Reply Brief — Arkansas v. Oklahoma

Supreme Court brief1992

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

OFFICE OF THE CLema |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

STATE OF ARKANSAS, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WINSTON BRYANT EDWARD W. WARREN, P.C.

Attorney General DAVID G. NORRELL

MARY STALLCUP (Counsel of Record)

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GARY E. MARCHANT

GENERAL KIRKLAND & ELLIS

200 Tower Building Suite 1200

4th & Center 655 Fifteenth St., N.W.

Little Rock, AR 72201 Washington, D.C. 20005

JAMES N. McCorpD (202) 879-5070

CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE WALTER R. NIBLOCK

207 West Center Street THE NIBLOCK LAW FIRM

ANNE ROBERTS BOBO Fay etteville, AR 72702

A.D.P.C. & E. ———<

P.O. Box 8913 Staseee Law Wenne

Little Rock, AR 72219-8918 193 West Lafayette

March 15, 1991 Fayetteville, AR 72702

SS

WILeon - Eras Printine Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS * .........................

ID icctrcteiettintircinenitnnitnnevticccnmnenion

I. RESPONDENTS’ DEFENSE OF THE DECI-

SION BELOW ACTUALLY EMPHASIZES

THE NEED FOR SUPREME COURT RE-

Il.

RESPONDENTS’ SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS

DO NOT DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF

THE ISSUES PRESENTED ...............................

A.

B.

Respondents’ Assertion Of “Correctness” Is

Not A Reason For Denying Review ..............

Respondents Fail to Explain Away The Con-

flict Created By The Tenth Circuit’s Deci-

sion

Respondents Cannot Artificially Limit The

Tenth Circuit’s Decision To An Interpreta-

tion Of Oklahoma Water Quality Standards..

. The Permit Renewal Proceedings Do Not

Diminish The Need For Immediate Review

ENE SMEs ET ee a

. The Facts Of This Case Confirm the Ex-

treme Scope Of The Tenth Circuit’s Deci-

* There have been no changes in the parties to the proceedings

listed on page ii of Arkansas’ petition.

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279

i. ) Yh oe et eae

_,lUinois Vv. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) ....

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481

CUTIE canittastitletensindonistenissstinscciiaadadaiansiasinihiaaaaneaiads

Shearson/American Express Inc. Vv. McMahon,

Re

Statutes and Regulations

CWA § 401, 88 U.S.C. § 1841 ..........2...... eee eceeee ones

CWA § 402 (b) (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b) (5) ............

CWA § 402 (d) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1842 (d) (2) ............

CWA, § GEG, SB UB. § BGO anna ancccecncccrcesceeccensceseccses

et 8 8 een

Miscellaneous

EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,099 (Sept. 22, 1989) —...........

Letter from Brita Haugland Cantrell, Assistant

A.G. of Oklahoma to Arkansas Dept. of Pollu-

tion Control & Ecology, Dec. 21, 1990 ................

Comments of U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Fish and

Wildlife Service, to U.S. EPA, Region 10, Feb.

| a Se ee Pe

Motion of Oklahoma for Leave to File Complaint,

Oklahoma v. Arkansas (No. 93, Orig.), motion

denied, 460 U.S. 1020 (1988) .........-..0.. 0.

Rebuttal Testimony of Jack H. Gakstatter, EPA

Office of Research & Development (Index No.

Jy §" SS | eee

aA kr ww Ww

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents’ brief in opposition is most revealing for

the points that it implicitly concedes and declines to ad-

dress. See Section I infra. But even the points that

Oklahoma does choose to address in no way diminish the

need for Supreme Court review or demonstrate that this

case is inappropriate for resolution of the issues pre-

sented. See Section II infra.

I. RESPONDENTS’ DEFENSE OF THE DECISION

BELOW ACTUALLY EMPHASIZES THE NEED

FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW.

In defending the decision below, Oklahoma readily con-

firms the sweeping nature of the Tenth Circuit’s first

holding regarding the applicability of downstream state

standards to facilities in upstream states. Not only must

EPA and state permitting agencies apply the downstream

state standards, but they have absolutely no discretion to

depart from or interpret those standards. See, e.g., Br.

Opp. at 11, 16 (mandating “strict compliance’). In re-

spondents’ view, the Tenth Circuit was fully justified in

giving downstream states a veto power over the permit-

ting of sources in upstream states.

Similarly, Oklahoma is quick to support the absolute

nature of the Tenth Circuit’s second holding requiring a

ban on new permits. Although respondents suggest the

ban might not apply in other states (a point addressed

in Section II.C infra), Oklahoma explicitly endorses the

mandatory and immediate nature of the ban where it

does apply. The ban even precludes issuance of permits

for new sources that would have no detectable adverse

effect on water quality. Br. Opp. at 13-14. As shown by

EPA, Arkansas, and the states and cities submitting

amicus briefs, however, this ban would dramatically

change the existing regulatory system, and whether in-

tended or not by Oklahoma, it is already being invoked

by federal agencies in other states and circuits. See infra

note 4,

| 2

Finally, apart from a passing disclaimer, respondents

prefer to ignore the revolutionary impact of the Tenth

Circuit’s decision. See EPA Pet. at 13, 23; Ark. Pet. at

8, 26-29. As the petitions by both EPA and Arkansas

demonstrate, and the amicus briefs submitted by other

states, cities and industries confirm, the change in law

mandated by the Tenth Circuit will severely disrupt the

Clean Water Act (CWA) permitting process and jeop-

ardize the permits for countless facilities now under con-

struction or in planning. See Brief of Colorado et al. as

Amici Curiae at 8-9; Brief of Montana as Amicus Curiae

at 6; Brief of The Association of Metropolitan Sewerage

Agencies et al. as Amici Curiae at 17-18; Brief of

Champion International Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae at

12-13. Again, Oklahoma treats that impact as only ap-

propriate, and it offers these other affected parties no

quarter.

After a decade of disputes with Arkansas over inter-

state waterways, Oklahoma has finally achieved its own

parochial objectives in the Tenth Circuit. But the rest

of the nation now has to live with the disruptive effects

of the Tenth Circuit’s decision, absent review by this

Court. Respondents’ effort to ignore these nationwide

consequences does not make them disappear.

II. RESPONDENTS’ SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS DO NOT

DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES

PRESENTED.

A. Respondents’ Assertion Of “Correctness” Is Not A

Reason For Denying Review.

Respondents’ primary ground for opposing certiorari

is that they believe the Tenth Circuit’s decision is clearly

“correct.” Br. Opp. at 15. Most prevailing parties feel

that way. Before succeeding in the Tenth Circuit, how-

ever, Oklahoma fully agreed that these interstate issues

were substantial and itself urged that resolution by the

Supreme Court was necessary. Motion of Oklahoma for

Leave to File Complaint, Oklahoma v. Arkansas (No. 93,

Orig.), motion denied, 460 U.S. 1020 (1983). Moreover,

3

respondents base their new patina of clarity on nothing

more than isolated snippets of statutory language and an

unsubstantiated assertion that the Tenth Circuit's deci-

sion is consistent with current practice under the CWA.

Br. Opp. at 16-17.

The question presented is whether the CWA compels

permitting agencies to apply, without any deviation or

flexibility, the standards of downstream states. Arkansas

contends that the statute gives agencies the discretion to

apply these standards and to decide how they should be

considered in any given case. Oklahoma’s rigid view to

the contrary certainly is not compelled by the statute

(even the Tenth Circuit needed over thirty pages to jus-

tify its conclusion), and that view has not previously

been accepted in any other litigation. Moreover, Okla-

homa’s view completely ignores the language in § 402,

among other provisions. Section 402 was specifically in-

tended by Congress to address the precise question at is-

sue and expressly treats downstream standards as a dis-

cretionary consideration, rather than as automatically

applicable. CWA § 402(b) (5), (d) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342

(b) (5), (d) (2); Ark. Pet. at 14-15."

Respondents are on even weaker ground in asserting

that the Tenth Circuit’s holding is consistent with the

current administration of the CWA. Respondents offer

no evidence to support this claim and, in fact, the amicus

briefs filed by various states directly contradict the re-

spondents. As those briefs explain, the current prac-

tice of states with approved permitting programs is to

consider only the water quality standards of the source

state, and not downstream states, when evaluating a per-

mit application. Brief of Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae

at 6; Brief of Montana as Amicus Curiae at 6. Thus,

far from supporting the Tenth Circuit’s decision, the ac-

1 It would make no sense to suggest that EPA has even less dis-

cretion in the application of downstream standards when it is the

permitting agency under § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341.

4

tual practice in administering the Act runs directly con-

trary to the court’s new construction.

Respondents’ assertion of “correctness” is further re-

futed by the untenable situation created as a result of

the Tenth Circuit’s elimination of any mechanism for

balancing the competing interests of upstream and down-

stream states. As the brief submitted by the municipal

amici demonstrates, the statutory scheme must provide

some flexibility to accommodate both upstream and down-

stream state interests. Brief of The Association of Metro-

politan Sewerage Agencies et al. as Amici Curiae at 7-14.

Indeed, even Oklahoma agrees that some mechanism for

accommodation must exist and suggests that EPA can

“disapprove” downstream standards that would unrea-

sonably affect upstream interests. Br. Opp. at 23. Un-

fortunately, both the courts and EPA have concluded

that, under § 510 of the CWA, the Agency “is not author-

ized to disapprove a State water quality standard on the

basis that EPA considers the standard to be too strin-

gent.” EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,099 (Sept. 22, 1989);

Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284

(D.S.D. 1979). Adoption of the Tenth Circuit’s position

would therefore remove the only available mechanism for

EPA to mediate interstate disputes over the application

of conflicting water quality standards.

Finally, notwithstanding Oklahoma’s wishful charac-

terization, EPA does not support Oklahoma’s position on

this issue. The Tenth Circuit’s decision effectively elim-

inates any Agency flexibility or discretion in applying

downstream state standards, and EPA’s petition clearly

confirms that it is seeking review of the court’s inter-

state holding. As EPA concluded, the Tenth Circuit’s

decision “has significantly undermined EPA’s authority

to implement the Clean Water Act by usurping EPA’s

role under the Act as arbiter of interstate water pollu-

tion disputes.” EPA Pet. at 12-13. Consequently, even

though EPA may advocate a somewhat different ap-

proach than the Arkansas petitioners, Oklahoma’s char-

acterization of EPA’s position should be recognized as

5

nothing more than an attempt to obfuscate the court’s

radical departure from current practice.*

B. Respondents Fail to Explain Away The Conflict

Created By The Tenth Circuit’s Decision.

Respondents’ rhetoric and superficial readings similarly

fail to explain away the conflict between the Tenth Cir-

cuit’s holdings and the decisions of this Court and other

circuits. With respect to International Paper Co. v. Ouel-

lette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), Oklahoma dismisses this

Court’s detailed discussion of the issue as mere dicta.

This “distinction” simply reflects a refusal to examine the

substance of the Court’s decision. The Supreme Court’s

preemption holding necessarily required the Court to in-

terpret the Clean Water Act’s provisions on the interstate

application of water quality standards before the Court

could decide whether these provisions conflicted with, and

therefore preempted, the application of a downstream

state’s common law. See Ark. Pet. at 12 n.10. Thus, this

Court’s conclusion in Ouellette that a downstream state

could not impose its standards under the CWA on out-of-

state sources was an essential part of the Court’s holding.

In any event, lower courts are not free to disregard at

will this Court’s explanation of the law. See Shearson/

American Express Inc. V. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268

(1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (a statute that has been construed by the Supreme

Court “acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if

the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress it-

self’).

Respondents are equally mistaken in attempting to dis-

tinguish J/linois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985), on the

ground that it only dealt with state common law. Br.

2In fact, respondents’ brief is internally inconsistent on this

issue. At some points in their brief, respondents do concede that

EPA’s “present position” would allow for “administrative balanc-

ing” between the downstream standard and “other considerations.”

Br. Opp. at 21-22.

6

Opp. at 19. In fact, this decision involved the interstate

application of both Illinois common law and the Illinois

water quality standards adopted under state statutes and

approved under the Clean Water Act. 731 F.2d at 406.

Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit held that a downstream

state could not apply either its common law or its water

quality standards against out-of-state sources. Jd. at

414. In short, a fair reading of these and the other de-

cisions addressed in Arkansas’ petition demonstrates a

substantial conflict in the precedent, which can only be

resolved by this Court.

C. Respondents Cannot Artificially Limit The Tenth

Circuit’s Decision To An Interpretation Of Okla-

homa Water Quality Standards.

Having won their own ban on any new Arkansas dis-

charges that reach their border, Oklahoma now suggests

that this ban might not apply in other states. While the

ban on new permits that Oklahoma advocated below may

have been confined in this manner, the Tenth Circuit

made clear that it was adopting a much more sweeping

holding than the argument advanced by Oklahoma. In-

deed, in justifying its decision not to remand the case,

the court explicitly stated that it was creating a new test,

going far beyond the position advocated by Oklahoma,

and that the parties “did not recognize the real signifi-

cance of this issue.” Ark. Pet. App. at 54a n.40.

The nationwide applicability of the court’s permit ban

is readily demonstrated by the court’s opinion. Specifi-

cally, the court predicated the ban on its interpretation of

the Clean Water Act, rather than on Oklahoma’s non-

degradation standard. See, e.g., Ark. Pet. App. at 82a.

The Tenth Circuit repeatedly relied on the intent of Con-

gress and the legislative history of the CWA to justify

its permit ban holding, without even referring to the in-

tent of the specific Oklahoma standard involved in this

case. See, e.g., id. at 88a (“the agency’s decision is in-

consistent with the language of the Clean Water Act, as

interpreted in light of the legislative history, and frus-

trates the policy that Congress sought to implement”)

7

See also id. at 76a, 78a-79a. In addition, the Tenth Cir-

cuit emphasized that the permit ban is triggered by a

pre-existing violation of any relevant water quality

standard.’ See, e.g., id. at 54a, 75a. According to the

court, EPA’s failure to impose a permit ban upstream

from an existing water quality violation was the “prin-

cipal flaw in the agency’s decision-making rationale.”

Id. at 75a,

In sum, regardless of what Oklahoma may have in-

tended, the Tenth Circuit’s permit ban is applicable to

any stream with an existing violation of a water quality

standard. Oklahoma’s artificial construction therefore

cannot avoid the severe nationwide impact described by

Arkansas’ petition and the amicus briefs. See, e.g., Ark.

Pet. at 27-29. In fact, the Tenth Circuit’s holding al-

ready is being applied nationwide exactly as predicted

by the Arkansas petition.*

D. The Permit Renewal Proceedings Do Not Diminish

The Need For Immediate Review By This Court.

Respondents also suggest that this case is inappro-

priate for review because the Fayetteville facility’s dis-

charge permit is up for renewal and Arkansas, rather

than EPA, is now the permitting agency. Br. Opp. at 25.

* Furthermore, as explained in EPA’s petition, even if the court’s

holding had been based on an interpretation of Oklahoma’s non-

degradation standard rather than the CWA, the holding would still

have a dramatic nationwide impact because every state is required

to adopt a similar non-degradation policy based on EPA’s model

standard. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.

*For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and other

interest groups have submitted comments on a draft NPDES permit

(AK-004978-6) in Alaska arguing that the permit must be denied

because there is a pre-existing downstream violation of a relevant

water quality standard, based specifically on the Tenth Circuit's

decision. See, e.g., Comments of U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Fish

and Wildlife Service, to U.S. EPA, Region 10, Feb. 12, 1991. Thus,

despite respondents’ characterization, the Tenth Circuit's permit

ban holding is already being used to block new permits throughout

the nation, even in contexts that involve only a single state.

8

This suggestion is a red herring and has no bearing on

the appropriateness of review. Respondents’ own brief

states that “the Court of Appeals’ decision establishes the

law to be applied in such subsequent proceedings.” Id. In

addition, Oklahoma has made clear its intention to use the

Tenth Cireuit’s decision to block the renewal of the Fay-

etteville permit." Moreover, Oklahoma does not point to

any specific change in the Oklahoma standards or the

other circumstances of the case that would make the Tenth

Circuit’s holdings less relevant or determinative in the

permit renewal proceeding.

Thus, as a matter of law and fact, the permit renewal

proceedings do not in any way moot the issues presented

by Arkansas’ petition. In addition to the factors dis-

cussed abuve, the Fayetteville plant’s ability to continue

operating during the lengthy renewal proceedings will

depend on the legal validity of the existing permit. Ab-

sent review, Oklahoma will undoubtedly contend that the

Tenth Circuit’s decision requires the Fayetteville plant

to immediately stop discharging into the Illinois River

basin, forcing the plant to shut down. Consequently, even

Oklahoma was ca * not to suggest that the Tenth

Circuit’s decision is

Moreover, NPDEs . nits are issued for a maximum

of five years. Because evidentiary hearings on a permit

are conducted after the permit is issued, and given the

length of time it takes for judicial review after comple-

tion of the evidentiary hearings, there would almost never

be time to get Supreme Court review of a permit deci-

sion if the time for revie.v expires at the end of the five

year permit period.

5 See, e.g., Letter from Brita Haugland Cantrell, Assistant A.G.

of Oklahoma to Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control & Ecology,

Dec. 21, 1990 (Oklahoma “preserves all rights won in EPA v.

Oklahoma, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990) as applied to that permit

and any successive permits for the Fayetteville discharge. This

objection to the Fayetteville permit, upheld by the Tenth Circuit in

that case, likewise applies to this draft Permit and any successive

permits.’”’).

9

Finally, the appropriateness of immediate review by

this Court is reinforced by the tremendous consequences

of these issues for the nation as a whole. With each day

that passes, the Tenth Circuit’s decision is exacerbating

interstate conflicts, disrupting permit programs, jeopar-

dizing the permits for countless public and private facili-

ties across the nation, and otherwise creating intolerable

uncertainty for the expenditure of scarce public resources.

While Oklahoma’s primary interest may be in preserving

its victory in the court below, the rest of the country

needs an immediate resolution by this Court.

E. The Facts Of This Case Confirm the Extreme Scope

Of The Tenth Circuit’s Decision.

While the factual context of this case is not critical

for deciding the central legal issues presented, a bal-

anced portrayal of the record before EPA demonstrates

the extreme scope and consequences of the Tenth Circuit’s

decision.

For example, the quality of the Fayetteville effluent

actually exceeds the quality of the Illinois River in Ar-

kansas and Oklahoma, contrary to respondents’ insinua-

tion that the plant is polluting the river. At most, re-

spondents presented evidence suggesting that the Fayette-

ville discharge may increase phosphorous levels in the

Illinois River at the Oklahoma border by six pounds per

day. Br. Opp. at 11.° However, respondents fail to men-

tion that this small amount of additional phosphorous

will be accompanied by a proportionally much larger in-

crease in water flow, since most of the water discharged

by the Fayetteville facility originally came from outside

the Illinois River basin.

The concentration of phosphorous and other substances

in the Fayetteville effluent will therefore actually be lower

than in the Illinois River at the point of confluence. Thus,

® Every expert who testified at the permit hearings concluded

that the Fayetteville effluent would result in no change in any

observable parameter of water quality. See, e.g., Ark. Pet. App. at

130a-132a.

10

the Fayetteville discharge will result in a net dilution of

pollutants in the river and actually improve water qual-

ity by, for example, increasing dissolved oxygen levels.

Ark. Pet. App. at 139a. Moreover, EPA’s expert witness

at the hearings on the Fayetteville permit testified that

the facility’s discharge will improve Oklahoma water

quality because it “will result in much less algal growth

in Lake Frances and improved water clarity in the Illi-

nois River below Lake Frances as well as benefiting Lake

Tenkiller.” Rebuttal Testimony of Jack H. Gakstatter,

EPA Office of Research & Development (Index No. EPA-

4, Log. No. 121, p. 5).

The fact that the Tenth Circuit’s decision would now

prevent the City of Fayetteville from operating its $40

million state-of-the-art plant further demonstrates the

extreme nature of the Tenth Circuit’s holdings. As even

the Oklahoma Department of Health acknowledged, the

Fayetteville plant incorporates “the most thorough and

complete treatment currently available.” Ark. Pet. App.

at 105a. There is absolutely no question that the new

Fayetteville facility is environmentally superior to the

previous plant it has replaced. Allowing Oklahoma to

block this improvement simply cannot be reconciled with

the purposes and objectives of the CWA.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for those stated in the

petitions, a writ of certiorari should be granted.

WINSTON BRYANT

Attorney General

MARY STALLCUP

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL

200 Tower Building

4th & Center

Little Rock, AR 72201

JAMES N. McCorp

CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE

207 West Center Street

Fayetteville, AR 72701

ANNE ROBERTS BOBO

A.D.P.C. & E.

P.O. Box 8913

Little Rock, AR 72219-8913

March 15, 1991

11

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. WARREN, P.C.

DAVID G. NORRELL

(Counsel of Record)

GARY E. MARCHANT

KIRKLAND & ELLIS

Suite 1200

655 Fifteenth St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 879-5070

WALTER R. NIBLOCK

THE NIBLOCK LAW FIRM

P.O. Drawer 818

Fayetteville, AR 72702

NANCY L. HAMM

HAMM LAW FIRM

193 West Lafayette

Fayetteville, AR 72702

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.