Record and brief — United States v. Kozminski

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No. 86-2000-CFY Title: United States, Petitioner

Status: GRANTED Vv.

Ike Kozminski, et al.

Docketed: Court: United States Court of Appeals

June 15, 1987 for the Sixth Circuit

Counsel for petitioner: Solicitor General

Counsel for respondent: Ziemba,Carl, Solicitor General

Entry Date Note Proceedings and Orders

1 Jun 15 1987 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.

2 Jun 15 1987 #Appendix of petitioner United States filed.

3 Jul 22 1987 DISTRIBUTED. September 28, 1987

4 Aug 31 1987 F Response requested -- WJB, HAB.

5 Sep 19 1987 Brief of respondents Ike Kozminski, et al. in opposition

filed.

6 Sep 23 1987 REDISTRIBUTED. October 9, 1987

8 Oct 13 1987 Petition GRANTED.

EAA AAAAAAAEAEAAAAAAAAEAAAAEEAEEEEAEEEEEEREARERHEHHRHHRHEEE

10 Nov 25 1987 Order extending time to file brief of petitioner on the

merits until December 14, 1987.

11 Dec 14 1987 Brief of petitioner United States filed.

12 Dec 17 1987 Joint appendix filed.

13. Dec 29 1987 Record filed.

* Certified copy of C. A. proceedings received.

14 Dec 30 1987 Brief of respondents Ike Kozminski, et al. filed.

15 Jan 4 1988 Record filed.

* Certified copy of original record, box, received.

16 Jan 5 1988 CIRCULATED.

17 Jan 5 1988 SET FOR ARGUMENT. Tuesday, February 23, 1988. (3rd

case). (1 hour).

18 Jan 13 1988 G Motion of International Society for Krishna

Consciousness of California, Inc. for leave to file a

brief as amicus curiae filed.

19 Jan 29 1988 X Reply brief of petitioner United States filed.

20 Feb 22 1988 Motion of International Society for Krishna

Consciousness of California, Inc. for leave to file a

brief as amicus curiae GRANTED.

21 Feb 23 1988 ARGUED.

PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

| In the Supreme Court of the

OcTOBER TERM, 1986

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

v.

IKE KOZMINSKI, ET AL.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS

Assistant Attorney General

DONALD B. AYER

Deputy Solicitor General

ROGER CLEGG

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

RICHARD J. LAZARUS

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER

IRVING L. GORNSTEIN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether “involuntary servitude,” as prohibited and

made criminal by the Thirteenth Amendment and 18

U.S.C. 241 and 1584, is present only where a person com-

pels another to remain in his service through physical or

legal coercion or, if the victim is a minor, an immigrant, or

a mental incompetent, through fraud and deceit.

(1)

ERE Rn re a

EEE ERE SEL A ee

Constitutional and statutory provisions involved ............

EE ee ee ee

Reasons for granting the petition .........................

EE EE ne en ee 15

TABLE OF CONTENTS

aN SO

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (Sth Cir. 1977),

cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978) .................. 10

United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981) .... 14

United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert.

RG rrr 14

United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert.

CO. ccc cccsecwecccsccees 6, 9, 10

United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964)... 7, 10

United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (1ith Cir. 1985) ... 10, 14

Constitution and siatutes:

U.S. Const.:

Amend. V:

Double Jeopardy Clause .................... 9

oe ves ccees enh sebbnbeees 10

ee passim

EE Ee ee 2, 5, 8, 11, 13

ns oe ec hadandeseesesceeséesed passim

el dh aan ce eeneteabedn 2

(111)

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

\

No.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

Vv.

IKE KOZMINSKI, ET AL

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

The Solicitor General petitions for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, sitting en banc,

(App. la-71a) is not yet reported. The panel opinion of the

court of appeals (App. 72a-106a) is not yet reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (App. 107a) was

entered on April 16, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

The pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions

are set forth at App. 11Sa.

(1)

2

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan, respondents, Ike and

Margarethe Kozminski and their son John Kozminski,

were convicted of conspiring to deprive two mentally

retarded white adult males of their Thirteenth Amendment

right to be free from involuntary servitude, in violation of

18 U.S.C. 241. Ike and Margarethe Kozminski were also

convicted of holding the two adults to involuntary ser-

vitude, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1584. John Kozminski

was acquitted on that count. Ike and Margarethe Kozmin-

ski were each sentenced to five and ten years’ imprison-

ment on the two counts, their sentences were suspended,

and they were placed on probation for two years. Ike Koz -

minski was also fined $20,000 and ordered to pay

$6,190.80 as restitution to each of the two victims pur-

suant to 18 U.S.C. 3579(a)(1). John Kozminski was

sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, his sentence

suspended, and he was placed on probation for two years.

He was also fined $10,000.

1. At trial, the government established that in 1967

Margarethe Kozminski picked up Robert Fulmer while he

was walking down the road and took him to work on the

Kozminski family farm (App. 73a). At the time, Fulmer

was working at another farm, and Mrs. Kozminski simply

left a note telling Fulmer’s former employer that he had

gone (ibid.). Mrs. Kozminski later told several people that

she had kidnapped Fulmer (ibid). Fulmer has an IQ of 67

(ibid.). He has lived in foster homes since he was five, and

he spent some of his childhood at a training school (IV Tr.

134-135).

Louis Molitoris came to the Kozminski farm in the early

1970’s (App. 73a). Molitoris had been living ont! streets

in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and had sometimes used the

Kozminski barber shop there as a place to sleep (ibid.).

Some time after they met, Ike took Molitoris to work on

3

his farm (ibid.). Molitoris has an IQ of 60 (ibid.).

Molitoris had once been institutionalized at a state mental

hospital (V Tr. 66).

The evidence indicated that the men were housed in an

insect-infected dilapidated trailer with no heat and a

refrigerator that did not work (App. 74a; II Tr. 51; III Tr.

24; IV Tr. 45, 143-144, 147-153, 155; V Tr. 15-16, 104).

They were often worked from 3:00 in the morning until at

least 8:30 at night, without vacation and without pay (ex-

cept for small gifts on holidays and for the county fair)

(ibid.). They were dressed in tattered clothes that were in-

adequate for warmth (App. 74a; III Tr. 20). They were

sometimes provided moldy bread to eat and were not pro-

vided with proper nutrition (II Tr. 62; Ill Tr. 30, 32; IX

Tr. 208).'

Both men were also denied proper medical care (App.

74a). On one occasion, Fulmer cut off the tip of his

thumb, and the Kozminskis would not let him have it

treated at a hospital (ibid.). Neighbors later saw Fulmer’s

thumb covered with dirt and encrusted with blood (III Tr.

115, 171). Molitoris was once gored by a bull and at

another time kicked by a calf, but on both occasions the

Kozminskis refused his request to see a doctor (V Tr.

71-73).

The Kozminskis subjected Fulmer and Molitoris to

physical abuse for not doing their work as they were

directed (App. 74a). Specific instances of such abuse

presented at trial include Ike’s conduct in slapping

Molitoris across the side of the face (II Tr. 139), striking

' There was, of course, evidence presented tending to controvert the

adverse conditions and conduct demonstrated by the government.

There was testimony, for example, that Ike Kozminski delivered

groceries, including luncheon meat, hot dogs, bread, ice cream, and

potatoes, every week (IV Tr. 154); that Fulmer and Molitoris were

taken out to dinner al a restaurant approximately once a week (IV Tr.

201; V Tr. 91); that they were taken to professional baseball games on

several occasions (IV Tr. 203-204; V Tr. 96); and that Ike paid for

Fulmer’s teeth (V Tr. 26).

4

Fulmer’s ear with the back of his hand (II Tr. 211-212),

kicking Fulmer (III Tr. 22; IV Tr. 141), slapping Molitoris

across the back (III Tr. 125), and hitting Molitoris with his

fist cutting him over his eye (I1V Tr. 158-159); Margarethe

dragging Molitoris off a tractor, throwing him in a ditch,

and kicking him three or four times (III Tr. 22), and slap-

ping Fulmer (V Tr. 39); and John grabbing Molitoris and

ripping off part of his shirt (III Tr. 23), and slamming him

against the wall (III Tr. 137). The Kozminskis’ herdsmen

were specifically instructed to hit Fulmer and Molitoris if

necessary to get them to work (II Tr. 37), and Molitoris

was beaten nearly every day by one of the herdsmen (IV

Tr. 157-158). The Kozminskis also frequently directed

abusive language and obscenities to the men; they called

them names such as “stupid bastard” and “[njigger

motherfucker” (App. 74a; II Tr. 138, 211; III Tr. 21; IV

Tr. 82-83).

The Kozminskis told the men they were not to leave the

farm (II Tr. 100; IV Tr. 170; V Tr. 74). The Kozminskis

also threatened to return the men to institutions if they did

not do what they were told (App. 19a; IV Tr. 167). Ona

number of occasions, the men attempted to run away and

the Kozminskis or one of their employees went after them

and brought them back (App. 74a).

The Kozminskis told the men not to talk to others and

told others not to talk to them (App. 74a). Once when

Fulmer used the phone to call a neighbor, Margarethe

Kozminski ripped the phone from the wall and told him

never to use it again (App. Sa; IV Tr. 168). They told

Molitoris that a neighbor might shoot him (III Tr. 73). To

further avoid interference, the Kozminskis falsely told

neighbors, farm hands, and visitors that the men were in

their custody (App. Sa; III Tr. 71, 96, 153; IV Tr. 84).

The Kozminskis also discouraged relatives from con-

tacting the men, and discouraged the men from contacting

their relatives (App. 74a). Once when Fulmer’s sister called

5

to arrange a visit, Margarethe told her that Fulmer would

be upset by such a visit and that she should not come (IV

Tr. 101). Margarethe made the same represeniation to

Fulmer’s brother (X Tr. 206). Fulmer once told Ike Koz-

minski that he would like to visit his brother and sister,

and Ike replied that they did not care about him (App. 5a;

IV Tr. 173). Shortly after Molitoris came to the farm, the

Kozminskis had him burn the trunk containing all his

possessions — including his family pictures — because, they

claimed, the trunk had cockroaches (App. Sa).

Over the years, Fulmer and Molitoris asked others to

help them leave the farm (App. 74a). Molitoris once

begged a visitor to call the police to take him away (II Tr.

199-200). A neighbor testified that Fulmer told him he had

to get away from the Kozminskis because “ ‘they are kill-

ing me’ ” (III Tr. 171). And a temporary resident on the

farm testified that Molitoris came to his trailer weeping

and asked him to take him away from *he farm when he

left (IV Tr. 85).

In August of 1983, a newly hired herdsman helped the

men to leave the farm. While the Kozminskis were out of

town, the herdsman notified county officials of the condi-

tions under which the men lived (II Tr. 58-59). When the

sheritf and a social service employee came to the farm,

Fulmer and Molitoris asked to be taken away before the

Kozminskis returned (IV Tr. 44-52). The men were then

taken to an adult foster care home (ibid.).

2. At the close of the evidence, the district court in-

structed the jury concerning the meaning of “involuntary

servitude.” The same instructions applied to both the Sec-

tion 1584 count and the Section 241 count (for conspiring

to deprive Fulmer and Molitoris of their Thirteenth

Amendment rights). See App. 109a-112a; XI Tr. 131-137,

154. The court instructed the jury that it was “to determine

if there was a means of compulsion used, sufficient in kind

and degree, to subject a person having the same general

6

station in life as the alleged victims to believe they had no

reasonable means of escape and no choice except to re-

main in the service of the employer” (App. 110a). The

court stated that involuntary servitude “may include situa-

tions in which * * * coercive acts or words cause persons

in employment to believe they cannot freely leave employ-

ment if the acts are done or the words spoken with the in-

tent to cause this result” (App. 109a). The court cautione1

the jury that “an employer can use any legitimate means to

retain the services of an emp[ljoyee, such as offering the

employee benefits, or seeking to convince the employee

that he would be better off if he continued in his employ-

ment” (App. 110a).

3. The court of appeals initially affirmed the convic-

tions (App. 72a-106a). The court rejected respondents’

claim that Section 1584 would be unconstitutionally vague

if not limited to cases of physical or legal coercion (App.

77a-78a). Adopting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in

United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1454-1455, cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984), the court concluded that Sec-

tion 1584’s “mens rea requirement vitiated vagueness con-

cerns” that might otherwise be presented by a broader con-

struction of the statute (App. 78a).

4. Onrehearing en banc, a majority of the court of ap-

peals reversed (App. la-7la). The court held that the

district court had improperly instructed the jury on the

standard for proving involuntary servitude and remanded

for a new trial. According to the majority, a holding to in-

voluntary servitude occurs only when (id. at 12a):

(a) the servant believes that he or she has no viable

alternative but to perform service for the master (b)

because of (1) the master’s use or threatened use of

physical force, or (2) the master’s use or threatened

use of state-imposed legal coercion (i.e. , peonage), or

(3) the master’s use of fraud or deceit to obtain or

7

-maintain services where the servant is a minor, an im-

migrant or one who is mentally incompetent.

According to the majority, the district court’s charge was

too broad because it “would appear to criminalize general

psychological coercion without fraud, deceit, force or

legal coercion and would include all individuals within the

covered class of victims subject to psychological coercion,

not just the particularly vulnerable classes” (id. at 14a).

Finding sufficient evidence from which a jury could con-

clude that the victims were mentally incompetent and that

the defendants practiced fraud and deceit in maintaining

their services, the court remanded for a new trial on that

limited ground (id. at 14a-15a).?

Five judges dissented (App. 50a-68a), concluding that

the majority had constructed “an arbitrary definition [of

involuntary servitude] that raises more questions than it

answers” (id. at Sila). The dissent emphasized that the

definition “not only unduly focuses on the means of ac-

complishing involuntary servitude, but also, at least as to

its third prong, would define and /imit the classes of per-

sons to whom it applies” (ibid. (emphasis in original)). Ac-

cording to the dissent, involuntary servitude occurs

whenever “ ‘the subjugation of the will of the servant is so

complete as to render him incapable of making a rational

choice’ ” (id. at 52a (quoting United States v. Shackney,

333 F.2d 475, 488 (2d Cir. 1964) (Dimock, J., concurring))

and the master intends that result (App. 52a).’

? The majority also held that the district court erred in admitting ex-

pert psychological testimony that the defendants had broken Fuimer

and Molitoris of their will to leave by involuntarily converting them

(App. 15a-17a). The majority concluded that for expert testimony to

be admissible, it must conform to a generally accepted explanatory

theory and that the testimony on involuntary conversion did not

satisfy that requirement (/bid.).

’ The dissent concluded that the district court acted within its

discretion in admitting the government’s expert testimony on involun-

tary conversion (App. 53a-68a). According to the dissent, a district

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision of the court of appeals misconstrues the

terms of 18 U.S.C. 1584 and the Thirteenth Amendment‘

to limit the scope of their respective prohibitions of “in-

voluntary servitude.” According to the court of appeals, a

person is held to involuntary servitude, within the meaning

of those prohibitions, only when the person’s service is

compelled by physical or legal coercion, unless he is a

minor, immigrant, or mental incompetent, in which case

service compelled by fraud or deceit is also barred. These

arbitrary limitations find no support in the text of either

provision and frustrate the clear intent of Congress and of

the Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit in-

voluntary servitude wherever it is imposed. The decision

also aggravates a split in the circuits on a matter which, for

historical and practical enforcement reasons, demands na-

tional uniformity. Accordingly, this Court’s review is

clearly warranted.

court has discretion to admit expert psychological testimony

regardless of whether it conforms to a generally accepted explanatory

theory (id. at $4a-$9a). The dissent also pointed out that other courts

of appeals have rejected the standard used by the majority (see id. at

58a-59a n.5). Finally, the dissent concluded that, in any event, the

district court was justified in finding that the expert testimony con-

formed to a generally accepted theory (id. at 60a-66a).

* The jury instruction regarding the meaning of “involuntary ser-

vitude” that the court of appeals overturned related both to

respondents’ Section 1584 conviction and their Section 241 conviction

for conspiring to deprive Fulmer and Molitoris of their Thirteenth

Amendment rights (see page 5, supra). As noted by the court of ap-

peals (App. 2a n.3), the parties agreed that the statutory and constitu-

tional definitions of “involuntary servitude” were identical.

* Although the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new

trial on two grounds — its ruling that the jury instructions too broadly

detined involuntary servitude and its ruling that certain government

expert testimony was improperly admitted (see note 2, supra) —we

have confined our petition to the involuntary servitude issue, which

9

1. The courts of appeals are in conflict on the precise

issue presented in this case. To date, three circuits have

directly addressed the issue whether involuntary servitude

is limited to certain methods of compulsion or to certain

classes of victims. Each has construed Section 1584 dif-

ferently. The resulting confusion in the lower courts war-

rants this Court’s review. se

Unlike the Sixth Circuit in this case, the Ninth Circuit in

United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, cert. denied, 469

U.S. 855 (1984), * rejected an arbitrary construction of the

scope of Section 1584 and of the Thirteenth Amendment.

The Ninth Circuit held that “[cjonduct other than the use,

or threatened use, of law or physical force may, under

some circumstances, have the same effect as the more

we believe is the more pressing issue for this Court's review. Hence, we

do not challenge here the court of appeals’ determination that a new

trial is warranted. This Court's review is nonetheless appropriate

because absent reversal of the court of appeals’ construction of in-

voluntary servitude, we will be forced to retry respondents based on

an (incorrect) legal theory, under which highly relevant evidence will

be inadmissible and acquittal therefore will be more likely. Should the

jury acquit respondents on remand, moreover, we would not then be

able to seek review of that result. Indeed, absent review now by this

Court, we will be precluded in the future from maintaining Section

1584 prosecutions in the Sixth Circuit that, like this case, depend on

coercive means outside of the Circuit’s reading of the statute. And, in

light of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the government would be un-

likely ever to have the opportunity to seek appellate review of this

issue in the Sixth Circuit.

* We opposed certiorari in Mussry on the ground that the case was

then in an interlocutory posture and petitioners were, following the

court of appeals decision, in precisely the same position they would

have occupied had the district court denied their motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, we did not address the merits of the petition. See Memo.

in Opp. at 3-4 & n.4, Singman v. United States, No. 84-91. Of course,

while this case is also in an interlocutory posture, review now is ap-

propriate because the government would not be equally free to seek

further review after remand (see note 5, supra).

10

traditional forms of coercion — or may even be more coer-

cive” (726 F.2d at 1453). According to the Ninth Circuit,

the “crucial factor” is not the precise character of the

means of coercion, but “whether a person intends to and

does coerce an individual into his service by subjugating

the will of the other person” (ibid.). The court thus con-

cluded, consistent with the jury instructions struck down

by the Sixth Circuit in this case, that “{a] holding in in-

voluntary servitude occurs when an individual coerces

another into his service by improper or wrongful conduct

that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other person

to believe that he or she has no alternative but to perform

the labor” (ibid.). The court specifically rejected (id. at

1454-1455) the claim, accepted by the Sixth Circuit in this

case, that Section 1584 would be void for vagueness under

the Due Process Clause if construed to extend beyond

physical or legal coercion.

The decision of the Sixth Circuit in this case is also in-

consistent with the decision of the Second Circuit in

United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (1964). Both the

Ninth and Sixth Circuits read Shackney as holding that in-

voluntary servitude, within the meaning of Section 1584, is

confined to circumstances where the defendant has sub-

jugated the will of another through physical or legal coer-

cion. See App. 6a; Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1452. Neither the

Sixth Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit agrees with that stand-

ard.’

* In dictum, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have both suggested

their agreement with the Ninth Circuit standard or at least their

disagreement with the standard now adopted by the Sixth Circuit. See

United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167 (Sth Cir. 1977) (“the law

takes fio account of the means of coercion”), cert. denied, 435 U.S.

1007 (1978); United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 833-834 (11th Cir.

1985) (“[vJarious forms of coercion may constitute a holding in in-

voluntary servitude”).

2. The Thirteenth Amendment proclaims that “in-

voluntary servitude *** shall [not] exist within the

United States.” Section 1584 expresses Congress's commit-

ment to that principle by making it unlawful to “knowing-

ly and willfully hold{} to involuntary servitude * * * any

other person for any term.” In each, the commitment to

the elimination of involuntary servitude is unqualified.

Except for the obvious exclusion of criminal punishment,

there are no words of limitation. Involuntary servitude is

condemned, in all circumstances and irrespective of the

precise manner by which it is brought about.

The district court in this case accordingly instructed the

jury that to find the respondents guilty of violating Section

1584 and Section 241 (for conspiring to violate the Thir-

teenth Amendment rights of another) it must find that the

defendants possessed the requisite specific intent and that

“there was a means of compulsion used, sufficient in kind

and degree, to subject a person having the same general

station in life as the alleged victims to believe they had no

reasonable means of escape and no choice except to re-

main in the service of the employer” (App. 1 10a). Hence

the court did not instruct the jury that it could consider

only “means of compulsion” of a specified character, such

as physical or legal coercion. Nor did the court instruct the

jury that only certain classes of individuals were suscepti-

ble to some kinds of coercive measures. The court instead

defined “means of compulsion” in terms of the human

condition the law was designed to condemn — involuntary

servitude —thereby allowing jury consideration of any

coercive means “sufficient in kind and degree” to produce

that forbidden result. The court instructed the jury con-

cerning the difference between coercive means and the em-

ployer’s “use [of] legitimate means to retain the services of

an emp[ljoyee, such as offering the employee benefits, or

seeking to convince the employee that he would be better

12

off if he continued in his employment” (ibid.), and made

clear that the latter falls outside the scope of Section 1584

(App. 110a).

The court of appeals reversed respondents’ convictions

on the erroneous ground that the jury instructions

overstated the scope of Section 1584 (and thereby of the

Thirteenth Amendment). The court did not dispute the

district court’s formulation of the requisite state of mind

in the victim, agreeing that “involuntary servitude” re-

quires a showing that “the servant believes that he or she

has no viable alternative but to perform service for the

master” (App. 12a), and that there was sufficient evidence

for the jury to conclude in this case “that the victims

believed that they had no viable alternative but to perform

the labor in question” (id. at 15a). The court nonetheless

held that even if one were (as in this case) to establish that

a defendant intentionally and successfully sought to create

that subjugated state of mind in the victim, Section 1584

would still be violated only if it could be further estab-

lished that the state of mind was caused exclusively by

physical or legal coercion, or, if the victim is a minor, im-

migrant, or mental incompetent, by fraud and deceit.

These restrictions have no basis in the relevant statutory

and constitutional language. Both the Thirteenth Amend-

ment and Section 1584 condemn the intentional creation

of a result: involuntary servitude. Neither prescribes the

means by which that result is achieved or distinguishes be-

tween different types of individuals, based on their

membership in certain formal legal categories, such as

minors, immigrants, and mental incompetents. Nor is

there any reason to suppose that involuntary servitude

results only from certain coercive means or occurs only to

certain classes of persons in the context of Section 1584

and the Thirteenth Amendment. Just as involuntariness

may be established in a variety of different ways in other

more familiar legal contexts, ranging from contract

13

and tort law to criminal procedure, so too may it be shown

in establishing involuntary servitude.

The court of appeals’ decision itself provides little, if

any, support for its restrictive gloss on Section 1584. The

court readily acknowledges that one of Section 1584’s

parent statuies “was designed to reach a broader class of

exploitation than was previously covered by laws dealing

with slavery, involuntary servitude and peonage” (App.

10a), and that Section 1584 was itself a deliberate expan-

sion upon all prior laws (App. 9a & n.5). The court never

explains the basis for its conclusion that Section 1584 is,

except for certain “legally incapable” persons, limited to

“physical or legal coercion.” Nor does the court’s support

for the exception justify its narrow scope.

We do not doubt that Congress has the authority to im-

pose limitations on the scope of Section 1584 that are com-

parable or even identical to those fashioned by the court of

appeals in this case. Congress, however, has not enacted

these limitations and, while the scope of Section 1584 may

be less precise as a result, a judicial preference for greater

precision neither substitutes for congressional intent nor

excuses judicial legislation.

3. The issue presented in this case is important to the

United States. The court of appeals’ decision will impede

our ability to maintain successful prosecutions under Sec-

tions 1584 and 241 (for conspiring to violate the Thir-

teenth Amendment) in many meritorious circumstances.

For instance, where, as in this case, the defendant used

some limited physical force in combination with other

means of coercion—such as isolating the victim,

withholding wages, denying needed medical assistance,

and verbally abusing the victim —the Sixth Circuit stand-

ard would preclude any reliance on those other means of

coercion.* Even introduction of evidence of a defendant’s

* Such coercive techniques were utilized by respondents in this case

for the specific purpose of compelling service by Fulmer and Molitoris

14

fraudulent and deceitful activities would be allowed only

in a narrow class of cases, which may not include the pres-

ent case.? Most of our Section 1584 prosecutions depend,

as does this case, on a combination of coercive measures

(see note 8, supra).

Perhaps even more important, an individual’s entitle-

ment to protection from involuntary servitude currently

depends on the jurisdiction in which he happens to reside.

Circumstances that would constitute involuntary servitude

in the Ninth Circuit would not similarly be considered in-

voluntary servitude in the Sixth Circuit and might not be

so considered in the Second Circuit. The Thirteenth

Amendment, particularly in light of its historical context,

expresses a national commitment. For this additional

reason, this Court’s resolution of the current conflict in

the courts of appeals is warranted.

(see pages 3-5, supra) and these and comparable techniques have been

utilized in other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d at

830, 832 (placing victim in unfamiliar setting; verbal abuse; inducing

alcohol dependency), United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 564 (4th

Cir. 1981) (verbal abuse; withholding wages); United States v. Harris,

701 F.2d 1095, 1098 (4th Cir.) (denying medical assistance), cert.

denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983).

* The court of appeals remanded for a new trial only after con-

cluding that “there [was] evidence from which a jury could conclude

(1) that the victims believed that they had no viable alternative but to

perform the labor in question, and (2) that the victims were mentally

incompetent and the defendants practiced fraud and deceit in main-

taining the victims’ service” (App. 15a). Thus, the court of appeals ap-

parently held that the presence of some physical abuse did not justify

the admission of evidence of nonphysical coercion unless the victims

fell within its third category. Nor is there any guarantee that on re-

mand the jury (or judge) will conclude that the victims in this case

were “mentally incompetent” and, hence, evidence of respondents’

fraud and deceit may ultimately be deemed inadmissible; indeed, we

note that the district court ruled that the victims were “competent” to

testify.

15

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS

Assistant Attorney General

DONALD B. AYER |

Deputy Solicitor General

ROGER CLEGG

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

RICHARD J. LAZARUS

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER

IRVING L. GORNSTEIN

Altorneys

JUNE 1987

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1986— 161 463/40380

APPENDIX

In the Supreme Court of the

OctToser Term, 1986

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

Vv.

lke® KOZMINSKI, ET AL.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS

Assistant Attorney General

DONALD B. AYER

Deputy Solicitor General

ROOCER B. CLEGG

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

RICHARD J. LAZARUS

Assistant to the Solicitor General

Jessica DUNSAY SIL VER

IRVING L. GORNSTEIN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A (court of appeals’ opinion dated 4/16/87) . la

Appendix B (court of appeals’ opinion dated 8/23/85). la

Appendix C (court of appeals’ judgment dated 4/16/87) 07a

Appendix D (relevant jury instructions).............. 108a

Appendix E (relevant constitutional and statutory pro-

St tscadtdseodeebeesdeedoksonteddeesndeboes 11Sa

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 84-1288

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

IkE KOZMINSKI, MARGARETHE KOZMINSKI,

AND JOHN KOZMINSKI, DEFENDANT-APPELL ANTS

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Michigan

DECIDED AND FILED APRIL 16, 1987

Before: LIVELY, Chief Judge; ENGEL, KEITH,

MERRITT, KENNEDY, MARTIN, JONES, CONTIE*,

KRUPANSKY, WELLFORD, MILBURN, GUY, and

NELSON, Circuit Judges.

MERRITT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which

ENGEL, CONTIE, MILBURN and NELSON, JJ., joined.

KENNEDY, J. (pp. 18-19), WELLFORD, J. (p. 20), and

KRUPANSKY, J. (pp. 21-49) delivered separate concurring

opinions. KEITH, J. (p. 50) delivered a separate dissenting

* Honorable Leroy J. Contie became Senior Circun Judge July 1,

1YR6.

(la)

2a

opinion. GUY, J. (pp. 51-68) also delivered a separate dis-

—- —_— jomed by LIVELY, CJ., MARTIN and

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted the defen-

dants, a dairy farmer and his wife, of two federal crimes: (1)

“willfully holding to involuntary servitude” two retarded

farm workers,’ and (2) conspiring to deprive the workers of

their constitutional right to be free from “involuntary

servitude” as guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment?

Their son was also convicted on the conspiracy charge. On

appeal the defendants contend that the court below erred in

broadly defining “imvoluntary servitude” to include purely

psychological coercion in addition to slavery, peonage, serf-

dom and other forms of physical or legal coercion.’ They also

‘Section 1584, Title 18, punishes as a felony: “

. . y: “Whoever k

pry tee holds to mvoluatary servitude or sells nto any condition

voluntary tude, an term, brings

a the United States pm fn yds og ai

section 241, Title 18, states the conspiracy offense as follows: ~

two OF More Persons conspire Lo injure, Oppress, panne ae A

any citizen in the free exercise of enjoyment of any right or privilege

secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States...”

The Thirteenth Amendment reads: “Section |. Neither

involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime —_

party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United

of any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2.

= Snes shall have power to enforce this article by appro-

*The inal court instructed the .

. jury to incorporate the

- ey servitude from § 1584 into § 241 which aeanon

hirteenth Amendment. The parties do not challenge the process of

—_ the statutory definition into the constitutional defini-

ton, al the Kozmuinshis argue that the § 1584 definition which

was incorporated was incorrect. For the reasons stated below. we agree

that the § 1584 standard was incorrect, and it should not have been

applied im esther conteat. We do not reach the Question of whether

i was proper for the inal court to use the same standard for § 241

and § 1584 since this issue was not raised by the partes.

3a

argue that the court below erred in admutting expert psycho-

logical testimony tending to show that the two victims were

held in servitude through “involuntary conversion” or

“brainwashing.” After reconsidering the legislative develop-

ment and purpose of the two nineteenth century criminal

statutes in question, we agree with the defendants that the

court below erred in defining involuntary servitude too

broadly, and we agree that the psychological testimony

should not have been admitted.

The government does not contend that the two men were

forcibly held to work on the farm. In its en banc brief, the

governnment concedes that the men were “free to leave,”

“came back on their own accord” but “believed they had no

place else to go.” Brief for Appellee at 15. Nevertheless the

government contends that the defendants’ efforts to isolate

the men from contact with the outside world through a pat-

tern of verbal and physical abuse, as well as harsh living and

working conditions, exerted a form of extreme psychological

coercion upon the men given their low intelligence. Accord-

ing to the government's theory of the case, this coercive con-

duct, referred to as “involuntary conversion” or “brain-

washing,” is sufficient to constitute “involuntary servitude.”

The servants, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris, lived

and worked on the Kozminski dairy farm for more than ten

years as general farm laborers. They brought in the cows for

milking twice a day, cleaned up the barn during milking,

repaired and cleaned farm equipment, hauled teed for the

cows and did other farm chores. Dr. Harley Stock, a clinical

psychologist, found that Fulmer’s 1.Q. ts 67 and Molitoris’

is 60. ,

Robert Fulmer lived in foster homes until he was eleven

years old. He then entered a training school for boys where

he learned to do general farm work. In the 1950's and 60's,

he worked as a farm hand on various farms. One evening

da

in 1967, Ike and Margarethe Kozminski and their son,

Michael, picked up Fulmer on a road near the farm where

he was working. Fulmer agreed to work for them in exchange

for food and a place to live. Fulmer worked on the Kozmin-

ski's dairy farm in Stockbridge, Michigan until 1968 when

he moved to the Kozminski’s farm in Chelsea, Michigan.

_ The other farm worker, Louis Molitoris, had been institu-

tionalized at the Ypsilanti State Hospital and had been a

_ groundskeeper al a cemetery in Ann Arbor, Michigan prior

to coming to the Kozminski's farm. In the early 1970's Moli-

toris was unemployed and lived on the streets of Ann Arbor.

During the winter, Ike Kozminski, who also ran a barber

shop, occasionally allowed Molitoris to come into his shop

to get warm and to sleep. Ike Kozminski thereafter offered

to give Molitoris a place to stay, food and cigarettes if he

would work on the Kozminski dairy farm. Molitoris agreed.

The government offered testimony about the condition

Fulmer and Molitoris’ life on the fm iachadinn thale Geton

quarters, their physical treatment, their isolation on the farm

and how the Kozminsk:'s held them out to the community.

Several witnesses testified that the men lived in squalor. The

trailer they occupred was hithy having no running water, a

broken refrigerator and maggot-infested food. Nevertheless

the men apparently had working bathroom facilities nearby.

Moreover, Fulmer and Molitoris were responsible for clean-

ing their own quarters. Mrs. Kozminski cooked meals for Ful-

mer when he lived at the Stockbridge farm until he told her

he wanted to cook for himself. Thereafter, the Kozminskis

provided Fulmer and later Molitoris with groceries.

The testimony about the men’s physical treatment includes

neighbors’, tenants’ and co-workers’ descriptions of the men

being slapped, choked and kicked on several occasions. John

and Margarethe Kozminsh: denied striking the men. Ike Koz-

minski testified that he kicked Fulmer for hitting a cow with

a crowbar and he threw a pail at him for not repairing a leak

Sa

ike also testified that he hit Molitoris “as hard as | could,”

after Molitoris hit him while they were loading pigs.

The men often drove a tractor on the road. Several wit-

nesses also testified that they had seen the men in town or

in other locations away from the farm. On occasion they left

the farm to visit family members or friends. They sometimes

“sneaked away” from the farm. They “hid” with neighbors.

Two witnesses testified that tke, Margarethe and John Koz-

minski brought the men back to the farm and discouraged

them from leaving. Four witnesses testihed that the men

asked them to remove them from the farm.

The government contends that the Kozminskis tried to 1so-

late the men from their families and the outside world. The

Kozminskis told visitors on the farm to ignore Fulmer and

Molitoris and the men were told not to speak to visitors. Mar-

garethe Kozminski pulled a telephone off the wail in the barn

when Fulmer used it to call a neighbor. Shortly after Molitoris

moved to the farm, Ike and Margarethe apparently ordered

him to burn the trunk which contained his belongings, includ-

ing family pictures, allegedly because they contained cock-

roaches. Ike Kozminski told Fulmer his brothers and sister

did not care about him. Margarethe discouraged Fulmer’s

sister and brother from visiting him. She also discouraged

Molitoris’ sister from calling him.

Witnesses testihed that the Kozminskis told neighbors and

visitors to the farm the men were in their custody and were

wards of the state, although Mrs. Kozminski denied these

allegations. Both she and Ike Kozminski testified that at one

tume they had a farm hand who was a ward of the state.

The court below gave a general charge on involuntary servi-

tude. Under its instructions, the jury could convict the defen-

dants of holding the workers to involuntary servitude through

psychological as well as physical coercion. It did not set out

a specific theory of involuntary servitude or confine the jury's

deliberations to a particular definition of the crime. Instead,

6a

it left the definition of “involuntary servitude” up to the jury

under a general charge. This Court granted en banc review

vacating the judgment of a three-judge panel of the Court,

Judge Krupansky, dissenting, which had affirmed the convic-

tions and judgments of the court below with respect to each

i

The Courts of Appeals are squarely in conflict in their inter-

pretation of the words of § 1584, “whoever knowingly and

willfully holds [another] to involuntary servitude.” The two

polar cases are United Siates v. Shackney, 333 F.24 475 (24

Cur. 1964) Friendly, J.), and United States v Mussry, 726 F.2d

1448 (9h Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984) (Reinhardt,

J). in Shackney, the Second Circuit gave “involuntary

servitude” a narrow construction. The court effectively lim-

ited the concept to slavery and peonage: the use or threat

of physical punishment to enforce work, and the use of

state-imposed legal coercion to make a debtor work for his

creditor. .

The Ninth Circuit, like the trial court below and the panel

decision of our Count, adopis a more expansive interpreta-

tion that includes the use of purely psychological coercion

The Ninth Circuit opinion, like the jury instruction of the

court below, leaves the precise nature of the crime to the jury

under a general charge; “The crucial factor is whether a per-

son intends to and does coerce an individual into his service

by subjugating the will... .” 726 F.2d at 1453. Although the

Second and the Ninth Circuits differ on whether

cal coercion can cause “involuntary” servitude within the

meaning of the statute, both courts agree that the coercion

—physical, legal or psychological—must produce in the vic-

tum the same basic state of mind. The coercion must cause

6 9aen ae that he has “no alternative,” Afussry,

24 at 1453, or “no id” |

590 Obs ane way to avoid” the labor. Shackney.

7a

The difficulty of the statutory construction question pres-

ented and the lack of agreement among the Circuits have

prompted us to reread and reconsider the unusual legislative

development and history of § 1584. The history of the statute

begins in 1807 when Congress passed a statute prohibiting

the slave trade, and it ends in 1948 when Congress, while

codsfying the criminal laws into Title 18, combined the slave

trade and involuntary servitude statutes into the present lan-

guage of § 1584. (The text of these statutes and their historical

development 1s summarized in a chart attached herelo as an

Appendix )

The words, “hold to involuntary servitude” as used in

§ 1584, emanate directly from an 1874 statute designed to

outlaw the so-called “Pudrone” system of importing, selling

and explouing the labor of Italian children in the United

States. The 1874 Pudrone statute punished “whoever shall

knowingly and wilfully bring into the United States any

person inveigled or. kidnapped. . .with intent to hold. . to

any involuntary service,” of “cause to be sold, into any condi-

tion of involuntary servitude, any other person.” The 1874

statute goes on to say that “every person who shall knowingly

and wilfully hold to imvoluntary service any [such] per-

son. . shall be deemed guilty of a felony... .” The original

statute 1s narrower than the presenti § 1584 because the old

statute requires that the victim be “imported” or “sold” prior

to the servitude, whereas § 1584 eliminates the requirement

of umportation or sale prior to the holding of involuntary ser-

vilude.

The metamorphosis of the Paudrone statute into its present

form took place in two stages. The 1909 general revision of

the criminal law altered the language of the old statute slightly

but continued the requirement of importation or sale At the

tume of this revision, Congress beheved that the broad lan-

guage of the 1874 statute should be retained because the

Padrone system and other similar forms of exploitation stil

flourished This sentiment ts vividly ilustrated by Senator

Sa

Henry Cabot Lodge's remarks during debate on the 1909

revision.

ligated the qucstion of the importation of Mahan

boys into this country. . . | happen to be one of those

who made investigation into what was known as the

padrone system. The padrones were men in New

the fact that it is a crime, does not seem to me to

make it desirable, therefore, 10 do away with all the

Statutes which were designed to punish the crime

and which make a crime

The declaration of the thirteenth amendment tw the

Constitution is not of itself sufficient. so 1 think that

saniues of sumilar mature on the statute bouks of the

Unued States should remain in order to prevent

crimes of that character, whether they occur among

the Chinese immigrants or whether among the padro-

nes who exist in New York and in some of our other

large cies

42 Cong Rec. 1122 (1908) (statement of Sen Lodge) (empha-

+13 supplied)

Senator Heyburn, the chicl proponent of the penal law revi-

son, also argued for the reenactment of the P*

Ya

wn order to protect classes of individuals who “can not protect

themselves”.

[T)hes criminal statute 1s intended only to enable

the law to reach those who come here without being

a party to ther coming here or without being a party

to the disposition of their services or the control of

thear rights, whether they be children of wresponsible

; years and conditions or whether they be people who.

because of thew environment or the conditions of

thew lives. can not protect themselves.

42 Cong. Rec. 1115 (1908) (statement of Sen. Heyburn) (em-

pha.ts supplied)

| .

None of the cases listed above, which attempt to define

of give content to a standard of involuntary servitude under

§ 1584, rely on the legislative purpose of the | Padrone a”

statute or its judicial interpretation. Judge Friendly in

ment which had been a 2

statutes: 1584 hestorcal and revision Hotes Other

saan changes cnamerated wn the revision notes, the 1948 recodifice

S Rep No. 1620. eiuh Cong. 2d Sess 1 (1948 The origunal intent

of Congress preserved “)

Specihcally, the legssiative history surrounding the Padrone

Statule suggests that i was designed to reach a broader class

of exploitation than was previously covered by laws dealing

laws clearly covered circumstances involving the use or

threatened use of law or physical force to constitute a

“holding im involuntary servitude ” The Padrune statute was

aimed at a form of exploitation that was more subtle securing

the services of an individual who 1s incapable of giving legally

vahd consent.

Judge Blatchford, writing two years prior to his elevation

to the Supreme Court, slustrated this purpose of the Pudrone

statute in United Siates » Ancarola, | F.676(C CS DN Y.

1880) In affirming Ancarola’s conviction for violating the

Padrone statute, Judge Blatchford addressed the propnety of

the trial Court's yury charge which had instructed that the age

als, subject to his control, could not properly be con-

sidered as rendering him voluntary service. They

were incapable of exercising will or chowe afhrma-

lively on the subject. They were cast off by their par-

ents, in violation of the law of Maly, and thei being

in this country at all with the defendant was, on all

the facts, really involuntary on their paris, although

the sham form of thei consent was gone through

with.

Ancarola, | F. at 683.

lla

As discussed above, Judge Friendly docs not focus on the

Padrone statute and the interpretation thereof The Shachney

standard thus fails to address the full range of conduct pro

scribed by § 1584 such as that held criminal in Ancarola. tn

establishing our standard, we have attempted to give effect

to the 1874 statute im a way that is consistent with the princ:-

ple of narrow construction of criminal statutes Accordingly.

the standard we adopt modihes the Shackney standard to

include the type of servitude outlawed im the 1874 statute

as interpreted im the Ancarola case.

We conclude that a “holding to involuntary servitude”

occurs when (a) the servant believes that he of she has no

viable alternative but to perform service for tie master (b)

because of (1) the master's use or threatened us of physical

force, or (2) the master's use or threatened wie of state-

imposed legal coercion (i ¢. peonage’), or (3) the master's

use of fraud of decent to obtain of maintain services where

the servant 6 @ menor, an UMMigsant oF ONE who 1s Mentally

tacompetent ta cases im the last Category, it must be shown

that the servant is under a disability to recognize of resist

the master’s fraud os deceit because of the servant's vulnera-

belity as a member of one of these classes In order to be found

guilly under the statute, the masier musi intentionally hold

ac. of ding to 8 CONditIOg, then you will be banding

thas ho tecanded on bah nosh abe oo —

Darged om the indictment aod this

tnarcla | F at 682 (emphasu supplied)

"See eg. Pollock +. Williams, 322 US 4 (1944), Basley » Alabama

2190 S 21900901) 1X A Bickel & B Sched. History of the Supreme

( wrt of the Unued Sraser. The

1910-21 620-907 (1984)

7

|

|

peonage vulnerable

and 1s designed to protect extremely

Soa ed individuats covered Gy ts 1874 Padrone statute,

classes similar to those who lack the capacity to contract at

common law

deeds ~ Unued

( nued

Cul con demoed 43 US 1214 u“h

aoe iat cher. 655 F 2d 562, $67 (4th Ce 196i The Cwcen

requires “such fear of physical harm that the eataid ten,

of the victum’s opportwamies for ” Unuaed States

F .

I4a

Heyburn's statement quoted above that the sla

were intended to protect “childeen of irresponsible sears ans

The Dastrict Cowrt did not limit the masters or the servants

We reverse and remand the case for

mew tral for these

sons. After a careful review of the evidence, we conclude tha

15a

we should not order a judgment of acquittal, as the defen-

dants contend, because there is evidence from which a jury

could conclude (1) that the victims believed tha: they had

no viable alternative but to perform the labor in question,

and (2) that the victims were mentally incompetent and the

defendants practiced fraud and deceit in maintaining the vic-

tums’ services.

The Kozminskis also contest the admissibility of the expert

psychological testimony presented at tnal by Dr. Harley

Stock. Dr. Stock testified that given the victims’ low mental-

ity, the psychological pressures exerted upon them created

an “involuntary conversion” to complete depe: lency akin

lo “captivity syndrome,” a psychological phenomenon aris-

ing from prolonged physical captivity. This testimony was

offered to show that Fulmer and Molitoris were the victims

of psychological coercion and had been “brainwashed” into

serving the Kozminskis. This evidence ts inadmissible

because a foundation was not laid to establish its conformity

to a generally accepted explanatory theory.

The admissibility of expert testimony ts governed by Rule

702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-

edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-

ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in

the form of an opimion or otherwise.

For expert testimony to be admissible under Rule 702, a four-

part test must be met: (1) a qualihed expert, (2) testifying

on a proper subject, (3) in conformity to a generally accepted

explanatory theory, (4) the probative value of which out-

weighs any prejudicial effect. United States v Green, $48 F.2d

1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977) (emphasis supplied), United States

l6a

v Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 469

U.S. 868 (1984). The elements of this four part test under

Green constitute preliminary questions for purposes of Rule

104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As such, the trial

judge must find that the expert and the proposed testimony

meet the Green criteria prior to admitting the testimony: this

is NOt a jury question. See Fed. R. Evid. 104 advisory com-

mittee’s note; 11 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal

Practice, § 702.10{3} (2d ed. 1985)."*

It does not appear that a proper foundation was laid under

the third element of the Green test. The criticisms voiced by

Drs. Emanuel Tenay and Robert Walsh suggest that Dr.

Stock’s “involuntary conversion” theory is not scientifically-

recognized. Dr. Tenay stated that he had never heard of Dr.

Stock's “involuntary conversion” theory prior to trial. Dr.

Tenay went on to note that the phenomenon of “ideological

conversion” which is associated with captivity syndrome

would have “no application” to the present situation, and

that it would be “ridiculous” to attempt to apply it. Dr. Walsh

testihed that he considered involuntary conversion to be

equivalent to brainwashing and opined that Dr. Stock’s diag-

nosis “exceeded sound professional practice.”

Dr. Stock attempted to establish his theory by incorporat-

ing the well-established “captivity syndrome.” Although cap-

tivity syndrome is a generally accepted explanatory theory,

it has no application to this case. Drs. Tenay and Stock both

agreed that “captivity syndrome” has ten necessary elements:

(1) Prolonged captivity; (2) continuous around the

Clock supervision, such as guarding: (3) an isolated

environment; (4) removal of all supports; (5) an

attack on personality; (6) a lack of privacy; (7) as-

"The argument that United States y Green should be overruled 1s

made for the first time in Judge Guy's en banc dissent, and the coun

has not considered or voted on this issue

17a

hu the total personality, (8) a systematic use

we and punishment; (9) a tearing of the fab-

ric of the personality, and (10) the building up of

a new personality.

minski's dairy farm are alleged to be, they fall short of those

found in a Chinese prison camp. Accordingly, captivity ~¢"

drome is inapplicable as a matter of law given the facts

this case. Therefore, a proper foundation was not laid . ;

Stock’s testimony under the third element of the Gree

standard and it should have been excluded.

Ne 4

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court ts reverse

and the case remanded for a new trial under the standards

enunciated herein.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge, concurring. | concur generally

in Judge Merritt's opinion. However, because he adopts a

totally subjective standard of involuntariness, | think there

needs to be some mention of the relationship of the standard

to the intent of the defendants. Psychological coercion which

can be established only through testimony of expert witnesses

presents a significant problem with respect to a defendant's

intent and knowledge. Can a master be guilty of holding

someone in involuntary servitude where the master, a lay per-

son, doesn’t know that the servant remains involuntarily? If

expert testimony is necessary for the jury to find the servitude

involuntary, it would seem that a defendant also needs that

expert knowledge.

Where the master uses force or the threat of force or state-

imposed legal coercion to require the servant to remain, the

intent to hold the servant in involuntary servitude is appar-

ent. Here evidence that the master treated the servants cruelly

and provided deplorable living conditions was relevant to

establishing involuntariness only because of the clinical psy-

chologist’s testimony that such treatment, alternated with

kind treatment, such as providing a nice Sunday dinner,

made the servants dependent and unable to leave. Conduct

which had such effect, but without evidence that the master

knew or should have known of that effect, does not tend to

prove intent. In the case of psychological coercion, the jury

should be required to find that the defendant knew his con-

duct would cause the victim to remain involuntarily. The

master does not hold the servant to involuntary servitude

unless the master knows that the servant serves involuntarily.

I agree that the case should be remanded for a new trial

because of defendants’ acts which made it less likely that oth-

ers would help Fulmer and Molitoris to leave the farm, the

jury could find these acts were intended to keep them there

and that the victims were incapable of acting on their own

initiative. Representation by the Kozminskis that Fulmer

and Molitoris were wards of the court, acts which tsolated

19a

ictims from their families and the community, and tell-

ng the victims that they had no place to go or would have

to return 10 an institution, could be found to be fraud or

deceit which prevented Fulmer and Molitons from leaving

the farm and prevented others in the community from assist-

ing them to do so, when they were incapable of acting on

their own.

of case in Unised Stases v. Shackney333 F 24 47 -

a ee

United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9h Cir), cert. denied

is Set out in United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165. 1168

Cir. 1977), which sequices proof of physic. | harm or rene

able fear of harm and coercion imposed ty a defendant on

4 victim before @ prosecution may be sustained:

\A] defendant is guilty of holding a person to invol-

unary servitude if the defendant has placed him in

such fear of physical harm that the victim is afraid

to leave regardless of the victim's opportunities for

1 would therefore reverse and remand in this case

2la

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge, concurring | concur m

Judge Merritt's well-reasoned opimon and the decision of the

majority to reverse the judgment of the inal court and its

order to remand this case for further action not inconsisicnt

with the judgment of the majority of the en banc court

| write separately merely to observe that Dr. Stock, speak-

ing through the record, takes exception to the following

hypotheses upon which the logic of the dissent secks to evolve

us reasoning:

1. that his expert opinion testimony advancing the

novel concept of involuntary conversion and tts

relationship to mvoluntary servitude was not

anchored in the scientifically accepted theory of

captivity syadrome,

2. that hes novel concept was not a scientific explan-

atory theory of frst umpression but one that had

screntihc field to which it belonged,

3. that the transcript of the record does not conicst

his novel concept as scientific theones that had

gained general acceptance within the particular

screatinc held to which they belonged.

Dr. Stock insisted throughout his testimony, as demon-

strated by the record, that the scientifically recognized and

accepted theories of “captivity syndrome” and ~post-

traumatic stress disorder” were seminal to his concept of

“ynvoluntary conversion” as ut related to mvoluntary servi-

tude. The entire thrust of the government's evidence was

structured upon the keystone of his efforts to correlate his

conclusions with “captivity syndrome” and ~ post-traumatic

stress disorder” Hes mability to accomplish this calculated

result withen the mandates of cxarsting legal precedent gives

rise to thes order of reversal and remand to the trial court.

lt should be initially noted that the defendants were con-

victed of a Conspuracy to violate the nights of Fulmer and

22a

Motors to be free from involuntary servitude in violation

of 18 USC § 241 and of actually holding Fulmer and Moli-

tors to voluntary servitude and preventing them from leav-

slat tot da onitentainee

| of | |

As charges mandated proof of intent to commu

It was not the government's theory im presenting this case

that ether Fulmer or Molstors were restrained from leaving

the farm and the defendants’ employment by esther physical

force or threats of physical furce. Rather, u was the thrust

of the government's proof that both Fulmer and Molitors.

“sa result of an “involuntary conversion” became

“psychological hostages” and lost their “will” to leave the

farm and the service of the defendants

Dr Stock’s testemony was the only evidence that addressed

the very essence of the government's charges, and was, there-

fore, the sime qua non of the jury's verdict, without which

the conviction could not siand

An appropnate pot of departure for my chronology

+ dcnston of and purpose fot the rue that ete the San

dard to be apphed im considering the admussibulity of scicn-

the evidence im the form of experi testimony.

The rule is simply stated in United States » Brown, $57

F 2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977), and echoed in its progeny

within and without this circust im the following language

A necessary predicate to the admission of scientific

evidence 1s that the principle upon which it 1s based

must be sufhciently established to have gained gen-

eral acceptance im 4 particular ficld to which it

belongs,” Frye v United States, $4 App. D.C. 46, 293

F. 1013, 1014 (1923). In Unwed States » Franks

Sit F.2d 25, 33 w.12 (6th Cir, 1975), we equated

general acceptance in the scientific Community with

4 showing that the scientific principles and proce-

2a

dures on which the caper testimony 1s based are

rchable and suthciently accurate

The purpose for the rule 1s equally simple. It evolved to

avord the potential prejudicial umpact of “the aura of special

rehability and trustworthiness” which attaches to expert testi

mony admitied without proper foundation which may con-

fuse or musiead the wer of fact and thus defeat a defendant's

right to a fae tral,

Perhaps the purpose behind the rule 1s best articulated tn

Brown, $57 F.2d at $56, where this court admonished:

A courtroom 1s not a research laboratory The fate

of a defendant in a criminal prosecution should not

hang on his ability to successfully rebut screntihe

evidence which bears an “aura of special rehability

and trustworthiness,” although in reality the witness

1s testafyong on the basis of an unproved hypothesis

in an isolated caperiment which has yet to gam

mn ts held. See ¢ g. Untied States ¥ Ama-

ral 488 F 2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cur. 1973), Prove ¥

United States, 293 F. at 1014.

The permussible limits of expert testimony have been tradi-

tionally delegated to the sound discretion of the inal court

The scope of thes discretion has been broadly construcd, and

the tnal court's exercise of ts discretion 1s to be sustained

“yniess it is manifestly erroneous.” Brown, 557 F.2d at 556,

United States » Green, $48 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cw. 1977)

See also United States ¥ August, 745 F.2d 400, 407 (6th Cir.

1984) However. such discretion must be exercised, on an

ad hoc bases, by balancing the probative value of the evidence

against ots preyuduial effect upon the defendant's right to a

fa tial See Fed R Eved 403

I fully recognize and cadorse the proposition that absolute

certainty of result of unanimity of screatihc Opimion ts not

required for admissibility so bung as the conflicting testimony

d4a

concerning the concls sions drawn by the

on generally accepted ond telable scientiac pacisies

Having reviewed the rule that is decisive to the admissibul-

v Franks, S11 F-2d 25, 33 0.12 (6th Cir ,

US. 1042 (1975); United States ¥ Green $48 F.2d 1261 (oun

SS ae United States » Brown, $$7 F.2d $41 (6th Cir.

: anal Sees «. Sate 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir), cert

F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). — a

ea -

25a

the Kozmunshis resided in the vicinity of the farm where Ful-

mer and Molitorss lived and worked, they seldom visited the

farm more frequently than once a week Fulmer often com-

to provide Kozminshi with an insight into the problems

inherent to operation of the farm.

The lifestyles of both Fulmer and Molitons pror to coming

to the defendants’ farm reflected an unforwunate history of

Prior to working as a farm hand for the defendants, Molions,

who was 60 years of age, was a street person who got his food

where he found it, “had slept in cardboard boxes in the

winter” and in an old ice boa, and “drank homemade wine ~

Of greatest signihcance im addressing the opimon testi-

mony of Dr Stock within the content of this case are the con-

cessions of the parties that (a) neither Fulmer nor Molitoris

were ever physically confined of restrained, (b) they were at

all umes physically free to leave the farm at will, (c) they Anew

they were free to leave the farm, (a) they did un fact individually

and together leave the farm on numerous occasions, (ec) they

returned of their own accord or were picked up by the defen-

dants as a result of telephone calls from third parties," (f) they

associated freely with each other, with other farm hands

working the farm, and with newghbors on occasion, (g) they

remained at or returned to the defendants’ farm, in the words

of Fulmer, “because he had no place to go”

‘On occamons when Fulmer or Moltons were picked up as a result

of telephone calls trom third parties, there 1» 80 indication that they

were forcefully returned to the larm

48

and subsequently adopted by this circust im Green. S48

at 1268, and applied in Brown, $57 F 2d at United

States » Smith, 1% F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir), cert. denied

105 SCu. 213 (1984)

Brown, $537 Fld at $56.

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frecerved even greater

a , ier exposure amd acceptance than

Ht ts emteresting to mote at thes puncture thal an ——

of Dr. Stocks testimony discloses that whenever he resoried

to supporteng an opensoe of Comchusson by published research

oF peer endorsement, he referred, wuh experienced subtlety

not to bis theory of progression from “involuntary conver-

— “psychological hostage” to “involuntary

~ but rather to the conditions of “captivity

mre and “post-traumatic stress disorder,” both of

wethen the scremtih& Community to whech they belong.

Dr Stock’s damagong. if not fatal, admissions condemned

bes opinion testimony a5 « hypothecation that had not

——— ES

:

Q What « your hen af capereme wevetuntar

© epguard w m+ ubeaien, on servitude

A Theo

he test—thes © my Beet case of emvoluntary servi-

Q Se thes os the beet case that

cnen yow Nave dea with the so-called

of ehatever — merece vcr jouw ean ® phrase 1i— was

~~ ummedhete 20d 6Os nw)

ee

ee ae

le A a Al ata

ee ee ee

_*

29a

tice, confused the situation” and “ridiculous” and an

approval of the pronouncements in United States v. Sufel.

433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 US. 994

(1971), that “neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty

in a test suffices to render it inadmissible in court. Every new

development must have its first day in court.” The expression

in Stifel. however, must be tempered with the longstanding

teachings of Green, Brown, Brady, and Franks Certainly, the

application of Stifel would not apply to a theory of first

impression as testihed to by Dr. Stock.

A. No. I think the threat in this case was smmediate and obvi-

ous.

Q That 1s the conclusion you reached, isn't “?

A. That ss rmght

Q. But your testimony 1s you have never dealt with this type

of situation before, usn't that correct”

A. That's correct.

Q. You have never tested with regard to this situation

before’

A. Well, if I have never dealt with ut, I never could have testi-

hed betore

Q You have never been called upon to make 4 diagnosis oF

an evaluation im thes area before, 1 that right”

A. Right

In Brown, thts court recognized the ,

the ties of facta to extenaibty eslontife taduiaune nut

dehed effective response under circumstances where the s¢1-

entihe theory had no demonstrable standard against which

ut could be evaluated, tested, or ;

There are good reasons why not every ostensibly

sciemtific technique should be recognized as the

basis for expert testimony. Because of its apparent

objectivity, an opinion that claims a scientific basis

is apt to carry undue weight with the trier of fact.

In addition, it is difficult to rebut such an opinion

except by other experts or by cross-examination

cize the means by which it was reached drawing

their own conclusions from the underlying facts.

Brown, 557 F.2d at 556, quoting United States v

56, ' Baller, 519

F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir), cert. denied. 423 US. 1019 (1975).

The scope and magnitude of the confusion prejudice

generated by Dr. Stock's testimony cannot iret appreci-

ated without an analysis of his reasoning. Dr. Stock postu-

lated in this particular case, the basis for the post-traumatic

= disorder as defined in the literature is the captivity syn-

ome The captivity syndrome is the underlying event that

causes the post-traumatic stress disorder, what occurs to people

im captiviuy ” (emphasis added) Dr. Stock thereupon devel-

oped his logic in the following manner on direct examination.

Q. Well, isn't it true that you contemplate . . . telling

the jurors, if allowed to do so, that the so-called

iraumatic event occured”

3la

A. No. What | am contemplating telling the jurors,

if the allegations are true, that it is my Opinion,

based on information that | had available to me

and my knowledge as an expert witness, that

these individuals did indeed suffer the captivity

syndrome. They suffered from captivity syn-

drome.

On cross-examination he proceeded:

Q. Despite the fact there is not literature on that

subject at all through the second day of February

of 1984 that you are aware of or have read?

A. No. There is a lot of literature about the captivity

syndrome

Q. In relation to individuals who supposedly are

kept under the conditions which exrsted here?

A. Yes. In the sense it may not have been called

involuntary servitude, but the conditions are

analogous to other such happenings.

Q What were the analogous conditions?

A. Well, Mr. Stringer went through the |! points

{Dr. Lifton’s defined eleven essential elements

underlying “captivity syndrome”). If you would

like, I'd be glad to go through it again.

Q. But those were all basically, were they not, where

somebody was kidnaped of concentration camps

or a prisoner of war camp?

A. That 1s right

(emphasis added).

On further direct cxaamination he elaborated:

Q But you have examined these men and have an

opinion as to whether or not they suffer a post-

traumatic stress syndrome that would be consis-

32a

tent with a captivity syndrome prior to the time

you examined them, ts that correct?

A. Yes. Based on my understanding of the scientific

lnterature and my clinical experience in the area.

Q. In fact, they did suffer from the captivity syn-

that would have affected their psychological abil-

ity to leave or end the —to leave the environment

that was causing this syndrome; is that correct?

A. Yes. lt seems to me the bottom-line question is

if people have an opportunity to escape when

they are being held in any situation, why don't

they? Captivity syndrome explains that.

THE COURT: Would you tell me how would you

defne the captivity syndrome?

THE WITNESS: The captivity syndrome, Your

Honor, are psychological, are environmental manip-

ulations that occur to make people's normal think-

ing, feeling and reactions.

(emphasis added).

Simply stated, Dr. Stock posited that Molitors and Fulmer

developed “captivity syndrome” as a result of the living con-

ditions and treatment intentionally imposed upon them by

the defendants which induced “post-traumatic § siress

disorder” that destroyed their will to voluntarily leave the

farm and employ of the defendants, even though they were

tree to do so, thereby transforming them into “psychological

hostages” bound to “involuntary servitude” for the

defendants?’ Dr. Stock further hypothecated that the

"Direct examination of Dr Stock

Q Do you have any caplanation for thew not leaving the farm

where they were, the Kozminshs farm”

33a

“captivity syndrome,” as discussed by Dr. Lifton in his pub-

lished research of American prisoners held captive by the

Chinese during the Korean war, and the “brainwashing”

which induced “ideological conversion,”* were analogous to

the techniques employed by the defendanis in their continu-

ing efforts to intentionally control Molitoris and Fulmer.

Even the most casual review, however, will disclose that

the eleven criteria wdentihed by Dr. Lifton as essential to the

“brainwashing” implemented by the Chinese to achieve the

thought control necessary 10 accomplish the “ideological

conversion” characterized as “captivity syndrome” are

ment to which Moliutoms and Fulmer were exposed.

Initially, ot should be noted that the “brainwashing” tech-

niques employed by the Chinese as studied by Dr. Lifton were

scientifically conceived, scientifically implemented, and sci-

entihcally monitored around the clock. The techniques were

professionally structured into a planned, systematic, progres-

sive program calculated to totally pervert and/or destroy an

individual and to change his behavior and his beliefs. Essen-

A. Yes, on the surface, it appears that they had numerous

opportunitics to leave, and the quesinon to me, interesting

Question, 1s why didn’t they.

It's my Opinion that they were psychological hostages, that

even though they had the physical ability to get away from

the farm, they were so tied to the farm that these [deten-

danis| were the oaly Caretakers, they became psychology-

cally substituted parents for them They could not form

the requisiic mical © cxcape __.

“although the record disclosed that the term “ideological

conversion” refers to the efforts of the Chinese to influcace the

cal behefs of Amencan captives with a view toward having them

denounce the United States for propaganda purposes, the record does

not reflect that the term bears any relationship to the term “involuntary

conversion” as comed by Dr Stock

34a

tial to effective metamorphosis of the prisoner was an

environment of physical captivity, a realization ~~ Ye futility

of escape or rescue, and the use of force or the ever-preseni

threat of force and even death

lized by the Chinese in systematically phasing a captive

through the stages described by Dr. Lifton's writings as essen-

tial to inducing “captivity syndrome” does the attempted cor-

relation of Dr. Lifton’s criteria to the living conditions and

treatment to which Molitons and Fulmer were exposed

become incomprehensible.* The “brainwashing” discussed by

Dr Lifton involved total sensory deprivation. The prolonged

coahnement of the prisoner entailed total isolation in a room

of muted space without access to any reference pot and

without hope of escape or rescue, tsme and all concept of ume

were chminated, the prisoner was permitted to see no one

but his guard, the prisoner slept only as permitied, he was

permitted to hear only what he was intended to hear, he was

spoken to only by his captors, he was physically humibaicd,

he had no toulet facilities, he was permitted no pnvacy when

performing normal bodily functions, he was under around

the clock surveillance by his guard, and the prisoner was con-

stantly placed in fear of his life The wasidious procedure con-

stituted a total assault on the individual personality calcu-

lated to force him to recant all of his personal and ideological

values and accept the values and beliefs of his captors.

*The essential elements for inducing the “captivity syndrome” as

enumerated by Dr. Robert Lifton were

(1) prolonged captivity, (2) contumuous around the clock

supervision, such as by guarding, (3) an isolated enviroameni.

(4) removal of ali supports, (5) on attack oa personality, (6) a

lack of prvacy, (7) assault upon the total a

systematic use of reward and punishment, (9) a tearnag of the

fabric of the personality, (10) the building up of a new person.

ality and (11) miwalistic behaviors, which was not considered

by Dr. Stock om his analysis.

3Sa

in ght of this Comparative analysis, any aticmpt to equate

the “brainwashing” practiced by the Chinese to induce Dr.

Lifton’s “captivity syndrome” with Dr. Stocks “involuntary

ion” and ~ psychological hostage” was, mn the language

of Dr. Emanuel Tenay.® “ridiculous” and an “invention of

Stock.” Dr. Robert Walsh,” characterized Dr. Stock’s analogy

“Dr Emanual Tenay ss a graduate from the University of Munich.

Germany, School of Medicume He interned at Michaci Reese Hospital

wn Checago, Minos. completed his psychiatnc resedency at Elgin Siate

Hospital He attended post-graduate school at the University of Michi

|

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airy and Neurology and «s certhed as a specialist Dy the Amencan

Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and also acted on ts Board of

—Eaamuners He 1s a diplomat of the Amencan Board of Forensic Psyche

atry He os a derector of the Detrou Recenwing Hospual, Depariment

of Psychiatry He enjoys stad privileges at all of the major hosprtats

m the Detrou area, Beaumont, Harper, Grace. Si Joha.

Senas, and Cottege Hospual of Grosse Powute He 1s a member of the

Amerncan Psychiatry Associanon, a Fellow of the Amencan ( ollcge

of Forcasec Scrences. a member and pasi preudeni of the Michigan

Psychiatnsis Society and a number of other professional orga uzations

wm the ummedhate geographa area He has published m caces, of sev-

enty professsonal paper and has lectured to vanous law cafo cement

agencies as well as professsonal groups He has conducted seminars

foreasx psy hairy the country He has appeared

aa witness on of the Unsed Siates government

m a aumber of crumenal matiers, ic. the Jack Ruby

Garwood Vietnamese Captive case, and the Theodore case

has written professsoral papers—treatuses on Concentration camp sur

vivors and captives of prisoner of war camps He delivered a paper

at an international sympossum on the psychiainn aspects of Captivity

"De Robert R. Walsh is a board-cemified clinical po hologist

lecensed by the State of Mictagan and an employee of the © se Prison

of Southern Michigan sence 1974. where he caer uses ultematec respons:

belity for virtually the total mental health care of approamately 5 UOU

prnomers resedeng om the central regec> of the Mactigan Department

dants' farm

There 1s no controversy between the parties as to a dehni-

soo ef pee cnmmatis cisars Genntes, © & wath ideatiied ty

tssuc

On vou dere, Dr Stock under cross-caamination conceded

Q. Now, sir, is there Inerature dealing with the sub-

yect matier of involumary servitude as being

equatable to involuntary Conversion, that you

are aware of

A. Not that | am aware of

Q You know of none, right?

A. That's correct.

Both Doctors Tenay and Walsh conirmed that the terms

“ynvolumtary conversion” or “psychological hostage” could

not be found wn any psychiatric of ps chological teatbouk or

im any psychiatric of psychological lntesature

Even Dr. Stock, in a colloquy with the court, stated

THE COURT: ... but is captivity syndrome and

involumtary conversion the same thing’

THE WITNESS: ... well, | guess t's not exactly the

same thing If we look ot a circle, the captivity syn-

drome «s another circle

The imterrelationship of s “post-traumatic stress disorder”

diagnosis with Dr Stock's formulations 1s more diff ult to

comprehend lt would appear that under Dr Stock 's reason.

ing, “on thus particular case _. the post-traumatic stress disor-

der the captivity syndrome.” Dr. Stock had previously

equated the cause of “captivity syndrome” with the living

of Corrections He has 8 bachelor's and master's degree from Mu higen

the subject and ws 6 scholar im the fcid

It generally requires the individual to have been

a very severe stressor, and the book |

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= ting “sound professional practice and confused the conditions experienced by Molitors and F uimer at the defen-

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reoccurrence of the stimulus event of something

remotely resembling «, luke the whirring of a hel).

copter or the backfiring of a car, produces a very.

very clear dramatic effect on the individual

Va

Again, thes 1s the diagnostic criteria from the mao-

ual. The frst thing that is required 1s the casstence

of a recogmizable siressor that would evoke signih-

cant symptoms of distress in almost everyone

And again this is the type of stressor I've men-

toned before, very severe, very ble-threatening

(renerally the individual ts in a situation where at

least at some pownt during it they don't know if they

are goung to survive They are really faced with the

imminent possibility of death and no control from

thew perceptual standporal over it

of the trauma as evidenced by at

least one of the following One, recurrent and intru-

sive recollections of the event These are very vivid

memories of re-capersencing of ut, really As | men-

thoned before, the veteran walking down the sirect,

for example, that he hears the whirring of a helicop-

ter om the at Automatically, psychologically and

mentally, at that point he is back in Nam. He may

start acting very erratically He may become very

dangerous

[Tihere is &@ numbing of responsiveness to oF

reduced involvement with the external workd begin

ning sometime after the trauma 1s shown by at least

one of the following One, markedly diminished

interest im one of more ignihcant activities: Gener.

ally you have to know what the person's interests

were before. They often withdraw. They may have

had ahobby They may have been good im some par.

tnular vocatton They are no longer interested in

thes, they don't do it. It's @ very Obvious sign to peo-

ple around them, spouse siblings, thes sort of thing

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camps, victims of an exceptionally brutal or

assault of other violent criminal act, victims of a severe

:

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and Fulmer were exposed

With thes as I am constrained to re-examine

Dr. Stock's in an effort to give some fabric to his

testimony

Hies cramimation reflects the following dialogue:

Q But you have examined these men and have an

opinion as to whether or not they suffered a post

traumatnc stress syndrome that would be consis

tent with a captivity syndrome prior to the time

you cxamuned them, 1s that correct?

A Yes Based on my understanding of the scientific

hterature and my chaical capernence im the arca

Q. ta fect, they did suffer from that captivity sye-

drome and, sow, posttraumatic stress syn

drome. that would have affected then psycholog-

ical ability to leave of end the—to leave the

environment that was causing this syndrome, is

that correct?

A Yes it seems to me the bottom-line question

if people have an opportunity to escape when

they are being held in any stteation, why don't

they? Captivity syndrome caplains that

He proceeded to develop his logn Dy stating im response to

the court

THE COURT Wheat do you describe as the con-

dition that you would define as

the captivity syndrome?’

THE WITNESS. The condition «© the breaking

down of tree will, of conscious

and volitional chone

so traumatized that they host thew will to voluntarily leave the farm

Hes capressed conctumon appear to be comtradwtory am hight of he

com ero to the Court that hi reports reflected ao diagnos of “post

traumatn vires dusorder ~ Both Dry Tenay and Walsh ato ruled owt

the dragmose

dla

THE COURT And is relewance m this cave

whal, as you understand u’

THE WITNESS Explaming why of these people

had opportuanties to wath way

{sec}, why they did not

Upon further examination by the count, Dr Stock responded

Q There & no place mm your report __ that post-

traumatn disorder, enther chromn of delayed.

casts om thes Case, 6 that correct’

A. That's correct.

Upon further examination he conceded that the collapse

of the captewes’ well, as described by Dr. Lifton, was not «

critenon tor a diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder

Q_ Where vader post traumate stress disorder docs

say the breaking down of will & part of the

crvtera, that «6 what you told the Court’

A | would mctede that ender the death camps. con-

centration Camps, prisoner of war

Q im avenge pou 6 that Noted mm the criterna”

A. The brewking down, speciivally. we. 4s ee

fomphases added)

De Stock, 9 a purely conchusery manner, thercalter sum.

marized hes ratronate after goung full Curcte by restatong hes

srcate& ally unsupported theses that although the ~\ aptivity

syedrome” was anchored om forcible phys al confacment

and was mot cquatable to the living Conditions capenenmcd

by Molton aad Fulmer, and the facts of those hveng cond:

toms would aot supper the diagnos of “post traumata

vires disorder” was nevertheless hes opemion that both

Mohtorns and bulmer were “psychotage al hostages” who had

4la

ao will to beawe the defendants’ farm and were therefore

bowed to “mvobumtary ser tude”

Q Doctor, the basis of your opemon, you have

assumed ali of the facts a5 truce, 6 that correct,

that have bece retated to you’

A Yeu W's my feelings Mf they were, f they were

true, thea, thes 6 what occurred

And you have bterally um your eleven points [Dr

denng “Captivity syadrome yes .

aumber one. conctuded ehh 6 a conclusion,

that captivity carsts’

A Ves, io the prcteignal sme

fomphass added)

serwetede” of a “peychological hostage” situation. It ts

acumen from a forceful physical confinement and sys-

43a

tematic coercive environment calculated to induce

“wWeological conversion,” which is the essential predicate for

“captivity syndrome,” to psychologically induced involuntary

servitude in a environment free of forceful physical confine-

ment of psychological coercion that gives rise to the defen-

tants’

The dissent would bridge the vital gap, although Dr Stock

was unable to do so, by characterizing Dr. Stock’s use of the

term imvoluntary Conversion as merely a description to con-

vey the recognized effects of the captivity syndrome How-

ever characterized, Dr. Stock’s expressions to the jury,

intended as osicnsibly expert opinion predicated upon suth-

crently established professional principles and as having

gained general acceptance in the particular held to which ut

belonged, stand naked and ignored by his peers and hind sup-

port only im this initial airing of his own personally taslored

theory.*

The dissent again misconstrues the issues on appeal when

urges that, since the defendants clected to present two

experts who contradicted Dr. Stock’s analogy of the

“captivity syndrome,” it was for the jury to evaluate the

weight of the evidence. The weight of the evidence is not in

question, the threshold issue is the admissibility of the evi-

dence that must be initially addressed. Brown, 557 F.2d at

556, addressed the issue thusly:

Conflicting testimony concerning the conclusions

drawn by caperts, so lung as they are based on a gen

erally accepted and rehable scientific primiple

ordinarily go to the weight of the testimony rather

than to its admissibility.

(emphasis added) The language presumes a competent

caper witness and testimony which ts based upon demon-

"This was the first twume that he testified to his theories “this 1s my

hrst case of wmvoluntary servitude *

44a

strated rchable principles which have been suthcrently estab-

lished to have gamed general acceptance im the particular

held to which they belong

In sum, thes case represents 4 classical cxaampl- of the man-

ner in which expert testimony, admitted without proper foun-

dation, can confuse or mislead the ter of fact and thereby

defeat a defendant's mght to a fair trial Without doubt, Dr

Stock's opinion conveyed apparent objectivity as 1s evident

ned undue weight with the tner of fact and precluded effec.

live response beyond an ineffective general demal Since Dr

Stock's theory had received no exposure among his peers.

qualthed persons had no opportunity to esther validate Dr

Stock’s results or criticize the means by which he reached

his oprmons. Thus, paraphrasing the admonition of Brown

$57 F.2d at 556, the courtroom in the present case was a

research laboratory The fate of the defendants in this criminal

prosecution rested on their ability to successfully rebut scien

tite evidence which had an “aura of special reliability and

trustworthiness.” although in reality, Dr. Stock was testifying

to an unproved hypothesis in an isolated cxapermment which

had not gained general acceptance in its held.”

“11 would appear that the dissent would overrule overwhelming legal

precedent im this circus and throughout the nation that recognizes the

necessity for a strong countervailing resiraint on the admission of

caper testimony to protect a defendant's mghi to a faw tinal

Alter recogmizing that:

There are good reasons why not every ostensibly screntihc

technique should be recognized as the basis for exper testi

mony Because of us apparent objectivity, an Opinion that

claums a screntific bases 18 apt wo carry undue weight with the

trier of fact Vn addivwon, 1 65 dificult to rebut such an opinion

except by other experts or by cross-examination based on a

thorough acquaintance with the underlying —— In

order to prevent deception of mistake and to the

possibility of effective response. there musi be a demonstrable.

4Sa

| would therefore reathrm the sound pronouncements by

thes corcunt on Green, Brown, and Brady and reverse the trial

The competency of Dr. Stock to testify as an capert witness

was placed in issue by the government and the court as dem-

onstrated by the following dialogue:

Ms Morgan (government counsel} Your Honor, we

would offer Dr. Stock as an expert in the held of

Forensic Psychiatry and offer his expert testimony

to the Jury

THE COURT | don't pass on qualifications, it's up

to the jury Go ahead and interrogate him.

Initially ut should be noted that Dr. Stock was offered “as

an expert in the held of Forensic Psychiatry” Dr. Stock was

neither a medical doctor nor was he qualihed in the specialty

of psychiatry, let alone in the held of forensic psychiatry This

alone should have made his competency suspect.

The tral court obviously abdicated us mandatory duty to

psss upon the competency of a witness offered as an caxapert

The dissent would dismiss this refusal to act by citing to

defense counsel's lature to object. The rehance is misplaced

objec tive procedure for reaching the opinion and qualified per

sons who can evther duplicate the result of Critwizte the means

by which ut was reached, drawing thew own conclusions from

the underlying tacts

Brown, 357 F 2d at $596 (emphasis added) The dissent disregards the

admonmtion with the observation that the “defense produced two

eaperts who diflered with and ecflectiwely crtiwed Dr Stock's

testemony ~

lt « trwe that after the tral court erroneously admitted Dr Stock's

highly preyudn ial testimony, the defendants presented two eaperts to

contradict Dr Stock's operons, however, they had no alternative after

the Count permitted him to testify

46a

The sahent purpose for entering an objection during tral

1s to alert the tral court to an issue which demands is alten-

ton and to record for appellate review the court's disposition

for appropriate review. After the court disposed of the objec-

tron, counsel were thereafter obliged to abide by the ruling

and to proceed with the tral of the action. Manness v Meyers.

419 US. 449, 459, 95 S.Ct. 584, 591, 42 L.Ed 2d 574 (1975).

This court has construed Fed R.Evid. 702 to permit the

admission of expert testimony only when it is presented by

(1) a qualihed expert; (2) testifying on a proper subject,

(3) on conformity to a general accepted explanatory theory,

(4) the probative value of which outweighs any prejudicial

effect. Green, 548 F.2d at 1268. The appellants have also

charged the tral court with error in permitting the govern-

ment's expert to testify and to capress Opinions Contrary to

the first mandate of Green Green, $48 F.2d at 1268, para-

phrases Fed R_Evid. 702 as follows:

To permit expert testimony to be heard by the jury,

the trial court must frst determine whether the spe-

ciahzed knowledge involved “will assist the ter of

fact to understand the [other] evidence or to deter-

mine a fact in issue.” Then i must satisfy itself that

the proffered witness is “qualihed as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, or education ..~

Appellate review of such sensitive discriminations by

lower courts may only be rationally accomplished on

an ad hoc basis

(emphasis added).

The non-delegable duty is, a5 a matter of law, placed

squarely upon the shoulders of the trial pudge Stated difler-

enily, competency of a witness to testify us for the judge to

decide while credibility of the witness is left to the jury

United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir, 1973),

cert demed, 416 U.S. 989 (1974). Expert testemony is admuis-

47a

sible only when the witness ts in fact an expert and 1s accepted

as such by the court. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148,

and pass upon that competency when the facts of his expertise

demanded a court ruling. More specihcally, defendants chal-

an ved hypothesis derived for an isolated purpose and

which has no acceptance im the scientific held to which ut

belongs

An examination of Dr. Stock’s credentials" reflected aca-

"The record duclosed that Dr Stock’s academic credentials

included a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology from the University

sive capenence in testing and evaluating children and adoles-

literature im the field of psychiatry characterized as

“victomization,” which he defines as dealing with victims of

taking, and natural disasters. His knowledge of “captivity

syadrome™ resulted from reading Dr. Lifton’s book.

The defendants have not questioned Dr. Stock's compe-

tency to admunister individual intelligence tests of personal-

ily assessment tests, to conduct group testing, and to interpret

and evaluate individual mental retardation levels, the extent

it

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and i my work at the Forensx Center | have evaluated anu

treated individuals who were menially retarded

of the examination that he conducted of Fulmer and Moli-

toms that was described as extensive in the dissent Defen-

dants have taken no exception to his opmmions Concerning the

mental retardation levels of Moluonms or Fulmer All of the

of his expertise and trang His eapenence and traning in

the area of testing, interpreting, and evaluating levels of retar-

dation did not, however, qualify him as an caper i the uare-

tated held discussed im Dr. Lifton’s book. Moreover, absent

any correlation im the record between “terromsm”™ inciuding

“hostage-taking™ and Dr. Lifton’s “captivity syndrome,” Dr.

Stocks eaperence in the area of “terrorism” lends no weight

to his qualbhcations to advance a theory beyond his expertise

which had not received recognition, validation, or general

acceptance in the field to which i belonged"

In ght of De Stock’s questionable credentials and hus

highly convoluted and often confusing and contradictory tes-

temony, the tral court, at the very least, had a duty to protect

the defendants’ nghi to a fas inal by exerceseng sts mandatory

duty to rule on Dr Stock’s competency to appear as an capert

witness ADdiacation of thes duty by the tral cour constituted

plain error | would therefore also reverse the tnal court on

this issue

Accordingly, ut would appear that the record herein does

Aol suppor the hypotheses upon which the dissent relics

Syadrome™ by Dr Stock The record also fails to disclose any

between the clewen pounts of De Lifton’s “captiwnty syndrome” and

the crvtera that weduces “Stockholm Syadrome ~

50a

KEITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. | concur in Judge Guy's

well-reasoned dissenting opinion. However, | write sepa-

rately to highlight soune of my concerns about this case. I feel

that the majority opinion unduly restricts the scope of 18

U.S.C. § 1584. Judge Guy correctly states that fraud and

deceit are not the only ways to subjugate the will of another.

Also, limiting the class of victims to minors, immigrants and

mental incompetents is underinclusive and without merit.

| am especially disturbed with the majority's treatment of

the expert testimony issue. | think that the majority's reliance

of the factors in United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th

Cir. 1977), is misplaced. The Green analysis should be lim-

uted to determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.

In this case, the testimony of Dr. Stock was based on his clini-

cal findings, not on an esoteric theory.

Based on the above, | think the Court is committing an

egregious error in the position that it has taken.

Sla

GUY, Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by LIVELY, Chief

Judge, MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges. | respectfully

dissent from the majority's conclusions in both part II and

part Ill of the opinion.

it is clear that 18 U.S.C. § 1584 is lacking in definitional

precision when it makes criminal the holding of one in

“involuntary servitude.” Whether this is the genius of this

section or a deficiency to be cured by judicial legislation is

not so clear. The majority apparently concludes it is a def-

ciency and proceeds to cure it by substituting an arbitrary

definition that raises more questions than it answers. In dis-

cussing this specific section, Judge Dimock, who concurred

in Shackney, prophetically wrote:

To have an arbitrary classification which will resolve

with equal facility all of the cases that would arise

under the statute is indeed a tempting prospect. It

is much harder to have to work under a statute

which will raise difficult questions in the borderline

cases inevitable whenever the application of a stat-

ute depends upon an appraisal of the state of the

human mind.

333 F.2d at 488.

The problem with the definition offered by the majority

is that 1t not only unduly focuses on the means of accomplish-

ing involuntary servitude, but also, at least as to its third

prong, would define and /imit the classes of persons to whom

it applies. | see no necessity for the former and no justifica-

tion for the latter.

Whenever one attempts to define by setting out the means

of accomplishment the risk of underinclusion ts considerable.

What is needed 1s a definition of “involuntary servitude” not

a listing of examples of how it may be accomplished. | would

offer as an acceptable definition, at least for “involuntary,”

52a

that suggested in the concurring opinion in Shackney: “Where

the subjugation of the will of the servant is so complete as

to render him incapable of making a rational choice, the ser-

vitude is involuntary ....” /d. at 488. lt goes without saying

that since this is a criminal statute, the master would, of

course, have had to intend this result.'

The “fraud and deceit” prong of the majority's test appar-

ently is the creation of the majority as is the limiting of the

classes to whom it is to apply. Prongs (1) and (2) of the pro-

posed test—physical force and legal coercion—are the slav-

ery and peonage tests. “Fraud and deceit,” however, are not

terms of art in the arena of involuntary servitude cases and

would seem to cover an almost limitless range of conduct.

Since | write in support of a more flexible definition than

that offered by the majority, it is not the breadth of the pro-

posed definition that is troubling. | simply see no need to

specifically reference “fraud and decent” to the exclusion of

other means. | would agree that fraud and deceit, in addition

to physical force and legal coercion, are ways of subjugating

the will of anoi:her—but they are certainly not the only ways,

nor are they necessarily the most egregious.

| am also puzzled as to why the “fraud and deceit” excep-

tion, if there is to be one, should be limited in its application

to minors, immigrants, and mental incompetents. Where it

is necessary to resort to The Restatement (Second) on Con-

tracts to interpret a criminal involuntary servitude statute,

| become concerned thal revision, not interpretation, is

underway. Furthermore, the inclusion of “immigrants” as a

special class cannot be supported by reference to the Padrone

Statute as the majority suggests As the appendix to the major-

ity Opinion itself indicates, the antecedent statutes reference

ca)

*L think that the legislative history utilized by the majority is more

helpful on the question of what “servitude” means. | would concur

that the servitude contemplated is of a type associated with slavery

and peonage

S3a

“any person inveigled or forcibly kidnapped in any other

country, with intent to hold such person so inveigied or kid-

napped in confinement or to any involuntary service ... .”

This 1s hardly the definition of an immigrant.

| would offer as the final evidence in support of the proposi-

tion that the majority's new definition causes more problems

than it cures the fact that, when it is applied to the instant

case, the result is a remand for a retrial on the fraud and

deceit theory even after the majority rules out Dr. Stock's

testimony. Although | would affirm the original conviction,

I nonetheless find it strange and unsettling to send a criminal

case of this nature back for a retrial on a theory never advo-

cated by the government or defended against by the defen-

dants in the first trial.

This is not an easy definitional question and it is one on

which reasonable minds and federal circuits might differ. |

write in dissent, however, primarily because | believe the

majority has rewritten rather than interpreted 18 U.S.C.

§ 1584.

I have even greater concern for the ramifications of part

Ill of the majority's decision than I do part Il. This concern

is predicated, at least in part, by the frequency with which

courts deal with these problems. Involuntary servitude cases

are few and far between, whereas cases in which experts tes-

tify are a daily occurrence.

Due to what the record tells us about the condition of the

victims of this alleged crime and how traumatic the trial was

for them, | doubt very much that there will ever be a retrial

pursuant to our remand. Even if there is, I do not consider

it a matter of global significance whether Dr. Stock is allowed

tw testify or not.? However, | am concerned about the ratio-

711 1s not clear from the majyonty opimion whether the foundational

problems that they find mandate exclusion of Dr. Stock's testimony

are correctible in a second tral.

S4a

nale used for the exclusion of this evidence being used in

other cases. As | will develop further, infra, | submit that our

decision in United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th c ir.

1977), on which the majority wholly relies, should be clarified

if not overruled by this en banc court—not extended.

A.

The majority cites United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261

(6th Cir. 1977), as setting forth the standards to be applied

in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.Green,

convicted of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled sub-

stance, Dimethyliryptomine, challenged expert testimony

admitted at trial. First, he challenged the testimony of 4

chemist from the Food and Drug Administration who testi-

hed, among other things, as to the threat posed by the drug,

its effects upon the body, the procedure by which it may have

been classified as a controlled substance, and its relationship

to LSD. Second, Green challenged the testimony of a DEA

agent who testified as to the number of dosage units which

were theoretically manufacturable from the chemicals found,

the anticipated purity of the final product, the sireet price

of a dosage unit, and the details of other illegal drug transac-

tions that had no relation to the defendant. Id at 1264-65.

Significantly, the Green court first noted that Fed. R. Evid.

702 set forth the test for admissibility of expert testimony.

$48 F.2d at 1268. Nevertheless, the court found Rule 702

deficient when applied to criminal cases, in that it failed to

include among the factors to be balanced by the trial court

the potential prejudicial impact of the expert testimony upon

the substantial rights of the accused. /d Consequently, rely-

ing on United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th

Cir. 1973), the court adopted “for use in criminal appeals

the four criteria proposed in 4maral for review of trial court

decisions concerning expert testimony: ‘|. qualihed expert,

2. proper subject; 3. conformity to a generally accepted

55a

explanatory theory, and 4. probative value compared to prej-

udicial effect.’” Jd?

To the extent that the Green court suggested that its test

must be applied to all expert testimony in criminal cases,

such holding ts clearly inconsistent with common practice.

To the contrary, many types of expert testimony are regularly

received in criminal cases without resort to standards such

as those set forth in Green. Green describes the type of test

courts generally employ when analyzing the admissibility of

scientific evidence. To my mind, there is a difference between

the type of scientific testimony to which such a test is nor-

mally applied, and the expert testimony of a clinical psychol-

ogist like Dr. Stock.

Dr. Stock did not simply take two individuals, whom he

had never met or spoken to, and based on a set of known

facts attempt to fit them into a theory. Rather, he extensively

interviewed Fulmer and Molitoris, performed a battery of

psychological tests, reviewed medical histories, and

acquainted himself with the circumstances under which they

lived. Dr. Stock testified that his opinion was derived from

his clinical evaluation of the two men, including the objective

tests he administered, as well as his experience in this field

and the accepted theory of involuntary conversion. As a

result, Dr. Stock's testimony is no different than the clinical

assessments of psychologists and physicians regularly

received by trial courts. | am unable to distinguish this type

of testimony from, for example, that of a psychologist or psy-

chiatrist testifying on the issue of a criminal defendant's san-

ity. Essentially, Dr. Stock testified, after careful examination

"i 1s not readily understandable why the Green coun found 1 neces-

sary to adopt any special test for the admussibility of expert testimony

in Criminal cases In finding that the tnal cour erred in admitting the

testimony, the court concluded that the testimony was irrelevant and

prejudicial, determinations commonly made under Fed R Evid 401

and 403. Even more significant us the fact that 4maral was decided

before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted.

S6a

of the individuals as well as the background facts, that the

victims’ wills were overborne. This is neither novel theory

nor outside the general area of expertise of a psychologist or

psychiatrist. It ts certainly not the application of a scientific

test.

The majority assumes that opinion testimony offered like

that of Dr. Stock’s must be submitted to the Green test for

scientihic evidence. Yet, the rationale for such a test, as

explained by this court in United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d

541 (6th Cir. 1977), does not support such a conclusion:

“There are good reasons why not every ostensibly

scientific technique should be recognized as the

basis for expert testsmony. Because of its apparent

objectivity, an opinion that claims a scientific basis

is apt to carry undue weight with the trier of fact.

In addition, it ts difficult to rebut such an opinion

except by other experts or by cross-cxamination

based on a thorough acquaintance with the underly-

ee

take and to allow the possibility of effective

response, there must be a demonstrable, objective

persons who can esther duplicate the result or criti-

cize the means by which it was reached, drawing

their own conclusions from the underlying facts.”

557 F.2d at 556 (quoting United States v Baller, $19 F.2d

463, 466 (4th Cir), cert. denied. 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)).

This statement indicates the two traditional concerns

involved with scientific testimony: (1) that objective scien-

the testimony will bear an “aura of special reliability and

trustworthiness,” Brown, 557 F.2d at 556, and (2) that a

“minimal reserve of experts exist who can critically examine

the validity of a screntific determination in a particular case,”

United States v. Addison, 49% F.2d 741, 744(D.C. Cir. 1974).

Nesher of these concerns 1s implicated by the testimony of

Dr. Stock.

57a

Dr. Stock’s testimony on the state of mind of the victims

was nol predicated on a scientific technique but on the type

of subjective analysis that a clinical psychologist is trained

to perform. In a recent case, the California Supreme Court

rejected the argument that expert ao testimony

should be subject to the same test as sci testimony:

lt is important to distinguish in this regard between

expert testimony and scientific evidence. When a

witness gives his personal opinion on the

stand—even if he qualifies as an expert—the jurors

may temper their acceptance of his testimony with

a healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that

all human beings are fallible. But the opposite may

be true when the evidence is produced by a machine:

like many laypersons, jurors tend to ascribe an inor-

dinately high degree of certainty to proof derived

from an apparently “scientific” mechanism, instru-

ment or procedure. Yet the aura of infallibility that

often surrounds such evidence may well conceal the

fact that it remains experimental and tentative.

Here, by contrast, no such methods are in issue.

We have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert

medical testimony, even when the witness is a psy-

chiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as the

reconstitution of a past state of mind or the predic-

tion of future dangerousness, or even the diagnosis

of an unusual form of mental illness not listed in

the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric

Association ....

People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24,

208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984) (permitting expert psychological

testimony on eyewitness identification). See also United

States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1985) (expert opin-

ion as to cause of explosion based in part on comparison

58a

between actual explosion and demonstration does not claim

a “scientific basis,” but falls more properly within “other spe-

cialized knowledge” category of Fed. R. Evid. 702; as such,

it does not carry with it any “aura” of special reliability and

general acceptance in the particular field is not required).

Likewise, the second concern, relative to whether experts

exist who can effectively refute the scientific evidence being

admitted, is not relevant. Here, the defense produced two

experts who differed with and effectively criticized Dr.

Stock’s testimony. The defense was not prejudiced by being

unable to locate experts to respond to Dr. Stock’s testimony.‘

Moreover, to the extent that the Brown court suggested that

it is somehow unfair to burden the defendant with the neces-

sity of obtaining experts to rebut the prosecution's case, or

to gain a thorough acquaintance with the underlying princi-

ples of the expert’s testimony, such a suggestion was explicitly

rejected by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Notes of Advi-

sory Committee to Fed. R. Evid. 705 (rule “assumes that the

cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential

for effective cross-examination”).

The Green test is actually derivative of Frye v. United

States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Bul see infra Part

C. It is therefore noteworthy that the court which first intro-

duced the Frye standard for testing the admissibility of novel

scientific evidence has stated that the standard applies to

“questions of admissibility of expert testimony based on new

methods of scientific measurement ....” United States v.

Addison, 498 F.2d at 743 (emphasis added).*

“lt appears clear from the record that the government knew it would

have to present testimony on the victims’ state of mind in a case wheic

there was an obvious lack of physical restraint present. The sefense

was always aware of this and prepared accordingly.

*The Frye test has been the subject of vigorous criticism. See United

Siates v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235-37 (3d Cir. 1985), and authori-

59a

The concerns contemplated by the Green-Frye test can be

adequately addressed by Rule 403 in these circumstances.

For instance, the unwarranted “aura of reliability” that may

surround the evidence may be assessed by its tendency, if

any, to mislead the jury. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d

1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985); see also McCormick, Handbook

of the Law of Evidence § 203 at 608-609 (3d ed. 1984).* And

to the extent that the Green-Frye standard works to assure

the availability of more than one expert on the topic

involved, that value can be preserved under the Federal Rules

of Evidence as well. Courts may consider the availability of

experts to evaluate the evidence in determining whether

undue prejudice might result from its admission.

Since we are considering this case en banc, it would be an

appropriate time to reconsider the premise in Green that

expert testimony in criminal cases should be judged by a dif-

ferent standard than in civil cases. This result is certainly not

dictated by the Federal Rules of Evidence which were rela-

tively new at the time Green was decided. It appears to me

that the fact that a jury, after consideration of all the evi-

dence, including any expert opinions allowed into evidence,

must find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

is all the differentiation that is necessary or called for.

ties cited therein. The courts that have moved away from Frye have

adopted a reliability test. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238 (relying in

part on this court's opinion in United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25,

33 n.12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975)); 3 J. Weinstein

& M. Berger, Weinsiein's Fvidence § 702(03) at 702-18 to 702-20,

United States v. Williams, $83 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439

U.S. 1117 (1979).

*jury instructions are also a tool for dispelhng an unwarranted aura

of reliability, as jurors are usually instructed, as they were here, that

they should give an expert's opinion only such weight as they think

it deserves, and should reject it if they “conclude that the reasons given

in support of the opinion are not sound.” (App. 154.)

60a

Assuming, however, that the majority is correct in going

on to apply the four part test of Green, the first inquiry ts

whether the expert is qualified. No one here has challenged

the qualifications of Dr. Stock, and in fact, he appears emi-

nently qualified to offer an opinion on the victims’ state of

mind.’ The second element, whether the subject is a proper

one for expert testimony, has been implicitly answered by

this court’s definition of involuntary servitude. The first

prong of the majority's test is that “the servant believes that

he or she has no viable alternative but to perform service

for the master.” Consequently, the servant's state of mind

is a crucial factor in this formula. The majority has, however,

undercut iis adoption of this standard with its conclusion that

the type of expert testimony offered here on the victims’ state

of mind is inadmissible. If the proposition is accepted that

something less than actual physical restraint can result in vio-

lation of the statute prohibiting involuntary servitude, partic-

ularly in the case of a victim who is mentally incompetent

and may thus become an involuntary servant by virtue of

the master’s deceit or fraud, then any qualified psychiatrist

or psychologist should be able to testify that in a particular

instance the will of the victim was overborne to the point

that his service was involuntary.

The third inquiry is, of course, the crucial one here; that

is, whether the testimony is in “conformity with a generally

accepted explanatory theory.” 548 F.2d at 1268. As stated

above, this element has its genesis in Frye. At the same t'me,

it has undergone a subtle but important change.

The court in Frye held:

"iy “qualeed” I mean to suggest more than just paper credentials.

Here, Dr. Stock had worked with the victims and conducted extensive

testing He was completely familiar with their long penod of servitude

and the circumstances surrounding it

6la

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses

ihe line between the experimental and demonstrable

Stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twi-

light zone the evidential force of the principle must

be recognized, and while courts will go a long way

in admitting expert testimony deduced from a

well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the

thing from which the deduction is made must be suf-

ficiently established to have gained general accep-

tance in the particular field in which it belongs.

293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). “General acceptance in the

particular field in which it belongs” is the criterion still widely

applied today. Yet in Green, this standard has become

“conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory.” The

distinction is important because in Frye the emphasis was

placed upon the technique or methodology employed to reach

a result, yet in Green the focus has been transferred to the

theory. In other words, rather than assessing the “thing from

which - deduction is made,” we have focused on the deduc-

tion itself.

When adopting the Green test, the court relied on United

States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152, where the Ninth Circuit

stated: “Because of the peculiar risks of expert testimony,

courts have imposed an additional test, i.c., that the testi-

mony be in accordance with a generally accepted explanatory

theory.” In support of this characterization, the Ninth Circuit

cited Frye and United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.

1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). Stifel correctly sets

forth the language used in Frye, 433 F.2d at 438, 441 (record

affords support for the proposition that neutron activation

analysis has gained “general acceptance in the particular field

in which it belongs”). The Ninth Circuit has never cited

Amaral for “conformity to a generally accepted explanatory

theory.”*

*in fact, the Ninth Circuit has apparently adopted a “reliability”

standard. See United States v. Gwaltney, 7190 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir.

62a

In applying this factor, the majority concludes that Dr.

Stock’s testimony is inadmissible because a foundation was

not laid to establish its conformity to a generally accepted

explanatory theory. In arriving at this conclusion, the court

relies on the testimony of defendants’ experts who criticized

Dr. Stock’s theory. In addition, the majority, after listing the

elements of captivity syndrome, determines that the facts

presented at trial do not support the existence of these factors.

Accordingly, the court holds that captivity syndrome is inap-

plicable as a matter of law.

While this type of analysis may be compelled by the Green

formula, I have serious concerns with it. The majority frames

the evidentiary inquiry as whether Dr. Stock’s theory of

involuntary conversion as applied to this case is in confor-

mity with captivity syndrome. It is unclear why Dr. Stock’s

theory must completely track captivity syndrome. If the court

is saying that involuntary conversion must have gained gen-

eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs, and

the field is captivity syndrome, the basis for making that con-

clusion has not been specified. The only field involved here

is psychology or psychiatry. The only testimony as to what

class of experts would be qualified to express-an opinion on

these issues was Dr. Stock’s testimony that forensic psychia-

trists or psychologists would have such expertise (App. 75).

After determining that Dr. Stock’s theory must be in con-

formity with captivity syndrome, the majority concludes it

is not by relying on the testimony of the other experts. In

other words, the court fornd the defense experts to be more

believable and has determined the admissibility of Dr.

Stock’s testimony based on a credibility finding. This weigh-

1986) (proponent of scientific evidence has burden of laying a proper

foundation showing the underlying scientific basis and reliability of

the expert’s testimony), Brown v Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir

1986).

5

a

63a

ing of testimony clearly usurps the function of the jury in

deciding which expert, if any, should be believed.*

Next, the court determines that captivity syndrome is ina

plicable based on the facts of this case. Yet, during trial, oo

was testimony on many, if not all, of the ten elements of cap-

tivity syndrome."* It is my understanding that the jury deter-

mines whether or not the facts which are necessary to validate

an expert's opinion are present.

The majority interpretation raises, in turn, the question

of what “conformity” to a generaliy accepted theory means.

The court concludes that because the “captivity” here differs

from the type of restraint present in the classic captivity syn-

drome case, Dr. Stock’s theory is not in conformity with cap-

tivity syndrome. This presents a problem because Dr. Stock

testihed that not all elements of captivity syndrome would

have to be present and that captivity syndrome would have

a reliability of a low probability of applicability to a high

*As stated by the court in /bn-Tamas v. United States, 407

ae as A.24 626

For example, if there were

recognized and that the generally

methodology proffered |

accepted by the expert’s colleagues in the field. The judge is

not to take over the jury's function of weighing the persuasive-

ness of the testumony.

407 A.2d at 638-39 0.24.

‘°F or instance, there was testimony that the victims were told repeat-

edly not to leave the farm and that they were retrieved if they did:

that the farm was an isolated environment, that social supports were

64a

probability of applicability depending on the environmental

restrictions, Constraints, and manipulations that were con-

veyed. Essentially, the court has uself determined that there

is a low probability of applicability because u has concluded

from the facts presented at trial that the environmental

restrictions here differed from that of classic captivity syn-

drome. lt seems that “in conformity” must, at least in this

case, actually be interpreted as “exactly the same.”

The court, in a criminal jury trial, is neither a fact finder

nor a weigher of credibility. To evaluate the theory that a

person not physically captive may undergo an involuntary

conversion, a Court correctly evaluates the methodology uti-

lized to arrive at that conclusion, but not the conclusion itself,

which is the province of the yury. The methodology employed

by Dr. Stock was a careful, detailed, and lengthy examination

of the victims and the facts surrounding thei alleged captiv-

ity. It is NOL Open to question nor is the argumem made by

anyone here that that is not an appropriate methodology."

Accordingly, the third element of the Green test, perhaps

inadvertently, places courts in the position of evaluating

experts’ conclusions. The court's role is more properly lim-

uted to finding that the expert's methodology is generally

accepted. The court should not take over the jury's function

of weighing the persuasiveness of the testimony.

**lt us interesting to speculate on the result on this issue if Dr. Stock

had not referred to captivity syndrome, but had simply testshed that,

based on his interviews with and testing of the victims, and his training

and cxpenence in this held, in his opinion thew wills were overborne

and consequently their service was involuntary This is an entirely

plausible scenario in view of Fed R. Evid. 705, which allows experts

to testify without prnor disclosure of the underlying facts or data which

led to their opinion. It would indeed be ironic of Dr Stock’s testumony

was not allowed because he referred to an established branch of learn-

ing, Captivity syndrome, to bolster his conclusion that Fulmer and

Molitons were psychological hostages

6Sa

Cc.

The standard of review on appeal of the admission of testi-

mony ts abuse of discretion. In order to determine whether

as it was at the time the ruling was made. At that point in

time, the only testimony before Judge Joiner was Dr. Stock's,

and he testified that his theory was generally accepted.

Dr. Stock testihed that involuntary conversion has gained

general acceptance throughout the psychiatric and psycholog-

ical community (App. 51, 35). Judge Joiner found that the

testimony could be helpful to the trier of fact to understand

the evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 702. Moreover, Judge

Joiner also recognized that the Frye standard might not be

applicable to this type of testimony, but he felt that even if

the court was to apply the more restrictive Frye test, the testi-

mony was still admissible:

It's not an answer, in the Court's judgment, that this

may be the very first time that someone has said

something in court, otherwise, we would never have

any testimony in court about any new idea if we pre-

vented that, but he has demonstrated to the Court

that the body of experts that seem to be relevant at

this point have generally accepted the concepts and

idea that he is going to talk about, and he now is

in the process of simply taking those ideas, which

have general acceptance among a broad, relative and

important class of experts, and attempting to apply

them to a particular set of facts in this case, and if

there is objection to the testimony it's argumenta-

tive Objection in the sense that ultimately it may be

that the testsmony may not have value because the

particular facts in the case do not support the under-

lying basis on which he 1s going to base his conclu-

sions, and that is something that lawyers are most

expert in bringing Out on cross-examination.

66a

It's sumply no different than a diagnosis of tuber-

culosis or other things of that kind, it seems to me,

at that point. So I'm going to permit the testimony

to be received.

(App. 55.)

Judge Joiner's ruling properly recognized the role of the

trial pudge in admitting expert testimony. This ruling was cor-

rect, especially in light of the fact that the only testimony

before the court was that involuntary conversion had gained

general acceptance. Even though the defendants had retained

experts to testify on their behalf, none of the defendants

sought to offer evidence at the time that Dr. Stock was voir

dired that involuntary conversion was not generally accepted.

Yet defendants possessed at that time the information they

now rely on in arguing that Dr. Stock’s theory was not gener-

ally accepted.” | am simply unable to conclude that on this

record Judge Joiner abused his discretion in admitting the

testimony of Dr. Stock.

| would address one other issue raised on appeal and not

addressed by the majority which could be involved in any

retrial of this matter. On appeal, the defendants also argued

that the trial judge erred in failing to rule on Dr. Stock’s quali-

fications as an expert. At trial, after counsel for the govern-

ment questioned Dr. Stock about his education and experi-

ence, the following colloquy occurred:

Counsel: Your Honor, we would offer Dr. Stock

2In Brown, the court noted that when a defendant fails to produce

rebuttal testimony when given the.apportunity to do so, he runs a grave

risk that an appellate court will focus on the state of the record at the

tome the evidence was admitied in deciding whether the tnal coun

abused its discretion. $57 F 2d at 557 0.17. lt seems to me that defen-

dants have taken that gamble here, and it has paid off.

67a

as an expert in the field of Forensic Psychia-

try and offer his expert testimony to the jury.

The Court: | don't pass on qualifications, it's up

to the jury to. Go ahead and interrogate him.

(App. 101).

The defendants assert that it was error for the court to decline

to specifically find that Dr. Stock was qualified. | must dis-

agree.

When the attorney conducting the direct examination of

an expert witness concludes that portion of the examination

relating to the expert's qualifications, it is Common to so indi-

cate to the court in language not unlike that quoted here. The

person offering the expert is not secking a ruling but, rather,

signalling that the preliminaries are over and the other side

may now voir dire if they desire. If the other side conducts

a voir dire and then objects or just objects without a voir

dire, the court must then make a ruling if it is possible to do

so. Often it is not because the key question is not the expert's

general qualifications in some field, but whether the precise

question on which he will be asked to opine is within his held

of expertise or meets some other test such as that set forth

in the majority opinion. To illustrate here, the question was

not Dr. Stock's qualifications—those were impeccable. The

question was what he was going to be asked which would ing-

ger an answer comprising an “expert opinion.” Obviously,

no ruling can be made until the expert is actually asked the

question. Certainly the trial judge must rule upon the qualifi-

cations of an expert if challenged and must make all evidenti-

ary rulings required by objections to specific questions. The

Federal Rules of Evidence do not require the “proflering”

of an expert as such, however.

The error of the defendants’ argumen: 1s compounded by

the fact that the procedure suggested exacerbates the very

thing about which they express concern—an “aura of special

reliability” surrounding expert testimony. If the prosecutor

68a

in a criminal case completes the background questioning of

an expert witness and then turns to the court and says, “!

offer this person as an expert,” the response should be just

what Judge Joiner replied. kt is not for the court to add to

an “aura of reliability” at this juncture by declaring the wit-

ness an expert. The evidentiary matter at issue is the giving

of opinion testimony. The requisite rulings will be made

when an “expert” is asked to opine. Any ruling prior to that,

unless in response to an objection, appears to me to be some

type of advisory opinion for which there is no predicate in

the Federal Rules of Evidence.

a aaa

_—

APPENDIX

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Act of June 25, 1948. Ch 645,

62 Seat 773 (odimed a 18

1984 Sele satu involuntary

USC § 1584 (1982p

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72a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 84-1288

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLE:

Vv.

IKE KOZMINSK!I, MARGARETHE KOZMINSKI,

AND JOHN KOZMINSKI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS

On Appeal From the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Michigan

DECIDED AND FILED AUGUST 23, 1985

Before: LIVELY, Chief Judge; MARTIN and KRUPANSKY,

Circuit Judges.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which LIVELY, Chief Judge, joined. KRUPANSKY, Circuit

Judge (pp. 9-35) delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. In this unusual

case, the defendants appeal their conviction for conspiring to

deprive Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris of their civil rights in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241' and for holding the same two

' 18 U.S.C. § 241 provides, in pertinent part:

Seer Oe nee

73a

persons to involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1584.2 The defendants are Ike Kozminski, a Michigan

farmer, his wife, Margarethe Kozminski, and their son, John

Kozminski. The defendants claim that the district court erred

in admitting certain expert testimony, that the district court

used unconstitutional jury instructions, and that the evidence

was insufficient to support the verdict.

The events leading up to this case began in 1967 when

Margarethe Kozminski picked up Robert Fulmer while he

was walking down the road and took him to work on the

family’s farm. At that time, Fulmer was working at another

farm, and Mrs. Kozminski simply left a note to Fulmer’s

employer saying Fulmer had left. At that time, Mrs. Kozminski

told several people that she had kidnapped Fulmer.

Louis Molitoris came to the Kozminski farm in the early

1970's. Molitoris had been living on the streets of Ann Arbor,

Michigan, and Mr. Kozminski would sometimes allow him to

sleep in Kozminski's barber shop to stay warm. Shortly after

they met, Mr. Kozminski took Molitoris to the Kozminski farm

to work.

Both Fulmer and Molitoris are mentally retarded. Fulmer

has an 1,Q. of 67, and Molitoris has an I.Q. of only 60. Neither

Fulmer fhor Molitoris can read or write, and both need a

considerable amount of supervision to perform work.

right or privi

the United States, or because of having so

same;

They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not

more than ten years, or eee

74a

The Kozminskis worked Fulmer and Molitoris extremely long

hours. Their days often began at 3:00 A.M. and lasted until

8:30 in the evening. Fulmer and Molitoris received no salary,

and the only money they were given was small gifts on holi-

days and for the county fair. They never received any vacation.

Fulmer and Molitoris were found living in a dilapidated

trailer with no bathroom facilities, no heat, and no running

water. The two men slept on cots with no sheets, and the two

were dressed in ragged, second-hand clothing. Both men

were in poor physical condition when they were taken from

the farm, and Molitoris was substantially underweight.

There was considerable evidence that the Kozminskis and

other farm employees, at the Kozminskis’ direction, verbally

and physically abused Fulmer and Molitoris. On one occasion,

Mr. Kozminski hit Molitoris in the face and cut his eye. ‘The

Kozminskis also refused to provide adequate medical treat-

ment to the two men. In one case, Fulmer cut off the tip

of his thumb, and Mrs. Kozminski would not let him go to

the hospital.

The Kozminskis also attempted to limit greatly Fulmer’s

and Molitoris’ contact with the outside world. The Kozminskis

instructed visitors to the farm not to speak to the men, and

Fulmer and Molitoris were similarly instructed not to speak

to visitors. When relatives of Fulmer and Molitoris called,

they were discouraged by the Kozminskis from talking to the

two men.

There was also considerable evidence that Fulmer and

Molitoris had sought to leave the farm. Several witnesses

testified that the two men had asked for their assistance in

escaping from the farm. On a number of occasions, Fulmer

or Molitoris had left the farm, only to be returned by the

Kozminskis or one of their employees.

Based on this evidence, the jury found all three defendants

guilty of the conspiracy charge, and found Ike and Margarethe

Kozminski guilty of the involuntary servitude counts. Ike

75a

Kozminski received a suspended sentence, was fined $20,000,

and was ordered to pay restitution of $6,190.80 to each of the

two men. Margarethe Kozminski also received a suspended

sentence and was made jointly liable for the restitution. John

Kozminski likewise received a suspended sentence and was

fined $10,000.

The defendants’ first argument is that the district court

improperly admitted the testimony of Dr. Harley Stock, an

expert witness for the prosecution. Dr. Stock testified on two

matters. First, he testified as to Fulmer’s and Molitoris’ low

mental capacity. With respect to this testimony, he related

the results of several basic psychological tests that gauged

the two men’s mental status. Second, Dr. Stock testified to

the existence of a psychological phenomenon called “captivity

syndrome” that had been discussed in the psychological liter-

ature. Dr. Stock stated that when a certain ten or eleven factors

are found to exist in a hostage-type situation,’ this captivity

syndrome will ensue, and the victim will essentially be brain-

washed or, as Dr. Stock described it, will undergo involuntary

conversion. As a result of this involuntary conversion, the

victims’ attitude toward their captors changes, and the victims

can become compliant to their captors’ demands. Dr. Stock

opined that Fulmer and Molitoris had undergone such an

involuntary conversion, and that because of this, they were

psychologidally incapable of escaping from the Kozminskis’

farm, although they physically may have been able to do so.

The defendants challenge the admissibility of this testimony

under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. That Rule states:

3 The ten factors that Dr. Stock outlined as indicating captivit

are: (1) conduct; (2) that is continuous; (3

is carried out in ve isolation; (4) that removes social sup-

particularily family support — structures from the victims;

of the victim,

eee ate Sat trith ¢ limits

33

i

attacks the entire personality, making

on the captor; (8) that utilizes a

and punishments; (9) that tears away any resis-

; and 10)

y.

!

en

that transforms the victim

i

76a

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-

cation, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or

ise.

In applying this rule, this Court has adopted a four-point

analysis. For expert testimony to be admissible under Rule

702, it must be shown ‘that the witness is (1) a qualified ex-

pert; (2) testifying on a proper subject; (3) in conformity

to a generally accepted explanatory theory; (4) the probative

value of which outweighs any prejudicial effect. United

States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977);

United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir.), cert. -

denied, 105 S. Ct. 213 (1984). A district court's decision to

admit expert testimony shall not be reversed unless there was

a-elear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Green, 48

F.2d at 1268. We shall find an abuse of discretion only if we

have “a definite and firm conviction that the court below

committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it

reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Taylor v.

United States Parole Commission, 734 F.2d 1152, 1155 (6th

Cir. 1984) (citations omitted ).

In this case, the defendants argue that Dr. Stock’s testi-

mony failed to meet the first and third criteria set out above.

With regard to the first criterion, the defendants do not argue

that Dr. Stock was not a qualified expert; they simply argue

that the district court failed to find that he was a qualified

expert. This argument is unavailing, however, because trial

counsel for the defendants failed to object when Dr. Stock

was offered as an expert witness. Fed. R. Evid. 103. This

was also not plain-error as Dr. Stock’s credentials were out-

standing and defense counsel had ample opportunity to chal-

lenge Dr. Stock’s credentials during a lengthy voir dire.

The defendants’ objection to Stock’s testimony based on the

Pe a 6 Sint Oren

Tla

third criterion is misguided. To exclude evidence based on

the third criterion, the defendants must show that the captivity

syndrome is not a generally accepted explanatory theory. Yet

in voir dire at trial, and in their briefs before this Court, the

defendants do not seem to dispute that the captivity syndrome

is a generally accepted explanatory theory;* they instead argue

that the theory has never been applied to a case such as

this. The defendants maintain that the theory had been and

could be applied only in those instances where the victim,

such as a prisoner of war, was held captive physically for a

period of time.

Viewed in this light, the defendants’ argument goes not

to whether the captivity syndrome is a generally accepted

theory, but rather whether this theory is relevant to this case.

Thus, it is the fourth criterion outlined above, instead of t*<

third criterion, that is the heart of the defendants’ objection.

The question therefore should be whether Stock’s testimony

was more prejudicial than probative. We believe that the

district judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that it

was not.

Dr. Stock’s testimony on the captivity syndrome was cer-

tainly probative. If accepted by the jury, his testimony would

help explain why Fuliner and Molitoris, although not phvysi-

cally confined to the Kozminskis’ farm, felt psychologically

compelled to continue to work on the farm. His testimony

thus would help the jury comprehend why the two mens’

servitude was involuntary.

4In fact, based on our review of the transcript of voir dire of Dr.

Si Sea ee eae S SES a oo psychologi-

§ The defendants do challenge Dr. Stock’:, use of the term involun-

tary conversion. They claim that no authoritive work refers to

effects of captivity syndrome as involuntary conversion We view

Dr. Stock’s use of the term inveluntary conversion as merely a de-

scription to convey the recognized effects of the captivity syndrome.

78a

The defendants would argue, however, that the testimony

is extremely prejudicial because the captivity syndrome had

never been applied to an involuntary servitude case and that

there was a risk that the jury would unduly rely on Dr. Stock’s

expert opinion in applying the theory to the facts of the case.

Sce United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir.

1977). We believe, however, that any such prejudice in this

case was greatly vitiated by the fact that the defendants pre-

sented two experts who contradicted Dr. Stock’s application

of the captivity syndrome to this case. Dr. Emanuel Tenay,

a psychiatrist, testified, for example, that it was “really ridicu-

lous to apply [the captivity syndrome] to this situation.”

Given this well-rounded presentation, the jury was perfectly

capable of evaluating Dr. Stock’s testimony and giving it its

due weight. We therefore reject the defendants’ argument

that Dr. Stock’s testimony was improperly admitted.

The defendants next argue that there was insufficient evi-

dence to support their convictions, relying on Jackson v. Vir-

ginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). We find this claim to be devoid

of merit. Given tle low mental competency of the victims,

the pattern of verbal and physica! abuse, and the defendants’

efforts to shut off the victims from the outside world, we

believe there was easily sufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude that Fulmer and Molitoris were not voluntarily work-

ing for the defendants.

The defendants next argue that the involuntary servitude

statute, as interpreted by the district court in its jury instruc-

tions, is so vague that it violates due process. The district

court, relying on United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 180 (1984), instructed the jury

that involuntary servitude can result whenever the victim

of the crime is coerced to continue to work for the perpetrator,

whether or not the means of coercion is physical force or legal

sanctions. The defendants claim that unless the application

of the statute is limited to cases where there is evidence of

For

“define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness [so]

Criminal Procedure 35 which provides for the ection

reduction of a sentence by the trial court. -_ ”

Judgment affirmed

¢The defendants also argue that the Mussr

statute offends the first amendment because of the

80a

Kauransxy, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority's selec-

tive interpretation of this circuit's long standing pronounce-

ments in United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.

1977); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977);

and United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979), and the conflict created thereby,

prompts me to respectfully dissent.

This appellate review confronts charged errors committed

by the trial court in:

l. Permitting Dr. Harley Stock, a psychologist, to testify

to scientific principles and procedures in support of

his personally conceived theory of “involuntary con-

version” and “psychological hostage,” which was not

established to have been sufficiently reliable and

accurate to find general acceptance in the particular

field to which it belongs; and

2. Refusing to exercise its mandatory duty to rule upon

the competency of Dr. Stock to testify as an expert

in the field of Forensic Psychiatry and permitting

him to testify to scientific principles and procedures,

which had no recognition or acceptance in the

scientific community, in support of his personally

conceived theory of “involuntary conversion” and

“psychological hostage.”

It should be initially noted that the defendants were con-

victed of a conspiracy to violate the rights of Fulmer and

Molitoris to be free from involuntary servitude in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 241 and of actually holding Fulmer and Molitoris

to involuntary servitude and preventing them from leaving

the farm where they worked in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584.

Both charges mandate proof of intent to commit the offenses.

It was not the government's theory in presenting this case

that either Fulmer or Molitoris were restrained from leaving

the farm and the defendants’ employment by either physical

force or threats of physical force. Rather, it was the thrust of

the government's proof that both Fulmer and Molitoris, as a

result of an “involuntary conversion” became “psychological

hostages” and lost their “will” to leave the farm and the service

of the defendants.

Since Dr. Stock’s testimony was the only evidence that

addressed the very essence of the government's charges, and

was, therefore, the keystone that supported the jury's verdict,

without its cohesive effect the conviction could not be sus-

tained.

An appropriate point of departure for this dissent is a

definition of and purpose for the rule that identifies the stan-

dard to be applied in considering the admissibility of scientific

evidence in the form of expert testimony.

The rule is simply stated in United States v. Brown, 557

F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977), and echoed in its progeny

within and without this circuit in the following language:

A necessary predicate to the admission of scientific evi-

dence is that the principle upon which it is based “must

be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-

ceptance in a particular field to which it belongs.” Frye

v. United States, 54 Apo.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013, 1014

(1923). In United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12

(6th Cir. 1975) we equated general acceptance in the

scientffic community with a showing that the scientific

principles and procedures on which the expert testimony

is based are reliable and sufficiently accurate.

The purpose for the rule is equally simple. It evolved to

avoid the potential prejudicial impact of “the aura of special

reliability and trustworthiness” which attaches to expert testi-

mony admitted without proper foundation which may confuse

or mislead the trier of fact and thus defeat a defendant's right

to a fair trial.

Perhaps the purpose behind the rule is best articulated in

Brown, 557 F.2d at 556, where this court admonished:

82a

A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of

a defendant in a criminal prosecution should not hang

on his ability to rebut scientific evidence

which bears an “aura of special reliability and trust-

worthiness,” although, in reality the witness is testifying

on the basis of an unproved hypothesis in an isolated

experiment which has yet to gain acceptance in its field.

See e., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152

(9th Cir. 1973); Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1014.

The permissible limits of expert testimony have been tra-

ditionally delegated to the sound discretion of the trial court.

The scope of this discretion has been broadly construed, and

the trial court's exercise of its discretion is to be sustained

“unless it is manifestly erroneous.” Brown, 557 F.2d at 556;

United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977).

See also United States v. August, 745 F.2d 400, 407 (6th Cir.

1984). However, such discretion must be exercised, on an

ad hoc basis, by balancing the probative value of the evidence

against its prejudicial effect upon the defendants’ right to a

fair trial. See Fed.R.Evid. 403.

This dissent recognizes and endorses the proposition that

absolute certainty of result or unanimity of scientific opinion

is not required for admissibility so long as the conflicting tes-

timony concerning the conclusions drawn by the experts are

based on generally accepted and reliable scientific principles.

Having reviewed the rule that is decisive to the admissibility

of a scientific explanatory theory and the purpose for its ex-

istence, it is obvious that expert testimony is not permissible

in every case where the witness purports to base his testi-

mony on ostensible scientific principles. See e.g., Frye v. United

States, 292 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); United States v. Franks,

511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 422 US. 1042

(1975); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.

1977); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977);

United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

| oe

83a

444 U.S. 862 (1979); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148

(9th Cir. 1973).

Mindful of the rule, its purpose and the parameters of its

this dissent attempts to present an analysis of the

scientific conclusions and theories applied by Dr. Stock to

the facts of this case.

Although the thumbnail sketch of the facts related by the

majority opinion is substantially accurate, an enlargement of

lifestyles adopted by the two men. As a matter of fact,

although the Kozminskis resided in the vicinity of the farm

where Fulmer and Molitoris lived and worked, they seldom

visited the farm more frequently than once a week. Fulmer

often ined that John Kozminski’s single weekly visit was

too isolated to provide Kozminski with an insight into the

problems inherent to operation of the farm.

Prior to working as a farm hand for the defendants, Moli-

toris, who was 60 years of age, was a street person who got

his food where he found it, “had slept in cardboard boxes in

the winter” and in an old ice box and “drank homemade

wine.” Fulmer, age 59 years, had lived in a foster home from

age 5 to 11 years and was thereafter institutionalized where

he was taught to work as a farm hand. Upon release from

the institution, he drifted from farm to farm performing the

same simple, menial chores he performed for the defendants.

S4a

Of greatest significance in addressing the appellants’ assign-

ments of error arising from the opinion testimony of Dr.

Stock, are the concessions of the parties that (a) neither

Fulmer nor Molitoris were ever physically confined or re-

strained, (b) they were at all times physically free to leave

the farm at will; (c) thev knew they were free to leave the

farm; (d) they did in fact individually and together leave

the farm on numerous occasions; (e) they returned of their

own accord or were picked up by the defendants as a re-

sult of telephone calls from third parties;' (f) they associated

freely with each other, with other farm hands working the

farm, and with neighbors on occasion; (g) they remained at

or returned to the defendants’ farm, in the words of Fulmer

“because he had no place to go.”

Dr. Stock tailored his scientific theory for the above related

facts and concluded that as a result of the living conditions

to which Molitoris and Fulmer were intentionally exposed

by the defendants, the two men experienced, in Dr. Stock’s

coined terminology, an “involuntary conversion,” became

“psychological hostages” and thus were held to involuntary

servitude by the defendants’ willful acts as charged in the

indictment.

In determining the admissibility of Dr. Stock’s expert tes-

timony within the pronouncements of existing precedent as

discussed in this dissent, | am directed to the guidelines enun-

ciated in United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.

1973), and subsequently adopted by this circuit in Creen,

548 F.2d at 1268, and applied in Brown, 557 F.2d at 566, and

United States v. Smith, 736 F 2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 105 S.Ct. 213 (1984):

Four factors must appear in the record to uphold the

admission of expert testimony: 1. qualified expert, 2. prop-

'On eccastens when Fulmer or Molitoris were picked up as a result

of tele calls from third parties, there is no indication that they

were fully returned to the farm

85a

er subject; 3. conformity to a generally accepted explana-

tory theory; and 4. probative value compared to preju-

dicial effect.

Brown, 557 F.2d at 556.

The third element enumerated in Amaral provides that such

expert testimony must be in “conformity to a generally ac-

cepted explanatory theory.” Implicit in the language is the

predicate that the theory be firmly anchored in sound, reliable

and sufficiently accurate scientific principles, and sufficiently

established to the point of having achieved general acceptance

within the particular field to which it belongs. Stated differ-

ently, the scientific explanatory theory must have (a) re-

ceived at least some exposure within the scientific peerage to

which it belongs; (b) received peer evaluation to determine

its scientific validity and reliability; and (c) achieved general

acceptance within the scientific community to which it be-

longs.

Apart from the comments of his scientific peers, Dr. Stock’s

own admissions render his conclusions inadmissible under ex-

isting legal standards. At the outset, Dr. Stock’s progression

from “involuntary conversion” through “psychological hostage”

to the ultimate result of “involuntary servitude” must be dis-

ting from his testimonial discussion of “captivity syn-

drome” “post-traumatic stress disorder”. The distinction

is critical to an analysis of his testimony since “captivity syn-

drome” and “post-traum tic stress disorder” are mutually ex-

clusive and have independent origins as will be more fully

hereinafter discussed.

The “captivity syndrome” as a characterized condition, had

its genesis as a predictable scientific phenomenon in 1924

when Ivan Pavlov, a Russian physicist, first perceived the re-

lationship between prolonged physical and equivalent mental

stress and control of behavior patterns. The subject again re-

ceived considerable notoriety as a result of a proliferation of

EDITOR'S NOTE:

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY

AT THE TIME OF FILMING. IF AND WHEN A

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prisoner of war and concentration camps that existed during

World War IL.

The practice, characterized in early scientific literature as

the Triple-D Syndrome (debility, dependency and dread) was

refined into a highly sophisticated effective ordeal by the

Chinese during the Korean conflict. In published research, Dr.

Robert Lifton, a noted psychiatrist, synthesized the concepts of

“captivity syndrome” from his exhaustive studies of returning

Americans held captive by the Chinese during the Korean

war.

Obvious from the foregoing brief summary, the Triple-D

Syndrome currently characterized as “captivity syndrome,”

had received wide exposure within the scientific community

to which it belongs, had been evaluated by the peerage of that

scientific community and had received some degree of ac-

ceptance within that group, thereby satisfying the third cri-

terion of Amaral and its progeny. Equally well recognized

within the peer group of psychiatrists and psychologists was

the diagnosis of “post-traumatic stress disorder.” This diagnosis

had, perhaps, received even greater exposure and acceptance

than the “captivity syndrome.”

It is interesting to note at this juncture that an examination

of Dr. Stock’s testimony discloses that whenever he resorted

to supporting an opinion or conclusion by published research

or peer endorsement, he referred, not to his theory of pro-

gression from “involuntary conversion” through “psychological

hostage” to “involuntary servitude” but rather to the conditions

of “captivity syndrome” and “post-traumatic stress disorder,”

both of whi

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Record and brief — United States v. Kozminski · 487 U.S. 931 | Frix