Amicus Curiae Brief — Wooddell v. Electrical Workers

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

GUY WOODDELL, JR., ="

Petitioner,

—_—V—

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL

WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 71, ef ai.,

: Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF AMICUS

CURIAE OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR UNION

DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES UNION, IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Steven R. Shapiro

(Counsel of Record)

John A. Powell

Helen Hershkoff

American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation

132 West 43 Street

New York, New York 10036

(212) 944-9800

Susan M. Jennik

Association for Union Democracy

500 State Street

Brooklyn, New York 11217

(718) 855-6650

;

No. 90-967

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

GUY WOODDELL, JR..,

Petitioner,

-V.-

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD

OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS,

LOCAL NO. 71, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MOTION OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR

UNION DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOR LEAVE TO

: FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

—_—

The Association for Union Democracy (AUD) and

the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) respectfully

move for leave to file the annexed brief amicus curiae in

this case. Petitioner has consented to the filing of this

brief; respondents have refused to give their consent.

The AUD is a nonprofit corporation founded in

1969 which seeks to further democratic principles and

practices in American labor organizations, both by

encouraging union members to participate actively in the

life of their unions, and by protecting the exercise of

their democratic rights within their unions. No other

organization devotes itself primarily to this objective.

The sponsors of the Association include former

leaders of major unions, religious leaders, members of

union public review boards, lawyers, prominent educators

in labor studies and labor law, and numerous union

members. Despite divergent backgrounds, all share the

view that the labor movement is one of the great forces

which helps sustain democracy in our national life and

that, if the labor movement is to serve this purpose,

union leaders must be responsive to their members, and

unions must be democratic and just in their internal

operations.

The ACLU is a nationwide, nonprofit, nonpartisan

organization with over 275,000 members dedicated to the

principles of liberty and equality embodied in the Con-

stitution. For over forty years, the ACLU has supported

efforts in Congress and im the courts to recognize and

strengthen the rights of union members to internal union

democracy. Indeed, as commentators have noted, the

legislative campaign that eventually culminated in the

enactment of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-

closure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) "was formally launched

by the American Civil Liberties Union [when it] sub-

mitted a “Trade Union Democracy’ Bill to the Congress

during the 1947 hearings on new labor legislation."

Aaron, "The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-

sure Act of 1959," 73 Harv.L.Rev. 851 (1960). See also

Rothman, "Legislative History of the ‘Bill of Rights’ for

Union Members," 45 Minn.L.Rev. 199, 201-06 (1960).

Because the right of union members to enforce their

democratic rights is implicated by this case, the AUD

and the ACLU respectfully seek leave to submit this

brief amicus curiae for the Court’s consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

A/ OT,

Steven R. Shapiro

(Counsel of Record)

John A. Powell

Helen Hershkoff

American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation

132 West 43 Street

New York, New York 10036

(212) 944-9800 ;

Susan M. Jennik

Association for Union Democracy

500 State Street

Brooklyn, New York 11217

(718) 855-6650

Dated: April 22, 1991

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................. iii

INTEREST OF AMICI .. 2.2.20 oo ee ee |

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... |

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............... 2

RE c Guess suweesuSaenucwansuasss 3

i. PLAINTIFFS SEEKING DAMAGES

UNDER TITLE I OF THE LMRDA

ARE ENTITLED TO TRIAL BY

ee en ee ee ee 3

A. Congress Intended To Provide A

Right To Jury Trial When It

PED nedekenenkdencteses 3

B. The Right To A Jury Trial Guar-

anteed By The Seventh Amendment

Applies To Title I Actions ..... ee

1. Actions Brought Under Title I

Are Analogous To Actions At

RE 6 cccenetectieds« )

2. Actions Under Title I Are Sub-

ject To The Seventh Amend-

ment Right To Jury Trial Be-

cause Legal Remedies Are At

EE whew bet ebwaceensoeesncs 1]

Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ll. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE JURIS- rage

DICTION UNDER §301(a) OF THE Cases

yee 3 oe ACTIONS BROUGHT

ON MEMBERS TO EN. Abrams v. Carrier Co

SV. rp.

FORCE UNION CONSTITUTIONS ..... 15 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1970),

A. Union Constitutions Can Be En- cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971) ............045. 18

a In Federal Court Under Adams v. Boilermakers,

seman MOET LETT eT eee 15 262 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1958) .........--0-00e. 19

B. Union Members May Sue Under lor ve j

> en Alexander v. Operating Engineers,

§301(a) For Violations Of Union 624 F.2d 1235 (Sth Cir. 1980) peta ite eke ees eee 16, 19

Constitutions ................... 18

Bise v. IBEW, Local 1969,

CONCLUSION ....................0.5. 21 618 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1979),

a cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980) ............ 12, 13

Boilermakers v. Braswell,

388 F.2d 193 (Sth Cir.),

_* cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968) ............ >

Boilermakers v. Hardeman,

SP PEE cckvewesecccsaccescsceees 12

Bradford v. Textile Workers, Local 1093,

_ Pr Gi: f ls re 12

Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers,

___ US. __, 110 S.Ct. 424 (1989) .............. l

Brock v. Pierce County,

SR EEE cn cvcesesseseosesesceeres 6

Burris v. Teamsters,

224 F.Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963) ...........5-. 13

Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers,

Local No. 391 v. Terry,

__ US. __, 110 S.Ct. 1339 (1990) ........ 8, 13, 14

. iii

Clothing Workers v. Kaser,

6 S.E.2d 562 (Va. 1939) ... 0... eee eee 17

Cooke v. Painters, District 48,

529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976)

Curtis v. Loether,

se | passim

Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,

SOP U.S. 469 (1GG2) nn ccc ccc ccc cccccccces )

DelCostello v. Teamsters,

Ole Wid OPO CITED co ccccccccccccccceccccees 10

Desantiago v. Laborers, Local 1140,

914 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1990) .................., 18

Dole v. United Steelworkers,

__ US. __, 110 S.Ct. 929 (1990) .... 2.00... 6

Elfer v. Marine Engineers,

154 So. 32 (La. 1934) .... 0... ce eee eee ee eee 17

Finnegan v. Leu,

456 U.S. 431 (1982) ...... 0... eee eee 4

Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street

Lighting Co..,

BPO UB. BF CID) nc cccccccccbecscccccceces vy)

Franchise Tax Board v. Construction

Laborers Vacation Trust,

TP GE DOMED dccccccccccccvecececceccnces 19

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co..,

RE 1]

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,

__ US. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2782 (1989) ........... &, 13

Grove City College v. Bell,

465 UG. S55 (IGBA) on ccc ccc cre seve vveenes 6

Guidry v. Operating Engineers,

Local 406, :

882 F.2d 929 (Sth Cir. 1989) 2... ...05 66 eeeeeee 12

Hepner v. United States,

yy CIES Ff) | re ee )

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freigat,

424 U.S. 554 (1976) ww ccc cree eee e nen nens 10

Hospital & Health Care Employees,

Local 1199 DC v. Hospital & Health

Care Employees,

533 F.2d 1204 (D.C.Cir. 1976) 2... 66. eee 16

IBEW v. Foust, ,

SEs GE CUTED co ccc cee dierevccerseceves I:

Keeffe Bros. v. Teamsters, Local 592,

562 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1977) .. 0... cee ee eee 12

Kinney v. IBEW,

669 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1981) 2.0... ee ee 18

Lewis v. Teamsters, Local 771,

826 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1987)... 0.0.62 ee. 1%, 19

Lorillard v. Pons, +s

|: & 0. : ee ),

Lyde v. Household Mfg., Inc.,

US. _, 110 S.Ct. 1331 (1990) ......-.-5--. y

Machinists v. Gonzales, .

rp. SUP Ok)... ) l

Magelssen v. Plasterers, Local 518,

240 F.Supp. 259 (W.D.Mo. 1965) ......---+5555: 13

Page

McCraw v. Plumbers and Pi

pefitters,

341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. eee 1, 12, 13

Morrissey v. National Maritime Union

544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976)..... .. CRS 13

Murphy v. Operating Engineers, Local 18

774 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1985), _ «

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 ( Sa eee 12

Napier v. Firefighters, Local 2,

293 N.E.2d 384 (IIL. AN eg he 17

NLRB v. Food & Commercial Work

484 U.S. 112 (1987) .......___ ee 6

Owens v. Okure,

__ US.__, 109 S.Ct. 573 NY ot ee 10

Painting & Decorating Contractors Ass'n

v. Painters & Decorators

Joint Committee, .

717 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1983), .

cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 RE Ae 20

Parker v. Steelworkers, Local 1 466,

642 F.2d 104 (Sth Cir.),

reh’g denied, 646 F.2d 567 (Sth Cir. |) a

Parsons v. Bedford, is

28 USS. (3 Pet.) 433 ( in fe te 7

Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local 334 '

452 U.S. 615 (1981) ............ 2, 3, 16, 17, 18, 20

Plumbers Local 472 y. Georgia Power Co..,

684 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 1982) ................. 19

Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,

328 U.S. 395 (1946) ............. fe ee 9

Pruitt v. Carpenters, Local

Union No. 225,

893 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1990) ......7.......... 18

Quinn v. DiGiulian,

po ws oR rr 13

Reed v. United Transportation Union, ~

eg Be ee Gee CERRO) once cc cesss 10, 11

Republic Steel v. Maddox,

De ane bane oo Oh 10

Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge,

te wr aa ae ao 6 a sa. 6 6 Odeo 8

Ryan v. IBEW, Local 134,

pe Oe Le a ee re ee 1?

Schneider Moving & Storage Co.

v. Robbins,

GE GPE GP MEETD cece cccseccces Pe eee 20

Shimman v. Frank, ‘de

Se ee I OD bk c co cccccccccescnts 12

Simmons v. Textile Workers, Local 713,

See We Beem Cree GA, TUG) nw ccc cree nee ge

Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, y

og ee 3, 10, 19

Steelworkers v. Sadlowski,

I Se ee 4

Stelling v. IBEW,

587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978),

cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979) ............... 16

Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby,

ee ee 9

Vii

Trail v. Teamzters,

542 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1976) 2, 19

rere eee eoneneesecenn & Ge

United States v. Thirty-seven Photogra nis

402 U.S. 363 (1971) sinh

Vaca v. Sipes,

386 U.S. 171 (1967)

Vandeventer v. Operating Engineers,

Local 513,

579 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978)

Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v.

Newspaper Guild, Local 120,

647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1981),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982) - 19

"2. © Oe ©.8 6 ¢ 6s 6 eo 6

Statutes and Regulations -

Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967

29 U.S.C. §621, et seg.................... 6, 7

Civil Rights Act of 1968

PUB. 6002 ........ 6. oo c ee... 9, 10

§1(b), 29 U.S.C. §141(b) ....... 20

Labor-Management Reporting

and Disclosure Act

§§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§411-15

§101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(1)

§101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(2)

§ 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(3) ....... ween 4

§101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(4)

Vili

§101(a)(S), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(S) .......... 4,

SIBHOA SP UBL. GOLD) 2c ccc cece ccces

ey 6h Foe Cut we wd Ue eee nase ee Sem

adc coene be neneens sheet 10, 11

Ordinances of Laborers,

a UD 6 ccc eet ncunscsveescévs

Statute of Laborers,

3) es eee

Legislative History

H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong.,

Ist Sess. 108-09 (1947) .......... ele ieee eee

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong.,

ons Sa ee

S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong.,

Ist Sess. 17 (1947),

reprinted in NLRB, Legislative

History of the Labor

Management Relations Act (1949) ........... 16, 17

S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong.,

Ist Sess. 2 (1959),

reprinted in NLRB, .

Legislative History of the LMRDA (1960) .... 4.

Other Authorities

Bureau of Nationa! Affairs,

The Developing Labor Law (1989) .............

——

Commerce Clearing House,

Labor Law Course (17th ed. 1967 eer re &

Commons and Gilmore,

Documentary History of American

Industrial Society (1910) .................... %

Gregory, Labor and the Law (1946) ..... onaeiates 8

Malin, M., Individual Rights within

the Union (1988) ..................... 12, 19

Plucknett, A Concise History of

the Common Law (1929) .................. 10

Ross and Taft, "The Effect of the LMRDA

upon Union Constitutions,"

43 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 305 (1968) ................... 1%

Summers, "The Law of Union Discipline:

What the Courts Do in Fact,” : |

70 Yale LJ. 175 (1960) ................... 1%

INTEREST OF AMICI

The interest of the Association for Union Democ-

racy (AUD) and the American Civil Liberties Union

(ACLU) is set forth in the accompanying motion for

leave to file this brief amicus cunae.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner is a member of respondent Internationa!

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), Local No.

71. He brought this suit under Title I of the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA),

29 U.S.C. §401, et seq., alleging (1) that the union dis-

criminated against him in job referrals as retaliation for

his opposition to an announced increase in union dues

and the appointment of certain union representative, and

(2) that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him

by the union violated due process. In addition, petition-

er contendéd in his complaint that respondents’ actions

were inconsistent with the union constitution, and that

this breach was redressable in federal court under

§301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §185(a).

The lower courts held that petitioner was not enti-

tled to a jury trial of his claim under the LMRDA and

that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits

for violation of union constitutions, if those suits are

brought by union members.’ In reaching this conclusion,

the court of appeals relied on its earlier decision in

McCraw v. Plumbers and Pipefitters, 341 F.2d 705, 709

(6th Cir. 1965), to deny petitioner’s right to-a jury trial,

without analyzing whether the statute or the Seventh

' Citing this Court’s decision in Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers,

US. , 116 S.Ct. 424 (1989), the Sixth Circuit reversed the district

court’s dismissal of petitioner’s claim under Title |

Amendment required a jury trial. The court of appeals

also relied on an earlier decision, Trail v. Teamsters, 542

F.2d 961, 968 (6th Cir. 1976), to deny federal jurisdiction

under §301(a) for suits brought by union members to

pe a constitutions, despite this Court’s inter-

vening decision in Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local 334,

452 U.S. 615 (1981), which upheld the right of a union

local to enforce the union constitution under §301(a).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Union members suing to enforce rights ran-

teed by Title I of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. 6§411/15, on

entitled to a trial by jury. The structure and legislative

history of Title I establish the intent of Congress to pro-

vide for a jury trial. In part because it did not want to

deprive union members of a jury trial in Title I enforce-

ment cases, Congress rejected a proposal to allow only

the Secretary of Labor to enforce Title I rights in favor

of a proposal allowing individuals to bring suit. This

construction of the LMRDA, supported by the terms of

the Statute and the legislative history, allows the Court to

avoid reaching the constitutional question of whether a

trial by jury of Title I claims is required by the Seventh

Amendment.

—sidif the Court determines it must resolve the constitu-

tional issue, the result is the same: the Seventh Amend-

ment requires a jury trial, upon demand, of actions

brought under Title I. The Court has developed a two-

part test to determine whether the Seventh Amendment

requires a jury trial: (1) whether the action is analogous

to any 18th century English action at law prior to the

merger of law and equity; and (2) whether the remedies

sought are legal in nature. Title I actions meet both

parts of this test. First, actions brought to enforce rights

created by statute are most closely analogous to personal

injury actions that were recognized by the common law.

Second, legal remedies, including compensatory and pu-

nitive damages, are available in Title I actions and have

been awarded to numerous Title I plaintiffs.

II. Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §185(a),

creates a federal cause of action for union members

seeking to enforce a union constitution.’ That result fol-

lows logically from this Court’s decisions that local

unions may sue under §301(a) for violation of a union

constitution, Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local 334, 452 U.S.

615, and that individual employees may sue under

§301(a) for violation of a collective bargaining agree-

ment, Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).

Moreover, the plain words of the statute grant jurisdic-

tion based on the existence of a contract (including a

union constitution), not on the identity of the party seek-

ing to enforce the contract. There is no indication in

§301(a) or its legislative history that Congress meant to

prohibit suits by individual union members.

ARGUMENT

I. PLAINTIFFS SEEKING DAMAGES UNDER

TITLE I OF THE LMRDA ARE ENTITLED TO

TRIAL BY JURY

A. Congress Intended To Provide A Right To

- Jury Trial When It Enacted Title |!

The LMRDA was enacted to alleviate two serious

and related problems within the labor movement: the

corruption and racketeering that had been exposed by

the McClellan Committee (the Select Senate Committee

on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management

* By arguing for federal court jurisdiction, amici are not suggesting

that state court actions to enforce union constitutions are preempted

by federal law; that is a separate issue that the Court need not ad-

dress at this time.

o 3

Field), and the autocracy and lack of de

characterized the internal governance of mange. Pm

See S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 ( 1959),

reprinted in NLRB, Legislative History of the LMRDA

398 (1960)(hereinafter "Leg.Hist."). Title I therefore

specifies certain rights of union members and provides

for enforcement of those rights in the federal courts.

__ The provisions of Title I are modele ill of

Rights in the United States pie gf oom :

Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982). Indeed, the legisla.

tive proposal that eventually became Title I was intro-

duced in Congress under the heading “Bill of Rights of

Members of Labor Organizations." See Finnegan v. Leu

456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982). Consistent with that descrip-

tion, § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(1), grants members

equal rights to participate in union affairs; § 101(a)(2)

grants members the right to freedom of speech and as-

sembly, 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(2); §101(a)(3) grants mem-

bers a secret ballot vote on dues increases, 29 U.S.C

$411(a)(3); §101(a)(4) protects the right of members to

a > ae = U.S.C. §411(a)(4); and § 101(a)(S)

rs due process in uni iscipli

ceedings, 29 U.S.C. §411(a\(5). eee oe

Title I was added to the proposed bill regulating i

ternal union affairs, $.1555, i ab ememtnest ames “a

Senator McClellan. 2 Leg.Hist. 1102. In describing the

purpose of his amendment, Senator McClellan stated:

[T]he rights which I desire to have spelled out in the

bill are not now defined in the bill. Such rights are

basic. They ought to be basic to every person, and they

= _ the Constitution of the United States." Id. at

Under the McClellan amendmen judi

t, however, the -

cial enforcement of Title I rights would have rested i

ly with the Secretary of Labor. /d. at 1102.’ One of the

issues expressly raised during the floor debate was the

impact of this enforcement procedure on jury trials. /d.

at 1111-14. In the words of Senator John F. Kennedy:

. . . | stood on the floor of the Senate

and voted for jury trials in all cases of

injunction with respect to voting rights.

Yet the [McClellan] amendment .. .

would deny the right of jury trial in all

cases involving the rights of millions of

Americans if the Secretary of Labor gets

an injunction. I do not see how any

Senator who voted for the right of jury

trial in voting cases can denv the right

of all theses citizens to a jury trial.

id. at 1112.

In response to these and other concerns, Senator

Kuchel introduced a substitute Bill of Rights, which was

adopted on April 24, 1959. 2 Leg.Hist. 1239. Of partic-

ular relevance, the Kuchel amendment created a private

right of action for union members seeking to enforce the

substantive provisions of Title I.* As enacted, §102 does

* The proposed amendment provided as follows: “Sec. 103. The Sec-

retary, whenever it shall appear that any person has violated or is

about to violate any of the provisions of this title, may bring ‘an action

in a district court or other court of the United States for such relief as

may be appropriate including, but without limitation, injunctions to re-

strain any such violations and to compel compliance with this title.

Any such action against a labor organization may be brought im the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the

district court or other court of the United States where the violation

occurred or is about to occur.” 2 Leg.Hist. 1102.

* Section 102 of the Kuchel amendment provided as follows: “Any

person whose rights secured by the provisions of ths utle have been

infringed may bring an action im a district court of the United States

for such relief as may be appropriate. Any such action agaimsi a labor

(contunucd... )

not expressly refer to jury trials. But the fact that the

plain language of the statute does not resolve the jury

trial issue only means that the Court must "determine

congressional intent, using [its] traditional tools." Dole v.

United Steelworkers, US. __, 110 S.Ct. 929, 934

(1990). See also NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers,

484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987).

Here, it is clear from the legislative history that one

of the principal reasons for eliminating the role of the

Secretary of Labor in Title I enforcement actions was to

provide for the right to a jury trial. In discerning legisla-

tive intent, this Court has often looked to the statements

of individual legislators as relevant (albeit not disposi-

tive) evidence. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S.

253, 263 (1986); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,

567 (1984). More generally,-this Court has recognized in

analogous contexts that a congressional decision to sub-

Stitute (or supplement) government enforcement with

private enforcement is the sort of structural change that

Strongly suggests congressional intent to provide for jury

trials.

For example, in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. $75

(1977), the Court held that there is a right to jury trial

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §621, et seq., even though the

Statute does not expressly provide for a jury trial. The

Court examined the legislative histery of the ADEA and

was persuaded that the congressional decision to provide

for a private right of action, rather than vest sole en-

forcement powers with the Secretary of Labor, supported

* (...continued)

organization shall be brought in the United States district court for

the district where the alleged violation occurred or where the head4

quarters of such labor organization is located.” The words “(including

injunctions),” which appear in the enacted statute, were added in con.

ference. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86tb Cong., ist Sess. (1959).

1 Leg.Hist. 934. :

inference that Congress intended to provide for a

sary row ee couiea individuals brought suit under

the ADEA. /d. Similarly, it should be inferred that

Congress intended to protect the right to a jury trial for

Title I claims when it rejected a plan to place enforce-

ment of Title I rights under the exclusive province of the

Secretary of Labor.

If this Court agrees that the jury trial issue in this

case can be resolved based on a fair interpretation of

the statute itself, it need not reach the constitutional

question, in compliance with the "cardinal principle that

this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of

the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional]

question may be avoided." United States v. Thirty-seven

Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971), quoted in Curtis v.

Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974). Should this Court

reach the constitutional question, however, the result is

the same.

B. The Right To A Jury Trial Guaranteed By

The Seventh Amendment Applies To Title I

Actions

The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at

common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed

twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-

served." The Court long ago determined that the

Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee is not limited

to the common law forms of action recognized in 1791,

but extends to “all suits which are not of equity and ad-

miralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form

which they may assume to settle legal rights. Parsons v.

Bedfor ’, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830), quoted in Curtis

v. Loether, 415 U.S. at 193.’

, ! :

* It is not dispositive, therefore, that the legal status of unions was, a

best, uncertain in 1791. ee

i ’

The test developed b

y the Court for determinin

oY salons Seventh Amendment protects the right ~

| y Jury of any particular issue was Stated most re-

cently in Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No.

$91 v. Teny, __ US. __, 110 S.Ct. 1339 (1990).

To determine whether a particular ac-

tion will resolve legal rights, we examine

both the nature’ of the issues involved

and the remedy sought. "First, we com-

pare the statutory action to 18th-century

actions brought in the courts of England

prior to the merger of the courts of law

and equity. Second, we examine the

remedy sought and determine whether_it

is legal or equitable in nature.” The

second inquiry is the more important in

Our analysis.

Id. at 1345 (citations and footnote omitted). Actions

* (...continued)

1349 with the enactment of the Ordinance

s of Labor

4 @ ae) on by - Statute of Laborers, 25 Edw, . -——S

A regulated terms of labor contracts. unions w :

specifically outlawed, combined. action of —— was iatante 2

common law conspiracy in Rex v. Joumeymen Tailors of Cambridge 8

1%500-01 (17th ed. 1967); W

; » Weyrauch, Fundamentals of Labor

77 (2d ed. 1957); Gregory, Labor and the Law 13.30 fr bon —

trative agency or specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials

: (continued...)

under Title I meet both parts of this test.

1, Actions Brought Under Title I

Are Analogous To Actions At

Common Law

Actions brought under Title I seek to enforce demo-

cratic rights granted by the statute. This Court has re-

peatedly held that actions to enforce statutory rights are

subject to the right to a jury trial. Lytle v. Household

Mfg., Inc, __-:*OUW'S. __, 110 S.Ct. 1331 (1990)(Civil

Rights Act); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (fair housing

laws); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477

(1962)(trademark laws); Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,

328 U.S. 395 (1946)\(Emergency Price Control Act);

Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916)

(Safety Appliance Act); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S.

103, 115 (1909)(immigration laws); Fleitmann v. Wels-

bach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916)(antitrust

laws). Such actions are closely analogous to actions at

common law and, thus, are protected by the Seventh

Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.

Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, is particularly rele-

vant. The question in Curtis Was whether the Seventh

Amendment applied to actions to redress violations of

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.

§3612. Answering that question in the affirmative, this

Court extended its ruling beyond Title VIII, stating

broadly: "The Seventh Amendment does apply to ac-

tions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial

upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and rem-

edies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordi-

° (...continued)

would impair the functioning of the legislative scheme.” Granfinan-

ciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, __ US. , 109 S.Ct. 2782, 2790 2.4 (1989).

Congress explicitly granted jurisdiction of Title I claims to federal

courts, not to any administrative agency or specialized court of equity,

LMRDA §102, 29 U.S.C. §412.

nary courts of law." Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194. The Curtis

Court also found: "A damages action under [Title VIII]

sounds basically in tort -- the statute merely defines a

new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate

a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's

wrongful breach." /d. at 195.

Actions under Title I of the LMRDA, like actions

under Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, also

"sound{] basically in tort." Indeed, this Court has already

held that the most closely analogous state court action to

enforcement of Title I rights is an action for personal in-

jury. Reed v. United Transportation Union, ___ US. __,

109 S.Ct. 621 (1989).” The issue in Reed was the appro-

priate statute of limitations to be applied to Title I ac-

tions. The Court rejected the argument that LMRDA

actions were like hybrid §301/duty of fair representation

actions," and declined to adopt the six-month federal

statute of limitations applied to such hybrid actions in

DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). Instead,

the Court found that actions to enforce the free speech

rights of union members under §101(a)(2) of the

LMRDA were most closely analogous to actions to en-

’ Much of modern day personal injury law has developed from the

common aw action for trespass on the case. See Owens v. Okure,

US. __, 109 S.Ct. 573, 581 n.11 (1989). See also Plucknett, A Con-

cise History of the Common Law 468-72 (1929).

* Individual employees may sue under §301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §185, to enforce rights conferred

on them by collective bargaining agreements between their employers

and their unions. Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. at 200. But

the employee must exhaust contractual grievance procedures, in-

cluding arbitration, before suit is filed, Republic Steel v. Muddox, 379

U.S. 65) (1965), unless the union breached its duty of fair representa-

tion in handling the grievance. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967);

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976). A lawsuit in

which an employee seeks to enforce both the collective bargaining

agreement against the employer, and the duty of fair representation

against the union, is known as a “hybrid” action.

force constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

“are governed by state general or residual personal injury

Statutes of limitations. Owens v. Okure, [109 S.Ct. 573

(1989)]; Wilson v. Garcia, [471 U.S. 261 (1985)]. See also

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (ap-

plying State personal injury statute to federal civil rights

action against a private party brought under 42 U.S.C.

§ aaa Reed v. United Transportation Union, 109 S.Ct.

at AF

. While Reed dealt explicitly with §101(a)(2), its ra-

tionale applies with equal force to the other enumerated

right» in Title I, all of which can be analogized to § 1983

claims and the personal injury actions that they resem-

ble. The right to equal participation in union affairs

guaranteed by §101(a)(1) clearly has analogs in the

Equal Protection Clause. The right to a secret ballot on

dues and assessment increases, guaranteed by §101(a)

(3), reflects at least penumbral rights under the First

Amendment. The right of members to sue their union,

§ 101(a)(4), and to procedural regularity in disciplinary

proceedings, §101(a)(5), plainly derive from due process

principles. In short, statutory enforcement actions under

Title I flow just as directly from the common law as con-

Stitutional actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983, which are

heard before juries on a daily basis in federal courts

around the country.

2. Actions Under Title I Are Sub-

ject To The Seventh Amendment

Right To Jury Trial Because

Legal Remedies Are At Stake

Plaintiffs suing to enforce their rights under Title I

of the LMRDA may seek actual, compensatory and pu-

nitive damages. These remedies are legal in nature, and

therefore embraced by the jury trial guarantee of the

Seventh Amendment.

The availability of money damages in Title I actions

is supported by both the broad statutory language and

the case law construing it. The statute itself provides for

"such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropri-

ate." 29 U.S.C. §412. As this Court and other courts

have recognized, the parenthetical reference to injunctive

relief presumes the availability of money damages.

Thus, in Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971),

the Court rejected the union’s argument that a Title |

action seeking damages but no injunction should be dis-

missed. Jd. at 239-40. Indeed, the Court observed that

the statutory language "contemplates that damages will

be the usual, and injunctions the extraordinary form of

relief." Id. at 230.

Reflecting that view, the lower courts have granted

monetary damages for a wide range of injuries in Title I

suits. See generally M. Malin, Individual Rights within the

Union at 123-29 (1988). For example, courts have

awarded damages for lost wages, Murphy v. Operating

Engineers, Local 18, 774 F.2d 114, 126 (6th Cir. 1985),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); Shimman v. Frank,

625 F.2d 80, 100 (6th Cir. 1980); Ryan v. IBEW, Local

134, 387 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1967). Courts have also

awarded damages for physical injuries, if they are proxi-

mately related to a statutory violation. Compare Shim-

man v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, with McCraw v. Plumbers &

Pipefitters, 341 F.2d at 710. In addition, the weight of

authority allows damages for injury to reputation, Keeffe

Bros. v. Teamsters, Local 592, 562 F.2d 298, 304 (4th Cir.

1977); Simmons v. Textile Workers, Local 713, 350 F.2d

1012, 1019-20 (4th Cir. 1965); and for emotional distress,

if accompanied by physical or economic injuries, Guidry

v. Operating Engineers, Local 406, 882 F.2d 929, 943-44

(Sth Cir. 1989); Murphy v. Operating Engineers, Local 18,

774 F.2d 114; Bise v. IBEW, Local 1969, 618 F.2d 1299,

- 1305 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980);

“Bradford v. Textile Workers, Local 1093, 563 F.2d 1138,

1144 (4th Cir. 1977).

Punitive damages were disallowed in some early

cases, McCraw v. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 341 F.2d 705

(5th Cir. 1965); Magelssen v. Plasterers, Local 518, 240

F.Supp. 259 (W.D.Mo. 1965); Burris v. Teamsters, 224

F.Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963). However, since the Fifth

Circuit’s leading decision in Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388

F.2d 193 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968),

most circuits have allowed punitive damage awards un-

der Title I, Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d 637 (D.C.Cir.

1984); Parker v. Steelworkers, Local 1466, 642 F.2d 104

(Sth Cir.), reh’g denied, 646 F.2d 567 (Sth Cir. 1981);

Bise v. IBEW, Local 1969, 618 F.2d 1299: Vandeventer v.

Operating Engineers, Local 513, 579 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); Cooke v. Painters,

District 48, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976); Morrissey v.

National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1976).’

‘Compensatory and punitive damages are remedies at

law which require a jury trial on demand. See Gran-

financiera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S.Ct. at 2793-94; Curtis v.

Loether, 415 U.S. at 196. The application of this princi-

ple to LMRDA cases is reinforced by the Court’s recent

decision in Chauffeurs, 7 eamsters, and Helpers, Local 391

v. Terry, 110 S.Ct. 1339, holding that plaintiffs in hybrid

§301/duty of fair representation cases are entitled to a

jury trial. If anything, the jury trial issue in Terry pre-

sented a much closer question than this case. The Terry

Court found, nevertheless, that the Seventh Amendment

required a jury trial on demand in duty of fair represen-

tation actions against a union even though the most

* In IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), the Court held that punitive

damages were not allowable in hybrid §301/duty of fair representation

cases against unions. The majority expressly reserved decision on the

availability of punitive damages under the LMRDA, id. at 47 n.9; four

Justices, in concurrence with the result on the facts of Foust but in

disagreement with an absolute rule denying punitive damages, explicit-

ly approved of punitive damages in LMRDA actions.

closely analogous 18th century English action was an

equitable claim against a trustee for breach of fiduciary

duty. 110 S.Ct. at 1345-47." Citing Curtis v. Loether, 415

U.S. at 196, the Terry Court emphasized that plaintiffs

were seeking monetary relief and that "an action for

money damages was ‘the traditional form of relief of-

fered in the courts of law.” 110 S.Ct. at 1347."

*- The remedy sought in the instant case is similar to

that sought in Terry: wages and benefits lost because of

the union's retaliatory discrimination in job referrals.

Like Terry, these monetary damages, sought not from the

employer as restitution but from the union as a proxi-

mate injury caused by the union’s statutory violation, are

legal in nature. And, like Terry, a union member seeking

such damages pursuant to Title I is entitled to a jury

trial under the Seventh Amendment. 2:

The requirement for a jury trial in Title I cases is es-

pecially appropriate. Title I is intended to protect the

basic democratic rights of members of labor unions.

One of the basic democratic rights of citizens of our

country is the right to a jury trial. Union members who

Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun. Justices Kennedy,

O’Connor and Scalia, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with Justice

Marshall that the most closely analogous 18th century English form of

action was in equity but would have held that there was no right to a

jury trial. Justice Stevens concurred with the result of the majority

opinion but concluded that a duty of fair representation action was

most closely analogous to an action at law for attorney malpractice.

Justice Brennan concurred with the result of the majority opinion but

focused on the nature of the remedy sought rather than the search for

an analogous 18th century English form of action.

" The plaintiffs in Terry alleged that, due to their union’s failure to

represent them properly, they lost wages and benefits which they

would have received from their employer. The Court held that, unlike

backpay damages sought against an employer which may be equitable

restitutionary relief, backpay damages sought from a union were not

equitable but legal in nature. Jd. at 1348.

seek to enforce the democratic guarantees provided by

Title I are entitled to have their claims heard and

decided by a jury.

Il. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION

-UNDER §301(a) OF THE LMRA OVER

ACTIONS BROUGHT BY UNION MEMBERS

TO ENFORCE UNION CONSTITUTIONS

A. Union Constitutions Can Be Enforced In

Federal Court Under §301(a)

Union constitutions set the rules for governance of

the union.” They describe officers’ positions and their

duties; they also set terms of office and election proce-

dures. Constitutions regulate convention procedures, in-

cluding the election of delegates eligible to vote at con-

ventions. The relationship between the loca! and nation-

al or international organization, including trusteeship

provisions, is defined in the union constitution. Mem-

bership duties, including dues obligations, are set forth in

the union constitution. Grounds for discipline, and for

trial and appeal procedures, may be found in the consti-

tution. It may also contain other important provisions,

regarding officers’ salaries, union committees, the fre-

quency of local union meetings, strike benefits, and con-

tract ratification votes.

Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §185(a),

provides federal court jurisdiction over "[s]uits for viola-

tion of contracts between an employer and a labor or-

ganization representing employees in an industry affect-

* Generally, national and international unions are governed by “con-

stitutions” and intermediate and local labor organizations are governed

by “bylaws.” Sometimes the terms are used interchangeably. To avoid

confusion, the term “constitution” will be used herein to refer to the

documents containing the rules governing all levels of union organiza-

tion.

ing commerce as defined in this Act, or between any

such labor organizations." The primary legislative pur-

pose in enacting §301(a) was to "promote industrial

peace." S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1947),

reprinted in NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor

Management Relations Act 423 (1949)(hereinafter

"LMRA Leg.Hist.").

In Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615,

the Court held that a local union could sue its parent

organization under §301(a) to enforce the union's consti-

tution, as a contract between labor organizations. The

Court rejected the requirement, adopted by several low-

er courts at the time," that §301(a) provided jurisdiction

only over contracts which "potentially have a significant

impact on labor-management relations or industrial

peace... ." Jd. at 623 (citation omitted). While ac-

knowledging the significant interest in stability of labor

relations, the Court noted an additional legislative pur-

pose of §301(a):

[A]pparently Congress was also con-

cerned that unions be made legally ac-

countable for agreements into which

they entered among themselves, an ob-

jective that itself would further stability

among labor organizations. Therefore,

§301(a) provided federal jurisdiction for

enforcement of contracts made by labor

organizations to counteract jurisdictional

defects in many state courts that made it

difficult or impossible to bring suits

against labor organizations by reason of

their status as unincorporated organiza-

Alexander v. Operating Engineers, 624 F.2d 1235, 1238 (Sth Cir.

1980); Stelling v. IBEW, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442

U.S. 944 (1979); Hospital & Health Care Employees, Local 1199 DC v.

Hospital & Health Care Employees, 533 F.2d 1204 (D.C.Cir, 1976).

tions.

Id, at 624 (emphasis in original).

These two legislative purposes, promoting industrial

stability and holding unions accountable for the agree-

ments they have made, were found to be complementa-

ry: "Surely Congress could conclude that the enforce-

ment of the terms of union constitutions -- documents

that prescribe the legal relationship and the rights and

obligations between the parent and affiliated locals --

would contribute to the achievement of labor stability."

ld, Thus, the Plumbers Court did not require further

proof that enforcement of a particular constitutional pro-

vision would have an additional impact on labor stability

beyond that inherent in enforcing union constitutions.

Acknowledging that “there is no specific legislative

history on [the] phrase ["contracts between labor organi-

zations"| to explain what Congress meant," id. at 623, the

Court found that union constitutions were familiar to

Congress when it enacted §301(a), and that the broad

inclusive language of §301(a) did not exclude constitu-

tions from the general term “contracts.” /d. at 625.

Thus, the Court held that since the statute on its face

encompassed union constitutions, and there was no indi-

cation of a countervailing legislative intent or purpose,

actions for violation of union constitutions are subject to

federal court jurisdiction under §301(a)."

“ Congress was concerned that unions were not legal entities under

the common law of many states. Thus, some states required service

on each member of the union in order to initiate a lawsuit; some

states did not enforce damage awards against union funds. See

Plumbers, 452 U.S. at 624, See also §.Rep. No. 105, supra, at 15-18:

H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 108-09 (1947). 1 LMRA Leg.

Hist. 399-400.

'* Even before Plumbers was decided, numerous state courts had char-

acterized union constitutions as enforceable contracts between labor

(continued...)

In addition, Plumbers rejected the argument that al-

lowing suits in federal court for violations of union con-

stitutions would result in undue interference with the in-

ternal affairs of the unions. /d, at 625-26, First, when

Congress enacted the LMRDA in 1959, it imposed strin-

gent requirements on the governing processes of unions

and voided any conflicting constitutional provisions."

Second, as this Court emphasized in Plumbers, "[t}here is

an obvious and important difference between substantive

regulation by the National Labor Relations Board of in-

ternal union governance of its membership, and enforce-

ment by the federal courts of freely" enacted union con-

stitutions. /d. at 626. That same distinction applies with

equal force here.

B. Union Members May Sue Under §301(a)

For Violations Of Union Constitutions

The Court in Plumbers expressly declined to decide

whether “individual union members may bring suit on a

union constitution against a labor organization.” 452

U.S, at 627 n.16. The courts of appeals have split on the

issue although, since Plumbers, the weight of authority

favors finding federal jurisdiction for such suits."

* (continued)

organizations. See, e.g., Napier v. Firefighters, Local 2, 293 N.B.2d 384,

386 (Ill. 1973); Elfer v. Marine Engineers, 154 So. 32, 35 (La. 1934);

Clothing Workers v. Kaser, 6 $.B.2d 562, 564 (Va. 1939). See also Ma-

chinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958). See generally Summers,

"The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact,” 70 Yale

LJ. 175, 179 (1960).

Section 101(b) provides: “Any provision of the constitution and

bylaws of any labor organization which is inconsistent with the provi-

sions of this section shall be of no force or effect,” 29 U.S.C. §411(b).

See Ross and Taft, "The Effect of the LMRDA upon Union Constitu-

tions,” 43 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 305 (1968).

"’ Compare Desantiago v. Laborers, Local 1140, 914 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.

(continued...)

In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, this

Court held that individual employees could sue for

breach of a collective bargaining agreement between a

union and employer even though the employee is not a

party to the contract. The Court treated employees,

whose "rates of pay and conditions of employment are a

major focus of the negotiation and administration of col-

lective bargaining contracts,” id. at 200, as third party

beneficiaries of the contract entitled to sue under §30)

(a) for enforcement.

Applying the same reasoning, the Third Circuit has

held that §301(a) authorizes suits by individual union

members seeking enforcement of union constitutions: “If

individual union members are third party beneficiaries of

collective bargaining agreements, it follows that they

have the same status with respect to union constitutions

. +++ If third party beneficiaries of the one agreement

can sue in federal court, then so can third party benefici-

aries of the other." Lewis v. Teamsters, Local 771, 826

F.2d at 1314,

_ In similar fashion, this Court has “not taken a re-

Strictive view of who may sue under §301(a)," Franchise

Tux Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463

U.S. 1, 25 n.28 (1982). Suits have been allowed by a

union against third parties for tortious interference with

a collective bargaining agreement, Plumbers Local 472 v.

Georgia Power Co., 684 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 1982);

Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild, Local

120, 647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.

" (...continued)

1990); Pruitt v. Carpenters, Local Union No. 225, 893 F.2d 1216 (11th

Cir, 1990); Lewis v. Teamsters, Local 771, 826 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir.

1987); Kinney v. IBEW, 669 F.2d 1222 (%h Cir. 1981); Abrams v. Car-

ner Com., 434 F.2d 12§@ (2d Cir. 1970), cent. denied, 401 US. 1009

(1971); with Alexander v. Operating Engineers, 624 F.2d 1235, Trail v.

Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961; Adams v. Boilermakers, 262 F.2d 835 (10th

Cir, 1958). See generally M. Malin, supra, at 9-12.

° *.\ ©

1143 (1982); by trustees of a pension trust agreement in-

corporated into the collective bargaining agreement,

Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364

(1984), and by a union against a nonsignatory joint com-

mittee established to administer a contract, Painting &

Decorating Contractors Ass'n v. Painters & Decorators

Joint Committee, 717 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir, 1983), cert

denied, 466 U.S, 927 (1984). See generally Bureau of

National Affairs, The Developing Labor Law 435-38

(1989).

Furthermore, the legislative purposes of the LMRA

support conferring federal court jurisdiction on suits to

enforce union constitutions whether brought by union

members or unions. One of the stated purposes of the

LMRA, set forth in §1(b), is “to protect the right of in-

dividual employees in their relations with labor organiza-

tions.” §1(b), 29 USC. §141(b). Relations between

members and their unions are defined primarily by the

union constitution. Although the legislative history of

§301(a) does not refer to union constitutions, it is cer-

tainly reasonable to assume that one of the means by

which Congress intended to protect the rights of

individual union members was to provide for federal

court jurisdiction of suits for violations of union constitu-

tions. Cf. Plumbers, 452 U.S. at 624-24.".,

Finally, allowing union members to sue in federal

court for violations of union constitutions will promote

judicial efficiency. Lawsuits brought by union members

challenging union actions may raise a variety of claims

under the LMRDA, the union constitution, and the duty

“The jurisdictional barriers to successful litigation against union

defendants in effect in many states when the LMRA was adopted, see

n.13, supra, applied whether the lawsuit was brought by an employer

secking to enforce a collective bargaining agreement or a union mem-

ber seeking to enforce a union constitution, In fact, such require.

ments fell more heavily on union members who had fewer resources

for btugation than most employers.

of fair representation. The facts of the instant case are

prototypical: petitioner claims the union discriminated

against him in job referrals. He alleges violations of the

LMRDA, the duty of fair representation and the union

constitution, It would be far more efficient to resolve all

the claims in one forum, rather than requiring petitioner

to pursue his claims under the union constitution in a

Separate state court action.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the

court of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Steven R. Shapiro

(Counsel of Record)

John A. Powell

Helen Hershkoff

American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation

132 West 43 Street

New York, New York 10036

(212) 944-9800

Susan M. Jennik

Association for Union Democracy

500 State Street

Brooklyn, New York 11217

‘ (718) 855-6650

Dated: April 22, 199)

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