Amicus Curiae Brief — Blanton v. North Las Vegas

No. 87-1437 ~

IN THE

Supreme Court of the GAnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1988

MELVIN R. BLANTON and MARK D. FRALEY,

Petitioners,

a,

CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, NEVADA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF AMICUS CURIAE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

Boris Moczula W. Cary Edwards

Attorney of Record Attorney Ceneral of New Jersey

Hughes Justice Complex

Boris Moczula Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Larry R. Etzweiler

Cherrie Madden Black

Deputy Attorneys General

Division of Criminal Justice

Hughes Justice Complex

CNO86

Trenton, New Jersey 08625

(609) 292-9086

Of Counsel and

on the Brief

September 2, 1988

A TS

PRESS OF BYRON 8. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

4

-

POINT III TO THE EXTENT THAT FAC-

APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

ii

NEW JERSEY STATUTES,

COURT RULES, AND CONSTI-

TUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED

IN THIS BRIEF .........ccccceeeeeeeeeeees

STATES THAT DO NOT REC-

OGNIZE A CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT TO JURY TRIALS FOR

FIRST OFFENSE DRUNK

DRIVING .ccoccccccccccscsssosossssosossceseees

STATES IN WHICH THE MAX-

IMUM AUTHORIZED PERIOD

OF CONFINEMENT FOR FIRST

OFFENSE DRUNK DRIVING

EXCEEDS THE BALDWIN

THRESHOLD ..........ccceeseeeereeeereeees

STATES WHICH PROVIDE

JURY TRIALS FOR FIRST OF-

FENSE DRUNK DRIVING FOR

WHICH THE AUTHORIZED

TERM OF CONFINEMENT IS

LESS THAN THE BALDWIN

THRESHOLD ...........se0eereeeerreeereees

la

17a

19a

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES CITED Page

— |} | v. City Court of Mesa, 135 Ariz. 549,

P.2d 938 (1983) wl itiaeiaeinametpntansiniecessescase 22

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) ........... )

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66

TED seniietensnenensecnetsenssseenessessssccesscesese 4,6,8,9,11,23,27

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) .............. 14

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) .............0.... 13

Blanton v. North Las Vegas Municipal Court, 103

Nev. 135, 748 P.2d “494 | ll

ee ee See ©. Dev. ,

quanensesenesecessssssscsessssssscscsssossescccccescccococeccese l

Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) .................. 6,7

Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) ......... 6

Clark v. New . Div. of Motor Vehicles, 211

512 A.2d 588 (App. Div.

I UaasstNernceierinerencnenesennnsnscccooeecse 13

Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974) .. eS)

a Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 esas

District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63

II tidliisteieneereeietntneeenesenessccenececcscceseeeces 6,7,9,15,20

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145

EE 4,6,8,9,10,11,25

Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) ........ 4,6,8

In re Jones & oe a Hi Pension Plan v.

P LTV Corp., F.2d 1 Cir. 1987) ....... 26

ustiniano Matos v. ed ing 440 F.

673 (DPR. 1976) vncccrncecrccceccssee oni

(une tndiane 36, 107 S.Ct. 353

v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988)

ee panie fr ent. filed June 13,

a 9,14,16,20,21,25

Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) cccccccccsco 13

iv

Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (1987),

reh'g denied 107 S.Ct. 1913 (1987) ............000++ 23

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ............. 26

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) ..... 17,18

Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891) ............... 6

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 2636

CRIED cecceccecesssssscnssssccsessscsssensscsnenssssesssnscnessseses 13

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) ........ 23,26

Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410

PE GO GHD ccnscennsessens-<ensnennsssnssscesensscececcase 21

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) ................ 17,23

Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904) .......... 7

Sedima, S.P.R.L., v. Imrezx Co., 473 U.S. 479

6 ee 12

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) ......cccccccccceeeees 24

State ex rel Dean v. City Court of Tucson, 141 Ariz.

361, 687 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1984) ................. 16,21

State v. Abbott, 15 Or. App. 205, 514 P.2d 355

SR 22

State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573, 458 A.2d 502

ee 20

State v. Ferretti, 189 N.J. . 578, 461 A.2d

193 (Law Div. 1 . den. 94 N.J. 606,

GRD Be Sd CD ceccecncemsseeene 1

State v. Linnehan, 197 N.J. Super. 41, 484 A.2d

34 ( Div. 1984), certif. den. 99 N.J. 236,

491 || a 1

State v. Maier, 13 N.J. 235, 99 A.2d 21 (1953).... 14,15

State v. Owens, 54 N.J. 153, 254 A.2d 97 (1969),

cert. denied 396 U.S. 1021 (1970) ................. 3,15,17

State v. , 91 N.J.L. 212, 102 A. 433 (E. &

Re 1,20

State v. Roenicke, 174 N.J. Super. 513, 417 A.2d

Jl) § eee 20

State v. i, 196 N.J. Super. 596, 483 A.2d 844

(Law 5 ee ee 1

Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 450

yy aaa 12

v

United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir.

SII cnanacepentiensupensnmesenusemasnemepmiuainnepecntemsemes ll

United States v. Reed, 617 F. Supp. 792 (D.Md.

TEED ditnmindaipiciceadecpinapestaiipmmatitinaiiadinieienmmmenanas 20

United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914) .......... 12

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) ............ 9,10,17

STATUTES CITED

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 2A:8-2la (West 1987) ............ l

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 2C:1-4 (West 1982) ...............

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 2C:43-3.la(2Ya) (West 1982 &

enemies an: SRT 3

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 2C:43-3c (West 1982 & Supp.

EEE Se enema 3

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 2C:43-8 (West 1982 & Supp.

ET LE eS eae meen 3

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 17:29A-35b(2) (West 1985 &

ee 2

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 39:3-40 (West 1973 & Supp.

TI iiiiintinianenetnisansnideipiainenttaiientpestemmeenincememmenss 18

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 39:4-50(aX1) (West 1973 &

RE ee 2

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 39:4-50(aX2) (West 1973 &

SERN EEDUETIED cnsvnesnnenemnennenetinteinnasenentassnesesensnsnscese 2

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 39:4-50(aX3) (West 1973 &

Ce ceenrecitccescnincesnisetticonmemnensscemccnessnsecs 1,2

N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 39:4-50.8 (West Supp. 1988) . 2

RULES CITED

New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-B(aW1) .........cccccccccceeeeee l

New Jersey Court Rule 2:12-3a ............:ccccccccceeeeees l

New Jersey Court Rule 3:23-1 ............ccccccccccceeeneees l

New Jersey Court Rule 3:23-8 ..0.........ccccccccccceeeeeees 1

New Jersey Court Rule 7:6-1 .........cccccccccccecesceeeeeee 1

fF Gf

OTHER SOURCES CITED

Annot., Reckless Driving as Lesser Included Offense

a While Intoxicated or Similar

rge, 10 A.L.R. 4th 1252 (1981)............

Blakeslee, Scientists Find Key Biological Causes of

~ 7 pe N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1984, at Cl,

» By ccsnsccessssssessnssssessesussnssessssssssassnnssussscssasssseee

9 J. Wigmore, Evidence sec. 2498 (Chadbourn rev.

BSED coveccecccnsncecnssescenscnseesecssssensemmenasnesenesvennecats

:

-

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

This case involves a determination of whether, under

Nevada state law, the offense of driving while intoxicated

constitutes a “serious” offense which entitles a defendant

jury under the United States Constitution.

Amicus, the State of New Jersey, has never provided jury

trials for drunk driving offenses, either at common law or

under statutory prescription. State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L.

212, 102 A. 433 (E. & A. 1917); State v. Linnehan, 197

N.J. Super. 41, 484 A.2d 34 (App. Div. 1984), certif. den.

.2d 723 (1985); State v. Zoppi, 196 N.J.

&

Z

-

5

ra

©!

>

law, defendants receive a bench trial in municipal court

(court of limited jurisdiction), after which they are entitled

to a trial de novo on the municipal court record in the

Superior Court (court of statewide jurisdiction). N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 2A:8-21a (West 1987) (App. A, p. la); New Jersey

Court Rules 7:6-1 (App. A, p. 15a); 3:23-1 (App. A, p. 13a); —

3:23-8 (App. A, p. 13a). Thereafter, a defendant may pur-

termediate appellate and request discretionary

review by the New Jersey Supreme Court. New Jersey

Court Rules 2:2-3(aX1) (App. A, p. 12a); 2:12-3a (App. A,

tion and application of this phrase ensure that 180 days is the maximum

v. Ferretti,

94 N.J. 606, 468 A.2d 238 (1983).

to reduction by up to ninety days of community service;

a $1000 fine; loss of driving privileges for ten years; a

motor vehicle insurance surcharge of $1500 per year for

three years; an additional $100 surcharge payable to a

Drunk Driving Enforcement Fund; and payment of an $80

fee for and screening by the Division of Alcoholism’s In-

toxicated Driving Programs Unit. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:4-

50(aX3) (West 1973 & Supp. 1988) (App. A, p. 6a); 39:4-

50.8 (West Supp. 1988) (App. A, p. lla); 17:29A-35b(2)

(West 1985 & Supp. 1988) (App. A, p. 3a). Second of-

fenders are subject to potential incarceration of ninety

days, two days of which are mandatory; thirty days. of

community service; between $500 and $1000 fine; and two

years’ license revocation. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50(a\(2)

(West 1973 & Supp. 1988) (App. A, p. 6a). First offender

penalties include potential incarceration of thirty days; a

mandatory term of two consecutive days (at least six hours

per day) at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center; $250

to $400 fine; and loss of license for a period between six

months and one year. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50(aX1) (West

1973 & Supp. 1988) (App. A, p. 5a). Surcharges are also

applicable to first and second offenders at lower rates.

N.J. Stat. Ann. 17:29A-35b(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988).

As a result of these potential penalties, and a bar against

plea bargaining for drunk driving offenses, New Jersey’s

municipal courts are facing an ever-increasing caseload of

drunk driving prosecutions.’ Consequently, this Court’s ul-

timate resolution of the case at bar could substantially

*The New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts reports that

in 1987, a total of 42,575 drunk driving cases were processed in the

municipal courts of New Jersey. Of that number, 8,429 trials were held.

There were also 294,121 dispositions of disorderly persons and petty

disorderly persons offenses in the municipal courts in 1987; of these

dispositions, 50,706 were trials. Finally, the aggregate number of crim-

inal trials for indictable offenses held in New Jersey superior courts

in 1987 was 2,050. Of this latter number, in only 174 did defendants

waive trial by jury. These figures demonstrate that granting jury trials

affect the enforcement of, and disposition of violators un-

der, the drunk driving law in this State.

Additionally, the maximum punishment for various dis-

orderly persons offenses in New Jersey is currently six

months’ incarceration, a $1000 fine and a $30 penalty pay-

able to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board. N.J. Stat.

Ann. §§ 2C:43-3c (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (App. A, p.

2a); 2C:43-3.1a(2¥a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (App. A,

p. 2a); 2C:43-8 (West 1982) (App. A, p. 2a). Although N.J.

Const. (1947) art. 1, para. 10 (App. A, p. 16a) guarantees

jury trials for crimes, both statute and case law limit the

definition of “‘crime’’ to those offenses carrying « maxi-

mum term of incarceration in excess of six months. State

v. Owens, 54 N.J. 153, 254 A.2d. 97 (1969), cert. denied

396 U.S. 1021 (1970); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-4 (West 1982).

Thus, jury trials are not available for these disorderly per-

sons offenses. Notwithstanding petitioners’ professed in-

tent to isolate only the offense of driving while i: ‘oxicated

for purposes of their jury trial demand, it is clear that

any decision by this Court compelling a jury trial for any

offense—including Nevada's drunk driving offense—carry-

ing a term of incarceration of six months or less would

have far-reaching and disruptive implications for the pros-

ecution of a variety of offenses not only in this State, but

in many jurisdictions throughout the nation.

New Jersey maintains a strong interest in the efficient

and effective administration of its criminal justice system.

We therefore join as amicus in support of respondent's

assertion that petitioners are not entitled to jury trials and

urge this Court to affirm the judgment of the court below.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. In defining the scope of the Sixth Amendment's right

to jury trial, this Court has long recognized that the right

for drunk driving—let alone for other “petty” offenses—would dra-

matically increase the number of offenses tried by jury in New Jersey.

does not extend to “petty’’ offenses, but is limited to

“serious” crimes. Although earlier decisions focused upon

the nature of the offense and whether it was indictable

at com,.i1on law, recent opinions—Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

U.S. 145 (1968); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147

(1969); and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970)—

have abandoned consideration of these factors in favor of

a relia..ce upon the penalties that might be imposed. Later

decisio: s have interpreted these cases as establishing a

bright line between “‘petty’”’ and “serious” offenses—a line

that coincides with the congressional maximum of six

months’ incarceration for federal petty offenses. The de-

velopment of this Court’s case law therefore evinces a

contemporary rule requiring jury trials only for offenses

carrying a maximum authorized term of confinement ex-

ceeding six months.

2. If it has not already done so, this Court should clearly

enunciate a bright line rule which would provide a con-

stitutional right to a jury trial if and only if the maximum

authorized term of incarceration exceeds six months. With-

out a bright line rule, the boundaries of the “petty” of-

fense category will remain ill-defined, and will impede the

prosecution of “‘petty” and “‘serious’’ offenses. Consider-

ation of factors other than incarceration render difficult

the formulation of a bright line rule; injection of subjective

and time-variable factors such as public perception of the

seriousness of the offense or other states’ classifications

of the offense render the “petty” versus “‘serious’’ analysis

particulary unstable. The maximum term of incarceration

is the most reliable indicator of the seriousness with which

a state views the offense and should be the only factor

relevant to a defendant’s right to a jury trial. This Court’s

case law allowing penalties other than incarceration to be

imposed by civil or administrative mechanisms supports a

rule excluding consideration of these penalties in deter-

mining whetiver an offense is “petty.” Due process limi-

tations upon a state’s ability to incarcerate defendants for

failure to pay a fine ensure that legislative bodies will not

choose short imprisonments and large fines to avoid jury

trials for “serious” offenses and thus support a rule con-

sidering only incarceration, and not fines, in the “pety

offense’ analysis. Problems associated with making mar-

datory minimum terms relevant for “petty offense’ na1-

ysis should foreclose deviation from this Court’s rule

focusing upon the maximum potential, rather than the ac-

tual term imposed.

3. Even without a bright line rule focusing upon the

maximum term of incarceration, the additional consider-

ations proposed by petitioners do not demonstrate their

entitlement to a trial by jury. Drunk driving was not in-

dictable at common law and is not an offense malum in

se. The existing laws and practices of other jurisdictions

with respect to drunk driving establish no clear national

consensus concerning the seriousness of this offense.

4. Nevada has a legitimate state interest in not provid-

ing jury trials for first-offender drunk drivers. Bench trials

are speedy and inexpensive, and fully protect petitioners’

constitutional rights. They also help to guarantee speedy

trials in the prosecution of all crimes.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS COURT’S CASE

LAW EVINCES A CONTEMPORARY RULE RE-

QUIRING JURY TRIALS ONLY FOR OFFENSES

CARRYING A MAXIMUM AUTHORIZED TERM OF

INCARCERATION EXCEEDING SIX MONTHS.

The Sixth Amendment provides that “{iJn all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right toa...

trial, by an impartial jury....” In defining the scope of

the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee, this Court has long

recognized that the right to trial by jury does not extend

to “petty” offenses but is limited to “serious’’ crimes.‘

The problem faced by this Court has been “to draw a line

in the spectrum of crime, separating petty from serious

infractions.”” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160-161

(1968). While this Court has from time to time considered

a variety of factors pertinent to this task, recent devel-

opments in this Court’s case law evince a contemporary

rule requiring jury trials only for offenses carrying a max-

imum authorized term of confinement exceeding six

months.

While the question concerning the exact location of the

line between “petty” and “‘serious’’ offenses arguably sur-

vived the Duncan decision, this Court did determine that

the crime at issue in Duncan, a crime punishable by two

years’ imprisonment, clearly fell on the “‘serious’’ side of

the line. Jd. at 161-162. Two years later, a three member

plurality of this Court, referring to Congress’s definition

of petty offenses, extended the jury trial rule of Duncan

to any state criminal offense in which the authorized period

of confinement exceeded six months. Baldwin v. New York,

399 U.S. 66 (1970). The Court’s treatment of this issue in

Duncan and Baldwin differed from this Court’s analyses

in prior cases.

In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888), this Court

rejected the contention that the right to trial by jury was

limited to felonies or crimes by confinement in

a penitentiary. Id. at 549. Callan involved the crime of

, an offense indictable at common law. Given

the status of the offense at common law, the Callan Court

held that conspiracy could not be prosecuted summarily

* Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States,

395 U.S. 147 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Cheff

v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); District of Columbia v. Clawans,

300 U.S. 617 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930);

Natal v. Lowisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.

540 (1888).

without benefit of trial by jury. Jd. at 556. The issue

surfaced again in Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65

(1904), which involved a prosecution for violation of a rev-

enue statute. After noting that both the nature of the

offense and the authorized punishment indicated only a

petty offense, the Court, relying on Callan, again empha-

concerning the right to trial by jury “in the light of the

common law.” Schick, 195 U.S. at 69. Finally, in District

of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930), this Court de-

termined that since reckless driving was an offense in-

dictable at common law, the accused was entitled to trial

by jury.

In District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937),

this Court confronted the issue in the context of an offense

not indictable at common law. The defendant in Clawans

was charged with dealing in secondhand property without

a license, an offense punishable by ninety days’ impris-

onment. Jd. at 623. Having determined that the offense

was not indictable at common law, this Court conceded

that an otherwise “trivial” statutory offense may, by vir-

tue of “the severity of the penalty,”’ acquire the status of

a “serious” offense entitling the accused to trial by jury.

Id. at 625. This Court thus turned to the question whether

a nonindictable offense may be brought within the realm

of crimes for which the accused is entitled to trial by jury

solely by virtue of the authorized punishment. Jd. By ref-

erence to the common law, in this case to English and

Colonial statutes in existence at the time the Constitution

was adopted, this Court discerned that an authorized pe-

riod of confinement in excess of ninety days was not an

uncommon punishment for petty offenses tried summarily.

Id. at 626-627. In resolving the issue whether a given

penalty could elevate an otherwise “‘petty’’ offense to the

“serious” category, this Court noted:

[W]e may doubt whether summary trial with pun-

ishment of more than six months’ imprisonment,

prescribed by some pre-Revolutionary statutes, is

admissible, without concluding that a penalty of

ninety days is too much. Doubts must be re-

solved, not subjectively by recourse of the judge

to his own sympathy and emotions, but by ob-

jective standards such as may be observed in the

laws and practices of the community taken as a

gauge of its social and ethical judgments.

Congress itself, by measuring the punishment in

this case in conformity to the commonly accepted

standard when the Constitution was adopted, and

declaring that it should be applied today unless

found to transgress constitutional limitations, has

expressed its deliberate judgment that the pun-

ishment is not too great to be summarily admin-

istered. [Clawans, 300 U.S. at 627-628].

In Duncan, this Court, continuing the evolving theme

of Clawans, did not refer to the common law status of

the charged offense, but relied exclusively upon the length

of the authorized prison term. In other words, this Court

declined to determine whether simple battery constituted

an indictable offense at common law, observing instead

that “the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of

major relevance in determining whether it is serious or

not” and noting that the authorized penalty “‘may be taken

‘as a gauge of [the locality’s] social and ethical judgments’

of the crime in question.”” Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159, 160

(citation omitted).

Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969), echoed the

Duncan Court’s search for an objective benchmark of se-

riousness. Referring to Clawans and Duncan, this Court

identified the severity of authorized punishment as “(t]he

most relevant indication of the seriousness of an offense

.... 395 U.S. at 148. Moving in the same direction in

Baldwin, this Court again did not concern itself with the

question whether the crime of “‘jostling’’ was an indictable

offense at common law, but found the authorized one year

sentence to constitute the most relevant indication of the

seriousness of the crime. 399 U.S. at 69. Significantly, the

Baldwin Court went on to hold that no offense carrying

an authorized penalty in excess of six months can be char-

acterized as “‘petty” for purposes of the right to trial by

jury. Id. at 73-74. Subsequent decisions of this Court have

interpreted Duncan and its progeny as establishing a bright

line between “‘petty’’ and “serious” offenses—a line that

coincides with the congressional maximum of six months’

imprisonment for federal petty offenses. Codispoti v. Penn-

sylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974). See Welsh v. Wisconsin,

466 U.S. 740, 754 n.14 (1984) (penalty for particular of-

fense provides clearest and most consistent indication of

State’s interest in arresting individual for a given offense);

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29 (1972).

Three points can be gleaned from the relevant case law.

First, perhaps due to the emergence of statutory offenses

unknown to the common law, this Court has moved away

from assessments of the common law nature of the of-

fense, see Colts and Callan, as the determinative, or even

a relevant factor concerning the right to trial by jury. See

Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1988)

(en banc), petition for cert. filed June 13, 1988; Justiniano

Matos v. Gaspar Rodriguez, 440 F. Supp. 673, 676-677

(D.P.R. 1976). Second, this Court has never deemed an

of the other considerations which appear to have played

a role in the early decisions of this Court has ever been

10

imum custodial penalty authorized for a given offense.

Welsh v. Wisconsin 466 U.S. at 754 n.14; Duncan v. Lou-

isiana, 391 U.S. at 160.

This Court should maintain the course charted in its

recent cases and apply a bright line rule of six months’

incarceration to determine which offenses are “‘petty’’ and

which offenses are ‘‘serious’’ for purposes of Sixth Amend-

ment jury trial analysis. Even if a rule of this nature is

not preordained by this Court’s decisional authority, it

should now be adopted as the most sensible and workable

manner of deciding whether petitioners are entitled to jury

trials.

POINT II

THIS COURT SHOULD ENUNCIATE A BRIGHT

LINE RULE PROVIDING A RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

ONLY IF THE MAXIMUM AUTHORIZED TERM OF

INCARCERATION EXCEEDS SIX MONTHS.

Amicus State of New Jersey urges this Court clearly

to enunciate a bright line rule which would provide a con-

stitutional right to a jury trial if and only if the maximum

authorized term of incarceration exceeds six months.’ All

other factors, including the maximum authorized fine, the

collateral consequences of conviction (including license sus-

pension), factors intrinsic to the proscribed conduct (in-

cluding whether it was indictable at common law) and

statutory requirements for a minimum term of incarcer-

ation should be irrelevant. Several policy considerations

support the explicit adoption of this bright line rule. The

rule, if not compelled by this Court’s case law, is certainly

consistent with it and logically follows from it.

* However, we support the exception noted in Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145, 162 n.35 (1968), for the offense of contempt of court,

under which the penalty actually imposed, rather than the maximum

authorized penalty, is the determinative factor. That exception and the

reasons for it are not generally applicable, and are not germane to

this case.

11

There is a need for a bright line rule. Without it, “the

boundaries of the petty offense category .. . [will remain]

ill-defined, if not ambulatory.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

U.S. 145, 160 (1968). The states’ (and the federal govern-

ment’s) interest in prosecuting both “‘serious’’ and “petty”

offenses is too important to admit uncertainty as to

whether a given offense is “serious,”’ thus requiring a jury

trial, or “petty,”’ thus subject to “speedy and inexpensive

nonjury adjudications.” Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.

66, 73 (1970). Under the various amorphous tests proposed

by petitioners, the uncertainty is omnipresent; even this

Court’s adjudication today that a given offense is ‘‘petty”

would not necessarily be valid next year if, in the inter-

vening period, the public perception of the seriousness of

the offense changed. (Petitioners’ brief at 19-20). Without

and state judiciary (as has occurred in Nevada) would be

inevitable. Compare United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23

(9th Cir. 1981) and Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094

(D. Nev. 1986) with Blanton v. North Las Vegas Municipal

Court, 103 Nev. 135, 748 P.2d 494 (1987). It is difficult

for prosecutors to prosecute if they are uncertain regard

ing something so elementary as whether a jury is neces

sary. In this aspect of the law, this Court has noted the

wisdom of employing “objective criteria,” Duncan v. Low

istana, é

z

¢

z

13

12

ea

aT

Bapliggelinises HH ait HEE

ATE | ities

tHe ale let TB

HE SHE ERI jin

it ip He tHE HE | Hi Ni

Talia Ras] atl a iitint

i i

SRST OL eu AH cE

av TBH fH i i a8 it

li HAE rea Ht i

RIBTtHI TIM aati

14

if the failure is blameless because the defendant cannot

afford to pay. Cf. Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201,

1216 n.30 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). However, this Court's

opinion in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), ensures

that a defendant who cannot afford to pay will not be

incarcerated for that failure unless other penological al-

ternatives are inadequate; and in any event the aggregate

term of incarceration for the offense and for the failure

to pay cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the of-

fense (which for petty offenses is six months). The dimin-

ishing effectiveness of increasing fines, occasioned by the

diminishing class of defendants who can afford to pay them

and Bearden’s due process limitations upon incarceration

difficulty and differences in opinions among legal scholars.

.. State v. Maier, 13 N.J. 235, 251-252, 99 A.2d

1953). In any event, difficulty in application is not

15

“Our Constitution was not intended to consecrate the

common law’s treatment of any specific misconduct and

thus to bar legislative revaluation of it in the light of

changing conditions and mores.” State v. Owens, 54 N.J.

153, 159, 254 A.2d 97, 100 (1969), cert. denied 396 U.S.

slight offense,” and persons victimized by the offensive

(but nevertheless petty) conduct are “‘without the redress

that the law contemplated would be accorded [them].’’ State

v. Maier, 13 N.J. at 243, 99 A.2d at 25.°

An example of the need for revaluation of conduct in-

dictable under the common law may be found in this

Court’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S.

indictable offense at common law. .. when horses, instead

of gasoline, constituted the motive power.” Jd. at 73. The

Court thus concluded that the vehicular infraction of reck-

less driving was indictable at common law, id., yet surely

the Si

i

eet

ine

ut

: Hi

SaHib

lige

li

16

Indeed, amicus State of New Jersey respectfully sug-

gests that this Court’s valuation of the nature of reckless

driving fifty-eight years ago in Colts has not withstood the

test of time. Many jurisdictions today do not treat reckless

driving as a “serious” offense. See State ex rel Dean v.

City Court of Tucson, 141 Ariz. 361, 363, 687 P.2d 369,

371 (Ct. App. 1984\“{W]je do not believe that reckless

driving is today considered to be ‘an act of such obvious

depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would

be to shock the general moral sense.’ ’’ (quoting Colts));

Justiniano Matos v. Gaspar Rodriguez, 440 F. Supp. 673,

677 (D.P.R. 1976) (“At the present day, all men and women

travel much more rapidly than was possible in the eight-

eenth century’’). See generally Annot. Reckless Driving as

Lesser Included Offense of Driving While Intoxicated or

Similar Charge, 10 A.L.R. 4th 1252 (1981). Petitioners

and amici A.C.L.U., by invoking the “indictable at com-

mon law” test, ignore the dynamic social trends which

have ameliorated society’s attitudes towards reckless driv-

ing, yet purport to rely upon the same dynamic social

trends in arguing that society’s contemporary condemna-

tion of drunk driving renders it “serious” independent of

its penalties.

Petitioners would also have this Court consider how so-

ciety views the offense, and whether it is malum in se or

malum prohibitum. These social judgments are best left

to the legislatures. It is not to “involve judges in

i

sentence. Legislatures ... are far better equipped to per-

form the task . . [being] more responsive to changes in

attitude and more amenable to the recognition and cor-

rection of their misperceptions in this respect.”” Landry v.

Hoepfner, 840 F.2d at 1209. Moreover, it is not useful for

a court ‘‘to sample popular opinion to determine how much

stigma is attributed to each act of misconduct and there-

upon to decide, in some way which escapes us, whether

17

an offense is more than petty notwithstanding the statute

has so treated it. It is for the Legislature alone to assay

the public’s judgment, and the Legislature does so when

it prescribes the legal consequences ... "’ State v. Owens,

54 N.J. at 160, 254 A.2d at 101.

To argue that this Court’s case law has mandated con-

sideration of factors other than penalties is to confuse the

goal with the means by which it is accomplished. Admit-

tedly, this Court’s case law concerning the right to trial

by jury has in the past considered factors such as whether

the conduct was indictable at common law, but even then

the sole purpose was to gauge the seriousness of the of-

fense. Offenses serious in sixteenth century England are

not necessarily serious today; and offenses serious in Cal-

ifornia are not necessarily serious in Arizona. Rummel v.

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1980). “[Tjhe classification

of state crimes differs widely among the states,”’ Welsh

v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 n.14 (1984), and this is

entirely proper in our federal system. Thus, “the penalty

that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide

the clearest and most consistent indication of the State’s

{evaluation of its seriousness].”” Jd. This is therefore the

factor which should determine the right to trial by jury.

Finally, petitioners argue that an offense not otherwise

“serious” might become so if the statute (like the Nevada

drunk driving statute) requires a mandatory minimum jail

term. Aside from contempt proceedings, see supra note

5, this Court has always hinged its ‘petty offense’’ analysis

upon the maximum potential term of incarceration, rather

than the term actually imposed, and thus an offense car-

rying a maximum term of six months should be “‘petty’’

regardless of statutory requirements for imposition of a

minimum term. A statutory requirement for a minimum

term “operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s dis-

cretion in selecting a penalty within the ...’’ petty offense

range, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986),

18

and should not serve to transform an otherwise “petty’’

offense into one which is “serious,”

Injection of custodial minima into the “petty offense”

analysis, and the consequential abandonment of the rule

hinging that analysis exclusively upon the maximum au-

thorized term, would likely complicate the administration

of justice. It could logleally, compe! consideration of related

factors such as de facto minima or the standard senter ‘ing

for other offenses. For example, some defendants

would inevitably contend that they were entitled to jury

trials for a ‘petty’ offense because a given judge or col-

lection of judges routinely imposed a minimum term, and

thus established a de facto minimum period of inearceration

sufficient to render the “petty” offense “serious.”’ Other

ae oe Cee. ee. offense was ‘‘se-

Consideration of mandatory minimum sentences in the

“petty offense” analysis would also lead to problems with

respect to “petty” offenses which statutorily require min-

imum terms only upon the judge's finding of certain ag-

gravating factors.’ McMillan held that the Sixth

Amendment does not require a jury trial with respect to

sceee of “esti efivane” enaiveis check toeedienn deviation

from this Court's rule focusing upon the maximum poten-

tial, rather than actual term imposed,

For these several reasons, this Court should clearly

enunciate the bright line rule advanced herein and fore-

close consideration of extranous factors such as the max-

imum fine, the public's alleged perception of the seriousness

of the offense, whether the offense was indictable at com-

mon law, whether it is malum in se, and the circumstances

under which it might require imposition of a minimum

term of incarceration. Nevada's drunk driving statute for

first offenders meets this bright line rule; it authorizes no

period of incarceration exceeding six months. Thus,

petitioners are not entitled to jury trials.

POINT UI

TO THE EXTENT THAT FACTORS OTHER THAN

THE MAXIMUM TERM OF INCARCERATION ARE

RELEVANT, THEY DO NOT ENTITLE

PETITIONERS TO TRIAL BY JURY.

| m Feit Ot amicus State of New Jersey has advocated

20

With respect to the factor of the inherent seriousness

of an offense, amici A.C.L.U. point to this Court's opinion

ict of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1980), which

held that the offense of driving an automobile recklessly

so as to endanger property and individuals was malum in

se, and argue that it would be wholly incongruous to treat

driving while intoxicated as malum proh.bitum. Amici

A.C.L.U, ignore the fact that in the process of declaring

a certain degree of reckless driving to be malum in se,

this Court in Colts specifically sonsidered and implicitly

approved the holding in State v. Rodgers, 91 NJ.L. 212,

102 A. 433 (E. & A. 1917), which determined that driving

while intoxicated was only a petty offense not indictable

at common law. See Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201,

1212-1213 (5th Cir. ry (en banc). More fundamentally,

there is nothing factu |

as the reckless driver. State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573, 583,

458 A.2d 502, 507 n.7 (1983) (“Driving while drunk does

not necessarily translate into reckless driving. It is possible

ven recklessly and obviously there are drivers who are

reckless but not drunk.”); State v. Roenicke, 174 N.J.

Super. 513, 517, 417 A.2d 54, 56 (Law Div. 1980) ("The

dean tho manner te whieh be & Gera

“Even if an intoxicated person drives his car with ut-

most care, he can be charged with driving while intoxi-

617 F. Supp. 792, 798 (D.Md. 1985). According to a study

conducted at the University of Colorado, a substantial

21

ne Cees ee balance and

as well when they were

‘Tegal Grankt” 00 ehen thay wore saber. Blakeslee, Sct-

entlete’ Pind Key Diclogieal Causes of Aleoholion, N.Y.

Times, Aug. 14, 1984, at Cl, col. 1, Therefore, this Court's

characterization of reckless driving in Colts is not

dispositive of whether drunk is malum in se and

does not support the claim that drunk driving offenses are

“serious” enough to warrant jury trials. Compare Roth-

weiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479 (1966)

(en bane) (jury trials for driving while intoxicated) with

State ex rel Dean v. City Court of Tueson, 141 Ariz. 361,

aviv : 4 r ; -

rious, we submit that nether ofthese offenses is “serous

nt : ontext, absent exposure to a period of

terme of this Court's trest

driving with Pope po ty Fey

blood. This newer, alternative method of prosecuting drunk

proof: which focus wpen 0 defendant's phys

. More precisely, the effect, if any, upon a

person of the alcohol which that person has imbibed is

wholly irrelevant to that individual's guilt or innocence, so

long as the requisite percentage of alcohol is in the per-

son's system. See, ¢.g., Anderjeski v. City Court of Mesa,

135 Ariz. 549, 663 P.2d 233, 234-235 (1983) (en bane) (‘It

8 possible to have less than .10% blood alcohol content

and still be under the influence of intoxicating liquor .

. On the other hand, a person may have over .10 per cent

blood alcohol content and still not have his driving abilities

significantly wnpaires. . "yy, State v. Abbott, 15 Or. App.

205, 514 P.2d 355 357 (1973) (“[T}he question is not

whether they are > nenieaoed but whether they have [the

requisite percentage] of alcohol in their blood.”’) The

emergence of .10% per se legislation is further indicative

that drunk driving is not a malum in se offense.

Finally, the citation by amici A.C.L.U. and petitioners

to the current strong emphasis on enforcement of drunk

driving laws in the country, and on the efforts of national

Coens oF © Se and 8.A.D.D., is also not

—— of the issue before this Court. There is no doubt

chat drank driving ithe target of national condemnation

public's opinion of the gravity of certain illegal

{er purpoue of deciding whee prosecution

for purposes of deciding whether its tion

ee ae As thle Court has acknow » Oe

nae pt

| nal

expensive non-jury adjudications. [Baldwin v. New

York, 399 U.S. 66, 13 (1970)}

fenses as either ‘serious’ or “petty,”

fashioning a test which wae be con-

{ While me oat veal constitutionally a Ay a

ry a - conduct of driving while in-

oxieated is by no means trivial, it is nevertheless a “petty”

offense which does not entitle them to trial by jury.

Petitioners’ invocation of ‘the existing laws and prac-

tices in the Nation’’ is no more

(1977).

all cut cuuaiiened eheene ta thn tanne of pamaiiies tes?

islatively promulgated the states were drawing the jury

trial line. Baldwin did not analyze national perception of

an identical offense. Indeed, any comparison of various

urisdictions ' treatments of the same offense is fraught

with risk and unrelia lity; there are numerous variables

contained in laws of different states which simply cannot

be ¢ entalized and accounted for when such a multi-

jurisdictional measurement is made. Rummel v. Estelle 445

24

U.S. 263, 279-281 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,

308-309 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

However, to the extent that this analysis is appropriate,

it is clear that the numbers offered by petitioners are not

supportive of their cause. Surely it is not enough simply

to do as petitioners have done and make the general as-

sertion that forty-six of fifty states grant jury trials to

drunk drivers, To go only thus far does nothing to satisfy

the more pertinent question of exactly under what circum-

stances jury trials are being provided in these forty-six

states. Critical to this inquiry, and left unaddressed by

petitioners, is a determination of the maximum penalties

attendant to drunk driving offenses in the jurisdictions in

which jury trials are allowed. If the possible term of im-

prisonment is, for example, six years (the maximum term

available for a third offender in Nevada), then one need

look no further than this Court's ruling in Baldwin to

recognize that a jury trial is necessary. Culy when 0 stnte’e

penalties for drunk driving are below the Baldwin six

month threshold and jury trials are nevertheless provided

would that jurisdiction's treatment of drunk driving be-

come significant for purposes of petitioners’ analysis.

_ Amicus State of New et has therefore — a

the Balen rule in determining whether jury trials are

warranted. (Appendix C). A second list examines the rea

drunk driving penalties below the Baldwin limit; specif

cally, an analysis is made as to whether each jurisdiction

even recognizes Baldwin's ‘‘petty” versus “serious” die-

tinction for any offense. (Appendix D). A review of the

experience of other jurisdictions in this fashion discloses

the following results.

Appellate courts in six states have refused to recognize

a constitutional right to jury trials for first-offender drunk

a

25

drivers. (Appendix B). Of the forty-four remaining states,

twenty-two which provide jury trials for first offenders

have first-offender penalties higher than the Baldwin

threshold. (Appendix C). Therefore, these jurisdictions are

consistent with Baldwin and actually support the argument

for application of the bright line rule.

The other twenty-two states grant jury trials for first-

offender drunk driving cases even though the potential

incarceration is below the Baldwin line. However, of these

twenty-two jurisdictions, nineteen do not recognize Bald-

win's “petty’”’ versus “serious” distinction for any offense

and, therefore, are completely useless in gauging these

’ views of the seriousness of drunk driving.

jurisdictions’ views

(Appendix D). And only four states have made an affirm-

ative determination that, independent of relevant penalties,

drunk driving is innately a “serious” enough offense to

warrant a jury trial. Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d at 1218

n.36. Two of these four states allow potential incarceration

in excess of six months. /d.

Clearly, there is an absence of a national consensus as

to just how “serious” or “petty” drunk driving actually

is. Petitioners’ blanket statement that ‘‘most states allow

trial by jury in d.w.i. prosecutions’ does not take into

account the simple reality that a substantial percentage of

these states conform with Baldwin’s bright line in doing

so. Consequently, the “existing laws and practices of the

Nation,” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 161, compel

adherence to the bright line rule.

The arguments above demonstrate the deficiency of

petitioners’ complex ‘“‘petty” versus “serious” offense test.

Analysis of the additional factors which petitioners propose

reveals that these factors provide no legitimate foundation

for petitioners’ jury trial demand. Consequently, even if

this Court were not satisfied to limit the applicable rule

to consideration of the maximum authorized term of in-

carceration, petitioners would not be entitled to trial by

jury.

26

POINT IV

NEVADA HAS A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST

IN BENCH TRIALS FOR PETTY OFFENSES.

Amici A.C.L.U. and, to a certain extent, petitioners,

attempt to minimize Nevada’s interest in not providing

jury trials for first-offender drunk drivers by claiming that

no state interest of constitutional magnitude exists to out-

weigh a defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury.

Their claim is somewhat tautological; obviously, if

petitioners are entitled to jury trials, then Nevada has no

interest in foreclosing that entitlement. However,

petitioners and amici A.C.L.U. underrate and oversimplify

the value of Nevada’s and, inferentially, other states’ in-

terests in bench trials for ‘“‘petty’’ offenses. Regardless of

whether this Court accepts our construction of its case law

(Point I), accepts our arguments favoring the bright line

rule (Point II), or agrees with our evaluation of other tests

proffered by petitioners (Point III), it should definitely re-

affirm the State’s right to impose bench trials for “‘petty’’

offenses.

Whether or not they reach the level of being of con-

stitutional import, financial costs and administrative bur-

dens to the State are properly considered in the jury trial

analysis. Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 209

(1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). For

example, in New Jersey, where jury trials have never been

provided for drunk driving offenses, massive delays would

undoubtedly result from the implementation of such a sys-

tem. Cf. In re Jones & Laughlin Hourly Pension Plan v.

LTV Corp., 824 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1987). See supra

note 3. Such a large encumbrance upon a State’s criminal

justice system, particularly with respect to its attendant

delays, directly impacts upon that State’s obligation to

provide all defendants with another constitutional right,

i.e., speedy trials. U.S. Const. amend. VI.

27

This Court should reaffirm its prior conclusion that

whatever disadvantages exist for defendants in terms of

the potential penalties they face, in situations where they

are charged only with a “petty” offense, these disadvan-

tages are outweighed by the benefits that result from

speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications. Baldwin v.

New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970). Nevada’s first-offender

drunk driving offense is a “petty” offense, but, in any

event, amicus State of New Jersey urges this Court to

reject petitioners’ minimization of the value of adminis-

trative burdens and financial costs in the “petty offense”’

analysis.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, amicus State of New Jersey

respectfully urges this Court to affirm the judgment of

the Supreme Court of Nevada.

Respectfully submitted,

W. CARY EDWARDS

Attorney General of New Jersey

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

BORIS MOCZULA

Deputy Attorney General

Attorney of Record

Boris Moczula

Larry R. Etzweiler

Cherrie Madden Black

Deputy Attorneys General

Division of Criminal Justice

Appellate Section

Of Counsel and on the Brief

“A a.

la

APPENDIX A

NEW JERSEY STATUTES, COURT RULES, AND

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED IN THIS BRIEF

A. NEW JERSEY STATUTES ANNOTATED

2A:8-21. Jurisdiction of specified offenses

Each municipal court, and the judge or judges

thereof, shall have jurisdiction of the following

offenses occurring within the territorial jurisdic-

tion of the court:

a. Violations of the motor vehicle and traffic

laws;

b. Violations of the fish and game laws;

c. Violations of the ordinances of the munici-

pality wherein the municipal court is located or

of the municipalities to which its jurisdiction ex-

tends;

d. Violations of disorderly persons offenses and

petty disorderly persons offenses in Title 2C of

the New Jersey Statutes or any other disorderly

persons or petty disorderly persons offense as

defined by the laws of this State;

e. Violations of chapters one and four of Title

44, Poor, of the Revised Statutes;

f. Violations of chapters six and seventeen of

Title 9, Children, of the Revised Statutes; and

g. Offenses as to which no indictment by a

grand jury is required.

2C:43-3. Fines and restitutions

A person who has been convicted of an offense

may be sentenced to pay a fine, to make resti-

tution, or both, such fine not to exceed:

2a 3a

4, $100,000.00, when the conviction is of a 17:29A-35. Merit rating accident surcharge for private pas-

crime of the first or second degree; sant Guemnahien Gham | n of license; disposi-

tion of funds; amount of surcharge; rules and regulations

b. $7,500.00, when the conviction is of a crime

of the third or fourth degree;

¢. $1,000.00, when the conviction is of a dis-

orderly persons offense;

d. $500.00, when the conviction is of a petty

(bX2) Plan surcharges shall be levied for convic-

tions (a) under R.S. 39:4-50 for violations occur-

ring on or after February 10, 1983, and (b) under

section 2 of P.L.1981, ¢. 512 (C, 39:4-5° 4a), or

for offe —

disorderly persons offense; committed in other jurisdicuons of

eee a substantially similar nature to those under R.S.

2C:43-3.1. Additional penalties; collection and disposition 89: 4-60 or section 2 of P.L.1981, ¢. 512 (C. 39: od

by violent crimes compensation board; victim and witness

advocacy fund; failure to pay; driver license privileges shah ba loved Gan wally for @ three year period

eee and shall be net loco then $1,000 per year for

(2¥a) In addition to any other disposition made ref feapbaghy wy pA oc:

pursuant to the provisions of N.J.8, 2C:43-2 or curring within a three period, If a driver is

any other statute imposing sentences for crimes, convicted under both R.S. 39:4-50 and section 2

person convicted of any disorderly persons of P.L.1981, ¢, 512 (C, 39:4-50.4a) for offenses

nse, any petty disorderly persons offense, or arising out of the same incident, the driver shall

any crime not resulting inthe injury oF death of be assessed only one surcharge for the two of:

any other person shall be assessed a penal

Hey hm gh pt dy bd Ay

he wes convicted, effectuate the purposes

eee section and P.L.1983, ¢. 65 (C. 1T:29A-38 €

| and may, t to regulation, permit t!

2C:48-8. unas ¢ Saamenmans Se Geweery purses ty or any hese .

offenses and petty disorderly persons offenses ra or ay ere

A Paresh She Nad Stee SOMERS & 6 Cheveey

fense or a petty disorderly persons of

may be sentenced to imprisonment for a

definite term which shall be fixed by the a

and shall not exceed 6 months in the case of a

of a petty disorderly persons offense.

If, upon written notification from the Division

of Motor Vehicles, mailed to the last address of

record with the division, Ke ee fs

ircha levied under this subsection, li

cense i the driver shall be suspended forthwith

tor Vehicles; ‘except that upon satisfactory show-

da

r —e y, the es dy Motor Vehicles

may au payment surcharge on an

—— a basis over a period not to exceed 10

mon

39:3-40. Driving when license refused, suspended, revoked

or prohibited; motor vehicle license revoked; punishment

No person to whom a driver's license has been

refused or whose driver's license or reciprocity

: ed or revoked, or who

5a

if while operating a vehicle in violation of this

section a person is involved in an accident re-

sulting in personal injury to another person.

Nothwithstanding subsections a. through e., any

person violating this section while under suspen-

sien tensed pursuant to R.S. 39:4-50, upon con-

viction, shall be fined $500.00, shall have his

license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for

an additional period of not less than one year

nor more than two years, and may be imprisoned

in the county jail for not more than 90 days.

been prohibited from obtaining driver's li-

cense, shall personally operate a motor vehicle

during the period of refusal, suspension, revo-

cation, or prohibition.

39:4-50. Operating or allowing operation by person under

influence of liquor or drugs; penalties; alcohol education

or rehabilitation; collection of driver's license; rights of

discovery; intoxicated driver resource centers

No person whose motor vehicle registration has

stn of cash taster Tahide Surleg the ported

the of

such revocation.

A person violating this section shall be subject

to the following penalties:

a. Upon conviction for a first offense, a fine of

$500.00;

b. Upon conviction for a second offense, a fine

of $750.00 and imprisonment in the county jail

for not more than five days;

¢, Upon conviction for a third offense, a fine of

$1,000.00 and imprisonment in the county jail for

10 days;

d. Upon conviction, the court shall impose or ex-

tend a period of suspension not to exceed six

months;

e. Upon conviction, the court shall impose a pe-

riod of imprisonment for not less than 45 days,

(a) A 1 who operates a motor vehicle

while \ So taiegnte of lnterteating Heuer

op epenatan © moter vebidle With @ bleed eleshel

concentration of 0.10% or more by weight of al-

oe Oe ee ee ee

who is under the influence of intoxicating

(1) For the first offense, to a fine of not less

of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more

than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days

of not less than six hours each day and served

prescribed by the program requirements of the

Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established

under subsection (f) of this section and, in the

ba

discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment

of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith

forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over

the highways of this State for a period of not

the expiration per may | ap-

plication to the Director of the Division of Motor

Vehicles for a license to operate a motor vehicle,

which application may be granted at the discre-

tion of the director, consistent with subsection

(b) of this section.

(3) For a third or s t violation, a per-

90 days served rforming comm inity service in

such and on such terms as the court shall

deem appropriate under the circumstances and

shall thereafter forfeit his right to operate a mo-

tor vehicle over the highways of this State for

10 years.

Ta

If the driving privilege of any person is under

revocation or nsion for a violation of any

ea ake tees ot ont cute

tion for a violation of this section, the revocation

or suspension period imposed shall commence as

of the date of termination of the existing revo-

cation or suspension period. A court that imposes

a term of imprisonment under this section may

Paes chee eaae cheme os

tation program or to an Intoxicated Driver Re-

source Center or other facility approved by the

Director of the Division of Alcoholism in the De-

partment of Health; provided that for a third or

subsequent offense a person shall not serve a

term of imprisonment at an Intoxicated Driver

Resource Center as provided in subsection (f).

A person who has been convicted of a previous

violation of this section need not be charged as

a second or subsequent offender in the complaint

made against him in order to render him liable

to the punishment imposed by this section on a

second or subsequent offender, but if the second

offense occurs more than 10 years after the first

offense, the court shall treat the second convic-

tion as a first offense for sentencing purposes

after the second offense, the court shall treat the

third conviction as a second offense for sentenc-

ing purposes.

(b) A person convicted under this section must

satisfy the screening, evaluation, referral pro-

gram and fee requirements of the Division of

Alcoholism's Intoxicated Driving Programs Unit,

and of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers

and a program of alcohol education and highway

Ra

safety, as prescribed by the Director of the Di-

vision of Motor Vehicles, The sentencing court

shall inform the person convicted that failure to

satisfy such requirements shall result in a man-

datory two day term of imprisonment in a county

jail and a driver license revocation or

and continuation of revocation or suspension until

such requirements are satisfied, unless stayed by

court order in accordance with Rule 7:8-2 of the

N.J. Court Rules, 1969, or R.S, 39:5-22. Upon

sentencing, the court shall forward to the Bureau

of Alcohol Countermeasures within the Intoxi-

cated Driving Programs Unit a copy of a person's

conviction record, A fee of $80.00 shall be pay-

able to the Alcohol Education, Rehabilitation and

Enforcement Fund established pursuant to sec-

tion 3, P.L.1983, ¢, 531 (C, 26:2B-32) to support

the Intoxicated Driving Programs Unit.

(c) Upon conviction of a violation of this sec-

tion, the court shall collect forthwith the New

Jersey driver's license or licenses of the person

so convicted and forward such license or licenses

to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles.

The court shall inform the person convicted that

if he is convicted of f nally operating a motor

vehicle during the period of license suspension

imposed pureunnh to sabecstion Gn of ie testion.

he shall, upon conviction, be subject to the pen-

alties established in R.S. 39:3-40. person con-

victed shall be informed orally and in writing. A

person shall be required to acknowledge receipt

of that written notice in writing. Failure to re-

ceive a written notice or failure to acknowledge

in writing the receipt of a written notice shall

not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a

violation of R.S. 39:3-40. In the event that a

9a

person convicted under this section is the holder

of any out-of-state driver’s license, the court shall

not collect the license but shall notify forthwith

the director, who shall, in turn, notify appropri-

ate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court

shall, however, revoke the nonresident’s driving

privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State,

in accordance with this section. Upon conviction

of a violation of this section, the court shall notify

the person convicted, orally and in writing, of

the penalties for a second, third or subsequent

violation of this section. A person shall be re-

quired to acknowledge receipt of that written no-

tice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice

or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt

of a written notice shall not be a defense to a

subsequent charge of a violation of this section.

(d) The Director of the Division of Motor Ve-

hicles shall promulgate rules and regulations pur-

suant to the “Administrative Procedure Act,”

P.L.1968, c. 410 (C. 52:14B-1 et seq.) in order

to estabish a program of alcohol education and

highway safety, as prescribed by this act.

(e) Any person accused of a violation of this

section who is liable to punishment imposed by

this section as a second or subsequent offender

shall be entitled to the same rights of discovery

as allowed defendants pursuant to the Rules Gov-

erning Criminal Practice, as set forth in the Rules

Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.

(f) The counties, in cooperation with the Di-

vision of Alcoholism and the Division of Motor

Vehicles, but subject to the approval of the Di-

vision of Alcoholism, shall designate and establish

on a county or regional basis Intoxicated Driver

Resource Centers. These centers shall have the

10a

capability of serving as community treatment re-

ferral centers and as court monitors of a person’s

compliance with the ordered treatment, service

alternative or community service. All centers es-

tablished pursuant to this subsection shall be ad-

ministered by a certified alcoholism counsellor or

other professional with a minimum of five years’

experience in treatment of alcoholism. All centers

shall be required to develop individualized treat-

ment plans for all persons attending the centers;

provided that the duration of any ordered treat-

ment or referral shall not exceed one year. It

shall be the center’s responsibility to establish

networks with the community alcohol education,

treatment and rehabilitation resources and to re-

ceive monthly reports from the referral agencies

regarding a person’s participation and compliance

with the program. Nothing in this subsection shall

bar these centers from developing their own ed-

ucation and treatment programs; provided that

they are approved by the Division of Alcoholism.

Upon a person’s failure to report to the initial

screening or any subsequent ordered referral, the

Intoxicated Driver Resource Center shall

promptly notify the sentencing court of the per-

son’s failure to comply.

Required detention periods at the Intoxicated

Driver Resource Centers shall be determined ac-

cording to the individual treatment classification

assigned by the Bureau of Alcohol Countermea-

sures. Upon attendance at an Intoxicated Driver

Resource Center, a person shall be assessed a

per diem fee of $50.00 for the first offender pro-

gram or a per diem fee of $75.00 for the second

offender program, as appropriate.

lla

The centers shall conduct a program of alcohol

education and highway safety, as prescribed by

the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles.

The Director of the Division of Alcoholism shall

adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the “Ad-

ministrative Procedure Act,”” P.L.1968, c. 410 (C.

52:14B-1 et seq.), in order to effectuate the pur-

poses of this subsection.

39:4-50.8. Conviction for violation of § 39:4-50; surcharge;

distribution

Upon a conviction of a violation of R.S. 39:4-

50, the court shall collect from the defendant a

surcharge of $100.00 in addition to and inde-

pendently of any fine imposed on that defendant.

The court shall forward the surcharge to the Di-

rector of the Division of Motor Vehicles who shall

deposit $95.00 of the surcharge into a “Drunk

Driving Enforcement Fund” (hereinafter referred

to as the “fund’’). This fund shall be used to

establish a Statewide drunk driving enforcement

program to be supervised by the director. The

remaining $5.00 of each surcharge shall be de-

posited by the director into a separate fund for

administrative expenses.

A municipality shall be entitled to periodic

grants from the “Drunk Driving Enforcement

Fund” in amounts representing its proportionate

contribution to the fund. A municipality shall be

deemed to have contributed to the fund the por-

tion of the surcharge allocated to the fund, col-

lected pursuant to this section if the violation of

R.S. 39:4-50 occurred within the municipality and

the arrest resulting in conviction was made by

the member of a municipal police force. The

grants from the fund shall be used by the mu-

nicipality to increase enforcement of R.S. 39:4-

12a

50 by subsidizing additional law enforcement pa-

trols and through other measures approved by

the director. The Division of State Police, inter-

state law enforcement agencies and county law

enforcement agencies shall be entitled to periodic

grants from the fund in amounts representing

their proportionate contribution to the fund. The

Division of State Police or county or interstate

law enforcement agency shall be deemed to have

contributed to the fund the portion of the sur-

charge allocated to the fund collected pursuant

to this section if the arrest resulting in a con-

viction was made by a member of the Division

of State Police or county or interstate law en-

forcement agency. The grants from the fund shall

be used by the Division of State Police or county

or interstate law enforcement agency to increase

enforcement of R.S. 39:4-50 by subsidizing ad-

ditional law enforcement patrols and through

other measures approved by the director.

The surcharge described herein shall not be

considered a fine, penalty or forfeiture to be dis-

tributed pursuant to R.S. 39:5-41.

The director shall promulgate rules and regu-

lations in order to effectuate the purposes of this

section.

13a

(1) from final judgments of the Superior Court

trial divisions, or the judges thereof sitting as

statutory agents; the Tax Court; and in summary

contempt proceedings in all trial courts except

municipal courts;

2:12-3. Certification of Final Judgments of the Appellate

Division

(a) Notice of Petition for Certification: Time

for Filing; Contents; Filing Fees. If certification

is sought to review a final judgment of the Ap-

pellate Division, the petitioner shall, within 20

days after its entry, serve a copy of a notice of

petition for certification upon all parties who may

be affected by the proceeding and shall file, to-

gether with the payment to each court of the

appropriate fee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 22A:2, the

original notice with the Clerk of the Appellate

Division and a copy thereof with the Clerk of the

Supreme Court.

3:23-1. Exclusive Method of Review

Except as provided by R. 2:2-3(b), review of a

judgment of conviction in a criminal action or

proceeding in a court of limited criminal juris-

diction shall be by appeal as provided by R. 3:23.

B. NEW JERSEY COURT RULES

2:2-3. Appeals to the Appellate Division from Final Judg-

ments, Decisions, Actions and from Rules; Tax Court

3:23-8. Hearing on Appeal

(a) Plenary Hearing; Hearing on Record; Correc-

tion or Supplementation of Record; Transcript for

Indigents. If a verbatim record or sound record-

ing was made pursuant to FR. 7:4-5 in the court

from which the appeal is taken, the original tran-

script thereof duly certified as correct shall be

filed by the clerk of the court below with the

county clerk, and a certified copy served on the

(a) As of Right. Except as otherwise provided

by R. 2:2-1(aX3) (final judgments appealable di-

rectly to the Supreme Court), appeals may be

taken to the Appellate Division as of right

l4a

prosecuting attorney by the clerk of the court

below within 20 days after the filing of the notice

of appeal or within such extension of time as the

court permits. In such cases the trial of the appeal

shall be heard de novo on the record unless it

shall appear that the rights of either party may

be prejudiced by a substantially unintelligible re-

cord or that the rights of defendant were prej-

udiced below in which event the court to which

the appeal has been taken may either reverse and

remand for a new trial or conduct a plenary trial

de novo without a jury. The Court shall provide

the municipal court with reasons for the remand.

The Court may also supplement the record and

admit additional testimony whenever (1) the mu-

nicipal court erred in excluding evidence offered

by the defendant, (2) the state offers rebuttal

evidence to discredit supplementary evidence ad-

mitted hereunder, or (3) the record being re-

viewed is partially unintelligible or defective. If

the appellant, upon application to the court

appealed to, is found to be indigent, the court

shall order the transcript of the proceedings be-

low furnished at the county’s expense if the

appeal involves violation of a statute and at the

municipality’s expense if the appeal involves vi-

olation of an ordinance. If no such record was

made in the court from which the appeal is taken,

the appeal shall operate as an application for a

plenary trial de novo without a jury in the court

to which the appeal is taken.

(e) Disposition by Superior Court, Law Division.

If the defendant is convicted, the court shall im-

pose a sentence as provided by law. If the

defendant is acquitted, the court shall order the

defendant discharged, the conviction in the court

15a

below set aside, and the return of all fines and

costs paid by the defendant. An appropriate judg-

ment shall be entered and a copy thereof trans-

mitted to the court below.

7:6-1. Complaint and Summons

(a) Form. In cases involving violations of stat-

utes or ordinances relating to the operation or

use of motor vehicles, hereinafter designated as

“traffic offenses,’’ the complaint and summons

shall be a uniform traffic ticket in the form pre-

scribed by the Administrative Director of the

Courts. On a complaint and summons for a non-

moving traffic offense, in lieu of the name of the

defendant it shall be sufficient to set forth the

license number of the vehicle involved, and it

shall be presumed that the owner of the vehicle

is the defendant charged with the violation.

(b) Issuance. The complaint may be made and

signed by a law enforcement officer, or by any

other person, but the summons shall be signed

and issued only by such officer, or the judge,

clerk or deputy clerk of the court in which the

complaint is, or is to be filed. R. 7:3 relating to

warrants and summons in respect of nonindict-

able offenses generally, shall be applicable to

cases involving a traffic offense, except as oth-

erwise herein provided.

*>_ * *

16a

C, NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

New Jersey Constitution (1947), Art I, para, 10

Rights of persons accused of crime

10. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall

have the right to a speedy and public trial by an

impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause

of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses

against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining

witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of

counsel in his defense.

17a

STATES THAT DO NOT RECOGNIZE A

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JURY TRIALS FOR FIRST

OFFENSE DRUNK DRIVING.

1. rida: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316,.193(2¥a) 2.a (West

Supp. 1988) (first offense driving under the influence sub-

Se de cae anal Ga. tan itn i nn ed Whir-

ley v. State, 450 So.2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1984) a oe

with driving with unlawful blood alcohol | has been

charged with a “petty offense’ and is not entitled to trial

by jury under Federal or State Constitutions). But see State

v. Heidrich, 490 So.2d 1306 (Fla. App. 1986) (Court of

Appeals calling into question the continued vitality of

Whirley, supra, in light of subsequent legislative action).

2. Lowisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:98.B (West 1986)

(authorized maximum period of six months’ imprisonment

for first offense driving while intoxicated); City of Monroe

v. Withite, 255 La. 838, 233 So.2d 535, 536, cert. denied

400 U.S. 910 (1970) (defendant charged with driving au-

tomobile under the influence of alcohol not entitled to jury

since offense was ‘‘petty’’); State v. Landry, 463 So.2d 761

(La. App. 1985), cert. denied 464 So.2d 1373 (La. 1985);

Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F, 2d 1201 (5th C. 1988) (en bane)

(where defendant's sentencing exposure was limited to six

months and $500, defendant not entitled to trial by jury).

3. Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann, § 484,3792(1XaX2)

(Supp. 1988) (first offender drunk driver subject to six

months’ imprisonment); Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mu-

nicipal Court, 103 Nev, 135, 748 P.2d 494 (1987), cert

granted, 108 §.Ct, 2843 (1988).

4. New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 265:82-b

(Supp. 1981) (no authorized period of imprisonment); State

v. Morril, 123 N.H. 707, 465 A.2d 882, 886 (N.H. 1983)

(so long as a fine of no more than $500 may be levied

against first offense drunk driver, no right to trial by jury).

18a

5. New Mewico: N.M. . Ann, § 66-8-102(D) (Supp.

1988) (imprisonment of A. a. than ninety days); Ham-

ilton v. Walker, 65 N.M. 470, 340 P.2d ye (1959) (no

constitutional Rhy ay Fy drunk driving prose-

cution).

6. New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann, § 39:4-50(aX1) (West 1973

& Supp. 1988) (first offenders subject to potential impris-

onment of thirty days); State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212,

102 A, 433 (BE, & A. 1917) (no right to trial by jury); State

v. Linnehan, 197 N.J. Super. 41, 484 A.2d 34 (App. Div,

1984), certif, denied 99 N.J. 236, 491 A.2d 723 (1985);

State v. Zoppi, 196 N.J. Super. 596, 483 A.2d 844 (Law

Div. 1984).

i)

19a

APPENDIX C

STATES IN WHICH THE MAXIMUM AUTHORIZED

PERIOD OF CON iT FOR FIRST OFFENSE

DRUNK DRIVING EXCEEDS THE BALDWIN

. Alabama: Ala. Code § 32-5A-191(c) (1983 & Supp. 1987)

(imprisonment in county or municipal jail for not more

Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 28.35.030(b) (1984) (drunk driv-

ing is a Class A misdemeanor); Alaska Stat. §

12.55.135(a) (1984) (class A misdemeanor punishable

by a term of imprisonment not to exceed one year).

. Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann, § 5-65-103 (1987); Ark. Stat.

Ann, § 5-65-111(a) (1987) (imprisonment not to exceed

one year). et a | |

Colorado: Colo, Rev, Stat. § 42-4-1202(1\(a), (b),-(1.5Xa),

~ (4XaXT) (1984) (punishment in the county jail for not

more than one year).

' ia: Ga. Code Ann, § 40-6-391(c 1B) (1985 &

Supp. 1988) (imprisonment for not more than one year).

. TUinois: I. Ann, Stat. Ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501 (4) (ec)

(1988-1989 Supp.) (drunk driving is a Class A misde-

meanor); Ill. Ann, Stat. Ch. 38, § 1005-1, 1005-8-3

(1983) (range of appropriate dispositions), _

Indiana: Ind, Code Ann. § 9-11-2-2 (Burns 1988 Supp.)

(drunk driving is a Class A misdemeanor); § 35-50-3-

2 (1985) (Class A misdemeanor punishable by impris-

onment of not more than one year).

Towa: lowa Code Ann. § 321J.2(2Xa) (West Supp. 1988)

(DWI is a Serious Misdemeanor); lowa Code Ann. §

903.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988) (punishable by im-

prisonment of not more than one year).

. Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 1312-B(2) (Supp.

1987) (Class D crime requiring incarceration of not less

than forty-eight consecutive hours); Me. Rev. Stat.

Ann. tit. 17A, § 1252 (24D 1964 & Supp. 1987) (im-

prisonment of up to one year prescribed for Class D

10. Maryland: Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 21-902(a) (1987)

(drunk driving); § 27-101(h\)) (first offense drunk driv-

ing subject to imprisonment of not more than one

year).

11, Massachusetts; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, §

24(1XaX1) (West 1985) (first offense drunk driving pun-

ishable by imprisonment of not more than two years).

12. New York: N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §

1192(2),(3),(5) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988) (drunk

driving subject to imprisonment of not more than one

year).

13. Oklahoma: Okla, Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 11-902(c) (West

1988) (incarceration in county jail for not more than

la. ¢ : Or. Rev. Stat. § 813.010(8) (1985) (driving

> tatentented to 0 Clase A mtademesnats Ge. Rev.

Stet § 161.615 (1985) (Class A misdemeanors -punish-

able by maximum term of one year impris

15. Pennsylvania: 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9781(eX1)

(1988 bey (first offense driving while intoxicated is

16. Rhode Islan : RAL Gen. Laws § 31-27-2(dX1) (Supp.

| offender drunk driver may be imprisoned

Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 32-23-2 (1984

p. 1988) (first offense driving while intoxicated

lags 1 misdemeanor); 8.D. Codified Laws Ann.

§ * 29-6-2 (1988) (Class 1 misdemeanor punishable by

imprisonment of up to one year).

18. Ten) : Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-403(aX1) (1980 &

Supp. 987) (first offenders subject to imprisonment

in county jail for up to eleven months and twenty-nine

days),

2la

19, Tewas: Tex. Rev. Civ, Stat. Ann. art, 67011-1 (Vernon

Supp. 1988) (first offenders subject to confinement in

county jail for not more than two years).

20. Vermont; Vt. Stat. Ann, tit. 23, § 1210 (1987) (im-

prisonment of up to one year).

21. 7 inia: Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-270 (1988) (driving

intoxicated is a Class one misdemeanor); Va.

Code Ann, § 18.2-11 (Class one misdemeanor punish-

able by imprisonment in county jail for up to twelve

months).

22. Washington: § 46.61.515(1) (1987) (first offense driving

while intoxicated subject to imprisonment of up to one

year).

‘(Quawuosudut sapnyo

-ul uOoT}oURS ajqissod ay} JaAqueyM [ely Aant

saaquesend UOTNIYSUOD 32787) (9861 OYFPT) 196

‘266 PZ d OGL ‘ZE CUBPL ZII “woruuag ~@ ams

(Kant Aq peur} 07 Wy sey pesseyo

os JUBpuayap puke asuazjo ,snoles,, A[feuoKN}

-jsuoo st aouangul sapun Suraup) (Gg6T “*eH)

E88 Pzd FOL ‘6S “MPH 89 ‘MMZ.O @ 71S

(6161

9) PL ‘ZL PZV 10h ‘74n0D Aprungy “a spua

may osye aeg (seumlso ,snowiaes,, pue ,,Ajyed,,

usemjeq oul] SuIpiAIp pexy ey} St syjuoU

XIs UBYy} et0UL JOJ UOT}BI90IBIUl jenuajod)

(GL6I “1?C) OST ‘LEI Pa Vv Ist ‘aIDIS “a SOULOYL

‘(00°661$

jo ouy ® sl Aypeued wnuixew alaym suoty

-oe eurumtaa ut Aunt Aq petsy 09 W4St1 OU) (8861

‘ddng 389M) (e)qzg-PS § “UU “JeIg “Ue “UUOD

(Gg61 382M) 689 § PPOD feUag “TBD ‘CuRq

ua) (E261 TO) 6ZE “IGA TRO OIL “LZ Ped

umn

e ‘wi a)

arqeoydde you Aunt

(9961) 98% “28h ‘6Lb Ped OIF “LE MV 001

‘Aqunog wurg fo jane smsadngy “a samanywoy

aad

Se

oyepl “9

wusOse) S

‘AUNOD YAM Puy sua] ‘jAn0y aoysNe ‘a sou

mop (Aant & a10jaq MauP patsy aq ysnUI szIN0D

Ayo puke synod yLYsIP wo sfeadde\X)g6]

‘WOW) LOL ‘9OL P2'd 9EL ‘aurmfiny a ang ON BuRWUOW “I

‘(Sanqio ssejo

yyanoy pue paryy ur Aanf Aq pets 07 yYysU A109M)

“23S ynq ‘saseo soueUIpso jediounu ut Aanf Aq

(B14) 0} 74S feEUOTNAYSUOD OU) (QURq Ua) (TLET

OW) 986 ‘E86 PZ M’'S LIP ‘o4btNy “a 9709 “Jou xa

ams ‘fo mg (,Aanl Aq peta, 07 ya Ar0ynqWR4s

8 B pey sey ased JOUROWEpsIUI eB Ul JUBpUazEp

oy} “jSB2] 3 OLET outs,,) (oueq uUeXL96T

‘OW) 09 ‘SS PZM'S BIb ‘worunQoW a amg ON LUNOssIW “ZI

‘(paarem asimia

“YjO Jou pue pepuewep Ajai ueym yey Aunt

e—sased ydwiaqu0d ul ydaoxe—jzinood Ajunod ul

Sorjied [fe 0) sps0s0e ¢gE-G-6 “99S apod iddissis

“SIN) (QLET “SSIA) STP PZOS ZEE ‘aMIg “a y4m]D ON iddississtw [1

‘(Ayaesd Jo sso|

“paedei ‘saseo [ye ut pets} Aunt 07 yySta suayuod

eee

UOIININSUOD 9781S) (L961 “UUIW) SZB PZ M'N

SSI “GLZ “UUIW BLZ ‘wOsuajaqg “A U0S19}0d ON ByosoUUIW “Ol

‘(suorlnoesoid

feurwmiis jje ut Aanf Aq peiay 04 YH saaquesend

UOIINSUOD) (ZBI) L9b PZ “M'N EE ‘LOS “ddy

WI 9TT ‘“ayowmoysg a aydoag ‘(sours 04 [oYyoo

fe Suriptaoid jo souvawiepsiul 403 uoMNnoesosd

uy petsy Aunt 04 34H SurziudosasXgc61) F2z

PZ M'N 9S ‘SLE “WIN SEE ‘zZINYosup a ajdoag ON uRsIyIW 6

24a

‘(ps6 “ddy 39 “Ay)

6EI ‘SEI PZ M'S 089 “YIPamUoMWUWOD ‘a aU04D

(sjN0d YoLASIP puw yNdI19 ayy Ul SUONNIaSOId

Suipnjout ‘suoynsesosd feurunso [ye ur Aunt Aq

[Blu 0) paynua syuepuazap) (GRET [I449W-Sqqog

/PUPUANXDOLS V6z § “UUy “IG “‘Aoy “Ay ON Ayonquay *g

‘(ps6 “ddy ‘uey)

PIS ‘SIS PZd 089 ‘Szb paddy ‘uvy 6 ‘uosyouT

‘a ang (seseo uonoeajul dyes) pur sOUROUI

-epsim ut yey Aunf puewap Aew yuepuasap)

(1861 “ddng) pore-zz § “UUy ‘JIC ‘URY ON sesuvy */

27a

SIU pue SaTUO[ey YIOG JO} Papsoov0B [BL} Aant

0} 14S ‘eIULsuIA SAM JO SJANOd yedioruNUI Ul)

(P86 “FA “M) OTL P2A'S HZE “A9YDW @ 10S

‘(asuayjo But

-Alup yunip souvawapsiu Surfs} Jo asodind 40}

jeuornyrysuos anoy Jo Aunt) (O86 YBIN) SZL-PSL

‘Z2L Ped 119 ‘NPMN “@ aDIG (S}NOD a8eq

ay} jo aonsne pue Aj Ul Saseo [BUILD Ul

papiaoid st anoy yo Aunt e ‘asuagyo yo Ayaesd uo

Surpuadep saoanf yo saquinu Jessa] & 40 7YSIe

‘QAjaM} 0} SJUBPUaJep apWIQUA S}INOD 4OLIYSIP

ul peyertul saseo feurutd) (8261 YeI) E8ZI

P2'd SLG “ou ‘huaymy sam “a Ang ayv'T NPS

‘(uotnopsunt sazes{sLdeU UIYIM SASUaszO [[e OF

saydde Aanf Aq peta 07 34H Aroynyeys 9789S)

(9861) I9TT “S'N QLP paruap 7499 “CAL Yh) SLD

“PLY ‘ZLP PZ A OBL ‘Sutyuar “a saqMIS paqu/)

(OOT$ Speeoxe paajoaut Aypeued ayy Yyorym Ul

saseo jye ut Aunt Aq [etsy 07 7yHt4 sey pasnooe)

(L861 e3eqg) LI'Sh6Z § “UUY epoD “AY O14O

‘(poarem etsy Aunt

ssajun—Auojay 10 sourawapsiu seyjyeym—Aanl

Aq pay aq ysnul yous Jo sansst [[%) 0-91-62

§ “(Ayind you jo vad e uodn sasue ,.joRy JO

anssi,, Ue) (PL61) 10-91-62 § 9POD “WED “'N

‘(jeedde uo Aanf yyim oaou ap [ely papsojye

sjuepuajap yng ‘Aunf ynoyym pata Ajpertut—sio

-ugawapsiu AyjW0d uaAa—SOUBAWApsIw) (PL61)

O9II "S'N bIb paruap 7199 (7161) OSL PZ “A'S

L81 001 ‘ON 18% So pJfr “(IL6L “O'N) 261

‘681 PZ A'S SBI ‘PL “ON 082 ‘wospnyy “a ang

‘(saouRUIpsO aBETILA

io Ayo Japun Zuisue saseo euIWILID pue suOty

-seagul ayes) ydeoxe sasvo [je ut Aunt 04 4Yst

Sps0ve YoIyM “9ES-bZ § “IIS “APY “GaN Jepun

anf Aq [ety 0) peynue Suralp yunsp asuajjo

ySaly YM pesaeyo yuepuajep) (661 “4°N) SI

‘ZI PZ M'N $82 ‘ELS “G9N FOZ ‘72404 “@ AIDS

‘(syquow xis 03 dn Aq

aiqeystund suouvawapsiu 12A0 uoNatpstun{ aary

synod aarysnf) (9861 “I4OW) E8Z “18Z PZ'd OZL

ON

ON

ON

ON

ON

ON

ON

BIULSIIA ISAM “0Z

yet) “6

Bulorey) YINOS ‘ST

oro “LI

BIOYe YON “9T

BUI[OIBD YON “ST

BYySBIGON “PT

aH