Opposition Brief — Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi

Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

JAN 22 1987

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, and

CINQUE BAMBINI PARTNERSHIP,

Petitioners,

Vv.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI and

SAGA PETROLEUM USS. INC.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

Charles Ed Harper

HARPER, BELLAN, MCWHORTER

& WILLIAMS

Sth Floor, 518 Building

518 East Capitol Street

Jackson, Mississippi 39201-2705

(601) 969-1300

Boyce Holleman

BOYCE HOLLEMAN, P.A.

P.O. Drawer 1030

Gulfport, Mississippi 39501

(601) 863-3142

Attorneys for Respondent

Saga Petroleum U.S. Inc.

ee

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

CAN THE EQUAL FOOTING DOC-

TRINE BE APPLIED TO LIMIT RET-

ROACTIVELY THE SCOPE OF A

STATE’S PUBLIC TRUST LANDS?

DOES THE PUBLIC TRUST DOC-

TRINE INCLUDE TIDAL WETLANDS

WITHIN THE STATES’ PUBLIC

TRUST LANDS?

DOES THE EXISTENCE OF OPPOS-

ING PRIVATE INTERESTS AFFECT

THE VITALITY OF THE PUBLIC

TRUST DOCTRINE?

RULE 28.1 LISTING

Saga Petroleum U.S. Inc. is a wholly owned sub-

sidiary of Volvo North America Corporation. Volvo North

America Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of A.B.

Volvo. Saga Petroleum U.S. Inc. is a partner in Saga

Products Company, a general partnership. Saga Petroleum

U.S. Inc. has no subsidiaries.

-jji-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED i

RULE 28.1 LISTING ij

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE l

ARGUMENT

I. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

SINCE THE SUPREME COURT OF

MISSISSIPPI PROPERLY RECOGNIZED

THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE

EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE OPERATED

SOLELY TO GRANT MISSISSIPPI THE

SAME RIGHTS TO PUBLIC TRUST LANDS

THAT WERE OBTAINED BY THE THIR-

TEEN ORIGINAL STATES AS AN

ATTRIBUTE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Il. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

SINCE THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF MISSISSIPPI IS CONSISTENT

WITH THE COURT'S RULINGS THAT THE

PUBLIC TRUST LAND OF THE STATES

INCLUDES TIDF} ANDS, WITHOUT

REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF

NAVIGABILITY 8

Il. THE EXISTENCE OF COMPETING

INTERESTS CANNOT JUSTIFY THE

ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC’S

RIGHTS UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST

DOCTRINE 19

CONCLUSION 21

WG

-311-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877) 11

Borax Consolidated v. City of Los Angeles,

296 U.S. 10, rehearing denied, 296

U.S. 664 (1933) 12

Cinque Bambini Partnership v. Mississippi,

491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986) 1,3,9,19

City of Newark v. Natural Resources Coun-

cil, 82 N.J. 530, 414 A.2d 1304, cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980) 18

Coastal Petroleum Co. v. United States,

524 F.2d 1206 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980), cert.

denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982) 15

Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.)

471 (1850) 9

Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,

146 U.S. 387 (1892) 4,8,10,11

passim

Martin v. Waddeil, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)

367 (1842) 10

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544

(1981) 9,14

Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)

423 (1867) 8

Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922) 14

Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Cor-

vallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 US.

363 (1977) 4,9,11

»iwe

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont.)

Cases Page

Pollard’s Lessee v. on 44 US. (3

How.) 212 (1845) 6,8,9

Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229 (1913) 14

Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) 14

The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitz-

hugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) 11

United States v. Appalachian Power Co.,

311 U.S. 377 (1940) 15

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,

rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 787 (1947) 13

United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045

(D. Del. 1973) 16

United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132

(S.D. Ga. 1973) 16

United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498

F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974) 16

United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931) 9

United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp.

1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980) 16

Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 85 U.S.

(18 Wall.) 57 (1873) 8,15

Statutes

33 U.S.C.S. §§ 401 et seq. (Law. Co-op 1980 &

Supp. 1986) .... 15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action involves a question as to the ownership

of approximately 2,400 acres of land in Mississippi. This

land, which lies near the state’s gulf coast, is subject to

tidal influence. The Petitioners claim ownership of the

land by virtue of certain Spanish grants. The Respon-

dents argue that the property is embraced within the

State of Mississippi’s public trust lands.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that the

Spanish grants had no effect, and that at the time of

achieving statehood, the State of Mississippi obtained title

to all lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide up to

the then mean high water level. Cinque Bambini Partner-

ship v. Mississippi, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986). The

Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States,

arguing that the equal footing doctrine mandates a dif-

ferent result than that reached by the Supreme Court of

Mississippi, and that the public trust lands properly in-

clude only land beneath navigable water (See Phillips

Petroleum Co. and Cinque Bambini Partnership’s Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missis-

sippi; hereinafter “Petition").

2

ARGUMENT

I. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED SINCE

THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI PROP-

ERLY RECOGNIZED THAT IN THE PRESENT

CASE, THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE OPER-

ATED SOLELY TO GRANT MISSISSIPPI THE

SAME RIGHTS TO PUBLIC TRUST LANDS

THAT WERE OBTAINED BY THE THIRTEEN

ORIGINAL STATES AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF

SOVEREIGNTY.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi rendered its deci-

sion in the present case with a complete appreciation of

the “equal footing doctrine” and its impact on Mississippi's

public trust lands. That court recognized that following

the accession of the original thirteen states to the sov-

ereign rights of dominion over navigable waters and tide-

lands, similar rights were held in trust by the United

States, to be passed to each new state upon its entry into

the Union so as to give it “equal footing” with its for-

bears. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. Mississippi, supra,

491 So. 2d at 512.

In considering the identity of the public trust prop-

erty obtained by Mississippi when it joined the Union in

1817, the court applied the equal footing doctrine and

.4-

recognized that Mississippi, like the original thirteen

States, had dominion over such lands as were subject to

the ebb and flow of the tides at that time, as called for

by the controlling authorities of that era. /d. at 513-14.

Having ascertained the scope of Mississippi's public trust

land, as fixed in 1817, the Supreme Court of Mississippi

determined that the equal footing doctrine had served its

purpose, and had no further role in shaping the limits of

the state’s public trust land. /d. at 512. This conclusion

finds support from decisions of the Supreme Court of the

United States in the cases of Oregon ex rel. Siate Land

Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 376

(1977) and Jilinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S.

387 (1892), which embrace the rule that the function of

the equal footing doctrine ends immediately after a state

is admitted to the Union.

Without refuting the soundness of the Supreme Court

of Mississippi's traditional application of the equal footing

doctrine, the Petitioners argue that the doctrine should be

given an expanded role, operating to detach retroactively

&-

certain public trust lands that were acquired by states

upon their entry to the Union. In particular, they argue

that Mississippi's trust lands should now be limited by

application of the doctrine to ensure that the state’s

rights in public trust lands are not greater than those of

the states that subsequently entered the Union. Thus, the

Petitioners would have the doctrine serve to place Mibssis-

Sippi On an equal footing, not with the original thirteen

States as traditionally called for, but with the states that

followed it into the Union.

As discussed in Section II, infra, the Petitioners’

claim that the rights of states which entered the Union

when the “ebb and flow" test was the sole gauge for the

scope of public trust lands are somehow greater than the

rights of states which subsequently entered the Union

when the test of navigability was supposedly the only test

for the trust lands is unsupported by case law or other

authority. Yet, even if it were true, the Petitioners’

equal footing argument would be groundless. The lack of

merit of the argument is revealed by the dearth of

-6-

authority mustered by the Petitioners in its support. In

short, there is no viable authority indicating that the

doctrine of equal footing was developed to restrict any

State’s rights to public trust lands after the state has

obtained the land upon entry to the Union. Clearly, the

phrase “equal footing" cannot be given too much emphasis

in analyzing the nature of the doctrine. As new states

entered the Union following the revolution, they varied

widely in terms of their size and geographic features.

Thus, the quantum of public trust land held by each state

varied accordingly. There is, therefore, an inherent "im-

balance” as to the quantity of lands obtained by the

States in this manner. This result obtains regardless of

whether the “ebb and flow” test or a “navigability” test is

used to determine the identity of each state's public trust

lands.

In support of their request for consideration of this

issue, the Petitioners cite Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44

U.S. (3 How.) 212, 220 (1845), which is said to demon-

strate that “this Court has deemed efforts to limit the

x

scope of the state-owned public trust land of such ex-

traordinary importance as to warrant plenary considera-

tion" (Petition at 9-10). Plainly, this authority is not

relevant to the issue at hand. It seems that the only

parties who seek to limit the scope of Mississippi's public

trust land in this action are the Petitioners themselves;

the Supreme Court of Mississippi clearly has not done so.

Since the Petitioners’ contention is devoid of sup-

porting authority, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi

has applied the equal footing doctrine in a manner consis-

tent with the decisions of this Court, the petition should

be denied.

-8-

Il. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED SINCE

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

MISSISSIPPI IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS

COURT'S RULING THAT THE PUBLIC TRUST

LAND OF THE STATES INCLUDES TIDELANDS,

WITHOUT REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF NAVI-

GABILITY.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in

this case rests upon a sound interpretation of the scope

of the public trust land that devolved upon the State of

Mississippi when it entered the Union. It is well recog-

nized that the courts of this nation adopted the English

common-law doctrine that reserved to the sovereign the

right to tidal waters and the lands beneath them. See,

e.g., Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, supra, 146 U.S. at

435-36; Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)

57 (1873). Pursuant to this doctrine, the United States

held the nation’s tidewaters in trust for the future states,

dominion over such property passing to each state upon

its admission to the Union. See Weber v. Harbor Commis

sioners, supra; Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423,

436 (1867); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, supra. The identity

of the land included within the public trust was

9.

established at the time that the states achieved statehood.

Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand &

Gravel Co., supra, 429 U.S. at 376; United States v. Utah,

283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9

How.) 471, 477 (1850). Thus, in 1817, when the State of

Mississippi entered the Union, its public trust lands were

identified and fixed. At that time, American courts fol-

lowed the English common-law rule which defined the

sovercign’s trust to include land subject to the ebb and

flow of the tide. See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, supra.

In light of this authority, the Supreme Court of

Mississippi properly concluded that the state’s trust lands

included those lying under coastal wetlands that are sub-

ject to tidal action. See Cinque Bambini Partnership v.

Mississippi, supra.

The Petitioners argue that decisions reached by this

Court subsequent to Mississippi's statehood have complete

ly supplanted the earlier “ebb and flow” test with a “nav-

igability in fact" test. In support of this contention, the

Petitioners cite authorities such as Montana v. United

-J0-

States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Illinois Central Railroad v.

Illinois, supra, and Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)

367 (1842), which undeniably rely on the factor of naviga-

bility to ascertain questions regarding the scope of public

trust land in certain situations.

However, the Petitioners fail to cite any authority,

predating or contemporancous with Mississippi's entry into

the Union in 1817, that sets forth a navigability criterion

for delineating public trust lands. Nor have the Peti-

tioners provided any authority indicating that the “naviga-

bility” test was intended to divest from certain states land

already held under the “ebb and flow” test. Indeed, the

Petitioners simply fail to address the problems that neces-

sarily arise from a construction of the public trust doc-

trine that operates to take from the states vast quantities

of land already vested in them when they became states.

Despite the Petitioners’ argument, the proper role of

the factor of navigability can only be appreciated when

viewed from the perspective of the courts that fashioned

the equal footing doctrine (discussed supra, in Section I)

-11-

Plainly, the public trust doctrine, as originally formulated,

offered little to the iniand states with no tidal waters.

The development of a navigability test, which coincided

with the development of the interior of the nation, repre-

sents an expansion from the original "ebb and flow" test

to provide the inland states with similar benefits of sov-

ereignty already enjoyed by coastal states. See Oregon ex

rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,

supra, 429 U.S. at 375 (citing Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US.

324, 338 (1877)).

Despite the expanded definition of public trust lands,

the navigability analysis of the scope of public trust lands

has not entirely replaced the "ebb and flow" test. The

Petitioners suggest that, by virtue of the decisions in

cases such as The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh,

53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) and Jilinois Central Railroad

v. Illinois, supra, this Court rejected the “historical mis-

conception" that the "public trust doctrine encompassed

‘tidewaters’ or lands that are subject to the ‘ebb and flow

of the tide,’ all without regard to navigability" (Petition

12.

at 15). Nevertheless, over forty years after the /Ilinois

Central Railroad decision, this Court reiterated the valid-

ity of the ebb and flow test.

In the case of Borax Consolidated v. City of Los

Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, rehearing denied, 296 U.S. 664

(1933), this Court addressed the issue of the ownership of

certain tidal lands lying on the coast of California. One

party to the suit claimed title to the land by way of a

patent issued by the United States. The other party

claimed title through a legislative grant by the state. In

determining the respective rights of the parties, this

Court considered the public trust doctrine, and stated that

"[t]he soils under tidewaters within the original states

were reserved to them respectively, and the states since

admitted to the Union have the same sovereignty and

jurisdiction in relation to such land within their borders

as the original states possessed." 296 U.S. at 15.

Having recognized the superior rights of the State of

California in tidelands by reason of the public trust doc-

trine, the Supreme Court concluded that the issue of

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ownership of the land could be resolved by answering one

question: "Was it upland, which the United States could

patent, or tideland, which it could not?" Jd. at 18-19.

In determining the boundary of the tidelands, the

Supreme Court looked to the common-law "ebb and flow"

test, the same test which was relied upon by the Supreme

Court of Mississippi in the present case. Jd. at 22-23.

The Supreme Court of the United States did not consider

the factor of navigability at all.

A similar reaffirmation of the inclusion of tidelands

in the public trust may be found in this Court’s decision

in the case of United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,

rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 787 (1947). Although in that

case, this Court refused to expand the scope of the public

trust to include a belt of submerged land lying offshore,

it did acknowledge that the soils lying beneath inland

navigable waters and tidelands were within the trust. 332

US. at 36.

It should be noted that the authorities espousing the

navigability analysis of the scope of the public trust

-14-

lands, such as Montana v. United States, supra; Oklahoma

v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922): Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S.

229 (1913); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois

Central Railroad v. Illinois, supra, and others,

specifically involved inland waters and thus under-

standably do not utilize factors of analysis more relevant

to coastal areas.

The Petitioners’ misplaced reliance on the issue of

navigability arises in part from their misunderstanding of

the relationship between the federal government’s reserved

rights in the public trust lands and the scope of the

trust. The Petitioners stress the importance of the ap-

plication of the "navigability in fact test" in order to

respect the constitutional concern underlying the public

trust doctrine that it be "deemed subject to the para-

mount power of Congress to regulate the commerce and

navigability of such waters" (Petition at 12-13).

It is well established that the states’ rights in public

trust lands are subject to the paramount rights of Con-

gress to regulate commerce over such lands. See, e.g.,

-]5-

Illinois Central Rail: ad v. Illinois, supra; Weber v. Harbor

Commissioners, supra. The federal interest in submerged

property beneath navigable waters, known as the "naviga-

tional servitude,” is manifested in such legislation as the

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.S. § § 401 et seq.

(Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1986). See also Coastal Petro-

leum Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1206, 1209 (Ct. Cl.

1976), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980), cert. denied, 456

U.S. 915 (1982). As a superior interest, the navigational

servitude can hardly be said to be limited or otherwise

affected by the inclusion or exclusion of non-navigable

tidal waters in the public trust lands. This point is well

illustrated by the following passage from the case of

United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,

426-27 (1940):

(I]t cannot properly be said that the constitu-

tional power of the United States over its

waters is limited to control for navigation. .. .

In truth the authority of the United States is

the regulation of commerce on its waters.

Navigability . . . is but a part of this whole.

Flood protection, watershed development, recov-

ery of the cost of improvements through utili-

zation of power are likewise parts of commerce

control. ... [T]he authority is as broad as the

-16-

needs of commerce.

Thus, the Petitioners’ suggestion that the federal rights in

the lands in question will not be "respected" under the

Supreme Court of Mississppi’s decision in the present

case is utterly without merit.

Nevertheless, federal case law pertaining to the

federal intcrest in submerged lands does illuminate the

issue at hand in one respect. A number of courts have

held that "navigable waters,” the primary factor in ascer-

taining the scope of the federal interest in submerged

lands, extend from coastal ocean areas up into tidal wet-

lands that are not actually "navigable in fact.” See, e¢.g.,

United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.

1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975) (holding that the

scope of the federal servitude is defined by the ebb and

flow of the tide and therefore extends to include tidal

marshes); United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045 (D.

Del. 1973); United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.

Ga. 1973); see also United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp.

1331, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (in considering whether tidal

-17-

creeks are navigable, the court held that "the legal status

of a determination of navigability applies laterally over

the entire surface of the water body and extends shore-

ward to the mean high water mark"; where a tidal creek

lies adjacent to a navigable river, "no inquiry is required

here concerning the potential of these tidal creeks for

commerce or transportation”).

Thus, it is apparent that, even if the scope of public

trust lands is to be determined by the criterion of naviga-

bility of waters, federal law recognizes that navigable

waters extend into tidal wetlands that are not navigable

in fact. The application of a navigability criterion in the

present case would not alter the rights of the parties

herein, as established by the Supreme Court of Mississippi,

since the property in question lies under tidal wetlands,

and since it would fall within the public trust under

either an “ebb and flow” test or a navigable waters test.

In ascertaining the scope of Mississippi's public trust

lands, the Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that the

trust included tidal wetlands. This ruling is in accord

-18-

with the authorities controlling when Mississippi became a

State as well as with more recent decisions of the

Supreme Court of the United States. Furthermore, the

Supreme Court of Mississippi’s decision mirrors that ren-

dered by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case of

City of Newark v. Natural Resources Council, 82 N.J. 530,

414 A.2d 1304 (sovereign ownership based on tidal flow,

irrespective of navigability, has been and continues to be

the rule in New Jersey), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).

In light of the overwhelming support for the Supreme

Court of Mississippi’s approach in this case, and the cor-

responding lack of authority for that of the Petitioners,

the petition should be denied.

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Ill. THE EXISTENCE OF COMPETING INTERESTS

CANNOT JUSTIFY THE ABANDONMENT OF

THE PUBLIC’S RIGHTS UNDER THE PUBLIC

TRUST DOCTRINE.

As the Mississippi Supreme Court stated, "great

public interests and neither insignificant nor illegitimate

private interests are present and in conflict, [neverthe-

less} this in the end is a title suit." Cinque Bambini

Partnership v. Mississippi, supra, 491 So. 2d at 510.

These conflicts are not irreconcilable, as evidenced by the

court’s opinion.

The existence of the public trust ownership is a fact

which the alleged purchaser of tidelands may be expected

to weigh when attempting to purchase such lands, and,

when the state exercises its long-held title to such lands,

it has hardly frustrated the justifiable expectations of the

alleged owners. Nor is it reasonable for purported owners

to complain that public trust rights in these lands have

largely lain dormant for many years.

The principal objects of public trust ownership are

the maintenance of navigation, ports, free passage, com-

merce, fishing, sand and stones, seaweed and shells,

-20-

recreation, conservation and aesthetics, and other impor-

tant public interests. When common-law principles within

the state established the existence of such ownership in

1817, alleged purchasers of public trust lands were subject

to the exercise of the trust ownership at any future date.

The coastal zone, with its biological and mineral

resources and recreational and aesthetic values, is not a

limitless resource. It must be protected and used in a

manner that will ensure that resources are not misallo-

cated. Thus it is clear that the general public, as owners

of the tidelands pursuant to the public trust doctrine, has

a vital interest in the coastal zone. Although the rights

of the general public may be in conflict with those of

private littoral owners, such conflict is capable of just

resolution by the courts, as amply demonstrated by the

decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in the present

Case.

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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Mississippi's decision is con-

sistent with this Court’s rulings regarding the public trust

and equal footing doctrines, and since no conflict between

the circuits is presented by this case, the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles Ed Harper

HARPER, BELLAN,

MCWHORTER & WILLIAMS

Sth Floor, 518 Building

518 East Capitol Street

Jackson, Mississippi 39201-2705

(601) 969-1300

Boyce Holleman

BOYCE HOLLEMAN, P.A.

P.O. Drawer 1030

Gulfport, Mississippi 39501

(601) 863-3142

Attorneys for Respondent

Saga Petroleum US. Inc.