Amicus Curiae Brief — Blanton v. North Las Vegas

Supreme Court brief1989

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

* i.

No. 87-1437

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

>_>

MELVIN R. BLANTON and MARK D. FRALEY,

Petitioners,

—

CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, NEVADA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AND

THE ACLU OF NEVADA IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS

DAN C. BOWEN

(Counsel of Record)

Lionel Sawyer & Collins

50 West Liberty Street

P.O. Box 2610

Reno, Nevada 89505

(702) 788-8666

JOHN A. POWELL

JACQUELINE A. BERRIEN

American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation

132 West 43 Street

New York, New York 10036

(212) 944-9800

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .

INTEREST OF AMICI. .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . .

AN INDIVIDUAL ACCUSED OF A

SERIOUS CRIMINAL OFFENSE IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED

THE RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY A

11.

CONCLUSION .

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont. )

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

OF ALCOHOL IS A SERIOUS

CRIMINAL OFFENSE IN NEVADA,

AND THERE IS NO

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DENIAL

OF PETITIONERS' FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY A JURY

ON THESE CHARGES. ..... 33

A. Applying The Standards

Articulated In The

Decisions Of This Court,

It Is Clear That The

Offense Of Driving

While Under The

Influence of Alcohol Is

A Serious Offense In

DUN « 6 0 #2 @ % 6 33

B. Petitioners' Interests

Are Disserved By The

State Of Nevada's

Statutory Preclusion Of

Jury Trials For Indi-

viduals Accused Of DUI,

And There Are No State

Interests Of Constitu-

tional Magnitude Served

By The Deprivations Of

The Jury Trial Right

Which Occurred In This

Case. > ee Be Ssh} 50

* * * * * * * > * * * * > * 62

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Baker v. City of Fairbanks,

471 P.2d 386, 395, 401 (Alaska 1970) . . 29

Baldwin v. New York,

399 U.S. 66, 72 (197)

776 24 282, 295 (Nev. 1987)

7 9. F. COMET .

. . 5. Ohio 1976)

i 157 1

Bronson v. Swinney,

648 F.Supp. 1094 (D.Nev. 1986)

Bruce v. State,

614 P. 2d 813, 815

126 Ariz. 271, 273 (1980)

Callan v. Wilson,

127 U.S. 540 (18666) 11,

’

Cheff v. Schnackenberg

384 U.S. 373 (19866))))

iii

—

38, 48,

50, 51

418 U.S. 506 (1974) ;

District of Columbia v. Clawans,

00 U.S. 617 (1937) ...

District of Columbia v. colts,

13,

82 U.S. 63 (1930) ....

Duncan v. Louisiana

391 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968)

Dyke v. Taylor Implement gg.,

391 U.S. 216, (1968) ...

395 U.S. 147 (1868)

356 U.S. 165, 183 n.14 (1958)

Landry v. Hoepfner

840 F. zd 1201, 1213 n.25

(Sth Cir. 1988) .

427 U.S. 618, (1976) . 2 .

re '

424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) .

139 U.S. 621 (1891) ...,

-41, 43-47,

32, 42

mut) Vea

’

42 Cal.App. 3d Supp. 4, 8 n.6,

Patton v. United States,

281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) . - - 13

116 Cal.Rptr. 795 (cal. Super. 1974) 32

’

Schick v. United States

195 U.S. 65 (1904) .....

459 U.S. 553, 558-59 (1983) ..

Se Be 794, (S.D. 1980)

ow x eee r

United States v. Barnett,

376 U.S. 681, 692-700 (1964) . .

25 (1981) .

652 F.2d 23,

’

United States v. Sanchez-Mesa

547 F. 2d 461 (9th Cir. 1976)

United States v. Stewart,

568 F. 2d 501 (6th Cir. 1978) . .

United States v. Woods,

450 F. Supp. 1335 (D. Md. 1978)

399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970) 9,

18, 20

o „ „ „ AF

20,

Constitutions and Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.3792

(1983) > > * > . * * > * * * * 38, 39, 49

Nev. Rev. Stat. 484.3794 386, 37

1983 Nev. Stat. 1068-72 .... 37

Nevada Revised Statutes §484.3792

(1983) >. >. > > > > > * >. * — — > >. — >. > 36

U * 8 * Const * Amend * VI * * * * * * * * > 8

OE „„ „„ „ 0

Legislative Materials

Legislative Commission of the Legislative

Counsel Bureau of the State of Nevada,

Driving While Intoxicated, Bull.No. 83-7

at 1 (1982) * > > > > > > > 35, 41

Other Authorities

Judges, Reno Gazette-Journal,

Feb. 17, 1983 > >. > >. > * — > * > 40, 54

H. Kalven & H. Zeisel,

The American Jury 15 (1966) 9, 55, 59

— tea ie

Kimble, George Ceccarelli On Drunk Drivers: |

“Let the Sentence Fit the Crime", The

Nevada Highway Patrolman, vol. III, no. 1,

(Jan. 1983) * * * > * >. > >. * * * >. 40, 56

The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nine-

teenth Century,

74 Yale L. J. 170, 171-72 (19643) 10

Morrison,

on DUI Deaths, Reno Gazzette-Journal,

November 22, 1987 >. > „ > * > >. > 7 >. > 35

Phillis,

Punch, Reno Gazzette-Journal, April 18,

1988 > >. >. >. o > — > >. * * * * > > 35, 54

vii

then RAEI ES Vai Bere DoE at sey ast o

INTEREST OF MMI

The American Civil Liberties Union

("ACLU") is a nationwide, non-partisan

organization of over 250,000 members dedi-

cated to defending the Bill of Rights and

advancing the civil rights and individual

liberties of the people of the United

States. The American Civil Liberties Union

of Nevada is one of the ACLU's state

affiliates.

This case presents the question

whether the constitutional protection of a

trial by jury should be afforded to indi-

viduals accused of driving while under the

influence of alcohol, who are facing

serious deprivations of liberty and

property, including incarceration and

pursuant to Rule 36.2 of the Rules of this

Court, letters of consent from the parties have

been filed with the Clerk of the Court.

monetary sanctions. Amici believe that

persons accused of serious criminal

offenses possess a fundamental consti-

tutional right to be tried by a jury, and

that the decisions of this Court support

the recognition of this right in the

instant case. Accordingly, we submit this

brief in support of Petitioners, and we

urge the Court to reverse the decision of

the court below.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE2/

Petitioner Melvin R. Blanton was

accused of driving while under the influ-

ence of alcohol ("DUI"). Following the

denial of his request for jury trial of the

charges against him, Petitioner filed a

petition for writ of mandamus. The Eighth

Judicial District Court of Nevada denied

Blanton's petition for writ of mandamus,

and he appealed to the Nevada Supreme

court. Petitioner Mark D. Fraley, like

Blanton, was charged with DUI, but

following the denial of his motion for jury

trial he pled guilty. Fraley was sentenced

to a period of incarceration and was

2/ amici adopt the Statement of the Case

set forth in Petitioner's Brief, but here

highlight the facts most relevant to the

argument presented infra.

* See generally Joint Appendix (hereafter

"J.A.") at 6, 13-15, 20-23.

ordered to pay a fine by the North Las

Vegas Municipal Court.4/ Fraley

subsequently challenged his conviction on

the ground that the denial of a jury trial

violated his federal constitutional rights.

Fraley's appeal to the Eighth Judicial

District Court was successful, and his case

was remanded to the municipal court, with

instructions to conduct a jury trial.

The City of North Las Vegas, Nevada

appealed the District Court's decision,

however, and the Nevada Supreme Court

granted the City’s petition for review. 2&/

= Nevada Supreme court summarily rejected

petitioners' argument that the denial of

jury trials on their DUI charges violated

4/ J.A. at 1.

S/ J.A. at 25-27.

8 J. A. at 28-52, 101.

their constitutional rights and concluded

that since state law "provide[d] a penalty

of .. . six months imprisonment [or less]

for a first-time DUI offense, there is no

constitutional right to a trial by jury."

Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 748 P.2d 292,

299 (Nev. 1987). This Court granted

certiorari on June 20, 1988.2/

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The right to jury trial is a funda-

mental constitutional right which extends

to all persons accused of committing seri-

ous crimes. The offense of driving while

under the influence of alcohol is a serious

crime in Nevada and thus, such cases must

be tried by jury upon the demand of the

accused in order to meet the requirements

J. A. at 102-03.

of the United States Constitution. The

decisions of this Court provide that: (1)

an individual accused of a serious criminal

offense must be afforded the opportunity to

be tried by a jury; (2) where the jury

trial right is not statutorily mandated,

the assessment of the seriousness of the

offense, and hence, the determination

whether a specific offense must be tried by

jury upon the defendant's demand, must be

conducted by the courts on a case-by-case

basis; and (3) to determine whether an

offense is "serious," a court must consider

the maximum authorized period of imprison-

ment, along with a number of other factors

including the collateral consequences

accompanying the conviction, the intrinsic

nature of, and the societal condemnation

attendant to, the particular offense, as

reflected in the nature and type of sanc-

tions imposed upon conviction.

This Court has recognized that the

length of the maximum statutorily author-

ized sentence is not the sole determinant

of the seriousness of an offense for pur-

poses of deciding whether a state may

avoid the constitutional criminal jury

trial requirement. Nevertheless, the

Court below relied exclusively upon the

length of sentence to determine whether

Petitioners were entitled to a jury trial.

Under the tests articulated by this Court,

the offense of driving while under the in-

fluence of alcohol is a serious offense in

Nevada. Thus, the decision nolo, which

deprived petitioners of the jury trials

they requested, contravenes the require-

ments of the United States Constitution and

should be reversed by this Court.

I. AN INDIVIDUAL ACCUSED OF A SERIOUS

CRIMINAL OFFENSE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY

GUARANTEED THE RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY A

JURY.

The Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution guarantees that "in all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right toa ... trial by an

impartial jury."8/ This Court has recog-

nized that "(t)he right to jury trial in

criminal cases...{is] fundamental to our

system of justice." Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968). The criminal

defendant's right to be tried by a jury

upon demand is significant because it

8/ U.S. Const. Amend. VI. See also U.S. Const.

Art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all

Crimes...shall be by Jury.“).

prevent (s] the possibility of

oppression by the Government; the

jury interposes between the ac-

cused and his accuser the judg-

ment of laymen who are

less likely to function or appear

as but another arm of the

Government that has proceeded

against hin.

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72

(1970). This nation has "a long tradition

[of] attaching great importance to the

concept of relying on a body of one's peers

to determine guilt or innocence as a safe-

guard against arbitrary law enforcement, "2/

and this tradition is clearly reflected in

the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.22/

2/ Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87

(1970).

10% some commentators have described the

right to trial by jury in criminal cases as

“enshrined” in the Sixth Amendment. H.

Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 15

(1966). Another commentator has ~oted that

“(ejnthusiasm for the jury“ predated the

ratification of the Sixth Amendment, as

demonstrated by the remark of one observer

in 1788 that the “jury was ‘adapted to the

(continued...)

Accordingly, this Court has recognized that

the right to criminal jury trial, which is

„basic in our system of jurisprudence! /

and essential to a fair trial, '"22/

extends to defendants in the state courts

as well as in the federal courts, and is

“protected against" incursions by the state

and federal governments. 391 U.S. at 148-

49.

On its face, the Sixth Amendment does

not admit any exception for “petty”

2 (. .. continued)

investigation of truth beyond any other

[system] the world can produce. Note,

teenth Century, 74 Yale L.J. 170, 171-72

(1964) (quoting Gerry,

New Constitution

(1788), reprinted in 2

714, 720 (Scott ed. 1894)).

2 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 149

(quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273

(1948)).

12 puncan, id., (quoting Gideon x.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963)).

. dene > ee * .

;

crimes.43/ Nevertheless the Court has

recognized an exception for a category of

offenses that are, on the basis of several

criteria, deemed petty. See Baldwin v. New

York, 399 U.S. at 71-72. In such cases, a

jury trial is not constitutionally

required.

This Court first discussed the issue

of the right to jury trial for minor

offenses in Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540

(1888). There the Court vacated a police

court conviction of conspiracy which

carried a sentence of a $25 fine or thirty

days in jail. In Callan, the Court

13/ Indeed, Justices Black and Douglas were of the

view that the Sixth Amendment ard Article III,

Section 2, made no distinction between "petty" and

"serious" crimes. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.

66, 69. As Justice White noted in Baldwin, the

legal distinction may be unpersuasive to the ac-

cused since "the prospect of for how-

ever short a time will seldom be viewed by the

accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter." Id. at

71.

observed, in dictum, that there was a

class of offenses “not of the class or

grade triable at common law by a jury"

that could be considered “petty” and thus,

could be tried without a jury in federal

court. However, the Court concluded that

conspiracy was an offense indictable at

common law, and thus, the right to jury

trial could not be bypassed in such cases.

127 U.S. at 555.44/ Eventually, the Court

was squarely presented with the issue of

whether the denial of a jury trial for

persons accused of offenses characterized

as “petty” constituted a violation of the

Sixth Amendment. See District of Columbia

v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) .22/

Even with the exception for petty

offenses, this Court has recognized that

"(tjrial by jury has been established by

the Constitution as the 'normal and...

preferable mode of disposing of issues ot

fact in criminal cases. / his Court

has never rejected the premise that "the

right of the accused to a trial by. .

jury [must] be jealously preserved, "17/

and, for the reasons set forth more fully

infra, the case now before the Court is one

15/ In dicta, the Court addressed the issue in

several cases between 1888 and 1937. See Natal v.

State of Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Schick v.

United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); District of

Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).

16/ , 380 U.S. 24, 35

Singer v. United States

(1965), (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.

276, 312 (1930)).

17/ patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312

(1930).

which demands and deserves this Court's

intervention to preserve this important

constitutional right.

The decisions of this Court have

provided useful guidance for determining

whether an offense is petty or serious for

the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. This

Court has developed a three-part test for

evaluating the severity of an offense.

The essential elements of that structure

include consideration of: (1) whether a

crime is serious, either intrinsically or

as a result of the gravity ff potential

penalties; (2) whether an intrinsically

serious crime has been or could be

classified as petty by mere reduction of

the sentence imposed; and (3) whether an

intrinsically petty crime has developed

into a serious one due to an escalation of

the authorized penalties. Courts, not

legislators or prosecutors, are the

accepted and proper arbiters of whether the

Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial for

any given offense. Courts are vested with

the constitutional task of assessing

whether a crime is serious or petty. As

stated by the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana:

Of course the boundaries of the

petty offense category have

always been ill-defined, if not

ambulatory. In the absence of an

explicit constitutional

provision the definitional task

necessarily falls on the courts,

which must either pass upon the

validity of legislative attempts

to identify those petty offenses

which are exempt from jury trial

or, where the legislature has not

addressed itself to the problen,

themselves face the question in

the first instance.

391 U.S. at 160. As the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has observed, in the

absence of judicial action, "the

constitutional right to a jury trial would

exist only at the sufferance of the

legislative branch." United States v.

Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 25 (1981).

The evaluation of whether the offense

is intrinsically serious requires consider-

ation of three factors: (1) whether the

crime is indictable at common law; (2)

whether the offense is malum in se; and (3)

whether the offense involves moral delin-

quency or turpitude. Crimes indictable at

common law are uniformly regarded as

serious, despite the insignificance of the

penalty attached. See, e.g., Callan v.

Wilson, 127 U.S. at 555-557 (conspiracy

held to be a serious offense despite

assessed sentence of thirty days in

prison). Crimes mala in se are similarly

deemed serious despite relatively brief

authorized sentences to be imposed upon a

finding of violation of the relevant

law. 10 See, e.g., District of Columbia v.

Colts, 282 U.S. at 73-74 (reckless driving

is malum in se and thus requires jury trial

notwithstanding penalty limited to $300

fine or ninety days imprisonment). Cf.

District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.

at 625 (holding that license violation was

a morally inoffensive mala prohibita

offense, and thus was not triable by

If the offense is not, by its nature,

serious, then this Court instructs that the

next consideration is whether the sentence

imposed is sufficiently serious to elevate

the offense from the “petty” to "serious"

category. In Schick v. United States, this

Court indicated that a crime petty by

nature could rise to the level of "serious"

solely on the basis of the sentence

imposed. 195 U.S. at 67-68. That view was

reaffirmed in District of Columbia x.

Clawans:

[This Court has refused to

foreclose consideration of the

severity of the penalty as an

element to be considered in

determining whether a statutory

offense, in other respects

trivial and not a crime at common

law, must be deemed so serious as

to be comparable with common law

crimes, and thus to entitle the

accused to the benefit of a jury

trial prescribed by the Consti-

tution.

300 U.S. at 625.

In a spate of decisions between 1966

and 1970, a number of which concerned

sanctions for criminal contempt, the Court

refined and elaborated upon the aforemen-

tioned analysis without departing from the

basic principies. The analysis of criminal

contempt proceeded along the conventional

lines. The Court inquired whether contempt

was by its nature serious, and if not,

whether the penalty authorized was suffi-

ciently long to make it so.

In Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S.

373 (1966), the Court affirmed that cri-

minal contempt is not a crime which is per

se serious. "[(C)riminal contempt, intrin-

sically and aside from the particular

penalty imposed [is] not deemed a serious

offense requiring the protection of the

constitutional guarantees of the right to

jury trial." Id. at 378-80.22/ However,

even criminal contempt is no longer viewed

as petty if it carries a potential penalty

of more than six months. Bloom v.

Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). See also

Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216

(1968).

In Duncan v. Louisiana, this Court

elaborated upon the significance of the

maximum authorized sentence (as contrasted

with the sentence actually imposed or

served) as a relevant criterion for

establishing the severity of an offense. 22/

42/ cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U

(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in a ont *

dissenting in part) ("In Clawans, the Court held

the severity of punishment was not determinative

when the offense by its own nature is not

considered grave.... {In Callan v. Wilson, 127

U.S. 540, 556 Schick YX. United States

65], this Court noted the nature —

offense and the severity of punishment are

distinct considerations.") — aaah.

20/ See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.

In Duncan, the defendant was sentenced to

60 days imprisonment for "simple battery,"

but imprisonment for up to two years was

authorized by the applicable statute. This

Court found that the conviction violated

the Constitution, and held that "the

penalty authorized for a particular crime

. .. may in itself, if serious enough,

subject the trial to the mandates of the

Sixth Amendment."21/ The court added that

"“(cjrimes carrying possible penalties up to

six months do not require a jury trial if

they otherwise qualify as petty offenses."

Id. at 159 (emphasis supplied)

Significantly, though, Duncan does not

identify the severity of sentence as the

sole factor for assessing the seriousness

of an offense, and the concomitant trial

21/ puncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 159.

procedures to be extended to persons

charged with the offense. "While this

Court has said that the most significant

index to the seriousness of an offense if

the degree of penalty that attaches ...

this is not alone determinative .... [T]he

‘apportioned punishment lat common law) was

both a consequence of the ... quality of

the misconduct and an index of the commun-

ity's moral judgment upon it.“ Williams

Vv. Florida, 399 U.S. at 121 n.7 (Harlan,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (1970) (quoting Frankfurter &

Corcoron, Petty Federal Offenses and the

Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,

39 Harv. L.Rev. 917, 980 (1926)) (emphasis

supplied).

While Duncan held that in some cases

"the length of the authorized prison term

or the seriousness of other punishment is

enough in itself to require a jury

trial,"22/ it does not affect the corollary

principle that even offenses bearing

shorter potential terms of imprisonment may

also be serious crimes, thereby requiring

the attendant procedural guarantees

extended to persons accused of committing

them. See also, Frank v. United States,

395 U.S. 147 (1969); Baldwin v. New York,

399 U.S. 66 (1970).

Baldwin v. New York, id., held that

any crime carrying a maximum authorized

sentence of more than six months is

necessarily serious. This bright-line

standard for assessing the severity of an

offense was first suggested in Cheff v.

Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, where this

Court, relying upon its supervises: y power,

22/ 391 U.S. at 161.

imposed a six-month limit on sentences

imposed by federal courts in contempt pro-

ceedings. In Baldwin v. New York, the

Court squarely addressed the issue,

holding that "no offense can be deemed

petty for purposes of the right to trial

by jury where imprisonment for more than

six months is authorized." 399 U.S. at 69

(emphasis supplied).

This Court has repeatedly adhered to

the basic principle that the Sixth Amend-

ment assessment of the seriousness of a

crime depends upon its intrinsic nature as

well as the severity of the maximum

authorized penalty. Finally, a crime

23/ In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506

(1974), the Court held that petty contempt could be

serious by nature may not be made petty

merely by reducing the maximum authorized

absent legislative

422 U.S. at 476 (emphasis supplied)

Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, (

held Massachusetts’ two-tier system

sentence,24/ and a crime petty by nature

could be made serious by increasing the

maximum sentence.22/ Thus, it is clear

that the severity of a crime depends upon

both the nature of the offense and the

penalty imposed.

The most significant doctrinal

development in the judicial process of

establishing the boundaries required by

Duncan has been the evolution of objective

standards for evaluating the severity of an

offense. This Court suggested in Baldwin

that in deciding whether an offense is

"petty" or serious,“ courts should look

to objective criteria reflecting the

24/ cf. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. at 76 n.2

(Black, J., concurring) (“ben the sanction lin-

posed against an individual] bem all the indicia

of a criminal punishment, a jury trial cannot be

denied by labeling the punishment 'petty.'").

22/ See supra note 23.

seriousness with which society regards the

offense. Baldwin also indicates that the

maximum authorized length of imprisonment

is a relevant objective criterion. How-

ever, the maximum authorized sentence is

but one objective criterion, and the

courts must look to all the relevant

criteria in each particular case. The

additional measures of the severity of a

crime, as is clear from the Court's opin-

ions dating back to 1888, are based upon

four factors: historical and federal

practices, collateral consequences, and

contemporary responses to criminal acts.

An example of the importance of

historical practice is the tradition of

punishment for contempt of court. The fact

that for centuries contempt has been sum-

marily punished weighed heavily in the

Court's conclusion that contempt was not

intrinsically serious. See Green v. United

States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 n.14 (1958);

United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681,

692-700 (1964). See also District of

Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625-26

(discussing standards prevailing at time of

adoption of Constitution as a guidepost for

the Sixth Amendment assessment of the

seriousness of an offense).

Similarly, the federal practice of

defining petty offenses as the category of

offenses punishable by not more than six

months imprisonment and a $500 fine in-

fluenced this Court's decision that the

right to jury trial must be extended to a

person accused of committing crime for

which the authorized sentence exceeded six

months. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.

at 161.

Another important consideration is

whether serious collateral consequences

attend conviction for the offense. In

Baldwin, Justice White examined the col-

lateral consequences in assessing the

gravity of conviction for felonies and

misdemeanors and in establishing "that

some misdemeanors are also serious

offenses."28/ Lower federal courts2// and

state courts28/ have also considered the

collateral consequences in assessing the

26/ 399 U.S. at 70. See generally id. at 69 n.8;