STATE
LEGISLATION.
Illinois’ threshold argument raises a question that has
never been resolved in Illinois’ favor—whether Congress
in the OSH Act intended to preempt states without ap-
proved state plans from enacting occupational health
and safety legislation that duplicates and supplements
a comprehensive OSHA standard. The court below stated
that “|wle have discovered no case contradicting the
view that section 18 expressly prohibits states without
federally approved state plans from exercising jurisdic-
tion over an occupational health and safety matter as to
which OSHA has already duly promulgated a federal
standard.” Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 678 (7th Cir. 1990).°
5 Ser also Pedraza +. Shell O1 Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 117 lL. Ed. 2d 154, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 694;
Associated Industrics of Massachusetts +». Snow, 898 F.2d 274A,
278 (ist Cir. 1990); Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v«. New
York City, 855 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1988); Farmworker Justice
Fund, Ine. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 626, opinion and judgment
vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n
v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 828 (6th Cir. 1986), appeal dis-
missed and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 801 (1987); New Jersey State
Chamber of Commerce vc. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587, 593 (1985), appeal
after remend, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
920 (1989): United Stee'worlers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC ve.
Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 7234 (3d Cir. 1985); People v. Pymm, 561
N.Y.S.2d 687, 694 (Ct. Ap. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 958
(1991); New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. State of New Jersey,
653 F. Supp. 1453, 1462 (D.N.J. 1987); AFL-CIO +. Marshall, 570
F.2d 1030, 1027 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Columbus Coated Fabrics
v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 1 OSM. Cas. (BNA) 1361, 1365
(S.D. Ohio 1973); People v. Heqgedus, 443 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Mich.
1989); Thornock v. State, TA5 P.2d 224, 327 (Mont. 1987); Lepore
v. National Tool and Mfg. Co., 510 A.2d 1296, 1306 (App. Div.
1988), aff'd, 557 A.2d 1371, cert. denied, 492 US. 954 (1989);
Sabine Consolidated, Ine. v. State of Texas, 756 S.W.2d 865
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988), reversed on other grounds, 806 S.W.2d
13
Application of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Constitu-
tion, Art. VI, cl. 2, “is guided by familiar and well-
established principles.” Capital Cities Cable Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 698 (1984). First and foremost, “| p|re-
emption fundamentally is a question of congressional in-
tent, and when Congress has made its intent known
through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is
an easy one.” English v. General Electric Co., 110 8S. Ct.
2270, 2275 (1990) ‘citation omitted).
In the absence of explicit statutory language, con-
gressional intent may be implied from a pervasive “scheme
of federa! regulation. ...” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 11917), where compliance with
both federal and state laws is physically impossible, Flor-
ida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132.
142-143 (1963), or where state law “stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.” Hines +. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
A. Section 18 Expresses Congress’ Intent To Allow
States to Enact Standards Such as the Illinois Acts
Only Upon Approval of an Adequate State Plan.
Determining the intent of Congress “must begin with a
statute’s language,” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for
Southern District of lowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989), for
there is a “ ‘strong presumption’” that the “plain lan-
guage of the statute expresses congressional intent.”
Ardestani v. INS, 112 8. Ct. 515, 520 (1991); ef. Shaw vr.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). Here,
that task is greatly simplified because Congress has ex-
pressly addressed the question of federal preemption of
533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 425
N.W.2d 21, 24 «Wis. 1988): Stanislawski v. Induatrial Comn'n,
197 N.E.2d 399, 400 (Ml. 1983); United Air Lines, Ine. v. Ocenpa-
tronal Satety and Health Appeals Roard, 187 Cal. Rptr. 387, 34
(1982); Five Migrant Farmicorkers +. Hoffman, 345 A.2d 378,
380 (NJ. Super. 1975).
14
state worker health and safety legislation in Section 18,
29 U.S.C. § 667.
Section 18 establishes ‘a scheme of administratively
controlled preemption,” Stephen Bokat & Horace Thomp-
son III, Occupational Safety and Health Law, 681 (1988),
that must be examined in its entirety. Section 18(a)
expresses Congress’ intent not to prevent states from en-
acting occupational health and safety laws in areas where
OSHA has not promulgated standards. While Section
18(a) expressly authorizes states to regulate worker
health and safety, it explicitly limits that authority to
areas not subject to an OSHA standard. States are not,
however, entirely powerless to regulate in areas subject
to OSHA standards. Sections 18(b) and (ec) establish a
mechanism for states to assume administration, subject
to federal approval and oversight, of occupational safety
and health in those areas. If states wish to assume re-
sponsibility for developing standards “relating to any
occupational safety or health issue” covered by an OSHA
standard,® they “shall submit a state plan for the develop-
ment of such standards” to the Secretary, who shall
approve it if it meets certain criteria set forth in Section
18ic) ‘emphasis added).
The three subsections of Section 18 read together com-
pel the conclusion that Congress intended (1) that ulti-
mately one level of government, federal or state, would
regulate any occupational safety and health issue at any
® “Relate to” has been construed broadly by this Court as meaning
having “a connection with or reference to.” FMC Corp. v. Holliday.
111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. In the present
case, the “issue” addressed by the Final Rule is at a minimum the
protection of worker health and safety in the hazardous waste in-
dustry. See 29 CFR § 1902.2:c)(1) (1999) (“la]nm issue is con-
sidered to be an industrial, occupational or hazard grouping”); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120, Subpart H, Hasardous materials. State
standards duplicating or supplementing hazardous waste worker
training, competency and certification requirements addressed in the
Final Rule unquestionably “relate to” the broader issue of protect-
ing the health and safety of hazardous waste workers.
15
one time, (2) that the approval of a state plan would be
the sole mechanism by which states might regulate an
issue With respect to which an OSHA standard exists, and
(3) that the federal and state governments would coordi-
nate the transfer of responsibility to develop and enforce
standards. Cf. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713
(1975) ‘courts should “not be guided by a sinele sentence
or member of a sentence”) ‘citation omitted).
Illinois argues that, under Section 18(b), Congress in-
tended to allow states to legislate piecemeal despite the
existence of an OSHA standard, and to require an ap-
proved plan only if a state sought wholly to displace fed-
eral enforcement authority. (Pet. Br. at 14-15.) If this
were correct, the language of Section 18(a) would be
superfluous: why would Congress limit a savings clause
to areas not subject to OSHA standards if it also in-
tended to save state laws in areas subject to OSHA stand-
ards? A reviewing court would either be required to treat
all sf Section 18‘a) as surplusage or would have to con-
strue Section 18/a! as if the last fifteen words of that
section—“‘with respect to which no standard is in effect
under Section 655 of this title’—-were not there. Either
approach would violate a fundamental tenet of statutory
construction that seeks to give effect, if possible, “to every
clause and word of a statute.”* Moskal v. U.S., 1118S. Ct.
461, 466 (1990) ‘quoting United States v». Menasche,
75 S. Ct. 513, 519-520 (195511: see Fidelity Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
163 (1982); American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Ine. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981).
Moreover, the state plan mechanism is an integral part
of the OSH Act that encourages states to assume compre-
* The only possible interpretation that would not render Section
IX(a) superfluous would be that Congress gave OSHA discretion to
preempt state laws in areas where it chose to adopt standards, in
which case the Illinois Acts would be preempted because of OSHA’s
intent to preempt as clearly stated in the preamble to the Final
Rule.
16
hensive responsibility for occupational safety and health
issues subject to federal supervision. At the present time,
23 states and 2 territories have OSHA-approved state
plans in effect. See 29 C.F.R. $$ 1952, 1956. Under
Illinois’ interpretation of Section 18, states would have
less incentive to assume jurisdiction pursuant to the man-
datory plan approval process set forth in Sections 18(b)
and ‘¢} because they would not have to comply with that
process in order to supplement federal standards.“
The correct interpretation of Section 18 is reinforced
by Section 18'¢c'‘2) which requires the Secretary to ap-
prove a state plan if, in her judgment, “the state stand-
ards are or will be at least as effective’ as OSHA's
standards. Illinois’ piecemeal regulation would subvert the
careful process contemplated by Sections 18(b) and ic)
to avoid arbitrary exclusions of groups of employers and
employees, to ensure full participation in the development
of complex technical standards by all interested parties
and experts, and to coordinate ‘the transfer of enforce-
ment authority from one level of government to the other
efficiently.”
* This would be contrary to Congress’ express desire to encourage
states to develop and submit state plans. Because of initial federal
funding of up to ninety percent of the cost of developing state
plans, excellent models for state plans now exist and new plans can
be developed at comparatively little cost. 29 U.S.C. § 672(a) (2),
(f). Grants continue to be available for up to fifty percent of the
annual cost of implementing state plans. 29 U.S.C. $672(g); 29
C.F.R. §§ 1951.10, 1951.22.
* A state plan must be “at least as comprehensive” as the OSHA
standard unless it “show)s] good cause why any group or groups
of employers or employees should be excluded.” 29 C.F.R. § 1902.2
(c). Furthermore, in demonst»ating effectiveness, the state must
show, inter alia, that it has :ddressed the same specific issues as
effectively, has relicd upon the best available research and expert
technical knowledge, and has conducted hearings involving employ-
ees, employers, and the public. 20 C.F.R. §1902.4(b) (2). Once the
plan is approved, OSHA has establ’shed an ongoing procedure for
evaluating, monitoring and permitting changes to state plans. 29
C.F.R. $$ 1953, 1954. The Secretary must wait at least three years
17
Concurrent enforcement of different yet overlap-
ping state and federal requirements may well be less
effective than a unitary or coordinated enforcement
scheme, particularly where the federal standard is care-
fully crafted to incorporate needed flexibility to respond
to special or emergency circumstances. To accept Illinois’
argument is to accept the fallacy that more regulation
is always more effective regulation. Moreover, because
the overall effectiveness of concurrent regulation would
be beyond the Secretary’s control, Illinois’ interpretation
negates her statutory obligation to determine such effec-
tiveness in her sole “judgment.” 29 U.S.C. § 667(c¢).
Even more compelling is the requirement of Section
18ic) (2) that the Secretary determine, prior to approving
a state plan, that state standards relating to products
in interstate commerce “are required by compelling local
conditions and do not unduly burden interstate commerce.”
29 U.S.C. § 6671c) (2). If states were privileged under
Section 18 to “supplement” federal standards without
filing state plans, the Secretary’s authority to prevent
undue interference with interstate commerce would be
easily circumvented.
Illinois relies heavily upon Wisconsin Public Intervenor
», Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991), to suggest that an
inference of preemption should never be drawn from
statutory language that authorizes state legislation. (Pet.
Br. at 16-17.) Mortier does not assert so broad a propo-
sition. In that ease, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) expressly allowed states
to regulate the sale or use of pesticides so long as the
state reculation does not permit a sale or use prohibited
by the Act, 7 U.S.C, £ 136via). The question presented
was whether the statute’s silence with respect to /ocal
overnmental regulation of pesticide use indicated that
local governments were excluded, even though local gov-
ernments are political subdivisions of states. This Court
before relinquishing concurrert federal jurisdiction, and may re-
instate such jurisdiction if necessary. 20 U.S.C. § 667(e); 29 C.PF.R.
$$ 1902.1 (c) (1)-(2), 1902.36-1902.53.
18
concluded that “{mJere silence, in this context, cannot
suffice to establish a ‘clear and manifest purpose’ to pre-
empt local authority.” Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2483 (cita-
tions omitted).
Here, the facts are very different. Unlike FIFRA,
which was completely silent as to regulation by local
government, Section 18 of the OSH Act deals expressly
and in detail with state regulations, such as the Illinois
Acts, which duplicate federal regulations.” In concluding
that, in FIFRA, the term “state” includes its political
subdivisions, this Court adopted both a positive and a
negative inference. On the one hand, local governments,
like the state of which they are a part, could regulate the
sale or use of pesticides. On the other hand, by negative
inference, local governments could “not permit any sale
or use prohibited” by federal regulation. 7 U.S.C.
s 136v(a). Similarly, a proper construction of Section 18
allows both positive and negative inferences. States may
duplicate or supplement federal standards if they file a
state plan in accordance with the explicit requirements
of Section 18(b), but they may not do so if they do not
file such a plan.
Illinois also argues that the OSH Act does not contain
the breadth of preemptive language found in the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
s 1144(a). (Pet. Br. at 15 n. 3.) Unlike ERISA, however,
the OSH Act offers the states an option to exercise their
traditional authority even in areas governed by federal
law. Congress may express its intent to preempt through
a scheme of cooperative federalism just as clearly as it
may express its intent to preempt all related state laws
absolutely and in all circumstances. To insist on specific
prohibitory words would penalize Congress for creating
a flexible scheme that encourages and accommodates state
participation.
The validity of local regulation of occupational safety and
health in the absence of a state plan is not at issue in this case.
19
Illinois further contends that the Illinois Acts are
not “standards.” (Pet. Br. at 32-33.) The OSH Act
and OSHA regulations define “standard” as “requir|ing]
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably neces-
sary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employ-
ment and places of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 652(8);
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1(f). Illinois argues that licensing is
a precondition to employment and therefore does not con-
stitute a “condition” of employment. (Pet. Br. at 32-33.)
Illinois presumably concedes that the Illinois Acts are
“reasonably necessary or appropriate” to achieve their
stated goal of worker safety. Moreover, the trial judge
entered a finding of fact that “|t|he Illinois Acts regu-
late the same matter (and therefore the same employees)
as Part 1910.120.” (Pet. App. at 49). OSHA’s only regu-
latory authority in this area is to issue “standards”: if
worker certification requirements are standards when
promulgated by OSHA, then they must be standards when
enacted by Illinois, at least for the purpose of federal
preemption analysis."
The AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae, suggests that the IIli-
nois Acts are not “standards” because they regulate em-
ployees while OSHA regulates employers. (AFL-CIO Brief
at 18-19.) Neither characterization is entirely accurate.
Both Illinois Acts impose penalties on employers who
knowingly utilize unlicensed workers. IJ]. Stat. at paras.
7715(b)}, 7716(b), 7814(b). In addition, Congress em-
powered OSHA to regulate employee as well as employer
behavior. 29 U.S.C. §651(b)(2) (“by providing that
employers and employees have separate but dependent
responsibilities and rights”) (emphasis added) ; 29 U.S.C.
§ 654(b) (“Each employee shall comply with occupational
' Congress also disagrees with Illinois. Section 126 of SARA
directed the Secretary to promulgate “standards” that included
training requirements for workers “before such workers are per-
mitted to engage in hazardous waste operations” and to provide
for “certification” of such workers. 29 U.S.C. § 655 note, at (a),
(b)(2) and (¢)(3) (emphasis added).
20
safety and health standards”) (emphasis added) : sce also
29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1).
The AFL-CIO observes that OSHA has interpreted its
proposed standard for Occupant Protection in Motor
Vehicles as not preempting generally applicable state laws
regarding use of safety belts and motorcycle helmets.
5) Fed. Reg. 28,728, 28,739 (1990): (AFL-CIO Brief at
18-19). OSHA has noted that “the proposed standard has
been carefully worded to regulate a safety and health
issue distinct from the subject matter addressed by these
state laws.” 55 Fed. Reg. 28,728, 28,739 (1990). If any-
thing, this demonstrates OSHA's consistent desire to limit
preemptive effect to state standards that directly relate
to the specific issue addressed by the federal standard in
accordance with Section 18. See also, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg.
9294, 9315 (1989) (“OSHA has used its regulatory pre-
emption of State law to the minimum level necessary to
achieve the objectives of the OSH Act and section 126 of
SARA”). Unlike states’ general motor safety laws, which
govern conduct beyond the workplace, the Illinois Acts
regulate the competency and training of only one group—
the hazardous waste remediation and disposal industry—
Which is also the group directly subject to an OSHA
standard that addresses the same issue." Cf. Schneide-
wind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 308 & n.11
(1988),
'? The AFL-CIO also refers to a statement that OSHA would
not take any formal or legal action to preempt inspections by state
and focal fire marshals. However, OSHA cautioned that “States
which carry out these enforcement activities without an approved
I8(b) plan covering the standards would be subject to challenge on
appeal by employers.” OSH Act Instruction STP 2-1.10A, Mar. 13,
IYS1, reprinted in 1984 CCH Employment Safety & Health Guide
* 5008.71; see also OSHA Policy Statement, April 1972. reprinted
im 1984 CCH Employment Safety & Health Guide © 5008.81; (AFL-
C10 Brief at 18.) OSHA apparently relied on the longstanding and
widespread employment of fire marshals to in fer that Congress did
not intend to halt their activity. OSHA Policy Statement, April
1972, reprinted in 1984 CCH Employment Safety & Health Guide
* 5008.81.
21
B. SARA and the OSH Act Express Congress’ Intent
to Eliminate Duplicative Regulation of Hazardous
Waste Workers.
Statutory language must be interpreted in light of the
entire statute. Philbrook, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975).
The OSH Act read as a whole compels the conclusion
that Congress intended that regulation of occupational
health and safety should not be duplicative and there-
fore that the states must submit a plan to the fed-
eral government in order to regulate in areas in which
OSHA has promulgated standards. Cf. Farmworker
Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 641, opinion
and judgment vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“Section 18(a)’s preemption rule serves the use-
ful function of protecting employers from conflicting
standards and a double dose of enforcement agents.”).
When Congress intended to reserve specific powers to
the states in the OSH Act, it said so explicitly and pre-
cisely. As noted above, Section 18(a) expressly allows
state regulation in areas not covered by a federal stand-
ard."’ Section 4{b) (4) expressly disclaims preemption of
State worker compensation and tort laws. 29 U.S.C. § 653
(bi (4). Section 4b) (1) reserves state powers to regu-
late, in conjunction with Federal law, the occupational
safety and health of nuclear energy employees. 29 U.S.C.
+ 653'bii1). The absence of language in the OSH Act
reserving to the states the authority to duplicate or sup-
plement federal standards is especially significant in light
of the many other federal statutes in which Congress has
included analogous language."
13 Section 18(h) expressly allowed state regulation in areas cov-
ered by an OSHA standard to remain in effect upon agreement with
the Secretary, but only during an interim period of not more than
two years from the enactment of the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. $ 667(h).
This provision also undermines Illinois’ position since it makes no
allowance for “supplementary” standards beyond the two-year
period,
"See, ea. 156 U.S.C. $2075 (states prohibited from having
product safety standards that overlap with federal standards unless
22
Regulatory consistency and coordination was a special
concern of Congress in Section 126 of SARA. Since state
and local employees are excluded from OSHA jurisdiction,
Section 126‘f) of SARA requires the EPA to promulgate
standards “identical to those promulgated by the Secre-
tary of Labor” which “shall apply to employees of State
and local governments in each State which does not have
in effect an approved State plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 655 note
at (f) (emphasis added).
Other provisions of the OSH Act demonstrate that
Congress sought to avoid overlapping occupational safety
und healt» regulation by more than one federal or state
agency. Section 4(b)(1) prohibits the application of
OSHA standards to employees of other federal and cer-
tain state agencies with authority to regulate occupational
safety or health, and Section 4‘(b) (3) directs the Secre-
tary “to avoid unnecessary duplication and to achieve
coordination” between OSHA and other federal laws. 29
U.S.C. $ 6531b) (1) & (3); see also 29 U.S.C. § 657(d)
(“information . . . shall be obtained with a minimum
burden upon employers .... Unnecessary duplication .. .
shall be reduced to the maximum extent feasible.”) Co-
ordination with respeet to the employees of other federal
agencies iv achieved through OSHA regulations that are
analogous to the procedure for federal-state cooperation
they provide a “significantly higher degree of protection” from risk
of injury, and do not “unduly burden interstate commerce”); 21
U.S.C. £ 360k (states may not have standards for “device!s] in-
tended for human use” that differ from federal standards, but
exceptions may be granted if state requirements are more stringent
than the feders! standard, and are required by “compelling local
conditions”); 23 U.S.C. § 1370 (states may not adopt water pollu-
tion standards that are less stringent than overlapping federal
standards): 42 U.S.C. © 7416 (state air pollution standards may not
be Jess stringent than standards established under applicable fed-
eral law); 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (states may adopt motor vehicle emis-
sion standards pricr to « certain date if they are “at least as pro-
tective of public health” as the federal standards and are required
to “meet compelling ond extraordinary conditions”).
23
provided in Section 18 and require similar supervision by
OSHA."
C. The Legislative Context of the OSH Act Demon-
strates that Congress Deliberately Crafted Section
18 So As to Preclude “Supplemental” State Regula-
tion.
The legislative history of the OSH Act demonstrates
that Congress chose not to include language that would
have saved more stringent state legislation relating to
worker safety and health issues subject to a federal
standard. Not only did Congress reject such language in
legislation proposed by the Nixon Administration, but it
also rejected savings language contained in other occupa-
tional safety and health legislation that the same Con-
gress had previously enacted.
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
ithe “Mine Safety Act”) was enacted by the same Con-
gress and reported by the same committees as the OSH
Act.'* Both laws sought to expand federal efforts to
regulate occupational safety and health. The Mine
Safety Act followed an earlier Federal Metal and Non-
metallic Mine Safety Act (‘the “Metal Mine Act”),
Act of Sept. 16, 1966, 80 Stat. 772, repealed by Act of
Nov. 9, 1977, P.L. 95-164, Title III § 306(a), 91 Stat.
1322. These two prior statutes show that the scheme for
submitting state plans to federal authorities was not an
innovation of the OSH Act, and that when Congress in-
Agency heads are required by Section 19 to establish and
maintain standards identical to OSHA's or obtain OSHA approval.
29 U.S.C. § 668; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1960.1, 1960.17. In areas “for which
there exists no appropriate OSHA standards,” agency heads are
required to adopt additional standards “as necessary and appropri-
ate to working conditions of agency employees ...,” which may be
disallowed by OSHA if “inconsistent with OSHA standards.” 29
C.F.LR. § 1960.18(a)-(b) (emphasis added ).
' See, e.g., Colloquy among Sen, Dominick, Sen. Saxbe, and
Sen. Williams, in Comm, on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, at 340-341 (1970) (‘Legislative History”).
24
tended to permit more stringent state regulation in areas
covered by a federal standard, it said so explicitly. In
the Metal Mine Act, Congress chose to employ state plans
but to allow more stringent state legislation.’ H.R.
Comm. Rep. No. 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13-15
(1966). Subsequently, in the Mine Safety Act, Congress
chose not to employ state plans, but still to a/low more
stringent state legislation. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 761, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), reprinted in Legislative History
of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
As Amended Through 1974, at 1537, 1627 (1975).'* In
the OSH Act, Congress again utilized the state plan mech-
anism but did wot allow more stringent “supplemental”
17 The Metal Mine Act provided in pertinent part:
$16(a) Any State which . . . desires to develop and enforce
health and safety standards in mines... shall submit... a State
plan for the development of such standards and their enforcement.
$19(a) No state... law... shall be superseded by any pro-
vision of this Act, cxcept insofar as such State or territorial law is
in conflict with this Act, or with orders issued pursuant to this
Act.
(b) Provisions in any State .. . law... which provide for
greater safety of persons in a mine es defined in this Act, than
do provisions of this Att; which relate to the same phase of such
operations, shell not be construed or held to be in conflict with
this Act.
Act of Sept. 16, 1966, ch. 21, 80 Stat. 772, 782-781, repealed by
Act of Nov, 9, 1977, O1 Stat. 1822: see Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act,
S. Rep. No, 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14 (1966).
Sia) No State law... shall be superseded by any .. . order
issued or any mandatory health or safety standard, except insofar
as such State law is in contlict ... with any order issued or any
mandatory health or safety standard.
(b) The provisions of any State law or regulation . . . whiclt
provide for more stringent health and safety standards applicable
to coal or other mines than do the provisions of this chapter or
any order issued or any mandatory health or safety standard shall
not thereby be construed or held to be in conflict with this chapter.
30 U.S.C. § 955 (a) and (b).
Lo
state regulation except as part of an approved state
plan.’ 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)-'b).
Convress easily could have incorporated the language
contained in the Nixon Administration’s version of
OSH Act, which explicitly saved more stringent “supy e-
mental” state regulation from preemption." But Con-
gress rejected such language, and OSHA itself has cited
Congress’ rejection of this language to confirm that the
OSH Act preempts legislation by states without approved
plans that relates to issues subject to a federal standard,
“without regard to whether the state law would con-
flict with. complement, or supplement the Federal stand-
ard....” Hazard Communication, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,552,
31,860 (1987).
1% [}linois’ selective quotation of members of Congres. actu
supports the conclusion that Congress by enacting the OSH Act
departed from previous laws which aliowed tor more string
state regulation. Wlinois quotes Rep. Dent as saying, “Federe:
legislation has mever yet superseded State legislation wher
state law is superior to the provisions of the Federal law” Ils
Cong. Rec. P1460, reprinted in Legislative History at 1020. Be
Dent, however, then goes on to say. “We took care of that
Mine Safety Law. For instance, two areas where we have Fe
legislation . . . are the Mine Safety Act and the Longshoremer
Safety Act.” Jd. at 1029-20. Examination of these tu
reveals regulatory schemes that, unlike the OSH Act, expressiy |
vide for concurrent federal-state regulation. See, Federal Coal M:
Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175 | codity
amended at 30 U.S.C. $$ 953, 955 (1988)), and Longshoremens :
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § O41 | 19s-
2” Section 14(b)(1) of the Administration's bill, S. 2788 anc THEE
13373, O1st Cong., Ist Sess., provided that, “No state ager
health standard in effect upon the effective date of this Actor wt
may become effective thereafter, shall be superseded by any standarc
promulgated under this Act except imsofar as such State safer
or health standard is in conflict with this Act.” See. lib 2
provided that, “Any State safety or health standard in effect
the effective date of this Act, or which may become effective thy
after, which affords employees significantly greater protection tha
a safety or health standard promulgated under this Act sha
thereby be construed or held to be in conflict.”
26
D. The Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion Interprets Section 18 as Preempting Duplica-
tive or Supplemental State Regulation.
OSHA has consistently interpreted Section 18 as pre-
empting supplemental state laws unless OSHA has ap-
proved a state plan.“’ An administrative agency’s inter-
pretation of its enabling legislation has been accorded
great weight by this Court. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S.
968, 574 (1988); Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-715 (1985); Chev-
ron USA Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984); Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979): see also Missis-
sippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487
U.S. 354 (1988) ‘Sealia, J., concurring). While the
preemptive effect of Section 18 is quite explicit, to the
extent that there is any ambiguity in the statutory lan-
guage, it should be reselved by deference to the agency in-
terpretation. Sve Presley + Etowah County Comm'n,
Nos. 90-711, 90-712, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 554 (Jan. 27,
*! An OSHA Instruction confirms OSHA's “view ... that the
intention of Congres. under Section 18(a) of the Act was to pre-
empt States without an approved 18(b) State plan from enforcing
standards covering occupational safety and health hazards for
which Federal standards are in effect. SOSH Act Instruction STP
2-1.10A, Mar. 13, 1981, + printed in 1984 CCH Employment Safety
& Health Guide © 5008.71. Since 1987, OSHA and other federal
agencies have been required by executive order to consider the
effect on federalism of their proposed rules. Section 4(a) of
Executive Order 12612 instructs executive departments to “con-
strue, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt
State law only when the statute contains an express preemption
provision or there is some other firm and palpable evidence com-
pelling the conclusion that Congress intended preemption of State
law, or when the excrcise of State authority directly conflicts with
the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal statute.” Exec-
utive Order 12612 of October 26, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685, 41,686
(1987). See, ¢.g., Hazard Communication Standard, 52 Fed. Reg.
31,852, 21,860 (1987).
27
1992); Lechmere, luc. ve. NLRB, No. 90-970, 1992 U.S.
LEXIS 555 (Jan. 27, 1992).
In the preamble to the Final Rule, OSHA confirmed
“Congress’ clear intent to preempt state laws relating to
issues with respect to which Federal OSHA has promul-
gated occupational safety or health standards.” 54 Fed.
Reg. 9294, 9315 (1989). The preamble further provides
that “|tlo the extent that there are state vu. regional pe-
culiarities caused by the types of hazardous waste opera-
tions ... states with occupational safety and health plans
approved by OSHA under section 18 of the OSH Act
would be able to develop their own state standards to
address any special problems.” Jd. (emphasis added).
The preamble advises that “if a state develops its own
OSHA approved state program, it could make additional
requirements in its standards.” /d. at 9316. These state-
ments show unequivocally that OSHA interprets the
OSH Act a» precluding states without state plans from
enacting legislation directly relating to issues addressed
by federal standards.**
“2 By contrast, Illinois points only to a non-mandatory note in
the Final Rule, stating that safety and health programs developed
to meet other federal, state or local regulations may be retained
if properly supplemented to conform to OSHA’s requirements, as
evidence that OSHA permits supplemental state regulation. (Pet.
Br. at 29), 29 C.F.R. §1910.120(b) note. Iinois misinterpret
OSHA's intent. In the preamble to the Final Rule, OSHA notes
that several commentors had suggested that OSHA’s requirements
“were somewhat duplicative of the contingency plans and emer-
gency response plans required by the E.P.A. for its permit require-
ments, . . . OSHA does not intend to require the duplication of
efforts made to meet other governmental regulations. 54 Fed. Reg.
9294, 9302 (1989). This allowance was made by OSHA to avoid
duplicative regulation, largely required by federal entities, and to
reduce the burden on employers, in the narrow setting of pre-eris’-
ing written safety programs, not to permit states subsequently to
enact duplicative and burdensome piecemeal legislation affecting
the regulated area.
28
Illinois also questions OSHA’s intent to preempt,”
arguing that, because a statement regarding preemption
was included only in the preamble to the Final Rule and
not in the text of the Final Rule itself, OSHA did not
intend the Final Rule to have preemptive effect.“' (Pet.
Br. at 26.) As this Court has recognized, however, pre-
ambles are one of the “variety of means {through which |
. We can expect that |agencies| will make their inten-
tions clear if they intend for their regulations to be ex-
clusive.” Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 718; ef. Fidelity Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 147, 158 (1982).°°
“8 1f the OSH Act were silent as to preemption, OSHA itself
would have the authority to preempt related state laws. Express
preemption by an administrative agency has been accorded effect
equal to express preemption by Congress itself. City of New York
ew FCC, 1486 US. 57, 63-64 (1988); Lowisiana Public Service
Comm'n v. FOC, ATG US, 855, 369 (1986). Therefore, if this Court
concludes, despite the explicit preemptive language of Section 18,
that Congress intended to delegate preemptive discretion to OSHA,
the Court should defer to OSHA's clear expressign of the preemp-—
tive reach of the Final Rule.
“"Tllinois argues that the inclusion of express preemptive lan-
guage in the text of OSHA's Hoezard Communication Standard, 20
C.F.R. §1910.1200(a)(2) (1991), and the omission of such lan-
guage from the text of other final standards, including the Final
Rule, demonstrates lack of preemptive intent. (Pet. Br. at 27).
Ilinois apparentivy rejects the maxim erpressio unius est exrclus/o
alteriue—+n porsing the express language of Section 18, but adopts
it wholehoartedly in ana:vzing the long history of OSHA rulemak-
ing. Moreover, Illinois’ a guments are contradictory. Mlineis has
argued that Section IS reflects Congress’ express intent not to
delegate preemptive discretion to OSHA but to allow states to
enact supplemental legislation in all eases. How could the Hazard
Communication Standard demonstrate OSHA's decision to preempt
in just that one instance if OSHA had no delegated authority to
preempt at all?
“In addition, where OSHA has intended that a standard not
interfere with particular state laws not substantially affecting oc-
cupationasl health and safety or with the application of state laws
to certain groups of employees not subject to federal regulation,
OSHA has followed Section 18 by framing the issue addressed by
its standard narrowly and stating so plainly in its regulations.
29
E. The Contested Provisions of the Illinois Acts
Duplicate, Supplement and Conflict With OSHA’s
Final Rule and Frustrate the Purposes of the led-
eral Legislative Scheme.
Illinois has chosen not to submit the state plan called
for by Section 18(b), but has nevertheless enacted li-
censing requirements which include competency stand-
ards that duplicate, supplement and conflict with the
Final Rule. Illinois’ rejection of the explicit process for
federal-state cooperation created by Congress overcomes
any “presumption that state or local regulation of mat-
ters related to health and safety is not invalidated under
the Supremacy Clause,” Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 715.
The cases cited by IHlinois do not support its claim
that states may enact “supplemental” regulations for
occupational safety and health without regard to Section
18." In Hillshorough, 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (Pet. Br.
See, o.9., 29 CFR. § 128.110(a) (Field Sanitation Standard limited
to agricultural establishments with more than ten employees); 55
Fed. Reg. 28,728, 28,739 (1990) Cissue of Occupant Protection in
Motor Vehicles framed so as not broadly to preempt general state
motor vehicle laws). See aleo Martin v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission, 1118. Ct. 1171, 1175-1176 (1991) Cen
ageney’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substan-
tial deference.) (citation omitted).
*“ [llinois makes much of the fact that the OSH Act is described
as establishing “minimum requirements.” (Pet. Br. at 18-19.) To
the extent Illinois’ criticism of “minimum requirements” suggests
that OSHA chould frame, for example, a training requirement as
an absolute or maximum number, the argument is frivolous. (See
Pet. Br. at 29.) To the extent Ilinois sugvests merely that states
are allowed to do more, the sensible interpretation is again evident
from Section 18. States are invited to enact standards “at least as
effective” as OSHA standards and thereby to build upon the “fed-
eral floor” by assuming responsibility for developing and enforcing
occupational safety and health standards in federally regulated
areas, but only upon approval of a state plan filed pursuant to
Section 18(b). See Ray v, Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 168
n. 19 (1978) (la) statutory reference to ‘minimum standards’ .
[does not furnish! a litmus paper test for resolving issues of pre-
emption”); Florida Lime, 272 U.S. at 171 (White, J., dissenting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S, 218, 236 (1947).
30
at 28), this Court held that local ordinances and regula-
tions governing blood plasma centers were not impliedly
preempted by £ 351 of the Public Health Service Act and
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations.
Congress had not expressed an intent to preempt such
local regulations and the FDA had expressly disavowed
preemptive intent, a factor given substantial deference
by the Court. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 714-715. By
contrast, Section 18 sets forth explicitly those areas in
which a state may not regulate without an approved plan,
which OSHA has repeatedly invoked in its rulemaking.
New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405 (1973) (Pet. Br. at 21), addressed whether eligibil-
ity criteria enacted by New York in furtherance of the
federal government’s Aid to Families With Dependent
Children (“AFDC”) program were consistent with the
provisions of the Work Incentive Program (“WIN”), a
federal program also within AFDC. Dublino, however,
“|did| not involve arguable federal pre-emption of a
wholly independent state program dealing with the same
or a similar problem.” Dublino, 413 U.S. at 411 n.9.
The Court noted that Congress had not expressed any
intention that WIN should supersede state AFDC imple-
mentation, that the responsible federal agency never con-
sidered the WIN legislation preemptive and that “WIN
is a partial program which stops short of providing
adequate job and training opportunities.” Jd. at 416,
419-20. By contrast, OSHA’s Final Rule is comprehensive
and has been interpreted by OSHA as preempting state
enactments on the same issue.
In CTS Corp, v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.
69 (1987) (Pet. Br, at 21), this Court held that an
Indiana Act regulating the acquisition of voting control
following a tender offer was not impliedly preempted by
the federal Williams Act. Relying on the absence of ex-
press preemptive language in the Williams Act, the Court
concluded that “if Congress had intended to pre-empt all
state laws that delay the acquisition of voting control
following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly.”
31
481 U.S. at 85-86. Unlike the OSH Act, the Williams
Act had not expressly delineated areas in which the states
might regulate or provided a specific mechanism for state
regulation in other areas.
Illinois’ reliance on these implied preemption decisions
disregards the expressed intent of Congress to prohibit
redundant or supplemental state legislation except in con-
junction with an approved state plan. Moreover, the im-
plied preemption jurisprudence developed by this Court
would not save the Illinois Acts even if Congress had
been completely silent with respect to state regulation
of occupational safety and health. The Illinois legislation
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941): see alse
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). In SARA,
Congress mandated a comprehensive OSHA program for
the protection of hazardous waste workers. The Illinois
Acts require that these workers undergo an IEPA or
EPA approved training course for 40 hours, pass an
IEPA prescribed written test and, in the case of crane
and hoist operators, show that they have worked with
such equipment for at least 4,000 hours. The court below
concluded that some of these provisions “might well dup-
licate ‘or even conflict witht OSHA’s training require-
ments.” Killian, 918 F.2d at 678. In fact, the Illinois
Acts do create duplication and conflict that frustrates
the purpose of Congress; therefore, the Illinois Acts may
not stand. Cf. Pacific Gas & Electric Co, v. State Energy
Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220-221 (1983).
For example, the Illinois Acts do not permit workers
with training or experience equivalent to the 40-hour
requirement to obtain licenses. In contrast, Section
126(d) (1) of SARA specifically directs that the hour-
based training requirements for non-emergency workers
“shall not apply to any general site worker who has
received the equivalent of such training.” ** 29 U.S.C.
“7 SARA’s provision for equivalent training affirms a basic tenet
of OSHA regulation: the need for flexibility in designing and en-
»”
S55 note at ‘d) 1) ‘emphasis added}. Furthermore,
by requiring trainin fan EPA or IEPA approved pro-
gram, the Illinois Acts would conflict with SARA’s diree-
tion that OSHA regulate accreditation of training pro-
grams for hazardous waste operations and with OSHA’s
proposed rules on that subject. Ill. Stat. at paras. 7705
fe}, 7805; 101 Stat. at 1329-198 (1987); 55 Fed. Reg.
2776, 2778-2779 (1990). In addition, the Illinois Acts
do not permit any flexibility in emergency operations at
covered facilities, which conflicts with OSHA’s recogni-
tion that “emergency actions necessary to protect the
public safety and health {should not] be prevented be-
cause in a particular circumstance it is not feasible to
carry out particular requirements of this standard in the
time needed to respond to the emergency.” 51 Fed. Reg.
45,654, 45,662 (1986); see also 29 C.FLR. § 1910.120(e),
(previ, (8) cilih, (qri4e-(8); 54 Fed. Reg. 9294,
9328-20 (1989),
The 4,000-hour requirement of the Operators Act has
no parallel in the Final Rule. Any employer wishing to
employ hazardous waste crane operators in Illinois would
be forced to hire persons possessing Illinois credentials.
The trial judge found that the Illinois Acts would dimin-
ish the pool of workers available to clean Up hazardous
Waste sites, which could be critical in an emergency re-
sponse situation * «Pet. App. at 501. See also, e.g., (Tr.
at 35).
forcing standards. Sve 29 U.S.C. £655(d) (variances): 29 U.S.C.
§$655(b)(6)(A) (temporary variances); 29 C.F_R. § 1905. This
Court has held that a lack of provision for variation in a state
standard where such variation was essentiel te the federal scheme
Was sufficient to imply preemption even without express statutory
language such as exists in Section 18, Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 542-543 (1977).
*\ Efficient emergeney operations by national enterprises would
be frustrated if other states followed suit by enacting redundant,
inconsistent and state-speec'fic requirements for hazardous waste
workers. The filing of a brief amieus curiae in support of Mlinois
by nine other states suggests the possibility of such state legis-
lation. Because specialized hazardous waste operations in southern
33
The Illinois Acts also would interfere with the opera-
tion of the “buddy system” by forcing interstate waste
management companies to select workers meeting specific
state requirements rather than being able to transport,
immediately and to any place in the country, an expert
team accustomed to handling a particular type of haz-
ardous material. (Tr. at 73.) The buddy system works
effectively only when workers have developed familiar-
ity with each other’s skills and practices. See, ¢.g., 29
C.F.R. § 1910.120'(a113) (“The purpose of the buddy
system is to provide rapid assistance to employees in the
event of an emergency.”); 29 C.F.R. §$ 1910.1201q) 13)
(‘y) (in an emergency response to a hazardous substance
release, “operations in hazardous areas shall be per-
formed using the buddy system in groups of two or
more”).
Il. THE TEST APPLIED BY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
PROVIDES AN OBJECTIVE AND WORKABLE
STANDARD FOR APPLYING SECTION 18 OF THE
OSH ACT.
A. Congress May Express!y Preempt State Laws That
Interfere With the Valid Exercise of Federal Legis-
lative Power Regardless of the Purpose of the
State Enactment.
This case presents an opportunity for this Court to
resolve a difference of opinion among the circuit courts
with respect to the preemption of what has been called
“dual purpose” state legislation. ‘Dual purpose” describes
a state enactment which furthers two state interests, only
one of which is identical to the purpose of the overlapping
federal legislative scheme. The Final Rule is unchallenged
as a valid exercise of OSHA’s authority to regulate occu-
pational safety and health.*’ Despite the existence of the
illinois are covered by teams from Missouri and central Illinois
from Indiana, the Illinois Acts potentially would delay cleanup in
parts of Illinois for up to six hours until less specialized workers
arrived from Chicago. (Tr. at 31-32.)
““OSHA itself noted the dual impact of its requirements on
safety and the environment: “The training requirement will assure
34
federal] standard, Illinois enacted overlapping legislation
ostensibly for both worker health and safety and public
health and safety. The court below recognized that it
would “defeat the purpose of Section 1%” if a state could
enact worker safety standards “simply by asserting a non-
secupational purpose for the legislation.” Killian, 91%
F.2d at 679. Such “unauthorized state regulation” could
result “in duplication and unwarranted additional costs
‘yg workers and employers” as well as interfere with the
operation of federa) law. Id. at 676, 679.
To address preemption in this context, the court below
formulated a two-step test that focuses precisely on the
effects of the state law on the federal regulation by iden-
tifying and invalidating only those provisions that “relate
to worker health and safety in a direct, clear and sub-
stantial way,” subject to severability analysis under state
law." Id. at €79. The court coneluded that “Ilinois’
4000-hour rule directly, clearly and substantially impli-
cates worker “health and safety as well as public health
and safety, and it is impossible to modify the provision
“0 as to delete matter serving the impermissible worker
health and safety goal without also eliminating the per-
missible public health and safety goal.” Jd. at 6&3. The
court therefore held that Section 1% of the OSH Act pre-
empted the challenged provision regardless of its addi-
tional asserted purpose.
tite activities will he carried out by qualified personnel, with
the mnowedge and atility to fulfill their job functions in a safe
and responsible manner. To the extent that this oecurs, there wil]
te a potential benefit te the environment.” 54 Fed. Rey. 9294.
W41%-9214 (198%
"The severability analysia applied hy the Seventh Cireuit com-
ts with the decisions of this Court. which have held that sever
ability of a etate statute in a question of state law. Bvrcon Corp 4
Hunt ATS US. 355, 276 (1986,: Wateon v. Buck, 313 US. 287.
1-36, (194) Ly preserving a challenged state enactment to the
extent compatible with state wseverahilitv law the eourt below In
‘ tle roi on the oy firnate exvercian -« f tate power
35
The test applied below is directly derived from the
holding of this Court in Lnglish v. General Electric Co,,
110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990). In English, the Court preserved
a claim under state tort law for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, observing that “for a state law to fall
within the preempted zone, it must have some direct and
substantial effect on the decisions made by those who
build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological
safety levels.” 1105S. Ct. at 227% n. 7 (emphasis added) ;
ef. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Ine., 463 US. #5, 100 n, 21
(1983, (“Some state actions may affect employee benefit
plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to
warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.”)
Fidelity Federal Savings avd Loan Agen v. De la Cuesta,
45% U.S. 141, 171-172 (19%2) (O’ Connor, J., concurring).
The decisions of this Court do not support states’ un-
limited authority to interfere with federal law by assert-
ing an additional purpose for their actions. Despite the
deference accorded traditional state powers, see Califor-
nia v. ARC America Corp., 490 US. 93,101 (19%9), this
Court has held since the early days of the republic that
Congress may expressly preempt a state law enacted
pursuant to its police power that has a direct and sub-
stantial effeet on the valid exercise of federal authority.
Gibbons +. Ogden, 9 US. (1 Wheat.) 1, 271 (1824) (“the
act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law
of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, must yield to it.”) (emphasis added).”
"! Evaluation of the validity of #tate lawe in federally regulated
areas must be an effecte-oriented rather than «a purpose-oriented in-
quiry. If it were otherwise, the goal of the Supremacy Clause, to
protect federal leygi«lation from frustration, would itself be frus-
trated whenever a etate or local government asserted a purpose
derived from ite broad residual powers rather than the federal!
yoverpmne c's narrow er roernted newer. pt. J. ne ; Prati Park.
nad ("a 10 ¢ £1% S45 1977 her ne jist J eoncurring in part
nd dissenting in part Preemption, ther f it in te exiat at all
in thie cave, must exixt because the operation of the state Act in-
exorably conflicts with the purposes underlying the Federal Act”
*
‘initial emphasis added
36
The standard applied by this Court to cases in which
neither Congress nor an administrative agency has ex-
pressed preemptive intent demonstrates most clearly the
effects-oriented nature of the Supremacy Clause. Implied
preemption has been found where Congress intended to
“oecupy the field” or where there exists an actual conflict
between the state and federal laws, either in the sense
that it would be impossible to comply with both laws
simultaneously or in the sense that the existence’ of the
state law would frustrate the purpose of the federal legis-
lative scheme. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-143; Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 2380 (1947);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). These tests
look to the effect of the state law on the federal enact-
ment, not to the purpose of the state law.
In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S, 687, 651-52 (1971),
this Court concluded:
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doc-
trine of Kesler and Reitz tnat state law may frus-
trate the operation of federal law as long as the
state legislature in passing its law had some purpose
in mind other than one of frustration. Apart from
the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken
in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a
doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify
nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply
publishing a legislative committee report articulating
some state interest or policy—other than frustration
of the federal objective—that would be tangentially
furthered by the proposed state law.
See also Intl Paper Co, v, Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498-
499 n.19 (1987) ‘citing Perez for the proposition that
“effect rather than purpose of a state statute governs pre-
emption analysis’); Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216-217 n.28;
Alessi et al. v. Rayhestos-Manhattan, Ine., 451 U.S, 504
(1981): Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142 (1963); Napier
», Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605, 612 (1926).
Illinois’ reliance on Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213,
is misplaced. In that case, the Court affirmed the de-
ee Se
37
cision of the Ninth Circuit that a state moratorium
on the certification of new nuclear power plants was
not impliedly preempied by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. There was no express preemptive language in
that statute. To the contrary, Congress expressly made
the state’s purpose the issue by providing that noth-
ing “shall be construed to affect the authority of
any State or local agency to regulate activities for
purposes other than protection against radiation haz-
ards,” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k). Not surprisingly, the Court
accepted the evidence offered by California that there was
a non-safety-related, economic rationale for the chal-
lenged moratorium, Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213. More
significantly, however, the effect of the state moratorium
on the federal statute was indirect. The Court observed
that “the statute does not seek to regulate the construc-
tion or operation of a nuclear powerplant.” Id. at 212
Furthermore, the Court continued, “{i]t would clearly
be impermissible for California to attempt to do so, for
such regulation, even if enacted out of nonsafety con-
cerns, would nevertheless directly conflict with the NRC’s
exclusive authority over plan construction and operation.”
Id. (emphasis added). This reasoning plainly demon-
strates that, even where Congress expressly raises the
issue of state purpose, a permissible purpose will not save
a state law with an impermissible effect.”
*2 Subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that Pacifie Gas
does not exempt state laws from preemption based on their asserted
purposes, In English v. General Blectrie Co., 110 S.Ct, 2270 61990),
the Court observed:
[T}he Court [in Pacific Gas! did not suggest that a finding of
safety motivation was necessary to place a state law within the
preempted field. On the contrary, it took great pains to make
clear that state regulation of matters directly affecting the
radiological safety of nuclear-plant construction and operation,
‘even if enacted ont of nonsafety concerns, would nevertheless
linfringe upen!| the NRC's exclusive authority. 461 U.S. at
212, 108 S.Ct., at 1726. Thus, even as the Court [in Pacific
Gas| sugyested that part of the pre-empted field is defined by
reference to the purpose of the state law in question, it made
38
The preemption analysis of a “dual purpose” state law
should therefore be no different from that applied to other
state enactments. The suggestion “that the coexistence of
federal and state regulatory legislation should depend upon
whether the purposes of the two laws are parallel or di-
vergent” tends to “obscure more than aid in the solution
of the [preemption] problem.” Florida Lime, 373 U.S.
at 141-142. The deference due states’ exercise of their
pohce power applies whenever Congress enters a field
traditionally occupied by the states, including regulation
of occupational safety and health, and does not gather im-
portance because the state asserts additional powers in
areas not entered by the federal government. The stand-
ard applied by the court below correctly recognizes tradi-
tional state authority to enact worker safety and public
safety legislation, but correctly disregards Illinois’ sug-
gestion that the existence of such residual state authority
automatically overrides clear congressional intent to pre-
empt overlapping state laws.
B. The First, Second and Third Circuits Incorrectly
Concluded That Preemption Should Depend on the
Additional Purposes or Effects of the State Enact-
ment Rather Than on the Direct Effect of the State
Enactment on the Federal Legislative Scheme.
In New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. H ughey,
774 F.2d 587 (1985), appeal after remand, 868 F.2d
621 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989),
the Third Circuit invoked the traditional framework
for analyzing the preemptive-reach of the OSH Act and
the Hazard Communication Standard, but based its con-
clusions as to the viability of certain provisions of the
New Jersey Worker and Community Right to Know Act
on the “primary purpose” of those provisions. Jd. at 595.
On appeal after remand, New Jerse y State Chamber of
Commerce v. Hughey, 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir.). cert. *
denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989) (“Hughey II’), the court
clear that another part of the field is defined by the state law's
actual effect on nuclear safety.
110 S.Ct. at 2278 (emphasis in original).
39
reaffirmed its “primary purpose” test and held that a
labeling requirement was “addressed to a concern other
than occupational health and safety and |wal|s therefore
not expressly preempted by Section 18/a) of the OsH
Act.” Id. at 627. Despite the fact that New Jersey con-
ceded certain “obvious areas of overlap between the state
and federal requirement,” id. at 626, the court then up-
held the decision of the lower court on remand “that the
New Jersey Act was not an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the purposes of the federal standard and conse-
quently ... that the Act was not impliedly preempted.”
Id. at 622.
This analysis does not comport with the established
precedents of this Court. Preemption is a question of con-
gressional intent; “express” and “implied” are merel)
indicators of the manner in which congressional inten’
has been elucidated. CF. English vw. General Electric Co.,
110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 n.5 (1990). The Third Circuit
saved the state legislation in question from express pre-
emption not because Section 18 is ambiguous, but because
the state had asserted a primary purpose different from
that of the federal law. The Third Circuit then invoked
the traditional test for implied preemption as if Congress
had been entirely silent as to the preemptive reach of the
OSH Act. But Congress was not silent. In effect, the
Third Circuit standard allows a state to defeat the ex-
pressed intent of Congress.
In Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New Yor
City, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit
evaluated a*preemption challenge to New York City’s
asbestos abatement program. The Second Circuit rejected
the Third Circuit’s test, observing that “ ‘primary’ is an
ambiguous word, and to adopt its use leads down an un-
marked avenue of inquiry into legislative motive, which
is ‘often an unsatisfactory venture.’” 855 F.2d at 57
(quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216). Instead, the
court held that “in order to avoid preemption the City
must demonstrate only that ... there is a legitimate and
substantial purpose apart from protecting asbestos work-
4U
ers.” dd. at o7. Applying this extremely permissive
standard to the challenged legislation, the Second Cireuit
upheld a variety of provisions relating to worker educa-
tion based on the city’s asserted “legitimate and substan-
tial purpose to promote public safety and health,” even if
the only arguable effect on safety and health other than
that of workers was on workers’ immediate families."
Id. at 57.
The Second Circuit reached this conclusion by removing
these provisions from the express preemptive reach of
Section IS based on an additional state purpose while
nonetheless admitting that if the city law were impliedly
preempted as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress,” preemption would be justified “regardless of the
state's legitimate purpose.” 855 F.2d at 59 (eiting Pacific
Gras, MOL US. at 216 n.28). As is the ease with the Third
Circuit's decision in Hughey 11, such reasoning adheres
to the form but misinterprets the substance of this
Court's preemmtion jurisprudence by considering “ex-
press” and “implied” preemption as unrelated categories
rather than as alternative methods of determining con-
cressional intent,
In Associated Industries of Massachusetts vv. Snow.
SOS Pld 274 dst Cir. 1990), the First Circuit held that
most of Massachusetts’ asbestos abatement scheme was
not preempted by OSHA's Hazard Communication Stand-
ard. The First Cireuit test “look[s] .. . to the effect of
the regulatory scheme” in addition to worker health and
safety. Jd. at 27% The court concluded that “lif! the
effect (of! ... the Massachusetts standards .. . is to pro-
tect the public, the state regulation is not preempted. If
the effect is solely to protect workers, the OSHA Standard
‘The court upheld educational requirements relating to the fol.
lowing: the physical characteristics and aerodynamic qualities of
asbestos, the health hazards and effects of asbestos and routes of
exposure, workers personal hygicne, personal protective equipment
on-the-job work practices, air monitoring, remediation methods,
decontamination and airflow direction, and safety hazards
Eee
41
prevails and the state regulation falls. If the effect is
to protect the public by regulating workers and work
places, the regulation stands because its ultimate effect
is protection of the public.” /d, at 279-280.
The First Circuit test avoids divining state legislative
purpose, but indiscriminately protects a// legislation that
furthers any exercise of state residual powers regardless
of congressional intent. This stands the Supremacy Clause
on its head. Where a federal and a state law regulate
exactly the same matter, such as training requirements
for hazardous waste workers, and the effects of such
regulation further the exercise of both a federal and a
state power, the First Circuit standard would deny Con-
gress its constitutional ability to preempt the = state
enactment.
The decisions of the circuit courts relied upon. by
Illinois render express preemption analysis and there-
fore the expressed intent of Congress irrelevant so long
as a legitimate additional state purpose or effect exists.
As convenient as these “bright-line” rules appear at first
glance, they incorrectly interpret the Supremacy Clause,
deny Congress its preemptive power, and disregard the
decisions of this Court. By contrast, the Seventh Cir-
cult’s test recognizes that there is no easy substitute for
a case-by-case inquiry as to the expressed scope of con-
gressional preemptive intent. Cf. Florida Lime, 373
U.S. 1382, 142 11963) ("There is not—-and from the very
nature of the problem there cannot be—any rigid formula
or rule...
Only the effects-oriented test of the Seventh Circuit
focuses on the impairment of the federal enactment rather
than on the characteristics of the state enactment, whether
“purpose” or “effect.” What creates an obstacle to a
federal legislative scheme is not a state law with a “dual
purpose” but one with a direct and substantial effect
on federal law. Whatever the articulated goals of a
state law and whatever its effects in other regulatory
spheres, the overriding concern to a federal court hearing
an express preemption challenge is whether the state
42
law has a “direct and substantial effect” on the oper-
ation of federal law. Cf. English, 110 S. Ct. at 2278 n.7.
C. The Seventh Circuit Test Avoids Requiring Federal
Judges to Probe the Minds of State Legislatures.
Unlike the purpose-oriented tests of the Second and
Third Cireuits, the Seventh Circuit standard avoids in-
quiring into the intent of state legislatures. If the valid-
ity of state legislation were to depend on its purposes,
federal judges would become the inquisitors of state
legislatures, divining correctly or incorrectly the “true”
motives behind state legislative action. Although this
may be « necessary task in other constitutional arenas, it
is of little value in the evaluation of a claim of express
preemption. Congressional intent to preempt state law
is essential to the analysis of a preemption claim: state
legislative intent should be irrelevant.
The assessment of state legislative intent by a federal
court is unpredictable. Cf. Paeitie Gas, 461 U.S. 190, 216
(1983). Beeause asserted purposes may be unreli-
able, “this Court is not bound by ‘[t]he name, de-
scription or characterization given [a challenged statute |
by the legislature or the courts of the State,’ but will deter-
mine for itself the practical impact of the law.” Hughes v.
Oklahoma, AAL U.S. 822, 386 11979) (quoting Lacoste v,
Louisiana Dh pt.of Conservation, 263 U.S, O45, 550 (19245):
see alse California Coastal Comm'n v, Granite Rock Co., 480
U.S. 572, G07 (1987) tSealia, J., dissenting). In addition,
individual legislators may vote in favor of the same bil]
for different reasons. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp, 450 US. 662, 703 41981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
in). State legislators could exercise their historic powers
with greater confidence knowing that only legislation with
a direct, clear and substantial effect on an expressly pre
empted federal legislative area is forbidden. To provide
such guidance should be a goal of the courts. Jd. at 706
‘Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The difficulty of evaluating the nature and legitimacy
of state legislative intent is aptly demonstrated in this
—swT
43
ease."' Moreover, apart from their clear interference with
OSHA’s regulatory scheme, the effects of the Illinois Acts
are speculative.” The title of the Illinois Acts character-
“4 The legislative history of the Illinois Acts creates serious doubts
as to the legitimacy of the state purposes asserted by Illinois. Be-
cause the Illinois Acts were not added to HB-3100 until a few days
before the bill was passed, official transcripts reveal only brief de-
bate in both houses regarding worker licensing. State of Illinois,
85th General Assembly, Senate Transcription Debate, July 1, 1988
(App. at 27a); State of Illinois, 85th General Assembly, House of
Representatives Transcription Debate, July 1, 1988 (App. at 18a).
Comments by the bill's proponents suggest that the Illinois Acts
were reintroduced at the eleventh hour at labor union behest because
hazardous waste disposal companies were bringing in skilled work-
ers from out-of-state. State Senator Rock, arguing in support of
the Illinois Acts, observed that “we have been discussing for a num-
ber of vears the licensure of those members of the laborers union
and the crane operators who dealt in hazardous waste sites. Z/f ts ex-
tremely important if we are to retain jobs in Illinois that this pro-
Vision, in fact, be included.” (emphasis added). Remarks of Sen.
Rock, State of Ilinois, 85th General Assembly, Senate Transcription
Debate, July 1, 1988 at 18 (App, at 38a). Representative Wenn
lund, speaking in support of passage of the entire package bill,
remarked that “] realize that some of the provisions with respect
to the crane operators licensing may be somewhat offensive,” but
nevertheless concluded that “I strongly urge a ‘yes’ vote even if
you have to hold your nose with respect to the crane operators.”
Remarks of Rep. Wennlund, State of Illinois, 85th General As-
sembly, House of Representatives Transcription Debate, July 1,
1988 at 5S (App. at 22a)
“ The 4,000-hour requirement, for example, relates only to ex-
perience with the fypes of equipment that may be used for waste
handling, not to experience actually handling hazardous waste, and
benefits most directly union members who have kept records of
such operations, Incredibly, both the Operators Act and the Labor-
ers Act exempt hazardous waste workers using small-capacity
lifters such as forklifts and bobcats. This leads to the irrational
result that the laborer who shovels hazardous waste into barrels,
the operator who picks up a large but empty tank with a crane,
and the worker who sweeps up afterwards all must have valid
licenses under the Illinois Acts, but the operator who moves rust-
ing barrels with a forklift or removes hazardous waste from a
trench with a bebeat (cand who does not belong to the union tn-
volved in drafting the Illinois Acts) may remain unlicensed. In
addition, the Illinois Acta exempt workers in various industries and
44
izes them as “in relation to environmental protection,”
Public Act 85-1195, codified at Ill. Stat. at para. 7701-
7717, while the text describes them as necessary “to
promote job safety and... protect life, limb and prop-
erty.” Ill. Stat. at paras. 7702, 7802. However, the trial
judge found (1) that the IEPA did not even participate
in the drafting of the Illinois Acts, while Local 150 of
the Operating Engineers’ union did (Pet. App. at 49),
and (2) that Illinois introduced no evidence at trial that
would arguably show that the 4,000-hour requirement
would reduce the risk of danger to the public or employees
or the environment. (Pet. App. at 19, 58-59.) Given
these circumstances, the purpose tests of the Second and
Third Circuits and the additional effect test of the First
Circuit would require judicial telepathy and would argu-
ably produce random results.
D. The Seventh Circuit Test Would Not Threaten
States’ Licensing and Police Powers.
Illinois claims that application of the Seventh Circuit
standard would broadly preempt a variety of important
state laws, ranging from licensing of healthcare work-
ers to local building codes. (Pet. Br. at 35-36.) NSWMA
must regrettably rain on Illinois’ parade of horribles.
The point of the Seventh Circuit’s test is that the detri-
mental effect of the state enactment on the federal scheme
must be direct, clear and substantial.*® This conclusion
workers who are employed by manufacturers rather than hazardous
waste contractors. This sieve of coverage hardly supports a ration-
ale of public safety or environmental benefit.
%6 The test employed by the court below would recognize, for
example, that most tort and criminal laws of general applicability
do not affect in a direct, clear and substantial manner employer-
employee obligations with respect to health and safety matters in
the workplace. Cf. People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534
N.E.2d 962, 967 (1989); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238 (1984). These laws apply with hindsight to those who
have caused worker injury, illness or death, and therefore differ
conceptually from the OSHA Final Rule and the Illinois Acts,
which prospectively prescribe conduct necessary or appropriate to
avoid such unfortunate outcomes. See Note, Getting Away with
el la
45
may only be reached with reference to the scope of Con-
gress’ expressed intent to preempt. Section 18 of the OSH
Act does not reflect a broad intent to supersede state law
comparable to ERISA. Cf. Franchise Tax Bd. of Califor-
nia v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
24 n.26 (1983). On the contrary, Congress’ intent to pre-
empt under the OSH Act is limited. Certain powers are ex-
pressly reserved to the states in Sections 4(b) (1), 4' b) 4 ]
and 18(a), and states may assume exclusive responsibil-
ity for developing and enforcing standards under an
approved state plan. All that is preempted is state regu-
lation of worker health and safety relating to an issue
covered by a federal standard in the absence of a state
plan. Moreover, the court below requires a showing that
the state regulation directly, clearly and substantially
affects employer-employee obligations in the workplace.
Thus, the interaction between the intent of Congress and
the effect of the state law must be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. Finally, by severing and preserving the por-
tions of the state law that do not interfere with federal
legislation, the test applied below respects states’ enforce-
ment responsibilities. The practical application of this
test will not iead to wholesale abrogation of states’ gen-
eral police powers. Rather, it will remain focused on the
workplace and the attainment of the OSH Act’s vision of
cooperative federalism.
Under the Seventh Circuit standard, Illinois is free to
license medical personnel.*’ Illinois is free as well to
Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecu-
tions for Industrial Accidents, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 535, 542-543
(1987).
37 The OSHA bloodborne pathogen standard contains several
provisions which preserve a variety of state and local laws, so that
such laws would never be viewed as directly, clearly and substan-
tially affecting the federal scheme. See, ¢.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004,
64,147 (1991) (permitting disposal of regulated waste in accord-
ance with applicable federal, state and local regulations) ; 56 Fed.
Reg. 64,004, 64,154 (1991) (recognizing state accreditation of
laboratories); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,157-64,158, 64,179 (1991)
46
license electricians and enact local electrical codes.* Ili-
nois may even establish detailed certification standards
for hazardous Waste workers as part of a comprehensive
program for the regulation of occupational safety and
health upon approval by the Seeretary of a state plan
filed pursuant to Section 18tb) of the OSH Act. Illinois,
however, has declined to follow the procedure designed
by Congress for doing so. ITilinois is therefore not free
under the OSH Act and the United States Constitution
to adopt the contested provisions of the Illinois Acts.”
respecting confidentiality-of-source provisions of state or local
law . 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,170 (1991) (“This standard does not
abridge, enlarge, or alter any existing ethical or statutory code
with respect to confidentiality of medical records |.” )
‘In the preamble to the revision of its Part 5 Electrical Stand
ards, OSHA describes the National Electrical Code “NEC") as
“the cornerstone of electrical safety in the United States,” provid
ing “important assistance to OSHA in its mission to afford elec-
trical safety an the workplace.” 46 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4036 (1981
ev ales 29 CFR. §$1910-301-1910441. The same preamble ex
plains that the 1081] revisions “streamlined the existing standard,
which incorporated by reference the whole 1971 NEC, by deleting
portions of the NEC which were not directly related to employee
safety.” 46 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4087 (1981
’ Other provisions of the Illinois Acts initially challenged bys
NSWMA but not ruled upon by the trial judge likely also would
not survive application of the Seventh Circuit's test
47
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, NSWMA respectfully
submits that the decision of the court of appeals should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DONALD T. BLIss *
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
WILLIAM M. SAGE
O'MELVENY & MYERS
555 13th Street, N.W.
Of Counsel: Washington, D.C. 20004-1109
BRUCE J. PARKER (202) 383-5331
NATIONAL SOLID WASTES
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Suite 1000
1730 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 659-4613
JOHN T. VAN GESSEL
CHEMICAL WASTE
MANAGEMENT, INC.
3003 Butterfield Road
Oak Brook, Illinois 60521
(708) 218-1638 * Counsel of Record
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX
U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT,
29 U.S.C, $$ 651-658
TITLE 29—LABOR
$ 652. Definitions
* . + .
(5) The term “employer” means a person engaged in
a business affecting commerce who has employees, but
does not include the United States or any State or po-
litical subdivision of a State.
* 7 * o
(8) The term “occupational safety and health stand-
ard” means a standard which requires conditions, or the
adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appro-
priate to provide safe or healthful employment and places
of employment.
(if) Federal share.
The Federal share for each State grant under subsec-
tion ‘a! or th! of this section may not exceed 90 per
centum of the total cost of the application. In the event
the Federal share for all States under either such sub-
section is not the same, the differences among the States
shall be established on the basis of objective criteria.
iy: Administration and enforcement of programs con-
tained in approved State plans; Federal share
The Secretary is authorized to make grants to the States
to assist them in administering and enforcing programs
for occupational safety and health contained in State
plans approved by the Secretary pursuant to section 667
of this title. The Federal share for each State grant un-
der this subsection may not exceed 50 per centum of the
total cost to the State of such a program. The last sen-
tence of subsection (f) of this section shall be applicable
in determining the Federal share under this subsection,
2a
£653. Geographic applicability; judicial enforcement;
applicability to existing standards; report to Con-
gress on duplication and coordination of Federal
laws; workmen’s compensation law or common
law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employcrs and employees unaffected
(b) 11) Nothing in this chapter shall apply to working
conditions of employees with respect to which other Fed-
eral agencies and State agencies acting under section
2021 of title 42. exercise statutory authority to prescribe
or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational
safety or health.
* * * *
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to super-
sede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensa-
tion law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other
manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or
liabilities of employers and employees under any law with
respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising
out of, or in the course of, employment.
* * * *
~ 667. State jurisdiction and plans
ia! Assertion of State standards in absence of applicable
Federal standards
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency
or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over
any occupational safety or health issue with respect to
which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this
title.
‘hb: Submission of State plan for development and en-
forcement of State standards to preempt applicable
Federal standards
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume re-
sponsibility for development and enforcement therein of
3a
occupational safety and health standards relating to any
eccupational safety or health issue with respect to which
a Federal standard has been promulgated under section
655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the develop-
ment of such standards and their enforcement.
(¢} Conditions for approval of plan
The Secretary shall approve the plan submitted by a
State under subsection (b) of this section, or any modifi-
cation thereof, if such plan in his judgment—
(1) designates a State agency or agencies as the
agency or agencies responsible for administering t.
plan throughout the State,
(2) provides for the development and enforcement
of safety and health standards relating to one or
more safety or health issues, which standards ‘and
the enforcement of which standards) are or will be
at least as effective in providing safe and healthful
employment and places of employment as the stand-
ards promulvated under section 655 of this title
which relate to the same issues, and which stand-
ards, when applicable to products which are dis-
tributed or used in interstate commerce, are required
by compelling local conditions and do not unduly
burden interstate commerce,
(3) provides for a right of entry and inspection of
all workplaces subject to this chapter which is at
least as effective as that provided in section 657 of
this title, and includes a prohibition on advance
notice of inspections,
(4) contains satisfactory assurances that such
agency or agencies have or will have the legal au-
thority and qualified personne] necessary for the
enforcement of such standards,
(5) gives satisfactory assurances that such State
will devote adequate funds to the administration and
enforcement of such standards,
4a
(6) contains satisfactory assurances that such
State will, to the extent permitted by its law, estab-
lish and maintain an effective and comprehensive
occupational safety and health program applicable to
all employees of public agencies of the State and its
political subdivisions, which program is effective as
the standards contained in an approved plan,
(7) requires employers in the State to make re-
ports to the Secretary in the same manner and to the
same extent as if the plan were not in effect, and
(8) provides that the State agency will make such
reports to the Secretary in such form and containing
such information, as the Secretary shall from time to
time require.
* * . .
(h) Temporary enforcement of State standards
The Secretary may enter into an agreement with a
State under which ihe State will be permitted to continue
to enforce one or more occupational health and safety
standards in effect in such State until final action is
taken by the Secretary with respect to a plan submitted
by a State under subsection (b) of this section, or two
years from December 29, 1970, whichever is earlier.
5a
SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986,
PUBLIC LAW 99-499
Hazardous Waste Operations. Pub.L. 99-499, Title I,
§ 126(a)-(f), Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1690, as amended
PubL. 100-202, § 101(f) [Title II], Dec. 22, 1987, 101
Stat. 1329-198, provided that:
“(a) Promulgation.—Within one year after the date
of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Labor
shall, pursuant to section 6 of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, promulgate standards for the
health and safety protection of employees engaged in
hazardous waste operations.
“(b) Proposed standards.—The Secretary of Labor
shall issue proposed regulations on such standards which
shall include, but need not be limited to, the following
worker protection provisions:
“(1) Site analysis——Requirements for a formal
hazard analysis of the site and development of a
site specific plan for worker protection.
“(2) Training.—Requirements for contractors to
provide initial and routine training of workers be-
fore such workers are permitted to engage in hazard-
ous waste operations which would expose them to
toxic substances.
“(d) Specific training standards.—
“(1) Offsite instruction; field experience.—Stand-
ards promulgated under subsection (a) shall include
training standards requiring that general site work-
ers (such as equipment operators, general laborers,
and other supervised personnel) engaged in hazardous
substance removal or other activities which expose
or potentially expose such workers to hazardous sub-
stances receive a minimum of 40 hours of initial in-
struction off the site, and a minimum of three days
6a
of actual field experience under the direct supervi-
sion of a trained, experienced supervisor, at the time
of assignment. The requirements of the preceding
sentence shall not apply to any general site worker
who has received the equivalent of such training.
Workers who may be exposed to unique or special
hazards shall be provided additional training.
“(2) Training of supervisors.—Standards prom-
ulgated under subsection (a) shall include training
standards requiring that onsite managers and super-
visors directly responsible for the hazardous waste
operations (such as foremen) receive the same train-
ing as general site workers set forth in paragraph
(1) of this subsection and at least eight additional
hours of specialized training on managing hazardous
waste operations. The requirements of the preceed-
ing sentence shall not apply to any person who has
received the equivalent of such training.
“(3) Certification; enforcement.—Such training
standards shall contain provisions for certifying that
general site workers, onsite managers, and super-
visors have received the specified training and shall
prohibit any individual who has not received the
specified training from engaging in hazardous waste
operations covered by the standard. The certifica-
tion procedures shall be no less comprehensive than
those adopted by the Environmental Protection
Agency in its Model Accreditation Plan for Asbestos
Abatement Training as required under the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1886 [Pub. L.
99-519].
_“(4) Training of emergency response personnel.—
Such training standards shall set forth requirements
for the training of workers who are responsible for
responding to hazardous emergency situations who
may be exposed to toxic substances in carrying out
their responsibilities.
7a
“(e) Interim regulations—The Secretary of Labor
shall issue interim final regulations under this section
within 60 days after the enactment of this section which
shall provide no less protection under this section for
workers employed by contractors and emergency response
workers than the protections contained in the Environ-
mental Protection Agency Manual (1981) “Health and
Safety Requirements for Employees Engaged in Field
Activities” and existing standards under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 found in subpart C of
part 1926 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Such interim final regulations shall take effect upon is-
suance and shall apply until final regulations become
effective under subsection (c).
“(f) Coverage of certain State and local employees.—
Not later than 90 days after the promulgation of final
regulations under subsection (a), the Administrator shall
promulgate standards identical to those promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor under subsection (a). Standards
promulgated under this subsection shall apply to employ-
ees of State and local governments in each State which
does not have in effect an approved State plan under
section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 providing for standards for the health and safety
protection of employees engaged in hazardous waste
operations.”
8a
PROPOSED OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY ACT OF 1970
S. 2788, 91ST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP
2" >
(b) (1) No State safety or health standard in effect
upon the effective date of this Act or which may become
effective thereafter, shall be superseded by any standard
promulgated under this Act except insofar as such State
safety or health standard is in conflict with this Act.
(2) Any State safety or health standard in effect upon
the effective date of this Act, or which may become effec-
tive thereafter, which affords employees significantly
greater protection than a safety or health standard prom-
ulgated under this Act shall not thereby be construed or
held to be in conflict.
(c) Any State which, at any time, desires to assume
responsibility for development and enforcement in such
State of occupational safety or health standards relating
to any occupational safety or health issue with respect
to which a Federal standard has been promulgated under
section 4 shall submit a State plan for the development of
such standards and their enforcement.
+ * 7 *
9a
FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY
ACT OF 1969, PUBLIC LAW 91-173
EFFECT ON STATE LAWS
Sec. 506. (a) No State law in effect on the date of
enactment of this Act or which may become effective
thereafter shall be superseded by any provision of this
Act or order issued or any mandatory health or safety
standard, except insofar as such State law is in conflict
with this Act or with any order issued or any mandatory
health or safety standard.
(b) The provisions of any State law or regulation in
effect upon the operative date of this Act, or which may
become effective thereafter, which provide for more strin-
gent health and safety standards applicable to coal mines
than do the provisions of this Act or any order issued or
any mandatory health or safety standard shall not thereby
be construed or held to be in conflict with this Act. The
provisions of any State law or regulation in effect on the
date of enactment of this Act, or which may become effec-
tive thereafter, which provide for health and safety stand-
ards applicable to coal mines for which no provision is
contained in this Act or in any order issued or any
mandatory health or safety standard, shall not be held to
be in conflict with this Act.
10a
FEDERAL METAL AND NONMETALLIC MINE
SAFETY ACT, PUBLIC LAW 89-577
STATE PLANS
Sec. 16. (a) In order to promote sound and effective
coordination in Federal and State activities within the
field covered by this Act, the Secretary shall cooperate
with the official mine inspection or safety agencies of the
several States.
(b) Any State which, at any time, desires to develop
and enforce health and safety standards in mines located
in the State which are subject to this Act shall submit,
through a State mine inspection or safety agency, a State
plan for the development of such standards and their
enforcement.
EFFECT ON STATE LAWS
SEc. 19. (a) No State or territorial law in effect upon
the effective date of this Act or which may become ef-
fective therafter, shall be superseded by any provision
of this Act, except insofar as such State or territorial
law is in conflict with this Act, or with orders issued
pursuant to this Act.
(b) Provisions in any State or territorial law in effect
upon the effective date of this Act, or which may become
effective thereafter, which provide for greater safety of
persons in a mine as defined in this Act, than do pro-
visions of this Act, which relate to the same phase of
such operations, shall not be construed or held to be in
conflict with this Act. Provisions in any State or terri-
torial law in effect upon the effective date of this Act,
or which may become effective thereafter, which pro-
vide for the safety of persons in a mine as defined in this
Act concerning which no provision is contained in this
Act, shall not be construed or held to be superseded by
this Act.
lla
29 C.F.R. §1910.120 Hazardous waste operations and
emergency response.
(3) Definitions—“Buddy system means a system of or-
ganizing employees into work groups in such a manner
that each employee*of the work group is designated to be
observed by at least one other employee in the work
group. The purpose of the buddy system is to provide
rapid assistance to employees in the event of an emer-
gency.
(e) Training—(1) General. (i) All employees work-
Ing on site (such as but not limited to equipment opera-
tors, general laborers and others) exposed to hazardous
substances, health hazards, or safety hazards and their
supervisors and management responsible for the site shall
receive training meeting the requirements of this para-
graph before they are permitted to engage in hazardous
waste operations that could expose them to hazardous
substances, safety, or health hazards, and they shall re-
ceive review training as specified in this paragraph.
(ii) Employees shall not be permitted to participate
in or supervise field activities until they have been trained
to a level required by their job function and responsibility.
(2) Elements to be covered. The training shall
thoroughly cover the following:
(i) Names of personnel and alternates responsible for
site safety and health;
(ii) Safety, health and other hazards present on the
site;
(iii) Use of personal protective equipment;
. (iv) Work practices by which the employee can min-
imize risks from hazards;
12a
(3) Initial training. (i) General site workers (such
as equipment operators, general laborers and supervisory
personnel) engaged in hazardous substance removal or
other activities which expose or potentially expose work-
ers to hazardous substances and health hazards shall re-
ceive a minimum of 40 hours of instruction off the site,
and a minimum of three days actual field experience
under the direct supervsion of a trained, experienced
supervisor.
(ii) Workers on site only occasionally for a specific
limited task (such as, but not limited to, ground water
monitoring, land surveying, or geo-physical surveying)
and who are unlikely to be exposed over permissible ex-
posure limits and published exposure limits shall receive
a minimum of 24 hours of instruction off the site, and
the minimum of one day actual field experience under the
direct supervision of a trained, experienced supervisor.
(iii) Workers regularly on site who work in areas
which have been monitored and fully characterized indi-
cating that exposures are under permissible exposure
limits and published exposure limits where respirators
are not necessary, and the characterization indicates that
there are no health hazards or the possibility of an emer-
gency developing, shall receive a minimum of 24 hours
of instruction off the site and the minimum of one day
actual field experience under the direct supervision of a
trained, experienced supervisor.
(iv) Workers with 24 hours of training who are cov-
ered by paragraphs (e) (3) (ii) and (e) (3) (iii) of this
section, and who become general site workers or who are
required to wear respirators, shall have the additional 16
hours and two days of training necessary to total the
training specified in paragraph (e) (3) (i).
(4) Management and supervisor training. On-site man-
agement and supervisors directly responsible for, or who
supervise employees engaged in, hazardous waste opera-
tions shall receive 40 hours initial training, and three
13a
days of supervised field experience (the training may be
reduced to 24 hours and one day if the only area of their
responsibility is employees covered by paragraphs (e)
(3) (ii) and (e) (3) (iii)) and at least eight additional
hours of specialized training at the time of job assign-
ment on such topics as, but not limited to, the employer’s
safety and health program and the associated employee
training program, personal protective equipment pro-
gram, spill containment program, and health hazard mon-
itoring procedure and techniques.
* - om *
(9) Equivalent training. Employers who can show by
documentation or certification that an employee’s work
experience and/or training has resulted in training equiv-
alent to that training required in paragraphs (e) (1)
through (e) (4) of this section shall not be required to
provide the initial training requirements of those para-
graphs to such employees and shall provide a copy of the
certification or documentation to the employee upon re-
quest. However, certified employees or employees with
equivalent training new to a site shall receive appropriate,
site specific training before site entry and have appro-
priate supervised field experience at the new site. Equiv-
alent training includes any academic training or the train-
ing that existing employees might have already received
from actual hazardous waste site work experience.
~ * . *
l4a
Hazardous Waste Operations & Emergency Response
Final Rule
54 Fed. Reg. 9294, 9315-9316
IX. Federalism
This final regulation has been reviewed in accordance
with Executive Order 12612 (52 FR 41685; October 30,
1987) regarding Federalism. Executive Order 12612 re-
quires that agencies, to the extent possible, refrain from
limiting state policy options, consult with states prior to
taking any actions that would restrict state policy op-
tions, and take such actions only when there is clear
constitutional authority and the presence of a problem of
national scope. The Executive Order provides for pre-
emption of state law only if there is a clear Congressional
intent for the Agency to do so. Any such preemption 1s
to be limited to the extent possible.
During the development of this rule, OSHA has, to the
extent possible, refrained from limiting state policy op-
tions by developing a rule that permits flexibility on the
part of the States through the use of performance lan-
guage. We have also consulted with the States, in par-
ticular those states with approved state OSHA plans,
during the public hearings and comment period called for
in the notice of proposed rulemaking for this rule. We
will continue to work with the States that have state
occupational safety and health plans approved under sec-
tion 18 of the OSHA Act to encourage those states to
develop their own policies to achieve program objectives
and continue to work with appropriate state: officials as
they present their state standards for approval.
This rulemaking is directed by Congress under the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA). The Constitutional authority and Congressional
intent for Federal action in the area of worker protec-
tion standards for employees engaged in hazardous waste
operations is mandated clearly in section 126 of SARA.
lda
Congress therefore has identified the protection of em-
ployees engaged in hazardous waste operations and emer-
gency response as a problem of national scope through
the enactment of SARA.
Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSH Act), permits any state to develop its own inde-
pendent state occupational safety and health program.
Any state may develop and submit to OSHA, for approval
and use, a state occupational safety and health program
that provides, among other things, worker protection “at
least as effective as” that protection provided under the
Federal program.
With respect to Section 4 of Executive Order 12612,
Section 18 of the OSH Act also expresses Congress’ clear
intent to preempt state laws relating to issues with re-
spect to which Federal OSHA has promulgated occupa-
tional safety or health standards. Under the OSH Act,
a state can avoid preemption only if it submits, and ob-
tains Federal OSHA approval of, a plan for the develop-
ment of such standards and their enforcement as men-
tioned above. Occupational safety and health standards
developed by such approved Plan-States must, among
other things, be as least as effective in providing safe and
healthful employment and places of employment as the
Federal standards.
OSHA has used its regulatory preemption of State
law to the minimum level necessary to achieve the objec-
tives of the OSH Act and section 126 of SARA.
Section 126 of SARA, under paragraph (f), requires
that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
provide those state and local government workers who
are not covered by the protections of approved OSHA
state plans with protection that is identical to that pro-
vided under the Federal OSHA standards. Non-state
and local government employees would be regulated by
the Federal OSHA standard. State and local government
l6a
workers, employed in 25 non-OSHA state plan states,
would not normally be covered by standards promulgated
under Federal OSHA or approved state OSHA programs.
OSHA has worked with EPA in the development of this
final rule to assure that the protections provided to all
state and local government employees is consistent with
that provided by the Federal OSHA standard and the
OSH Act. EPA as the regulatory authority for the non-
OSHA state plan states will address their actions with
respect to worker protection policies that have federalism
implications in their rulemaking.
This final rule is written so that employees engaged
in hazardous waste operations and related emergency re-
sponse operations in every state, including those state
and local government employees in states regulated by
EPA, would be protected by general, performance
oriented standards. To the extent that there are state
or regional peculiarities caused by the types of hazardous
waste operations, including the types of related emer-
gency response provided, states with occupational safety
and health plans approved by OSHA under section 18 of
the OSH Act would be able to develop their own state
standards to address any special problems. This would
assure the compatibility of state or local emergency re-
sponse plans developed independently by state or local
emergency planning committees under Title III of SARA
with Federal worker protection standards issued by
OSHA and EPA.
And, under the OSH Act, if a state develops its own
OSHA approved state program, it could make additional
requirements in its standards. States that will be cov-
ered by regulations issued by EPA under paragraph
126(f) of SARA will be provided the same option.
Moreover, the performance nature of this final rule, of
and by itself, allows for flexibility by states and owners
or operators of hazardous wastes sites or providers of
emergency response to provide as much safety as pos-
17a
sible using varying methods consonant with the condi-
tions in each state.
In summary, there is a clear national problem, iden-
tified by Congress, related to occupational safety and
health in hazardous waste operations and related emer-
gency response. While the individual states, if all acted
collectively, might be able to deal with the safety prob-
lems involved, most have not elected to do so in the seven-
teen years since the enactment of the OSH Act. Those
States which have elected to participate under section
18 of the OSH Act, would not be preempted by this final
regulation and would be able to address special, local con-
ditions within the framework provided by this perform-
ance oriented standard while ensuring that their stand-
ards are at least as effective as the Federal standard.
State comments were invited on the proposal and those
that were submitted to the record were fully considered
prior to promulgation of this Final Rule.
The agency certifies that this document has been as-
sessed in light of the principles, criteria, and require-
ments stated in sections 2 through 5 of Executive Order
12621. There are no provisions of this rulemaking that
are inconsistent with the principles, criteria, and re-
quirements stated in sections 2 through 5 of Executive
Order 12621. States which have approved state occu-
pational safety and health plans may incur additional
costs associated with standards development and enforce-
ment as a result of this rulemaking. Funding for these
approved state plan programs is available from OSHA
under section 18 of the OSH Act. This rulemaking would
not change the State’s ability to discharge traditional
State governmental functions or other aspects of State
sovereignty.
18a
STATE OF ILLINOIS
85TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE—CERTIFIED
| STATE SEAL]
State of Illinois
Executive Department
CERTIFICATE
To All To Whom These Presents Shall Come, Greeting:
I, GEORGE H. RYAN, Secretary of State of the State
of Illinois, do hereby certify that the attached is a true
copy of debate on H.B. 3100 (P.A. 85-1195) in the House
on April 27, May 10, June 23 and July 1 and in the
Senate on June 14, June 15, June 27 and July 1.
[SEAL]
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I hereto set
my hand and cause to be affixed the Great
Seal of the State of Illinois. Done at the City
of Springfield, February 21, 1992.
/s/ George H. Ryan
Secretary of State
19a
127 Legislative Day July 1, 1988
Speaker McPike: “Representative Mays to close. Repre-
sentative Leverenz to close. Representative Leverenz
to close.”
Leverenz: “On... House Bill 3205, I now move that
the First Conference Committee Report be adopted
inasmuch as it was adopted in the Senate who has
the same concern by a vote of 57 to 0.”
Speaker McPike: “Question is, ‘Shall the House adopt
the First Conference Committee Report to House Bill
3205?’ All those in favor vote ‘aye’, opposed vote
‘no’. Have all voted? Have all voted? Have all voted
who wish? Clerk will take the record. On this Mo-
tion there are 107 ‘ayes’ 5 ‘nos’, and 1 voting ‘pres-
ent’. The House does adopt First Conference Com-
mitte Report to House Bill 3205. And this Bill
having received the required three fifths Constitu-
tional Majority is hereby declared passed. House
Calendar Supplemental #3, appears House Bill
3100, Representative Breslin.”
Breslin: “Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentle
men. I rise to inform the Body that we have been
able to reach an agreement with regard to tipping
fees in order to secure funding for the hazardous
waste disposal fund for both the State and Local
Government. The agreement is contained in House
Bill 3100. The following are the highlights of that
agreement. First of all, it has been agreed that there
will be a cap of seventy cents on the DuPage County
Forest Preserve District that landfills that are cur-
rently in existence. There are two. It is also agreed
that the language in this Bill with regard to this
issue will have no effect on the current suit dealing
with the Constitutionality challenging the Constitu-
20a
tionality of that DuPage County seventy cent tax.
The second part of the agreement is that the states
surcharge, tipping fee, shall be sixty cents for the
next three years and then it will drop down to forty
five cents. That will generate for the State of IIli-
nois, approximately sixteen million dollars for the
first three years and then will drop down to about
twelve million dollars thereafter. For the locals, the
surcharge will be forty-five cents for the first three
years and then will go up to sixty cents. The reason
for this change is and for the flipping of the fees
between the state and the locals is because at the
beginning of this process, the State will have the
major responsibility for helping locals in giving plan-
ning grants so the state is going to need more money.
After three years pass, the locals are going to be
ready to start implementing their plans. They are
going to need money to buy landfill space. They are
going to need money in order to start their incin-
erator to start their recycling programs etc. So, we
want to encourage implementation after this point.
The Bill refers to waste which is permanently dis-
posed of in landfills, not just that which is trans-
ferred. A local unit of Government is defined in the
Act as that which is defined under the Local Solid
Waste Disposal Abt and it must be located, the
facility must be . . . the charge can be placed only
where the disposal facility is located. It should be
noted that there are three units of Local Government
which could impose this tax. The county in which it
is located, the municipality in which it is located or
a joint action agency. It is up to the local communi-
ties to decide how and what they will charge. The
cap, however, is that it can not exceed forty five cents
for the next three years and sixty cents thereafter.
So it is possible, that should you have a municipal
landfill in a municipality. The Municipality may de-
cide to charge twenty cents and the county twenty
2la
five cents, and that will get them up to their forty
five cents. It is left in this Bill up to those individual
entities to make the determination. The Bill also
addresses the Constitutional questions that previously
held the previous Bill unconstitutional. Last but not
least, there is an additional provision in the Bill
which establishes a licensing system for crane op-
erators and for laborers who work with hazardous
waste materials only. The purpose of this licensing
requirement is to promote job safety and to protect
the life and health of our citizens. I don’t know if
you realize that, but I became familiar with this
issue when I was working on the hazardous—on the
household hazardous waste issue. We, as you know
last year passed a Bill that would require—or allow
municipalities to establish local collection programs
for their household hazardous waste. And it came to
my attention that this was a very tricky issue be-
cause we were having people who were untrained in
the handling of hazardous materials, actually going
out and doing the collecting. It was a concern with
regard to liability and it was a concern with regard
to the EPA and ENR as to how they should be main-
tained. We did build into that system, a requirement
that EPA and ENR set the operating standards for
such collection programs and we had to exempt people
from liability under. Well here are laborers and
crane operators, citizens of our state, taxpayers of
our state who can be put in hazardous positions,
handling hazardous waste material removal and clean
up, with no training whatsoever. This Bill would
establish a licensing procedure for both. I have—I
stand ready to answer any question that you might
have and I move for the adoption of the First Con-
ference Committee Report on House Bill 3100.”
Speaker McPike: ‘“You’ve heard the Lady’s Motion, and
on that Representative Wennlund,”
22a
Wennlund: “Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gen-
tlemen of the House. I rise in support of House Bill
3100. The State of Illinois can no longer wait to
implement tipping fees to fund recycling programs in
Illinois, composting programs in Illinois and waste
reduction in Illinois, The barge will not leave the
State of Illinois, its got to be dealt with now. The
time is now. I realize that some of the provisions
with respect to the crane operators licensing may be
somewhat offensive, but as Representative Breslin
said, they are limited to only hazardous waste. These
are the people who drive the bulldozers and the cranes
wearing white and yellow uniforms with masks on.
That’s all there is to it. We cannot afford to vote
‘no’ on this issue and see another New Jersey or
New York barge be rejected. The time is now in
Illinois, recycling is now in I}linois, composting is now
in Illinois, reduction of solid waste is now in Illinois
and the only way it’s going to get funded is through
this mechanism. It has been agreed to by all parties
with respect to the fees, DuPage County Forest
Preserve District is taken care of. Everything is in
place, we can no longer wait. I strongly urge a ‘yes’
vote even if you have to hold your nose with respect
to the crane operators. But remember it’s only those
operators dealing with hazardous waste, the time is
now, I urge all my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle, please vote ‘yes’ on this issue and let’s get it
out and get it implemented.”
Speaker McPike: “Representative Didrickson.”
Didrickson: “Thank you, Mr. Speaker, would the Spon-
sor yield for some questions please?”
Speaker McPike: ‘Yes she will.”
Didrickson: “Representative Breslin, the statement has
been made that there is some very fine and good
aspects to this Bill and the time has come and I
28a
may concur on that. But there are also a number
of us that are concerned about the licensure crane
operators. Why at the twelfth hour has this been
put into the Conference Committee Report? Has
there been a Bill going through the system, this
legislative year or has there been public debate on
this particular licensure of crane operators?”
Breslin: “There was public debate on this issue earlier
in the House in this Session. At that time, the Bill
as considered was poorly drafted, there were not a lot
of details worked out on it between the various oppos-
ing parties and it was defeated in the House Com-
mittee. Since that time, a great number of meetings
have taken place. The language has been cleaned up
dramatically and a number of compromises have been
reached. So the Bill that comes to you today is much
improved over that which failed in House Committee
earlier this year.”
Didrickson: “The second question that I would have for
those that are concerned about the licensure of the
crane operators is the fact that you’re licensing the
big crane operators, but what about the smaller lift
crane operators? Why are you excluding them?”
Breslin: “It is my understanding that the type of crane
that is used in the removal of hazardous waste ap-
plies to the larger crane. And we did not intend to
include the forklift or the bobcat, the thing that—
runs around the average manufacturing plant, we
wanted to confine it only to the large crane that is
typically used in this process and so this restriction
was put in, I believe in order to satisfy the concerns
of the business community of this state.”
Didrickson: “Well, it’s my understanding that the lan-
guage you have here has been drafted so broadly that
it does not do what you just said and so that’s the
line of my questioning here and that indeed it is so
ib |
24a
broad that there is concern now that you are also
going to be licensing cleaning ladies at these plants
because of the overly broad language.”
Breslin: “I disagree. This is a strict construction for the
definition for crane, hoist, laborer, hazardous waste
and the facility in which this applies. In addition to
that, there are several exemptions. The following are
those exemptions. Operators of forklifts or bobcats.
Operators of graining . . . grading, drainage, field
tile and irrigation equipment. Operators of agricul-
tural farming equipment. Persons involved in activi-
ties associated with the excavation for discovery,
development or production of minerals, coals or other
substances and oil, gas and water. Employees of a
railroad who operate a crane or a hoist. And any
employee of the owner, operator or principal re-
sponsible party of the manufacturing facility under-
going cleanup providing the employee has undergone
the required training by OSHA, hazardous waste
operations.”
Didrickson: “I think you just mentioned the fact that
it also requires those regarding clean up is that
correct?”
Breslin: “It exempts any employee of the owner, op-
erator or principal responsible party of manufactur-
ing facilities undergoing cleanup provided the em-
ployee has had some training under the OSHA haz-
ardous waste operations. I just gave you an exemp-
tion not an inclusion.”
Didrickson: “Well ... what you’re saying and reading
into the record here is correct. I just would like to
caution for those who are concerned about the li-
censure of crane operators and the potential future
licensure of the trades, which is really what we’re
opening the door for here, that this has been drafted
as I am told very broadly and that will include what
25a
it is that you are saying it doesn’t. I hope you’re
correct. I just want to raise the flag on that and
express those concerns of the business community.”
Speaker McPike: “Representative McCracken.”
McCracken: “Thank you, Mr. Speaker, I move the previ-
ous question.”
Speaker McPike: ‘The Gentleman moves the previous
question. The question is, ‘Shall the previous question
be put?’ All those in favor say ‘aye’, opposed ‘no’, the
‘ayes’ have it and the previous question is put. Rep-
resentative Breslin to close.”
Breslin: “I repeat, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the
tipping fee Bill. It has the agreement of DuPage
County, the City of Chicago, downstate, ENR, the
EPA, the Environmental Community. It has the sup-
port of laborers and the trades people and the crane
operators, so I ask for adoption of the First Con-
ference Committee Report.”’
Speaker McPike: “The Lady moves for the adoption of
the report. The question is, ‘Shall the House adopt
the Conference Committee Report to House Bill 3100?
All in favor vote ‘aye’, opposed ‘no’. Have all voted?
Have all voted who wish? Representative Hultgren,
did you wish to explain your ‘no’ vote?”’
Hutlgren: “Yes, if I may.”
Speaker McPike: ‘Proceed sir.”
Hultgren: “In the debate, I heard much discussion about
the licensing of crane operators. I think omitted
from the discussion, at least from the question and
answer, apparently the provision also licenses labor-
ers and if that makes a difference to some, just—it
would appear that a basic laborer would have to
maintain a license under the Conference Committee
Report. I wanted to point that out.”
- 26a
Speaker McPike: ‘Have all voted? Have all voted who
wish? The Clerk will take the record. On this Motion
there are 95 ‘ayes’, 15 ‘nos’ and 5 voting ‘present’.
The House does adopt the First Conference Commit-
tee Report to House Bill 3100, and this Bill having
received the required three fifths Constitutional Ma-
jority is hereby declared passed. The vote has been
taken and the Bill has been declared passed. If some-
one wishes to add, they can be journalized. The Clerk
has a mechanical problem with this roll, we will dump
the Roll Call and vote again. Question is, ‘Shall
the House adopt the First Conference Committee Re-
port to House Bill 3100? All those in favor vote ‘aye’,
opposed vote ‘no’. Have all voted? Have all voted
who wish? Clerk will take the record. Representa-
tive Dunn would like to change from ‘aye’ to ‘no’.
Mr. Dunn from ‘aye’ to ‘no’. On this Motion there
are 91 ‘ayes’, 16 ‘nos’ and 8 voting ‘present’. The
House does adopt the First Conference Committee
Report to House Bill 3100, and this Bill having re-
ceived the required three fifths Constitutional Ma-
jority is hereby declared passed. Turning to Supple-
mental + 2, House Bill 3227, Representative Mays,
Mr. Mays.”
Mays: “Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and
Gentlemen of the House. This is the operations and
new appropriations for the Department of Trans-
portation spends a billion, nine hundred and twenty
million, six hundred and seventeen thousand total of
which nineteen million, eight hundred and sixty five
thousand, six hundred dollars is general funds. I
would move for adoption of the Conference Commit-
tee Report.”
27a
STATE OF ILLINOIS
85TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SENATE
TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE—CERTIFIED
PRESIDENT :
Senator Savickas.
SENATOR SAVICKAS:
Yes, the amendment did not even bring the cost into it.
The amendment just was put on primarily so that it
can go into a conference committee and then the cost
would be put on. That is not happening, so we’ll remove
it, let it go out and let them work on it next. . . Session.
PRESIDENT:
Further discussion? Further discussion? If not, the
question is, shall the Senate recede from Senate Amend-
ment No. 1 to House Bill 849. Those in favor will vote
Aye. Opposed vote Nay. The voting is open. Have all
voted who wish? Have all voted who wish? Have all
voted who wish? Take the record. On that question,
there are 55 Ayes, no Nays, none voting Present. The
Senate does recede from Amendment—Senate Amend-
ment No. 1 to House Bill 849 and the bill having received
the required constitutional majority is declared passed.
Now, on page 7—Senator Smith, for what purpose do you
arise?
SENATOR SMITH:
Would you be kind and register me as voting Aye on
that, please? I’m so sorry.
PRESIDENT:
All right, the record will so reflect. Middle of page 7,
ladies and gentlemen. We'll go right through the Con-
ference Committee Reports as filed, then we will go to
28a
the Order of Secretary’s Desk Resolutions and by then, I
hope, we will have a supplemental Calendar to address.
On the Order of Conference Committee Reports, Madam
Secretary, the Conference Committee Report on House
Bill 3100.
SECRETARY:
First Conference Committee Report on House Bill 3100.
PRESIDENT:
Senator Welch.
SENATOR WELCH:
Thank you, Mr. President. The Conference Committee
Report on House Bill 3100 reflects initially an agreement
that has been worked out over two years. As many of
you recall, the Solid Waste Management Act was de-
clared unconstitutional in 1987 because the court decided
that money was collected without regard to discretion
as to categories that were included or excluded. This bill
now reaches an agreement between the major parties who
were involved. There is only one group, a waste disposal
industry, that is opposed to this part of that bill. In
addition to that, this also enacts a bill . . . legislation
that will create the Hazardous Waste Crane and Hoisting
Equipment Operators Licensing Act. Let me explain the
part of the bill that affects the settlement between Du-
Page County, Cook County and the rest of the state to
reenact the Solid Waste Management Act. The major
dispute between the party was the
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
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