Reply Brief — Arkansas v. Oklahoma
Supreme Court brief1991
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In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
Vv.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217
rer AVATL ADIE CODY | PP
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 90-1266
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
Vv.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
Respondents’ brief in opposition does not provide
a persuasive reason for denying our petition for a
writ of certiorari.’ Respondents claim that the
1 The brief in opposition also discusses the Arkansas peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari, Arkansas Vv. Oklahoma, No. 90-
1262, which seeks review of the same judgment. We do not
oppose the granting of that petition.
Despite the caption of the Arkansas petition, this case is
not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of this Court
under 28 U.S.C. 1251(a). As we explain in our petition (Pet.
9), this case originated in three petitions to the courts of
appeals for review of EPA’s issuance of a permit for the
Fayetteville wastewater treatment plant. In each case, the
State was joined ac petitioner by other governmental entities,
and EPA was the respondent. When the cases were consoli-
dated in the Tenth Circuit, the States remained petitioners in
(1)
2
court of appeals’ decision is limited to the applica-
tion of a particular Oklahoma Water Quality Stand-
ard (OWQS) to the upper reaches of the Illinois
River, and thus presents ‘no focused issue of gen-
eral significance” meriting review by this Court (Br.
in Opp. 16). Respondents also assert that the issue
is of limited importance because the permit at issue
here is subject to renewal, and the OWQS to periodic
review (id. at 25-26). Neither of these contentions
has merit.
1. In arguing that the decision below is of limited
significance because it simply applies a particular
provision of the Oklahoma Water Quality Standards
to the Fayetteville discharges, respondents overlook
the importance of the fundamental question in this
case—whether it is, indeed, the proper role of the
court reviewing the validity of EPA’s action to base
its decision on the court’s own interpretation of the
antidegradation provision as simply a matter of state
law, or whether, as we contend, the court should up-
hold the validity of EPA’s administrative action if
EPA’s interpretation of the antidegradation provision
was reasonable. We explain in our petition (Pet. 15-
19, 22-23) the serious implications of the court of
appeals’ approach for the implementation of the
Clean Water Act, and particularly its effect on EPA’s
both cases, and EPA remained the respondent. There was
accordingly no doubt that the court of appeals had jurisdic-
tion of the case under 33 U.S.C. 1369(b) (1) (providing that
review of EPA action in issuing NPDES permit “may be had
by any interested person in the [appropriate] Circuit Court
of Appeals of the United States.”) and 33 U.S.C. 1362(5)
(defining “‘person” to include a State). Since this suit did
not originate as a “controvers[y] between two or more
States,” it is not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
this Court; the Court accordingly has appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C, 1254(1).
3
responsibilities to facilitate the resolution of inter-
state water pollution disputes. Our petition also
points out (Pet. 15-16) the fundamental inconsistency
between the court of appeals’ holding and this Court’s
decision in International Paper Co. vy. Ouellette, 479
U.S. 481 (1987).
Respondents assert that EPA’s present position
concerning the deference due to its interpretation of
the federally approved standards is “at odds with”
its position in the administrative proceedings (Br. in
Opp. 21-22). There is in fact no inconsistency be-
tween the position that federally approved down-
stream state standards must be strictly complied
with—the position taken by EPA in the administra-
tive proceedings—and the contention in our petition
that the reviewing court must uphold EPA’s permit-
ting action when it is based on a reasonable interpre-
tation of those standards. The distinction is between
determining the requirements of the standards—a
matter as to which deference is due the expertise of
the agency that approved them—and assuring strict
compliance with those standards once their meaning
has been ascertained.
Respondents also suggest (Br. in Opp. 22) that def-
erence is inappropriate because the OWQS are clear
and unambiguous.” Respondents argue (id. at 24,
11) that degradation in violation of the OWQS oc-
curs whenever “it is determined that harmful pollu-
tants are added to the river by a new discharge.”
But, as Arkansas notes in its reply brief, the small
amount of additional phosphorus in the Illinois River
at the border is accompanied by a_ proportionally
* As we note in our petition (Pet. 10, 18), the court’s inter-
pretation was not proposed by any party below. Respondents
do not dispute this; they simply assert that the standard was
unambiguous.
4
larger increase in the water flow in the river, and
testimony at the hearings on the Fayetteville permit
indicated that the quality of the Fayetteville effluent
actually exceeds the quality of the Illinois River in
Oklahoma. Ark. Reply Br. 9-10. This evidence
means that the concentration of phosphorus and other
pollutants in the river at the border will be lower
with than without the Fayetteville discharge. It is
accordingly not at all obvious that permitting such
discharge results in a violation of Oklahoma’s fed-
erally approved antidegradation provision. In any
event, and particularly on this state of the record, it
was reasonable for EPA to conclude that Oklahoma
did noi, by enacting a provision that simply prevents
“degradation,” foreclose issuance of a permit for a
discharge into upstream Arkansas waters where the
discharge would not cause any injury to Oklahoma
waters. EPA, accordingly, properly exercised its fed-
eral statutory authority in issuing the permit.
2. Respondents also claim (Br. in Opp. 16, 25-
26) that certiorari should not be granted in this case
because renewal of the Fayetteville permit is pres-
ently being considered by the Arkansas Department
of Pollution Control and Ecology, which has assumed
NPDES permitting responsibilities. But the court of
appeals’ decision rested, in substantial part, on its
view of the constraints imposed by the Clean Water
Act on EPA’s interpretation of the OWQS—and pre-
sumably on the interpretation of any other similarly
worded water quality standard.’ The decision in this
case, if unreviewed, thus will presumably limit the
options available in subsequent permitting proceed-
* As we noted in our petition (Pet. 16-17), Oklahoma’s
antidegradation provision substantially reflects the model
standard promulgated by EPA. It is thus fairly typical of
antidegradation provisions in other States.
5
ings, whether conducted by EPA itself or by the State
subject to EPA’s authority to object to a _ state-
proposed permit. See Br. in Opp. 25 (“the Court of
Appeals’ decision establishes the law to be applied in
such subsequent proceedings”’ ).
Although state water quality standards are subject
to periodic review by EPA, that review may well be
similarly cabined by the decision below, absent re-
view by this Court. And, of course, the fact that state
standards undergo periodic review by EPA hardly
diminishes the importance of assuring that courts re-
viewing permitting decisions pay proper deference to
EPA’s reasonable interpretations of those standards.
Significantly, respondents do not suggest that any
changes made in the course of these reviews have
materially changed the meaning of the state anti-
degradation provision, or that any such changes are
contemplated.*
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the
petition, the petition for a writ of certiorari should
be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
KENNETH W. STARR
Solicitor General
MARCH 1991
* NPDES permits are always of limited duration and state
water quality standards are always subject to periodic review.
Respondents suggest (Br. in Opp. 25) that these factors make
the issues presented too “narrowly limited by place and time”
to merit review by this Court. Under that rationale, issues
involving the interpretation and application of the Clean
Water Act to the NPDES permitting process would rarely,
if ever, merit such review.
WW U. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1991 2e2061 20447
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.