Opposition Brief — Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux
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Supreme Court, US.
No. 85-1043 JAN 14 1986
22 IR.
| JOSEPH Des
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
PILOT LIFE INSURANCE Co.,
Petitioner,
V.
EVERATE W. DEDEAUX,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
WILLIAM L. DENTON
(Counsel of Record)
WILLIAM C. WALKER, JR.
RONALD S. COCHRAN
DENTON, PERSONS, DORNAN
& BILBO
P. O. Box 1204
Biloxi, MS 39533
(601) 374-8722
Attorneys for Respondent
WILSON - Eras Printing Co... Inc. - 789-0096 - WasnincTon, D.C. 20001
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act preempts state common-law claims against an in-
surer for failure to pay insurance benefits to a bene-
ficiary of an insured plan?
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ee i
eg iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................... 1
REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED. 3
r è 1... 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Dedeauz v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 770 F. 2d 1311
e Taitncdlanicenninseccsctvevenneseesnscceesenes-~- 2, 3
Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 500
F.Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1980) 5
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Rus-
Vw ee 4
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,
eee 2, 3-4, 5
Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 105
r . 4
STATUTES
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”), § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) 4
ERISA § 514(b) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2)
; a — 4,5
ERISA § 514(c) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (c) (1) ........ 5
5
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq...
(iii)
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
No. 85-1043
PILOT LIFE INSURANCE Co.,
Petitioner,
V.
EVERATE W. DEDEAUX,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Respondent, Everate W. Dedeaux, respectfully requests
that this Court deny the petition for the writ of cer-
tiorari seeking review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to reverse and remand this
case. The opinion is reported at 770 F.2d 1311. .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pilot Life Insurance Company (“Pilot”) issued a
group insurance policy to Entex, Inc. (“Entex”) to in-
sure a long-term disability benefits plan provided by
Entex to its employees. Respondent was an employee of
Entex on March 26, 1975, when he injured his back.
2
Respondent filed a claim with Pilot for long-term dis-
ability benefits, which were paid for two years. Pilot
then refused to pay further disability benefits until em-
ployees of both Entex and Pilot urged it to do so. A
short time later, however, Pilot again attempted to ter-
minate Respondent’s benefits which were reinstated only
after Respondent hired an attorney and after Pilot’s
in-house legal counsel informed Pilot that, based on
Mississippi law, the termination of benefits could not be
defended. Pilot, nevertheless, continued its attempts to
terminate Respondent’s long-term disability benefits and
finally did so in 1980 in spite of an independent medical
examination confirming continued total disability at the
time.
On May 30, 1980, Respondent filed a Complaint de-
manding, in pertinent part, actual and punitive dam-
ages for Pilot's wrongful refusal to pay the long-term
disability benefits. Subsequently, on April 19, 1983, Pilot
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA’’)
preempted Respondent’s state law claims. The motion
was overruled pursuant to a memorandum opinion signed
by the Court on September 29, 1983. Pilot then filed a
motion to reconsider this adverse ruling, asserting the
same grounds as previously presented. By opinion dated
March 19, 1984, the trial court sustained Pilot’s motion
for reconsideration and granted summary judgment in
its favor.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District
Court ruling on the authority of Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co. v. Massachusetts; —— U.S. , 105 S. Ct.
2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985), decided after the decision
of the District Court.” Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Insurance
Co., 770 F.2d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth
Circuit noted that the insurer in the Metropolitan Life
case raised the same arguments Pilot raised in the Fifth
Circuit. It concluded that the Supreme Court’s unani-
3
mous rejection of those arguments clearly and unequivo-
cally repudiated the same arguments Pilot raised on
appeal.“ Having concluded that Pilot’s first four argu-
ments for preemption had been decided against it in
Metropolitan Life, the Fifth Circuit rejected Pilot’s ar-
gument that Congress could not have intended to permit
states to do the same thing as it did in ERISA with
the epithet “ipsi dixit.“ Dedeaux, 770 F.2d at 1316.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the proper analysis of
whether a particular law is saved from preemption “ends
once it is determined that a law falls within the saving
clause and is not exempt by the narrow deemer clause.”
Id., citing Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2393. The
Fifth Circuit was, thus, left with the unavoidable con-
clusion that Respondent’s common-law causes of action
for Pilot’s failure to pay disability benefits were not
preempted.
REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED
Since the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals correctly followed this Court’s decision in Metro-
politan Life, and since this Court settled the question of
preemption in that decision, the writ should be denied.
Both Petitioner and amici argue that important con-
gressional policy will be thwarted by the Fifth Circuit
decision. In doing so, both ignore the careful considera-
tion of congressional policy given by this Court in the
Metropolitan Life decision. In short, both re-argue what
this Court has already clearly decided:
If a state law “regulates insurance,” . . it is not
preempted. Nothing in the language, structure, or
1 Pilot argued that national uniformity would be destroyed, that
common-law causes of action could not be laws which regulate
insurance, that a distinction between plans that are self-insured
and those that are insurance-funded would be indefensible, and that
only traditional insurance laws were saved from preemption.
Dedeauz, 770 F.2d at 1314.
4
legislative history of the Act supports a more narrow
reading? of the clause, whether it be the Supreme
Judicial Court’s attempt to save only state regula-
tions unrelated to the substantive provisions of
ERISA, or the insurers’ more speculative attempt to
read the saving clause out of the statute.
We are aware that our decision results in a dis-
tinction between insured and uninsured plans, leav-
ing the former open to indirect regulation while the
latter are not. By so doing we merely give life to a
distinction created by Congress in the “deemer
clause,” a distinction Congress is aware of and one
it has chosen not to alter. We also are aware that
appellants’ construction of the statute would elimi-
nate some of the disuniformities currently facing
national plans that enter into local markets to pur-
chase insurance. Such disuniformities, however, are
the inevitable result of the congressional decision to
“save” local insurance regulation. Arguments as to
the wisdom of these policy choices must be directed
at Congress.
Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2393 (footnote omitted).
The disingenuous argument made by amici that a
conflict in “approaches” must be resolved by this Court
ignores the factual distinction between insured and self-
insured plans giving rise to the so-called difference in
approaches.“
2 Elsewhere in the opinion, this Court observed that the pre-
emption language of §514(a) of ERISA is “substantially quali-
fied” by a “broad” and explicit“ limitation in § 514(b) (2) (A).
Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2385-86, 2389.
The centerpiece of the briefs filed in support of the petition is
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct.
3085 (1985). It is used by both the Petitioner and amici to manu-
facture a non-existent conflict of “approaches” between circuits.
Russell, however, presents an entirely different factual background,
as was recognized by the Ninth Circuit at the outset of its opinion:
“Neither plan [in Russell] involves an insurance policy.” Russell
v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 722 F.2d 482, 486
(9th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985).
5
The arguments concerning the effect of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. $§ 1011 et seg., made by both
Petitioner and amici also ignore this Court’s decision in
Metropolitan Life. Perhaps more importantly, those ar-
guments ignore § 514(c) (1) as well.“ That section makes
clear that the laws that are saved by § 514(b) (2) (A)
include state decisional law.“ Thus, Respondent’s com-
mon-law claims for relief based on a breach of duty of
an insurer to its beneficiary clearly are covered both by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and by the very explicit
ERISA saving clause.
The Fifth Circuit correctly followed this Court’s de-
cision in Metropolitan Life in holding that Respondent’s
state law claims against an insurance company for fail-
ure to pay benefits were not preempted since the plan in
question was insured.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari
should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM L. DENTON
(Counsel of Record)
WILLIAM C. WALKER, JR.
RONALD S. COCHRAN
DENTON, PERSONS, DORNAN
& BILBO
P. O. Box 1204
Biloxi, MS 39533
(601) 374-8722
Attorneys for Respondent
4 Amici does mention that section in footnote 14 but fails to
quote it in its appendix of relevant statutory provisions.
5 For a thorough discussion, see Eversole v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 500 F.Supp. 1162, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1980), a case with
which this Court is familiar, Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2390
n.18, but which is wholly ignored by Petitioner and only noted by
am ci.
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