Cross Petition — United States Department of Energy v. Ohio
Supreme Court brief1991
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90-1517 [sams |
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AR 26 1991
\ Uy in CLERK
No. \ eae
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
STATE OF OHIO, et al..
Cross -Petitioner,
V.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
CROSS-PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CROSS-PETITION OF THE STATE OF OHIO
LEE FISHER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO
By. JACK A. VAN KLEY
Assistant Attorney Genera!
Environmental Enforcement Section
30 East Broad Street, 25th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43266-0410
(614) 466-2766
Counsel of Record for Cross-Petitioner
TIMOTHY J. KERN
TERRENCE S. FINN
Assistant Attorneys Genera!
Co-Counsel for Cross-Petitioner
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether Section 7002 of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42
U.S.C. 6972, waives the sovereign immunity of
the United States from assessment of state civil
penalties for violation of state hazardous waste
laws.
Whether Sections 313 and 505 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1323, waive the sovereign
immunity of the United States from assessment
of federal civil penalties for violations of the
Clean Water Act.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
This case was brought in the district court and litigated
in the Court of Appeals by the State of Ohio on the relation
of its Attorney General, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. succeeded
by Lee Fisher. The Defendants-Appellants before the Court
of Appeals were the U.S. Department of Energy and Secretary
of Energy James D. Watkins.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
OPINIONS BELOW
JURISDICTION
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE CROSS-PETITION
As Shown By The Widespread National Interest
in This Case, The Elimination Of Dangerous
And Illegal Hazardous Waste Activities By
Federal Agencies !s Vital For the Protection
EEE ES
Because The Department Of Justice Prohibits
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
From Suing Or Penalizing Sister Federal
Agencies For Illegal Hazardous Waste
Activities, The States Must Be Allowed To
Utilize The Civil Penalty Deterrent Provided By
Congress To Enforce The Law At Federal
DT SEGEECGSESececcocccesccecccccce.
The Courts’ Continued Failure To Implement
The Civil Penalty Waiver Provided By
Congress Will Magnify The Multi-Billion Dollar
Cleanup Crisis Caused By Illegal Federal
Agency Pollution Activities ................
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\V. By Discarding The History Preceding The
Enactment Of The RCRA Waiver, The Court
Of Appeals Violated The Rules of Statutory
Construction Applicable To Waivers Of
Sovereign Immunity Set Forth By This Court
And Established A Rule Of Law Inconsistent
With This Court’s Holding In Hancock v.
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A. The Sovereign Immunity Decisions Of
This Court Require That Congressional
Intent Be Ascertained and Implemented ...
B. Because This Court In Hancock v. Train
Equated ‘Procedural Requirements”
With “Enforcement Mechanisms,”
Congress Waived Federal Agency
immunity For Civil Penalties And Other
Enforcement Mechanisms By Subjecting
The Agencies To “All Procedural
PE” “Kebceedeseewseeseonnec<
C. By Admitting That Congress Used The
Words "All Procedural Requirements’’ To
Waive Immunity For Enforcement
Mechanisms, And Then Ruling That
Procedural Requirements Do Not Include
Enforcement Mechanisms, The Court of
Appeals Violated The Rules Of Statutory
Construction Provided By This Court And
Adopted A Rule Of Law Contrary To This
Court’s Decision In Hancock v. Train
V. By Interpreting The Waiver in A Manner
inconsistent With The Plain Meaning Of The
Language And By Creating An Exception To
Exempt Penalties From The Broad Waiver
Intended By Congress To Cover All
Enforcement Mechanisms, The Court Of
Appeals Violated This Court’s Principles Of
Statutory Construction And Thwarted
Congressional Policy ..................... 13
A. Where Congress In General Terms Has
Enacted A Broad Waiver Of Sovereign
Immunity, The Language Of That Waiver
Must Be Interpreted According To Its
Common Meaning And in A Manner
Which Effectuates The Broad Waiver.
Congress Is Not Required To Specifically
Spell Out Each And Every Federal Action
included In The Waiver ............... 13
B. Because The RCRA Waiver Includes All
Requirements” Without Limitation, And
Because The Common Meaning Of
“Requirements” Includes Civil Penalties,
The Court Of Appeals Erred In Deleting
Penalties From The Waiver ............ 15
C. By Admitting That The Plain Meaning Of
Requirements” includes Civil Penalties,
And Then Manufacturing Ambiguity As
An Excuse To Except Penalties From That
Plain Meaning, The Court Of Appeals
Violated The Rules Of Statutory
Construction Followed By This Court ... 17
Vi. if The Court Reverses The Decision Below
With Respect To State Water Pollution
Penalties, It Should Find That The Citizen Suit
Provision Of The Clean Water Act Waives
Immunity From Civil Penalties ............. 19
GREE Chere bdccdodessebhetéseédseesteeds 20
Vv!
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1974)
ee en nt ke eeeee es 10
Canadian Aviator v. United States,
ARE EE EE EEE EP EE Ee ETE 14
EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) .......... 5.6.7.9
Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co.,
EO Oe 16
Florida Dept. of Envti. Regulation v.
silvex Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fila. 1985) ........ 3
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. U.S.
Postal Service, 467 US. 512 (1984) .......... 8, 12,13
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
Oe 14, 16, 18
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) ............. 5-12
Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp.,
PTD Sheddeusscidvevdsccecvepeonns 16
Kosak v United States,
465 U.S. 848 (1984) ...... eee eeeeeeeees 13, 14,17, 18
Maine v. Navy.
702 F. Supp. 322 (D. Me. 1988) .............. 12, 15, 17
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Ault,
ee ee Coens be eee 14,15
Nationai City Bank of New York v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) .......... 8, 12
vii
PC. Pfeiffer Company v. Ford, 444 U.S.69 (1979) ...... 16
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S.658(1975) ......... 8, 12
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) ........ 8,12
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) ............... 19
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) ... 13,17, 18
United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
PU PRUE «oc wccccecccesecsee 8, 13, 14, 17, 18
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States,
i ee eee cn beneseenes 14
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
FEDERAL
PEE MENU ccc cccsocenccceescosccecosecccesse 1
CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.:
PME WEED ceecccccnccesccosesscceveseccess 1, 19
BPG UD Svc ccccvccecscnvseenescececocceees 19
SE CED o ccccceccccveccesecesecncencesese 1
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT (RCRA),
42 U.S.C. 6901 et seg.
EE. “aebnendadececescceascucece 1, 15, 16, 18
OHIO REVISED CODE
ED, ccdccpccectccccdsvactieseesensoes 1
MISCELLANEOUS
H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ......... 5
H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ........ 2
H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ........ 6
vill
Report of the NGA-NAAG Task Force on Federal!
Facilities, From Crisis To Commitment:
Environmental Cleanup And Compliance At
Federal Facilities, (January, 1990) ............... 3,4
S. Rep. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ..........
S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ...........
S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ..........
Webster's Third New International Dictionary ........
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the court of appeals is reported at 904
F.2d 1058 and is reprinted at pages 1a-27a in the Appendix
of the Department of Energy's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
The decision of the district court is reported at 689 F.Supp.
760 and is reprinted at pages 28a-46a of the same Appendix.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
June 11, 1990. A petition for rehearing was denied on October
10, 1990. On December 28, 1990, Justice Stevens extended
the time for filing a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to February
7, 1991. On January 30, 1991, Justice Stevens ‘urther
extended the time for filing a petition to and including
February 22, 1991. The State of Ohio received the Department
of Energy's Petition (No. 90-1341) for a Writ of Certiorari on
February 25, 1991 and is filing this cross-petition in reliance
on Rule 12.3 of the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Sections 313(a) and 505(a) of the Clean Water Act (““CWA’’),
33 US.C. 1323(a), 1365(a), are reproduced at pages 49a-
52a of the Appendix to the Department of Energy's Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari. Section 6001 of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C.
6961, is reproduced in the Appendix to the State's Brief in
Opposition to DOE's Petition. Section 3734.13(C) of the Ohio
Revised Code is reproduced at pages 54a-55a of the
Appendix to the DOE Petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts relevant to this Cross-Petition have been
described in the Statement of the Case for the State's Brief
in Opposition to the Department of Energy's Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari. The State's Statement of the Case in that
brief is hereby incorporated by reference.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE CROSS-PETITION
i. As Shown By The Widespread National Interest
In This Case, The Elimination of Dangerous And
\legal Hazardous Waste Activities By Federal
Agencies Is Vital For the Protection Of The
Public.
When enacting the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), Congress was primarily concerned about the
unsafe management and disposal of hazardous waste. H.R.
Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6241. The House found
that these wastes can “blind, cripple or kill . . . defoliate
the environment, contaminate drinking water supplies and
enter the food chain.” H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at 11, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6249. See also,
the 59 examples of groundwater pollution, fish kills, wildlife
and livestock kills, and human poisonings cited by the House
to illustrate the problems resulting from improper hazardous
waste disposal. H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at 17-23, 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6254-61.
Hazardous waste mismanagement at federal facilities was
a rea! concern for Congress since the federal government
had over twenty thousand facilities. H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at
46, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6284.
Because Congress realized that a comprehensive program
to prevent hazardous waste pollution would be ineffective
without the cooperation of federal facilities, Congress wanted
federal facilities to “provide national leadership in dealing
with solid waste and hazardous waste disposal problems.”
S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976).
A January, 1990 report by a task force commissioned by
the National Governors Association and the National
Association of Attorneys General estimates that the
Department of Defense alone generates approximately
750,000 tons of hazardous waste each year.’ This quantity
of waste is more than the annual production of waste by
the five largest U.S. chemical companies combined.’
Because the federal government is the nation’s worst
polluter, Ohio as well as other states and the public have
a vital stake in eliminating the pervasive hazardous waste
hazards at federai facilities. Twenty-three (23) amici states
supported Ohio below in the Sixth Circuit by filing a brief
urging the court of appeals to effectuate Congress’ waiver
for state hazardous waste penalties. Ohio was also supported
by a number of public interest organizations.
Given the dangers posed by toxic wastes at federal
facilities, it should come as no Surprise that, of the four civil
penalty issues in this case, the state hazardous waste penalty
issue has stirred the most national interest. In fact, the number
of cases related to state hazardous waste penalties is greater
than the totai number of cases for the other three penalty
provisions combined. See the cases listed at page 25 of
DOE's brief.” Therefore, this is an extremely important
question of national interest which should be addressed by
the Court.
ll. Because The Department Of Justice Prohibits
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
From Suing Or Penalizing Sister Federal
Agencies For Illegal Hazardous Waste
Activities, The States Must Be Allowed To
Utilize The Civil Penalty Deterrent Provided By
Congress To Enforce The Law At Federal
Facilities.
' Report of the NGA-NAAG Task Force on Federal Facilities, From Crisis
To Commitment: Environmental Cleanup And Compliance At Federal
Facilities, (January, 1990), p. 3.
2 Id., at p. 3-4.
> It should be noted, however, that one of the cases on DOE's list of
civil penalty cases does not address civil penalties at all. Florida Dep't.
of Envtl. Regulation v. Silvex Corp., 606 F.Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
The importance of effective state enforcement is
heightened by the comparative inability of the U-S.
Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA’) to enforce the
pollution laws against its sister agencies. Under Department
of Justice policy, the U.S. EPA is not allowed to file suit against
other federa! agencies or to penalize them. As a result, former
U.S. EPA Assistant Administrative J. Winston Porter testified
before Congress that U.S. EPA had been forced to rely on
‘“jawboning” federal agencies in attempt to obtain
compliance. Report of NGA-NAAG Task Force, p. 7.
Therefore, in the absence of U.S. EPA enforcement, the
states are left to conduct enforcement at federal facilities.
It is thus essential that the states be allowed to utilize the
civil penalty deterrent Congress intended them to use against
uncooperative federal agencies. Because the court of
appeals below struck that deterrent tool from the
Congressional waiver, review by this Court is necessary to
repair the waiver and restore Congressional intent.
lll. The Courts’ Continued Failure To Iimpiement
The Civil Penalty Waiver Provided By
Congress Will Magnify The Multi-Billion Dollar
Cleanup Crisis Caused By Illegal Federal
Agency Pollution Activities.
Careless and illegal pollution from federal facilities is a
federal disaster, creating a national cleanup crisis which will
cost the taxpayers billions of doilars to remedy. The General
Accounting Office and others have estimated that
contaminated Department of Energy sites alone will cost
between $95 billion to $130 billion to remedy. Report of the
NGA-NAAG Task Force, p. 3. Even if DOE works aggressively
on this cleanup, the Department has predicted that this
mammoth task will take thirty years to complete.
This epic cleanup Crisis did not develop overnight. Instead,
this cleanup problem is rooted in decades of federal agency
disregard for state and federal pollution laws. Convinced
that they had sovereign immunity against punishment, these
agencies continued to violate the law even after Congress
enacted stricter legislation in a vain attempt to inject
responsibility into federal pollution practices.
The history of federal agency neglect, as chronicled in
the legislative history of federal pollution contro! statutes,
is useful for two purposes. First, it demonstrates the
importance of the RCRA civil penalty waiver and thus the
importance of granting this Cross-Petition. Second, this
history shows what Congress nad in mind when it wrote
the civil penalty waiver, an intent discarded by the court's
decision below.
While considering the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Congress
noted with dismay the “many incidents of flagrant violations
of air and water pollution requirements” by federal activities.
S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in 1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3733-34. Both the House and
Senate noticed that the bad federal example was
discouraging private compliance as well. /d.; H.R. Rep. No.
911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 188 (1972). As a result, Congress
inserted, into both the air and water statutes, waivers
requiring federal agencies to obey federal, state, and local
pollution control laws.
This legislation, however, did not stop, or even slow down,
federal facility pollution. By refusing to apply for and obtain
pollution contro! permits, federal agencies stymied the states’
attempts to halt federal pollution.
The states’ attempts to control federal agency pollution
through permits e®ded in federal agency challenges to the
waivers in both the Clean Air Act in Hancock v. Train, 426
U.S. 167 (1976), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
in EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976). Narrowly construing
the waivers in both statutes, the Court ruled that Congress
had not intended to waive immunity for permits and other
enforcement mechanisms.
Congress reacted sharply to these decisions when it
passed RCRA in 1976 and amended the Clean Air Act and
Federal Water Pollution Control Act in 1977. Finding that
“many federal agencies continue to try to evade the mandate
of Federal law to comply with all State and local
requirements,” the House discovered that the agencies had
been invoking sovereign immunity to avoid their air pollution
contro! duties. H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 199,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1277-
78. The House then discussed the Hancock decision, stating:
In the committee's view, the language of existing
law should have been sufficient to insure Federal
compliance in all of the aforementioned situations.
Unfortunately, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
construed Section 118 narrowly in Hancock v. Train.
_.. The new section 113 of the bill is intended
to overturn the Hancock case....
Id. Congress fiad a similar adverse reaction to the Supreme
Court decision in California, commenting:
The act has been amended to indicate
unequivocally that all Federal facilities and
activities are subject to a// of the provisions of State
and local pollution laws. Though this was the intent
of the Congress in passing the 1972 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments, the Supreme
Court, encouraged by Federal agencies, has
misconstrued the original intent.
S. Rep. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4392 (emphasis added).
Dismayed by the widespread failure of federal agencies
to abate their pollution even while private citizens were doing
their part to protect the environment, Congress amended
the waivers in both the air and water statutes. To end federally
sponsored pollution, Congress inserted broadly worded
waivers into both statutes designed to authorize a//
enforcement mechanisms against federal agencies. A similar
broad waiver was inserted into RCRA, enacted only months
after the Hancock decision.
Therefore, Congress intended to remove the cloak of
sovereign immunity from enforcement sanctions in order to
overcome federal agency obstacles to a clean environment.
Buoyed by their successes in Hancock and California,
however, federal agencies continued to ignore their pollution
control obligations. Confident in their ability to persuade the
courts to restrictively interpret the waivers, federal agencies
took the position that they could not be punished even though
they continued to disobey the law.
Unfortunately, the agencies have enjoyed continued
success in many of their attempts to invoke sovereign
immunity against enforcement mechanisms despite the clear
intent of Congress to waive immunity from these
mechanisms. In response to state attempts to enforce their
hazardous waste laws at federal facilities, federal agencies
have persuaded some of the courts to disregard the waiver
for civil penalties and other enforcement mechanisms
provided by RCRA. See the list of cases on page 25 of DOE’s
Petition. As a result, these courts have removed from the
states’ arsenal the most effective deterrent against the
creation of yet additiona! cleanup problems.
Federal agencies would have taken greater care to comply
with the law had they thought they could be penalized for
their illegal behavior. Had federal agencies not been
complacent in their ability to persuade the courts to ignore
Congressional waivers of sovereign immunity, the multi-
billion dollar cleanup crisis would have been substantially
avoided. Unless the Court grants Ohio's petition and corrects
the court of appeals below for deleting state hazardous waste
penalties from the waiver, the states will lose their most
effective weapon against this costly, federally sponsored
pollution.
1V. By Discarding The History Preceding The
Enactment Of The RCRA Waiver, The Court
Of Appeals Violated The Rules of Statutory
Construction Applicable To Waivers Of
Sovereign Immunity Set Forth By This Court
And Established A Rule Of Law Inconsistent
With This Court’s Holding In Hancock v. Train.
A. The Sovereign Immunity Decisions Of
This Court Require That Congressional
Intent Be Ascertained and Implemented.
When interpreting part of a statute, the courts do not look
solely at the specific language being construed. Rather than
reading a statutory section or sentence in isolation and out
of context, the courts examine the whole statute as well as
its objective and policy. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 658,
713 (1975); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
In performing such an examination, the courts’ goal is to
ascertain congressionai intent and to effectuate it. Phi/brook,
421 U.S. at 713. The courts are not to adopt a “crabbed
construction” of a waiver or to insist that Congress use “a
ritualistic formula” to waive immunity. Franchise Tax Bd. of
Cal. v. U.S. Postal Service, 467 U.S. 512, 521 (1984). instead.
the scope of a waiver can be ascertained only by reference
to “underlying congressional policy.” /d.
When interpreting Congressional intent in a statute waiving
the sovereign immunity of the United States, the courts have
found the public feeling toward sovereign immunity reflected
in the statute to be a helpful barometer of Congressional
objectives and goals. While discussing “the immunity
enjoyed by the United States as territorial sovereign,” the
Supreme Court explained the necessity of gauging public/
Congressional feeling in the following words:
The outlook and feeling thus reflected are not
merely relevant to our problem. They are important.
A steady legislative trend, presumably
manifesting a strong social policy, properly makes
demands on the judicial process.
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348
U.S. 356, 359-60 (1955). See also, United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 (1951).
Therefore, the Court has acknowledged that public and
Congressional feeling about sovereign immunity under a
statute influences Congressional purpose, and that the
courts’ understanding of the public climate are vital to
interpreting Congressional intent. This climate can be
ascertained from the words and legislative history ofa statute.
The district court below conscientiously followed the
sovereign immunity decisions of this Court by carefully
analyzing the history of the RCRA waiver. Upon completion
of this analysis, the district court honored the obvious
Congressional response to Hancock in waiving immunity for
all enforcement mechanisms. The court of appeals, however,
paid only lip service to the obvious Congressional intent
to waive immunity for penalties and reversed the district
court. Because the court of appeals declined to follow
Congressional intent contrary to the opinions of this Court,
the Court should review this matter.
B. Because This Court In Hancock v. Train
Equated ‘Procedural Requirements’ With
“Enforcement Mechanisms,’’ Congress
Waived Federal Agency Immunity For Civil
Penalties And Other Enforcement
Mechanisms By Subjecting The Agencies To
“All Procedural Requirements.”
At the time the Court considered the Hancock and
California cases, the air and water statutes waived immunity
for “requirements.” At issue in these cases was whether
“requirements” was meant to include only substantive
obligations, or whether “requirements” also included
procedural obligations such as the procurement of permits.
Resorting to legislative history, the Court held that Congress
did not intend to include permits and other procedural
obligations within the meaning of “requirements”. California,
426 U.S. at 223; Hancock, 426 U.S. at 197-98. The Court's
distinction between substantive and procedural
requirements is extremely important, because it was this
distinction that Congress had in mind when writing the
present waivers in RCRA.
10
Before Hancock, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had phrased the issue in the same fashion, coming to the
opposite conclusion. In Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238
(5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit distinguished between
substantive duties and enforcement mechanisms in the
Clean Air Act, as follows:
Defendants seek to avoid the impact of $118 by
engrafting upon it a substantive procedural overlay.
They argue that the phrase “requirements
respecting control and abatement of air pollution”
means only requirements such as emission
standards and limitations, which they label
“substantive,” and does not include mechanisms,
e.g., permit systems, for enforcing these
requirements.
(Emphasis added). /d., at 1245. Relying on the wording of
the Clean Air Act waiver, the “scheme of the Act as a whole,”
and “Congressional purpose,” the Fifth Circuit held that
enforcement mechanisms were requirements. /d., at 1245-
47.
Although the Seeber decision was vacated in light of the
subsequent decision in Hancock, this Court in Hancock
phrased the issue in the same fashion by quoting from
Seeber:
[T]he question is .. . “whether Congress intended
that the enforcement mechanisms of federally
approved state implementation plans, in this case
permit systems, would be” available to the States
to enforce that duty.
426 US. at 183-(emphasis added). On page 184 of the
Hancock opinion, the Court rejected the state’s contention
that Congress had intended to “subject federal facilities to
the enforcement mechanisms’ of state law (emphasis added).
In holding that enforcement mechanisms were not
“requirements”, the Court repeatedly distinguished between
enforcement mechanisms and substantive duties. /d., at 182,
11
183, 184, 185, 186, 187 n. 48, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193,
194, 195, 196, 197, 198. In fact, the opinion uses “enforcement
mechanisms” and derivatives of “enforce” no fewer than
thirty-one times when discussing “procedural requirements.”
Therefore, just before Congress passed RCRA, the courts
had drawn the distinction between substantive requirements
on one hand, and enforcement mechanisms or procedural
requirements, on the other hand. However, this was just one
of Hancock's statements which influenced the language later
written into the RCRA and Clean Water Act waivers. The
Court also declared that it was “notable” that Congress
required federal agencies only to comply with “requirements”
instead of requiring that they comply with “a/f’ requirements.
326 U.S. at 182.
Due to the Court's holdings, Congress wrote waivers for
both “substantive” and “procedural” requirements in RCRA,
the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act. Because the
existing court decisions had expressly referred to
enforcement mechanisms as “procedural requirements,”
Congress in reliance on this distinction waived immunity from
both “substantive” and “procedural” requirements in order
to subject federal facilities to enforcement mechanisms.
Relying heavily on Hancock's emphasis on the use of “a/f”’
to accomplish a complete waiver, Congress used the term
“alf’ to describe the procedural requirements waived in all
three acts. Thus, Congress unambiguously showed its intent
to apply a// enforcement mechanisms to polluting federal
facilities.
Because civil penalties are most definitely an enforcement
mechanism, Congress very clearly intended to waive
immunity for penalties. The court of appeals, however, failed
to effectuate that intent and thus has set back Congress’
attempt to reduce the dangers and cost of irresponsible
hazardous waste activities by federal agencies.
C. By Admitting That Congress Used The Words
“All Procedural Requirements’’ To Waive
immunity For Enforcement Mechanisms, And
12
Then Ruling That Procedural Requirements
Do Not include Enforcement Mechanisms,
The Court of Appeals Violated The Rules Of
Statutory Construction Provided By This Court
And Adopted A Rule Of Law Contrary To This
Court’s Decision In Hancock v. Train.
In its opinion, the court of appeals discussed and
acknowledged the history proceeding the enactment of the
RCRA waiver, concluding:
Circumstances surrounding the passage of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also
support a finding that “requirements” include civil
penaities.
App. to DOE Pet., p. 10a. The court of appeals even admitted
that Congress had inserted into the waiver the exact wording
the Hancock opinion stated would effectuate a clear waiver
for all enforcement mechanisms. /d., pp. 10a-11a. This finding
is in accord with the district court analysis below, as well!
as the opinion in Maine v. Navy, 702 F.Supp. 322, 329 (D.
Me. 1988) (appeal pending, No. 86-0211 (1st Cir.)), both of
which held that immunity from civil penalties is waived.
Then the court of appeals inexplicably adopted the Ninth
Circuit position that requirements do not include
enforcement mechanisms, stating that this is “a different
plausible” reading of the waiver. /d., p. 12a. This “plausible”
reading is flatly contradictory to this Court's decision in
Hancock, which describes “enforcement mechanisms” as
“procedural requirements” thirty-one (31) times.
Therefore, the court of appeals ascertained underlying
Congressional intent and policy in accordance with this
Court’s above-cited decisions in Franchise Tax Bd.,
Philbrook, Richards, and National City Bank. However, the
court of appeals then proceeded to search for “a different
plausible’ meaning that contradicted that known
Congressional intent, thereby adopting a ‘‘crabbed
construction” of the waiver in violation of this Court's decision
13
in Franchise Tax Bd. Because the court of appeals has
disregarded this Court's rules of statutory construction, and
because that court's opinion will increase the danger and
cost of hazardous waste pollution at federal facilities, the
Court should review this matter.
V. By Interpreting The Waiver in A Manner
inconsistent With The Plain Meaning Of The
Language And By Creating An Exception To
Exempt Penalties From The Broad Waiver
Intended By Congress To Cover All
Enforcement Mechanisms, The Court Of
Appeals Violated This Court’s Principles Of
Statutory Construction And Thwarted
Congressioral Policy.
A. Where Congress In General Terms Has
Enacted A Broad Waiver Of Sovereign
Immunity, The Language Of That Waiver
Must Be Interpreted According To Its
Common Meaning And in A Manner
Which Effectuates The Broad Waiver.
Congress Is Not Required To Specifically
Spell Out Each And Every Federal Action
included In The Waiver.
When determining the meaning of a waiver, the courts
assume that legislative intent is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used in the statute. Kosak v. United
States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 (1984): Yellow Cab Co., 340 US.
at 548. When construing statutes in general, this Court has
consistently declined to depart from the plain meaning of
statutory language absent clear indication of contrary
legislative intent. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580
(1981). Where the language of a statute broadly waives
sovereign immunity, the courts may not whittle it down by
resorting to a review of legislative history or other
refinements. Yellow Cab, 340 US. at 549-50.
Furthermore, when Congress uses broad. sweeping
language to waive immunity for a large category of
14
government activities, it is presumed to mean exactly what
it says. In such a case, Congress has waived immunity for
all federal activities fitting within that category of activity
and the courts may not defeat Congressional intent by
narrowing the scope of the waiver. Thus, in Goodyear Atomic
Corp. v. Miller, 108 S. Ct. 1704, 1711 (1988), the Court rejected
the contention that a federal workers’ compensation act
failed to waive immunity for state penalties, because the
statute made the federal government liable “in the same way
and to the same extent” as a private person. In addition,
in a case construing the waiver for “any claims... on account
of personal injury” in the Federal Torts Claims Act, this Court
found that Congress had waived immunity for each and every
claim on account of personal injury (except for exceptions
expressly set forth in the statute). Yellow Cab, 340 US. at
548-50. The Court rejected the government's claim that the
statute was not “sufficiently specific.” /d., at 555.
Where Congress has provided a broad waiver of immunity,
the scope of the waiver must not be narrowly limited by
a court's construction of its terms. Canadian Aviator v. United
States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945). Congressional intent is not to
be “thwarted by an unduly restrictive interpretation.” /d.
Where the meaning of the words used in the waiver imposes
the same liability on the United States as it does on a private
person, this waiver should be honored. /d. See also,
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597,
600 (1963).
The Court has also stated that it will not judicially create
or expand exceptions to a general waiver. Kosak, 465 U.S.
at 853, n. 9. Creating exceptions to its general waivers is
the function of Congress, not the courts.
DOE relies heavily on Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Ault,
256 U.S. 554 (1921), in an attempt to contradict this principle
of statutory construction and to argue that the waiver
language construed in the Ault case was similar to that in
the case at bar. However, the statute in Ault provided that
the waiver in question applied only to the degree consistent
with an order of the President. An order of the President,
15
in turn, expressly excluded the assessment of penalties. This
'S why penalties were disallowed in Ault, rather than being
due to a hypercritical interpretation of the statute’s sweeping
waiver language. /d., at 562, n. 1
The Court's refusal to strap Congress into a straitjacket
of specificity serves a useful function. Requiring Congress
to enact waivers only in the form of exhaustive and complex
ists of each and every specific application, instead of broadly
categorizing them, could result in Congress easily missing
specific items it intended to include. insisting on itemization
would exalt style over substance and would defeat the intent
of Congress where it intended to waive immunity on a broad
scale.
B. Because The RCRA Waiver Includes All
‘“Requirements’’ Without Limitation, And
Because The Common Meaning Of
“Requirements” Includes Civil Penalties, The
Court Of Appeals Errec In Deleting Penaities
From The Waiver.
The RCRA waiver in 42 U.S.C. 6961 waives immunity from
all requirements, as follows:
Each department... shall be subject to, and
comply with, a// federal [and] state... requirements,
both substantive and procedural (including any
requirement for permits or reporting or any
provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions
as may be imposed by a court to enforce such
relief) ....
(Emphasis added). In common usage, “requirements” is
defined as “something called for or demanded.” Maine v.
Navy, 702 F.Supp. at 326, citing Webster's Third New
International Dictionary. Hazardous waste civil penalties,
being called for or demanded by the hazardous waste laws,
are obviously requirements of those laws. /d., 326-27
To make the waiver even more explicit, the language in
16
parentheses gives some examples of procedural
requirements. Permits, reports, injunctive relief, and
sanctions to enforce injunctive relief are all listed as examples
of requirements.
The examples within parentheses do not constitute a
complete list of requirements for which sovereign immunity
s waived The section unequivocally states that federal
fact™yes are subject to “al/ .. . requirements” (emphasis
adg#c) including those listed within the parentheses. The
wc including” is aterm of enlargement meant to illustrate
rat\er than a limitation meant to exclude all items not
spetifically listed. PC. Pfeiffer Company v. Ford, 444 US.
69 47 - 7 (1979). Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber
Co, '314 US 95, 99-100 (1941). Therefore, the list in
parentheses is meantto illustrate rather than to be exclusive.
The nature of the examples in the parenthetical list of
requirements also demonstrates that “requirements” include
enforcement mechanisms. Injunctive relief and sanctions to
enforce such relief are enforcement mechanisms, not
substantive obligations. Therefore, “requirements” obviously
include enforcement mechanisms. Any other interpretation
of the section would be illogical, by saying, on the one hand,
that two enforcement mechanisms are requirements and on
the other hand, that requirements exclude enforcement
mechanisms. Statutes must be construed in a manner which
will avoid inconsistency. Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp.,
316 U.S. 107, 112 (1942). Because Congress has waived
immunity for all requirements, federal facilities are subject
to all enforcement mechanisms, including civil penalties.
Finally, 42 U.S.C. 696! waives immunity for all requirements
“in the same manner, and to the same extent” as private
persons. This quoted language is almost identical to the
language construed by this court in Goodyear Atomic Corp.
to provide a broad waiver without exceptions. 108 S. Ct. at
1711. Obviously, Congress did not intend to place limitations
on the RCRA waiver either.
17
C. By Admitting That The Plain Meaning Of
“Requirements” Includes Civil Penalties, And
Then Manufacturing Ambiguity As An Excuse
To Except Penalties From That Plain Meaning,
The Court Of Appeals Violated The Rules Of
Statutory Construction Followed By This
Court.
The district court in Maine v. Navy remarked that “an
intelligent person reading the statute would think the
message plain” that RCRA requirements include civil
penalties. 702 F.Supp. at 326. That court noted that it would
have been “nonsensical” to require Congress to make a
detailed itemization of requirements in federal law and the
laws Of fifty states. /d., at 327.
Similarly, the court of appeals below acknowledged:
An ordinary reading of the phrase, “all .. .
requirements,” indicates that a civil penalty is a
“requirement” because a party violating the statute
will be required to pay the penalty.
App. to DOE Pet., p. 10a. Thus, even the court of appeals
realized that the plain meaning of the words of the statute
encompassed Civil penalties.
Despite the admonitions of this Court to utilize the ordinary
neaning of the words in a waiver, Kosak, 465 U.S. at 853,
the court of appeals discarded the ordinary meaning of
“requirements” in favor of searching elsewhere for ambiguity.
The first reason cited by the court of appeals for ignoring
the plain meaning of the term concerned som» differences
in: the language of RCRA and Clean Water Act waivers. App.
to DOE Pet., p. 11a. However, the courts are not allowed
to insert ambiguity into the other wise clear language of RCRA
by looking to another statute. As the Court stated in Yellow
Cab Co., 740 U.S. at 550, the courts may not whittle down
a broadly worded waiver by resorting to “refinements.”
By deviating from the plain meaning of “requirements,”
18
the court of appeals also violated the admonition in Turkette.
As discussed above, Turkette warns the courts to effectuate
the plain meaning of words of waiver unless there is a clear
Congressional mandate to differentiate from that plain
meaning. 452 U.S. at 580. The court of appeals found no
such clear mandate but disregarded the plain meaning of
“requirements” anyway.
The second reason given by the court of appeals for its
interpretation is the absence of a “specific mention” of
“monetary relief or civil penalties.” /d., at 11a-12a. This reason
for declining to find a waiver in 42 U.S.C. 6961 runs afoul
of two principles elucidated in decisions of the Court. First,
Congress is not required to itemize each and every item
for which-federal agencies are liable but may instead enact
broad, sweeping waivers. Yellow Cab, 340 at 548. Therefore,
the absence of the word “civil penalties” from the
parenthetical list of “requiremerits” is not troubling. Second,
strict construction may not be used to create exceptions
to a sweeping waiver unless Congress has set forth the
exceptions in the statute. /d.; Kosak, 465 U.S. at 853. Under
these cases, the court below was not permitted to speculate
that the absence of the term “civil penalties” could mean
an exception for penalties, since Congress has created a
waiver for “all... requirements.”
The court of appeals thus rewrote 42 U.S.C. 6961 to create
an exception not expressed in the plain language chosen
by Congress for the waiver. The court below, in fact, went
out of its way to find a meaning for the waiver other than
the one intended by Congress. By struggling to find an
ambiguity in the waiver, the court of appeals has violated
this Court's rules of statutory construction and has thwarted
Congressional intent.
The waiver in 42 U.S.C. 6961 broadly requires federal
agencies to be treated “in the same manner, and to the same
extent” as the private sector. The court of appeals’ decision
nullifies this waiver and contradicts this Court’s broad
construction of almost identical language in Goodyear
Atomic Corp. Only if penalized in the same fashion as private
19
citizens will federal agencies refrain from their costly,
dangerous pollution activities. In order to halt this preferential
treatment of polluting federal agencies by a number of the
courts, the State respectfully requests that the Court grant
the State's petition to hear the state hazardous waste penalty
issue.
Vi. if The Court Reverses The Decision Below
With Respect To State Water Pollution
Penalties, It Should Find That The Citizen Suit
Provision Of The Clean Water Act Waives
immunity From Civil Penalties.
The Court has noted that a federal appellate court may
decide an issue not adjudicated below where the proper
resolution of that issue is clear. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 121 (1976). If the Court grants DOE's Petition with respect
to state water pollution penalties and reverses the court of
appeals’ determination of that issue, DOE would still be
subject to penalties pursuant to the waiver in the Clean Water
Act citizen suit provision. As a result, the court of appeals’
finding of mootness for the citizen suit penalty issue would
be erroneous and the Court should review that matter as
well.
Because 33 U.S.C. 1365 uses waiver language virtually
identical to that of the RCRA citizen suit provision, the same
analysis applies to both provisions. Therefore, the State
incorporates by reference herein its discussion of the
language of the RCRA citizen suit provision from its Brief
in Opposition to DOE’s Petition.
in addition, civil penalties authorized by 33 U.S.C. 1365
obviously “arise under federal law.” This phrase and another
specific reference to civil penalties in 33 U.S.C. 1323 would
become nullities if the Court declined to find a waiver for
either state or federal penalties. The waiver for these
penalties is clear and should be defined as such by the
court rather than requiring unnecessary additional litigation
on that issue before the court of appeals.
20
CONCLUSION
In the event the Court grants the Petition filed by the
Department of Energy, the State's Cross-Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari should also be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
LEE FISHER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO
By: JACK A. VAN KLEY
Assistant Attorney General
Environmental Enforcement Section
30 East Broad Street, 25th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43266-0410
(614) 466-2766
Counsel of Record Cross-Petitioner
TIMOTHY J. KERN
TERRENCE S. FINN
Assistant Attorneys General
Co-Counsel for Cross-Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.