Reply Brief — Arkansas v. Oklahoma

Supreme Court brief1991

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER

Vv.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 514-2217

rer AVATL ADIE CODY | PP

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 90-1266

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER

Vv.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

Respondents’ brief in opposition does not provide

a persuasive reason for denying our petition for a

writ of certiorari.’ Respondents claim that the

1 The brief in opposition also discusses the Arkansas peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari, Arkansas Vv. Oklahoma, No. 90-

1262, which seeks review of the same judgment. We do not

oppose the granting of that petition.

Despite the caption of the Arkansas petition, this case is

not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of this Court

under 28 U.S.C. 1251(a). As we explain in our petition (Pet.

9), this case originated in three petitions to the courts of

appeals for review of EPA’s issuance of a permit for the

Fayetteville wastewater treatment plant. In each case, the

State was joined ac petitioner by other governmental entities,

and EPA was the respondent. When the cases were consoli-

dated in the Tenth Circuit, the States remained petitioners in

(1)

2

court of appeals’ decision is limited to the applica-

tion of a particular Oklahoma Water Quality Stand-

ard (OWQS) to the upper reaches of the Illinois

River, and thus presents ‘no focused issue of gen-

eral significance” meriting review by this Court (Br.

in Opp. 16). Respondents also assert that the issue

is of limited importance because the permit at issue

here is subject to renewal, and the OWQS to periodic

review (id. at 25-26). Neither of these contentions

has merit.

1. In arguing that the decision below is of limited

significance because it simply applies a particular

provision of the Oklahoma Water Quality Standards

to the Fayetteville discharges, respondents overlook

the importance of the fundamental question in this

case—whether it is, indeed, the proper role of the

court reviewing the validity of EPA’s action to base

its decision on the court’s own interpretation of the

antidegradation provision as simply a matter of state

law, or whether, as we contend, the court should up-

hold the validity of EPA’s administrative action if

EPA’s interpretation of the antidegradation provision

was reasonable. We explain in our petition (Pet. 15-

19, 22-23) the serious implications of the court of

appeals’ approach for the implementation of the

Clean Water Act, and particularly its effect on EPA’s

both cases, and EPA remained the respondent. There was

accordingly no doubt that the court of appeals had jurisdic-

tion of the case under 33 U.S.C. 1369(b) (1) (providing that

review of EPA action in issuing NPDES permit “may be had

by any interested person in the [appropriate] Circuit Court

of Appeals of the United States.”) and 33 U.S.C. 1362(5)

(defining “‘person” to include a State). Since this suit did

not originate as a “controvers[y] between two or more

States,” it is not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of

this Court; the Court accordingly has appellate jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C, 1254(1).

3

responsibilities to facilitate the resolution of inter-

state water pollution disputes. Our petition also

points out (Pet. 15-16) the fundamental inconsistency

between the court of appeals’ holding and this Court’s

decision in International Paper Co. vy. Ouellette, 479

U.S. 481 (1987).

Respondents assert that EPA’s present position

concerning the deference due to its interpretation of

the federally approved standards is “at odds with”

its position in the administrative proceedings (Br. in

Opp. 21-22). There is in fact no inconsistency be-

tween the position that federally approved down-

stream state standards must be strictly complied

with—the position taken by EPA in the administra-

tive proceedings—and the contention in our petition

that the reviewing court must uphold EPA’s permit-

ting action when it is based on a reasonable interpre-

tation of those standards. The distinction is between

determining the requirements of the standards—a

matter as to which deference is due the expertise of

the agency that approved them—and assuring strict

compliance with those standards once their meaning

has been ascertained.

Respondents also suggest (Br. in Opp. 22) that def-

erence is inappropriate because the OWQS are clear

and unambiguous.” Respondents argue (id. at 24,

11) that degradation in violation of the OWQS oc-

curs whenever “it is determined that harmful pollu-

tants are added to the river by a new discharge.”

But, as Arkansas notes in its reply brief, the small

amount of additional phosphorus in the Illinois River

at the border is accompanied by a_ proportionally

* As we note in our petition (Pet. 10, 18), the court’s inter-

pretation was not proposed by any party below. Respondents

do not dispute this; they simply assert that the standard was

unambiguous.

4

larger increase in the water flow in the river, and

testimony at the hearings on the Fayetteville permit

indicated that the quality of the Fayetteville effluent

actually exceeds the quality of the Illinois River in

Oklahoma. Ark. Reply Br. 9-10. This evidence

means that the concentration of phosphorus and other

pollutants in the river at the border will be lower

with than without the Fayetteville discharge. It is

accordingly not at all obvious that permitting such

discharge results in a violation of Oklahoma’s fed-

erally approved antidegradation provision. In any

event, and particularly on this state of the record, it

was reasonable for EPA to conclude that Oklahoma

did noi, by enacting a provision that simply prevents

“degradation,” foreclose issuance of a permit for a

discharge into upstream Arkansas waters where the

discharge would not cause any injury to Oklahoma

waters. EPA, accordingly, properly exercised its fed-

eral statutory authority in issuing the permit.

2. Respondents also claim (Br. in Opp. 16, 25-

26) that certiorari should not be granted in this case

because renewal of the Fayetteville permit is pres-

ently being considered by the Arkansas Department

of Pollution Control and Ecology, which has assumed

NPDES permitting responsibilities. But the court of

appeals’ decision rested, in substantial part, on its

view of the constraints imposed by the Clean Water

Act on EPA’s interpretation of the OWQS—and pre-

sumably on the interpretation of any other similarly

worded water quality standard.’ The decision in this

case, if unreviewed, thus will presumably limit the

options available in subsequent permitting proceed-

* As we noted in our petition (Pet. 16-17), Oklahoma’s

antidegradation provision substantially reflects the model

standard promulgated by EPA. It is thus fairly typical of

antidegradation provisions in other States.

5

ings, whether conducted by EPA itself or by the State

subject to EPA’s authority to object to a _ state-

proposed permit. See Br. in Opp. 25 (“the Court of

Appeals’ decision establishes the law to be applied in

such subsequent proceedings”’ ).

Although state water quality standards are subject

to periodic review by EPA, that review may well be

similarly cabined by the decision below, absent re-

view by this Court. And, of course, the fact that state

standards undergo periodic review by EPA hardly

diminishes the importance of assuring that courts re-

viewing permitting decisions pay proper deference to

EPA’s reasonable interpretations of those standards.

Significantly, respondents do not suggest that any

changes made in the course of these reviews have

materially changed the meaning of the state anti-

degradation provision, or that any such changes are

contemplated.*

For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the

petition, the petition for a writ of certiorari should

be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

MARCH 1991

* NPDES permits are always of limited duration and state

water quality standards are always subject to periodic review.

Respondents suggest (Br. in Opp. 25) that these factors make

the issues presented too “narrowly limited by place and time”

to merit review by this Court. Under that rationale, issues

involving the interpretation and application of the Clean

Water Act to the NPDES permitting process would rarely,

if ever, merit such review.

WW U. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1991 2e2061 20447

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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