Record and brief — Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council

Supreme Court brief1989

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No. 87-1703-CFX Title: F. Dale Robertson, Chief of the Forest Service, et

Status: GRANTED al., Petitioners

Vv.

Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al.

Docketed:

April 14, 1988 Court: United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Vide:

87-1704 Counsel for petitioner: Solicitor General

Counsel for respondent: Amster,Glenn J., Bricklin,David A. ,

Entry Date Note Proceedings and Orders

1 Feb 17 1988 Application for extension of time to file petition and

order granting same until March 30, 1988 (O’Connor,

February 18, 1988).

2 Mar 18 1988 Application for further extension of time to file

petition and order granting same until April 14, 1988

(O’Connor, March 23, 1988).

3 Apr 14 1988 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.

4 May 6 1988 =< respondent Methow Recreation, Inc. in opposition

filed.

6 May 8 1988 Order extending time to file response to petition until

June 1, 1988.

7 Jun 1 1988 Brief of respondents Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al.

in opposition filed.

8 Jun 7 1988 DISTRIBUTED. June 23, 1988

9 Jun 14 1988 X Reply brief of petitioner F. Dale Robertson, Chief filed.

10 Jun 27 1988 Petition GRANTED. The case is consolidated with 87-1704,

and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.

PT UC TITTLE LILLE LLL eee

li Aug 3 1988 G Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with

printing the joint appendix filed.

13. Aug 3 1988 urder extending time to file brief of petitioner on the

merits until r 10, 1988.

14 Aug 10 1988 G Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a

brief as amicus curiae filed.

15 Sep 9 1988 Brief amicus curiae of Institute of Law and Public Helath

Protection filed. VIDED.

18 Sep 9 1988 Brief of respondent Methow Recreation, Inc. filed.

20 Sep 9 1988 Order extending time to file brief of petitioner on the

merits until September 13, 1988.

17 Sep 13 1988 Brief of petitioner F. Dale Robertson, Chief filed.

16 Sep 14 1988 Box of Lodgings received.

22 Sep 19 1988 Order extending time to file brief of respondent on the

merits until November 14, 1988.

25 Oct 1 1988 D Motion of respondents Oregon Natural Resources Council,

et al. for divided argument filed.

23 Oct 3 1988 Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with

printing the — appendix GRANTED.

24 Oct 3 1988 Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a

brief as amicus curiae GRANTED.

26 Oct 11 1988 Motion of respondents Oregon Natural Resources Council,

et al. for divided argument DENIED.

No. 87-1703-CFX

Entry Date

Note

Proceedings and Orders

Jan

SET FOR ARGUMENT. Monday, January 9, 1989. This case is

consolidated with 87-1704. (ist case) (1 hr.)

Extension of time to file t itten brief of

re Methow Valley Citizens Council, et al. (No.

87-1703) extended to November 17, 1988. Printed copies

to be filed and served November 21, 1988. Extension is

limited to respondents in No. 87-1703 and is not ‘

extended to any emicus curiae parties.

Lodging received.

Brief amicus curiae of International Association of Fish and

Wildlife Agencies filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of California, et al. filed. VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Center for Environmental Education

filed. VIDED.

Brief amici curiae of National Wildlife Federation, et al.

filed.

Brief amicus curiae of American Planning Association filed.

Brief of respondents Methow Valley Citizens Counsel, et al.

filed.

CIRCULATED.

Lodging received.

X Reply brief of petitioner F. Dale Robertson, Chief filed.

ARGUED.

PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

Supreme Court, US.

EILED

F. DALE ROBERTSON, CHIEF OF THE

FOREST SERVICE, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

MeTHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

ROGER J. MARZULLA

Assistant Attorney General

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

Deputy Solicitor General

JEFFREY P. MINEAR

Assistant to the Solicitor General

PETER R. STEENLAND, JR.

Vick! L. PLAUT

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESEN. D

1. Whether the National Environmental Policy Act re-

quires federal agencies to include in each environmental

impact statement: (a) a fully developed pian to mitigate

environmental harm; and (b) a “worst case” analysis of

potential environmental harm if relevant information con-

cerning significant environmental effects is unavailable or

too costly to obtain.

2. Whether the Forest Service may issue a special use

permit for recreational use of national forest land in the

absence of a fully developed plan to mitigate environ-

mental harm.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Ce 1

ee ee ee 1

Statutory provisions and regulations involved .............. 2

ee eee eee ed dis ccc eccceenees 2

Reasons for granting the petition ......................... 12

isan Nese neeeaeeseSGdencuses se oscesectcees 24

DE iiidccecbeneheedstédeeeseseeeecesesceednae la

i iivhadt ddedhawsekdebeseeeéheesacucésvnns 20a

eS te ne Cie ei tee seadethennddeenee 48a

sade db ddan geeceeseseebotesedscecoceseceswus 49a

ee de Teens ek ee cesnquaneeceeatess 63a

EEE Oe ee a ee ee 72a

esc s i sdkb cn cVeddibdbhthetevetndaGeS CastEtees 73a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1982) ........... 16

Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated

sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n vy. Alaska, 439

ee can cc eeeanseees 19

American Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry.,

CC EE ee 21

Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) ............. 14, 21

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) .... 2.2... eee 13, 17

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410

EEE Oe 23

Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d

ES el a 19

Clark v. Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays,

Inc., cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984) .............. 20

Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d

EE 18

lV

Cases — Continued: Page

Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (%h Cir.

BD cicccccddsccnccneseeensebaceccéecestessess 18

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) ............. 13, 15

Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986) ..... ©. 6 6 eee 23

Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,

795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, No. 86-1013

Baas 4, THBP cc cccccccccccccescccccccssccecceses 16

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d

ft Le rrrrrriTiT rrr 11, 12, 16,

20, 22, 23, 24

River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 764 F.2d

445 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055 (1986) . 18

Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684

- | f ). 5 a errrrrrrrri rity 18

Scientists’ Irstitute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC,

458 B.28 GETD GAL. Git. TEES ce ccccccccccccccsccscs 19

Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir. 1983) ....... 19

Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v.

Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 694

WAS, GRD d doc cccccccscasescoesvcecconsess 18-19, 20

Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Haw.

1974), rev’d, 533 F.2d 434 (%h Cir.), cert. denied, 429

FS a Pree rere rT i 11, 14-15

Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444

Ce BED cncccenccecéecécesecedaccueeeees 15, 17-18

United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) ......... 23

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) ...... 12, 13, 15

Statutes and regulations:

Act of Oct. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-544, 82 Stat. 926:

7 § 9 2enNehei ia ay 3

SS, Re PD cnc ccccccvccccnecesseesese 3

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV)

GED ccdawdccecddiancdesddredscsaceussstrcess 12

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 ef seg. ... 2... 6 ee ee. 9

Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, § 1, 16 U.S.C.

GED sccsccedccccssucesescabactcocsaseseseseceess 3

V

Statutes and regulations — Continued: Page

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.

SE tek Gite cacdbantavedbdéeeetecéaucns 2

§ 102, 42 U.S.C. 4332 .................... 2, 4, 11, 14, 16

§ 102(2M(C), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2KC) .... 5, 13

ELIT TERT 14

National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.

Sa aah ekGtbemnnBongeedscneecsscetcecceccecs 9

EE aay 3

Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.

ER 4

nk 4

ee 4

SR ae a a a 10

36 C.F.R.:

I ee ORS: A 7)

a ee 4

ee 7Sa

ED ons cc cccccvccecectceencane 12, 75a

es Jtdeweeneae 75a

Section 251.56(a)(IMii) ..................... 12, 21, 75a

40 C.F.R.:

ET Suis bcc ece ceckecdvededdlavessas 17

i oe ns nue ch usecctedcedius 17

Ne ee 2 ee ae 17

ne ee 15

I i 15

can con cvecesadcriracas 17

ee 18, 74a

en ee 20, 73a

ES ceo otk) 15

ED a4 onan cn cs penecnacecenncucceuus 15

Miscellaneous:

D. Dannenbring & M. Starr, Management Science: An

ER ee 16

45 Fed. Reg. 38324 (1980) ........................... 22

49 Fed. Reg. te eta! eb eS oe) Ta 4

Pw OOD. TED, SERPS CITED oo. ccc ccc ccc cccccccccces 20

vi

Miscellaneous — Continued: Page

$0 Fed. Reg. 32236 (1985) ... 6.6.6 nnes 20, 21

51 Fed. Reg. (1986):

®. 1SGIG 2... cece cece cece eee ererennnneeeenees 19-20

pp. 19619-19620 .... 1.2.6 eee eee eee ee enenes 20

an bY. | rr 19-20

1963 Forest Service Manual ....... . 6. 6 oc wenn 22

H.R. Rep. 99-709, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1 (1986) ..... 3

S. Rep. 98-461, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) ..........-.

Wilkinson & Andersen, Land and Resource Planning in

the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1985) ......... 18

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1987

No.

F. DALE ROBERTSON, CHIEF OF THE

FOREST SERVICE, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Solicitor General, on behalf of F. Dale Robertson,

Chief of the Forest Service, et al., petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,

la-19a) is reported at 833 F.2d 810. The opinion of the

district court (App., infra, 20a-47a) is unreported.

The court of appeals entered its judgment (App., infra,

72a) on December 1, 1987. On February 18, 1988, Justice

O’Connor extended the time for filing a petition for a writ

of certiorari to and including March 30, 1988. On March

23, 1988, Justice O’Connor further extended the time for

filing the petition to and including April 14, 1988. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

(1)

2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act

of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4332, provides, in relevant part:

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the

fullest extent possible: * * * (2) all agencies of the

Federal Government shall —

(C) include in every recommendation or report on

proposals for legislation and other major Federal ac-

tions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment, a detailed statement by the responsible

official on —

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed

action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the proposal be im-

plemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term

uses of man’s environment and the maintenance

and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable com-

mitments of resources which would be involved

in the proposed action should it be implemented.

Pertinent excerpts from the regulations involved in this

case are reproduced in an appendix to this petition (App.,

infra, 73a-76a).

STATEMENT

Petitioners seek review of a court of appeals decision

reversing a magistrate’s determination that the Forest

Service had fully complied with the National Environmen-

tal Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 ef seq.,

3

and its own regulations in deciding to issue a special use

permit for the proposed Early Winters Ski Resort in the

Okanogan National Forest.

1. Congress has created a National Forest System and

entrusted its management to the Department of Agricul-

ture’s Forest Service. See National Forest Management

Act of 1976, § 2, 16 U.S.C. 1600. Congress has specifi-

cally directed the Forest Service to administer the national

forests “for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,

and wildlife and fish purposes.” Multiple-Use Sustained-

Yield Act of 1960, § 1, 16 U.S.C. 528. As part of this

multiple-use program, the Forest Service has permitted

development of 170 alpine ski areas within these federally

reserved lands. See H.R. Rep. 99-709, 99th Cong., 2d

Sess. Pt. 1, at 2 (1986). The ski seas, which occupy less

than 1/20th of 1% of the national forest lands, account

for more than 6% of recreational visitor use (ibid.).

In 1968, Congress established the North Cascades Na-

tional Park and directed the Secretary of the Interior and

the Secretary of Agriculture to designate portions of that

enclave and adjacent national forests for public uses, in-

cluding camping and ski areas. Act of Oct. 2, 1968,

§§ 101, 504, 16 U.S.C. 90, 90d-3. Pursuant to this specific

congressional directive, the Forest Service prepared a

report entitled the North Cascades Winter Sports Study

(hereinafter North Cascades Study| to compare existing

and potential ski areas in the North Cascades and to

recommend further development alternatives. The North

Cascades Study, which was completed in 1970, concluded

that existing ski areas should be expanded and identified a

single site as suitable for development of a “major destina-

4

tion ski resort.”' That site is a 6,000-foot mountain in the

Okanogan National Forest known as Sandy Butte.

In 1978, Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI), applied to the

Forest Service for a “special use” permit, pursuant to 36

C.F.R. 251.50, to develop an alpine ski resort at Sandy

Butte, to be known as Early Winters. In response, the

Forest Service prepared an environmental impact state-

ment, known as the Early Winters Study, in accordance

with Section 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332, to assess the

environmental consequences of the proposed develop-

ment.? The Early Winters Study was the first in a series of

' A major destination ski resort is a large, multi-season ski area

with sufficient ski runs, adequate vertical rise, sufficiently varied ac-

tivities and appropriate high-quality base facilities to entice vaca-

tioners to travel long distances and to stay several days at the site.

2 This final environmental impact statement — formally entitled the

Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study and sometimes referred to

as an “FEIS” — was released on August 31, 1934 (49 Fed. Reg. 34575).

The Forest Service completed and circulate. a draft environmental

impact statement in 1982, but delayed release of the statement and a

decision on MRI's permit application while Congress considered in-

cluding Sandy Butte in a proposed wilderness designation. On July 3,

1984, Congress passed the Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984,

Pub. L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 296 ~° signating as wilderness certain

portions of the National Forest System in Washington — not including

Sandy Butte — and directing (§ 2(b), 98 Stat. 299) that “other National

Forest System lands in the State of Washington be available for non-

wilderness multiple uses.” The Senate Report accompanying the Act

spoke directly to the issue of further development at Sandy Butte (S.

Rep. 98-461, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1984)):

That area of the Okanogan National Forest known as Sandy

Butte has been excluded from wilderness designation in S. 837.

*** The designation by Congress in S. 837 of appropriate

wilderness areas in Washington State makes it unnecessary to fur-

ther withhold the Sandy Butte/Early Winters Alpine Winter

Sports Siudy FEIS pending completion of the Okanogan Forest

Plan. The Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture are

5

steps that had to be completed before issuance of a special

use permit. Early Winters Study xvi.’

2. The Early Winters Study explained that its purpose

was to provide the Forest Service with “the information re-

quired to evaluate the potential for skiing at Early

Winters, to assist in making a decision whether to issue a

special use permit for downhill skiing on all or part” of

Sandy Butte. Early Winters Study 1. The Study considered

five alternative levels of development in detail, including a

“no action” alternative, and identified the second highest

directed to allow the evaluation process for the Sandy Butte

development to proceed without additional delay * * *.

For the Court's convenience, we have lodged a copy of the Early

Winters Study with tne Clerk of the Court.

> The Forest Service generally reviews special use permit applica-

tions for major developments through a two-stage process. In the first

stage, the Forest Service examines the general environmental and

financial feasibility of the proposed development. The environmental

study is usually conducted through the preparation of an environmen-

tal impact statement in accordance with NEPA’s requirements

(§ 102(2MC), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2KC)), while financial feasibility is

determined through a conventional assessment of the developer's

resources. Once the Forest Service determines that a general scheme

for development is environmentally sound and financially feasible, the

Forest Service may issue a special use permit to plan, construct, main-

tain, and operate the development. However, prior to any construc-

tion activity, the Forest Service must approve the developer's master

plan for development, construction, and operation of the project. In

the second stage, the Forest Service reviews the developer's proposed

master plan. Based on this plan, (he Forest Service also completes an

additional environmental analysis of on-site impacts. Only after com-

pletion of the second environmental analysis and final approval of the

completed master plan may the developer begin construction. All con-

struction and operation of the facility must be in accordance with the

master plan and the permit’s other requirements.

6

level—serving up to 8,200 skiers at one time—as the

preferred development option (id. at 6-22).‘

The Early Winters Study made clear that a decision to

‘go forward with a ski resort would not result directly in

development; rather, “(further environmental analysis

and review will be required prior to any decision by the

Forest Service to allow a specific development at Early

Winters, and by the responsible state and local govern-

ment agencies, prior to any authorization to develop non-

Forest Service lands.” Early Winters Study |. Following is-

suance of a special use permit, the developer would have

to submit a detailed mountain and base development plan

for the Forest Service’s approval, providing the precise ski

area design (id. at xvi). At this stage, the Study explained,

site-specific mitigation plans would be required (ibid.).

Although it was too early to design a detailed mitigation

plan, it was not too early to identify significant anticipated

effects that major development might have on Sandy

Butte and the surrounding communities. The Early

Winters Study evaluated the potentia! effects on air and

water quality, vegetation, wildlife, fisheries, timber

resources, socio-economic conditions, land use, recrea-

tion, transportation, and public services. Early Winters

Study 65-145. In each of these areas, the Study considered

* The alternatives ranged from maintaining the status quo (no ski

hill development) to developing a ski area capable of serving 10,500

skiers at one time. The Early Winters Study did not give detailed con-

sideration to expansion of existing ski areas at other locations or

development of new ski areas at other locations. The North Cascades

Study had considered these options and had concluded that — of 23 ex-

isting and potential sites — Sandy Butte was the only site in the State of

Washington suitable for development as a major ski area. See Early

Winters Study 6-7; see also App., infra, Sla-S2a.

7

both the impacts within and outside the National Forest,

denominating On-site impacts as primary and off-site im-

pacts as secondary (ibid.).°

The Study concluded that all of the alternatives, in-

cluding the “no action” option, would adversely affect

Methow Valley’s mule deer population and the region’s air

quality. In the case of the mule deer, the Study observed

that the ski resort itself could reduce their range and fawn-

ing habitat but that, even if the ski resort were not built, the

anticipated growth in human population on surrounding

non-federal land would disturb the mule deer herds. Early

Winters Study 75-76. In the case of air quality, the Study

concluded that the construction and operation of the ski

resort would not have a measurable impact, but the secon-

dary impacts from development of nearby private land

would have a significant effect that would increase with

successive levels of development (id. at 65-67). In both

cases, the Study identified measures to reduce or eliminate

the adverse effects (id. at 14-18, 68-69, 77-78). The Study

specifically cautioned, however, that these suggestions were

conceptual, that they would be made more specific in

subsequent steps of the planning process, and that addi-

tional mitigation measures might be required (id. at 14).*

* The Study acknowledged that the evaluation of off-site impacts

was hampered by the absence of any specific development plans.

“Since there are no pending proposals or plans to develop off-site

lands, the evaluation of off-site impacts is not site-specific. It is

general in nature, acknowledging to the extent practicable the impacts

associated with the growth that is likely to be induced by development

of Sandy Butte for skiing. The evaluation of off-site impacts {is} in-

cluded to provide a more complete picture of the likely effects of ski

development at Early Winters and alert other jurisdictions to decisions

to [be] made.” Early Winters Study 1-3.

* The Study suggested that on-site wildlife effects could be

mitigated by locating runs, lifts, and roads in a minimally disruptive

manner and by restricting travel and other activities in sensitive areas

3. The Regional Forester reviewed the Early Winters

Study and concurred in the Study’s recommendation sup-

porting a ski resort capable of serving 8,200 skiers at one

time. He accordingly issued a decision, on July 5, 1984, to

seek a qualified developer (App., infra, 63a-7la).’ The

Regional Forester explained that the highest development

alternative (serving up to 10,500 skiers at one time) “would

provide maximum utilization of the recreation resource

opportunities and increased economic benefit to the area”

(id. at 65a), and that the “no action” alternative “would

cause the least disruption to the natural environment”

(ibid.), but the selected alternative “provides a balance of

concerns for the physical and biological components of

the human environment in addition to concerns for social

and economic welfare” (ibid.). He further observed that

adverse environmental effects would result from all of the

alternatives, including the “no action” option, that these

adverse effects would result almost exclusively from off-

site development, and that “[p]jractical measures to reduce

during fawning season (Early Winters Study 14-16). The Study

repeated that “[s}pecific mitigation for wildlife at the ski development

can only be determined in review of the Master Plan” (id. at 16). The

’ This decision was an important but preliminary step in the permit-

ting process. See note 3, supra. It established that development of a

certain size and character was environmentally feasible and preferable

to other alternatives, but it did not determine whether MRI (which ini-

tially proposed the development) or some other applicant would

qualify for or obtain the special use permit.

the adverse impacts have been, or are in the process of

being, implemented by Okanogan County” (id. at 67a).*

On October 1, 1984, the Methow Valley Citizens Coun-

cil et al. (MVCC) requested, pursuant to % C.F.R.

211.18, that the Chief of the Forest Service reverse the

Regional Forester’s decision. He denied that request, with

an extensive discussion of the reasons supporting his deci-

sion, on December 16, 1985 (App., infra, 49a-62a).

MVCC then filed this action in the United States District

Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint con-

tended, among other claims, that the Early Winters Study

did not conform with NEPA's requirements, that the

Forest Service's decision to develop Sandy Butte was not in

the public interest, and that the Forest Service had violated

the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.

1600 ef seqg., and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 ef seg.

The parties agreed to submit the issues to a United States

magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c).

The magistrate dismissed through summary judgment

MVCC"’s claims under the National Forest Management

Act and the Clean Air Act, and, after a hearing to supple-

ment the administrative record, he rejected all of MVCC’s

remaining claims (App., infra, 20a-48a). The magistrate

* These efforts included the development of various local restric-

tal Protection Agency, and the State Department of Ecology,

Okanogan County commuted itself to develop and enforce an air

quality ordinance and other mitigation measures necessary to main-

tain air quality within the standards of the state air quality umplemen-

tation plan. The Forest Service, in turn, agreed to ensure that

measures sufficient to maintain air Quality were in place betore allow-

ing any construction of permatted facilites at Sandy Butte See Supp.

E.R. 47.48.

10

concluded that the Forest Service's decision to go forward

with the issuance of a special use permit was unreviewable

under Ninth Circuit precedent (id. at 28a-30a); that even if

it were reviewable, it was not arbitrary and capricious (id. —

at 30a n.4); and that it did not violate due process (id. at

3ia). The magistrate next held that the Early Winters

Study satisfied NEPA's requirements for ap cavironmen-

tal impact statement (id. at 3ia-47a). He rejected MVCC’s

argument that the Srudy's discussion of alternative

development sites was inadequate (id. at 34a-38a), observ-

ing that “the North Cascades Winter Sports Study, a work

cited in the [Barly Winters Study] and available to the

public, had identified Sandy Butte as the only area in the

Okanogan Forest having good potential as a major ski

development” (id. at 37a), and that expansions of sites “a

hundred or more miles away from the Okanogan National

Forest are not reasonable alternatives” (ibid.). The

magistrate further determined that the Forest Service ade-

quately discussed the project's environmental impacts (/d.

at 38a-47a). He specifically rejected MVCC’s contentions

that the Forest Service was obligated to prepare a “worst

case” analysis of the possible impacts (id. at 40a, 45a) and

that the Early Winters Study gave insufficient analysis to

possible mitigation measures (id. at 4la-42a, 45a-46a).

4. MVCC appealed the magistrate’s decision directly

to the court of appeals (see 28 U.S.C. 636(cX(3)). The court

reversed the magistrate’s determination, holding that the

Early Winters Study failed to satisfy NEP A's requirements

and that the Forest Service's decision to issue a special use

permit was arbitrary and capricious (App., infra, 1a-19a).

The court found the Early Winters Study to be flawed in

three respects. First, the court held that the Study should

have given detailed consideration to the possibility of ex-

panding existing ski resorts as one of the alternative

development proposals, rejecting the magistrate’s deter-

11

mination that these were not feasible alternatives (App.,

infra, 8a-1la). Second, the court held that the statement

did not provide a sufficiently detailed discussion of the en-

vironmental impacts of the proposed project on mule deer

and air quality (id. at lla-16a). The court specifically

stated that if the government is unable to obtain adequate

information on the effects of the project on mule deer, the

government must conduct a “worst case” analysis of the

environmental impacts (id. at 13a, 14a).° Finally, the court

held that Section 102 of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4332) “requires

that ‘action be taken to mitigate the adverse effects of

major federal actions’” (App., infra, 17a).'° The court

specifically ruled that an environmental impact statement

must contain both a detailed plan to mitigate any adverse

environmental effects and an analysis of the plan’s effec-

tiveness (ibid.).'' Having failed to include such a detailed

plan, the Early Winters Study was “inadequate as a matter

of law” (id. at 19a).

With respect to the Forest Service’s decision to issue a

special use permit, the court acknowledged (App., infra,

3a-4a) that its prior precedent had indicated that such deci-

sions are not reviewable under the Administrative Pro-

* The cous. dased this requirement on its recent decision in Oregon

Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1058-1059

(1987).

'® The court quoted Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102,

1111 (D. Haw. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).

'' The court stated: “ ‘The importance of the mitigation plan can-

not be overestimated. It is a determinative factor in evaluating the

adequacy of an environmental impact statement. Without a complete

mitigation plan, the decisionmaker is unable to make an informed

judgment as to the environmental impact of the project — one of the

main purposes of an environmental impact statement.’ ” App., infra,

19a (quoting Oregon Natural Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055).

12

cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 701-706. The court

concluded, however, that subsequent Forest Service

regulations had since created “ ‘law’ for this court to

apply” and that the decisions were therefore now

reviewable (App., infra, 4a-Sa). The court then held that

the relevant Forest Service regulations (36 C.F.R.

251.54(e)(4) and 36 C.F.R. 251.56(a)(1)(ii)) require “an

adequate mitigation plan” (App., infra, 5a n.3), and that

the mitigation plan contained in the Early Winters Study

was so inadequate that the “decision to grant the special

use permit could be none other than arbitrary, capricious,

and an abuse of discretion” (ibid.).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The court of appeals has departed from the teachings of

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), and

has imposed significant new NEPA obligations on federal

agencies. The court’s decision, which builds upon its prior

decision in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh,

820 F.2d 1051 (1987),'? requires all environmental impact

statements to contain detailed and demonstrably effective

mitigation plans and to include a “worst case” analysis

whenever the agency lacks information or adequate scien-

tific methodology to determine precisely a potential en-

vironmental effect. Neither NEPA nor its implementing

regulations authorize these court-created directives. The

court of appeals’ decision also incorrectly construes the

Forest Service’s special use permit regulations to impose

similar mitigation obligations. The court’s rigid new re-

quirements would actually impede the goal of informed

'2 The Solicitor General has sought review of the Oregon Natural

Resources Council decision through a petition for a writ of certiorari

filed simultaneously with this petition.

13

agency decision-making by preventing federal agencies

from carrying out their resource management respon-

sibilities through systematic project development. The

court’s clear deviation from established precedent has

great practical significance owing to the vast expanse of

federal lands and the numerous planned and potential

federal projects located within the Ninth Circuit.

1. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA directs that federal

agencies proposing actions that significantly affect the

quality of the human environment must prepare a detailed

statement on “the environmental impact of the proposed

action.” 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). This requirement serves

two purposes: First, it obligates the agency to consider the

environmental consequences of the proposed action; and

second, it assures the public that the agency has considered

environmental concerns in the decisionmaking process.

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).

As this Court has explained, “NEPA does set forth

significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its man-

date to the agencies is essentially procedural.” Vermont

Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 558. Further-

more, “the only procedural requirements imposed by

NEPA are those stated in the plain language of the Act”

(id. at 548). “The procedural duty imposed upon agencies

by [Section 102(2)(C)] is quite precise, and the role of the

courts in enforcing that duty is similarly precise.” Kleppe

v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976). “The only role

for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard

look’ at environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject

itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the

choice of the action to be taken’ ” (id. at 410 n.21 (citation

omitted)). Furthermore, the courts should defer to the

judgment of the Council on Environmental Quality

14

(CEQ)—the agency responsible for assuring proper im-

plementation of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4344) — which has pro-

mulgated regulations for preparing environmental impact

statements. “CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to

substantial deference.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.

347, 358 (1979).

The court of appeals ignored these established principles

and, relying solely on its own precedent, created two

significant new NEPA requirements. The court incorrectly

held that an agency must include in every environmental

impact statement (a) a fully developed plan to mitigate en-

vironmental harm; and (b) a “worst case” analysis of

potential environmental harm if relevant information con-

cerning significant environmental effects is unavailable or

too costly to obtain.'*

a. The court of appeals based its mitigation require-

ment on the fundamentally mistaken premise that Section

102 of NEPA “requires that ‘action be taken to mitigate

the adverse effects of major federal actions’ ” (App., in-

fra, 17a (citation omitted)). Neither Section 102, nor this

Court’s decisions interpreting that provision, impose any

such requirement. The court obtained its proposition from

a 1974 district court decision, Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar,

389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Haw.), that was reversed

') We believe that the court of appeals also erred in holding that the

Early Winters Study’s discussion of development alternatives was in-

adequate, but we do not press that question in this Court. The court

appears to have agreed that the reasonableness of the alternatives

depends essentially upon the scope of the proposed action as defined

by the agency (App., infra, 9a). But the court proceeded to ignore the

agency’s own description of the scope of its action. Nevertheless, the

question of appropriate alternatives is somewhat factbound and less

significant than the mitigation and worst case issues. Furthermore, the

government may be able to cure that supposed deficiency on remand

without an excessive commitment of time and resources.

15

on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 999 (1976).'* The district court decision was

dubious authority even when its ink was fresh; this Court's

subsequent decisions in Vermont Yankee and Kleppe

demonstrate that the decision was quite clearly wrong.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that Section 102 re-

quires the agency to consider and inform the public of

potential environmental impacts; it does not require the

agency to “elevate environmental concerns over other ap-

propriate considerations.” Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood

Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).

The court of appeals’ imposition of a substantive duty

to mitigate environmental harm is also inconsistent with

the CEQ regulations implementing NEPA. Those regula-

tions require an agency to identify mitigation possibilities

in the environmental impact statement in the course of

discussing project alternatives and the resulting en-

vironmental effects. See 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h).

In addition, an agency must state, as part of its ultimate

decision, whether it has adopted mitigation measures (40

C.F.R. 1505.2) and, if it has, it must implement those

measures (40 C.F.R. 1505.3). These regulations ensure

that decisionmakers consider opportunities to mitigate en-

vironmental harm, but they do not impose a duty to adopt

such measures. The decision whether to adopt mitigation

measures, like the decision whether to go forward with the

project itself, is left to the expert agency's informed discre-

tion. Compare Sirycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council,

Inc., 444 U.S. at 227; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Corp., 435 U.S. at 558; Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n.20.

'* The district court decision in Stop H-3 states, without any cita-

tion of authority, that “NEPA implies a requirement that action be

taken to mitigate the adverse effects of major federal actions.” 389 F.

Supp. at 1111 (emphasis added).

16

The court of appeals not only imposed a new substan-

tive duty to mitigate environmental harm, it also imposed

a concomitant procedural obligation — derived solely from

its own precedents—to develop a “ ‘complete mitigation

plan’” (App., infra, 19a (quoting Oregon Natural

Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055)).'* As in the case of

the substantive duty to mitigate harm, this procedural re-

quirement to develop a detailed mitigation plan finds no

source in Section 102 of NEPA. The CEQ’s implementing

regulations recognize that potential mitigation measures

should be identified—as was done here (see pages 6-7,

supra)—but they do not require development of a com-

plete mitigation plan. The court’s blanket statements that

the “‘importance of a mitigation plan cannot be

overestimated’” (App., infra, 19a (quoting Oregon

Natural Resources Council, 820 F.2d at 1055)) and that

“ ‘ijt is a determinative factor in evaluating the adequacy

of an environmental impact statement’ ” (ibid.) find no

support whatsoever in NEPA or the CEQ regulations.

The court of appeals’ decision on this score would have

severe consequences. As the facts of this case demonstrate,

the decision would prevent an agency from evaluating the

environmental consequences of a proposed project

through the familiar and sensible concept of staged project

development.'* In particular, it would prevent an agency

'S The court first suggested that agencies must provide a detailed

discussion of mitigation measures in Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-

tective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 697 (Sth Cir. 1985), cert.

granted on other grounds, No. 86-1013 (May 4, 1987). That case cited

Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 1982), which made no

mention of mitigation at all. The court later expanded the obligation

to prepare a detailed mitigation plan in Oregon Natural Resources

Council, 820 F.2d at 1055.

'* See, e.g., D. Dannenbring & M. Starr, Management Science: An

Introduction $48 (1981) (“A project is itself a combination of many

17

from making any initial feasibility determinations until the

entire project planning process has been completed and a

complete mitigation plan has been developed. This ap-

proach pervasively conflicts with the CEQ’s regulations

mandating early application of NEPA (40 C.F.R. 1501.2,

1502.5(b)), encouraging tiered environmental analysis (40

C.F.R. 1502.20), and forbidding agencies from commit-

ting resources in a manner that will bias the agency's

ultimate decision (40 C.F.R. 1502.2(f)). As a practical

matter, the court’s approach would frustrate or impede a

wide range of federal and federally permitted projects.

Here, for example, the Forest Service could offer potential

developers . assurance whatsoever that it will issue a

special use permit for the Early Winters project unti! a

developer has spent several years and millions of dollars to

provide comprehensive plans on which to base a detailed

mitigation plan. More generally, agencies would be forced

to defer complete environmental analysis until far along in

the planning process and to invest resources on a large “

scale before making even preliminary decisions. By defer-

ring the environmental analysis to satisfy the requirements

of this decision, the agencies would run the grave risk of

having proposed projects enjoined on the ground that ir-

retrievable commitments have been made without the re-

quisite environmental analysis.

“As Vermont Yankee made clear, NEPA does not re-

quire agencies to adopt any particular internal decision-

making structure.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at

100. NEPA and its implementing regulations were

deliberately structured to permit federal decisionmakers

great latitude to determine the appropriate scope of their

environmental discussion and evaluation. See, e.g.,

Strycker’s Bay Neighorborhood Council, 444 U.S. at

varied and complex tasks or activities. These tasks are interdependent

in that most cannot begin until some other task has been completed”).

227.'’ The court’s decision here would eliminate this

latitude by forcing agencies to fit all of their actions into

the court’s rigid and counterproductive formula for en-

vironmental decisionmaking. The court's formula is par-

ticularly unsuitable for federal agencies such as the Forest

Service, which must manage vast acreages of federal lands

through long-range planning techniques'* and must

therefore engage in staged decisionmaking.

b. The court of appeals also erred in concluding

(App., infra, 13a) that a “worst case” analysis is required

whenever an agency is unable to obtain information on

which to base a reasoned decision. The court noted (id. at

13a n.11) that CEQ regulations had at one time required

that environmental impact statements evaluate uncertainty

by including a “worst case analysis and an indication of

the probability or improbability of its occurrence” (40

C.F.R. 1502.22 (1985)), but that CEQ had subsequently

rescinded that requirement.'* The court determined that

the “worst case” requirement nevertheless remains in effect

because “the regulation was merely a codification of prior

NEPA easelaw” (App., infra, 13a n.11), citing its previous

decision in Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic

'” See also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837-838 (Mh

Cir. 1986); River Road Alliance, Inc. vy. Corps of Engineers, 764 F.2d

445, 448 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055 (1986); Friends of

Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (Mh Cir.

1985); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d

1041, 1047 (ist Cir. 1982).

'® See generally Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource Plan-

ning in the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1 (1985).

'* We have reproduced the relevant portions of CEQ’s present

regulation and the rescinded “worst case” regulation in the appendix,

infra, 73a-7Sa.

19

Sprays, Inc. v. Clark (SOCATS), 720 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984).

The SOCATS decision mistakenly derived that proposi-

tion from Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir.

1983). The question in Sigler was whether the Army Corps

of Engineers was required to comply with the CEQ regula-

tion under the particular facts of that case. The Fifth Cir-

cuit first admitted that while there is “some language in

NEPA which may be said to endorse generally the concept

of a worst case analysis” the statute’s “literal language does

not require a worst case analysis” (id. at 969). The court

next noted that a series of judicial decisions had recog-

nized that NEPA does contemplate that agencies would

engage in “ ‘[rjeasonable forecasting and speculation’ ”

concerning future environmental effects, including the

“probabilities of the occurrence” and the “ ‘cost of uncer-

tainty —i.e. the costs of proceeding without more and bet-

ter information’ ” (id. at 970).?° The court then stated that

the “CEQ’s worst case analysis merely codifies these

judicially created principles” (id. at 971). Thus, the Fifth

Circuit effectively concluded that the worst case regulation

was the CEQ’s mechanism for implementing certain

judicially recognized NEPA objectives. The court did not

hold that the worst case methodology was the only

allowable mechanism for effecting those general goals.

The CEQ has adhered to the objectives identified in

Sigler, but has determined that “the ‘worst case analysis’

requirement is an unproductive and ineffective method of

achieving those goa’s” (51 Fed. Reg. 15618, 15620

*® The court specifically cited Scientists’ Institute for Public Infor-

mation, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carolina

Envil. Study Group v. United States, $10 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir.

1975); and Alaska v. Andrus, $80 F.2d 465, 473-474 (D.C. Cir. 1978),

vacated on other grounds swh nom, Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v.

Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).

20

(1986)).2' The CEQ has therefore adopted “a wiser and

more manageable approach to the evaluation of reason-

ably foreseeable significant adverse impacts in the face of

incomplete or unavailable information” (id. at 15620).??

The court of appeals’ decisions in this case and in Oregon

Natural Resources Council effectively overrule the CEQ’s

new regulation and install worst case analysis as a perma-

nent feature of NEPA compliance.

2! The CEQ had received frequent complaints that the worst case

approach was not an effective method for addressing uncertainty and

led to excessive paperwork and delays. 51 Fed. Reg. 15619-15620

(1986). “Experts in the field of risk analysis and perception stated that

the ‘worst case analysis’ lacks defensible rationale or procedures, and

that the current regulatory language stands ‘without any discernible

link to the disciplines that have devoted so much thought and effort

toward developing rational ways to cope with problems of uncertain-

ty.” ” $0 Fed. Reg. 32234, 32236 (1985). The CEQ itself found that the

methodology “can breed endless hypothesis and speculation” (51 Fed.

Reg. 15620 (1986)) and “has proved counterproductive, because it has

led to agencies being required to devote substantial time and resources

to preparation of analyses which are not considered useful to decision-

makers and divert the EIS process from its intended purpose” (50 Fed.

Reg. 32236 (1986)). We described some of these difficulties in a

previous petition for a writ of certiorari in SOCATS. See Clark v.

Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc., cert. denied,

469 U.S. 1028 (1984) (White and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The

CEQ’s effort to alleviate these difficulties, after the denial of certiorari

in SOCATS, by revision of its regulations has now been repudiated by

the court of appeals.

22 The CEQ’s revised regulation provides that when relevant infor-

mation cannot be obtained because the costs of obtaining it are exor-

bitant or the means to obtain it are not known, the environmental im-

pact statement must identify the unavailable information and its

relevance, must summarize existing scientific information bearing on

foreseeable environmental impacts, and must contain the agency's

evaluation of those impacts based on research methods generally ac-

cepted in the scientific community. 40 C.F.R. 1502.22.

21

This aspect of the court of appeals’ decision is obviously _

contrary to this Court’s recognition in Andrus v. Sierra

Club, that the CEQ’s judgment is entitled to “substantial

deference” even when the agency has changed its regula-

tions governing NEPA compliance (442 U.S. at 358). See

also, ¢.g., American Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, T. &

S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967). As in the case of its

new mitigation requirements, the court of appeals holding

here would have severe consequences. As the CEQ has ex-

plained, federal agencies would be forced to conduct

wasteful and time-consuming inquiries into speculative

impacts that lack “a firm connection between credible

science and the hypothetical consequences of an agency’s

proposed action.” 50 Fed. Reg. 32236 (1985). This sort of

“pure conjecture * * * lacking a credible scientific basis is

not useful to either the decisionmaker or the public” (ibid.

(emphasis in original)).

2. The court of appeals not only misconstrued NEPA,

it also misconstrued the Forest Service's regulations gov-

erning the issuance of a special use permit. The principal

regulation involved in this case requires special use

authorizations to contain terms and conditions that will

“minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish

and wildlife habitat and othewise [sic] protect the environ-

ment.” 36 C.F.R. 251.56(a)(1(ii).?* The court interpreted

this provision to require “an adequate mitigation plan”

(App., infra, Sa n.3). The court then reasoned (ibid. ):

Since the mitigation “plan” here at issue is so vague

and undeveloped as to be wholly inadequate, [citing

the court’s discussion of NEPA mitigation re-

quirements], the Regional Forester’s decision to grant

7) We have reproduced the relevant portions of the Forest Service

regulations in the appendix, infra 7Sa-76a.

22

the special use permit could be none other than ar-

bitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.

Thus, the court concluded that the Forest Service regula-

tion incorporates the court's judicially created NEPA

mitigation requirements.

The court’s reasoning here is seriously flawed. The

Forest Service regulation makes no mention of mitigation

plans and was never intended to incorporate the sort of

“complete mitigation plan” that the court itself

created — without statutory authority —in Oregon Natural

* Resources Council v. Marsh, supra. The Forest Service

operated under guidelines, even prior to NEPA, that

directed the agency to minimize harm to resources.** In

1980, it revised its regulations to reflect their present form

(45 Fed. Reg. 38324 (1980)). However, the Forest Service

has never suggested, at any point in that process, that its

regulations require a complete mitigation plan, at the per-

mit stage, of the kind the court of appeals imposed here.

Instead, the Forest Service has routinely imposed terms

and conditions similar to those ultimately imposed in this

* See 1963 Forest Service Manual § 2140.1 (in planning special

uses, the agency’s objective is to manage and protect resources and to

minimize adverse effects to projects); § 2134 (special use permits must

contain stipulations that ensure maintenance of productivity of land

and resolution of conflicts with other planned of prospective uses).

25 & special use permit was issued to MRI on July 21, 1986, shortly

after this case was argued before the court of appeals. The special use

permit conditioned all construction on the Forest Service's prior ap-

proval of a fully developed master plan, which was to contain detailed

mitigation measures. The initial permit also put the developer on

notice that it would be required to protect scenic and esthetic values,

prevent soil erosion and degradation of water, soil, and air quality,

and immediately to cease construction upon discovery of ar-

chaeologically or historically significant material. See U.S. Dep't of

23

The court of appeals’ holding here “runs roughshod

over the established proposition that an agency’s construc-

tion of its own regulations is entitled to substantial

deference.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986). See,

e.g., United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977)

(“In construing administrative regulations, ‘the ultimate

criterion is the administrative interpretation, which

becomes of a aeden it is plainly er-

roneous or inconsistent regulation.’ ”, quoting

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414

(1945)). The Forest Service’s interpretation of its regula-

tion here is plainly reasonable and should be respected.

The court’s decision, which requires every special use per-

“mit henceforth issued to contain a detailed plan to mitigate

on- and off-site effects, creates yet another unjustified

obstacle to development and use of federal lands.

3. The court of appeals’ decisions in this case and in

Oregon Natural Resorces Council v. Marsh, supra, would

greatly expand the federal agencies’ substantive and pro-

cedural duties under NEPA. None of the newly imposed

duties finds its source in NEPA or in its implementing

regulations; rather, they are purely judicial creations. Fur-

thermore, the court's two decisions have confirmed those

duties as a settled element of the Ninth Circuit's peculiar

Courts MEPA prosoteas tes os —

. great practical significance.

As we have already explained, the court's newly fashioned

NEPA obligations would impose substantial burdens on

the federal government, private developers and, ultimate-

ly, the taxpaying public, without corresponding benefits.

Agriculture Forest Service Special Use Authorization, Region 06, User

~% 4171 (Methow Recreation Inc.) paras. 41, 44, 48, 49, 50, 54, 62.

24

Indeed, these court-imposed requirements are not only

contrary to sound environmental decisionmaking, they are

contrary to the goals of NEPA and the procedures created

by the CEQ for achieving those goals. The resulting costs

would be enormous even if limited to the projects within

the Ninth Circuit owing to the vast expanse of federal

lands and the numerous planned and potential federal

projects subject to that court's rulings. This Court’s review

is therefore warranted.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.?*

Respectfully submitted.

Jerraey P. Miweae

Assistant to the Solicitor General

Peres R. STEENLAND, Jr.

Vicar L. PlawuT

Altorneys

Aran 1988

* The Court may wish to consolidate this case with Marsh v.

Oregon Natural Resources Council, No. 87-____, of to order that the

cases be heard in tandem. The government's petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari im that case (which is being filed semultancously with this peti-

tion) presents overlapping, but not identical, NEPA issues.

A Rh ll al

a ee eee ners

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-4108

D.C. No. 85-2124-DA

, METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

v.

REGIONAL FORESTER, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

WILLIAM M. Da_e, JRr., Magistrate, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 6, 1987— Portland, Oregon

Filed December 1, 1987

Before: ALFRED GOODWIN and WARREN J. FERGUSON,

Circuit Judges, and ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, Jr..*

District Judge.

Opinion by Judge FERGUSON

* Honorable Albert Lee Stephens, Jr., Senior United States District

Judge, Central District of California, sitting by designation.

(la)

2a

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge:

Sandy Butte overlooks the Methow Valley, an un-

spoiled, sparsely populated area on the eastern side of the

North Cascade Mountains in the State of Washington.

The Methow Valley provides critical winter range and

migration corridors for Washington’s largest migratory

deer herd. Sandy Butte is a 3,900-acre parcel in the

Okanogan National Forest. The upper one-third of Sandy

Butte is entirely roadless. In 1978 appellee Methow

Recreation, Inc. (MRI) applied for a “special use” permit

to develop and operate a four-season destination ski resort

on Sandy Butte and a large parcel of private land it had ac-

quired adjacent to Sandy Butte. The proposed develop-

ment is known as the Early Winters project. The project is

expected to spawn extensive commercial and residential

development in the Methow Valley.

Pursuant to requirements of the National Environmen-

tal Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332, mandating

completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

analyzing the environmental impacts of “major” govern-

mental actions, the appellee Forest Service studied the

question of whether it should allocate Sandy Butte for use

as a downhill ski area. In 1982 the Forest Service published

a draft EIS on a proposal to designate Sandy Butte for use

as a major ski area capable of serving 8,200 skiers at one

time (SAOT). The final EIS was issued in 1984. Based on

its contents, in July 1984 the Regional Forester issued a

“Record of Decision” which adopted a “future manage-

ment plan” for Sandy Butte. The plan allocated the area

for use as a ski area capable of serving 8,200 SAOT. The

record of decision also approved the issuance of a special

use permit to MRI for the Early Winters Project.'

' A special use permit is necessary whenever a private party seeks to

use lands owned by the federal government. The Forest Service issues

special use permits under authority derived from 16 U.S.C. § 497.

3a

In December 1985, appellants Methow Valley Citizens

Council, et al. (MVCC), brought this action in the District

Court for the District of Oregon alleging violations of the

National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614,

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626, and NEPA.

Pursuant to local rule, the case was assigned to a United

States Magistrate. The National Forest Management Act

and Clean Air Act claims were dismissed upon motions for

summary judgment and are not raised on appeal. The re-

maining NEPA issues were tried before the district court

and the court affirmed the Forest Service’s Record of

Decision, dismissing the remaining claims. MVCC subse-

quently filed this appeal.

The issues facing this court are whether the district court

erred in holding that the Regional Forester’s decision to

issue a special use permit is not reviewable and in its deter-

mination that the EIS adequately discussed alternatives to

the proposed project, impacts to the deer herd, impacts on

air quality, other significant impacts, and mitigation

measures. Jurisdiction of this court is found under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§§ 701-706, governs judicial review of agency actions. Sec-

tion 702 grants standing to challenge an agency action to

anyone adversely affected by such action, except where the

statute under which the action was taken precludes judicial

review, Or where the action is committed to agency discre-

tion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). While there is no claim

here that judicial review is barred by statutory preclusion,

there is dispute as to whether the Regional Forester’s is-

suance of a special use permit is an action

4a

committed to agency discretion such that it is removed en-

tirely from the scrutiny of judicial review. The district

court held that it was committed to agency discretion and

not subject to judicial review.

The district court cited two cases — Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) and Ness

Investment Corp. v. United States Dept. of Agric., Forest

Service, 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975)—in support of its

decision. In Citizen to Preserve Overton Park, the

Supreme Court emphasized that action committed to

agency discretion by law is “a very narrow exception . . .

_applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn

in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to

apply.’ ” 401 U.S. at 410 (citation omitted). In Ness, this

court held that the denial of a special use permit was not

judicially reviewable because there was no “law to apply”

by which the court could assess the legality of the agency’s

decision. The court held that neither the authorizing

statute, 16 U.S.C. § 497, nor the very general language of

corresponding regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 251.1 et seq., of-

fered standards by which the agency’s action could be

tested. Jd. at 715, 716. Contra Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d

1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 1975). Thus central to our decision in

Ness was the lack of formal guidelines for the issuance of

special use permits.

The district court failed to note, however, that in 1980 —

prior to the commencement of activities relevant to this

action—the Forest Service issued detailed supplemental

regulations which, while not entirely removing the deci-

sion to issue a special use permit from agency discretion,

do impose specific obligations on the authority consider-

ing issuance. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.54-251.56. These

guidelines, binding upon the Regional Forester when

deciding whether to grant MRI its special use permit for

development of the Sandy Butte area, constitute sufficient

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“law” for this court to apply to confer jurisdiction over the

‘matter. See Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1556

(9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Hall, J., concurring).? Thus we

hold that the Regional Forester’s decision to issue a special

use permit is subject to judicial review’ where review in-

volves an inquiry into whether the proper factors -were

considered by the Forestry Service. See Save the Bay, Inc.

v. Administrator of E.P.A., 556 F.2d 1282, 1295-96 (Sth

Cir. 1977).*

* In Wallace v. Christensen, Judge Hall correctly noted that

[t}he inquiry into whether there are regulations which a court may

look to in reviewing an agency decision is a component of the sec-

tion 701(a)(2) determination of whether a matter is committed to

agency discretion by law ... If there are no statutory or

regulatory directives then a court may conclude that the agency

action at issue falls into that narrow class of cases in which there

is no law to apply.

802 F.2d at 1556 (Hail, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

> The magistrate stated that if he did have jurisdiction to review the

Regional Forester’s decision to issue the special use permit, then he

believed that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. However,

an application for a special use permit must include “measures and

plans for the protection and rehabilitation of the environment during

construction, operation, maintenance, and termination of the project

", 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(e)(4), and each special use authorization

“shall contain .. . [t}erms and conditions which will . . . minimize

damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and

otherwise [sic] protect the environment”. 36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a)(1 (ii).

Thus the Code of Federal Regulations specifically requires the ex-

istence of, among other things, an adequate mitigation plan. Since the

mitigation “plan” here at issue is so vague and undeveloped as to be —

wholly inadequate, see infra, the Regional Forester’s decision to grant

the special use permit could be none other than arbitrary, capricious

and an abuse of discretion.

* Save the Bay involved a challenge to the issuance of a permit pur-

suant to authority granted under the National Pollution Discharge

Elimination System, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The Fifth Circuit considered

6a

The National Environmental Policy Act, codified at 42

U.S.C. § 4332, provides in relevant part that when an EIS

must be prepared — whenever a major government action

is proposed — it must include

a detailed statement by the responsible official on —

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action.

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot

be avoided should the proposal be implemented.

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action.

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of

man’s environment and the maintenance and

enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of

resources which would be involved in the proposed

action should it be implemented.

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2K(C). Section 4332(2)(E) adds that all

agencies of the Federal Government shall, to the fullest ex-

tent possible

study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives

to recommended course of action in any proposal

which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alter-

native use of available resources;

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2,E).

There are two purposes served by preparation of an

EIS. The statement should “provide decision-makers with

whether it had jurisdiction in light of the statute’s broad language ex-

plaining that “[ojnce the relevant factors are before the agency, it can

weigh them within [its] broad mandate with an expertise to which the

restraining powers of judicial review could add little.” 556 F.2d at

1295. Nevertheless, the court held that “[jjudicial review, however,

can quite easily be effective to assure that all those factors receive the

agency's attention.” Jd. at 1296.

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an environmental disclosure sufficiently detailed to aid in

the substantive decision whether to proceed with the proj-

ect in light of its environmental consequences,” Trout

Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974),

as well as “provide the public with information and an op-

portunity to participate in gathering information.”

Citizens for A Better Henderson v. Hodei, 768 F.2d 1051,

1056 (9h Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

An EIS aids the agency’s own decisionmaking process

by ensuring that the agency has before it “ ‘all possible ap-

proaches to a particular project . . . which would alter the

environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance.’ ”

State of Alaska v. Andrus, $80 F.2d 465, 474 (D.C. Cir.),

vacated in part sub nom. Western Oil & Gas v. Alaska,

439 U.S. 922 (1978) (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating

Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.

1971)).

A.

The findings of fact underlying a lower court's decision

on the adequacy of an EIS are reviewed for clear error.

Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,

795 F.2d 688, 696 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.

1971 (1987). “Interpretations of [environmental] regula-

tions present questions of law, which are reviewable de

novo.” Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817

F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Sierra Club v. Union

Oil Co. of California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir.

1987)). “We review de novo the district court’s determina-

tion of whether the EIS is reasonably thorough in discuss-

ing the significant aspects of the probable environmental

impact of the proposed agency action.” Oregon Natural

Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir.

1987) (citation omitted). This requires application of a

8a

“rule of reason” because a “reviewing court may not ‘fly

speck’ an EIS and hold it insufficient on the basis of in-

consequential, technical deficiencies.” Kunzman, 817 F.2d

at 492. In other words, “whether a particular deficiency,

or combination of deficiencies in an EIS is sufficient to

warrant holding it legally inadequate, or constitutes mere-

ly a ‘fly speck,’ is essentially a legal question, reviewable de

novo.” Jd. at 493.

To explain the obligations set forth in section 4332, pro-

visions in the Code of Federal Regulations address, inter

alia, the discussion of alternatives’ and the discussion of

the foreseeable environmental consequences of these

various alternatives* which must be included in an EIS.

“The detail that NEPA requires in an EIS depends upon

the nature and scope of the proposed action.” California

v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982).

A.

To be adequate, an environmental impact statement

must consider every reasonable alternative. Friends of En-

dangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 988 (9th Cir.

1985); California v. Block, 690 F.2d at 766-67; Adler v.

Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1097 (9th Cir. 1982) (“this court

has held the alternatives discussion to be subject to

‘reasonableness.’ ”); Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641

F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981); Lange v. Brinegar, 625

F.2d 812, 818 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The discussion of alter-

natives in an E.1.S. statement is subject to a construction

of reasonableness.”). An EIS is rendered inadequate by

* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.

* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16.

.

}

9a

the existence of a viable but unexamined alternative.

Citizens for a Better Henderson, 768 F.2d at 1057 (cita-

tions omitted). Furthermore, even if an alternative re-

quires “legislative action”, this fact “does not automatical-

ly justify excluding it from an EIS.” City of Angoon vy.

Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986) (footnote

omitted), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 197 (1987). Thus, the

range of alternatives considered must be sufficient to per-

mit a reasoned choice. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485

F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961

(1974).

Here the Forest Service’s purpose —to provide a “winter

sports opportunity” — is broadly framed in terms of service

to the public benefit. It is not, by its own terms, tied to a

specific parcel of land. Compare City of Angoon, 803

F.2d at 1021; Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1286. There

appears no tenable reason for the Forest Service to be

wedded exclusively to the development of Sandy Butte.

Thus it should have appeared obvious that investigation

was warranted to determine whether the development of

winter sports opportunities could be pursued at alternative

sites.’

Appellants have offered evidence suggesting that other

sites may be well suited for the type of recreational

development envisioned by the Forest Service. Unlike

Sandy Butte, the sites discussed by the appellants are not

adjacent to land owned by defendant MRI, but under the

’ The Forest Service’s final EIS listed four alternatives, including

their preferred course of action, in addition to the alternative of “no-

action” mandated by statute. Yet all four of the “action” alternatives

required development of Sandy Butte. No consideration was given in

the EIS to ways of achieving the Forest Service's goal through other

options, such as the expansion of existing downhill ski areas in other

parts of Washington State.

10a

directive given to the Forest Service in its manual,* that

fact does not preclude consideration of other reasonable

alternatives. Moreover, since we find it reasonable to

assume that expansion of existing ski areas would have less

environmental impact than would the construction of an

entirely new ski area,’ while possibly achieving a com-

parable net increase in the total capacity of skiers served,'°

such alternatives might have been appropriate for in-

vestigation.

* The manual provides in relevant part that

A permit shall not be granted simply to provide a commercial

profit-making opportunity. The Forest Service is not required to

accommodate a desire of an individual applicant, a real public

service or other justification must be evident . . . to show at least

that the use meets a public need and will not conflict with Na-

tional Forest objectives, programs or purposes.

Forest Service Manual § 2710.3.

* In Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774,

778 (9h Cir. 1980), the defendants intended to construct a new four-

lane highway which pass through parkland in plaintiffs’ town. The

EIS was held to be deficient because it failed to consider the alter-

native of improving and widening a two-lane highway already in ex-

istence. This court stated that “the alternative ... was both

reasonable and obvious, and that therefore the EIS is deficient... .

The use of a narrower than four-lane road is made even more obvious

by the possibility that parkland would thereby [be] spared.” /d. at 784

(citations omitted). See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th

Cir. ERD CRS So Snes es ee Se See 0 Oey

developed areas for future resource extraction and use, the . . . deci-

sional process ends its inquiry at the beginning.”).

'© For example, one of the existing ski areas in Washington State

has plans in motion to expand into a destination ski resort. A 1981

development report prepared for the Mission Ridge ski area details an

intended expansion of the facility to accomodate an additional 3,900

SAOT, to make its total capacity 6,500 SAOT.

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This court, however, would not require that the Forest

Service explore an unreasonably broad range of alter-

natives. Rather, the range “need not extend beyond those

[alternatives] reasonably related to the purposes of the

project.” Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1286 (citations

omitted). Thus, the Forest Service should more clearly ar-

ticulate its goal, specifically identifying the market and

geographic pool of skiers targeted. This will provide a

clear standard by which it can determine which alter-

natives are appropriate for investigation and consideration

in its EIS. In its present state, the EIS’s discussion of alter-

natives to the proposed action is inadequate as a matter of

law.

The district court held that the EIS adequately discussed

the environmental impacts of the Early Winters project

and its alternatives. We do not agree.

The Magistrate’s error resulted, in part, because he

assumed that the law distinguished between primary and

secondary impacts. Such a distinction would only confuse

the issue. Rather, it is well established that NEPA and the

Council on Environmental Quality guidelines require

discussion of a// significant impacts proximately caused by

the proposed action — whether they, by convenience, are

termed “primary” or “secondary”. See Coalition for Can-

yon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 783 (9th Cir.

1980) (“so-called ‘secondary’ impacts are often as signifi-

cant as ‘primary’ effects.”); Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at

1238 n.9 (“The central focus should not be on a primary/

secondary impact analysis but upon those impacts (either

primary or secondary) which have a ‘significant impact’

12a

upon the environment.”); see also Environmental Defense

Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir.

1977).

This court would not require the government to specu-

late on impacts in order to “foresee the unforeseeable”.

See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir.

1975). However,

{ijt must be remembered that the basic thrust of an

agency’s responsibilities under N&I?A is to predict the

environmental effects of proposed action before the

action is taken and those effects fully known.

Reasonable forecasting and speculation is thus im-

plicit in NEPA, and we must reject any attempt by

agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by

labeling any and all discussion of future environmen-

tal effects as “crystal ball inquiry”.

Id. at 676 (quoting Scientists’ Institute for Public Informa-

tion v. A.E.C., 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).

Thus we find it imperative that the Forest Cervice evaluate

the reasonably foreseeable significant effects which would

be proximately caused by implementation of the proposed

action. Port of Astoria, Oregon v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467,

478 (%h Cir. 1979) (EIS must address those reasonably

likely consequences of a proposed development that would

have an environmental! impact).

2.

Plaintiffs argue that the development in the Methow

Valley that is reasonably certain to follow development of

Sandy Butte will cut off the deer herd’s migration route,

usurp fawning and staging areas and eliminate winter

range — all of which are vital to the herd’s survival. In con-

trast, the Forest Service believes that “with the imple-

mentation of mitigation measures” the impacts to the mule

3a

deer will be minor. This court fails to see the logic with

which the Forest Service reaches this conclusion, since not

only has the effectiveness of these mitigation measures not

Service’s conclusions in the EIS. He stated that the data

was inadequate in terms of assessing the impacts of, for

example, residential development reasonably certain to

follow development of ski slopes on Sandy Butte.

The Forest Service is presently preparing a detailed and

comprehensive study of the mule deer. However, just as

the subsequent preparation of mitigation measures will

not cure a deficient EIS, see infra, neither will a subse-

quent study providing information essential to assessment

of the environmental impacts of a proposed action and its

alternatives.

If a government agency has difficulty obtaining ade-

quate information upon which to make a reasoned assess-

ment of the environmental impacts of a course of action, it

may not simply negate the existence of these impacts.

Rather, it has an obligation to engage in what is called a

“worst-case” analysis.'' This is because “NEPA requires a

‘worst case analysis’ when ‘the information relevant to

adverse impacts is essential . . . and is not known and the

overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or . . . the in-

'' The worst case analysis requirement was codified in 1979, 40

C.F.R. § 1902.22, and rescinded in 1986. This rescission, however,

does not nullify the requirement, Marsh, 820 F.2d at 1058 2.8, since

the regulation was merely a codification of prior NEPA caselaw. See

Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720

F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984); see

* glso Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir.

1984).

l4a

formation . . . is important and the means to obtain it are

not known. . . .” Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d

at 988 (quoting Seve our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d

1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984)).

The purpose of the analysis is to carry out NEPA’s

mandate for full disclosure to the public of the poten-

tial consequences of agency decisions, and to cause

agencies to consider those potential consequences

when acting on the basis of scientific uncertainties or

gaps in available information. The analysis is formu-

lated on the basis of available information, using

reasonable projections of the worst possible conse-

quences of a proposed action.

Save our Ecosystems, 747 © 2d at 1244-45 (quoting 46

Fed. Reg. 18032 (1981)); see Oregon Natural Resources

Council, 820 F2d at 1059.

An absence of critical information renders it impossible

for the Forest Service to make a reasoned decision in the

disposition of a special use permit application. The EIS’s

cursory discussion of the impacts to the mule deer herd,

based on incomplete information, is inadequate as a mat-

ter of law. If the Forest Service finds that the new com-

prehensive study of the mule deer still provides incomplete

information, a worst-case analysis would be required for

the areas in which information is lacking.'?

'? & district court has held that “fw jithout accurate evidence of the

effectiveness of . . . mitigation techniques, the Forest Service must

prepare a worst case analysis.” Ner?. Wildlife Federation v. United

Seates Forest Service, 992 F. Supp. 931, 943 (D. Oreg. 1984). This

court expresses no opinion as to whether a worst case analysis is

necessarily required im the absence of an evaluation of the effec-

tiveness of mitigation measures. However, we do recognize the in-

herent limitation on a decisionmaker’s ability to make a reasoned deci-

sson as to the environmental impacts of a proposed action where in-

formation contained m an EIS ss mcomplete or maccurate.

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3.

Appellants also contend that the district court erred in

its assessment of the adequacy of the EIS’s discussion of

impacts On air quality.

a.

The Pasayten Wilderness has been designated a “Class

I” area by Congress. This means that its air is so un-

polluted as to require heightened protection. Appellants

believe that pollution in the Methow Valley proximately

caused by the proposed development of Sandy Butte will

significantly deteriorate the air quality in the Pasayten

Wilderness and that this was not revealed in the EIS. Ap-

pellees contend, and the district court held, that the EIS’s

discussion of air quality impacts to the Pasayten Wilder-

ness is adequate. We disagree.

The EIS concluded that no Class I area would be im-

pacted by the proposed action. In reaching this conclusion

the government relied on data that was based upon an

estimate of the difference in elevation between the floor of

the Methow Valley and the lowest portion of the ridge

separating the Methow Valley from the Pasayten Wilder-

ness—an estimate that has since been shown to be

egregiously incorrect. This error casts significant doubt on

the assumption that the ridge forms a physical barrier that

would prevent air pollution trapped beneath the inversion

layer in Methow Valley from entering the wilderness area.

Incorrect assumptions usually lead to incorrect conclu-

sions. Thus the district court’s conclusion, that the infor-

mation relied upon by the government in preparation of

the relevant section of the EIS was adequate, is clearly er-

roneous. The Forest Service must reassess the impacts

upon the Pasayten Wilderness.

16a

Appellees acknowledge that without effective mitigation

measures, the state standards for Total Suspended Par-

ticulates will be exceeded in nearly all of the areas of the

upper Methow Valley as a result of foreseeable growth and

development stimulated by the Early Winters project.

This, presumably, is why the Regional Forester in his

Record of Decision approving the special use permit ap-

plication required that an air quality management pro-

gram be developed. However, we interpret NEPA and sec-

tion 497 as requiring this type of inquiry and analysis

before a permit application can be approved.'’

'} Appellants have made two additional arguments relating to air

quality which merit attention. First, they argue that the development

of Sandy Butte and the growth it will spur will likely expend the

degradation increment available for this area under the federal

Prevention of Significant Deterioration program. They suggest that

the government is required to include in its EIS an assessment of how

this exhaustion of the increment will limit opportunities for future

commercial development in the Methow Valley. We disagree.

“[Ajssuming compliance [with federally established maximum

threshold levels of pollution], growth management decisions were left

by Congress for resolution by the states.” Alabama Power Co. v. Cos-

tle, 636 F.2d 323, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Second, appellants argue that the EIS is inadequate as a matter of

law because it did not discuss the foreseeable significant carbon

monoxide emissions from wood stoves. While the precise amount of

air quality degradation that would result from these emissions is not

entirely clear, given that even the highest estimate places the impact at

still far below the applicable national standard, this omission is prob-

ably not sufficient to render the EIS inadequate. However, since a new

EIS must be prepared, inclusion of an analysis of carbon monoxide

emissions produced by wood stoves would assist the decisionmaker in

making a fully informed decision.

Pew oe oa

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Section 4332 of NEPA requires that “action be taken to

mitigate the adverse effects of major federal actions.”

Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (D.

Hawaii 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976). Thus an agency

cannot decide to “act now and deal with the environmental

consequences later.” North American Wild Sheep v.

United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1181 (9th

Cir. 1982). Consequently, an EIS must include a thorough

discussion of measures to mitigate the adverse en-

vironmental impacts of a proposed action. Oregon

Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1055

(9th Cir. 1987). “A mere listing of mitigation measures is

insufficient to qualify as the reasoned discussion required

by NEPA.” Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 697. “More-

over, the EIS must analyze the mitigation measures in

detail and explain the effectiveness of the measures.” 820

F.2d at 1055; see Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 697. And

we note that the subsequent preparation of an elaborate

mitigation plan “would not absolve a failure to prepare an

adequate EIS.” Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1284.

' Provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations govern-

ing the award of special use permits impose an affirmative

duty on the appellees to develop the necessary mitigation

measures before the permit is granted.'* Similarly, the EIS

'* The relevant section provides that

Each special use authorization shall contain: (1) Terms and con-

ditions which will . . . (ii) minimize damage to scenic and esthetic

values and fish and wildlife habitat and othewise [sic] protect the

environment; ... and (2) such terms and conditions as the

authorized officer deems necessary to . . . (vi) require siting to

cause least damage to the environment, taking into consideration

feasibility and other relevant factors . . .

36 C.F.R. § 251.56(a).

18a

must also contain a detailed explanation of the specific

measures which will be employed to mitigate the adverse

impacts of a proposed action. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f),

1502.16(h).

The Forest Service’s EIS contains scattered pages in

which they enumerate possible mitigation measures and

identify mitigation goals that would be necessary to pre-

vent excessive adverse impacts. These various discussions,

however, are presented in very general terms, lacking both

a detailed description of required or possible mitigation

measures, and any analysis as to the effectiveness of these

measures.

The Forest Service argues that further specificity as to

the mitigation measures for on-site impacts can only be

provided when the permittee presents a master plan of

development. The Forest Service also maintains that they

have satisfied the mitigation discussion requirement for

another reason. In its EIS, there is a brief discussion of

measures that could be required by local government to

mitigate off-site impacts. Pursuant to this discussion, the

Forest Service executed a Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) with Okanogan County, the Washington Depart-

ment of Ecology, and the Environmental Protection

Agency. In very general terms, the MOU identifies mitiga-

tion tasks and assigns responsibilities to various parties.

It is true that contractual obligations to insure the

mitigation of adverse environmental consequences may

not be a prerequisite to a statutorily adequate EIS. Preser-

vation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th

Cir. 1982) (When efforts to mitigate the adverse environ-

mental effects are “to be undertaken by third parties, their

commitments, while they need not be contractual, must be

more than mere vague statements of good intentions.”)

(citation omitted). However, the MOU offers no

assurance whatsoever that the vague mitigation objectives

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19a

it features — performance of almost all of which would be

the responsibility of third parties to the permit pro-

cess — would ever in fact be achieved or even that effective

measures would ever be designed (let alone implemented),

if the Early Winters development were to proced. C7.

Preservation Coalition, 667 F.2d at 860 (“Since many of

the “mitigations’ proposed by the agency were . . . poten-

tial actions to be taken by [third parties] reliance on

them . . . was improper.”) (footnoted omitted).

As this court stated in Oregon Natural Resources Coun-

cil v. Marsh,

[t}he importance of the mitigation plan cannot be

overestimated. It is a determinative factor in

evaluating the adequacy of an environmental impact

Statement. Without a complete mitigation plan, the

decisionmaker is unable to make an informed judg-

ment as to the environmental impact of the proj-

ect — one of the main purposes of an environmental

impact statement.

820 F.2d at 1055 (citation omitted). The EIS’s discussion

of mitigation measures is inadequate as a matter of law.

IV.

The decision of the district court is reversed and

remanded for entry of appropriate relief in accordance

with this opinion.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

No. 85-2124-DA

MetHow VaALLFY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

Vv.

REGIONAL FORESTER, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

{June 25, 1986]

Peterson, Chief of the Forest Service, heard plaintiffs’ appeal. (A.R.

2la

ll. Procedural posture

In a previous opinion dated April 30, 1986, | identified

the parties and briefly summarized the claims in the com-

plaint. Plaintiffs are public interest and environmental

groups concerned variously with the protection of the en-

vironment, social, and economic amenities and resources

of the Methow Valley. Some of the members of these

groups reside in Methow Valley. Others use Methow

Valley for recreational, educational, scientific or employ-

ment purposes. The group in the forefront of the con-

troversy regarding Early Winters is Methow Valley

Citizens Council (MVCC). Defendants are various United

States Forest Service officials and the probable developer

of Early Winters, Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI).

12). On December 16, 1985, Peterson affirmed the July 15, 1984,

Record of Decision im all respects. (A.R. 57). The Secretary of the

Department of Agriculture declined to review Peterson's decision.

(A.R. 58). See 36 C.F.R. § 211.189 f2). This action was filed on

December 17, 1985.

All citations to “A.R.” refer to consecutively numbered tabs in the

three volume administrative record, a part of the trial record marked

as government's exhibit 102. The EIS is marked as government's ex-

The following glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in this

oprmon ts provided for the convenience of the reader:

APA Administrative Procedures Act.

CEQ Council on Environmental Quali y

EIS Environmental Impact Statement

MOU \iemorandum of Understanding

MRI Methow Recreation, Inc.

MUP Multiple-Use Plan

MVCC Methow Valley Citizens Councii

NEPA National Environmentai Policy Act

NFMA Natrona! Forest Management Act

PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration

TSP Total Suspended Particulates

T-W-C MUP = Twist-Winthrop-Concully MUP

22a

In response to the various pretrial motions then before

me and for reasons explained in the opinion, ‘1 granted

summary judgment to the defendants on two claims. |

held that the Forest Service had not violated either 1) the

National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16

U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 and other scattered sections of 16

U.S.C. or 2) the Clean Air Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§

7401-7626. | denied summary judgment on all remaining

claims.

A court trial was held on issues identified in a pretrial

order signed by all of the parties and approved by the

court. First, plaintiffs contend that the Forest Service

Record of Decision to issue the permit must be set aside

because it was arbitrary and capricious and not supported

by substantial evidence. Second, they argue that a change

in agency position on delaying the release of the en-

vironmental impact statement and Record of Decision

violated their constitutional right to due process. Third,

they argue that the environmental impact statement, en-

titled “Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study” (the

EIS), is inadequate under the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4231-4370a and

associated regulations. | find for the defendants on all

claims. The Recotfd of Decision stands. The action is

dismissed.

Il. Background

To put this case in perspective, it is necessary to begin

with a rather extensive background section. MRI applied

for a permit to develop and operate Early Winters on ap-

proximately 3,900 acres in the Okanogan National Forest,

a forest which contains approximately 1,706,000 acres of

land, on August 21, 1978. The Early Winters project had

its genesis many years before that time, however. In the

en = ee ow

23a

early 1960s, federal study teams began surveying the .

North Cascade Mountains for possible designation of na-

tional park and wilderness areas. Aware of the federal ef-

fort, ski industry representatives conducted their own

surveys of potential ski areas in the western United States.

From these surveys, Sandy Butte emerged as a potential

site for a desirable ski area. (A.R. 46A).

In 1968, Congress designated the North Cascades Na-

tional Park. 16 U.S.C. § 90. The legislation directed the

Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to “agree on the

designation of areas within the park on recreation areas or

within national forests adjacent to the park and recreation

areas needed for public use facilities. . . . [Such public

use facilities, including . . . lodges, campsites, and ski

lifts, shall be constructed according to a plan agreed upon

by the two Secretaries.” 16 U.S.C. § 90d-3. The national

park legislation referred to above led to joint study by the

National Forest and National Park Services of potential

winter sports activities and sites in the North Cascades

area and to the development of a North Cascades Recrea-

tion Plan. (A.R. 57 at 2).

In 1970, the Forest Service completed a work entitled

the North Cascades Winter Sports Study. (A.R. 43C). It

examined the opportunities for cross-country skiing, ex-

pansion of existing downhill ski resorts, and the develop-

ment of new skiing facilities. This study identified Sandy

Butte as having the highest potential of any site in the

State of Washington for development as a major destina-

tion ski area. (A.R. 57 at 2).

In 1974, the Park Service and the Forest Service issued

the Joint Plan for the North Cascades area. (A.R. 21A).

Like the studies that had preceded it, this plan recognized

Sandy Butte as a promising site for downhill skiing

facilities. (A.R. 21A at 33).

24a

In 1976, Congress enacted the NFMA. In 1977, the

Okanogan Forest Supervisor adopted the Twisp-

Winthrop-Concolly Unit Plan (T-W-C MUP). The MVCC

appealed the approval of the multiple use plan (hence

“MUP”) to the Regional Forester. The plan was ultimately

remanded because of deficiencies in the planning process,

particularly the T-W-C MUP’s treatment of roadless

areas. (A.R. 57 at 3).?

Because the T-W-C MUP never went into effect, the

previous plans, including the 1968 Winthrop MUP with its

1970 revision as well as the 1974 Joint Plan for the North

Cascades, remained in force.

At the time the T-W-C MUP was remanded, Phase II of

the Roadless Area review [sic] and Evaluation (RARE II)

was well underway.’ Under the RARE II project, the

Forest Service inventoried all roadless areas within the Na-

tional Forest System, some 190 million acres containing

154 National Forests and 19 National Grasslands. RARE

II allocated all roadless areas to one of three planning

categories: wilderness, nonwilderness, and future plan-

ning. Controversy arose about what a nonwilderness

designation meant. California brought suit against the

Fores’ Service, claiming that the EIS was inadequate

becawse it failed to make site specific evaluations. In 1979,

» district court agreed and enjoined the Forest Service

from taking any action that might change the wilderness

2 A “roadiess area” is defined as “{ajn area of undeveloped Federal

land within which there are not improved roads maintained for travel

by means of motorized vehicles intended for highway use.” FSM §

8260(B\3\1). Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v.

Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 583 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).

’ The Forest Service’s efforts in RARE II's precursor, RARE |,

were halted when a federal court enjoined development pursuant to

the plan until the Forest Service completed an EIS. Wyoming Outdoor

Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).

|

|

25a

character of the disputed areas in California until it filed

an EIS that satisfied NEPA’s requirements. The Ninth

Circuit affirmed. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th

Cir. 1982). The precarious legal foundation on which

RARE II found itself brought the ill-fated program to an

effective halt in states outside California.

MRI applied for a special use permit in 1978. The Forest

Supervisor announced his decision to study the feasibility

of a ski area at Sandy Butte. MVCC appealed the decision

to accept and process the permit application. The Chief

Forester concluded that MRI’s application could be proc-

essed if development was consistent with existing plans

and satisfied all procedural requirements, including

‘ NEPA. Former Department of Agriculture Assistant

Secretary M. Rupert Cutler affirmed the Chief Forester’s

decision. However, he directed the Chief to “ensure that

such applications are not approved until the area is ap-

propriately allocated in a land management plan and the

project considered through the appropriate environmental

review process.” (A.R. 4A at 2). By the time the appeal

reached Cutler, work on the T-W-C plan had been

dropped in favor of drafting the Okanogan NFMA plan.

The Regional Forester made inquiries whether the 1968,

1970 Winthrop MUP satisfied Cutler's directive quoted

above. Associate Deputy Chief Housley responded with a

simple answer: “No.” (A.R. 4B). Housley was concerned

primarily with the fact that no decision had yet been made

as to whether to allocate Sandy Butte for wilderness land.

It seems fair to say that Housley interpreted Cutler’s deci-

sion to allow study of the permit application, but not to

issue the permit until the Okanogan NFMA plan (in which

allocations to wilderness would be made) was complete.

The Forest Service proceeded simulianeously with con-

sideration of MRI's permit application and with prepara-

tion of its NFMA plan for Okanogan National Forest. A

was completed in due course but not released, apparently

because the Forest Service was concerned that release

would be successfully challenged in court under the prin-

ciples of California v. Block. He stated: “A substantial

amount of time would be needed to revise the Sandy Butte

. Ud. at 2).

ta) han

Cutler dated June 8, 1984, the author indicated that an

amendment to the Washington Wilderness Bill had been

added “that would alter the intent and effect of your rul-

ing.” (A.R. 21D at 1). The letter goes on to state: “Your

|

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:

27a

successor in the Reagan Administration is interpreting

your decision as appropriate only because the roadless

lands involved were not considered for wilderness designa-

tion in Rare Il.” (/d.) MVCC indicated it did not feel “that

the passage of the Washington Wilderness Bill fulfills the

intent of the Cutler Decision and hope that you will lend

your support at this time in upholding that decision.” (/d.

at 2).

The Washington State Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No.

98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (Washington Wilderness Act) became

law on July 3, 1984. It designated various public lands in

Washington as wilderness. Sandy Butte was purposefully

not among those chosen. Recognizing that the NFMA

authorized continued management of forest lands under

existing land and resource plans pending the completion

forest plans, the Senate Committee Report accompanying

the wilderness bill through Congress specified the manage-

ment direction for Sandy Butte:

That area of the Okanogan National Forest known as

Sandy Butte has been excluded from wilderness desig-

nation in S. 837. It is the intent of Congress that land

use management of Sandy Butte proceed, without

delay, in accordance with existing multiple-use

management plans, consistent with the National En-

vironment Policy Act (NEPA). The designation by

Congress in S. 837 of appropriate wilderness areas in

Washington State makes it unnecessary to further

withhold the Sandy Butte/Early Winters Alpine

Winter Sports Study FEIS pending completion of the

Okanogan Forest Plan. The Forest Service and the

Department of Agriculture are directed to allow the

evaluation process for the Sandy Butte development

to proceed without additional delay, given that Con-

gress has determined that the roadless upper third of

Sandy Butte is without wilderness characteristics.

(AR. 21F at 11); S. Rep. No. 461, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11

(1984). . :

With these facts in mind, | now turn to a discussion of

plaintiffs’ claims. Additional facts will be discussed below

as they become necessary.

A. Wes the Forest Service decision to issue the special use permit

arbitrary and capricious”

Plaintiffs claim that the Regional Forester’s decision

should be set aside because he acted arbitrarily and

capriciously and did not rely on substantial evidence in

reaching the decision to issue the special use permit. As a

threshold matter, | must determine whether the court has

the power to review this contention in the context pre-

sented in the pretrial order.

The Administrative Procedures Act (APA), provides:

(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions

thereof, except to the extent that —(1) statutes pre-

clude judicial review; or (2) agency action is com-

mitted to agency discretion by law.

§$ U.S.C. § 701(a).

No statute precludes judicial review of the Forest Ser-

vice’s Record of Decision. The court is concerned here

with the exception in § 701(aX2). In Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the

Supreme Court emphasized that the § 701(a)(2) exception

where “agency action ts committed to agency discretion by

law” is “a very narrow exception . . . applicable in those

rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad

terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” 401

U.S. at 410 (citation omitted).

In Ness Investment Corp. v. United States Depariment

of Agriculture, $12 F.2d 706 (Mh Cir. 1975), plaintiff

29a

sought review of a Forest Service decision that a company

was unqualified to receive a special use permit to operate a

resort. In that case, the Forest Service action was autho-

rized and taken pursuant to statutory authority provided

in 16 U.S.C. § 497. The company argued that § 701(a)(2)

did not apply. The court disagreed. “The statute, [16

U.S.C. § 497], is with respect to the proper recipient of a

special use permit, drawn in such broad terms that there is

no law to apply.” /d. at 715. Contra Sabin v. Butz, 515

F.2d 1061, 1067 (10th Cir. 1975).

Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have not interpreted

Ness to mean that judicial review of agency action taken

pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 497 or similar broadly-worded

discretionary statutes is completely foreclosed in all cir-

cumstances. As one of these decisions stated:

In considering whether administrative action is

“committed to agency discretion by law” within the

meaning of the APA, the test “is not whether a statute

viewed in the abstract lacks law to be applied but

rather, whether ‘in a given case’ there is no law to be

applied.” Strickland v. Morton, [519 F.2d 467, 470

(%h Cir. 1975)] (emphasis in original). Thus the ex-

istence of some law generally applicable to the subject

matter in question will not necessarily remove ad-

ministrative action from the “committed to agency

discretion” rubric. There is “law to apply,” only if a

specific statute limits the agency’s discretion to act in

the manner which is challenged.

Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied sub nom, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Santa

Clara, 439 U.S. § 859 (1978).

The discretion afforded the Forest Service is not limited

to the mere identification of a qualified recipient of a per-

mit; it extends equally to the more basic decision to issue

30a

an rmit at all. Plaintiffs’ challenge—however

one —is essentially a claim that the Forest Service had

either no basis or relied on an improper basis in reaching

the decision on whether or not to issue the permit for Early

Winters. That decision is “committed to agency discre-

tion” and is not reviewable. Ness, 512 F.2d at 715. See also

Arizona Power Authority v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231, 1239

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977). But cf. Sierra

Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985) (en-

vironmental challenge to Bureau of Land Management

decision to amend California Desert Conservation Area

Management Plan pursuant to Federal Land Policy and

Management Act of 1976; agency’s factual findings in sup-

port of decision to be overturned only “if arbitrary and

capricious” citing Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 686, 691

(9th Cir. 1985) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). .

Under the circumstances presented in this case, there is

no law to apply as to the propriety of the challenged deci-

sion. Ness and its progeny necessitate the conclusion that

§ 701(a)(2) deprives the court of any power to consider.

plaintiffs’ contentions.‘

4 If the case law of the Ninth Circuit allowed the court to engage in

a substantive review of the Regional Forester’s detision, | would af-

firm it because it is neither arbitrary nor capricious. 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). It is not the court’s place to substitute its judgment for

that of the agency on the decision to issue the permit. The decision

reached is without doubt a rational and lawful one. The substantial

evidence test of § U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) does not apply to either the issue

of the propriety of the decision or the adequacy of the EIS under

NEPA because the Regional Forester’s decision is not a “case that is

“subject to” formal adjudicatory hearings or formal rule-making “<

quired by 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557. Ethyl Corporation v. Environmenta

Protection Agency, $41 F.2d 1, 37 0.79 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) cert.

denied sub nom, E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). See generally D. Mandelker,

NEPA Law and Litigation, § 3:04 at 8 (1984).

- Re ill. At ll al iy A lt, il ln Alt, ely

)

:

31a

B. Did “reversal” of the “Cutler Decision” deprive plaintiffs of

any due process rights?

Plaintiffs claim that the reversal of the Cutler Decision

denied them due process under the fourteenth amendment

to the United States Constitution. Unlike the first claim,

here there is law to apply. Ness does not preclude review.

In my April 30 opinion, I stated that the Washington

Wilderness Act “appears” to have modified former Assist-

ant Secretary Cutler’s decision to refrain from making any

decision on issuance of a special use permit pending com-

pletion of the Okanogan NFMA plan. However one inter-

prets the scope of the Cutler Decision, it is undeniable that

the Senate report gives a clear indication that Congress

itself had made the determination that Sandy Butte did not

possess wilderness characteristics, one of the prime issues

in the Okanogan NFMA plan, and that the Forest Service

should proceed with land use management of Sandy Butte

in a manner consistent with existing multiple use plans

without waiting for the Okanogan NFMA plan.

Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiffs have a pro-

tected fourteenth amendment interest at stake, a doubtful

assumption, plaintiffs have not been denied due process in

either a procedural or substantive sense. The MVCC letter

to Cutler makes clear that they were aware of the pending

legislative action. (A.R. 21D). Nor can it be said that the

change in Forest Service policy is somehow “arbitrary or

capricious” or that the Forest Service was required to give

any explicit basis for the change in its policy. Congres-

sional directive is reason enough.

C. Was the EIS adequate under NEPA?

This claim is the heart of what remained in the case after

my rulings on the summary judgment motions. | will can-

didly admit that | found the factual material as well as

32a

some of the environmental statutes, e.g., the Clean Air

Act, complex; the legal argument, at times, difficult to

follow; and the Ninth Circuit NEPA precedents lacking in

adequate guidance from a trial judge’s perspective, par-

ticularly on evidentiary issues. Despite these admissions,

or more precisely because of them, I have given plaintiffs’

NEPA claim extensive consideration. However, applying

the applicable statutes, regulations and precedents as |

understand them, | find that the EIS is adequate in all

respects. °

“The purpose of NEPA is to assure that federal agencies

are fully aware of the impact of their decision on the en-

vironment.” Friends of the Endangered Species v. Jant-

zen, 760 F.2d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 1985). To effectuate

NEPA’s purpose, Congress requires that federal agencies

prepare an EIS where “major Federal actions [will] signifi-

cantly affect{ ] the quality of the human environment.” 42

U.S.C. § 4332(2(C). The EIS is designed to serve two

basic functions. First, it “should provide decision-makers

with an environmental disclosure sufficiently detailed to

aid in the substantive decision whether to proceed with the

project in light of its environmental consequences.” Trou!

Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974).

Second, the EIS should “provide the public with informa-

tion on the environmental impact of a proposed project as

well as encourage public participation in the development

’ The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has promulgated

regulations applicable to and binding upon al! federal agencies for im-

plementing the procedural provisions of NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3

(1985); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508. In the words of the CEQ, the pur-

pose of the regulations is to tell federal agencies what they must do to

achieve the goals of NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1500. 1(a). | grant substantial

deference to these regulations as the authoritative guide for NEPA’s

interpretation. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 763 (9h Cir. 1982)

citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).

;

;

}

:

{

’

33a

of that information.” /d.; Citizens for a Better Henderson

v. Hodei, 768 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1985).

There is no contention in this case that the Forest Serv-

ice did not observe the purely procedural requirement of

NEPA, in terms of the timing of its public announcements

and the like. The issue is solely one of adequacy of the im-

pact statement itself. The adequacy of an agency’s prep-

aration of an EIS is reviewed under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).

Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1985);

soa v. yoy 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974)

su uent ory Omitted). In passing on the

of the EIS under § 706(2)(D), the court must —

employ a “rule of reason” that inquires whether an

EIS contains a “reasonably thorough discussion of

the significant aspects of the probable environmental

consequences.” Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 509

F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974). [Sic]. This standard

is not susceptible to refined calibration. It instead re-

quires a reviewing court to make a ic judg-

ment whether the EIS’s form, ponies ayy ream

tion foster both informed decision-making and public

participation. Warm Springs Dam Task Force vy.

Gribble, 565 F.2d $49, 552 (9th Cir. 1977) (per

curiam); Trout Unlimited, Inc., 509-F.2d at 1283.

[Sic]. This standard of review, however, does not

authorize a reviewing court to substitute its judgment

for that of the agency concerning the wisdom or

prudence of a proposed action. Once satisfied that a

proposing agency has taken a “hard look” at the deci-

sion’s environmental consequences, the review is at an

end. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 []

(1976).

California v. Block, 690 F.2d at 761.

With these standards in mind, I now turn to plaintiffs’

specific challenges to the EIS.

1. Alternatives

NEPA requires that an EIS provide information in

detail on alternatives to the proposed action. 42 U.S.C.

* All C.F.R. citations are to the 1985 edition.

.

Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th

Cir. 1981); Brooks v. Coleman, $18 F.2d 17, 18-19 (9th -

Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Accord Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836-38

(D.C. Cir. 1972).

As Judge Burns recently noted, for purposes of judicial

it must be remembered that the scope of the EIS is

largely determined by the scope of the proposed ac-

tion itself and the rule of reason. . . . [Wyhere the

Proposed action is vast in scope, covering a large pro-

ject or program, NEPA'’s policy will obviously de-

mand more than the EIS in the way of specificity and

range of alternatives than where the proposed action

is more modest in its scale.

Natural Resources Defense Council. 1. v. Hodel, 624 F.

Supp. 1045, 1050-51 (D. Nev. 1985) (Burns, J. sitting by

designation) (NEPA challenge to adoption of site-specific

land use plan for Bureau of Land Management grazing

allotment). Compare id. with California v. Block, 690

F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (NEPA challenge to adoption of

” The uninitiated might think that one component of the inquiry in

Henderson regarding the seasonabieness of an alternative route would

be the relative superiority of a Henderson route over a route that

bypassed Henderson

De Council, Inc. v. Hodel (624 F. Supp.]} at 105!

pr ney Ame vy. Block, 690 F.2d at 767 and Save Lake

Washington, 641 F.2d at 1334. Stated another way, “[t}he

range of alternatives that must be considered need not ex-

“destination ski resort” in general terms is a large, multi-

season, recreation ski area with numerous runs and suffi-

ciently varied activities and base facilities of a sufficient

quality t~ entice vacationers to stay several days at the

site.* . .

The Early Winters EIS discussed five alternatives in

detail. The first was no action. Under this alternative, no

special use permit would have issued and no development

would have been allowed. Alternatives two through five

contemplated increasi larger developments ranging

from 2,300 to 10,500 skiers at one time. The preferred

alternative in the EIS was the fourth alternative, which

would permit a phased development over several years

ultimately allowing 8,200 skiers at one time. The Regional

Forester selected this preferred alternative in the Record of

Decision.’

* The parties’ dispute over this nonissue was particularly tedious.

* The Forest Service indicated that it preferred alternative five in the

Draft EIS. The Record of Decision states that alternative one (no ac-

tion) was environmentally preferred because it would cause the least

37a

The tone of plaintiffs’ alternatives argument makes it

sound as if other sites were simply ignored by the Forest

Service. This is not the case. The EIS itself indicates that

sites in the Okanogan National Forest other than Sandy

Butte were considered. (EIS at 6-7). These alternative sites

were eliminated from detailed study in the EIS. See 40

C.F.R. § 1502.14(a).

The primary reason given in the EIS for elimination of

detailed discussion of expansion of alternative sites was

that the North Cascade Winter Sports Study, a work cited

in the EIS and available to the public, had identified

Sandy Butte as the only area in the Okanogan Forest hav-

ing good potential as a major ski development.

The EIS also stated that it did not consider expanding

existing sites elsewhere in Washington because the EIS was

specificaliy tailored to development of Sandy Butte. Plain-

tiffs focus on this latter reason and contend that omission

of detailed discussion of alternative sites outside the

Okanogan National Forest renders the EIS inadequate. |

cannot agree.

Sites a hundred or more miles away from the Okanogan

National Forest are not reasonable alternatives to the

development of a ski resort at Sandy Butte. It was not

unreasonable for the Forest Service to forego detailed

discussion of expanding sites outside the Okanogan. As

the CEQ has recognized in explaining its own regulations

concerning alternatives in the context of licensing and per-

mitting situations, a decision-maker need not “disregard —

the applicant’s purposes and needs and the common seiise

disruption to the natural environment. Alternative five would provide

maximum utilization of the recreation resource opportunities and in-

creased economic benefit to the area. Alternative four was chosen

because “it provides a balance of concerns for the physical and

biological components of the human environment in addition to con-

cerns for social and economic welfare.” (A.R. 2 at 2a).

eS —

38a

realities of a given situation in the development of alter-

natives.” CEQ Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations,

48 Fed. Reg. 34263, 34267, citing with approval Roosevelt

Campobello International Park Commission v. EPA, 684

F.2d 1041 (ist Cir. 1982) (EPA licensing of refinery and

deep-water petroleum terminal). The EIS need only set

forth those alternatives “sufficient to permit a reasoned

choice.” Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472

(%h Cir. 1973) quoting Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil v. Morton, 458 F.2d at 834.

Consistent with the teachings of Better Henderson and

Kleppe and given the record before me, I conclude that ex-

pansion of existing sites was not 4 reasonable alternative

requiring detailed discussion in the EIS.

2. General observations regarding adequacy

The bulk of plaintiffs’ remaining attack challenges the

adequacy of the EIS discussion of “secondary” or “in-

direct” impacts. Indirect impacts are not those impacts

caused by the construction of runs, and ski lifts and the

like on Forest Service lands. In NEPA nomenclature, such

effects are known as “primary” or “direct” impacts. See

generally D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation,

§§ 10:28 and 10:36 (1984). Indirect impacts are those from

development on primarily private property that are ex-

pected to follow construction of the ski resort. Most of

this development is dependent on local development and

zoning policies. The forecasting of secondary impacts is

generally more speculative than forecasting of primary im-

pacts. Courts, in applying the rule of reason, take the

uncertainty and speculation involved with secondary im-

pacts into account in passing on the adequacy of the

discussion of secondary impacts in an EIS. See Enos v.

Marsh, 769 F.2d at 1373. This policy applies with equal

39a

force to mitigation measures of secondary impacts. See id.

The rule that courts are not to “fly-speck” an EIS,

Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d at 693, but rather to satisfy

itself [sic] that the EIS has reasonably set forth sufficient

information to enable the decision-maker to consider the

environmental factors and make a reasoned choice, Ad/er

v. Lewis, 675 F.2d at 1096, also bears repeating.

3. Mule Deer

Plaintiffs contend that the EIS discussion of the direct

and secondary impacts of the development on the valley's

mule deer herd is inadequate. Plaintiffs also contend thai

the Forest Service was required to prepare a worst case

analysis regarding the effect of the development on the

deer herd. Finally, plaintiffs contend that the Forest Serv-

ice had a duty to analyze proposed mitigation measures to

lessen the impact of the development on the deer herd.

a. Inadequate discussion of impact on mule deer.

The EIS discussed deer impacts both on-site and off-

site. It indicated that adoption of any of the four develop-

ment alternatives would disturb resident mule deer habitat

during the summer and fall. The Forest Service estimated

that suminer habitat on-site would decrease from seven to

ten percent depending on which alternative was chosen.

The EIS also discusses the impact of the development on

winter habitat and fawning. (EIS at 75-76). In making

these conclusions, the EIS depended in large part on a

1975 study and on a 1978 study by D. L. Zeigler.

The EIS acknowledged that discussion of off-site im-

pacts on deer herds was more difficult because of uncer-

tainty about where.other public and private lands may

ultimately be developed. (EIS at 76). The Record of Deci-

sion, it will be remembered, merely authorizes the issuance

LSS <x ttt

Wa

of the permit. Actual construction of the resort must be

preceded by an acceptable master development plan. The

EIS did proceed to indicate that the off-site development

would decrease the existing herd. (/d.).

Plaintiffs challenge the quality of the Zeigler studies as

well as the EIS discussion on deer impacts. They contend

that the Forest Service was obligated to obtain missing

data. CEQ regulations require that agencies include infor-

mation relevant to adverse impacts which is essential to a

reasoned choice among alternatives if the cost of obtaining

such information is not exorbitant. 40 C.F.R. § 1$02.22(a).

| find that the essential information relevant to a reasoned

choice among alternatives was known and discussed.

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof to show that studies,

models and the like are inadequate. They have not met

their burden. | find the studies and the EIS discussion on

deer impacts adequate under the rule of reason.

b. Failure to prepare a worst case analysis.

This argument is related to the preceding argument.

CEQ regulations provide that a worst case analysis must

be prepared in certain circumstances. A worst case

analysis is not required unless information relevant to a

reasoned choice among alternatives is not known and the

cost of obtaining it is exorbitant. Alternatively, a worst

case analysis is required if information relevant to adverse

impacts is important to the decision and the means of ob-

taining it are unknown, 40 C.F.R. § 1802.22(b). Neither

situation applies here. The relevant information essential

‘o a choice among alternatives was known as well as the

means to obtain such information. See Save Our Eco-

systems v, Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984);

cf. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (Sth Cir. 1983).'°

© The CEO recently rescinded its worst case analysis regulation

The new regulation, which became effective May 27, 1986, requires

4la

¢. Duty to analyze mitigation measures.

NEPA requires a discussion of “any adverse en-

vironmental effects which cannot be avoided.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2MCMii). The CEQ regulations require that an EIS

section on environmental consequences must “include a

: discussion” of [mjeans to mitigate adverse environmental

impacts (if not fully covered under § 1502.14(f)).” 40

C.F.R. § 1802.16(h). Section 1502.14(f) provides that the

EIS section on alternatives must contain “appropriate

mitigation measures not already included in the proposed

action or alternatives” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f). Mitigation

as used in the regulations is defined in 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.20.

Mere listing of mitigation measures '*. an EIS is general-

ly inadequate to satisfy the CEQ regulations. See North-

west Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson,

764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985). However, in this EIS there is

more — not much more — but more than a mere listing of

mitigation measures as to the deer herd. To be sure, the

mitigation discussion on deer herds and on all other

adverse environmental impacts could have been more ex-

tensive. More important, however, is the recognition that

formulation of at least some mitigation strategies logically

must follow submission of the master development plan.

Moreover, the Forest Service is currently in the process

of developing mitigation measures as information becomes

that the analysis of wmpacts in the face of unavailable information be

grounded in the rule of reason. The new rule siates that “in preparing

an environmental impact statement, the agency shall make reasonable

efforts, in light of overall costs and state of the art, to obtain missing

information which, in its judgment, ts important to evaluate signifi-

camt adverse impacts on the human environment that are reasonably

foreseeable.” $1 Fed. Reg. 15618 (1986). | have not applied the new

regulation in my analysis.

——SV722 t™—~—“=S—~—<—<— CS

42a

available based on a new study. See Oregon Natural

Resources Council v. Marsh, 628 F.Supp. 1557, 1565 (D.

Or. 1986). “i

The Record of Decision requires, as a condition to \s-

suance of the special use permit, that the Forest Service

enter into an agreement with the Washington Department

of Game and Okanogan County to develop actions to

mitigate effects of development on the mule deer herd. In

response to the conditions imposed by the Record of Deci-

sion, various federal, state and local agencies have signed

a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to develop a

plan to mitigate impacts on mule deer. To implement the

MOU, the Forest Service and the Washington State

of Game have undertaken an extensive study

of mule deer habitat and migratory routes in the Methow

Valley. Okanogan County is also studying and considering

various land use controls and other measures to mitigate

of population growth and development on

mule deer. The Forest Service's response demonstr ates

that it was informed and responsive to the public concern

on the effect the project would have on mule deer. See

Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d at 1411. |

I find under the rule of reason that discussion of mitiga-

tion measures for mule deer impacts in the EIS was ade-

quate.

4‘ Ae

This claim contains several subissues. Plaintiffs contend

that the EIS was inadequate on several grounds. As

background to this claim, it is important to note the EIS

states, and the statement has not been challenged by plain-

tiffs, that the ski area itself will have no measurable direct

impact on air quality in the Methow Valley. The con-

troversy over air, as over mule deer, concerns secondary

impacts.

43a

a. Inadequate discussion of air quality impacts.

i. Failure to discuss certain air pollutants.

Plaintiffs contend that the EIS is inadequate because it

contains absolutely no information regarding carbon

monoxide pollution resulting from woodstoves and no in-

formation regarding nitrogen dioxide pollution. Even

though plaintiffs’ contention of fact is correct, I find that

the omission does not render the EIS inadequate. This

argument strikes me as “fly-specking.”'' The evidence

showed that the impacts from these pollutants from

woodstoves would be relatively insignificant. The EIS

does contain a brief discussion of carbon monoxide im-

pacts. (EIS at 67). The evidence showed that nitrogen

dioxide impacts would be insignificant.

ii. Failure to measure existing concentrations of air

pollutants.

The EIS discusses the general air flow characteristics in

the Methow Valley in some detail. (EIS at 26-29). More

specifically, measurements of TSP were taken in both

Mazama and Winthrop, two towns in the valley. Plain-

tiffs’ argument that measurements of other pollutants,

particularly carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide, were

required to make the EIS adequate are unpersuasive. The

evidence showed that nitrogen dioxide impacts would not

be so significant as to warrant the type of treatment plain-

tiffs suggest.

ili. Failure to discuss Clean Air Act PSD policy.

This argument has been a moving target throughout

these proceedings. In an earlier form, plaintiffs challenged

'' The arguments on fish and water, population, and expansion of

the intercity airport also strike me as fly-specking.

| eel

44a

the EIS because it allegedly failed to discuss the Clean Air

Act’s PSD policy. This argument fails. The decision-makers

were aware of the PSD program and presumably the broad

congressional policy of nondegradation. See, e.g., EIS at

D-44. Disclosure of physical impacts on the environment is

the primary function of an EIS. NEPA does not require

that an EIS contain a definitive legal brief. At closing argu-

ment, plaintiffs contended that the EIS was inadequate

because it failed to inform the decision-maker that the PSD

increment for TSP had been triggered. Although the

materials submitted in support of the summary judgment

were in dispute on this point, the evidence clearly shows

that the baseline has in fact been triggered. Because of this

triggering, the PSD increment for TSP is in the process of

being consumed. The ski resort and the secondary develop-

ment to follow may consume the TSP increment of 37

micrograms per cubic meter for the applicable Clean Air

Act-geographic district. Consumption of the increment

would foreclose the placement of any major emitting facili-

ty in the geographic area covered by the TSP increment. See

discussion of Clean Air Act issues in April 30, 1986, opin-

ion at 4-10. Plaintiffs, citing Alabama Power Co. v. Cosile,

636 F.2d 323, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1979), challenge the EIS

because it fails to disclose this potential foreclosure ‘of

economic opportunity in the Methow Valley. I find nothing

in Alabama Power to support this contention. The EIS

would have been better had it contained such a discussion,

but given the lega! ambiguities surrounding the PSD pro-

gram, the omission is not fatal.

iv. Failure to discuss impacts on Pasayten

Wilderness.

There was some dispute in the evidence concerning

secondary impacts on the Pasayten Wilderness area, a

Class | area near the upper tip of the Methow Valley. See

45a

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(e). | find that the evidence supports the

conclusion in the EIS that Class | areas will not be im-

pacted. (EIS at 68). I find the discussion and the studies

underlying such discussion adequate.

b. Failure to prepare worst cases analysis.

No worst case analysis was necessary for reasons similar

to those previously discussed in the mule deer analysis.

c. Failure to analyze mitigation measures.

The EIS discloses the adverse impacts on air quality that

are likely to occur as a result of population growth and

development in the Methow Valley over the next ten to

twenty years. Air quality impacts resulting from increased

growth over such a _ period-of time is_ inherently

speculative. See Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 1373. The

secondary air quality impacts that may result from

population growth and development in the Methow Valley

were forecasted on the basis of existing information and

reasonable forecasting methods. The EIS stated that the

majority of those impacts would be caused by off-site

combustion of wood for space heat and motor vehicle use

during the operating ski reason. (EIS at 65, 68).

The EIS lists several mitigation measures to reduce air

quality impacts. (EIS at 68-69). It identifies mitigation

measures to be studied and implemented by Okanogan

County. The Record of Decision required development of

an air quality management program designed to minimize

deterioration of air quality in the Methow Valley, par-

ticularly that resulting from wood smoke emissions. (A.R.

2 at 4). The Forest Service, the Environmental Protection

Agency, the Washington State Department of Ecology

and Okanogan County executed a MOU which represents

a determination that the air pollution mitigation measures,

=x ——~—

46a

programs, plans and commitments identified therein will

operate to prevent violation of applicable air quality

standards. (A.R. 53).

I find the discussion of air mitigation measures in the

EIS adequate.

- 5. Remaining issues

a. Fish and Water

Plaintiffs argue that the EIS is inadequate because of its

failure to analyze the effectiveness of mitigation measures

relating to fish and water quality impacts. The EIS states

that Cedar Creek is one of the most productive trout

streams in the Early Winters creek system. It analyzes in

detail the increased sedimentation that could occur in

Cedar Creek predominantly as a result of construction of

the ski area. (EIS at 72). The EIS identifies several mitiga-

tion measures that will reduce the risk of impact on

fisheries resulting from the development on Sandy Butte.

Failure to discuss the effectiveness of specific mitigation

measures in this EIS is understandable given the fact that

effectiveness will depend on the location of facilities on

the mountain. I find the fish and water discussion ade-

quate.

b. Population

Plaintiffs take issue with the population growth analysis

in the EIS. They complain that the population model

underestimated population growth and consequently

underestimated environmental damage that correlates to

population growth. The discussion in the BIS is based on

an extensive study performed at the request of the Forest

Service. Experts disagreed over its adequacy. I find it ade-

quate in all respects.

EE ——

47a

c. Intercity airport

Plaintiffs contend that the expansion of the intercity air-

port is closely related to the development of Early

Winters, but the impacts of expansion of the intercity air-

port are not discussed in the EIS. Despite plaintiffs’ con-

tention, the EIS contains a rather detailed discussion of

the impact of the development on air commuter activity,

ae — activity through the intercity airport. (EIS at

To the extent plairtiffs argue that the airport is a

“closely-related” action within the meaning of 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.25(a)(1) requiring a separate EIS for the airport

itself, the argument fails. The intercity airport is a separate

action which has no direct relationship to the project pro-

posed by MRI. While the ski resort may have an indirect

effect on the airport, the actions are not “connected.” See

Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985).

Vv. Conclusion

Any issue I have neglected to discuss explicitly lacks

merit. This opinion constitutes findings of fact and con-

clusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

In summary, I conclude: 1) that the substantive merits

of the Record of Decision are not subject to judicial review

under Ninth Circuit precedent, 2) that plaintiffs did not

suffer any deprivation of due process, and 3) that the

Early Winters EIS complies fully with the requirements of

NEPA. The action is dismissed. Each side is to bear its

own costs.

It is so ORDERED.

DATED this 25th day of June, 1986.

/s/ William M. Dale

WILLIAM M. DALE

U.S. Magistrate

48a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

Civil 85-2124-DA

MeTHow VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS

v.

REGIONAL FORESTER, ETC., ET AL, DEFENDANTS

July 12, 1986

JUDGMENT

Based on the record,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED the action is

ticmissed.

DATED: this | day of July, 1986.

/s/ Jeffrey Amran

Clerk

APPENDIX D

1S70 NFS #1lll

(Rn)

DEC 16 1985

CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Mr. David Bricklin

Suite 900, Fourth and Pike Building

1424 Fourth Avenue

Seattle, Washington 98101

Dear Mr. Bricklin:

On October 1, 1984, you requested on behalf of your

clients Methow Valley Citizens Council, Washington State

Sportmen’s Council, Washington Environmental Council,

and the Cascade Chapter, Sierra Club, pursuant to 36

CFR 211.18, a review of Regional Forester Jeff Sirmon’s

July 5, 1984, decision to adopt Alternative IV of the Early

Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study Final Environmental

Impact Statement (FEIS). Based on this decision, the

Forest Service will permit development of a destination ski

resort on approximately 3,900 acres of land at Sandy

Butte, Okanogan National Forest, Washington. Relief re-

quested is that the decision be reversed.

Status as an intervenor in this appeal was requested and

granted to Mr. Glen Amster on behalf of his client,

Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI).

Regional Forester Sirmon signed the Record of Decision

for the Early Winters FEIS on July 5, 1984. The decision

was announced on August 10, 1984, and notice of

availability of the FEIS was published in the Federal

Register on August 31, 1984. You appealed this decision to

the Chief of the Forest Service on October ', 1984. MRI

50a

was granted intervenor status on April 3, 1985. A Stay of

permit issuance, and any activities which would signifi-

cantly disturb the site was granted on May I, 1985. Oral

presentations by appellants and intervenor were made on

July 29, 1985, and the official record was closed 10 days

later on August 8, 1985. At the request of both appellants

and intervenor, the appeal was suspended from September

23 to December 15, 1985.

Pursuant to 36 CFR 211.18, we have conducted the review

which you requested. The information submitted by you,

the intervenor, and the Regional Forester has been con-

sidered.

1. Issues

After carefully reviewing all of the information contained

in the record, we find the issues raised by this appeal can

be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the Regional Forester’s decision on the ski

development is premature because it was made prior to

and preempts decisions to be made in the Okaogan Forest

Plan.

2 Whether the Winthrop Ranger District Multiple-use

Plan provides for development of a major ski area al

Sandy Butte. .

3. Whether mitigation measures are adequate.

4. Whether the proposed use will be in the public in-

terest.

5. Whether the proposed development is financially

feasible.

6. Whether the Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports

Study EIS is adequate.

7. Whether the decision is in violation of the

Washington State Environmental Policy Act.

Sla

ll. Discussion

Whether the Regional Forester’s decision on the ski

development is premature because it was made prior to,

and preempts decisions to be made in the Okanogan

Forest Plan. You contend that the Regional Forester’s

decision was premature because: (a) the Department's

1979 decision required that the Okanogan Forest Plan be

completed prior to action on the MRI permit application;

(b) it preempts decisions to be made in the Forest Plan; (c)

because it violates requirements of NFMA; and (d)

because the Washington Wilderness Act does not negate

the need to complete the Okanogan Forest Plan prior to

making a decision on MRI's permit application.

a. There is a long history of land use and winter sports

planning for the Sandy Butte area of the Okanogan Na-

tional Forest. Contemporary planning regarding Sandy

Butte began in 1968 when Congress designated the North

Cascades National Park. The legislation directed the

Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to “agree on the

designation of areas within the park or recreation areas or

within National Forests adjacent to the park and recrea-

tion areas needed for public use facilities .... Such

public use facilities, including interpretive centers, visitor

contact stations, lodges, campsites, and ski lifts, shall be

constructed according to a plan agreed upon by the two

Secretaries.” (16 U.S.C. § 90d-3) The National Park

legislation led to several studies by the Forest and National

Park Services of potential winter sports activities and sites

in the area, and to the development of a North Cascades

Recreation Plan.

The North Cascades Winter Sports Study, completed in

1970 by the Forest Service, examined the opportunities for

cross-country skiing, expansion of existing downhill ski

resorts, and the development of new skiing facilities. The

S2da

study identified Sandy Butte as having the highest poten-

tial of any site in the State of Washington for development

as a major destination ski area. Page 8 of this study states:

“Of the 13 sites investigated, three were rated as good,

seven marginal, and three unacceptable. Of the three sites

rated good, only Sandy Butte was considered to have the

necessary physical features for a site of major im-

portance.”

Following the North Cascades Winter Sports Study, the

National Park and National Forest Services issued the

joint plan for the North Cascades area in 1974. Like the

studies that had preceded it, this plan recognized Sandy

Butte as a promising site for downhill skiing facilities. On

Page 22 of the Plan, it is stated that: “Developments in the

Granite Creek Valley/Early Valley emphasize scenic driv-

ing, picnicking, overlooks, wilderness trailheads and

trails, and potential ski areas.”

_ In April 1977, the Okanogan Forest Supervisor adopted

the Twisp-Winthrop Concenully (T-W C) Unit Plan. In

accordance with the 10 years of studies that had preceded

it, and consistent with the previous plans in effect, the

Unit Plan allocated Sandy Butte for skiing. The Methow

Valley Citizens’ Council (MVCC) appealed the approval

of the plan to the Chief. The plan was remanded by the

Chief for revision, because of some deficiencies in the

planning process, particularly the plan’s treatment of

roadless areas.

At the time the Unit Plan was remanded, “RARE II” was

well under way. The T-W C roadless areas, therefore, were

studied as part of that evaluation process. Also, with the

passage of the National Forest Management Act of 1976

(NFMA), the Forest Service decided that it would be more

efficient if planning for the T-W C unit area occurred

S3a

through the Forest-wide planning process required by the

NMA. With the remand of the T-W C Plan and in ac-

cordance with Section 6(c) of NFMA, the previous plans,

including the Winthrop Multiple-Use Plan and the Joint

Plan for The North Cascades, remain in force until ap-

proval of the Okanogan Foresi Plan.

Methow Recreation, Inc. submitted an application for a

special-use permit to develop a ski area on portions of

Sandy Butte not included in RARE II in August 1978.

RARE II allocated Sandy Butte to nonwilderness, and

following direction from Deputy Chief Ray Housley, that

roadless areas made available for nonwilderness use by

RARE II should be managed in accordance with existing

multiple-use plans until suci. time as a Forest-wide plan

was approved, the Forest Supervisor announced his deci-

sion to study the feasibility of a ski area at Sandy Butte.

This decision was appealed by NMCC. The Chief, in his

decision, concluded that applications to develop Sandy

Butte for skiing may be processed and subsequently ap-

proved if development was consistent with existing plans

and all procedural requirements, including NEPA, were

fulfilled. The Chief’s decision was sustained by Assistant

Secretary Rupert Cutler August 10, 1979. Dr. Cutler

found the Chief’s decision to allow applications for

special-use permits at Sandy Butte was consistent with

departmental policy; however, he directed the Chief to en-

sure that such applications were not approved until the

area was appropriately allocated in a land management

plan and the project considered through the appropriate

environmental review process.

in response to an inquiry from Senator Henry Jackson

about the delay his decision would cause, Dr. Culter sug-

gested that the ski area study could be prepared at the |

S4a

same time as the other related planning issues were re-

solved in the Forest Plan. In a January 29, 1980, letter to

the Regional Forester, the Chief confirmed that the

Regional Forester had agreed to finish the Draft Forest

Plan by the end of December 1981, and the final Plan by

the fall of 1982. The Chief found it was feasible to gather

the necessary data for ski development project analysis

concurrent with Plan development and a decision on

winter sports development at Sandy Butte could be forth-

coming simultaneously with the final Forest Plan and EIS.

Draft Environmental Impact Statements for Early Winters

and the Forest Plan were released in 1982. Work began on

both Final EIS’s. However, in spring 1983, the forest plan-

ning process was halted as a result of a court decision in-

validating the roadless area review. The Forest was

directed to prepare a new draft Forest Plan consistent with

the court’s direction.

Dr. Cutler’s 1979 direction was modified on December 20,

1983, when Assistant Secretary John Crowell told Con-

gressman Sid Morrison that the Sandy Butte FEIS could

be released within 45 days of a signed Washington

Wilderness Bill which contained adequate RARE II suffi-

ciency and release language.

In his letter, Mr. Crowell reasoned that “while the Sandy

Butte FEIS has been subjected to a project planning and

public input process, it fails to address the issue of whether

the roadless area in question should be considered for

wilderness designation. That issue has been dealt with by

consideration of the area during RARE II. Now, however,

the resulting recommendation that the area not be

wilderness is invalidated by the consequences of the Ninth

Circuit's decision in California vs. Block.”

5Sa

Mr. Crowell continued: “Experience in recent litigation

clearly indicates that a stand-alone FEIS on ski develop-

ment at Sandy Butte would be successfully challenged

unless the analysis deals with the wilderness issue to stand-

ards meeting the Ninth Circuit's decision in California vs.

Block. A substantial amount of time would be needed to

revise the Sandy Butte FEIS to address the question of

whether or not the site should be designated wilderness.

This is valuable time which would be better spent on ex-

pediting completion of the Forest Plan.”

Changing conditions and philosophies often dictate that

the Department modify or change its policies. In this case,

Mr. Crowell exercised his prerogative to modify the policy

of Dr. Cutler based on changes that had occurred in Forest

planning and wilderness allocations since Dr. Cutler’s 1979

cation ;

Your argument that Mr. Crowell’s policy change violated

due process is incorrect. Appellant, MVCC, were aware of

the change, as evidenced by MVCC’s June 8, 1984, letter

to Dr. Cutler asking his help in changing the Crowell deci-

sion and MVCC is now exercising its right to contest the

decision to permit development.

b. You contend that NEPA prohibits the Forest Service

from taking any action prior to completion of the Forest

Plan because such action would preempt decisions to be

made in the plan. The Early Winters FEIS was prepared in

full accordance with NEPA, NFMA, Departmental

policy, and existing plans. The purpose of NEPA is to en-

sure a full analysis of the impacts to the environment of a

proposed action. This analysis was accomplished by the

preparation of the Early Winters EIS in full compliance

with NEPA. A full range of alternatives was considered in

the analysis in accord with NEPA. Analysis of the Early

S6a

Winter proposal in a separate EIS subjected the proposal

to much closer scrutiny than would have been possible if

the proposal had been one of many complex issues ana-

lyzed in the Forest Plan.

c. You contend that allocation of land prior to comple-

tion of the Forest Plan violates NFMA. Section 6(c) of

NFMA directs that “until such time as a unit of the Na-

tional Forest System is managed under plans developed in

accordance with this Act, the management of such unit

may continue under existing land and resource manag-

ment plans.” There is no requirement in NFMA to halt

management actions, such as processing special-use ap-

plications, pending completion of forest plans. It was not

the intent of Congress to halt operations on the National

Forests pending Forest Plan completion. A ski develop-

ment at Sandy Butte is in full compliance with the previous

plans (Winthrop Ranger District M-U Plan, pg. 6, M-U

Survey Report Liberty Bell Management Unit pg. 11).

d. Your allegation that enactment of the Washington

State Wilderness Act of 1984 does not negate the need to

* complete the Okanogan Forest Plan prior to making 4

decision on MRI's permit application is incorrect. The

decision under appeal is to issue a 30-year special-use per-

mit authorizing use on approximately 3,900 acres of Na-

tional Forest land. The decision does not act on MRI's

permit application. MRI was chosen as the only suntable

applicant after the decision under appeal was made. it

must be stressed that, to date, no decision has been made

on MRI's application.

On July 3, 1984, the Washington Wilderness Act was

signed, resolving the roadless area issue in Washington.

The Legislative history of the Washington Wilderness Act

contains Senate Report 86-461. This report states that i ts

57a

the intent of Congress that land use management of Sandy

Butte proceed, without delay, in accordance with exisiting

multiple-use management plane, consistent with NEPA.

The Forest Service and Department are directed to allow

the evaluation process for the Sandy Butte development to

proceed without additional delay. This expression of con-

gressional intent is clear.

Based on the above discussion, we find that Regional

Forester Sirmon properly followed Department of

Agriculture policy, applicable laws, and congressional

direction is issuing his decision to authorize development

* of a destination ski resort on Sandy Butte.

2. Whether the Winthrop Ranger District Multiple

Use Plan provides for development of a major ski area at

Sandy Butte. Prior to completion of the Okanogan Forest

Plan, management of the National Forest land at Sandy

Butte is directed by the Winthrop Ranger District

Multiple-use Plan, completed in 1968 and revised in 1970

(per NFHA as discussed in the preceding issue). The

eastern portion of Sandy Butte is located in a National

Forest Landscape Management Unit with the following

management direction:

a. Manage for multiple use while recognizing esthetics

and recreation as key uses.

b. Manage to maintain and enhance esthetic qualities

in the foreground.

The western portion of Sandy Butte is located in the Liber-

ty Bell Management Unit, with management direction (pg.

30) to:

a. Retain a near natural landscape appearance.

b. Keep developed recreation sites unobtrusive.

c. Keep well-screened developed sites designed to pro-

vide maximum capacity and convenience.

58a

The M-U Survey Report for the Liberty Bell Management

Unit (pg. 11) and the Winthrop Ranger District M-U Plan

(pg. 6) specifically mention that a major ski area is a

possibility, provided it is studied in detail to determine

feasibility.

After carefully reviewing the M-U Plan and Survey Report

for Liberty Bell Management Unit, we find that the

management direction does allow development of a ski

area at Sandy Butte. We also find that, in the design of the

ski area, careful consideration of the visual resource must

be a major consideration. The techniques for mitigating

the effects of a major ski area development on the visual

resource have become highly sophisticated over the last

few years and are now in common use. Development of

Early Winters will meet visual quality objectives through

mitigation. Adequacy of these mitigation measures can

only be determined later in the project planning process

when more site-specific information becomes available.

Mitigation measures will be supplemental or changed as

necessary to achieve the desired objective.

3. Whether mitigation measures are adequate. The

purpose of the Early Winters EIS (EIS, pg. 1) was to pro-

vide the information required to evaluate the potential for

skiing at Early Winters and to assist in making a decision

whether to issue a permit for downhill skiing on National

Forest land. The decision does not authorize construction

of a particular ski development, nor does it authorize

development of any non-National Forest lands. Another

environmental analysis and review will be requires by the

Forest Service prior to any decision to allow a specific

development. The responsible State and local government

agencies may require similar review of development in-

volving matters within their jurisdiction on non-National

Forest lands.

59a

in addition to disclosing on-site impacts of the ski

development, the EIS also discloses off-site impacts

(FEIS, pg. 65-145). The Regional Forester determined that

there would be no major on-site adverse effects resulting

directly from the Federal action. He did find that there

would be some adverse environmental effects from

development of private land, and he prescribed actions

which must be taken to mitigate these effects (Record of

Decision, pg. 4a-6a).

You argue that the Regional Forester’s reliance on some

other agency to compel mitigation is not in the public’s in-

terest; that the Forest Service cannot delegate its duty to

assure mitigation of these measures to anyone else. The

amount of information provided in the FEIS must be

reasonable in the light of the decision being made. The

decision to be made by the Forest Service was whether to

grant the special-use permit, not to permit base area

development. The EIS disclosed potential off-site impacts

as required by NEPA and the Regional Forester required

mitigation measures. The Forest Service has no authority

to force the State or county to take certain actions. By his

decision, the Regional Forester has said that certain off-

site mitigation must take place as part of permit issuance.

The Regional Forester complied with his duty under

NEPA by informing Okanogan County of the adverse ef-

fects on the private land, and by conditioning approval of

detailed mountain development upon the mitigation of

these effects. Given the multi-sovereignty nature of the

permit review process (FEIS, pg. 4), we find the mitigation

measures adequate for this stage in the review process.

4. Whether the proposed use will be in the public in-

terest. You contend that the decision was erroneous

60a

because this proposed action was not in the public interest.

In making his decision, the Regional Forester was in part

guided by response from the public regarding the Early

Winters proposal. The majority of respondents to the

DEIS from outside Okanogan County (and total) favored

development of a destination ski area. The majority of

respondents from Okanogan County favored no develop-

ment. The Washington State Governor has stated a ma-

jority of Washington resic_ats favor a destination ski

development. (Record of Decision, pg. 3a). This was a

strong indicator of public interest. The Regional Forester

correctly concluded that he must evaluate the broad public

interest, and not just the local interest. We feel that, based

on the information available to him, the Regional Forester

correctly determined that development will be in the public

interest.

5. Whether the proposed development is financially

feasible. Your argument that the development is not finan-

cially feasible is not convincing. The Regional Forester

relied on two studies (FEIS, pg 80-83) which show that the

project is feasible. These studies were adequate for the

level of decision to be made. As the project progresses,

and more detailed information becomes available, both

the Forest Service and the developer will require further

financial analysis.

The Record of Decision (Para. 1, pg. 4a) states that all

prospective permittees will be required to submit financial

information on their ability to construct and operate ski

facilities over the period of the permit. This clause will be

strictly enforced.

6. Whether the Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports

Study EIS is adequate. You contend that the FEIS was in-

adequate because of a failure to discuss all reasonable

alternatives. For reasons explained in the FEIS, in con-

6la

sidering alternatives, the Regional Forester eliminated

from detailed study the alternatives of skiing at other sites

on the Okanogan National Forest, and expansion of ex-

isting areas. Other winter sports activity on Sandy Butte

was considered as part of the No Action Alternative.

We agree with this approach because the EIS was

developed in response to a site-specific request for a

special-use permit at Sandy Butte. The discussion of alter-

natives need not be exhaustive, but contain sufficient in-

formation to permit a rational choice by the decision-

maker. The range of alternatives discussed in an EIS must

be bound by some notion of feasibility, and an EIS is not

to be found wanting simply because it fails to include

every alternative conceivable. We conclude that the range

of alternatives discussed permitted a rational choice by the

Regional Forester.

The Regional Forester has adequately responded to your

specific concerns regarding the adequacy of the EIS in his

Responsive Statement, pages 15-21. Perfection is not the

test. The proper test is one of reasonableness, namely,

whether the amount of information provided was

reasonable in light of the decision being made. We find

that the FEIS adequately discloses the impacts of the proj-

ect in sufficient detail to provide the Regional Forester a

reasonable amount of information upon which to base his

decision.

7. Whether the decision is in volation of the

Washington State Environmental Policy Act. (SEPA)

Your claims on this point are incorrect for two reasons.

First, SEPA does not apply to decision making on Federal

land. Second, SEPA is similar to NEPA, and as discussed

previously, the decision was made in compliance with

NEPA and, therefore, would comply with SEPA if ap-

plicable.

62a

IV. Decision

Based upon our review of the record, it is my decision to

affirm Regional Forester Sirmon’s decision and deny the

specific relief which you seek. The stay granted on May |,

1985, will remain in effect for 10 days following the date

of this decision.

This decision is the final administrative determination of

the Department of Agriculture unless the Secretary, on his

own volition, elects to review the decision within 10 days

of receipt. Pursuant to 36 CFR 211.13 (F)(2), the Secretary

will not consider any request for review.

Sincerely,

/s/ L.B. Hilmon

for R. MAX PETERSON

Chief

63a

RECORD OF DECISION

USDA Forest Service

EARLY WINTERS ALPINE WINTER SPORTS STUDY

Okanogan National Forest

Okanogan County, Washington

Final Eavironmental Impact Statement

It is my decision to select Alternative IV as the future

management plan for the National Forest System lands

considered in this study. Based on this decision, the Forest

Service will issue 2 30-year Special Use Permit authorizing

use On approximately 3900 acres of land. Facilities would

allow utilization by 8200 skiers at one time. If competitive

interest exists, the permittee will be chosen through a pro-

spectus (bid) process. Construction may not begin until a

master development plan has been evaluated and approved.

This Environmental Impact Statement has been developed

through cooperative studies conducted by the Forest Serv-

ice and Okanogan County government. Studies began in

1968 following passage of the North Cascades National

Park Act, P.L. 90-544. The Secretaries of Agriculture and

Interior were directed to “agree on the designation of areas

within the park or recreation areas or within national

forests adjacent to the park and r

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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