Petitioners Brief — Blanton v. North Las Vegas

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No. 87-1437

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

MELVIN R. BLANTON,

MARK D. FRALEY,

Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS,

NEVADA

Respondent.

ee -

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court

of the State of Nevada

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

Graves, Leavitt & Kocu

JOHN J. Graves, JrR., Esa.

601 South Sixth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 385-7277

Counsel for Petitioner

Melvin Ray Blanton

Joun G. Watkins, Eso.

333 North Rancho Road,

#633

Las Vegas, Nevada 89106

(702) 646-3155

Counsel for Petitioner

Mark D. Fraley

AUG 4 1986

°°

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the misdemeanor offense of driving a vehi-

cle while intoxicated under Nevada state law is a

“serious” crime to which the right to jury trial applies.

PARTIES

Petitioners are MELVIN R. BLANTON, and MARK D.

FRALEY, Defendants separately charged in the City of

North Las Vegas, Nevada, with the misdemeanor offense

of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, NRS

484.379; Respondent, City of North Las Vegas, is an incor-

porated city in the State of Nevada pursuant to 1983

Nevada Statutes Chapter 517 at 1391-1437; 1971 Nevada

Statutes Chapter 573 at 1210-1229.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..............---000e eee i

ee cer cccnedsescceccccccccccces ii

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ........... iv

OPINION BELOW..........6.56 66 cc cece cece ee eees 1

DEERE s scccccccccccccccccccccocccccccccoes 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED...... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................00005 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............-.--++55: 5

i ccncccccesccccccccccccccccccccsceces 7

DC Raaseceecesecccsocccceccccccccccce 7

Il. The Penalty for Conviction of DWI in Nevada

Renders the Offense Serious ................- 9

III. Most States Allow Trial by Jury in DWI Pros-

GEURIGED 2c ccc ccc ccccccscccccccccscccccccssees 17

to Trial by Jury..........- 6. cece cece cece ees 18

V. The Lower Court Decision ................... 22

CSCC r ene becoces eves cccccccccccccees 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32

Mee I ss nccedceuccaesaea 5B 11

Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska

GUNG 6 bipn daddueenbcaucetéaceed due 14, 22

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26

ROS OP I bcnkcoscsccoeceoccacvas vs es passim

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29

Fe" > [Siete ee 14

Blanton v. North Las Vegas Municipal Court, 103

Nev. A.O. 135, 748 P3d 494 (1987)... 1

Brady v. Blair, 427 FSupp. 5 (S.D. Ohio 1976)...14, 17, 22

Bronson v. Swinney, 648 FSupp. 1094 (D. Nev.

acs ciuthncsancecdeetescicsa.. cee 14, 16, 17

te Saas! Os Me 880 mw,

“2 L. bi2d 629 (1868) spb ab Sate as 12, 22

City of Casper v. Cheatam, 739 P.2d 1222 (Wyo.

Dis ccdncesiessnicanisiieue eens: 22

V'SCt 660, 81 LEA 843 1997) 7, 1 48, 21, 22

OL PO aes

Ed 2a ‘ore _ = 2, 13, 17

ect 102, 0 Ed 24 6 re 968). a — 2... 11

. Ca *

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Fisher v. State, 305 Md. 357, 504 A.2d 626 (1986) ....22

Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 1503,

ee Oe Ge. og cccccccacccocecseccoosceoss »

Holterhaus v. State, 417 S.2d 291 (Fla App 1982) ..... 16

Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169 (CA5 1987),

reversed, 840 F.2d 1201 (CA5 1988).........--. 17, 19

Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 96 S.Ct.

2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976)..........-ceeeeeee eens 23

Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 45

L.BA.2d 31D (1975)... 22. ccc ccccccccccccccens 9, 13

North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S.Ct. 2709, 49

L.BG.2d S34 (1976). ... 222s cc cccccccccccccesccccees 24

Parham v. Municipal Court, City of Sioux Falls, 199

N.W.2d 501 (SD 1972) .......-.eeeeeeee een eeeeeees 22

Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563 (CA9 1987)........... 13

Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d

BF Ge vccccccccscccccccvscccsccccescescece 21, 22

Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49

LBA. GP (ISDE)... ccc ccccccccccccccccccccseece 7, 22

Sellers v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 S. 260 (1924)....... 21

State v. Morrill, 123 N.H. 707, 465 A.2d 882 (1983) ....21

State v. O’Brien, 704 P.2d 883 (Haw. 1985)........... 22

State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212, 102 A. 433 (1917)..... 21

State v. Smith, 99 Nev. 806, 672 P.2d 631 (1983)...... a4

State v. Watkins, 125 Ariz 570, 611 P.2d 923 (1980) .... 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Page

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d

FRR =F erie era apt ae 15

United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660 (CA4), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 992, 100 S.Ct. 524, 62 L.Ed.2d

Se EN acdc nad Fe otis cet Ge Uk dive bwin nk cance< 15

United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (CA9 1981)

recdbachb duds <ackdie ek nels cee eds 14, 17, 21, 22

United States v. Hart, 26 Fed. Cas. 193 (D.Pa. 1817) ....21

United States v. Restor, 679 F.2d 338 (CA3 1982) ..... 15

United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (CA5 1979)...... 15

United States v. Woods, 450 F.Supp. 1335 (D.Md.

GUE nc cecccccncdncdiécdupedsbesiessce 14, 17, 21, 22

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80

ED CU UE dededahstaetscduatncccsceccces 17

Whirley v. State, 450 S.2d 836 (Fla. 1984)............. 21

Nevapa Revisep STaTuTES

Pedstbchuchascwedetavenddsdndusddccicadsecewsae’ 24

Seth dedhcndcdsdecdsdaarckbaswaxecssenadecdedawe 4

i tn.65959enquks changes subeneibesibucddusnsnesces 4

hehe daccgtddhereksediwamenethessddekiedisudes 24

Pshtcakukenee ches cagunebibaetaabieskensedewedes 4

PACES 4s cddenens dhenéeGahGebesuestcetersecicce ca 14

PI aktdd6¢sacondotunedhedctesatendecushiwscescuns 13

nda ss sccccivenedendevesdesdesessdsvectccetect 13

SEED ovcccccvscevesucdédapebdteceedsctcotercctecedes 4

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Page

es. od pp ceeeeesesestesencsaesnesenss 4

GD oo vccccccccevccccctcsccccoccecsecs 10, 14

ki ccc aeeebocsuns cnneceedscceeeesunees 10

a, can cee cecetsdeadecececeneteee 2, 4,9

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eg cag dbéee dedeccenceuasecedeeee 19

ee nob cccecentenbocsecccscdoceseechenes 11

eu peudaWocddeccccccndccctccsvecesses 10

StaTeE OF NEVADA CONSTITUTION

DMR, By GB. occ ccccccccccccccccscccccccccccccceccensees 1

At. B, OD... ccccccccccccccccccccccsccccccecccesenes 24

as iu dpavsuevisesacssnditdccavssusencees 4

Ast. 6, G6..... 2. ccc ccccccccceeccececsceeeccreseeeeees 4

Unitep States Cope ANNOTATED

28 U.S.C. §1257(3) .... 0. e cece e eee e ee eenees 1

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Art. ITI, §2, para. 3 ....... 020 cece cece renee eens 2, 7

TC ee 7

Amnendimment VI... 2... ccc ccc cece cccccccccsecenes 1, 11

Pamamtimmaet WIV, .. wo ccc cccccccccccccccccceccccens 4

Law Review

Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses

ard the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by

Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917 (1926).......-..++00005: 23

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-Continued

Page

STATISTICAL

Statistics of Department of Motor Vehicles and

Public Safety, 6/30/88, provided by B.R. Vid-

mar, Highway Safety Representative, 555

Wright Way, Carson City, Nevada 89710........... 16

US. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Sta-

tistics, Report to the Nation on Crime and Jus-

tice (2nd Ed.), March 1988, MC] 105506....18, 19, 20

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Sta-

tistics, Special Report, Drunk Driving, February

EE PU adubU cede iewks chcdacaesdbececcees 19

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Sta-

tistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,

1986, NCJ 105287, Table 1.56.................. 12, 20

ue’ om,

OPINION BELOW

The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that a defendant

charged with the State misdemeanor offense of driving a

vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating

liquor, which carries a fine of not more than $1,000,

imprisonment of not more than six months in jail, as well

as other penalties, has no right to trial by jury pursuant

to the Constitution of the State of Nevada, Article I, § 3,

or Amendment VI to the United States Constitution, Blan-

ton v. North Las Vegas Municipal Court, 103 Nev. A.O. 135,

748 P.2d 494 (1987); Appendix to Petition for Writ of

Certiorari, Tab “A”.

JURISDICTION

Petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). The Supreme Court of Nev-

ada denied Petitioners’ claim of right to trial by jury ina

misdemeanor DWI offense, under the federal Constitu-

tion on December 31, 1987, and the petition for writ of

certiorari was docketed in this Court on February 26,

1988.

5 ae

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent part of Amendment VI to the United

States Constitution provides:

(I)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial

jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed

The pertinent part of Amendment XIV to the United

States Constitution provides:

(N)or shall any state deprive any person of life, lib-

erty, or property witnout due process of law

Article III, Section 2, paragraph 3 provides, in perti-

nent part:

The Trial of all Crimes, except in C f "

ment, shall be by jury; P ases of Impeach

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Melvin R. Blanton

Blanton was arrested for driving a vehicle while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor (no accident)

on July 18, 1986 in the City of North Las Vegas, Nevada.

Probable cause for the stop consisted of varying speeds

and several crossings of the lane divider by Blanton’s car.

An odor of alcoholic beverage about his person, red and

bloodshot eyes, and the officer’s belief that he failed the

field sobriety test, led to Blanton’s incarceration, and the

drawing of blood to determine the blood-alcohol level.

Defendant was arraigned through counsel on August

19, 1986, entering a plea of not guilty to the charge of

D.U.1., NRS 484.379 (first offense). (J.A. 1) Written

demand for jury trial was made on October 2, 1986, (J.A.

6-7) to which demand the City interposed written objec-

tion. (J.A. 7-10) The demand was later denied by the

Municipal Court Judge.

A pre-trial petition for writ of mandamus was filed

on November 3, 1986, in the Eighth Judicial District Court

in and for the County of Clark, State of Nevada, a court

of general jurisdiction. (J.A. 13-16) The City of North Las

Vegas again filed an answer and a legal memorandum

opposing the granting of the writ. (J.A. 18-20) District

Court Judge Michael Wendell denied the writ on January

14, 1987, (J.A. 20-21) and an appeal was filed by Blanton

to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada on January

20, 1987. (J.A. 21-23)

After Blanton’s appeal and other cases were consoli-

dated in the state Supreme Court on tie basis of the

common issue of a jury trial in misdemeanor D.U.I. pros-

ecutions, the appeal was briefed, culminating in oral

argument in Carson City, Nevada on September 18, 1987.

(J.A. 5) The Supreme Court of Nevada rendered its Deci-

sion, per Justice Gunderson, on December 31, 1987, deny-

ing Blanton, and the Defendants in the other consolidated

cases, the option of a jury trial; the Decision was based

upon the State of Nevada and Federal Constitutions.

A timely petition for writ of certiorari was thereafter

docketed in this Court by Blanton on February 26, 1988;

this petition was granted on June 20, 1988. (J.A. 102)

Mark D. Fraley

Fraley was arrested for driving a vehicle while under

the influence of intoxicating liquer on June 29, 1986 in the

City of North Las Vegas, Nevada. Probable cause for this

stop consisted of the arresting officer’s observation of

Fraley’s vehicle (at low speed) striking a traffic-control

device. A moderate odor of alcoholic beverage about his

person, bloodshot and watery eyes, and the officer’s

opinion that he failed the field sobriety test, led to

Fraley’s incarceration. Fraley refused a chemical test.

Defendant was arraigned on July 15, 1986, entering a

plea of not guilty to the charge of driving under the

influence of intoxicating liquor, NRS 484.379 (first

offense). (J.A. 1) Written demand for jury trial was made

(J.A 11), which demand was denied by the Municipal

Court Judge on October 28, 1986. (J.A. 1) Fraley entered a

plea of guilty to the-charge of D.U.I. on October 29, 1986

(J.A. 1), and received a fine of $300, five (5) days incarcer-

ation, and mandatory alcohol education school. Appeal

was timely taken to the Eighth Judicial District Court in

and for the County of Clark, State of Nevada, a court of

general jurisdiction, for a trial de novo, pursuant to NRS

266.565.! (J.A. 16-17) Demand for jury trial was also filed

in that Court by Defendant (J.A. 23-25), and the City of

North Las Vegas opposed the same. District Court Judge

Addelair Guy ruled on January 30, 1987, that the North

Las Vegas Municipal Court must grant a jury trial to

Fraley, and further ruled that NRS 266.550 (precluding

municipal courts from conducting jury trials) was uncon-

stitutional. (J.A. 25-27)

. : Misdemeanor offenses, including DWIs are prosecuted

in either Municipal (City) Courts (NRS 5.050) or Justice

(County) Courts (NRS 4.370). A defendant convicted after trial

or after plea of guilty in City court may appeal to the local

District Court for a trial de novo. NRS 266.565. A defendant

convicted after trial in Justice Court (a court of record) may

appeal to the District Court where trial errors are challenged in

briefs as in normal appellate cases. NRS 189.050. A party

aggrieved at the District Court level in a misdemeanor offense

may only bring an issue before the Supreme Court of Nevada

by extraordinary writ, as only cases originating in District

Courts may appeal as of right. Constitution, Article 6, §§ 4 and

6. There is no intermediate court of i

Reg appeal in the State of

The City of North Las Vegas, Nevada filed an origi-

nal petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of

the State of Nevada on April 13, 1987. (J.A. 28-52) That

case was consolidated in the Supreme Court of Nevada

with other cases (including Petitioner Blanton’s herein)

on the basis of the common issue of jury trial in misde-

meanor DWI prosecutions. (J.A. 4-5) The matter was

briefed, and oral argument took place in Carson City,

Nevada on September 18, 1987. (J.A. 5) The Supreme

Court of Nevada rendered its Decision, per Justice Gun-

derson, on December 31, 1987, granting the City’s writ

and thereby denying Fraley, and the defendants in the

other consolidated cases, the option of a jury trial in

misdemeanor DWI prosecutions. |

A timely joint petition for writ of certiorari was filed

in this Court with Melvin R. Blanton; this petition was

granted on June 20, 1988. (J.A. 103)

—>-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court has previously set out a “bright line” tes.

of 6 months incarceration and a $500 fine to separate

petty from serious offenses as regards the right to trial by

jury. Nevada’s Driving While Intoxicated (hereinafter

“DWI”) law carries a potential 6 month sentence and a

$1,000 fine, but also carries a host of other penalties that

“pack” the offense “below the line”. These penalties

include mandatory minimum incarceration and fine,

community service in lieu of incarceration with the

defendant dressed in distinctive arb identifying him as a

DWI offender, a mandatory alcohol educational course

paid by the defendant, and a mandatory 90-day driver’s

license revocation. A second offense within 7 years car-

ries increased minimum jail time and fine, and a third

conviction is a felony carrying 1 year mandatory in the

Nevada State Prison and a large minimum fine. The

convicted person is stigmatized as a convicted drunk

driver, and automobile insurance rate hikes routinely

follow. These serious penalties mandate a right to trial by

jury in a first-offense DWI prosecution.

The “National standard” test approved most recently

in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1889,

26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970) allows trial by jury in DWI. Our

research indicates 46 States which allow a jury trial, with

4 States and the District of Columbia denying.

The “nature of the offense” test first used in Callan v.

Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888),

reaffirmed in District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 51

S.Ct. 52, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930), and more recently approved

in Baldwin v. New York, supra, 399 U.S. at 69, 90 S.Ct. at

1888, n.6, defines DWI as a “serious” offense. In the last

10 years the intoxicated driver has been spotlighted by

national groups as a menace. Statutory punishments have

increased, including alcohol treatment and education,

driver’s license sanctions, and community service. Our

society views drunk driving as a serious criminal offense.

In addition, several federal and state courts have held

that DWI is a malum in se offense, and thereby “serious”.

These 3 tests, separately and considered together,

undeniably require a trial by jury in a DWI case in

Nevada. Petitioners seek no new rule for this offense

before this Court. DWI is, however, an offense that our

society has now singled out for harsh penalty. The

“bright line” penalty-based rule of 6 months and a $500

fine is so intensely bright that it has eclipsed other well-

grounded rules used to evaluate the right to trial by jury,

thereby retarding the recognition of DWI as a “serious”

offense by lower courts.

MENTS

~~] =

THE TESTS

In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.5S:-540, 555.(1888), this Court

declared that the crime of conspiracy was a “criminal and

indictable offense” at common law and an offense of a

grave character affecting the public at large. Pursuant to

Art. 3 of the federal Constitution, and Amendments V

and VI thereof, it was held that the “nature of the crime”

of conspiracy secured to the defendant the right to trial

by jury. Sixteen years later, in Schick v. United States, 195

U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49 L.Ed. 99 (1904), a maximum

penalty of $50 for a violation of the Oleomargarine Act

was found not to warrant trial by jury due to the small

penalty and the nature of the offense. District of Columbia

v. Colts, 282 US. 63, 51 S.Ct. 52, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930)

granted a trial by jury for the offense of “reckless driv-

ing”, carrying a $25 to $100 fine, and minimum jail time

of 10 days not to exceed 30. The offense was found to be

malum in se and indictable at common law. A scant 7

years later, in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617,

57 S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed 843 (1937), an offense of selling

personalty without a business license which carried a

penalty of as much as a $300 fine and 90 days in jail was

found not triable to a jury. Neither the penalty nor the

nature of the offense was deemed serious enough to

warrant trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88

S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), applied the federal

Sixth Amendment to the States through the Fourteenth

Amendment, and held that 2 years potential imprison-

ment entitled the defendant to a jury trial. Incarceration

of up to 6 months was found not to require a jury trial if

the crime otherwise qualified as a petty offense. 391 U.S.

at 159, 88 S.Ct. at 1453. This Court also observed:

But the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of

major relevance in determining whether it is serious

or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject the

trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment. . . .The

penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be

taken “as a gauge of its social and ethical judg-

ments.” Id.

And at 391 U.S. 161, 88 S.Ct. 1453:

In determining whether the length of the authorized

prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is

enough in itself to require a jury trial, we are coun-

seled by District of Columbia v. Clawans, supra, to

refer to objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws

and practices in the Nation. (Emphasis added).

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), established

the “bright line” test of 6 months incarceration or less to

deny the right to jury trial. Recognizing that the most

relevant criterion is the severity of the maximum autho-

rized penalty, Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148, 89

S.Ct. 1503, 1505, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), and thereby

applying State practices (objective criteria), a jury trial for

a potential 1 year jail sentence was required. No new

analytical framework was developed. This Court, at n.6,

399 US. 69, 90 S.Ct. 1888, first sentence, reiterates the

“nature of the offense” test, and in the second sentence,

announces that “ ... we decide only that a potential

sentence in excess of six months’ imprisonment is suffi-

ciently severe by itself to take the offense out of the

category of ‘petty’. . . .” (Emphasis added).

See, Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 45

L.Ed.2d 319 (1975).

A distillation of these cases illustrates 3 frameworks

from which the right to trial by jury springs:

1) the nature of the offense;

2) the potential penalty or punishment; and,

3) the Nation’s judgment, i.e., objective criteria

existing in the laws and practices in the Nation.

In the case at bar, petitioners seek to isolate one

special offense which has gained the Nation’s attention

and wrath over the last 10 years. The offense of driving

while intoxicated will be shown to be “serious” when

viewed from any of the 3 perspectives above.

THE PENALTY FOR CONVICTION OF DWI

IN NEVADA RENDERS THE OFFENSE SERIOUS

It is unlawful in the State of Nevada to drive a

vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public

has access while under the influence of intoxicating

liquor, or for the driver to have 0.10 percent or more by

weight of alcohol in his blood. NRS 484.379. The offense

is a misdemeanor carrying a fine of as much as $1,000

and 6 months incarceration in the county jail. NRS

484.3792. In 1986, the year of the arrests herein, the

following statutory consequences (NRS 484.3792) were

evident for a first offense conviction:

1) A fine of no less than $200 or more than

$1,000

2) Imprisonment for not less than 2 days or

more than 6 months which is non-probationable or sus-

pendable, or to perform 48 hours of community service

while dressed in distinctive garb identifying the person

as a DWI violator

3) An educational course on alcohol abuse and

controlled substances at the expense of the defendant

4) The offense is non-negotiable for the pros-

ecuting attorney unless the charge is not supported by

probable cause or cannot be proved at trial

5) A second offense of DWI within 7 years is a

misdemeanor carrying a minimum of 10 days incarcera-

tion and a fine of not less than $500

6) A third or subsequent offense within 7 years

is a felony punishable by no less than 1 year or more than

6 years in prison, and a fine of no less than $2,000 to

$5,000. The offender, if practicable, must be assigned to a

minimum security facility.

Additionally, NRS 483.460(1)(c) requires mandatory

driver’s license revocation upon conviction for 90 days;

only after 45 days of that period is served may the State

issue a restricted license for work, or for obtaining food

and medical supplies if the driver can show a “severe

hardship”. NRS 483.490(2). NRS 484.384(4) allows a

ae . this period by any period of revocation

- - 7 mposed by the Department of Motor Vehicles

e driver having had 0.10% or more by weight of

alcohol in his blood at the time of arrest. NRS 484.384(3)

Property interests of the convicted person are affected es

automobile insurance premiums inv

aria

ally double or triple). ee

Lastly, the individual must be

} ar the social stigma of

ee a convicted drunk driver. Argesinger v. Hamlin pr

‘S. 25, 48, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2019, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).

In Baldwin v. New York, 399 US. 66, 69

1966, n.6, 20 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), this en pearly

p oe we Cecide only that a potential sentence in excess

months’ imprisonment is sufficiently severe b

itself to take the offense out of the category of ‘petty’.” A

rtennns penalty has been held to be short enough to

— a ‘mane as “petty”. Dyke v. Taylor Implement

_ eo m US. 16, 220, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 1475, 20 L.Ed.2d

68); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct

1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966). This Court has never held

that the right to trial by jury does not attach to an offense

which carries a potential jail term of 6 months or |

which is otherwise considered “serious”; indeed ee

Court recognized in Baldwin, 399 US. at 68, 90 S.Ct

1888, that“... the task before us in this case is the

essential if not wholly satisfactory one, ... of determin-

ing the line between ‘petty’ and ‘serious’ for the purposes

of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.” The u

isfactory process of definition of “... the A -te ap

the petty offense category have always been ill-defined, if

not ambulatory.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. at 160 88

S.Ct. at 1453. Rules defining petty cffenses are dynamic,

changing with need, as at common law.

Petitioners in this case do not seek a new “bright

line” test. What they do seek is a right to trial by jury on

a special offense that has been winnowed from the petty

offense category and specially punished. This Court rec-

ognized the existence of such crimes in Duncan, supra, 391

U.S. at 159-60, 88 S.Ct. at 1453, “ ... Crimes carrying

possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury

trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses, Cheff v.

Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629

(1966) ...” (Emphasis added). And at 384 U.S. 161, 88

S.Ct. 1453:

In determining whether the length of the authorized

prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is

enough in itself to require a jury trial, we are coun-

seled by District of Columbia v. Clawans, supra, to

refer to objective criteria, chiefly the existin laws

and practices in the Nation. (Emphasis added).

The Duncan decision looked no further than the

length of the sentence, but the words “other punishment”

have independent vitality, and anticipate the possibility

of an offense “serious” by a measure other than length of

sentence. As in Baldwin, this Court must compare Nev-

ada’s punishment of DWI with other States. January, 1986

statistics indicate that Nevada’s punishments for DWI are

as stringent as, or more stringent than, other States in the

nation. Appendix “B” hereof? Indeed, Appendix “A

2 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,

Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Standards, 1986, NCJ 105287,

Table 1.56

hereof indicates by asterisk that 21 States (by our count)

punish DWI by a potential sentence of 1 year or more;

further, 46 States allow jury trials in DWI prosecutions.

In terms, then, of Nevada’s punishment for DWI

(which is commensurate with the Nation), and Nevada’s

deprivation of a right to trial by jury (which is not com-

mensurate with the Nation), the Baldwin case is persua-

sive authority.

FINE: In reviewing Nevada’s potential and manda-

tory punishment for DWI (NRS 484.3792), the maximum

fine by itself may be enough to trigger a right to trial by

jury. The case of Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563 (CA9 1987)

ruled that a State habeas petitioner convicted of a misde-

meanor and fined $1,000 had a federal constitutional

right to trial by jury. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 95

S.Ct. 2178, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975), was distinguished on

the basis that the contemnor was a labor union, a “non-

individual.” As stated in Muniz, 422 U.S. at 476-77, 95

S.Ct. 2190-91, this Court has not accorded the six-month

incarceration and $500 fine boundaries “talismanic signif-

icance.” However, the potential fine in the case at bar

($200 of which is mandatory) as well as a potential six-

month jail sentence moves DWI to the “serious” category,

at least as defined by Duncan and Baldwin.

MANDATORY INCARCERATION: Although Nev-

ada’s penalty of 6 months’ incarceration or less after a

DWI conviction is within the Baldwin boundary, 2 days of

that period cannot be suspended. Far more serious felony

crimes in Nevada are probationable with no mandatory

jail time (e.g., robbery, NRS 200.380; burglary, NRS

205.060; voluntary manslaughter, NRS 200.080). See, Bron-

son v. Swinney, 648 F.Supp. 1094, 1099 (D.Nev. 1986). This

is a clear indication that the citizens of Nevada, through

their legislators, consider DWI a “serious” crime. Only 16

States have mandatory minimum incarceration on first

conviction DWI. See Appendix “B” hereof.

MANDATORY LOSS OF DRIVER’S LICENSE: NRS

483.460(1)(c) requires a 90-day loss of driving privileges

upon conviction of DWI. This Court stated in Bell v.

Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d

90 (1971) that:

Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their

continued possession may become essential in the

pursuit of a livelihood. peapenes of issued licenses

thus involves state action that adjudicates important

interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses

are not to be taken away without that procedural due

process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Other courts have conceded the right to trial by jury

partly on the basis of the potential loss of a driver's

license. United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (CA9 1981);

United States v. Woods, 450 F.Supp. 1335, 1346 (D.Md.

1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 FSupp. 5, 10 (S.D. Ohio 1976);

Bronson v. Swinney, supra, 648 F.Supp. at 1099; Baker v.

City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).

48 HOURS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE DRESSED IN

DISTINCTIVE GARB: An individual convicted in North

Las Vegas may choose to perform 48 hours (6-8 hour

days) of community service wearing a “convict-striped”

black and white pullover shirt with a large white circle on

the back. Within the circle is a drawing of a liquor bottle

with a prominent skull and crossbones on the label. The

bottle is surrounded by a red circle with a red line

through the middle (similar to a “no smoking” sign).

Between the border of the red circle and the edge of the

greater white circle are the initials “D.U.I.” at the top and

“OFFENDER” at the bottom (the matching pants to this

outfit, for some reason, are no longer worn). Community

service is performed in lieu of 2 days of jail time. Com-

munity service is a proper condition of probation, United

States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (CA4), cert. denied, 444

U.S. 992, 100 S.Ct. 524, 62 L.Ed.2d 422 (1979),”... so

long as it is reasonably related to rehabilitation of the

probationer, ... deterrence of future misconduct by the

probationer >r general deterrence of others, (or) deserved

punishment.” United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148

(CA5 1979). See also United States v. Restor, 679 F.2d 338

(CA3 1982). Even assuming that community service is

non-penal and that the “garb” will deter others, it is

clearly punishment to the offender and “marks” him to

the public at large over an extended period as a convicted

DWI offender. Such extraordinary punishment is unique

in Nevada, and perhaps in the Nation, indicating again

how “serious” the crime is considered.

If a page from Eighth Amendment lore may be con-

trasted, “... Fines, imprisonment and even execution

may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the

crime, but any technique outside the bounds of those

traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. ...” Trop

v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630

(1958).

NO NEGOTIATION: The prosecutor cannot negotiate

the DWI offense. NRS 484.3792(3). This plea-bargain

straitjacket is rare, Bronson v. Swinney, supra, 648 F.Supp.

at 1099, and of all the provisions here set out, this one

forces a plea, or a trial to the judge. Nevada’s conviction

rate in 1987 was 82% (9,722 persons arrested and 8,001

convicted by plea or trial).3

SUCCESSIVE OFFENSES: A minimum period of

incarceration of 10 days for a second conviction within 7

years, without a jury. and a felony conviction carrying 1

to 6 years imprisonment (1 year of which is not suspend-

able) for a third conviction within 7 years, reflect the

seriousness of a single misdemeanor conviction of DWI

in Nevada.

ALCOHOL EDUCATION: Alcohol education has

been held a proper condition of probation, Holterhaus v.

State, 417 S.2d 291 (Fia. App. 1982), State v. Watkins, 125

Ariz. 570, 611 P.2d 923 (1980). Here, however, the defen-

dant must pay the cost of the program himself (about

$175). NRS 484.3792(1){a)(1).

The punishment contained in and collateral to the

misdemeanor DWI statute in Nevada in 1986 is harsh; a

person charged with this crime should have the option of

a trial by jury. For this Court to allow such punishment to

go unanswered will encourage legislatures to “pack”

petty offenses with penalties that do not puncture the

6-month incarceration line, and to simultaneously deny

the right to trial by jury.

3 Statistics of Department of Motor Vehicles and Public

Safety, 6/30/88, provided by B.R. Vidmar, Highway Safety

Representative, 555 Wright Way, Carson City, Nevada 89710.

MOST STATES ALLOW TRIAL BY JURY

IN DWI PROSECUTIONS

Appendix “A” hereof indicates that 46 State jurisdic-

tions allow a jury trial in first-offense DWI prosecutions if

not in the first instance, then on appeal. The District of

Columbia, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Nev-

ada do not.

This Court first compared State imprisonment pat-

terns in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57

S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937) in determining that a maxi-

mum fine of $300 and 90 days’ imprisonment (as well as

the “moral quality” of the offense) did not trigger a right

to trial by jury. A similar analysis was used in Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) and Baldwin v. New York, 399

U.S. 66 (1970).

Since the “bright line” test of 6 months’ incarceration

and a $500 fine has been established for almost 20 years

now, some lower federal courts have analyzed the issue

in terms of numbers of State jurisdictions allowing trial

by jury in DWI prosecutions, instead of State patterns of

potential incarceration. United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d

23, 27 (CA9 1981); United States v. Woods, 450 F.Supp.

1335, 1347 (D.Md. 1978) (federal regulation); Brady v.

Blair, 427 FSupp. 5, 10 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (city ordinance);

Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1217 (CAS 1988), en

banc, (no right to jury trial in Louisiana DWI offense);

Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F.Supp. 1094 (D. Nev. 1986) (trial

by jury mandated). See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,

763, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2104, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (White, J.,

dissenting joined by Rehnquist, J.) where two members of

this Court (albeit in a fourth amendment setting)

analyzed the “seriousness” of the Wisconsin DWI law in

terms of the right to trial by jury, among other factors. In

the DWI prosecution, of course, this approach is justified

because most State jurisdictions allow a trial by jury no

matter the penalty.

At least since the Clawans decision, supra, this Court

appears to have sought National uniformity in the jury

trial area. To hold that a defendant in a DWI prosecution

has a right to trial by jury will continue that needed

uniformity.

THE NATURE OF THIS OFFENSE REQUIRES

THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

The vast majority of States define driving while

intoxicated as driving under the influence of intoxicating

liquor, or driving while having 0.10% or more by weight

of alcohol in the hiooa (9.10% is considered to be legal

intoxication in 3) States ond the District of Columbia,

0.08% in 2 States, ).12% ir 1 State, and 0.15% in 1 State;

the other 7 States iiave a presumptive level of 0.10%

where the defense can rebut the presumption).* In Nev-

ada, the level of 0.10% or more is presumptive of DWI,

while being under the influence of intoxicating liquor is

more a factor of improper driving, facts drawn from a

* U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,

Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice (2nd Ed.), March

1988, MC] 105506, p.7.

field-sobriety test, and observation of the driver. An indi-

vidual may, for example, be prosecuted for DWI with a

level of 0.08% blood alcohol (no presumption) when his

driving or the factual results of a field-sobriety test indi-

cate intoxication. Cf., NRS 484.381.

Nationwide, in 1985, there were 1,788,400 non-juve-

nile arrests for DWI, which constituted 15% of all arrests

in that year.5 It is estimated that 40% of the 43,800 traffic-

related deaths in the United States in 1985 involved a

blood-alcohol level that exceeded the legal limit®, and in

1986 more than 650,000 persons were injured in alcohol-

related motor vehicle crashes.” It has been estimated that

property damage, medical costs, and other costs of drunk

driving may exceed $24 billion annually.* More signifi-

cantly, between 1970 and 1986 DWI arrests increased

nearly 223%, while the number of licensed drivers

increased by 42%.°

In the past few years, national organizations such as

Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) whose mem-

bership is now claimed at 600,000 with 400 chapters,

Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169, 1176 n.3 (CA5 1987),

and Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD) have exten-

sively publicized the individual and societal costs of

drunk driving. Their efforts have brought this message

5 Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice, supra, at 67

and 40.

6 Id., at 7.

7 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,

Special Report, Drunk Driving, February 1988, NCJ 97221, p.1.

8 Id.

9 Id.

via informational spots in movie houses, television and

radio, on billboards, and by telephone, especially during

holiday seasons when overindulgence is common. Most

States, including Nevada, have implemented sobriety

checkpoints to deter drunk driving in problem areas.

Twelve States have passed “happy hour” legislation

which limits the sale of alcoholic beverages in quantity

for a reduced price during certain hours.’ In 1986, 16

States imposed mandatory imprisonment for first convic-

tion DWI, 42 States for a second conviction, and 40 States

for a third conviction; 25 States required mandatory

license suspension or revocation for a first conviction, 44

States for a second conviction, and 44 States for a third

conviction.'! Thirty-two States permit or require commu-

nity service of some type upon conviction, with 47 States

permitting or requiring alcohol education or treatment

programs.'? A local paper, the Reno Gazette-Journal,

every few days, runs the names, addresses, and punish-

ments of persons convicted of DWI, even reporting plea

negotiations to lesser charges (see Wednesday, June 22,

1988 ed., p.2C). At least one bill is pending in the United

States Senate, sponsored by Sen. Frank Lautenberg,

D-N.J., which would appropriate more federal money to

States which toughen their drunk driving laws.

Appendices “C” and “D” hereof show, respectively,

the numbers of jury trials in misdemeanor cases in

reporting States in 1985, and numbers of jury trials in

DWI/DUI cases in reporting State courts in 1985. These

10 Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice, supra, at 7.

11 Id., at 94.

12 Id., Sourcebook of Justice Statistics, Table 1.56.

statistics bear out similar statistics set out in Baldwin v.

New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75, n.22, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1891, 26

L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), that there will be a high waiver rate of

jury trials in these types of cases. With these societal

dynamics as a backdrop, does the very nature of the

offense of DWI bring it within the constitutional guaran-

tee of trial by jury?

There is respectable authority for the proposition that

DWI was not an offense indictable at common law. State

v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212, 102 A. 433 (1917); Whirley v.

State, 450 S.2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984); State ex rel. Sellers v.

Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 S. 260 (1924); State v. Morrill, 123

N.H. 707, 465 A.2d 882, 885 (1983); Rothweiler v. Superior

Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479 (1966). But see, United

States v. Hart, 26 Fed. Cas. 193 (D.Pa. 1817). First, DWI as

we know it was not known to the common law, and

comparison to a drunk equestrian or driver of a wagon

and team is not congruent with the automobile’s high

speed and the congested conditions of our time. United

States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 26 n.3 (CA9 1981). DWI, with

its attendant mischief, would clearly have been indictable

at common law. Second, the factor of “indictable at com-

mon law” seems to have been abandoned by this Court.

Last mentioned in District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63

(1930), along with the “nature of the offense” test, 282

U.S. 73, it was not found to be a relevant consideration in

District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937)

where penalty only was considered, and it was not men-

tioned as a part of the “nature of the offense” test in

Baldwin v. New York, supra, 399 U.S. 69, 90 S.Ct. 1888, n.6;

United States v. Woods, 450 F.Supp. 1335, 1342 (D.Md.

1978).

In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) this Court

described a “conspiracy” as“... an offense of a grave

character, affecting the public at large; ...” 127 U.S. 556.

A violation of the Oleomargarine Act of 1901 carrying a

fine of $50 involved no moral delinquency, and therefore

nu trial by jury was required. Schick v. United States, 195

U.S. 65 (1904). And the crime of reckless driving was

found to be an offense malum in se to which a right to

jury trial attached. District of Columbia v. Colts, supra.

The offense of DWI has been held to be one malum in

se and an act repugnant to the moral sense of the commu-

nity. Rothweiler v. Superior Court of Pima County, supra;

State v. O’Brien, 704 P.2d 883 (Haw. 1985); Baker v. City of

Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970); Fisher v. State, 305

Md. 357, 504 A.2d 626 (1986); Parham v. Municipal Court,

City of Sioux Falls, 199 N.W.2d 501 (SD 1972); City of

Casper v. Cheatam, 739 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1987); United States

v. Craner, supra; Brady v. Blair, 427 F.Supp. 5 (S.D. Ohio

1976); United States v. Woods, supra.

In sum, the offense of DWI is one malum in se to

which a right to trial by jury attaches; any requirement

that the offense be indictable at common law seems to

have been abandoned in 1937 in Clawans, supra.

THE LOWER COURT DECISION

The Decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in this

case boils down to a strict reading and reaffirmation of

the Baldwin, standard, and a reluctance to transcend that

standard. See, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct.

1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966). The lower court felt that this

Court had retreated from the Colts, supra, decision where

the “nature of the offense” was of primary concern, and

had. moved instead to a more workable rule based on

potential penalties. The court listed the following policy

considerations in support of the denial of right to trial by

jury:

1) Bench trials are speedy and inexpensive.

The right to trial by jury has never turned on

these considerations. Summary adjudications for petty

offenses are proper, as the acts“... (do) not offend too

deeply the moral purposes of the community, .. . , and

(are) stigmatized by punishment relatively light... .”'°

But cost is never a consideration if the offense is serious.

2) The cost to jurors in time and money, and

procedures for summons and selection of jurors in

municipal court.

Other rural, thinly-populated States, e.g., North

and South Dakota, and Wyoming, grant trial by jury. The

lower court further speculates that jury duty for citizens

in outlying areas may be onerous. But this duty is as

onerous for felony trials as well. The court's further fear

that municipal and justice courts will adjudicate DWI

jury trials may be groundless, as the jury trial will occur,

no doubt by legislation, in District Court, the court of

general jurisdiction. See, Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S.

618, 96 S.Ct. 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976).

13 Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the

Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv.L.Rev. 917,

981 (1926).

3) Other misdemeanor crimes are as

opprobrious as the DWI.

The court’s cited offenses of indecent conduct

and lewd behavior are indeed vile and despicable, but

they are not “serious” in the constitutional sense so as to

require trial by jury.

4) Concern for number of jurors.

The numbers of jurors in municipal or justice

court in a prosecution would be a legislative decision at a

special meeting of the legislature. Constitution, Art. 5, §

9. If DWI jury trials occur in the District Court, a 12-

person jury will sit and the verdict will have to be unani-

mous. NRS 175.481.

5) The lower court’s concern with non-lawyer

judges presiding over DWI prosecutions.

First, if the jury trials are conducted in the Dis-

trict Court all judges are licensed attorneys. See NRS

3.060. Second, this Court has held that the “... concern

in prior cases with judicial functions being performed by

nonjudicial officers has also been directed at the need for

independent, neutral, and detached judgment, not at

legal training ...”. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S.Ct.

2709, 49 L.Ed.2d 534 (1976).

6) The right to trial by jury is a legislative

decision.

Leaving the issue to the Nevada legislature to

resolve does not satisfy constitutional needs. This issue

has been around since at lest State v. Smith, 99 Nev. 806,

672 P.2d 631 (1983) and the State legislature has done

nothing but make the penalties more severe without a

concomitant move to protect the integrity of the adjudica-

tive process with trial by jury.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, petitioners

pray that the judgment below be reversed.

Respectfully submitted:

Joun G. Warkins Graves, Leavrrr & Kocn

Joun G. Warxins, Eso. Joun G. Graves, Jr., Eso.

333 North Ranch Road, #633 601 South Sixth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 646-3155 (702) 385-7277

Attorney for Petitioner Attorney for Petitioner

MARK D. FRALEY MELVIN RAY BLANTON

App. 1

APPENDIX “A”

STATES ALLOWING TRIAL BY JURY

IN DWI PROSECUTIONS AT SOME LEVEL

* denotes 1 year possible jailtime or more

** denotes jury trial by court decision

1) *Alabama : D.W.I. = Code of Alabama

§32-5A-191

ed Trial - Code of Alabama

§15-14-30; Hose v. State, 489

So.2d 670 (Ala. Cr. App.

1986), cert. denied, 5/23/86 by

Supreme Court of Alabama.

2) *Alaska : D.W.L - A.S. §28-35.030

Jury Trial - Baker v. City of

Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386

(Alaska 1970).

3) Arizona : D.W.L - A.R.S. §28-692

Jury Trial —- Rothweiler v. Supe-

rior Court of Pima County, 41J

P.2d 479, 100 Ariz. 37 (1966).

4) *Arkansas : D.W.I. - Arkansas Code

§5-65-103

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 2, §10.

5) California : D.W.L - Veh. Crde §23152

Jury Trial - Constitution, Art.

1, §16; Code of Civil Pro-

cedure §194.

6) *Colorado : D.W.L - C.R.S. 42-4-1202

ap Bey - Constitution, Bill

of hts, Art. II, §23; C.R.S.

§16-10-109.

10)

11)

12)

13)

14)

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

*Georgia

**Hawaii

Idaho

*Illinois

*Indiana

App. 2

: D.W.L - G.S.A. §14-227a

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §8;

G.S.A. §54-82b; State of

Englehart, 256 A.2d 231, 158

Conn. 117 (1969).

: D.W.L - D.C.A. 21 §4177

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. 1, §7; Coxe v.

State, Del. Supr., 281 A.2d 606

(1971).

: D.W.L = FS.A. §316.193

Jury Trial - F.S.A.

§316.1934(4).

: D.W.L - Code §40-6-391

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. I, §1, para.11.

: D.W.L - Hawaii Revised Stat-

utes §291-4

Jury Trial - State v. O’Brien,

704 P.2d 883 (Hawaii 1985).

: D.W.L. - Code §18-8004

Jury Trial - Miller v. Winstead,

75 Idaho 262, 270 P.2d 1010

(1954); Constitution, Art. 1,

§7.

: D.W.I. - S.H.A. ch. 95-1/2,

§11-501

Jury Trial - S.H.A. ch. 38, par.

103-6; Constitution, Bill of

Rights, Art. 1, §8.

: D.W.I. - Burns Indiana Stat-

utes Annotated §9-11-2-2

Jury Trial - Constitution, Art.

1, §§12, 13.

15)

16)

17)

18)

19)

20)

21)

22)

{

*lowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Maine

*Maryland

*Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

App. 3

: D.W.L - Code §321.281

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. 1, §10; I.C.A.

§813.3, Rule 45; State of lowa

v. Droste, 232 N.W.2d 483

(lowa 1975).

: D.W.L = KS.A. §8-1567

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, §10; K.S.A.

§22-3404.

: D.W.L = K.R.S. §189A.010

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, §11; K.R.S.

§29A.270.

: D.W.L - M.R.S.A. 29 §1312-B

Jury Trial - Constitution, Art.

1, §6; State v. Pineau, 463 A.2d

779 (Me. 1983).

: D.W.L = Ann. Code of Mary-

land (Transportation) §21-902

Jury Trial - Fisher v. State, 504

A.2d 626 (Md. 1986).

: D.W.L = Massachusetts Gen-

eral Laws Annotated c. 90 §24

Jury Trial - M.G.L.A. ¢.263 §6;

Commonwealth v. Hesser, 307

N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1974) (jury

trial on a parking ticket).

: D.W.L - M.C.L.A. §257.625

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §20.

: D.W.L - M.S.A. §169.121

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. 1, §6; State v.

Hatlestad, 347 N.W.2d 843

(Minn. App. 1984).

23)

24)

25)

26)

27)

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

New Hampshire :

App. 4

: D.W.L - Code §63-11-30

Jury Trial - Code §9-9-33;

Clark v. State, 332 So.2d 415

(Miss. 1976).

: D.W.L - Annotated Missouri

Statutes §577.010

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. 1, §§22(A), (B);

A.M.S. §546.040.

: D.W.L - M.C.A. §61-8-401

Jury Trial —- Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. II, §26;

M.C.A. §46-16-102; M.C.A.

§§46-17-201 and 46-17-403

(Justice and City Court Jury

Trial).

: D.W.I. - Rev. Stat. of

Nebraska §39-669.07

Jury Trial - R.S.N. §24-536

(trial by jury); State v. Nielsen,

199 Neb. 597, 260 N.W.2d 321

(1977); State v. Soester, 199

Neb. 477, 259 N.W.2d 921

(1977); State v. Young, 194

Neb. 544, 234 N.W.2d 196

(1975).

D.W.I. - New Hampshire Rev.

a Ann. §265:82 and 265:82-

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Part 1, Art. 15; Jury

trial allowed on do novo

appeal to superior court. Cf.,

State v. Handfield, 115 NH 628,

348 A.2d 352, app. dismissed,

427 U.S. 909, 96 S.Ct. 3196, 49

L.Ed.2d 1201 (1976); R.S.A.

599:1; R.S.A. 606:8.

28)

29)

30)

31)

32)

33)

*New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

*Oklahoma

*Oregon

App. 5

: D.W.L - Vehicle and Traffic

Law §1192 (Volume 62A)

ag Been - Constitution, Bill

of ts, Art. 1, §2; Art. 6,

§18; People v. Dean, 80 A.D.2d

695, 436 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1981).

: D.W.L - Gen. Stat. of North

Carolina §20-138.1

Jury Trial - Constiiution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §24;

Ch. 7A-196 (jury trials); State

v. Mack, 81 N.C. App. 578, 345

S.E.2d 223 (1986).

- D.W.L - North Dakota Cen-

tury Code §39-08-01

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §13;

State v. Abrahamson, 328

N.W.2d 213 (ND 1982);

N.D.C.C. §40-18-15.

- D.W.L - Ohio Revised Code

§4511.19

Jury Trial - O.R.C. §2945.17;

City of Mentor v. Giordano, 9

Ohio St.2d 140, 224 N.E.2d

343 (1967); Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. 1, §10.

: D.W1. - Oklahoma Statutes

Annotated 47 §11-902

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. 2, §§19 and 20.

Bernhardt v. State, 719 P.2d 832

(Okla. Cr. 1986).

: DW. - on Revised Stat-

utes §487.

Jury Trial - Brown v. Mul-

tnomah County Dist. Court, 280

Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977).

34)

35)

36)

37)

38)

"Pennsylvania

*Rhode Island

South Carolina

*South Dakota

*Tennessee

App. 6

: D.W.I. - Purdon’s Pennsylva-

nia Consolidated Statutes

Ann. 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3731

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §§ 6

and 9; Commonwealth v. Crum,

523 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super.

1987).

: D.W.L - Gen. Laws of Rhode

Island §31-27-2

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §10,

State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945

(R.I. 1981) (Jury Trial required

for petty misdemeanor).

>: D.W.I. - Code §56-5-2930

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. I, §14;

State v. Gilliam, 242 S.E.2d 410

(S.C. 1978) (Magistrate’s

Court); State v. Dawkins, 232

S.E.2d 228 (S.C. 1977) (Circuit

Court).

>: D.W.L - S.D.C.L. §32-23-1

Jury Trial - Parham v. Munici-

pal Court, City of Sioux Falls,

199 N.W.2d 501 (S.D. 1972);

Constitution, Bill of Rights,

Art. VI, §§ 6 and 7.

: D.W.I. - Tennessee Code

Annotated §§ 55-10-401 and

55-10-403

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §§ 6

and 9; State v. Morgan, 598

S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1979).

*Vermont

*Virginia

*Washington

App. 7

: D.W.IL - Vernon’s Ann. Civ.

St. art. 6701L-1 ;

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. 1, §§ 10 and 15.

: D.WI. - Utah Code Anno-

tated §41-6-44

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1,

§§ 10 and 12; U.C.A. §78-46-5

(jury of 4); Salt Lake City v.

West Gallery, Inc., 573 P.2d

1283 (Utah 1978).

: D.W.I. - Vermont Statutes

Annotated T.23 §1201

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Chapter I,

Arts. 10 and 12; State v.

Becker, 287 A.2d 580 (Vt. 1972)

(jury trial allowed for “noise

in the nighttime” offense

punishable by maximum $50

fine).

: D.W.L - Code §18.2-266

Jury Trial - Constitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. I, §8; Rodgers v.

Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 90

S.E.2d 257 (1955); Gardner v.

Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81

S.E.2d 614 (1954).

: D.W.1. - R.C.W.A.

§§ 46.61.502 and 46.61.504

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §22;

R.C.W.A. §3.66.010 (jury

trial).

44)

45)

West Virginia

Wisconsin

46) **Wyoming

App. 8

: D.WL - Code §17C-5-2(d)

Jury Trial — Conistitution, Bill

of Rights, Art. 3, §14; W.V.C.

§ 50-5-8; Champ v. McGhee,

270 S.E.2d 445 (WV 1980).

: D.W.I. - Wis. Stat.

§§ 346.63(1) and 346.65

Jury Trial — Wis. Stat. §345.43.

: D.W.I. - Wyoming Statutes

Annotated §31-5-233

Jury Trial - Constitution, Dec-

laration of Rights, Art. 1, §§ 9

and 10; City of Casper v.

Cheatam, 739 P.2d 1222 (Wyo.

1987); Lapp v. City of Worland,

612 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1980).

NO JURY TRIAL

Nevada

Louisiana

District of

Columbia

New Mexico

: Case at bar.

: D.W.L - L.S.A. - R.S. 14.98

Jury Trial - not available -

L.S.A. C.Cr.P. art. 779.

: D.W.L - Code §40-716

Jury Trial - not available -

Code §16-705; Alston v. United

States, 509 A.2d 1129 (D.C.

App. 1986).

: D.W.L - NMSA §66-8-102

Jury Trial - not available -

NMSA §34-8A-5; Vallejos v.

Barnhart, 102 N.M. 438, 697

P.2d 121 (1985); Hamilton v.

Walker, 65 N.M. 470, 340 P.2d

407 (1959).

New Jersey

App. 9

: D.W.L - N.J.S.A. 39:4-50

Jury Trial - not available -

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4; State v. Zoppi,

483 A.2d 844 (N.J. Super. L.

1984).

FEDERAL STATUTE

18 U.S.C.A. §1

- 6 months incarceration 1nd

fine of $5000

App. 10

APPENDIX “B”

Table 1.56

Criminal sanctions, administrative licensing actions, and related

actions for driving while intoxicated offenses

By jurisdiction, as of Janury 1986

Administrative

Criminal Sanctions licensing actions Other actions

c Sal

- Fs 2 g 3 § 2

Ec & > Es 7

c os 3

E PS , = § same > seas cS

Sg ao 5 E E) & & = 3S ; i : E

c ae | ao) 4 x ;

— Hie id | 1 HAAG

Jurisdiction oa - 2 i sé U ~ s aEss §

Alabama S a Ss Sa (b) ¥ s s S

Alaska S S S Ss S S s s be

Arizona s S S S S (b) S s be 5

Arkansas S S S s s S s

California S S S S (b) s s 5 s

Colorado S a S S (c) S S¢ 5 be

Connecticut S S S S (e) s s s s

Delaware S (f) S S s s S s Se

District of

Columbia S S 5 s s

Florida S y S S S se 5

Georgia S Se S Se s 5 S

Hawaii S S S s s s s

Idaho S a Ss (b) s s 2 s

Illinois S aad S se S s 5

Indiana S a Ss “ s s s > >

lowa Ss oa Ss s > s s s

Kansas S S S S s s s 5

Kentucky S sp Ss > Ss s S s Ss Ss

Louisiana S > Ss s s = s s

Maine S S s 5 5 s ()

Maryland S a s se s s s s

Massachusetts S > s be s s s S-

App. 11

jo way

h ovf b& sw

ADPDOOHS ODVHHHH BPNHHHHHHH GCbhHDDHHOOHS

“EvbdunnnHHHDSDHSODH HHED BHHED OW

DHMH HHHAHDHDHHHHADHHHHHHHHHHHOHHOSH

ond 7) nhnwvndunw wn o & oda

ow & wn a

» &S aA db Ah wnnwn EA waowd

wn D o ww “ HDA ww Ww oo

ow DODHHADHDHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHOH

Shwubvbb whe wow KD “hwnhbbow &

DODHNNDHHADHHHHHHHHUDHHHHHHHDHHSS

i MHA HHT Hi

App. 12

Note: See Note, table 1.53. “The sanctions listed for convic-

tions of alcohol driving offenses. . are those specified by

statute. If a sanction is not specified by law. . ., it is not listed”

(US. Department of Traneportation, National Highway Trafic

: US.

L | Transp 83), (pp. 1, 2)). “Term of

impracrmet” refers bth il seiences and prion sen

tences. “ The term ‘mandatory sanction’ means either a crimi-

nal sanction or an administrative licensing action which must

be imposed by either a court or administrative agency”

(Source, p. 1-1). “Pre-conviction licensing action” refers to

provisions which enable the State licensing agency to suspend

a license prior to conviction based on blood alcohol concentra-

tion level. “Mandatory minimum term of withdrawal” refers

to a mandatory minimum term of either license suspension or

revocation. Because of variation among the jurisdictions

within categories of sanctions, e.g., terms of imprisonment or

amounts of fines, the Source document as well as individual

jurisdictions’ statutes should be consulted. In the table, “S”

indicates that such a provision is provided expressly by stat-

ute. Statutes should be consulted for the full text and meaning

of specific provisions.

* Not for first offense but may apply to second and/or subse-

quent offenses.

> May be required where involved in accident causing dam-

ages, injury, or death.

¢ Administrative per se with a blood concentration level of

0.15 percent; the period of license revocation is 1 year.

4 Where there has been a previous conviction or if defendant

is under 21 years of ago.

the driver has a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.10

percent or more.

‘ These minimum sanctions may not be suspended by the

Court; the law is silent as to prohibiting the Court from

placing a person on probation.

& Yes, but only if convicted of driving with suspended or

revoked license.

» First offense only.

‘ In lieu of fine.

) In lieu of for first offense and in lieu of fine for

second and subsequent offenses.

driving while intoxicated offenses.

' After two-thirds of license suspension period has passed,

offender may be issued a license if they have completed an

alcohol education/treatment program. Special provisions

apply.

™ If defendant consents.

" A limited license may be issued for employment purposes

or attendance at an alcohol treatment program.

PEERS CD SURITED CP CS GRE CEG Comm.

P In lieu of

4 Applies 10 all offenses, however, injury must have been

intentionally inflicted for the victim to be compensated.

‘ Administrative per se with a blood alcohol concentration

level of 0.13 percent; the period of revocation varies with

number and type of alcohol related convictions.

* Except for the driving while intoxicated death or bodily

injury offense.

‘ Where there is serious bodily injury or a 0.20 percent blood

alcohol level.

“ To be paid by the defendant if a sentence is either sus-

pended or deferred.

v Where there has been a previous conviction. Also, license

may be seized if the blood alcohol concentration level is 0.10

percent or above.

~ May be imposed if defendant is an alcoholic or suffering

from acute alcohol intoxication.

Sources: U.S. Department of Transportation, National High-

way Traffic Safety Administration, of State Alcohol-

wa Related ”

a a

pp. 3-1—3-379. Table adapted by SOURCEBOOK staff.

App. 13

APPENDIX “C”

METHOD OF MISDEMEANOR DISPOSITION IN

REPORTING STATE TRIAL COURTS IN 1985!

Total Trial

State and Court Jurisdiction dispositions Jury § Nonjury

Alaska: -

a L 25,689) 442) 239)

Arizona:

Municipal ................ L 100,587 232 4,186

Justice of

iD bax, oksaceeses L 29,861 7 2,079

California:

Municipal ................ L 541,614 3,512) 6,129)

Es L 43,461) 337) 1,657)

Colorado:

GE ccccveveccoccesens L 29,7884 2944 7874

Connecticut:

Superior ..........6.0005: G 116,916) 229) 523)

Delaware:

le hdeheepeenesoes G 4,142) 340) 36

Court of Common Pleas a 14,909 1034 N/A

Florida:

Dtindhckéeeseuceseses G 160,112) 3,123) 618)

GED cncecccccccccceces L 239,754 1,023 5,461

Hawai.

ee G 2071 317i 165)

Dh. skbbnaheseeees cs L 24,450! N/A N/A

1 Statistics provided by “The Court Statistics and Information Manage-

ment Project of the National Center for State Courts, 1988.” 300 Newport

Avenue, Williamsburg, Virginia 23187-8798.

Total Trial__ Total Trial

State and Court Jurisdiction dispositions jury § Nonjury State and Court Jurisdiction dispositions jury § Nonjury

Idaho: Pennsylvania:

District... ......0.ccceeeee G 34,258) N/A N/A Court of Common Pleas .. G 91,482) 3,571) 6,034)

District Justice............ L 298,574) N/A 51533)

Indiana

Superior and South Carolina:

CUCU. sccecccceeees G 18,1714 144 39" Magistrate................ L 104,788 233 = 59,488)

(County Court

function) 1D 938) South Dakota:

City and Town........... L 26,856") N/A 5,7524 ee a G 13,7364 115 105%

Municipal Court

of Marion Cty........-. L 44,831) 73) 18,4691 Sate

TT L 38,5334 945-2 AA PM Giseesanneteds G 12,666 41 291

Dv ccescccccececes L 350,699" 764 102,450!

Kansas: Justice of the Peace....... L 347,822! 591! 40,244

District...........ccce00e: G 16,250) 207) 548) County-Level............. L 222,870) 2,236) 2,598)

Michigan: Utah:

Se G 43,619) 2,310 2,273) i G 3,716) 276) 100)

ii aicsasnenbones L 187,220 1,608" 7,939" eae L 28,9749 361) 5,550)

Municipal...........000+: L 1,949 2 38") Justice of the Peace....... L 34,399 23 1,724

Missouri: Vermont:

Tn dissencatdtnedses G 2,438 182 707 Eee G 17,335) 203 97)

(circuit

judges) Virginia:

58,772 N/A 3,995 SLES EE G 23,322 758 6,750

(Assoc.

circuit West Virginia:

judges) Eee G 1,872 67 N/A

North Carolina: Wisconsin:

Superior .... 6... sce eeeees G 30,366! 1,456) N/A Ptinnisseacasesebada G 29,869 297 343

Ohio: , — on 10,200 District of Columbia:

Municipal .........6.0665- ’ CIEE ccccccccevccccces G 943 694 5

a. saiceaainiaaaeai L 24,309) 125) 1,841) 22, 71

Puerto Rico:

Oklahoma: DEED ccccccccccccceses 7,773) 61 1,734

Re G 29,631) 183) 862) — B. . a =

App. 16

Footnotes:

N/A = Data are not available.

* Court Jurisdiction:

Delaware - Court of Common Pleas - Jury trials are not handled in the

New Castle County Court of Common Pleas; jury trials for criminal

cases are held in Kent and Sussex Counties. If a jury demand is made

in New Castle County, the case is transferred to the Superior Court.

Data are incomplete:

Colorado - County Court - Data do not include figures from Denver

County Court (2nd District).

Hawaii - Circuit Court - Criminal data do not include reopened prior

cases included in the unclassified civil category.

- District Court - Misdemeanor data do not include some criminal

cases that could not be separated from the ordinance violation cases.

Indiana - Superior and Circuit Court - There were 13,546 dispositions

that could not be identified by case type and are not include in these

data.

These cases include matters where an adjudication is made, but the

formalities of a trial are not involved.

- City and Town Court - There were 1,153 disposed cases that were

not identified by category. These figures are not included in these

data.

Total trial data do not include jury figures.

~ County Court - There are 3,814 disposed cases that could not be

identified by case type and are not included in these data. These

cases include matters where an adjudication is made, but the for-

malities of a trial are not involved.

Michigan - District Court - Figures do not include data from the City of

Dearborn. Two other courts did not report data for the entire year.

~ Municipal Court - Municipal courts for Grosse Pointe Municipal

and Grosse Pointe Shores did not report data.

South Carolina - te Court - Data do not include acquittals.

South Dakota - Circuit Court - Misdemeanor data do not include Class 2

misdemeanors or Class 1 preliminary hearings.

Texas - District Court - Nonjury criminal trial data do not include guilty

pleas accepted during a bench trial.

~ Municipal Court - Data represent 7,473 reports out of a possible

1u,092 (reporting rate of 74 percent).

~ Justice of the Peace Court - Data represent 8,428 Justice of the Peace

App. 17

Court monthly reports out of a possible 11,616; a reporting rate of 73

percent.

Utah - Circuit Court - Felony/misdemeanor disposed data do not

include criminal traffic cases.

Explanation of data:

Alaska — District Court - Misdemeanor data include ordinance violation,

misdemeanor traffic cases and DWI/DUI cases.

California - Municipal Court - Misdemeanor data include some ordi-

nance violation cases.

— Justice Court - Misdemeanor data include some ordinance violation

cases.

Colorado - County Court - Misdemeanor data include de novo criminal!

appeals.

Connecticut - Superior Court - Felony/ misdemeanor data include Part D

felony cases and ordinance violation cases.

Delaware - Superior Court - Felony / misdemeanor disposed data include

appeals that are tried do novo.

Florida — Circuit Court - Felony/misdemeanor data include DWI/DUI

and miscellaneous criminal cases. All defendants were charged with at

least one felony, but may also be charged with misdemeanors, DWI/

DUI and miscellaneous criminal violations.

Hawaii - Circuit Court - Misdemeanor data include felony cases.

Idaho - District Court - Misdemeanor data include ordinance violation

cases.

Indiana - Superior and Circuit Court - Misdemeanor data include DWI/

DUI cases.

- City Court and Town Court - Misdemeanor data include DWI/DUI

cases. d

~ Municipal Court of Marion County - Misdemeanor data include

DWI/DUI cases.

- County Court - Misdemeanor data include DWI/DUI cases.

Kansas - District Court - Misdemeanor data include appeal cases from

the lower courts.

Michigan Circuit Court - Felony/misdemeanor data include 3rd offense

DWI/DUI cases.

- District Court - Misdemeanor data include ordinance violations.

- Municipal court - Misdemeanor data include ordinance violation

cases.

North Carolina - Superior Court - Misdemeanor data include criminal

appeal disposed cases.

App. 18

Ohio - Municipal Court - Misdemeanor data include appeal and ordi-

nance violation cases.

~ County Court - Misdemeanor data include criminal appeals and

ordinance violation cases.

Oklahoma - District Court - Misdemeanor data include some miscella-

neous criminal, all criminal appeal, and all ordinance violation cases.

Pennsylvania - Court of Common Pleas - Felony/misdemeanor data

include DWI/DUI and criminal appeal cases.

- District Justice Court - Triable misdemeanor data include ordinance

violation cases.

South Carolina - Magistrate Court —- Data include jury acquittals.

South Dakota - Circuit Court - Misdemeanor data include some criminal

appeals cases. Misdemeanor disposed data include DWI/DUI dis-

posed cases.

Texas — District Court - Pretrial guilty pleas include those received

during bench trials. In addition to jury and nonjury trials, there were

also 6 directed verdicts which are not reflected in the total.

~ County Level Court - Misdemeanor disposed data include criminal

and other criminal appeals cases. Data also include criminal and

traffic appeals cases from the lower courts in Dallas County. In

addition to jury and nonjury trials, there were also 58 directed

verdicts which are not reflected in the total.

Utah District Court - Felony/misdemeanor data include criminal

appeals cases.

- Circuit Court - Felony/misdemeanor data include some miscella-

neous criminal cascs.

Vermont — District Court - Misdemeanor data include ordinance viola-

tion cases and DWI/DUI cases.

Virginia —- Circuit Court - Misdemeanor data include criminal appeals

and ordinance violation cases.

Puerto Rico - Superior Court - Appeals of trial court cases are included

according to the case type for caseload inventories, trial and disposi-

tion data.

- District Court - Misdemeanor data include ordinance violation

cases.

by Jury Trial

Cases Disposed

Disposed by

Jury Trial

Number of Cases Percentage of

DWI/DUI Cases

Disposed

Jurisdiction

State /Court

App. 19

APPENDIX “D”

DWI/DUI Jury Trials in State Trial Courts, 1985!

Ss 6k Ss &S § e s &&

- 4. th ft

“3 -

Sg § 88 & 8288 8

ba . ie ws "Ee = oc

U U U ad al U 'é) ad ad al

8 8 § 3848 8 §& 826

abel 22 0lh shel Jl;

e056 36325 8 58 66 £03 B

' Statistics provided by “The Court Statistics and Informa-

tion Management Project of the National Center for State

Courts, 1988.” 300 Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, Virginia

23187-8798.

2 Clearly under-reported.

5.1%

323

311

13,517

Circuit Court

WISCONSIN

2.4%

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.