Record and brief — Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council
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No. 87-1703-CFX Title: F. Dale Robertson, Chief of the Forest Service, et
Status: GRANTED al., Petitioners
Vv.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al.
Docketed:
April 14, 1988 Court: United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Vide:
87-1704 Counsel for petitioner: Solicitor General
Counsel for respondent: Amster,Glenn J., Bricklin,David A. ,
Entry Date Note Proceedings and Orders
1 Feb 17 1988 Application for extension of time to file petition and
order granting same until March 30, 1988 (O’Connor,
February 18, 1988).
2 Mar 18 1988 Application for further extension of time to file
petition and order granting same until April 14, 1988
(O’Connor, March 23, 1988).
3 Apr 14 1988 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.
4 May 6 1988 =< respondent Methow Recreation, Inc. in opposition
filed.
6 May 8 1988 Order extending time to file response to petition until
June 1, 1988.
7 Jun 1 1988 Brief of respondents Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al.
in opposition filed.
8 Jun 7 1988 DISTRIBUTED. June 23, 1988
9 Jun 14 1988 X Reply brief of petitioner F. Dale Robertson, Chief filed.
10 Jun 27 1988 Petition GRANTED. The case is consolidated with 87-1704,
and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.
PT UC TITTLE LILLE LLL eee
li Aug 3 1988 G Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with
printing the joint appendix filed.
13. Aug 3 1988 urder extending time to file brief of petitioner on the
merits until r 10, 1988.
14 Aug 10 1988 G Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a
brief as amicus curiae filed.
15 Sep 9 1988 Brief amicus curiae of Institute of Law and Public Helath
Protection filed. VIDED.
18 Sep 9 1988 Brief of respondent Methow Recreation, Inc. filed.
20 Sep 9 1988 Order extending time to file brief of petitioner on the
merits until September 13, 1988.
17 Sep 13 1988 Brief of petitioner F. Dale Robertson, Chief filed.
16 Sep 14 1988 Box of Lodgings received.
22 Sep 19 1988 Order extending time to file brief of respondent on the
merits until November 14, 1988.
25 Oct 1 1988 D Motion of respondents Oregon Natural Resources Council,
et al. for divided argument filed.
23 Oct 3 1988 Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with
printing the — appendix GRANTED.
24 Oct 3 1988 Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a
brief as amicus curiae GRANTED.
26 Oct 11 1988 Motion of respondents Oregon Natural Resources Council,
et al. for divided argument DENIED.
No. 87-1703-CFX
Entry Date
Note
Proceedings and Orders
Jan
SET FOR ARGUMENT. Monday, January 9, 1989. This case is
consolidated with 87-1704. (ist case) (1 hr.)
Extension of time to file t itten brief of
re Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al. (No.
87-1703) extended to November 17, 1988. Printed copies
to be filed and served November 21, 1988. Extension is
limited to respondents in No. 87-1703 and is not ‘
extended to any emicus curiae parties.
Lodging received.
Brief amicus curiae of International Association of Fish and
Wildlife Agencies filed. VIDED.
Brief amici curiae of California, et al. filed. VIDED.
Brief amicus curiae of Center for Environmental Education
filed. VIDED.
Brief amici curiae of National Wildlife Federation, et al.
filed.
Brief amicus curiae of American Planning Association filed.
Brief of respondents Methow Valley Citizens Counsel, et al.
filed.
CIRCULATED.
Lodging received.
X Reply brief of petitioner F. Dale Robertson, Chief filed.
ARGUED.
PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
Supreme Court, US.
EILED
F. DALE ROBERTSON, CHIEF OF THE
FOREST SERVICE, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
MeTHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
ROGER J. MARZULLA
Assistant Attorney General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
JEFFREY P. MINEAR
Assistant to the Solicitor General
PETER R. STEENLAND, JR.
Vick! L. PLAUT
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
QUESTIONS PRESEN. D
1. Whether the National Environmental Policy Act re-
quires federal agencies to include in each environmental
impact statement: (a) a fully developed pian to mitigate
environmental harm; and (b) a “worst case” analysis of
potential environmental harm if relevant information con-
cerning significant environmental effects is unavailable or
too costly to obtain.
2. Whether the Forest Service may issue a special use
permit for recreational use of national forest land in the
absence of a fully developed plan to mitigate environ-
mental harm.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Ce 1
ee ee ee 1
Statutory provisions and regulations involved .............. 2
ee eee eee ed dis ccc eccceenees 2
Reasons for granting the petition ......................... 12
isan Nese neeeaeeseSGdencuses se oscesectcees 24
DE iiidccecbeneheedstédeeeseseeeecesesceednae la
i iivhadt ddedhawsekdebeseeeéheesacucésvnns 20a
eS te ne Cie ei tee seadethennddeenee 48a
sade db ddan geeceeseseebotesedscecoceseceswus 49a
ee de Teens ek ee cesnquaneeceeatess 63a
EEE Oe ee a ee ee 72a
esc s i sdkb cn cVeddibdbhthetevetndaGeS CastEtees 73a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1982) ........... 16
Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated
sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n vy. Alaska, 439
ee can cc eeeanseees 19
American Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry.,
CC EE ee 21
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) ............. 14, 21
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) .... 2.2... eee 13, 17
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410
EEE Oe 23
Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d
ES el a 19
Clark v. Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays,
Inc., cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984) .............. 20
Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d
EE 18
lV
Cases — Continued: Page
Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (%h Cir.
BD cicccccddsccnccneseeensebaceccéecestessess 18
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) ............. 13, 15
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986) ..... ©. 6 6 eee 23
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,
795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, No. 86-1013
Baas 4, THBP cc cccccccccccccescccccccssccecceses 16
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d
ft Le rrrrrriTiT rrr 11, 12, 16,
20, 22, 23, 24
River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 764 F.2d
445 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055 (1986) . 18
Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684
- | f ). 5 a errrrrrrrri rity 18
Scientists’ Irstitute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC,
458 B.28 GETD GAL. Git. TEES ce ccccccccccccccsccscs 19
Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir. 1983) ....... 19
Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v.
Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 694
WAS, GRD d doc cccccccscasescoesvcecconsess 18-19, 20
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Haw.
1974), rev’d, 533 F.2d 434 (%h Cir.), cert. denied, 429
FS a Pree rere rT i 11, 14-15
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
Ce BED cncccenccecéecécesecedaccueeeees 15, 17-18
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) ......... 23
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) ...... 12, 13, 15
Statutes and regulations:
Act of Oct. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-544, 82 Stat. 926:
7 § 9 2enNehei ia ay 3
SS, Re PD cnc ccccccvccccnecesseesese 3
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV)
GED ccdawdccecddiancdesddredscsaceussstrcess 12
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 ef seg. ... 2... 6 ee ee. 9
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, § 1, 16 U.S.C.
GED sccsccedccccssucesescabactcocsaseseseseceess 3
V
Statutes and regulations — Continued: Page
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
SE tek Gite cacdbantavedbdéeeetecéaucns 2
§ 102, 42 U.S.C. 4332 .................... 2, 4, 11, 14, 16
§ 102(2M(C), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2KC) .... 5, 13
ELIT TERT 14
National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
Sa aah ekGtbemnnBongeedscneecsscetcecceccecs 9
EE aay 3
Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
ER 4
nk 4
ee 4
SR ae a a a 10
36 C.F.R.:
I ee ORS: A 7)
a ee 4
ee 7Sa
ED ons cc cccccvccecectceencane 12, 75a
es Jtdeweeneae 75a
Section 251.56(a)(IMii) ..................... 12, 21, 75a
40 C.F.R.:
ET Suis bcc ece ceckecdvededdlavessas 17
i oe ns nue ch usecctedcedius 17
Ne ee 2 ee ae 17
ne ee 15
I i 15
can con cvecesadcriracas 17
ee 18, 74a
en ee 20, 73a
ES ceo otk) 15
ED a4 onan cn cs penecnacecenncucceuus 15
Miscellaneous:
D. Dannenbring & M. Starr, Management Science: An
ER ee 16
45 Fed. Reg. 38324 (1980) ........................... 22
49 Fed. Reg. te eta! eb eS oe) Ta 4
Pw OOD. TED, SERPS CITED oo. ccc ccc ccc cccccccccces 20
vi
Miscellaneous — Continued: Page
$0 Fed. Reg. 32236 (1985) ... 6.6.6 nnes 20, 21
51 Fed. Reg. (1986):
®. 1SGIG 2... cece cece cece eee ererennnneeeenees 19-20
pp. 19619-19620 .... 1.2.6 eee eee eee ee enenes 20
an bY. | rr 19-20
1963 Forest Service Manual ....... . 6. 6 oc wenn 22
H.R. Rep. 99-709, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1 (1986) ..... 3
S. Rep. 98-461, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) ..........-.
Wilkinson & Andersen, Land and Resource Planning in
the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1985) ......... 18
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1987
No.
F. DALE ROBERTSON, CHIEF OF THE
FOREST SERVICE, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
The Solicitor General, on behalf of F. Dale Robertson,
Chief of the Forest Service, et al., petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,
la-19a) is reported at 833 F.2d 810. The opinion of the
district court (App., infra, 20a-47a) is unreported.
The court of appeals entered its judgment (App., infra,
72a) on December 1, 1987. On February 18, 1988, Justice
O’Connor extended the time for filing a petition for a writ
of certiorari to and including March 30, 1988. On March
23, 1988, Justice O’Connor further extended the time for
filing the petition to and including April 14, 1988. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
(1)
2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4332, provides, in relevant part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the
fullest extent possible: * * * (2) all agencies of the
Federal Government shall —
(C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on —
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be im-
plemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man’s environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitments of resources which would be involved
in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Pertinent excerpts from the regulations involved in this
case are reproduced in an appendix to this petition (App.,
infra, 73a-76a).
STATEMENT
Petitioners seek review of a court of appeals decision
reversing a magistrate’s determination that the Forest
Service had fully complied with the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 ef seq.,
3
and its own regulations in deciding to issue a special use
permit for the proposed Early Winters Ski Resort in the
Okanogan National Forest.
1. Congress has created a National Forest System and
entrusted its management to the Department of Agricul-
ture’s Forest Service. See National Forest Management
Act of 1976, § 2, 16 U.S.C. 1600. Congress has specifi-
cally directed the Forest Service to administer the national
forests “for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes.” Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960, § 1, 16 U.S.C. 528. As part of this
multiple-use program, the Forest Service has permitted
development of 170 alpine ski areas within these federally
reserved lands. See H.R. Rep. 99-709, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. Pt. 1, at 2 (1986). The ski seas, which occupy less
than 1/20th of 1% of the national forest lands, account
for more than 6% of recreational visitor use (ibid.).
In 1968, Congress established the North Cascades Na-
tional Park and directed the Secretary of the Interior and
the Secretary of Agriculture to designate portions of that
enclave and adjacent national forests for public uses, in-
cluding camping and ski areas. Act of Oct. 2, 1968,
§§ 101, 504, 16 U.S.C. 90, 90d-3. Pursuant to this specific
congressional directive, the Forest Service prepared a
report entitled the North Cascades Winter Sports Study
(hereinafter North Cascades Study| to compare existing
and potential ski areas in the North Cascades and to
recommend further development alternatives. The North
Cascades Study, which was completed in 1970, concluded
that existing ski areas should be expanded and identified a
single site as suitable for development of a “major destina-
4
tion ski resort.”' That site is a 6,000-foot mountain in the
Okanogan National Forest known as Sandy Butte.
In 1978, Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI), applied to the
Forest Service for a “special use” permit, pursuant to 36
C.F.R. 251.50, to develop an alpine ski resort at Sandy
Butte, to be known as Early Winters. In response, the
Forest Service prepared an environmental impact state-
ment, known as the Early Winters Study, in accordance
with Section 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332, to assess the
environmental consequences of the proposed develop-
ment.? The Early Winters Study was the first in a series of
' A major destination ski resort is a large, multi-season ski area
with sufficient ski runs, adequate vertical rise, sufficiently varied ac-
tivities and appropriate high-quality base facilities to entice vaca-
tioners to travel long distances and to stay several days at the site.
2 This final environmental impact statement — formally entitled the
Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study and sometimes referred to
as an “FEIS” — was released on August 31, 1934 (49 Fed. Reg. 34575).
The Forest Service completed and circulate. a draft environmental
impact statement in 1982, but delayed release of the statement and a
decision on MRI's permit application while Congress considered in-
cluding Sandy Butte in a proposed wilderness designation. On July 3,
1984, Congress passed the Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 296 ~° signating as wilderness certain
portions of the National Forest System in Washington — not including
Sandy Butte — and directing (§ 2(b), 98 Stat. 299) that “other National
Forest System lands in the State of Washington be available for non-
wilderness multiple uses.” The Senate Report accompanying the Act
spoke directly to the issue of further development at Sandy Butte (S.
Rep. 98-461, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1984)):
That area of the Okanogan National Forest known as Sandy
Butte has been excluded from wilderness designation in S. 837.
*** The designation by Congress in S. 837 of appropriate
wilderness areas in Washington State makes it unnecessary to fur-
ther withhold the Sandy Butte/Early Winters Alpine Winter
Sports Siudy FEIS pending completion of the Okanogan Forest
Plan. The Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture are
5
steps that had to be completed before issuance of a special
use permit. Early Winters Study xvi.’
2. The Early Winters Study explained that its purpose
was to provide the Forest Service with “the information re-
quired to evaluate the potential for skiing at Early
Winters, to assist in making a decision whether to issue a
special use permit for downhill skiing on all or part” of
Sandy Butte. Early Winters Study 1. The Study considered
five alternative levels of development in detail, including a
“no action” alternative, and identified the second highest
directed to allow the evaluation process for the Sandy Butte
development to proceed without additional delay * * *.
For the Court's convenience, we have lodged a copy of the Early
Winters Study with tne Clerk of the Court.
> The Forest Service generally reviews special use permit applica-
tions for major developments through a two-stage process. In the first
stage, the Forest Service examines the general environmental and
financial feasibility of the proposed development. The environmental
study is usually conducted through the preparation of an environmen-
tal impact statement in accordance with NEPA’s requirements
(§ 102(2MC), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2KC)), while financial feasibility is
determined through a conventional assessment of the developer's
resources. Once the Forest Service determines that a general scheme
for development is environmentally sound and financially feasible, the
Forest Service may issue a special use permit to plan, construct, main-
tain, and operate the development. However, prior to any construc-
tion activity, the Forest Service must approve the developer's master
plan for development, construction, and operation of the project. In
the second stage, the Forest Service reviews the developer's proposed
master plan. Based on this plan, (he Forest Service also completes an
additional environmental analysis of on-site impacts. Only after com-
pletion of the second environmental analysis and final approval of the
completed master plan may the developer begin construction. All con-
struction and operation of the facility must be in accordance with the
master plan and the permit’s other requirements.
6
level—serving up to 8,200 skiers at one time—as the
preferred development option (id. at 6-22).‘
The Early Winters Study made clear that a decision to
‘go forward with a ski resort would not result directly in
development; rather, “(further environmental analysis
and review will be required prior to any decision by the
Forest Service to allow a specific development at Early
Winters, and by the responsible state and local govern-
ment agencies, prior to any authorization to develop non-
Forest Service lands.” Early Winters Study |. Following is-
suance of a special use permit, the developer would have
to submit a detailed mountain and base development plan
for the Forest Service’s approval, providing the precise ski
area design (id. at xvi). At this stage, the Study explained,
site-specific mitigation plans would be required (ibid.).
Although it was too early to design a detailed mitigation
plan, it was not too early to identify significant anticipated
effects that major development might have on Sandy
Butte and the surrounding communities. The Early
Winters Study evaluated the potentia! effects on air and
water quality, vegetation, wildlife, fisheries, timber
resources, socio-economic conditions, land use, recrea-
tion, transportation, and public services. Early Winters
Study 65-145. In each of these areas, the Study considered
* The alternatives ranged from maintaining the status quo (no ski
hill development) to developing a ski area capable of serving 10,500
skiers at one time. The Early Winters Study did not give detailed con-
sideration to expansion of existing ski areas at other locations or
development of new ski areas at other locations. The North Cascades
Study had considered these options and had concluded that — of 23 ex-
isting and potential sites — Sandy Butte was the only site in the State of
Washington suitable for development as a major ski area. See Early
Winters Study 6-7; see also App., infra, Sla-S2a.
7
both the impacts within and outside the National Forest,
denominating On-site impacts as primary and off-site im-
pacts as secondary (ibid.).°
The Study concluded that all of the alternatives, in-
cluding the “no action” option, would adversely affect
Methow Valley’s mule deer population and the region’s air
quality. In the case of the mule deer, the Study observed
that the ski resort itself could reduce their range and fawn-
ing habitat but that, even if the ski resort were not built, the
anticipated growth in human population on surrounding
non-federal land would disturb the mule deer herds. Early
Winters Study 75-76. In the case of air quality, the Study
concluded that the construction and operation of the ski
resort would not have a measurable impact, but the secon-
dary impacts from development of nearby private land
would have a significant effect that would increase with
successive levels of development (id. at 65-67). In both
cases, the Study identified measures to reduce or eliminate
the adverse effects (id. at 14-18, 68-69, 77-78). The Study
specifically cautioned, however, that these suggestions were
conceptual, that they would be made more specific in
subsequent steps of the planning process, and that addi-
tional mitigation measures might be required (id. at 14).*
* The Study acknowledged that the evaluation of off-site impacts
was hampered by the absence of any specific development plans.
“Since there are no pending proposals or plans to develop off-site
lands, the evaluation of off-site impacts is not site-specific. It is
general in nature, acknowledging to the extent practicable the impacts
associated with the growth that is likely to be induced by development
of Sandy Butte for skiing. The evaluation of off-site impacts {is} in-
cluded to provide a more complete picture of the likely effects of ski
development at Early Winters and alert other jurisdictions to decisions
to [be] made.” Early Winters Study 1-3.
* The Study suggested that on-site wildlife effects could be
mitigated by locating runs, lifts, and roads in a minimally disruptive
manner and by restricting travel and other activities in sensitive areas
3. The Regional Forester reviewed the Early Winters
Study and concurred in the Study’s recommendation sup-
porting a ski resort capable of serving 8,200 skiers at one
time. He accordingly issued a decision, on July 5, 1984, to
seek a qualified developer (App., infra, 63a-7la).’ The
Regional Forester explained that the highest development
alternative (serving up to 10,500 skiers at one time) “would
provide maximum utilization of the recreation resource
opportunities and increased economic benefit to the area”
(id. at 65a), and that the “no action” alternative “would
cause the least disruption to the natural environment”
(ibid.), but the selected alternative “provides a balance of
concerns for the physical and biological components of
the human environment in addition to concerns for social
and economic welfare” (ibid.). He further observed that
adverse environmental effects would result from all of the
alternatives, including the “no action” option, that these
adverse effects would result almost exclusively from off-
site development, and that “[p]jractical measures to reduce
during fawning season (Early Winters Study 14-16). The Study
repeated that “[s}pecific mitigation for wildlife at the ski development
can only be determined in review of the Master Plan” (id. at 16). The
’ This decision was an important but preliminary step in the permit-
ting process. See note 3, supra. It established that development of a
certain size and character was environmentally feasible and preferable
to other alternatives, but it did not determine whether MRI (which ini-
tially proposed the development) or some other applicant would
qualify for or obtain the special use permit.
the adverse impacts have been, or are in the process of
being, implemented by Okanogan County” (id. at 67a).*
On October 1, 1984, the Methow Valley Citizens Coun-
cil et al. (MVCC) requested, pursuant to % C.F.R.
211.18, that the Chief of the Forest Service reverse the
Regional Forester’s decision. He denied that request, with
an extensive discussion of the reasons supporting his deci-
sion, on December 16, 1985 (App., infra, 49a-62a).
MVCC then filed this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint con-
tended, among other claims, that the Early Winters Study
did not conform with NEPA's requirements, that the
Forest Service's decision to develop Sandy Butte was not in
the public interest, and that the Forest Service had violated
the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
1600 ef seqg., and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 ef seg.
The parties agreed to submit the issues to a United States
magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c).
The magistrate dismissed through summary judgment
MVCC"’s claims under the National Forest Management
Act and the Clean Air Act, and, after a hearing to supple-
ment the administrative record, he rejected all of MVCC’s
remaining claims (App., infra, 20a-48a). The magistrate
* These efforts included the development of various local restric-
tal Protection Agency, and the State Department of Ecology,
Okanogan County commuted itself to develop and enforce an air
quality ordinance and other mitigation measures necessary to main-
tain air quality within the standards of the state air quality umplemen-
tation plan. The Forest Service, in turn, agreed to ensure that
measures sufficient to maintain air Quality were in place betore allow-
ing any construction of permatted facilites at Sandy Butte See Supp.
E.R. 47.48.
10
concluded that the Forest Service's decision to go forward
with the issuance of a special use permit was unreviewable
under Ninth Circuit precedent (id. at 28a-30a); that even if
it were reviewable, it was not arbitrary and capricious (id. —
at 30a n.4); and that it did not violate due process (id. at
3ia). The magistrate next held that the Early Winters
Study satisfied NEPA's requirements for ap cavironmen-
tal impact statement (id. at 3ia-47a). He rejected MVCC’s
argument that the Srudy's discussion of alternative
development sites was inadequate (id. at 34a-38a), observ-
ing that “the North Cascades Winter Sports Study, a work
cited in the [Barly Winters Study] and available to the
public, had identified Sandy Butte as the only area in the
Okanogan Forest having good potential as a major ski
development” (id. at 37a), and that expansions of sites “a
hundred or more miles away from the Okanogan National
Forest are not reasonable alternatives” (ibid.). The
magistrate further determined that the Forest Service ade-
quately discussed the project's environmental impacts (/d.
at 38a-47a). He specifically rejected MVCC’s contentions
that the Forest Service was obligated to prepare a “worst
case” analysis of the possible impacts (id. at 40a, 45a) and
that the Early Winters Study gave insufficient analysis to
possible mitigation measures (id. at 4la-42a, 45a-46a).
4. MVCC appealed the magistrate’s decision directly
to the court of appeals (see 28 U.S.C. 636(cX(3)). The court
reversed the magistrate’s determination, holding that the
Early Winters Study failed to satisfy NEP A's requirements
and that the Forest Service's decision to issue a special use
permit was arbitrary and capricious (App., infra, 1a-19a).
The court found the Early Winters Study to be flawed in
three respects. First, the court held that the Study should
have given detailed consideration to the possibility of ex-
panding existing ski resorts as one of the alternative
development proposals, rejecting the magistrate’s deter-
11
mination that these were not feasible alternatives (App.,
infra, 8a-1la). Second, the court held that the statement
did not provide a sufficiently detailed discussion of the en-
vironmental impacts of the proposed project on mule deer
and air quality (id. at lla-16a). The court specifically
stated that if the government is unable to obtain adequate
information on the effects of the project on mule deer, the
government must conduct a “worst case” analysis of the
environmental impacts (id. at 13a, 14a).° Finally, the court
held that Section 102 of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4332) “requires
that ‘action be taken to mitigate the adverse effects of
major federal actions’” (App., infra, 17a).'° The court
specifically ruled that an environmental impact statement
must contain both a detailed plan to mitigate any adverse
environmental effects and an analysis of the plan’s effec-
tiveness (ibid.).'' Having failed to include such a detailed
plan, the Early Winters Study was “inadequate as a matter
of law” (id. at 19a).
With respect to the Forest Service’s decision to issue a
special use permit, the court acknowledged (App., infra,
3a-4a) that its prior precedent had indicated that such deci-
sions are not reviewable under the Administrative Pro-
* The cous. dased this requirement on its recent decision in Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1058-1059
(1987).
'® The court quoted Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102,
1111 (D. Haw. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
'' The court stated: “ ‘The importance of the mitigation plan can-
not be overestimated. It is a determinative factor in evaluating the
adequacy of an environmental impact statement. Without a complete
mitigation plan, the decisionmaker is unable to make an informed
judgment as to the environmental impact of the project — one of the
main purposes of an environmental impact statement.’ ” App., infra,
19a (quoting Oregon Natural Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055).
12
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 701-706. The court
concluded, however, that subsequent Forest Service
regulations had since created “ ‘law’ for this court to
apply” and that the decisions were therefore now
reviewable (App., infra, 4a-Sa). The court then held that
the relevant Forest Service regulations (36 C.F.R.
251.54(e)(4) and 36 C.F.R. 251.56(a)(1)(ii)) require “an
adequate mitigation plan” (App., infra, 5a n.3), and that
the mitigation plan contained in the Early Winters Study
was so inadequate that the “decision to grant the special
use permit could be none other than arbitrary, capricious,
and an abuse of discretion” (ibid.).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The court of appeals has departed from the teachings of
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), and
has imposed significant new NEPA obligations on federal
agencies. The court’s decision, which builds upon its prior
decision in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh,
820 F.2d 1051 (1987),'? requires all environmental impact
statements to contain detailed and demonstrably effective
mitigation plans and to include a “worst case” analysis
whenever the agency lacks information or adequate scien-
tific methodology to determine precisely a potential en-
vironmental effect. Neither NEPA nor its implementing
regulations authorize these court-created directives. The
court of appeals’ decision also incorrectly construes the
Forest Service’s special use permit regulations to impose
similar mitigation obligations. The court’s rigid new re-
quirements would actually impede the goal of informed
'2 The Solicitor General has sought review of the Oregon Natural
Resources Council decision through a petition for a writ of certiorari
filed simultaneously with this petition.
13
agency decision-making by preventing federal agencies
from carrying out their resource management respon-
sibilities through systematic project development. The
court’s clear deviation from established precedent has
great practical significance owing to the vast expanse of
federal lands and the numerous planned and potential
federal projects located within the Ninth Circuit.
1. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA directs that federal
agencies proposing actions that significantly affect the
quality of the human environment must prepare a detailed
statement on “the environmental impact of the proposed
action.” 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). This requirement serves
two purposes: First, it obligates the agency to consider the
environmental consequences of the proposed action; and
second, it assures the public that the agency has considered
environmental concerns in the decisionmaking process.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
As this Court has explained, “NEPA does set forth
significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its man-
date to the agencies is essentially procedural.” Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 558. Further-
more, “the only procedural requirements imposed by
NEPA are those stated in the plain language of the Act”
(id. at 548). “The procedural duty imposed upon agencies
by [Section 102(2)(C)] is quite precise, and the role of the
courts in enforcing that duty is similarly precise.” Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976). “The only role
for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard
look’ at environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject
itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the
choice of the action to be taken’ ” (id. at 410 n.21 (citation
omitted)). Furthermore, the courts should defer to the
judgment of the Council on Environmental Quality
14
(CEQ)—the agency responsible for assuring proper im-
plementation of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4344) — which has pro-
mulgated regulations for preparing environmental impact
statements. “CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to
substantial deference.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.
347, 358 (1979).
The court of appeals ignored these established principles
and, relying solely on its own precedent, created two
significant new NEPA requirements. The court incorrectly
held that an agency must include in every environmental
impact statement (a) a fully developed plan to mitigate en-
vironmental harm; and (b) a “worst case” analysis of
potential environmental harm if relevant information con-
cerning significant environmental effects is unavailable or
too costly to obtain.'*
a. The court of appeals based its mitigation require-
ment on the fundamentally mistaken premise that Section
102 of NEPA “requires that ‘action be taken to mitigate
the adverse effects of major federal actions’ ” (App., in-
fra, 17a (citation omitted)). Neither Section 102, nor this
Court’s decisions interpreting that provision, impose any
such requirement. The court obtained its proposition from
a 1974 district court decision, Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar,
389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Haw.), that was reversed
') We believe that the court of appeals also erred in holding that the
Early Winters Study’s discussion of development alternatives was in-
adequate, but we do not press that question in this Court. The court
appears to have agreed that the reasonableness of the alternatives
depends essentially upon the scope of the proposed action as defined
by the agency (App., infra, 9a). But the court proceeded to ignore the
agency’s own description of the scope of its action. Nevertheless, the
question of appropriate alternatives is somewhat factbound and less
significant than the mitigation and worst case issues. Furthermore, the
government may be able to cure that supposed deficiency on remand
without an excessive commitment of time and resources.
15
on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 999 (1976).'* The district court decision was
dubious authority even when its ink was fresh; this Court's
subsequent decisions in Vermont Yankee and Kleppe
demonstrate that the decision was quite clearly wrong.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that Section 102 re-
quires the agency to consider and inform the public of
potential environmental impacts; it does not require the
agency to “elevate environmental concerns over other ap-
propriate considerations.” Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
The court of appeals’ imposition of a substantive duty
to mitigate environmental harm is also inconsistent with
the CEQ regulations implementing NEPA. Those regula-
tions require an agency to identify mitigation possibilities
in the environmental impact statement in the course of
discussing project alternatives and the resulting en-
vironmental effects. See 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h).
In addition, an agency must state, as part of its ultimate
decision, whether it has adopted mitigation measures (40
C.F.R. 1505.2) and, if it has, it must implement those
measures (40 C.F.R. 1505.3). These regulations ensure
that decisionmakers consider opportunities to mitigate en-
vironmental harm, but they do not impose a duty to adopt
such measures. The decision whether to adopt mitigation
measures, like the decision whether to go forward with the
project itself, is left to the expert agency's informed discre-
tion. Compare Sirycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council,
Inc., 444 U.S. at 227; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp., 435 U.S. at 558; Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n.20.
'* The district court decision in Stop H-3 states, without any cita-
tion of authority, that “NEPA implies a requirement that action be
taken to mitigate the adverse effects of major federal actions.” 389 F.
Supp. at 1111 (emphasis added).
16
The court of appeals not only imposed a new substan-
tive duty to mitigate environmental harm, it also imposed
a concomitant procedural obligation — derived solely from
its own precedents—to develop a “ ‘complete mitigation
plan’” (App., infra, 19a (quoting Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055)).'* As in the case of
the substantive duty to mitigate harm, this procedural re-
quirement to develop a detailed mitigation plan finds no
source in Section 102 of NEPA. The CEQ’s implementing
regulations recognize that potential mitigation measures
should be identified—as was done here (see pages 6-7,
supra)—but they do not require development of a com-
plete mitigation plan. The court’s blanket statements that
the “‘importance of a mitigation plan cannot be
overestimated’” (App., infra, 19a (quoting Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055)) and that
“ ‘ijt is a determinative factor in evaluating the adequacy
of an environmental impact statement’ ” (ibid.) find no
support whatsoever in NEPA or the CEQ regulations.
The court of appeals’ decision on this score would have
severe consequences. As the facts of this case demonstrate,
the decision would prevent an agency from evaluating the
environmental consequences of a proposed project
through the familiar and sensible concept of staged project
development.'* In particular, it would prevent an agency
'S The court first suggested that agencies must provide a detailed
discussion of mitigation measures in Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-
tective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 697 (Sth Cir. 1985), cert.
granted on other grounds, No. 86-1013 (May 4, 1987). That case cited
Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 1982), which made no
mention of mitigation at all. The court later expanded the obligation
to prepare a detailed mitigation plan in Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 820 F.2d at 1055.
'* See, e.g., D. Dannenbring & M. Starr, Management Science: An
Introduction $48 (1981) (“A project is itself a combination of many
17
from making any initial feasibility determinations until the
entire project planning process has been completed and a
complete mitigation plan has been developed. This ap-
proach pervasively conflicts with the CEQ’s regulations
mandating early application of NEPA (40 C.F.R. 1501.2,
1502.5(b)), encouraging tiered environmental analysis (40
C.F.R. 1502.20), and forbidding agencies from commit-
ting resources in a manner that will bias the agency's
ultimate decision (40 C.F.R. 1502.2(f)). As a practical
matter, the court’s approach would frustrate or impede a
wide range of federal and federally permitted projects.
Here, for example, the Forest Service could offer potential
developers . assurance whatsoever that it will issue a
special use permit for the Early Winters project unti! a
developer has spent several years and millions of dollars to
provide comprehensive plans on which to base a detailed
mitigation plan. More generally, agencies would be forced
to defer complete environmental analysis until far along in
the planning process and to invest resources on a large “
scale before making even preliminary decisions. By defer-
ring the environmental analysis to satisfy the requirements
of this decision, the agencies would run the grave risk of
having proposed projects enjoined on the ground that ir-
retrievable commitments have been made without the re-
quisite environmental analysis.
“As Vermont Yankee made clear, NEPA does not re-
quire agencies to adopt any particular internal decision-
making structure.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at
100. NEPA and its implementing regulations were
deliberately structured to permit federal decisionmakers
great latitude to determine the appropriate scope of their
environmental discussion and evaluation. See, e.g.,
Strycker’s Bay Neighorborhood Council, 444 U.S. at
varied and complex tasks or activities. These tasks are interdependent
in that most cannot begin until some other task has been completed”).
227.'’ The court’s decision here would eliminate this
latitude by forcing agencies to fit all of their actions into
the court’s rigid and counterproductive formula for en-
vironmental decisionmaking. The court's formula is par-
ticularly unsuitable for federal agencies such as the Forest
Service, which must manage vast acreages of federal lands
through long-range planning techniques'* and must
therefore engage in staged decisionmaking.
b. The court of appeals also erred in concluding
(App., infra, 13a) that a “worst case” analysis is required
whenever an agency is unable to obtain information on
which to base a reasoned decision. The court noted (id. at
13a n.11) that CEQ regulations had at one time required
that environmental impact statements evaluate uncertainty
by including a “worst case analysis and an indication of
the probability or improbability of its occurrence” (40
C.F.R. 1502.22 (1985)), but that CEQ had subsequently
rescinded that requirement.'* The court determined that
the “worst case” requirement nevertheless remains in effect
because “the regulation was merely a codification of prior
NEPA easelaw” (App., infra, 13a n.11), citing its previous
decision in Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic
'” See also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837-838 (Mh
Cir. 1986); River Road Alliance, Inc. vy. Corps of Engineers, 764 F.2d
445, 448 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055 (1986); Friends of
Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (Mh Cir.
1985); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d
1041, 1047 (ist Cir. 1982).
'® See generally Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource Plan-
ning in the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
'* We have reproduced the relevant portions of CEQ’s present
regulation and the rescinded “worst case” regulation in the appendix,
infra, 73a-7Sa.
19
Sprays, Inc. v. Clark (SOCATS), 720 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984).
The SOCATS decision mistakenly derived that proposi-
tion from Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir.
1983). The question in Sigler was whether the Army Corps
of Engineers was required to comply with the CEQ regula-
tion under the particular facts of that case. The Fifth Cir-
cuit first admitted that while there is “some language in
NEPA which may be said to endorse generally the concept
of a worst case analysis” the statute’s “literal language does
not require a worst case analysis” (id. at 969). The court
next noted that a series of judicial decisions had recog-
nized that NEPA does contemplate that agencies would
engage in “ ‘[rjeasonable forecasting and speculation’ ”
concerning future environmental effects, including the
“probabilities of the occurrence” and the “ ‘cost of uncer-
tainty —i.e. the costs of proceeding without more and bet-
ter information’ ” (id. at 970).?° The court then stated that
the “CEQ’s worst case analysis merely codifies these
judicially created principles” (id. at 971). Thus, the Fifth
Circuit effectively concluded that the worst case regulation
was the CEQ’s mechanism for implementing certain
judicially recognized NEPA objectives. The court did not
hold that the worst case methodology was the only
allowable mechanism for effecting those general goals.
The CEQ has adhered to the objectives identified in
Sigler, but has determined that “the ‘worst case analysis’
requirement is an unproductive and ineffective method of
achieving those goa’s” (51 Fed. Reg. 15618, 15620
*® The court specifically cited Scientists’ Institute for Public Infor-
mation, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carolina
Envil. Study Group v. United States, $10 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir.
1975); and Alaska v. Andrus, $80 F.2d 465, 473-474 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
vacated on other grounds swh nom, Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v.
Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).
20
(1986)).2' The CEQ has therefore adopted “a wiser and
more manageable approach to the evaluation of reason-
ably foreseeable significant adverse impacts in the face of
incomplete or unavailable information” (id. at 15620).??
The court of appeals’ decisions in this case and in Oregon
Natural Resources Council effectively overrule the CEQ’s
new regulation and install worst case analysis as a perma-
nent feature of NEPA compliance.
2! The CEQ had received frequent complaints that the worst case
approach was not an effective method for addressing uncertainty and
led to excessive paperwork and delays. 51 Fed. Reg. 15619-15620
(1986). “Experts in the field of risk analysis and perception stated that
the ‘worst case analysis’ lacks defensible rationale or procedures, and
that the current regulatory language stands ‘without any discernible
link to the disciplines that have devoted so much thought and effort
toward developing rational ways to cope with problems of uncertain-
ty.” ” $0 Fed. Reg. 32234, 32236 (1985). The CEQ itself found that the
methodology “can breed endless hypothesis and speculation” (51 Fed.
Reg. 15620 (1986)) and “has proved counterproductive, because it has
led to agencies being required to devote substantial time and resources
to preparation of analyses which are not considered useful to decision-
makers and divert the EIS process from its intended purpose” (50 Fed.
Reg. 32236 (1986)). We described some of these difficulties in a
previous petition for a writ of certiorari in SOCATS. See Clark v.
Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc., cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1028 (1984) (White and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The
CEQ’s effort to alleviate these difficulties, after the denial of certiorari
in SOCATS, by revision of its regulations has now been repudiated by
the court of appeals.
22 The CEQ’s revised regulation provides that when relevant infor-
mation cannot be obtained because the costs of obtaining it are exor-
bitant or the means to obtain it are not known, the environmental im-
pact statement must identify the unavailable information and its
relevance, must summarize existing scientific information bearing on
foreseeable environmental impacts, and must contain the agency's
evaluation of those impacts based on research methods generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community. 40 C.F.R. 1502.22.
21
This aspect of the court of appeals’ decision is obviously _
contrary to this Court’s recognition in Andrus v. Sierra
Club, that the CEQ’s judgment is entitled to “substantial
deference” even when the agency has changed its regula-
tions governing NEPA compliance (442 U.S. at 358). See
also, ¢.g., American Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967). As in the case of its
new mitigation requirements, the court of appeals holding
here would have severe consequences. As the CEQ has ex-
plained, federal agencies would be forced to conduct
wasteful and time-consuming inquiries into speculative
impacts that lack “a firm connection between credible
science and the hypothetical consequences of an agency’s
proposed action.” 50 Fed. Reg. 32236 (1985). This sort of
“pure conjecture * * * lacking a credible scientific basis is
not useful to either the decisionmaker or the public” (ibid.
(emphasis in original)).
2. The court of appeals not only misconstrued NEPA,
it also misconstrued the Forest Service's regulations gov-
erning the issuance of a special use permit. The principal
regulation involved in this case requires special use
authorizations to contain terms and conditions that will
“minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish
and wildlife habitat and othewise [sic] protect the environ-
ment.” 36 C.F.R. 251.56(a)(1(ii).?* The court interpreted
this provision to require “an adequate mitigation plan”
(App., infra, Sa n.3). The court then reasoned (ibid. ):
Since the mitigation “plan” here at issue is so vague
and undeveloped as to be wholly inadequate, [citing
the court’s discussion of NEPA mitigation re-
quirements], the Regional Forester’s decision to grant
7) We have reproduced the relevant portions of the Forest Service
regulations in the appendix, infra 7Sa-76a.
22
the special use permit could be none other than ar-
bitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.
Thus, the court concluded that the Forest Service regula-
tion incorporates the court's judicially created NEPA
mitigation requirements.
The court’s reasoning here is seriously flawed. The
Forest Service regulation makes no mention of mitigation
plans and was never intended to incorporate the sort of
“complete mitigation plan” that the court itself
created — without statutory authority —in Oregon Natural
* Resources Council v. Marsh, supra. The Forest Service
operated under guidelines, even prior to NEPA, that
directed the agency to minimize harm to resources.** In
1980, it revised its regulations to reflect their present form
(45 Fed. Reg. 38324 (1980)). However, the Forest Service
has never suggested, at any point in that process, that its
regulations require a complete mitigation plan, at the per-
mit stage, of the kind the court of appeals imposed here.
Instead, the Forest Service has routinely imposed terms
and conditions similar to those ultimately imposed in this
* See 1963 Forest Service Manual § 2140.1 (in planning special
uses, the agency’s objective is to manage and protect resources and to
minimize adverse effects to projects); § 2134 (special use permits must
contain stipulations that ensure maintenance of productivity of land
and resolution of conflicts with other planned of prospective uses).
25 & special use permit was issued to MRI on July 21, 1986, shortly
after this case was argued before the court of appeals. The special use
permit conditioned all construction on the Forest Service's prior ap-
proval of a fully developed master plan, which was to contain detailed
mitigation measures. The initial permit also put the developer on
notice that it would be required to protect scenic and esthetic values,
prevent soil erosion and degradation of water, soil, and air quality,
and immediately to cease construction upon discovery of ar-
chaeologically or historically significant material. See U.S. Dep't of
23
The court of appeals’ holding here “runs roughshod
over the established proposition that an agency’s construc-
tion of its own regulations is entitled to substantial
deference.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986). See,
e.g., United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977)
(“In construing administrative regulations, ‘the ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which
becomes of a aeden it is plainly er-
roneous or inconsistent regulation.’ ”, quoting
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)). The Forest Service’s interpretation of its regula-
tion here is plainly reasonable and should be respected.
The court’s decision, which requires every special use per-
“mit henceforth issued to contain a detailed plan to mitigate
on- and off-site effects, creates yet another unjustified
obstacle to development and use of federal lands.
3. The court of appeals’ decisions in this case and in
Oregon Natural Resorces Council v. Marsh, supra, would
greatly expand the federal agencies’ substantive and pro-
cedural duties under NEPA. None of the newly imposed
duties finds its source in NEPA or in its implementing
regulations; rather, they are purely judicial creations. Fur-
thermore, the court's two decisions have confirmed those
duties as a settled element of the Ninth Circuit's peculiar
Courts MEPA prosoteas tes os —
. great practical significance.
As we have already explained, the court's newly fashioned
NEPA obligations would impose substantial burdens on
the federal government, private developers and, ultimate-
ly, the taxpaying public, without corresponding benefits.
Agriculture Forest Service Special Use Authorization, Region 06, User
~% 4171 (Methow Recreation Inc.) paras. 41, 44, 48, 49, 50, 54, 62.
24
Indeed, these court-imposed requirements are not only
contrary to sound environmental decisionmaking, they are
contrary to the goals of NEPA and the procedures created
by the CEQ for achieving those goals. The resulting costs
would be enormous even if limited to the projects within
the Ninth Circuit owing to the vast expanse of federal
lands and the numerous planned and potential federal
projects subject to that court's rulings. This Court’s review
is therefore warranted.
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.?*
Respectfully submitted.
Jerraey P. Miweae
Assistant to the Solicitor General
Peres R. STEENLAND, Jr.
Vicar L. PlawuT
Altorneys
Aran 1988
* The Court may wish to consolidate this case with Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council, No. 87-____, of to order that the
cases be heard in tandem. The government's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari im that case (which is being filed semultancously with this peti-
tion) presents overlapping, but not identical, NEPA issues.
A Rh ll al
a ee eee ners
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 86-4108
D.C. No. 85-2124-DA
, METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
v.
REGIONAL FORESTER, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
WILLIAM M. Da_e, JRr., Magistrate, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
July 6, 1987— Portland, Oregon
Filed December 1, 1987
Before: ALFRED GOODWIN and WARREN J. FERGUSON,
Circuit Judges, and ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, Jr..*
District Judge.
Opinion by Judge FERGUSON
* Honorable Albert Lee Stephens, Jr., Senior United States District
Judge, Central District of California, sitting by designation.
(la)
2a
FERGUSON, Circuit Judge:
Sandy Butte overlooks the Methow Valley, an un-
spoiled, sparsely populated area on the eastern side of the
North Cascade Mountains in the State of Washington.
The Methow Valley provides critical winter range and
migration corridors for Washington’s largest migratory
deer herd. Sandy Butte is a 3,900-acre parcel in the
Okanogan National Forest. The upper one-third of Sandy
Butte is entirely roadless. In 1978 appellee Methow
Recreation, Inc. (MRI) applied for a “special use” permit
to develop and operate a four-season destination ski resort
on Sandy Butte and a large parcel of private land it had ac-
quired adjacent to Sandy Butte. The proposed develop-
ment is known as the Early Winters project. The project is
expected to spawn extensive commercial and residential
development in the Methow Valley.
Pursuant to requirements of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332, mandating
completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
analyzing the environmental impacts of “major” govern-
mental actions, the appellee Forest Service studied the
question of whether it should allocate Sandy Butte for use
as a downhill ski area. In 1982 the Forest Service published
a draft EIS on a proposal to designate Sandy Butte for use
as a major ski area capable of serving 8,200 skiers at one
time (SAOT). The final EIS was issued in 1984. Based on
its contents, in July 1984 the Regional Forester issued a
“Record of Decision” which adopted a “future manage-
ment plan” for Sandy Butte. The plan allocated the area
for use as a ski area capable of serving 8,200 SAOT. The
record of decision also approved the issuance of a special
use permit to MRI for the Early Winters Project.'
' A special use permit is necessary whenever a private party seeks to
use lands owned by the federal government. The Forest Service issues
special use permits under authority derived from 16 U.S.C. § 497.
3a
In December 1985, appellants Methow Valley Citizens
Council, et al. (MVCC), brought this action in the District
Court for the District of Oregon alleging violations of the
National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614,
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626, and NEPA.
Pursuant to local rule, the case was assigned to a United
States Magistrate. The National Forest Management Act
and Clean Air Act claims were dismissed upon motions for
summary judgment and are not raised on appeal. The re-
maining NEPA issues were tried before the district court
and the court affirmed the Forest Service’s Record of
Decision, dismissing the remaining claims. MVCC subse-
quently filed this appeal.
The issues facing this court are whether the district court
erred in holding that the Regional Forester’s decision to
issue a special use permit is not reviewable and in its deter-
mination that the EIS adequately discussed alternatives to
the proposed project, impacts to the deer herd, impacts on
air quality, other significant impacts, and mitigation
measures. Jurisdiction of this court is found under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706, governs judicial review of agency actions. Sec-
tion 702 grants standing to challenge an agency action to
anyone adversely affected by such action, except where the
statute under which the action was taken precludes judicial
review, Or where the action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). While there is no claim
here that judicial review is barred by statutory preclusion,
there is dispute as to whether the Regional Forester’s is-
suance of a special use permit is an action
4a
committed to agency discretion such that it is removed en-
tirely from the scrutiny of judicial review. The district
court held that it was committed to agency discretion and
not subject to judicial review.
The district court cited two cases — Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) and Ness
Investment Corp. v. United States Dept. of Agric., Forest
Service, 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975)—in support of its
decision. In Citizen to Preserve Overton Park, the
Supreme Court emphasized that action committed to
agency discretion by law is “a very narrow exception . . .
_applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn
in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to
apply.’ ” 401 U.S. at 410 (citation omitted). In Ness, this
court held that the denial of a special use permit was not
judicially reviewable because there was no “law to apply”
by which the court could assess the legality of the agency’s
decision. The court held that neither the authorizing
statute, 16 U.S.C. § 497, nor the very general language of
corresponding regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 251.1 et seq., of-
fered standards by which the agency’s action could be
tested. Jd. at 715, 716. Contra Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d
1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 1975). Thus central to our decision in
Ness was the lack of formal guidelines for the issuance of
special use permits.
The district court failed to note, however, that in 1980 —
prior to the commencement of activities relevant to this
action—the Forest Service issued detailed supplemental
regulations which, while not entirely removing the deci-
sion to issue a special use permit from agency discretion,
do impose specific obligations on the authority consider-
ing issuance. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.54-251.56. These
guidelines, binding upon the Regional Forester when
deciding whether to grant MRI its special use permit for
development of the Sandy Butte area, constitute sufficient
j
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'
Sa
“law” for this court to apply to confer jurisdiction over the
‘matter. See Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1556
(9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Hall, J., concurring).? Thus we
hold that the Regional Forester’s decision to issue a special
use permit is subject to judicial review’ where review in-
volves an inquiry into whether the proper factors -were
considered by the Forestry Service. See Save the Bay, Inc.
v. Administrator of E.P.A., 556 F.2d 1282, 1295-96 (Sth
Cir. 1977).*
* In Wallace v. Christensen, Judge Hall correctly noted that
[t}he inquiry into whether there are regulations which a court may
look to in reviewing an agency decision is a component of the sec-
tion 701(a)(2) determination of whether a matter is committed to
agency discretion by law ... If there are no statutory or
regulatory directives then a court may conclude that the agency
action at issue falls into that narrow class of cases in which there
is no law to apply.
802 F.2d at 1556 (Hail, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
> The magistrate stated that if he did have jurisdiction to review the
Regional Forester’s decision to issue the special use permit, then he
believed that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. However,
an application for a special use permit must include “measures and
plans for the protection and rehabilitation of the environment during
construction, operation, maintenance, and termination of the project
", 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(e)(4), and each special use authorization
“shall contain .. . [t}erms and conditions which will . . . minimize
damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and
otherwise [sic] protect the environment”. 36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a)(1 (ii).
Thus the Code of Federal Regulations specifically requires the ex-
istence of, among other things, an adequate mitigation plan. Since the
mitigation “plan” here at issue is so vague and undeveloped as to be —
wholly inadequate, see infra, the Regional Forester’s decision to grant
the special use permit could be none other than arbitrary, capricious
and an abuse of discretion.
* Save the Bay involved a challenge to the issuance of a permit pur-
suant to authority granted under the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The Fifth Circuit considered
6a
The National Environmental Policy Act, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 4332, provides in relevant part that when an EIS
must be prepared — whenever a major government action
is proposed — it must include
a detailed statement by the responsible official on —
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action.
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented.
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action.
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2K(C). Section 4332(2)(E) adds that all
agencies of the Federal Government shall, to the fullest ex-
tent possible
study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives
to recommended course of action in any proposal
which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alter-
native use of available resources;
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2,E).
There are two purposes served by preparation of an
EIS. The statement should “provide decision-makers with
whether it had jurisdiction in light of the statute’s broad language ex-
plaining that “[ojnce the relevant factors are before the agency, it can
weigh them within [its] broad mandate with an expertise to which the
restraining powers of judicial review could add little.” 556 F.2d at
1295. Nevertheless, the court held that “[jjudicial review, however,
can quite easily be effective to assure that all those factors receive the
agency's attention.” Jd. at 1296.
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Ja
an environmental disclosure sufficiently detailed to aid in
the substantive decision whether to proceed with the proj-
ect in light of its environmental consequences,” Trout
Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974),
as well as “provide the public with information and an op-
portunity to participate in gathering information.”
Citizens for A Better Henderson v. Hodei, 768 F.2d 1051,
1056 (9h Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
An EIS aids the agency’s own decisionmaking process
by ensuring that the agency has before it “ ‘all possible ap-
proaches to a particular project . . . which would alter the
environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance.’ ”
State of Alaska v. Andrus, $80 F.2d 465, 474 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated in part sub nom. Western Oil & Gas v. Alaska,
439 U.S. 922 (1978) (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating
Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1971)).
A.
The findings of fact underlying a lower court's decision
on the adequacy of an EIS are reviewed for clear error.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,
795 F.2d 688, 696 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
1971 (1987). “Interpretations of [environmental] regula-
tions present questions of law, which are reviewable de
novo.” Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817
F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Sierra Club v. Union
Oil Co. of California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir.
1987)). “We review de novo the district court’s determina-
tion of whether the EIS is reasonably thorough in discuss-
ing the significant aspects of the probable environmental
impact of the proposed agency action.” Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir.
1987) (citation omitted). This requires application of a
8a
“rule of reason” because a “reviewing court may not ‘fly
speck’ an EIS and hold it insufficient on the basis of in-
consequential, technical deficiencies.” Kunzman, 817 F.2d
at 492. In other words, “whether a particular deficiency,
or combination of deficiencies in an EIS is sufficient to
warrant holding it legally inadequate, or constitutes mere-
ly a ‘fly speck,’ is essentially a legal question, reviewable de
novo.” Jd. at 493.
To explain the obligations set forth in section 4332, pro-
visions in the Code of Federal Regulations address, inter
alia, the discussion of alternatives’ and the discussion of
the foreseeable environmental consequences of these
various alternatives* which must be included in an EIS.
“The detail that NEPA requires in an EIS depends upon
the nature and scope of the proposed action.” California
v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982).
A.
To be adequate, an environmental impact statement
must consider every reasonable alternative. Friends of En-
dangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 988 (9th Cir.
1985); California v. Block, 690 F.2d at 766-67; Adler v.
Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1097 (9th Cir. 1982) (“this court
has held the alternatives discussion to be subject to
‘reasonableness.’ ”); Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641
F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981); Lange v. Brinegar, 625
F.2d 812, 818 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The discussion of alter-
natives in an E.1.S. statement is subject to a construction
of reasonableness.”). An EIS is rendered inadequate by
* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16.
.
}
9a
the existence of a viable but unexamined alternative.
Citizens for a Better Henderson, 768 F.2d at 1057 (cita-
tions omitted). Furthermore, even if an alternative re-
quires “legislative action”, this fact “does not automatical-
ly justify excluding it from an EIS.” City of Angoon vy.
Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986) (footnote
omitted), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 197 (1987). Thus, the
range of alternatives considered must be sufficient to per-
mit a reasoned choice. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485
F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961
(1974).
Here the Forest Service’s purpose —to provide a “winter
sports opportunity” — is broadly framed in terms of service
to the public benefit. It is not, by its own terms, tied to a
specific parcel of land. Compare City of Angoon, 803
F.2d at 1021; Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1286. There
appears no tenable reason for the Forest Service to be
wedded exclusively to the development of Sandy Butte.
Thus it should have appeared obvious that investigation
was warranted to determine whether the development of
winter sports opportunities could be pursued at alternative
sites.’
Appellants have offered evidence suggesting that other
sites may be well suited for the type of recreational
development envisioned by the Forest Service. Unlike
Sandy Butte, the sites discussed by the appellants are not
adjacent to land owned by defendant MRI, but under the
’ The Forest Service’s final EIS listed four alternatives, including
their preferred course of action, in addition to the alternative of “no-
action” mandated by statute. Yet all four of the “action” alternatives
required development of Sandy Butte. No consideration was given in
the EIS to ways of achieving the Forest Service's goal through other
options, such as the expansion of existing downhill ski areas in other
parts of Washington State.
10a
directive given to the Forest Service in its manual,* that
fact does not preclude consideration of other reasonable
alternatives. Moreover, since we find it reasonable to
assume that expansion of existing ski areas would have less
environmental impact than would the construction of an
entirely new ski area,’ while possibly achieving a com-
parable net increase in the total capacity of skiers served,'°
such alternatives might have been appropriate for in-
vestigation.
* The manual provides in relevant part that
A permit shall not be granted simply to provide a commercial
profit-making opportunity. The Forest Service is not required to
accommodate a desire of an individual applicant, a real public
service or other justification must be evident . . . to show at least
that the use meets a public need and will not conflict with Na-
tional Forest objectives, programs or purposes.
Forest Service Manual § 2710.3.
* In Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774,
778 (9h Cir. 1980), the defendants intended to construct a new four-
lane highway which pass through parkland in plaintiffs’ town. The
EIS was held to be deficient because it failed to consider the alter-
native of improving and widening a two-lane highway already in ex-
istence. This court stated that “the alternative ... was both
reasonable and obvious, and that therefore the EIS is deficient... .
The use of a narrower than four-lane road is made even more obvious
by the possibility that parkland would thereby [be] spared.” /d. at 784
(citations omitted). See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th
Cir. ERD CRS So Snes es ee Se See 0 Oey
developed areas for future resource extraction and use, the . . . deci-
sional process ends its inquiry at the beginning.”).
'© For example, one of the existing ski areas in Washington State
has plans in motion to expand into a destination ski resort. A 1981
development report prepared for the Mission Ridge ski area details an
intended expansion of the facility to accomodate an additional 3,900
SAOT, to make its total capacity 6,500 SAOT.
—
Pues ee ee ee or ee
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This court, however, would not require that the Forest
Service explore an unreasonably broad range of alter-
natives. Rather, the range “need not extend beyond those
[alternatives] reasonably related to the purposes of the
project.” Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1286 (citations
omitted). Thus, the Forest Service should more clearly ar-
ticulate its goal, specifically identifying the market and
geographic pool of skiers targeted. This will provide a
clear standard by which it can determine which alter-
natives are appropriate for investigation and consideration
in its EIS. In its present state, the EIS’s discussion of alter-
natives to the proposed action is inadequate as a matter of
law.
The district court held that the EIS adequately discussed
the environmental impacts of the Early Winters project
and its alternatives. We do not agree.
The Magistrate’s error resulted, in part, because he
assumed that the law distinguished between primary and
secondary impacts. Such a distinction would only confuse
the issue. Rather, it is well established that NEPA and the
Council on Environmental Quality guidelines require
discussion of a// significant impacts proximately caused by
the proposed action — whether they, by convenience, are
termed “primary” or “secondary”. See Coalition for Can-
yon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 783 (9th Cir.
1980) (“so-called ‘secondary’ impacts are often as signifi-
cant as ‘primary’ effects.”); Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at
1238 n.9 (“The central focus should not be on a primary/
secondary impact analysis but upon those impacts (either
primary or secondary) which have a ‘significant impact’
12a
upon the environment.”); see also Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir.
1977).
This court would not require the government to specu-
late on impacts in order to “foresee the unforeseeable”.
See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir.
1975). However,
{ijt must be remembered that the basic thrust of an
agency’s responsibilities under N&I?A is to predict the
environmental effects of proposed action before the
action is taken and those effects fully known.
Reasonable forecasting and speculation is thus im-
plicit in NEPA, and we must reject any attempt by
agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by
labeling any and all discussion of future environmen-
tal effects as “crystal ball inquiry”.
Id. at 676 (quoting Scientists’ Institute for Public Informa-
tion v. A.E.C., 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
Thus we find it imperative that the Forest Cervice evaluate
the reasonably foreseeable significant effects which would
be proximately caused by implementation of the proposed
action. Port of Astoria, Oregon v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467,
478 (%h Cir. 1979) (EIS must address those reasonably
likely consequences of a proposed development that would
have an environmental! impact).
2.
Plaintiffs argue that the development in the Methow
Valley that is reasonably certain to follow development of
Sandy Butte will cut off the deer herd’s migration route,
usurp fawning and staging areas and eliminate winter
range — all of which are vital to the herd’s survival. In con-
trast, the Forest Service believes that “with the imple-
mentation of mitigation measures” the impacts to the mule
3a
deer will be minor. This court fails to see the logic with
which the Forest Service reaches this conclusion, since not
only has the effectiveness of these mitigation measures not
Service’s conclusions in the EIS. He stated that the data
was inadequate in terms of assessing the impacts of, for
example, residential development reasonably certain to
follow development of ski slopes on Sandy Butte.
The Forest Service is presently preparing a detailed and
comprehensive study of the mule deer. However, just as
the subsequent preparation of mitigation measures will
not cure a deficient EIS, see infra, neither will a subse-
quent study providing information essential to assessment
of the environmental impacts of a proposed action and its
alternatives.
If a government agency has difficulty obtaining ade-
quate information upon which to make a reasoned assess-
ment of the environmental impacts of a course of action, it
may not simply negate the existence of these impacts.
Rather, it has an obligation to engage in what is called a
“worst-case” analysis.'' This is because “NEPA requires a
‘worst case analysis’ when ‘the information relevant to
adverse impacts is essential . . . and is not known and the
overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or . . . the in-
'' The worst case analysis requirement was codified in 1979, 40
C.F.R. § 1902.22, and rescinded in 1986. This rescission, however,
does not nullify the requirement, Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1058 2.8, since
the regulation was merely a codification of prior NEPA caselaw. See
Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720
F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); see
* glso Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.
1984).
l4a
formation . . . is important and the means to obtain it are
not known. . . .” Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d
at 988 (quoting Seve our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d
1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984)).
The purpose of the analysis is to carry out NEPA’s
mandate for full disclosure to the public of the poten-
tial consequences of agency decisions, and to cause
agencies to consider those potential consequences
when acting on the basis of scientific uncertainties or
gaps in available information. The analysis is formu-
lated on the basis of available information, using
reasonable projections of the worst possible conse-
quences of a proposed action.
Save our Ecosystems, 747 © 2d at 1244-45 (quoting 46
Fed. Reg. 18032 (1981)); see Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 820 F2d at 1059.
An absence of critical information renders it impossible
for the Forest Service to make a reasoned decision in the
disposition of a special use permit application. The EIS’s
cursory discussion of the impacts to the mule deer herd,
based on incomplete information, is inadequate as a mat-
ter of law. If the Forest Service finds that the new com-
prehensive study of the mule deer still provides incomplete
information, a worst-case analysis would be required for
the areas in which information is lacking.'?
'? & district court has held that “fw jithout accurate evidence of the
effectiveness of . . . mitigation techniques, the Forest Service must
prepare a worst case analysis.” Ner?. Wildlife Federation v. United
Seates Forest Service, 992 F. Supp. 931, 943 (D. Oreg. 1984). This
court expresses no opinion as to whether a worst case analysis is
necessarily required im the absence of an evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of mitigation measures. However, we do recognize the in-
herent limitation on a decisionmaker’s ability to make a reasoned deci-
sson as to the environmental impacts of a proposed action where in-
formation contained m an EIS ss mcomplete or maccurate.
)
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15a
3.
Appellants also contend that the district court erred in
its assessment of the adequacy of the EIS’s discussion of
impacts On air quality.
a.
The Pasayten Wilderness has been designated a “Class
I” area by Congress. This means that its air is so un-
polluted as to require heightened protection. Appellants
believe that pollution in the Methow Valley proximately
caused by the proposed development of Sandy Butte will
significantly deteriorate the air quality in the Pasayten
Wilderness and that this was not revealed in the EIS. Ap-
pellees contend, and the district court held, that the EIS’s
discussion of air quality impacts to the Pasayten Wilder-
ness is adequate. We disagree.
The EIS concluded that no Class I area would be im-
pacted by the proposed action. In reaching this conclusion
the government relied on data that was based upon an
estimate of the difference in elevation between the floor of
the Methow Valley and the lowest portion of the ridge
separating the Methow Valley from the Pasayten Wilder-
ness—an estimate that has since been shown to be
egregiously incorrect. This error casts significant doubt on
the assumption that the ridge forms a physical barrier that
would prevent air pollution trapped beneath the inversion
layer in Methow Valley from entering the wilderness area.
Incorrect assumptions usually lead to incorrect conclu-
sions. Thus the district court’s conclusion, that the infor-
mation relied upon by the government in preparation of
the relevant section of the EIS was adequate, is clearly er-
roneous. The Forest Service must reassess the impacts
upon the Pasayten Wilderness.
16a
Appellees acknowledge that without effective mitigation
measures, the state standards for Total Suspended Par-
ticulates will be exceeded in nearly all of the areas of the
upper Methow Valley as a result of foreseeable growth and
development stimulated by the Early Winters project.
This, presumably, is why the Regional Forester in his
Record of Decision approving the special use permit ap-
plication required that an air quality management pro-
gram be developed. However, we interpret NEPA and sec-
tion 497 as requiring this type of inquiry and analysis
before a permit application can be approved.'’
'} Appellants have made two additional arguments relating to air
quality which merit attention. First, they argue that the development
of Sandy Butte and the growth it will spur will likely expend the
degradation increment available for this area under the federal
Prevention of Significant Deterioration program. They suggest that
the government is required to include in its EIS an assessment of how
this exhaustion of the increment will limit opportunities for future
commercial development in the Methow Valley. We disagree.
“[Ajssuming compliance [with federally established maximum
threshold levels of pollution], growth management decisions were left
by Congress for resolution by the states.” Alabama Power Co. v. Cos-
tle, 636 F.2d 323, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Second, appellants argue that the EIS is inadequate as a matter of
law because it did not discuss the foreseeable significant carbon
monoxide emissions from wood stoves. While the precise amount of
air quality degradation that would result from these emissions is not
entirely clear, given that even the highest estimate places the impact at
still far below the applicable national standard, this omission is prob-
ably not sufficient to render the EIS inadequate. However, since a new
EIS must be prepared, inclusion of an analysis of carbon monoxide
emissions produced by wood stoves would assist the decisionmaker in
making a fully informed decision.
Pew oe oa
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17a
e
Section 4332 of NEPA requires that “action be taken to
mitigate the adverse effects of major federal actions.”
Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (D.
Hawaii 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976). Thus an agency
cannot decide to “act now and deal with the environmental
consequences later.” North American Wild Sheep v.
United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1181 (9th
Cir. 1982). Consequently, an EIS must include a thorough
discussion of measures to mitigate the adverse en-
vironmental impacts of a proposed action. Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1055
(9th Cir. 1987). “A mere listing of mitigation measures is
insufficient to qualify as the reasoned discussion required
by NEPA.” Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 697. “More-
over, the EIS must analyze the mitigation measures in
detail and explain the effectiveness of the measures.” 820
F.2d at 1055; see Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 697. And
we note that the subsequent preparation of an elaborate
mitigation plan “would not absolve a failure to prepare an
adequate EIS.” Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1284.
' Provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations govern-
ing the award of special use permits impose an affirmative
duty on the appellees to develop the necessary mitigation
measures before the permit is granted.'* Similarly, the EIS
'* The relevant section provides that
Each special use authorization shall contain: (1) Terms and con-
ditions which will . . . (ii) minimize damage to scenic and esthetic
values and fish and wildlife habitat and othewise [sic] protect the
environment; ... and (2) such terms and conditions as the
authorized officer deems necessary to . . . (vi) require siting to
cause least damage to the environment, taking into consideration
feasibility and other relevant factors . . .
36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a).
18a
must also contain a detailed explanation of the specific
measures which will be employed to mitigate the adverse
impacts of a proposed action. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f),
1502.16(h).
The Forest Service’s EIS contains scattered pages in
which they enumerate possible mitigation measures and
identify mitigation goals that would be necessary to pre-
vent excessive adverse impacts. These various discussions,
however, are presented in very general terms, lacking both
a detailed description of required or possible mitigation
measures, and any analysis as to the effectiveness of these
measures.
The Forest Service argues that further specificity as to
the mitigation measures for on-site impacts can only be
provided when the permittee presents a master plan of
development. The Forest Service also maintains that they
have satisfied the mitigation discussion requirement for
another reason. In its EIS, there is a brief discussion of
measures that could be required by local government to
mitigate off-site impacts. Pursuant to this discussion, the
Forest Service executed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with Okanogan County, the Washington Depart-
ment of Ecology, and the Environmental Protection
Agency. In very general terms, the MOU identifies mitiga-
tion tasks and assigns responsibilities to various parties.
It is true that contractual obligations to insure the
mitigation of adverse environmental consequences may
not be a prerequisite to a statutorily adequate EIS. Preser-
vation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th
Cir. 1982) (When efforts to mitigate the adverse environ-
mental effects are “to be undertaken by third parties, their
commitments, while they need not be contractual, must be
more than mere vague statements of good intentions.”)
(citation omitted). However, the MOU offers no
assurance whatsoever that the vague mitigation objectives
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3
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19a
it features — performance of almost all of which would be
the responsibility of third parties to the permit pro-
cess — would ever in fact be achieved or even that effective
measures would ever be designed (let alone implemented),
if the Early Winters development were to proced. C7.
Preservation Coalition, 667 F.2d at 860 (“Since many of
the “mitigations’ proposed by the agency were . . . poten-
tial actions to be taken by [third parties] reliance on
them . . . was improper.”) (footnoted omitted).
As this court stated in Oregon Natural Resources Coun-
cil v. Marsh,
[t}he importance of the mitigation plan cannot be
overestimated. It is a determinative factor in
evaluating the adequacy of an environmental impact
Statement. Without a complete mitigation plan, the
decisionmaker is unable to make an informed judg-
ment as to the environmental impact of the proj-
ect — one of the main purposes of an environmental
impact statement.
820 F.2d at 1055 (citation omitted). The EIS’s discussion
of mitigation measures is inadequate as a matter of law.
IV.
The decision of the district court is reversed and
remanded for entry of appropriate relief in accordance
with this opinion.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
No. 85-2124-DA
MetHow VaALLFY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS,
Vv.
REGIONAL FORESTER, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
{June 25, 1986]
Peterson, Chief of the Forest Service, heard plaintiffs’ appeal. (A.R.
2la
ll. Procedural posture
In a previous opinion dated April 30, 1986, | identified
the parties and briefly summarized the claims in the com-
plaint. Plaintiffs are public interest and environmental
groups concerned variously with the protection of the en-
vironment, social, and economic amenities and resources
of the Methow Valley. Some of the members of these
groups reside in Methow Valley. Others use Methow
Valley for recreational, educational, scientific or employ-
ment purposes. The group in the forefront of the con-
troversy regarding Early Winters is Methow Valley
Citizens Council (MVCC). Defendants are various United
States Forest Service officials and the probable developer
of Early Winters, Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI).
12). On December 16, 1985, Peterson affirmed the July 15, 1984,
Record of Decision im all respects. (A.R. 57). The Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture declined to review Peterson's decision.
(A.R. 58). See 36 C.F.R. § 211.189 f2). This action was filed on
December 17, 1985.
All citations to “A.R.” refer to consecutively numbered tabs in the
three volume administrative record, a part of the trial record marked
as government's exhibit 102. The EIS is marked as government's ex-
The following glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in this
oprmon ts provided for the convenience of the reader:
APA Administrative Procedures Act.
CEQ Council on Environmental Quali y
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
MOU \iemorandum of Understanding
MRI Methow Recreation, Inc.
MUP Multiple-Use Plan
MVCC Methow Valley Citizens Councii
NEPA National Environmentai Policy Act
NFMA Natrona! Forest Management Act
PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration
TSP Total Suspended Particulates
T-W-C MUP = Twist-Winthrop-Concully MUP
22a
In response to the various pretrial motions then before
me and for reasons explained in the opinion, ‘1 granted
summary judgment to the defendants on two claims. |
held that the Forest Service had not violated either 1) the
National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 and other scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. or 2) the Clean Air Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7626. | denied summary judgment on all remaining
claims.
A court trial was held on issues identified in a pretrial
order signed by all of the parties and approved by the
court. First, plaintiffs contend that the Forest Service
Record of Decision to issue the permit must be set aside
because it was arbitrary and capricious and not supported
by substantial evidence. Second, they argue that a change
in agency position on delaying the release of the en-
vironmental impact statement and Record of Decision
violated their constitutional right to due process. Third,
they argue that the environmental impact statement, en-
titled “Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study” (the
EIS), is inadequate under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4231-4370a and
associated regulations. | find for the defendants on all
claims. The Recotfd of Decision stands. The action is
dismissed.
Il. Background
To put this case in perspective, it is necessary to begin
with a rather extensive background section. MRI applied
for a permit to develop and operate Early Winters on ap-
proximately 3,900 acres in the Okanogan National Forest,
a forest which contains approximately 1,706,000 acres of
land, on August 21, 1978. The Early Winters project had
its genesis many years before that time, however. In the
en = ee ow
23a
early 1960s, federal study teams began surveying the .
North Cascade Mountains for possible designation of na-
tional park and wilderness areas. Aware of the federal ef-
fort, ski industry representatives conducted their own
surveys of potential ski areas in the western United States.
From these surveys, Sandy Butte emerged as a potential
site for a desirable ski area. (A.R. 46A).
In 1968, Congress designated the North Cascades Na-
tional Park. 16 U.S.C. § 90. The legislation directed the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to “agree on the
designation of areas within the park on recreation areas or
within national forests adjacent to the park and recreation
areas needed for public use facilities. . . . [Such public
use facilities, including . . . lodges, campsites, and ski
lifts, shall be constructed according to a plan agreed upon
by the two Secretaries.” 16 U.S.C. § 90d-3. The national
park legislation referred to above led to joint study by the
National Forest and National Park Services of potential
winter sports activities and sites in the North Cascades
area and to the development of a North Cascades Recrea-
tion Plan. (A.R. 57 at 2).
In 1970, the Forest Service completed a work entitled
the North Cascades Winter Sports Study. (A.R. 43C). It
examined the opportunities for cross-country skiing, ex-
pansion of existing downhill ski resorts, and the develop-
ment of new skiing facilities. This study identified Sandy
Butte as having the highest potential of any site in the
State of Washington for development as a major destina-
tion ski area. (A.R. 57 at 2).
In 1974, the Park Service and the Forest Service issued
the Joint Plan for the North Cascades area. (A.R. 21A).
Like the studies that had preceded it, this plan recognized
Sandy Butte as a promising site for downhill skiing
facilities. (A.R. 21A at 33).
24a
In 1976, Congress enacted the NFMA. In 1977, the
Okanogan Forest Supervisor adopted the Twisp-
Winthrop-Concolly Unit Plan (T-W-C MUP). The MVCC
appealed the approval of the multiple use plan (hence
“MUP”) to the Regional Forester. The plan was ultimately
remanded because of deficiencies in the planning process,
particularly the T-W-C MUP’s treatment of roadless
areas. (A.R. 57 at 3).?
Because the T-W-C MUP never went into effect, the
previous plans, including the 1968 Winthrop MUP with its
1970 revision as well as the 1974 Joint Plan for the North
Cascades, remained in force.
At the time the T-W-C MUP was remanded, Phase II of
the Roadless Area review [sic] and Evaluation (RARE II)
was well underway.’ Under the RARE II project, the
Forest Service inventoried all roadless areas within the Na-
tional Forest System, some 190 million acres containing
154 National Forests and 19 National Grasslands. RARE
II allocated all roadless areas to one of three planning
categories: wilderness, nonwilderness, and future plan-
ning. Controversy arose about what a nonwilderness
designation meant. California brought suit against the
Fores’ Service, claiming that the EIS was inadequate
becawse it failed to make site specific evaluations. In 1979,
» district court agreed and enjoined the Forest Service
from taking any action that might change the wilderness
2 A “roadiess area” is defined as “{ajn area of undeveloped Federal
land within which there are not improved roads maintained for travel
by means of motorized vehicles intended for highway use.” FSM §
8260(B\3\1). Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v.
Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 583 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).
’ The Forest Service’s efforts in RARE II's precursor, RARE |,
were halted when a federal court enjoined development pursuant to
the plan until the Forest Service completed an EIS. Wyoming Outdoor
Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
|
|
25a
character of the disputed areas in California until it filed
an EIS that satisfied NEPA’s requirements. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th
Cir. 1982). The precarious legal foundation on which
RARE II found itself brought the ill-fated program to an
effective halt in states outside California.
MRI applied for a special use permit in 1978. The Forest
Supervisor announced his decision to study the feasibility
of a ski area at Sandy Butte. MVCC appealed the decision
to accept and process the permit application. The Chief
Forester concluded that MRI’s application could be proc-
essed if development was consistent with existing plans
and satisfied all procedural requirements, including
‘ NEPA. Former Department of Agriculture Assistant
Secretary M. Rupert Cutler affirmed the Chief Forester’s
decision. However, he directed the Chief to “ensure that
such applications are not approved until the area is ap-
propriately allocated in a land management plan and the
project considered through the appropriate environmental
review process.” (A.R. 4A at 2). By the time the appeal
reached Cutler, work on the T-W-C plan had been
dropped in favor of drafting the Okanogan NFMA plan.
The Regional Forester made inquiries whether the 1968,
1970 Winthrop MUP satisfied Cutler's directive quoted
above. Associate Deputy Chief Housley responded with a
simple answer: “No.” (A.R. 4B). Housley was concerned
primarily with the fact that no decision had yet been made
as to whether to allocate Sandy Butte for wilderness land.
It seems fair to say that Housley interpreted Cutler’s deci-
sion to allow study of the permit application, but not to
issue the permit until the Okanogan NFMA plan (in which
allocations to wilderness would be made) was complete.
The Forest Service proceeded simulianeously with con-
sideration of MRI's permit application and with prepara-
tion of its NFMA plan for Okanogan National Forest. A
was completed in due course but not released, apparently
because the Forest Service was concerned that release
would be successfully challenged in court under the prin-
ciples of California v. Block. He stated: “A substantial
amount of time would be needed to revise the Sandy Butte
. Ud. at 2).
ta) han
Cutler dated June 8, 1984, the author indicated that an
amendment to the Washington Wilderness Bill had been
added “that would alter the intent and effect of your rul-
ing.” (A.R. 21D at 1). The letter goes on to state: “Your
|
'
:
27a
successor in the Reagan Administration is interpreting
your decision as appropriate only because the roadless
lands involved were not considered for wilderness designa-
tion in Rare Il.” (/d.) MVCC indicated it did not feel “that
the passage of the Washington Wilderness Bill fulfills the
intent of the Cutler Decision and hope that you will lend
your support at this time in upholding that decision.” (/d.
at 2).
The Washington State Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No.
98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (Washington Wilderness Act) became
law on July 3, 1984. It designated various public lands in
Washington as wilderness. Sandy Butte was purposefully
not among those chosen. Recognizing that the NFMA
authorized continued management of forest lands under
existing land and resource plans pending the completion
forest plans, the Senate Committee Report accompanying
the wilderness bill through Congress specified the manage-
ment direction for Sandy Butte:
That area of the Okanogan National Forest known as
Sandy Butte has been excluded from wilderness desig-
nation in S. 837. It is the intent of Congress that land
use management of Sandy Butte proceed, without
delay, in accordance with existing multiple-use
management plans, consistent with the National En-
vironment Policy Act (NEPA). The designation by
Congress in S. 837 of appropriate wilderness areas in
Washington State makes it unnecessary to further
withhold the Sandy Butte/Early Winters Alpine
Winter Sports Study FEIS pending completion of the
Okanogan Forest Plan. The Forest Service and the
Department of Agriculture are directed to allow the
evaluation process for the Sandy Butte development
to proceed without additional delay, given that Con-
gress has determined that the roadless upper third of
Sandy Butte is without wilderness characteristics.
(AR. 21F at 11); S. Rep. No. 461, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1984). . :
With these facts in mind, | now turn to a discussion of
plaintiffs’ claims. Additional facts will be discussed below
as they become necessary.
A. Wes the Forest Service decision to issue the special use permit
arbitrary and capricious”
Plaintiffs claim that the Regional Forester’s decision
should be set aside because he acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and did not rely on substantial evidence in
reaching the decision to issue the special use permit. As a
threshold matter, | must determine whether the court has
the power to review this contention in the context pre-
sented in the pretrial order.
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA), provides:
(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions
thereof, except to the extent that —(1) statutes pre-
clude judicial review; or (2) agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law.
§$ U.S.C. § 701(a).
No statute precludes judicial review of the Forest Ser-
vice’s Record of Decision. The court is concerned here
with the exception in § 701(aX2). In Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the
Supreme Court emphasized that the § 701(a)(2) exception
where “agency action ts committed to agency discretion by
law” is “a very narrow exception . . . applicable in those
rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” 401
U.S. at 410 (citation omitted).
In Ness Investment Corp. v. United States Depariment
of Agriculture, $12 F.2d 706 (Mh Cir. 1975), plaintiff
29a
sought review of a Forest Service decision that a company
was unqualified to receive a special use permit to operate a
resort. In that case, the Forest Service action was autho-
rized and taken pursuant to statutory authority provided
in 16 U.S.C. § 497. The company argued that § 701(a)(2)
did not apply. The court disagreed. “The statute, [16
U.S.C. § 497], is with respect to the proper recipient of a
special use permit, drawn in such broad terms that there is
no law to apply.” /d. at 715. Contra Sabin v. Butz, 515
F.2d 1061, 1067 (10th Cir. 1975).
Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have not interpreted
Ness to mean that judicial review of agency action taken
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 497 or similar broadly-worded
discretionary statutes is completely foreclosed in all cir-
cumstances. As one of these decisions stated:
In considering whether administrative action is
“committed to agency discretion by law” within the
meaning of the APA, the test “is not whether a statute
viewed in the abstract lacks law to be applied but
rather, whether ‘in a given case’ there is no law to be
applied.” Strickland v. Morton, [519 F.2d 467, 470
(%h Cir. 1975)] (emphasis in original). Thus the ex-
istence of some law generally applicable to the subject
matter in question will not necessarily remove ad-
ministrative action from the “committed to agency
discretion” rubric. There is “law to apply,” only if a
specific statute limits the agency’s discretion to act in
the manner which is challenged.
Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Santa
Clara, 439 U.S. § 859 (1978).
The discretion afforded the Forest Service is not limited
to the mere identification of a qualified recipient of a per-
mit; it extends equally to the more basic decision to issue
30a
an rmit at all. Plaintiffs’ challenge—however
one —is essentially a claim that the Forest Service had
either no basis or relied on an improper basis in reaching
the decision on whether or not to issue the permit for Early
Winters. That decision is “committed to agency discre-
tion” and is not reviewable. Ness, 512 F.2d at 715. See also
Arizona Power Authority v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231, 1239
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977). But cf. Sierra
Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985) (en-
vironmental challenge to Bureau of Land Management
decision to amend California Desert Conservation Area
Management Plan pursuant to Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976; agency’s factual findings in sup-
port of decision to be overturned only “if arbitrary and
capricious” citing Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 686, 691
(9th Cir. 1985) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). .
Under the circumstances presented in this case, there is
no law to apply as to the propriety of the challenged deci-
sion. Ness and its progeny necessitate the conclusion that
§ 701(a)(2) deprives the court of any power to consider.
plaintiffs’ contentions.‘
4 If the case law of the Ninth Circuit allowed the court to engage in
a substantive review of the Regional Forester’s detision, | would af-
firm it because it is neither arbitrary nor capricious. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A). It is not the court’s place to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency on the decision to issue the permit. The decision
reached is without doubt a rational and lawful one. The substantial
evidence test of § U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) does not apply to either the issue
of the propriety of the decision or the adequacy of the EIS under
NEPA because the Regional Forester’s decision is not a “case that is
“subject to” formal adjudicatory hearings or formal rule-making “<
quired by 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557. Ethyl Corporation v. Environmenta
Protection Agency, $41 F.2d 1, 37 0.79 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) cert.
denied sub nom, E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). See generally D. Mandelker,
NEPA Law and Litigation, § 3:04 at 8 (1984).
- Re ill. At ll al iy A lt, il ln Alt, ely
)
:
31a
B. Did “reversal” of the “Cutler Decision” deprive plaintiffs of
any due process rights?
Plaintiffs claim that the reversal of the Cutler Decision
denied them due process under the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. Unlike the first claim,
here there is law to apply. Ness does not preclude review.
In my April 30 opinion, I stated that the Washington
Wilderness Act “appears” to have modified former Assist-
ant Secretary Cutler’s decision to refrain from making any
decision on issuance of a special use permit pending com-
pletion of the Okanogan NFMA plan. However one inter-
prets the scope of the Cutler Decision, it is undeniable that
the Senate report gives a clear indication that Congress
itself had made the determination that Sandy Butte did not
possess wilderness characteristics, one of the prime issues
in the Okanogan NFMA plan, and that the Forest Service
should proceed with land use management of Sandy Butte
in a manner consistent with existing multiple use plans
without waiting for the Okanogan NFMA plan.
Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiffs have a pro-
tected fourteenth amendment interest at stake, a doubtful
assumption, plaintiffs have not been denied due process in
either a procedural or substantive sense. The MVCC letter
to Cutler makes clear that they were aware of the pending
legislative action. (A.R. 21D). Nor can it be said that the
change in Forest Service policy is somehow “arbitrary or
capricious” or that the Forest Service was required to give
any explicit basis for the change in its policy. Congres-
sional directive is reason enough.
C. Was the EIS adequate under NEPA?
This claim is the heart of what remained in the case after
my rulings on the summary judgment motions. | will can-
didly admit that | found the factual material as well as
32a
some of the environmental statutes, e.g., the Clean Air
Act, complex; the legal argument, at times, difficult to
follow; and the Ninth Circuit NEPA precedents lacking in
adequate guidance from a trial judge’s perspective, par-
ticularly on evidentiary issues. Despite these admissions,
or more precisely because of them, I have given plaintiffs’
NEPA claim extensive consideration. However, applying
the applicable statutes, regulations and precedents as |
understand them, | find that the EIS is adequate in all
respects. °
“The purpose of NEPA is to assure that federal agencies
are fully aware of the impact of their decision on the en-
vironment.” Friends of the Endangered Species v. Jant-
zen, 760 F.2d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 1985). To effectuate
NEPA’s purpose, Congress requires that federal agencies
prepare an EIS where “major Federal actions [will] signifi-
cantly affect{ ] the quality of the human environment.” 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2(C). The EIS is designed to serve two
basic functions. First, it “should provide decision-makers
with an environmental disclosure sufficiently detailed to
aid in the substantive decision whether to proceed with the
project in light of its environmental consequences.” Trou!
Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974).
Second, the EIS should “provide the public with informa-
tion on the environmental impact of a proposed project as
well as encourage public participation in the development
’ The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has promulgated
regulations applicable to and binding upon al! federal agencies for im-
plementing the procedural provisions of NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3
(1985); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508. In the words of the CEQ, the pur-
pose of the regulations is to tell federal agencies what they must do to
achieve the goals of NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1500. 1(a). | grant substantial
deference to these regulations as the authoritative guide for NEPA’s
interpretation. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 763 (9h Cir. 1982)
citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
;
;
}
:
{
’
33a
of that information.” /d.; Citizens for a Better Henderson
v. Hodei, 768 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985).
There is no contention in this case that the Forest Serv-
ice did not observe the purely procedural requirement of
NEPA, in terms of the timing of its public announcements
and the like. The issue is solely one of adequacy of the im-
pact statement itself. The adequacy of an agency’s prep-
aration of an EIS is reviewed under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).
Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1985);
soa v. yoy 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974)
su uent ory Omitted). In passing on the
of the EIS under § 706(2)(D), the court must —
employ a “rule of reason” that inquires whether an
EIS contains a “reasonably thorough discussion of
the significant aspects of the probable environmental
consequences.” Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 509
F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974). [Sic]. This standard
is not susceptible to refined calibration. It instead re-
quires a reviewing court to make a ic judg-
ment whether the EIS’s form, ponies ayy ream
tion foster both informed decision-making and public
participation. Warm Springs Dam Task Force vy.
Gribble, 565 F.2d $49, 552 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); Trout Unlimited, Inc., 509-F.2d at 1283.
[Sic]. This standard of review, however, does not
authorize a reviewing court to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency concerning the wisdom or
prudence of a proposed action. Once satisfied that a
proposing agency has taken a “hard look” at the deci-
sion’s environmental consequences, the review is at an
end. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 []
(1976).
California v. Block, 690 F.2d at 761.
With these standards in mind, I now turn to plaintiffs’
specific challenges to the EIS.
1. Alternatives
NEPA requires that an EIS provide information in
detail on alternatives to the proposed action. 42 U.S.C.
* All C.F.R. citations are to the 1985 edition.
.
Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th
Cir. 1981); Brooks v. Coleman, $18 F.2d 17, 18-19 (9th -
Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Accord Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836-38
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
As Judge Burns recently noted, for purposes of judicial
it must be remembered that the scope of the EIS is
largely determined by the scope of the proposed ac-
tion itself and the rule of reason. . . . [Wyhere the
Proposed action is vast in scope, covering a large pro-
ject or program, NEPA'’s policy will obviously de-
mand more than the EIS in the way of specificity and
range of alternatives than where the proposed action
is more modest in its scale.
Natural Resources Defense Council. 1. v. Hodel, 624 F.
Supp. 1045, 1050-51 (D. Nev. 1985) (Burns, J. sitting by
designation) (NEPA challenge to adoption of site-specific
land use plan for Bureau of Land Management grazing
allotment). Compare id. with California v. Block, 690
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (NEPA challenge to adoption of
” The uninitiated might think that one component of the inquiry in
Henderson regarding the seasonabieness of an alternative route would
be the relative superiority of a Henderson route over a route that
bypassed Henderson
De Council, Inc. v. Hodel (624 F. Supp.]} at 105!
pr ney Ame vy. Block, 690 F.2d at 767 and Save Lake
Washington, 641 F.2d at 1334. Stated another way, “[t}he
range of alternatives that must be considered need not ex-
“destination ski resort” in general terms is a large, multi-
season, recreation ski area with numerous runs and suffi-
ciently varied activities and base facilities of a sufficient
quality t~ entice vacationers to stay several days at the
site.* . .
The Early Winters EIS discussed five alternatives in
detail. The first was no action. Under this alternative, no
special use permit would have issued and no development
would have been allowed. Alternatives two through five
contemplated increasi larger developments ranging
from 2,300 to 10,500 skiers at one time. The preferred
alternative in the EIS was the fourth alternative, which
would permit a phased development over several years
ultimately allowing 8,200 skiers at one time. The Regional
Forester selected this preferred alternative in the Record of
Decision.’
* The parties’ dispute over this nonissue was particularly tedious.
* The Forest Service indicated that it preferred alternative five in the
Draft EIS. The Record of Decision states that alternative one (no ac-
tion) was environmentally preferred because it would cause the least
37a
The tone of plaintiffs’ alternatives argument makes it
sound as if other sites were simply ignored by the Forest
Service. This is not the case. The EIS itself indicates that
sites in the Okanogan National Forest other than Sandy
Butte were considered. (EIS at 6-7). These alternative sites
were eliminated from detailed study in the EIS. See 40
C.F.R. § 1502.14(a).
The primary reason given in the EIS for elimination of
detailed discussion of expansion of alternative sites was
that the North Cascade Winter Sports Study, a work cited
in the EIS and available to the public, had identified
Sandy Butte as the only area in the Okanogan Forest hav-
ing good potential as a major ski development.
The EIS also stated that it did not consider expanding
existing sites elsewhere in Washington because the EIS was
specificaliy tailored to development of Sandy Butte. Plain-
tiffs focus on this latter reason and contend that omission
of detailed discussion of alternative sites outside the
Okanogan National Forest renders the EIS inadequate. |
cannot agree.
Sites a hundred or more miles away from the Okanogan
National Forest are not reasonable alternatives to the
development of a ski resort at Sandy Butte. It was not
unreasonable for the Forest Service to forego detailed
discussion of expanding sites outside the Okanogan. As
the CEQ has recognized in explaining its own regulations
concerning alternatives in the context of licensing and per-
mitting situations, a decision-maker need not “disregard —
the applicant’s purposes and needs and the common seiise
disruption to the natural environment. Alternative five would provide
maximum utilization of the recreation resource opportunities and in-
creased economic benefit to the area. Alternative four was chosen
because “it provides a balance of concerns for the physical and
biological components of the human environment in addition to con-
cerns for social and economic welfare.” (A.R. 2 at 2a).
eS —
38a
realities of a given situation in the development of alter-
natives.” CEQ Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations,
48 Fed. Reg. 34263, 34267, citing with approval Roosevelt
Campobello International Park Commission v. EPA, 684
F.2d 1041 (ist Cir. 1982) (EPA licensing of refinery and
deep-water petroleum terminal). The EIS need only set
forth those alternatives “sufficient to permit a reasoned
choice.” Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472
(%h Cir. 1973) quoting Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil v. Morton, 458 F.2d at 834.
Consistent with the teachings of Better Henderson and
Kleppe and given the record before me, I conclude that ex-
pansion of existing sites was not 4 reasonable alternative
requiring detailed discussion in the EIS.
2. General observations regarding adequacy
The bulk of plaintiffs’ remaining attack challenges the
adequacy of the EIS discussion of “secondary” or “in-
direct” impacts. Indirect impacts are not those impacts
caused by the construction of runs, and ski lifts and the
like on Forest Service lands. In NEPA nomenclature, such
effects are known as “primary” or “direct” impacts. See
generally D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation,
§§ 10:28 and 10:36 (1984). Indirect impacts are those from
development on primarily private property that are ex-
pected to follow construction of the ski resort. Most of
this development is dependent on local development and
zoning policies. The forecasting of secondary impacts is
generally more speculative than forecasting of primary im-
pacts. Courts, in applying the rule of reason, take the
uncertainty and speculation involved with secondary im-
pacts into account in passing on the adequacy of the
discussion of secondary impacts in an EIS. See Enos v.
Marsh, 769 F.2d at 1373. This policy applies with equal
39a
force to mitigation measures of secondary impacts. See id.
The rule that courts are not to “fly-speck” an EIS,
Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d at 693, but rather to satisfy
itself [sic] that the EIS has reasonably set forth sufficient
information to enable the decision-maker to consider the
environmental factors and make a reasoned choice, Ad/er
v. Lewis, 675 F.2d at 1096, also bears repeating.
3. Mule Deer
Plaintiffs contend that the EIS discussion of the direct
and secondary impacts of the development on the valley's
mule deer herd is inadequate. Plaintiffs also contend thai
the Forest Service was required to prepare a worst case
analysis regarding the effect of the development on the
deer herd. Finally, plaintiffs contend that the Forest Serv-
ice had a duty to analyze proposed mitigation measures to
lessen the impact of the development on the deer herd.
a. Inadequate discussion of impact on mule deer.
The EIS discussed deer impacts both on-site and off-
site. It indicated that adoption of any of the four develop-
ment alternatives would disturb resident mule deer habitat
during the summer and fall. The Forest Service estimated
that suminer habitat on-site would decrease from seven to
ten percent depending on which alternative was chosen.
The EIS also discusses the impact of the development on
winter habitat and fawning. (EIS at 75-76). In making
these conclusions, the EIS depended in large part on a
1975 study and on a 1978 study by D. L. Zeigler.
The EIS acknowledged that discussion of off-site im-
pacts on deer herds was more difficult because of uncer-
tainty about where.other public and private lands may
ultimately be developed. (EIS at 76). The Record of Deci-
sion, it will be remembered, merely authorizes the issuance
LSS <x ttt
Wa
of the permit. Actual construction of the resort must be
preceded by an acceptable master development plan. The
EIS did proceed to indicate that the off-site development
would decrease the existing herd. (/d.).
Plaintiffs challenge the quality of the Zeigler studies as
well as the EIS discussion on deer impacts. They contend
that the Forest Service was obligated to obtain missing
data. CEQ regulations require that agencies include infor-
mation relevant to adverse impacts which is essential to a
reasoned choice among alternatives if the cost of obtaining
such information is not exorbitant. 40 C.F.R. § 1$02.22(a).
| find that the essential information relevant to a reasoned
choice among alternatives was known and discussed.
Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof to show that studies,
models and the like are inadequate. They have not met
their burden. | find the studies and the EIS discussion on
deer impacts adequate under the rule of reason.
b. Failure to prepare a worst case analysis.
This argument is related to the preceding argument.
CEQ regulations provide that a worst case analysis must
be prepared in certain circumstances. A worst case
analysis is not required unless information relevant to a
reasoned choice among alternatives is not known and the
cost of obtaining it is exorbitant. Alternatively, a worst
case analysis is required if information relevant to adverse
impacts is important to the decision and the means of ob-
taining it are unknown, 40 C.F.R. § 1802.22(b). Neither
situation applies here. The relevant information essential
‘o a choice among alternatives was known as well as the
means to obtain such information. See Save Our Eco-
systems v, Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984);
cf. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir. 1983).'°
© The CEO recently rescinded its worst case analysis regulation
The new regulation, which became effective May 27, 1986, requires
4la
¢. Duty to analyze mitigation measures.
NEPA requires a discussion of “any adverse en-
vironmental effects which cannot be avoided.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2MCMii). The CEQ regulations require that an EIS
section on environmental consequences must “include a
: discussion” of [mjeans to mitigate adverse environmental
impacts (if not fully covered under § 1502.14(f)).” 40
C.F.R. § 1802.16(h). Section 1502.14(f) provides that the
EIS section on alternatives must contain “appropriate
mitigation measures not already included in the proposed
action or alternatives” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f). Mitigation
as used in the regulations is defined in 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.20.
Mere listing of mitigation measures '*. an EIS is general-
ly inadequate to satisfy the CEQ regulations. See North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson,
764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985). However, in this EIS there is
more — not much more — but more than a mere listing of
mitigation measures as to the deer herd. To be sure, the
mitigation discussion on deer herds and on all other
adverse environmental impacts could have been more ex-
tensive. More important, however, is the recognition that
formulation of at least some mitigation strategies logically
must follow submission of the master development plan.
Moreover, the Forest Service is currently in the process
of developing mitigation measures as information becomes
that the analysis of wmpacts in the face of unavailable information be
grounded in the rule of reason. The new rule siates that “in preparing
an environmental impact statement, the agency shall make reasonable
efforts, in light of overall costs and state of the art, to obtain missing
information which, in its judgment, ts important to evaluate signifi-
camt adverse impacts on the human environment that are reasonably
foreseeable.” $1 Fed. Reg. 15618 (1986). | have not applied the new
regulation in my analysis.
——SV722 t™—~—“=S—~—<—<— CS
42a
available based on a new study. See Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Marsh, 628 F.Supp. 1557, 1565 (D.
Or. 1986). “i
The Record of Decision requires, as a condition to \s-
suance of the special use permit, that the Forest Service
enter into an agreement with the Washington Department
of Game and Okanogan County to develop actions to
mitigate effects of development on the mule deer herd. In
response to the conditions imposed by the Record of Deci-
sion, various federal, state and local agencies have signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to develop a
plan to mitigate impacts on mule deer. To implement the
MOU, the Forest Service and the Washington State
of Game have undertaken an extensive study
of mule deer habitat and migratory routes in the Methow
Valley. Okanogan County is also studying and considering
various land use controls and other measures to mitigate
of population growth and development on
mule deer. The Forest Service's response demonstr ates
that it was informed and responsive to the public concern
on the effect the project would have on mule deer. See
Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d at 1411. |
I find under the rule of reason that discussion of mitiga-
tion measures for mule deer impacts in the EIS was ade-
quate.
4‘ Ae
This claim contains several subissues. Plaintiffs contend
that the EIS was inadequate on several grounds. As
background to this claim, it is important to note the EIS
states, and the statement has not been challenged by plain-
tiffs, that the ski area itself will have no measurable direct
impact on air quality in the Methow Valley. The con-
troversy over air, as over mule deer, concerns secondary
impacts.
43a
a. Inadequate discussion of air quality impacts.
i. Failure to discuss certain air pollutants.
Plaintiffs contend that the EIS is inadequate because it
contains absolutely no information regarding carbon
monoxide pollution resulting from woodstoves and no in-
formation regarding nitrogen dioxide pollution. Even
though plaintiffs’ contention of fact is correct, I find that
the omission does not render the EIS inadequate. This
argument strikes me as “fly-specking.”'' The evidence
showed that the impacts from these pollutants from
woodstoves would be relatively insignificant. The EIS
does contain a brief discussion of carbon monoxide im-
pacts. (EIS at 67). The evidence showed that nitrogen
dioxide impacts would be insignificant.
ii. Failure to measure existing concentrations of air
pollutants.
The EIS discusses the general air flow characteristics in
the Methow Valley in some detail. (EIS at 26-29). More
specifically, measurements of TSP were taken in both
Mazama and Winthrop, two towns in the valley. Plain-
tiffs’ argument that measurements of other pollutants,
particularly carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide, were
required to make the EIS adequate are unpersuasive. The
evidence showed that nitrogen dioxide impacts would not
be so significant as to warrant the type of treatment plain-
tiffs suggest.
ili. Failure to discuss Clean Air Act PSD policy.
This argument has been a moving target throughout
these proceedings. In an earlier form, plaintiffs challenged
'' The arguments on fish and water, population, and expansion of
the intercity airport also strike me as fly-specking.
| eel
44a
the EIS because it allegedly failed to discuss the Clean Air
Act’s PSD policy. This argument fails. The decision-makers
were aware of the PSD program and presumably the broad
congressional policy of nondegradation. See, e.g., EIS at
D-44. Disclosure of physical impacts on the environment is
the primary function of an EIS. NEPA does not require
that an EIS contain a definitive legal brief. At closing argu-
ment, plaintiffs contended that the EIS was inadequate
because it failed to inform the decision-maker that the PSD
increment for TSP had been triggered. Although the
materials submitted in support of the summary judgment
were in dispute on this point, the evidence clearly shows
that the baseline has in fact been triggered. Because of this
triggering, the PSD increment for TSP is in the process of
being consumed. The ski resort and the secondary develop-
ment to follow may consume the TSP increment of 37
micrograms per cubic meter for the applicable Clean Air
Act-geographic district. Consumption of the increment
would foreclose the placement of any major emitting facili-
ty in the geographic area covered by the TSP increment. See
discussion of Clean Air Act issues in April 30, 1986, opin-
ion at 4-10. Plaintiffs, citing Alabama Power Co. v. Cosile,
636 F.2d 323, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1979), challenge the EIS
because it fails to disclose this potential foreclosure ‘of
economic opportunity in the Methow Valley. I find nothing
in Alabama Power to support this contention. The EIS
would have been better had it contained such a discussion,
but given the lega! ambiguities surrounding the PSD pro-
gram, the omission is not fatal.
iv. Failure to discuss impacts on Pasayten
Wilderness.
There was some dispute in the evidence concerning
secondary impacts on the Pasayten Wilderness area, a
Class | area near the upper tip of the Methow Valley. See
45a
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(e). | find that the evidence supports the
conclusion in the EIS that Class | areas will not be im-
pacted. (EIS at 68). I find the discussion and the studies
underlying such discussion adequate.
b. Failure to prepare worst cases analysis.
No worst case analysis was necessary for reasons similar
to those previously discussed in the mule deer analysis.
c. Failure to analyze mitigation measures.
The EIS discloses the adverse impacts on air quality that
are likely to occur as a result of population growth and
development in the Methow Valley over the next ten to
twenty years. Air quality impacts resulting from increased
growth over such a _ period-of time is_ inherently
speculative. See Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 1373. The
secondary air quality impacts that may result from
population growth and development in the Methow Valley
were forecasted on the basis of existing information and
reasonable forecasting methods. The EIS stated that the
majority of those impacts would be caused by off-site
combustion of wood for space heat and motor vehicle use
during the operating ski reason. (EIS at 65, 68).
The EIS lists several mitigation measures to reduce air
quality impacts. (EIS at 68-69). It identifies mitigation
measures to be studied and implemented by Okanogan
County. The Record of Decision required development of
an air quality management program designed to minimize
deterioration of air quality in the Methow Valley, par-
ticularly that resulting from wood smoke emissions. (A.R.
2 at 4). The Forest Service, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Washington State Department of Ecology
and Okanogan County executed a MOU which represents
a determination that the air pollution mitigation measures,
=x ——~—
46a
programs, plans and commitments identified therein will
operate to prevent violation of applicable air quality
standards. (A.R. 53).
I find the discussion of air mitigation measures in the
EIS adequate.
- 5. Remaining issues
a. Fish and Water
Plaintiffs argue that the EIS is inadequate because of its
failure to analyze the effectiveness of mitigation measures
relating to fish and water quality impacts. The EIS states
that Cedar Creek is one of the most productive trout
streams in the Early Winters creek system. It analyzes in
detail the increased sedimentation that could occur in
Cedar Creek predominantly as a result of construction of
the ski area. (EIS at 72). The EIS identifies several mitiga-
tion measures that will reduce the risk of impact on
fisheries resulting from the development on Sandy Butte.
Failure to discuss the effectiveness of specific mitigation
measures in this EIS is understandable given the fact that
effectiveness will depend on the location of facilities on
the mountain. I find the fish and water discussion ade-
quate.
b. Population
Plaintiffs take issue with the population growth analysis
in the EIS. They complain that the population model
underestimated population growth and consequently
underestimated environmental damage that correlates to
population growth. The discussion in the BIS is based on
an extensive study performed at the request of the Forest
Service. Experts disagreed over its adequacy. I find it ade-
quate in all respects.
EE ——
47a
c. Intercity airport
Plaintiffs contend that the expansion of the intercity air-
port is closely related to the development of Early
Winters, but the impacts of expansion of the intercity air-
port are not discussed in the EIS. Despite plaintiffs’ con-
tention, the EIS contains a rather detailed discussion of
the impact of the development on air commuter activity,
ae — activity through the intercity airport. (EIS at
To the extent plairtiffs argue that the airport is a
“closely-related” action within the meaning of 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.25(a)(1) requiring a separate EIS for the airport
itself, the argument fails. The intercity airport is a separate
action which has no direct relationship to the project pro-
posed by MRI. While the ski resort may have an indirect
effect on the airport, the actions are not “connected.” See
Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985).
Vv. Conclusion
Any issue I have neglected to discuss explicitly lacks
merit. This opinion constitutes findings of fact and con-
clusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
In summary, I conclude: 1) that the substantive merits
of the Record of Decision are not subject to judicial review
under Ninth Circuit precedent, 2) that plaintiffs did not
suffer any deprivation of due process, and 3) that the
Early Winters EIS complies fully with the requirements of
NEPA. The action is dismissed. Each side is to bear its
own costs.
It is so ORDERED.
DATED this 25th day of June, 1986.
/s/ William M. Dale
WILLIAM M. DALE
U.S. Magistrate
48a
APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
Civil 85-2124-DA
MeTHow VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS
v.
REGIONAL FORESTER, ETC., ET AL, DEFENDANTS
July 12, 1986
JUDGMENT
Based on the record,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED the action is
ticmissed.
DATED: this | day of July, 1986.
/s/ Jeffrey Amran
Clerk
APPENDIX D
1S70 NFS #1lll
(Rn)
DEC 16 1985
CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Mr. David Bricklin
Suite 900, Fourth and Pike Building
1424 Fourth Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98101
Dear Mr. Bricklin:
On October 1, 1984, you requested on behalf of your
clients Methow Valley Citizens Council, Washington State
Sportmen’s Council, Washington Environmental Council,
and the Cascade Chapter, Sierra Club, pursuant to 36
CFR 211.18, a review of Regional Forester Jeff Sirmon’s
July 5, 1984, decision to adopt Alternative IV of the Early
Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study Final Environmental
Impact Statement (FEIS). Based on this decision, the
Forest Service will permit development of a destination ski
resort on approximately 3,900 acres of land at Sandy
Butte, Okanogan National Forest, Washington. Relief re-
quested is that the decision be reversed.
Status as an intervenor in this appeal was requested and
granted to Mr. Glen Amster on behalf of his client,
Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI).
Regional Forester Sirmon signed the Record of Decision
for the Early Winters FEIS on July 5, 1984. The decision
was announced on August 10, 1984, and notice of
availability of the FEIS was published in the Federal
Register on August 31, 1984. You appealed this decision to
the Chief of the Forest Service on October ', 1984. MRI
50a
was granted intervenor status on April 3, 1985. A Stay of
permit issuance, and any activities which would signifi-
cantly disturb the site was granted on May I, 1985. Oral
presentations by appellants and intervenor were made on
July 29, 1985, and the official record was closed 10 days
later on August 8, 1985. At the request of both appellants
and intervenor, the appeal was suspended from September
23 to December 15, 1985.
Pursuant to 36 CFR 211.18, we have conducted the review
which you requested. The information submitted by you,
the intervenor, and the Regional Forester has been con-
sidered.
1. Issues
After carefully reviewing all of the information contained
in the record, we find the issues raised by this appeal can
be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the Regional Forester’s decision on the ski
development is premature because it was made prior to
and preempts decisions to be made in the Okaogan Forest
Plan.
2 Whether the Winthrop Ranger District Multiple-use
Plan provides for development of a major ski area al
Sandy Butte. .
3. Whether mitigation measures are adequate.
4. Whether the proposed use will be in the public in-
terest.
5. Whether the proposed development is financially
feasible.
6. Whether the Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports
Study EIS is adequate.
7. Whether the decision is in violation of the
Washington State Environmental Policy Act.
Sla
ll. Discussion
Whether the Regional Forester’s decision on the ski
development is premature because it was made prior to,
and preempts decisions to be made in the Okanogan
Forest Plan. You contend that the Regional Forester’s
decision was premature because: (a) the Department's
1979 decision required that the Okanogan Forest Plan be
completed prior to action on the MRI permit application;
(b) it preempts decisions to be made in the Forest Plan; (c)
because it violates requirements of NFMA; and (d)
because the Washington Wilderness Act does not negate
the need to complete the Okanogan Forest Plan prior to
making a decision on MRI's permit application.
a. There is a long history of land use and winter sports
planning for the Sandy Butte area of the Okanogan Na-
tional Forest. Contemporary planning regarding Sandy
Butte began in 1968 when Congress designated the North
Cascades National Park. The legislation directed the
Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to “agree on the
designation of areas within the park or recreation areas or
within National Forests adjacent to the park and recrea-
tion areas needed for public use facilities .... Such
public use facilities, including interpretive centers, visitor
contact stations, lodges, campsites, and ski lifts, shall be
constructed according to a plan agreed upon by the two
Secretaries.” (16 U.S.C. § 90d-3) The National Park
legislation led to several studies by the Forest and National
Park Services of potential winter sports activities and sites
in the area, and to the development of a North Cascades
Recreation Plan.
The North Cascades Winter Sports Study, completed in
1970 by the Forest Service, examined the opportunities for
cross-country skiing, expansion of existing downhill ski
resorts, and the development of new skiing facilities. The
S2da
study identified Sandy Butte as having the highest poten-
tial of any site in the State of Washington for development
as a major destination ski area. Page 8 of this study states:
“Of the 13 sites investigated, three were rated as good,
seven marginal, and three unacceptable. Of the three sites
rated good, only Sandy Butte was considered to have the
necessary physical features for a site of major im-
portance.”
Following the North Cascades Winter Sports Study, the
National Park and National Forest Services issued the
joint plan for the North Cascades area in 1974. Like the
studies that had preceded it, this plan recognized Sandy
Butte as a promising site for downhill skiing facilities. On
Page 22 of the Plan, it is stated that: “Developments in the
Granite Creek Valley/Early Valley emphasize scenic driv-
ing, picnicking, overlooks, wilderness trailheads and
trails, and potential ski areas.”
_ In April 1977, the Okanogan Forest Supervisor adopted
the Twisp-Winthrop Concenully (T-W C) Unit Plan. In
accordance with the 10 years of studies that had preceded
it, and consistent with the previous plans in effect, the
Unit Plan allocated Sandy Butte for skiing. The Methow
Valley Citizens’ Council (MVCC) appealed the approval
of the plan to the Chief. The plan was remanded by the
Chief for revision, because of some deficiencies in the
planning process, particularly the plan’s treatment of
roadless areas.
At the time the Unit Plan was remanded, “RARE II” was
well under way. The T-W C roadless areas, therefore, were
studied as part of that evaluation process. Also, with the
passage of the National Forest Management Act of 1976
(NFMA), the Forest Service decided that it would be more
efficient if planning for the T-W C unit area occurred
S3a
through the Forest-wide planning process required by the
NMA. With the remand of the T-W C Plan and in ac-
cordance with Section 6(c) of NFMA, the previous plans,
including the Winthrop Multiple-Use Plan and the Joint
Plan for The North Cascades, remain in force until ap-
proval of the Okanogan Foresi Plan.
Methow Recreation, Inc. submitted an application for a
special-use permit to develop a ski area on portions of
Sandy Butte not included in RARE II in August 1978.
RARE II allocated Sandy Butte to nonwilderness, and
following direction from Deputy Chief Ray Housley, that
roadless areas made available for nonwilderness use by
RARE II should be managed in accordance with existing
multiple-use plans until suci. time as a Forest-wide plan
was approved, the Forest Supervisor announced his deci-
sion to study the feasibility of a ski area at Sandy Butte.
This decision was appealed by NMCC. The Chief, in his
decision, concluded that applications to develop Sandy
Butte for skiing may be processed and subsequently ap-
proved if development was consistent with existing plans
and all procedural requirements, including NEPA, were
fulfilled. The Chief’s decision was sustained by Assistant
Secretary Rupert Cutler August 10, 1979. Dr. Cutler
found the Chief’s decision to allow applications for
special-use permits at Sandy Butte was consistent with
departmental policy; however, he directed the Chief to en-
sure that such applications were not approved until the
area was appropriately allocated in a land management
plan and the project considered through the appropriate
environmental review process.
in response to an inquiry from Senator Henry Jackson
about the delay his decision would cause, Dr. Culter sug-
gested that the ski area study could be prepared at the |
S4a
same time as the other related planning issues were re-
solved in the Forest Plan. In a January 29, 1980, letter to
the Regional Forester, the Chief confirmed that the
Regional Forester had agreed to finish the Draft Forest
Plan by the end of December 1981, and the final Plan by
the fall of 1982. The Chief found it was feasible to gather
the necessary data for ski development project analysis
concurrent with Plan development and a decision on
winter sports development at Sandy Butte could be forth-
coming simultaneously with the final Forest Plan and EIS.
Draft Environmental Impact Statements for Early Winters
and the Forest Plan were released in 1982. Work began on
both Final EIS’s. However, in spring 1983, the forest plan-
ning process was halted as a result of a court decision in-
validating the roadless area review. The Forest was
directed to prepare a new draft Forest Plan consistent with
the court’s direction.
Dr. Cutler’s 1979 direction was modified on December 20,
1983, when Assistant Secretary John Crowell told Con-
gressman Sid Morrison that the Sandy Butte FEIS could
be released within 45 days of a signed Washington
Wilderness Bill which contained adequate RARE II suffi-
ciency and release language.
In his letter, Mr. Crowell reasoned that “while the Sandy
Butte FEIS has been subjected to a project planning and
public input process, it fails to address the issue of whether
the roadless area in question should be considered for
wilderness designation. That issue has been dealt with by
consideration of the area during RARE II. Now, however,
the resulting recommendation that the area not be
wilderness is invalidated by the consequences of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in California vs. Block.”
5Sa
Mr. Crowell continued: “Experience in recent litigation
clearly indicates that a stand-alone FEIS on ski develop-
ment at Sandy Butte would be successfully challenged
unless the analysis deals with the wilderness issue to stand-
ards meeting the Ninth Circuit's decision in California vs.
Block. A substantial amount of time would be needed to
revise the Sandy Butte FEIS to address the question of
whether or not the site should be designated wilderness.
This is valuable time which would be better spent on ex-
pediting completion of the Forest Plan.”
Changing conditions and philosophies often dictate that
the Department modify or change its policies. In this case,
Mr. Crowell exercised his prerogative to modify the policy
of Dr. Cutler based on changes that had occurred in Forest
planning and wilderness allocations since Dr. Cutler’s 1979
cation ;
Your argument that Mr. Crowell’s policy change violated
due process is incorrect. Appellant, MVCC, were aware of
the change, as evidenced by MVCC’s June 8, 1984, letter
to Dr. Cutler asking his help in changing the Crowell deci-
sion and MVCC is now exercising its right to contest the
decision to permit development.
b. You contend that NEPA prohibits the Forest Service
from taking any action prior to completion of the Forest
Plan because such action would preempt decisions to be
made in the plan. The Early Winters FEIS was prepared in
full accordance with NEPA, NFMA, Departmental
policy, and existing plans. The purpose of NEPA is to en-
sure a full analysis of the impacts to the environment of a
proposed action. This analysis was accomplished by the
preparation of the Early Winters EIS in full compliance
with NEPA. A full range of alternatives was considered in
the analysis in accord with NEPA. Analysis of the Early
S6a
Winter proposal in a separate EIS subjected the proposal
to much closer scrutiny than would have been possible if
the proposal had been one of many complex issues ana-
lyzed in the Forest Plan.
c. You contend that allocation of land prior to comple-
tion of the Forest Plan violates NFMA. Section 6(c) of
NFMA directs that “until such time as a unit of the Na-
tional Forest System is managed under plans developed in
accordance with this Act, the management of such unit
may continue under existing land and resource manag-
ment plans.” There is no requirement in NFMA to halt
management actions, such as processing special-use ap-
plications, pending completion of forest plans. It was not
the intent of Congress to halt operations on the National
Forests pending Forest Plan completion. A ski develop-
ment at Sandy Butte is in full compliance with the previous
plans (Winthrop Ranger District M-U Plan, pg. 6, M-U
Survey Report Liberty Bell Management Unit pg. 11).
d. Your allegation that enactment of the Washington
State Wilderness Act of 1984 does not negate the need to
* complete the Okanogan Forest Plan prior to making 4
decision on MRI's permit application is incorrect. The
decision under appeal is to issue a 30-year special-use per-
mit authorizing use on approximately 3,900 acres of Na-
tional Forest land. The decision does not act on MRI's
permit application. MRI was chosen as the only suntable
applicant after the decision under appeal was made. it
must be stressed that, to date, no decision has been made
on MRI's application.
On July 3, 1984, the Washington Wilderness Act was
signed, resolving the roadless area issue in Washington.
The Legislative history of the Washington Wilderness Act
contains Senate Report 86-461. This report states that i ts
57a
the intent of Congress that land use management of Sandy
Butte proceed, without delay, in accordance with exisiting
multiple-use management plane, consistent with NEPA.
The Forest Service and Department are directed to allow
the evaluation process for the Sandy Butte development to
proceed without additional delay. This expression of con-
gressional intent is clear.
Based on the above discussion, we find that Regional
Forester Sirmon properly followed Department of
Agriculture policy, applicable laws, and congressional
direction is issuing his decision to authorize development
* of a destination ski resort on Sandy Butte.
2. Whether the Winthrop Ranger District Multiple
Use Plan provides for development of a major ski area at
Sandy Butte. Prior to completion of the Okanogan Forest
Plan, management of the National Forest land at Sandy
Butte is directed by the Winthrop Ranger District
Multiple-use Plan, completed in 1968 and revised in 1970
(per NFHA as discussed in the preceding issue). The
eastern portion of Sandy Butte is located in a National
Forest Landscape Management Unit with the following
management direction:
a. Manage for multiple use while recognizing esthetics
and recreation as key uses.
b. Manage to maintain and enhance esthetic qualities
in the foreground.
The western portion of Sandy Butte is located in the Liber-
ty Bell Management Unit, with management direction (pg.
30) to:
a. Retain a near natural landscape appearance.
b. Keep developed recreation sites unobtrusive.
c. Keep well-screened developed sites designed to pro-
vide maximum capacity and convenience.
58a
The M-U Survey Report for the Liberty Bell Management
Unit (pg. 11) and the Winthrop Ranger District M-U Plan
(pg. 6) specifically mention that a major ski area is a
possibility, provided it is studied in detail to determine
feasibility.
After carefully reviewing the M-U Plan and Survey Report
for Liberty Bell Management Unit, we find that the
management direction does allow development of a ski
area at Sandy Butte. We also find that, in the design of the
ski area, careful consideration of the visual resource must
be a major consideration. The techniques for mitigating
the effects of a major ski area development on the visual
resource have become highly sophisticated over the last
few years and are now in common use. Development of
Early Winters will meet visual quality objectives through
mitigation. Adequacy of these mitigation measures can
only be determined later in the project planning process
when more site-specific information becomes available.
Mitigation measures will be supplemental or changed as
necessary to achieve the desired objective.
3. Whether mitigation measures are adequate. The
purpose of the Early Winters EIS (EIS, pg. 1) was to pro-
vide the information required to evaluate the potential for
skiing at Early Winters and to assist in making a decision
whether to issue a permit for downhill skiing on National
Forest land. The decision does not authorize construction
of a particular ski development, nor does it authorize
development of any non-National Forest lands. Another
environmental analysis and review will be requires by the
Forest Service prior to any decision to allow a specific
development. The responsible State and local government
agencies may require similar review of development in-
volving matters within their jurisdiction on non-National
Forest lands.
59a
in addition to disclosing on-site impacts of the ski
development, the EIS also discloses off-site impacts
(FEIS, pg. 65-145). The Regional Forester determined that
there would be no major on-site adverse effects resulting
directly from the Federal action. He did find that there
would be some adverse environmental effects from
development of private land, and he prescribed actions
which must be taken to mitigate these effects (Record of
Decision, pg. 4a-6a).
You argue that the Regional Forester’s reliance on some
other agency to compel mitigation is not in the public’s in-
terest; that the Forest Service cannot delegate its duty to
assure mitigation of these measures to anyone else. The
amount of information provided in the FEIS must be
reasonable in the light of the decision being made. The
decision to be made by the Forest Service was whether to
grant the special-use permit, not to permit base area
development. The EIS disclosed potential off-site impacts
as required by NEPA and the Regional Forester required
mitigation measures. The Forest Service has no authority
to force the State or county to take certain actions. By his
decision, the Regional Forester has said that certain off-
site mitigation must take place as part of permit issuance.
The Regional Forester complied with his duty under
NEPA by informing Okanogan County of the adverse ef-
fects on the private land, and by conditioning approval of
detailed mountain development upon the mitigation of
these effects. Given the multi-sovereignty nature of the
permit review process (FEIS, pg. 4), we find the mitigation
measures adequate for this stage in the review process.
4. Whether the proposed use will be in the public in-
terest. You contend that the decision was erroneous
60a
because this proposed action was not in the public interest.
In making his decision, the Regional Forester was in part
guided by response from the public regarding the Early
Winters proposal. The majority of respondents to the
DEIS from outside Okanogan County (and total) favored
development of a destination ski area. The majority of
respondents from Okanogan County favored no develop-
ment. The Washington State Governor has stated a ma-
jority of Washington resic_ats favor a destination ski
development. (Record of Decision, pg. 3a). This was a
strong indicator of public interest. The Regional Forester
correctly concluded that he must evaluate the broad public
interest, and not just the local interest. We feel that, based
on the information available to him, the Regional Forester
correctly determined that development will be in the public
interest.
5. Whether the proposed development is financially
feasible. Your argument that the development is not finan-
cially feasible is not convincing. The Regional Forester
relied on two studies (FEIS, pg 80-83) which show that the
project is feasible. These studies were adequate for the
level of decision to be made. As the project progresses,
and more detailed information becomes available, both
the Forest Service and the developer will require further
financial analysis.
The Record of Decision (Para. 1, pg. 4a) states that all
prospective permittees will be required to submit financial
information on their ability to construct and operate ski
facilities over the period of the permit. This clause will be
strictly enforced.
6. Whether the Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports
Study EIS is adequate. You contend that the FEIS was in-
adequate because of a failure to discuss all reasonable
alternatives. For reasons explained in the FEIS, in con-
6la
sidering alternatives, the Regional Forester eliminated
from detailed study the alternatives of skiing at other sites
on the Okanogan National Forest, and expansion of ex-
isting areas. Other winter sports activity on Sandy Butte
was considered as part of the No Action Alternative.
We agree with this approach because the EIS was
developed in response to a site-specific request for a
special-use permit at Sandy Butte. The discussion of alter-
natives need not be exhaustive, but contain sufficient in-
formation to permit a rational choice by the decision-
maker. The range of alternatives discussed in an EIS must
be bound by some notion of feasibility, and an EIS is not
to be found wanting simply because it fails to include
every alternative conceivable. We conclude that the range
of alternatives discussed permitted a rational choice by the
Regional Forester.
The Regional Forester has adequately responded to your
specific concerns regarding the adequacy of the EIS in his
Responsive Statement, pages 15-21. Perfection is not the
test. The proper test is one of reasonableness, namely,
whether the amount of information provided was
reasonable in light of the decision being made. We find
that the FEIS adequately discloses the impacts of the proj-
ect in sufficient detail to provide the Regional Forester a
reasonable amount of information upon which to base his
decision.
7. Whether the decision is in volation of the
Washington State Environmental Policy Act. (SEPA)
Your claims on this point are incorrect for two reasons.
First, SEPA does not apply to decision making on Federal
land. Second, SEPA is similar to NEPA, and as discussed
previously, the decision was made in compliance with
NEPA and, therefore, would comply with SEPA if ap-
plicable.
62a
IV. Decision
Based upon our review of the record, it is my decision to
affirm Regional Forester Sirmon’s decision and deny the
specific relief which you seek. The stay granted on May |,
1985, will remain in effect for 10 days following the date
of this decision.
This decision is the final administrative determination of
the Department of Agriculture unless the Secretary, on his
own volition, elects to review the decision within 10 days
of receipt. Pursuant to 36 CFR 211.13 (F)(2), the Secretary
will not consider any request for review.
Sincerely,
/s/ L.B. Hilmon
for R. MAX PETERSON
Chief
63a
RECORD OF DECISION
USDA Forest Service
EARLY WINTERS ALPINE WINTER SPORTS STUDY
Okanogan National Forest
Okanogan County, Washington
Final Eavironmental Impact Statement
It is my decision to select Alternative IV as the future
management plan for the National Forest System lands
considered in this study. Based on this decision, the Forest
Service will issue 2 30-year Special Use Permit authorizing
use On approximately 3900 acres of land. Facilities would
allow utilization by 8200 skiers at one time. If competitive
interest exists, the permittee will be chosen through a pro-
spectus (bid) process. Construction may not begin until a
master development plan has been evaluated and approved.
This Environmental Impact Statement has been developed
through cooperative studies conducted by the Forest Serv-
ice and Okanogan County government. Studies began in
1968 following passage of the North Cascades National
Park Act, P.L. 90-544. The Secretaries of Agriculture and
Interior were directed to “agree on the designation of areas
within the park or recreation areas or within national
forests adjacent to the park and r
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.