Cross Petition — United States Department of Energy v. Ohio

Supreme Court brief1991

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90-1517 [sams |

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AR 26 1991

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No. \ eae

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

STATE OF OHIO, et al..

Cross -Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

CROSS-PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CROSS-PETITION OF THE STATE OF OHIO

LEE FISHER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO

By. JACK A. VAN KLEY

Assistant Attorney Genera!

Environmental Enforcement Section

30 East Broad Street, 25th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43266-0410

(614) 466-2766

Counsel of Record for Cross-Petitioner

TIMOTHY J. KERN

TERRENCE S. FINN

Assistant Attorneys Genera!

Co-Counsel for Cross-Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether Section 7002 of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42

U.S.C. 6972, waives the sovereign immunity of

the United States from assessment of state civil

penalties for violation of state hazardous waste

laws.

Whether Sections 313 and 505 of the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1323, waive the sovereign

immunity of the United States from assessment

of federal civil penalties for violations of the

Clean Water Act.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

This case was brought in the district court and litigated

in the Court of Appeals by the State of Ohio on the relation

of its Attorney General, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. succeeded

by Lee Fisher. The Defendants-Appellants before the Court

of Appeals were the U.S. Department of Energy and Secretary

of Energy James D. Watkins.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE CROSS-PETITION

As Shown By The Widespread National Interest

in This Case, The Elimination Of Dangerous

And Illegal Hazardous Waste Activities By

Federal Agencies !s Vital For the Protection

EEE ES

Because The Department Of Justice Prohibits

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

From Suing Or Penalizing Sister Federal

Agencies For Illegal Hazardous Waste

Activities, The States Must Be Allowed To

Utilize The Civil Penalty Deterrent Provided By

Congress To Enforce The Law At Federal

DT SEGEECGSESececcocccesccecccccce.

The Courts’ Continued Failure To Implement

The Civil Penalty Waiver Provided By

Congress Will Magnify The Multi-Billion Dollar

Cleanup Crisis Caused By Illegal Federal

Agency Pollution Activities ................

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\V. By Discarding The History Preceding The

Enactment Of The RCRA Waiver, The Court

Of Appeals Violated The Rules of Statutory

Construction Applicable To Waivers Of

Sovereign Immunity Set Forth By This Court

And Established A Rule Of Law Inconsistent

With This Court’s Holding In Hancock v.

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A. The Sovereign Immunity Decisions Of

This Court Require That Congressional

Intent Be Ascertained and Implemented ...

B. Because This Court In Hancock v. Train

Equated ‘Procedural Requirements”

With “Enforcement Mechanisms,”

Congress Waived Federal Agency

immunity For Civil Penalties And Other

Enforcement Mechanisms By Subjecting

The Agencies To “All Procedural

PE” “Kebceedeseewseeseonnec<

C. By Admitting That Congress Used The

Words "All Procedural Requirements’’ To

Waive Immunity For Enforcement

Mechanisms, And Then Ruling That

Procedural Requirements Do Not Include

Enforcement Mechanisms, The Court of

Appeals Violated The Rules Of Statutory

Construction Provided By This Court And

Adopted A Rule Of Law Contrary To This

Court’s Decision In Hancock v. Train

V. By Interpreting The Waiver in A Manner

inconsistent With The Plain Meaning Of The

Language And By Creating An Exception To

Exempt Penalties From The Broad Waiver

Intended By Congress To Cover All

Enforcement Mechanisms, The Court Of

Appeals Violated This Court’s Principles Of

Statutory Construction And Thwarted

Congressional Policy ..................... 13

A. Where Congress In General Terms Has

Enacted A Broad Waiver Of Sovereign

Immunity, The Language Of That Waiver

Must Be Interpreted According To Its

Common Meaning And in A Manner

Which Effectuates The Broad Waiver.

Congress Is Not Required To Specifically

Spell Out Each And Every Federal Action

included In The Waiver ............... 13

B. Because The RCRA Waiver Includes All

Requirements” Without Limitation, And

Because The Common Meaning Of

“Requirements” Includes Civil Penalties,

The Court Of Appeals Erred In Deleting

Penalties From The Waiver ............ 15

C. By Admitting That The Plain Meaning Of

Requirements” includes Civil Penalties,

And Then Manufacturing Ambiguity As

An Excuse To Except Penalties From That

Plain Meaning, The Court Of Appeals

Violated The Rules Of Statutory

Construction Followed By This Court ... 17

Vi. if The Court Reverses The Decision Below

With Respect To State Water Pollution

Penalties, It Should Find That The Citizen Suit

Provision Of The Clean Water Act Waives

Immunity From Civil Penalties ............. 19

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Vv!

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1974)

ee en nt ke eeeee es 10

Canadian Aviator v. United States,

ARE EE EE EEE EP EE Ee ETE 14

EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) .......... 5.6.7.9

Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co.,

EO Oe 16

Florida Dept. of Envti. Regulation v.

silvex Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fila. 1985) ........ 3

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. U.S.

Postal Service, 467 US. 512 (1984) .......... 8, 12,13

Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,

Oe 14, 16, 18

Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) ............. 5-12

Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp.,

PTD Sheddeusscidvevdsccecvepeonns 16

Kosak v United States,

465 U.S. 848 (1984) ...... eee eeeeeeeees 13, 14,17, 18

Maine v. Navy.

702 F. Supp. 322 (D. Me. 1988) .............. 12, 15, 17

Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Ault,

ee ee Coens be eee 14,15

Nationai City Bank of New York v.

Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) .......... 8, 12

vii

PC. Pfeiffer Company v. Ford, 444 U.S.69 (1979) ...... 16

Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S.658(1975) ......... 8, 12

Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) ........ 8,12

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) ............... 19

United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) ... 13,17, 18

United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,

PU PRUE «oc wccccecccesecsee 8, 13, 14, 17, 18

Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States,

i ee eee cn beneseenes 14

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

FEDERAL

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CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.:

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BPG UD Svc ccccvccecscnvseenescececocceees 19

SE CED o ccccceccccveccesecesecncencesese 1

RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT (RCRA),

42 U.S.C. 6901 et seg.

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OHIO REVISED CODE

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MISCELLANEOUS

H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ......... 5

H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ........ 2

H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ........ 6

vill

Report of the NGA-NAAG Task Force on Federal!

Facilities, From Crisis To Commitment:

Environmental Cleanup And Compliance At

Federal Facilities, (January, 1990) ............... 3,4

S. Rep. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ..........

S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ...........

S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ..........

Webster's Third New International Dictionary ........

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the court of appeals is reported at 904

F.2d 1058 and is reprinted at pages 1a-27a in the Appendix

of the Department of Energy's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

The decision of the district court is reported at 689 F.Supp.

760 and is reprinted at pages 28a-46a of the same Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

June 11, 1990. A petition for rehearing was denied on October

10, 1990. On December 28, 1990, Justice Stevens extended

the time for filing a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to February

7, 1991. On January 30, 1991, Justice Stevens ‘urther

extended the time for filing a petition to and including

February 22, 1991. The State of Ohio received the Department

of Energy's Petition (No. 90-1341) for a Writ of Certiorari on

February 25, 1991 and is filing this cross-petition in reliance

on Rule 12.3 of the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Sections 313(a) and 505(a) of the Clean Water Act (““CWA’’),

33 US.C. 1323(a), 1365(a), are reproduced at pages 49a-

52a of the Appendix to the Department of Energy's Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari. Section 6001 of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C.

6961, is reproduced in the Appendix to the State's Brief in

Opposition to DOE's Petition. Section 3734.13(C) of the Ohio

Revised Code is reproduced at pages 54a-55a of the

Appendix to the DOE Petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts relevant to this Cross-Petition have been

described in the Statement of the Case for the State's Brief

in Opposition to the Department of Energy's Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari. The State's Statement of the Case in that

brief is hereby incorporated by reference.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE CROSS-PETITION

i. As Shown By The Widespread National Interest

In This Case, The Elimination of Dangerous And

\legal Hazardous Waste Activities By Federal

Agencies Is Vital For the Protection Of The

Public.

When enacting the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act (RCRA), Congress was primarily concerned about the

unsafe management and disposal of hazardous waste. H.R.

Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) reprinted in

1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6241. The House found

that these wastes can “blind, cripple or kill . . . defoliate

the environment, contaminate drinking water supplies and

enter the food chain.” H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at 11, reprinted

in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6249. See also,

the 59 examples of groundwater pollution, fish kills, wildlife

and livestock kills, and human poisonings cited by the House

to illustrate the problems resulting from improper hazardous

waste disposal. H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at 17-23, 1976 U.S. Code

Cong. & Ad. News at 6254-61.

Hazardous waste mismanagement at federal facilities was

a rea! concern for Congress since the federal government

had over twenty thousand facilities. H.R. Rep. No. 1491 at

46, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6284.

Because Congress realized that a comprehensive program

to prevent hazardous waste pollution would be ineffective

without the cooperation of federal facilities, Congress wanted

federal facilities to “provide national leadership in dealing

with solid waste and hazardous waste disposal problems.”

S. Rep. No. 988, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976).

A January, 1990 report by a task force commissioned by

the National Governors Association and the National

Association of Attorneys General estimates that the

Department of Defense alone generates approximately

750,000 tons of hazardous waste each year.’ This quantity

of waste is more than the annual production of waste by

the five largest U.S. chemical companies combined.’

Because the federal government is the nation’s worst

polluter, Ohio as well as other states and the public have

a vital stake in eliminating the pervasive hazardous waste

hazards at federai facilities. Twenty-three (23) amici states

supported Ohio below in the Sixth Circuit by filing a brief

urging the court of appeals to effectuate Congress’ waiver

for state hazardous waste penalties. Ohio was also supported

by a number of public interest organizations.

Given the dangers posed by toxic wastes at federal

facilities, it should come as no Surprise that, of the four civil

penalty issues in this case, the state hazardous waste penalty

issue has stirred the most national interest. In fact, the number

of cases related to state hazardous waste penalties is greater

than the totai number of cases for the other three penalty

provisions combined. See the cases listed at page 25 of

DOE's brief.” Therefore, this is an extremely important

question of national interest which should be addressed by

the Court.

ll. Because The Department Of Justice Prohibits

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

From Suing Or Penalizing Sister Federal

Agencies For Illegal Hazardous Waste

Activities, The States Must Be Allowed To

Utilize The Civil Penalty Deterrent Provided By

Congress To Enforce The Law At Federal

Facilities.

' Report of the NGA-NAAG Task Force on Federal Facilities, From Crisis

To Commitment: Environmental Cleanup And Compliance At Federal

Facilities, (January, 1990), p. 3.

2 Id., at p. 3-4.

> It should be noted, however, that one of the cases on DOE's list of

civil penalty cases does not address civil penalties at all. Florida Dep't.

of Envtl. Regulation v. Silvex Corp., 606 F.Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985).

The importance of effective state enforcement is

heightened by the comparative inability of the U-S.

Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA’) to enforce the

pollution laws against its sister agencies. Under Department

of Justice policy, the U.S. EPA is not allowed to file suit against

other federa! agencies or to penalize them. As a result, former

U.S. EPA Assistant Administrative J. Winston Porter testified

before Congress that U.S. EPA had been forced to rely on

‘“jawboning” federal agencies in attempt to obtain

compliance. Report of NGA-NAAG Task Force, p. 7.

Therefore, in the absence of U.S. EPA enforcement, the

states are left to conduct enforcement at federal facilities.

It is thus essential that the states be allowed to utilize the

civil penalty deterrent Congress intended them to use against

uncooperative federal agencies. Because the court of

appeals below struck that deterrent tool from the

Congressional waiver, review by this Court is necessary to

repair the waiver and restore Congressional intent.

lll. The Courts’ Continued Failure To Iimpiement

The Civil Penalty Waiver Provided By

Congress Will Magnify The Multi-Billion Dollar

Cleanup Crisis Caused By Illegal Federal

Agency Pollution Activities.

Careless and illegal pollution from federal facilities is a

federal disaster, creating a national cleanup crisis which will

cost the taxpayers billions of doilars to remedy. The General

Accounting Office and others have estimated that

contaminated Department of Energy sites alone will cost

between $95 billion to $130 billion to remedy. Report of the

NGA-NAAG Task Force, p. 3. Even if DOE works aggressively

on this cleanup, the Department has predicted that this

mammoth task will take thirty years to complete.

This epic cleanup Crisis did not develop overnight. Instead,

this cleanup problem is rooted in decades of federal agency

disregard for state and federal pollution laws. Convinced

that they had sovereign immunity against punishment, these

agencies continued to violate the law even after Congress

enacted stricter legislation in a vain attempt to inject

responsibility into federal pollution practices.

The history of federal agency neglect, as chronicled in

the legislative history of federal pollution contro! statutes,

is useful for two purposes. First, it demonstrates the

importance of the RCRA civil penalty waiver and thus the

importance of granting this Cross-Petition. Second, this

history shows what Congress nad in mind when it wrote

the civil penalty waiver, an intent discarded by the court's

decision below.

While considering the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Federal

Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Congress

noted with dismay the “many incidents of flagrant violations

of air and water pollution requirements” by federal activities.

S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in 1972

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3733-34. Both the House and

Senate noticed that the bad federal example was

discouraging private compliance as well. /d.; H.R. Rep. No.

911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 188 (1972). As a result, Congress

inserted, into both the air and water statutes, waivers

requiring federal agencies to obey federal, state, and local

pollution control laws.

This legislation, however, did not stop, or even slow down,

federal facility pollution. By refusing to apply for and obtain

pollution contro! permits, federal agencies stymied the states’

attempts to halt federal pollution.

The states’ attempts to control federal agency pollution

through permits e®ded in federal agency challenges to the

waivers in both the Clean Air Act in Hancock v. Train, 426

U.S. 167 (1976), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

in EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976). Narrowly construing

the waivers in both statutes, the Court ruled that Congress

had not intended to waive immunity for permits and other

enforcement mechanisms.

Congress reacted sharply to these decisions when it

passed RCRA in 1976 and amended the Clean Air Act and

Federal Water Pollution Control Act in 1977. Finding that

“many federal agencies continue to try to evade the mandate

of Federal law to comply with all State and local

requirements,” the House discovered that the agencies had

been invoking sovereign immunity to avoid their air pollution

contro! duties. H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 199,

reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1277-

78. The House then discussed the Hancock decision, stating:

In the committee's view, the language of existing

law should have been sufficient to insure Federal

compliance in all of the aforementioned situations.

Unfortunately, however, the U.S. Supreme Court

construed Section 118 narrowly in Hancock v. Train.

_.. The new section 113 of the bill is intended

to overturn the Hancock case....

Id. Congress fiad a similar adverse reaction to the Supreme

Court decision in California, commenting:

The act has been amended to indicate

unequivocally that all Federal facilities and

activities are subject to a// of the provisions of State

and local pollution laws. Though this was the intent

of the Congress in passing the 1972 Federal Water

Pollution Control Act Amendments, the Supreme

Court, encouraged by Federal agencies, has

misconstrued the original intent.

S. Rep. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977), reprinted

in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4392 (emphasis added).

Dismayed by the widespread failure of federal agencies

to abate their pollution even while private citizens were doing

their part to protect the environment, Congress amended

the waivers in both the air and water statutes. To end federally

sponsored pollution, Congress inserted broadly worded

waivers into both statutes designed to authorize a//

enforcement mechanisms against federal agencies. A similar

broad waiver was inserted into RCRA, enacted only months

after the Hancock decision.

Therefore, Congress intended to remove the cloak of

sovereign immunity from enforcement sanctions in order to

overcome federal agency obstacles to a clean environment.

Buoyed by their successes in Hancock and California,

however, federal agencies continued to ignore their pollution

control obligations. Confident in their ability to persuade the

courts to restrictively interpret the waivers, federal agencies

took the position that they could not be punished even though

they continued to disobey the law.

Unfortunately, the agencies have enjoyed continued

success in many of their attempts to invoke sovereign

immunity against enforcement mechanisms despite the clear

intent of Congress to waive immunity from these

mechanisms. In response to state attempts to enforce their

hazardous waste laws at federal facilities, federal agencies

have persuaded some of the courts to disregard the waiver

for civil penalties and other enforcement mechanisms

provided by RCRA. See the list of cases on page 25 of DOE’s

Petition. As a result, these courts have removed from the

states’ arsenal the most effective deterrent against the

creation of yet additiona! cleanup problems.

Federal agencies would have taken greater care to comply

with the law had they thought they could be penalized for

their illegal behavior. Had federal agencies not been

complacent in their ability to persuade the courts to ignore

Congressional waivers of sovereign immunity, the multi-

billion dollar cleanup crisis would have been substantially

avoided. Unless the Court grants Ohio's petition and corrects

the court of appeals below for deleting state hazardous waste

penalties from the waiver, the states will lose their most

effective weapon against this costly, federally sponsored

pollution.

1V. By Discarding The History Preceding The

Enactment Of The RCRA Waiver, The Court

Of Appeals Violated The Rules of Statutory

Construction Applicable To Waivers Of

Sovereign Immunity Set Forth By This Court

And Established A Rule Of Law Inconsistent

With This Court’s Holding In Hancock v. Train.

A. The Sovereign Immunity Decisions Of

This Court Require That Congressional

Intent Be Ascertained and Implemented.

When interpreting part of a statute, the courts do not look

solely at the specific language being construed. Rather than

reading a statutory section or sentence in isolation and out

of context, the courts examine the whole statute as well as

its objective and policy. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 658,

713 (1975); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).

In performing such an examination, the courts’ goal is to

ascertain congressionai intent and to effectuate it. Phi/brook,

421 U.S. at 713. The courts are not to adopt a “crabbed

construction” of a waiver or to insist that Congress use “a

ritualistic formula” to waive immunity. Franchise Tax Bd. of

Cal. v. U.S. Postal Service, 467 U.S. 512, 521 (1984). instead.

the scope of a waiver can be ascertained only by reference

to “underlying congressional policy.” /d.

When interpreting Congressional intent in a statute waiving

the sovereign immunity of the United States, the courts have

found the public feeling toward sovereign immunity reflected

in the statute to be a helpful barometer of Congressional

objectives and goals. While discussing “the immunity

enjoyed by the United States as territorial sovereign,” the

Supreme Court explained the necessity of gauging public/

Congressional feeling in the following words:

The outlook and feeling thus reflected are not

merely relevant to our problem. They are important.

A steady legislative trend, presumably

manifesting a strong social policy, properly makes

demands on the judicial process.

National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348

U.S. 356, 359-60 (1955). See also, United States v. Yellow

Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 (1951).

Therefore, the Court has acknowledged that public and

Congressional feeling about sovereign immunity under a

statute influences Congressional purpose, and that the

courts’ understanding of the public climate are vital to

interpreting Congressional intent. This climate can be

ascertained from the words and legislative history ofa statute.

The district court below conscientiously followed the

sovereign immunity decisions of this Court by carefully

analyzing the history of the RCRA waiver. Upon completion

of this analysis, the district court honored the obvious

Congressional response to Hancock in waiving immunity for

all enforcement mechanisms. The court of appeals, however,

paid only lip service to the obvious Congressional intent

to waive immunity for penalties and reversed the district

court. Because the court of appeals declined to follow

Congressional intent contrary to the opinions of this Court,

the Court should review this matter.

B. Because This Court In Hancock v. Train

Equated ‘Procedural Requirements’ With

“Enforcement Mechanisms,’’ Congress

Waived Federal Agency Immunity For Civil

Penalties And Other Enforcement

Mechanisms By Subjecting The Agencies To

“All Procedural Requirements.”

At the time the Court considered the Hancock and

California cases, the air and water statutes waived immunity

for “requirements.” At issue in these cases was whether

“requirements” was meant to include only substantive

obligations, or whether “requirements” also included

procedural obligations such as the procurement of permits.

Resorting to legislative history, the Court held that Congress

did not intend to include permits and other procedural

obligations within the meaning of “requirements”. California,

426 U.S. at 223; Hancock, 426 U.S. at 197-98. The Court's

distinction between substantive and procedural

requirements is extremely important, because it was this

distinction that Congress had in mind when writing the

present waivers in RCRA.

10

Before Hancock, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

had phrased the issue in the same fashion, coming to the

opposite conclusion. In Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238

(5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit distinguished between

substantive duties and enforcement mechanisms in the

Clean Air Act, as follows:

Defendants seek to avoid the impact of $118 by

engrafting upon it a substantive procedural overlay.

They argue that the phrase “requirements

respecting control and abatement of air pollution”

means only requirements such as emission

standards and limitations, which they label

“substantive,” and does not include mechanisms,

e.g., permit systems, for enforcing these

requirements.

(Emphasis added). /d., at 1245. Relying on the wording of

the Clean Air Act waiver, the “scheme of the Act as a whole,”

and “Congressional purpose,” the Fifth Circuit held that

enforcement mechanisms were requirements. /d., at 1245-

47.

Although the Seeber decision was vacated in light of the

subsequent decision in Hancock, this Court in Hancock

phrased the issue in the same fashion by quoting from

Seeber:

[T]he question is .. . “whether Congress intended

that the enforcement mechanisms of federally

approved state implementation plans, in this case

permit systems, would be” available to the States

to enforce that duty.

426 US. at 183-(emphasis added). On page 184 of the

Hancock opinion, the Court rejected the state’s contention

that Congress had intended to “subject federal facilities to

the enforcement mechanisms’ of state law (emphasis added).

In holding that enforcement mechanisms were not

“requirements”, the Court repeatedly distinguished between

enforcement mechanisms and substantive duties. /d., at 182,

11

183, 184, 185, 186, 187 n. 48, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193,

194, 195, 196, 197, 198. In fact, the opinion uses “enforcement

mechanisms” and derivatives of “enforce” no fewer than

thirty-one times when discussing “procedural requirements.”

Therefore, just before Congress passed RCRA, the courts

had drawn the distinction between substantive requirements

on one hand, and enforcement mechanisms or procedural

requirements, on the other hand. However, this was just one

of Hancock's statements which influenced the language later

written into the RCRA and Clean Water Act waivers. The

Court also declared that it was “notable” that Congress

required federal agencies only to comply with “requirements”

instead of requiring that they comply with “a/f’ requirements.

326 U.S. at 182.

Due to the Court's holdings, Congress wrote waivers for

both “substantive” and “procedural” requirements in RCRA,

the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act. Because the

existing court decisions had expressly referred to

enforcement mechanisms as “procedural requirements,”

Congress in reliance on this distinction waived immunity from

both “substantive” and “procedural” requirements in order

to subject federal facilities to enforcement mechanisms.

Relying heavily on Hancock's emphasis on the use of “a/f”’

to accomplish a complete waiver, Congress used the term

“alf’ to describe the procedural requirements waived in all

three acts. Thus, Congress unambiguously showed its intent

to apply a// enforcement mechanisms to polluting federal

facilities.

Because civil penalties are most definitely an enforcement

mechanism, Congress very clearly intended to waive

immunity for penalties. The court of appeals, however, failed

to effectuate that intent and thus has set back Congress’

attempt to reduce the dangers and cost of irresponsible

hazardous waste activities by federal agencies.

C. By Admitting That Congress Used The Words

“All Procedural Requirements’’ To Waive

immunity For Enforcement Mechanisms, And

12

Then Ruling That Procedural Requirements

Do Not include Enforcement Mechanisms,

The Court of Appeals Violated The Rules Of

Statutory Construction Provided By This Court

And Adopted A Rule Of Law Contrary To This

Court’s Decision In Hancock v. Train.

In its opinion, the court of appeals discussed and

acknowledged the history proceeding the enactment of the

RCRA waiver, concluding:

Circumstances surrounding the passage of the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also

support a finding that “requirements” include civil

penaities.

App. to DOE Pet., p. 10a. The court of appeals even admitted

that Congress had inserted into the waiver the exact wording

the Hancock opinion stated would effectuate a clear waiver

for all enforcement mechanisms. /d., pp. 10a-11a. This finding

is in accord with the district court analysis below, as well!

as the opinion in Maine v. Navy, 702 F.Supp. 322, 329 (D.

Me. 1988) (appeal pending, No. 86-0211 (1st Cir.)), both of

which held that immunity from civil penalties is waived.

Then the court of appeals inexplicably adopted the Ninth

Circuit position that requirements do not include

enforcement mechanisms, stating that this is “a different

plausible” reading of the waiver. /d., p. 12a. This “plausible”

reading is flatly contradictory to this Court's decision in

Hancock, which describes “enforcement mechanisms” as

“procedural requirements” thirty-one (31) times.

Therefore, the court of appeals ascertained underlying

Congressional intent and policy in accordance with this

Court’s above-cited decisions in Franchise Tax Bd.,

Philbrook, Richards, and National City Bank. However, the

court of appeals then proceeded to search for “a different

plausible’ meaning that contradicted that known

Congressional intent, thereby adopting a ‘‘crabbed

construction” of the waiver in violation of this Court's decision

13

in Franchise Tax Bd. Because the court of appeals has

disregarded this Court's rules of statutory construction, and

because that court's opinion will increase the danger and

cost of hazardous waste pollution at federal facilities, the

Court should review this matter.

V. By Interpreting The Waiver in A Manner

inconsistent With The Plain Meaning Of The

Language And By Creating An Exception To

Exempt Penalties From The Broad Waiver

Intended By Congress To Cover All

Enforcement Mechanisms, The Court Of

Appeals Violated This Court’s Principles Of

Statutory Construction And Thwarted

Congressioral Policy.

A. Where Congress In General Terms Has

Enacted A Broad Waiver Of Sovereign

Immunity, The Language Of That Waiver

Must Be Interpreted According To Its

Common Meaning And in A Manner

Which Effectuates The Broad Waiver.

Congress Is Not Required To Specifically

Spell Out Each And Every Federal Action

included In The Waiver.

When determining the meaning of a waiver, the courts

assume that legislative intent is expressed by the ordinary

meaning of the words used in the statute. Kosak v. United

States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 (1984): Yellow Cab Co., 340 US.

at 548. When construing statutes in general, this Court has

consistently declined to depart from the plain meaning of

statutory language absent clear indication of contrary

legislative intent. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580

(1981). Where the language of a statute broadly waives

sovereign immunity, the courts may not whittle it down by

resorting to a review of legislative history or other

refinements. Yellow Cab, 340 US. at 549-50.

Furthermore, when Congress uses broad. sweeping

language to waive immunity for a large category of

14

government activities, it is presumed to mean exactly what

it says. In such a case, Congress has waived immunity for

all federal activities fitting within that category of activity

and the courts may not defeat Congressional intent by

narrowing the scope of the waiver. Thus, in Goodyear Atomic

Corp. v. Miller, 108 S. Ct. 1704, 1711 (1988), the Court rejected

the contention that a federal workers’ compensation act

failed to waive immunity for state penalties, because the

statute made the federal government liable “in the same way

and to the same extent” as a private person. In addition,

in a case construing the waiver for “any claims... on account

of personal injury” in the Federal Torts Claims Act, this Court

found that Congress had waived immunity for each and every

claim on account of personal injury (except for exceptions

expressly set forth in the statute). Yellow Cab, 340 US. at

548-50. The Court rejected the government's claim that the

statute was not “sufficiently specific.” /d., at 555.

Where Congress has provided a broad waiver of immunity,

the scope of the waiver must not be narrowly limited by

a court's construction of its terms. Canadian Aviator v. United

States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945). Congressional intent is not to

be “thwarted by an unduly restrictive interpretation.” /d.

Where the meaning of the words used in the waiver imposes

the same liability on the United States as it does on a private

person, this waiver should be honored. /d. See also,

Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597,

600 (1963).

The Court has also stated that it will not judicially create

or expand exceptions to a general waiver. Kosak, 465 U.S.

at 853, n. 9. Creating exceptions to its general waivers is

the function of Congress, not the courts.

DOE relies heavily on Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Ault,

256 U.S. 554 (1921), in an attempt to contradict this principle

of statutory construction and to argue that the waiver

language construed in the Ault case was similar to that in

the case at bar. However, the statute in Ault provided that

the waiver in question applied only to the degree consistent

with an order of the President. An order of the President,

15

in turn, expressly excluded the assessment of penalties. This

'S why penalties were disallowed in Ault, rather than being

due to a hypercritical interpretation of the statute’s sweeping

waiver language. /d., at 562, n. 1

The Court's refusal to strap Congress into a straitjacket

of specificity serves a useful function. Requiring Congress

to enact waivers only in the form of exhaustive and complex

ists of each and every specific application, instead of broadly

categorizing them, could result in Congress easily missing

specific items it intended to include. insisting on itemization

would exalt style over substance and would defeat the intent

of Congress where it intended to waive immunity on a broad

scale.

B. Because The RCRA Waiver Includes All

‘“Requirements’’ Without Limitation, And

Because The Common Meaning Of

“Requirements” Includes Civil Penalties, The

Court Of Appeals Errec In Deleting Penaities

From The Waiver.

The RCRA waiver in 42 U.S.C. 6961 waives immunity from

all requirements, as follows:

Each department... shall be subject to, and

comply with, a// federal [and] state... requirements,

both substantive and procedural (including any

requirement for permits or reporting or any

provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions

as may be imposed by a court to enforce such

relief) ....

(Emphasis added). In common usage, “requirements” is

defined as “something called for or demanded.” Maine v.

Navy, 702 F.Supp. at 326, citing Webster's Third New

International Dictionary. Hazardous waste civil penalties,

being called for or demanded by the hazardous waste laws,

are obviously requirements of those laws. /d., 326-27

To make the waiver even more explicit, the language in

16

parentheses gives some examples of procedural

requirements. Permits, reports, injunctive relief, and

sanctions to enforce injunctive relief are all listed as examples

of requirements.

The examples within parentheses do not constitute a

complete list of requirements for which sovereign immunity

s waived The section unequivocally states that federal

fact™yes are subject to “al/ .. . requirements” (emphasis

adg#c) including those listed within the parentheses. The

wc including” is aterm of enlargement meant to illustrate

rat\er than a limitation meant to exclude all items not

spetifically listed. PC. Pfeiffer Company v. Ford, 444 US.

69 47 - 7 (1979). Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber

Co, '314 US 95, 99-100 (1941). Therefore, the list in

parentheses is meantto illustrate rather than to be exclusive.

The nature of the examples in the parenthetical list of

requirements also demonstrates that “requirements” include

enforcement mechanisms. Injunctive relief and sanctions to

enforce such relief are enforcement mechanisms, not

substantive obligations. Therefore, “requirements” obviously

include enforcement mechanisms. Any other interpretation

of the section would be illogical, by saying, on the one hand,

that two enforcement mechanisms are requirements and on

the other hand, that requirements exclude enforcement

mechanisms. Statutes must be construed in a manner which

will avoid inconsistency. Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp.,

316 U.S. 107, 112 (1942). Because Congress has waived

immunity for all requirements, federal facilities are subject

to all enforcement mechanisms, including civil penalties.

Finally, 42 U.S.C. 696! waives immunity for all requirements

“in the same manner, and to the same extent” as private

persons. This quoted language is almost identical to the

language construed by this court in Goodyear Atomic Corp.

to provide a broad waiver without exceptions. 108 S. Ct. at

1711. Obviously, Congress did not intend to place limitations

on the RCRA waiver either.

17

C. By Admitting That The Plain Meaning Of

“Requirements” Includes Civil Penalties, And

Then Manufacturing Ambiguity As An Excuse

To Except Penalties From That Plain Meaning,

The Court Of Appeals Violated The Rules Of

Statutory Construction Followed By This

Court.

The district court in Maine v. Navy remarked that “an

intelligent person reading the statute would think the

message plain” that RCRA requirements include civil

penalties. 702 F.Supp. at 326. That court noted that it would

have been “nonsensical” to require Congress to make a

detailed itemization of requirements in federal law and the

laws Of fifty states. /d., at 327.

Similarly, the court of appeals below acknowledged:

An ordinary reading of the phrase, “all .. .

requirements,” indicates that a civil penalty is a

“requirement” because a party violating the statute

will be required to pay the penalty.

App. to DOE Pet., p. 10a. Thus, even the court of appeals

realized that the plain meaning of the words of the statute

encompassed Civil penalties.

Despite the admonitions of this Court to utilize the ordinary

neaning of the words in a waiver, Kosak, 465 U.S. at 853,

the court of appeals discarded the ordinary meaning of

“requirements” in favor of searching elsewhere for ambiguity.

The first reason cited by the court of appeals for ignoring

the plain meaning of the term concerned som» differences

in: the language of RCRA and Clean Water Act waivers. App.

to DOE Pet., p. 11a. However, the courts are not allowed

to insert ambiguity into the other wise clear language of RCRA

by looking to another statute. As the Court stated in Yellow

Cab Co., 740 U.S. at 550, the courts may not whittle down

a broadly worded waiver by resorting to “refinements.”

By deviating from the plain meaning of “requirements,”

18

the court of appeals also violated the admonition in Turkette.

As discussed above, Turkette warns the courts to effectuate

the plain meaning of words of waiver unless there is a clear

Congressional mandate to differentiate from that plain

meaning. 452 U.S. at 580. The court of appeals found no

such clear mandate but disregarded the plain meaning of

“requirements” anyway.

The second reason given by the court of appeals for its

interpretation is the absence of a “specific mention” of

“monetary relief or civil penalties.” /d., at 11a-12a. This reason

for declining to find a waiver in 42 U.S.C. 6961 runs afoul

of two principles elucidated in decisions of the Court. First,

Congress is not required to itemize each and every item

for which-federal agencies are liable but may instead enact

broad, sweeping waivers. Yellow Cab, 340 at 548. Therefore,

the absence of the word “civil penalties” from the

parenthetical list of “requiremerits” is not troubling. Second,

strict construction may not be used to create exceptions

to a sweeping waiver unless Congress has set forth the

exceptions in the statute. /d.; Kosak, 465 U.S. at 853. Under

these cases, the court below was not permitted to speculate

that the absence of the term “civil penalties” could mean

an exception for penalties, since Congress has created a

waiver for “all... requirements.”

The court of appeals thus rewrote 42 U.S.C. 6961 to create

an exception not expressed in the plain language chosen

by Congress for the waiver. The court below, in fact, went

out of its way to find a meaning for the waiver other than

the one intended by Congress. By struggling to find an

ambiguity in the waiver, the court of appeals has violated

this Court's rules of statutory construction and has thwarted

Congressional intent.

The waiver in 42 U.S.C. 6961 broadly requires federal

agencies to be treated “in the same manner, and to the same

extent” as the private sector. The court of appeals’ decision

nullifies this waiver and contradicts this Court’s broad

construction of almost identical language in Goodyear

Atomic Corp. Only if penalized in the same fashion as private

19

citizens will federal agencies refrain from their costly,

dangerous pollution activities. In order to halt this preferential

treatment of polluting federal agencies by a number of the

courts, the State respectfully requests that the Court grant

the State's petition to hear the state hazardous waste penalty

issue.

Vi. if The Court Reverses The Decision Below

With Respect To State Water Pollution

Penalties, It Should Find That The Citizen Suit

Provision Of The Clean Water Act Waives

immunity From Civil Penalties.

The Court has noted that a federal appellate court may

decide an issue not adjudicated below where the proper

resolution of that issue is clear. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.

106, 121 (1976). If the Court grants DOE's Petition with respect

to state water pollution penalties and reverses the court of

appeals’ determination of that issue, DOE would still be

subject to penalties pursuant to the waiver in the Clean Water

Act citizen suit provision. As a result, the court of appeals’

finding of mootness for the citizen suit penalty issue would

be erroneous and the Court should review that matter as

well.

Because 33 U.S.C. 1365 uses waiver language virtually

identical to that of the RCRA citizen suit provision, the same

analysis applies to both provisions. Therefore, the State

incorporates by reference herein its discussion of the

language of the RCRA citizen suit provision from its Brief

in Opposition to DOE’s Petition.

in addition, civil penalties authorized by 33 U.S.C. 1365

obviously “arise under federal law.” This phrase and another

specific reference to civil penalties in 33 U.S.C. 1323 would

become nullities if the Court declined to find a waiver for

either state or federal penalties. The waiver for these

penalties is clear and should be defined as such by the

court rather than requiring unnecessary additional litigation

on that issue before the court of appeals.

20

CONCLUSION

In the event the Court grants the Petition filed by the

Department of Energy, the State's Cross-Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari should also be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

LEE FISHER

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO

By: JACK A. VAN KLEY

Assistant Attorney General

Environmental Enforcement Section

30 East Broad Street, 25th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43266-0410

(614) 466-2766

Counsel of Record Cross-Petitioner

TIMOTHY J. KERN

TERRENCE S. FINN

Assistant Attorneys General

Co-Counsel for Cross-Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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