Reply Brief — United States v. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (Nos. 86-625, 86-495, 86-624)

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Nos. 86-495, 86-624 and 86-625

e2 BST

IN THE

Suprenw Court of the United Steetes———"—-

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

K MART CORPORATION,

y

Petitioner,

CARTIER, INC., et a/.

ATTH STREET PHOTO, INC.,

V.

Petitioner,

COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF

AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et a’.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ef a/.,

V.

Petitioners,

COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF

AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et al.

JOSEPH F. SPANIDOY

~

LESK

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR

PETITIONER K MART CORPORATION

September 22, 1987

ROBERT W. STEELE *

ROBERT E. HEBDA

Steele & Fornaciari

Suite 850

2020 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-1857

202) 887-1779

JAMES C, TUTTLE

Assistant General Counsel

Antitrust and International

K mart Corporation

International Headquarters

3100 West Big Beaver Road

Troy, Michigan 48084

(313) 643-1688

Attorneys for Petitioner

K mart Corporation

* Counsel of Record

RS SSS

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

i Supreme Court, U.S. 7

FILED

JR,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................- ii

FE ET I RY A ee eS ee ae 2

I THE STATUTORY SCHEME FAVORS

PARALLEL IMPORTS --.-.-.-------------~-- 4

A. Protection Of Trademarks .__.__.__-_---_-- 4

B. Protection Of American Interests ._______- 7

C. Regulatory Authority _.....-.-.___--__-- i)

Il. BOTH CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC HAVE

LONG RELIED ON THE CUSTOMS SERV-

eB EE eC ee ae 9

Ee 11

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir.

1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) ------------ 5,7

Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp.

NR | 7

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,

ee ee emeewece x

Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,

EL 2

E! Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.,

806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’g 599 F. Supp.

1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), petition for cert. filed,

No. 86-1735 (Apr. 27, 1987) ..-------------- 6

Lever Brothers Co. v. United States, 652 F. Supp.

Ne meee 3

National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482

F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.

a ewe 9

NEC Electronics, Inc. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Inc.,

810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert.

filed, No. 87-125 (July 20, 1987) ___-.-------- 6

Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada

Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987),

aff’g 640 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), petition

for cert. filed, No. 87-38 (July 3, 1987) -.__---- 6

Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924) _- 2

STATUTES

Clean Air Act

ET 4

Fair Packaging and Labelling Act

TT 4

Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act

a 4

Lanham Act

Ee . 3

EE passim

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Page

LS 4

National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act

ae 4

Tariff Act of 1930

ET ee RE 9

ES Ren passim

EL a a 9

Trademark Act of 1905

EE ES A 5

Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984

Be PCED CRED on cen ccecccns 6

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

62 Cong. Rec. S 11,605 (Aug. 19, 1922) .._________ x

133 Cong. Rec. H 7,303-7,304 (daily ed. Aug. 7,

ae Sat eae a re 9

133 Cong. Rec. S 11,893-11,894 (daily ed. Sept. 9,

a 10

S. Rep. No. 98-526, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. (1984),

reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

eo eaimanwnue 6, 10

REGULATORY MATERIALS

Art. 517, Customs Regulations of 1931 _________ 5

1 Fed. Reg. 1,725 (1936) (T.D. 48,537) _________ 5,8

T.D. 58,399 (1958) ........_-_- ee he 10

re ameciomoen 5

PD nn cece eweccoccecec 5

MISCELLANEOUS

COPIAT, The Economic Impact of Diversion, sub-

mitted to the Customs Service Sept. 20, 1984__ 3

Wall Street Journal, Aug. 29, 1987, at 2 _________ 8

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

Nos. 86-495, 86-624 and 86-625

K MART CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

CARTIER, INC., et al.

47TH STREET PHOTO, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF

AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et al.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

- Petitioners,

COALITION TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF

AMERICAN TRADEMARKS, et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR

PETITIONER K MART CORPORATION

K mart submits the following brief in reply to the

May 7, 1987 briefs for Respondents and amici, and as

a supplement to its February 21, 1987 brief.

2

ARGUMENT

Respondents argue for a supposedly literal construc-

tion of Section 526 which would do something done by

no other trademark law (or copyright or patent law)

before or since: entitle an enterprise to impose restric-

tions upon the resale of its goods. Section 526 was in-

tended to protect United States trademark owners

against the importation of infringing goods made by

others, not to enable foreign manufacturers to control

the flow of their own goods after sale.’

Even the Respondents tacitly concede that the drafters

of Section 526 never envisioned ‘such a drastic result as

flowing from their legislative efforts. But based on a

twisted interpretation of a rather clear cut legislative

intent to prevent trademark infringement by independent

foreign companies, Respondents ask the Customs Service

to enforce territorial restrictions and price discrimina-

tions which are illegal both in the United States* and

abroad*. There is especially no justification for this

when Respondents are themselves responsible for the ex-

istence of parallel imports:

1As Justice Holmes said in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S.

359, 368 (1924), “A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit

the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s good will against the

sale of another’s product as his.” Cf. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.

John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911), holding that

once a product has been sold, the public is entitled to the advantage

of competition in the subsequent traffic.

2 The antitrust laws prohibit the price-fixing and other restric-

tions on domestic distribution which Respondents seek to impose

at the point of importation.

3 Respondents admit that “efforts to stop diversion short of this

country’s borders are often ineffectual because of the practical or

legal difficulty or impossibility of preventing sales in foreign coun-

tries to third-party diverters.”” Respondents’ May 7, 1987 Brief at

3. This is because other countries have rejected as illegally anti-

competitive Respondents’ efforts to restrict parallel imports. See

foreign cases cited in K mart’s February 21, 1987 Brief at 43-44.

3

COPIAT members manufacture abroad, rather than

in the United States, because it is more profitable;

COPIAT members promote the same trademarks

and use the same packaging worldwide because it

is more profitable; *

COPIAT members charge the American consumer

higher prices because it is more profitable; and

COPIAT members are owned and/or controlled by

foreign companies because it is more profitable.

Respondents have proffered conflicting economic reasons

for parallel imports.° On the one hand, Respondents

claim that expensive warranties and service in the

United States account for the cost differences which

result in parallel imports.* However, COPIAT has sub-

mitted statistics to the Treasury Department in connec-

tion with the ongoing rulemaking proceeding which show

instead that these costs come nowhere near the price

difference between “authorized” and parallel imports.’

* Respondents claim that import restrictions are necessary be-

cause they market inferior products abroad with trademarks, pack-

aging and labelling identical to those on the products they market

in the United States. See Lever Brothers Co. v. United States,

652 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1987). The Lanham Act, however, ex-

pressly provides that a trademark is forfeited if a related company

uses it on an inferior product, thereby deceiving the public. 15

U.S.C. § 1055. .

5 If the result in this case were to depend on such evidence, the

case must be remanded for discovery. Cross motions for summary

judgment were filed, but no discovery was conducted on the con-

tested issues of material fact (J.A. 2 No. 28). See Statement of

Robert W. Steele (J.A. 2 No. 28 Att. 8).

® See Statements of Robert H. Miller {13, Aaron Altman 9 9,

Jack M. Abrams ‘\{ 12-18 (J.A. 2, No. 8).

7 For example, the warranty costs for three camera manufac-

turers averaged less than 2.7% of the retail price; three fragrance

and cosmetic manufacturers had no warranty or service costs what-

soever. COPIAT, The Economic Impact of Diversion, submitted to

the Customs Service Sept. 20, 1984 at Table 4.

4

The latter is the more sensible conclusion: Respondents

must promote, market, service, and guarantee their prod-

ucts regardless of the country in which they sell them; on

the other hand, United States retailers must promote,

market, service and guarantee parallel imports at their

own expense.*®

I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME FAVORS PARALLEL

IMPORTS

Respondents and their amici would have the Court be-

lieve that Section 526 (and Section 42 of the Lanham

Act) were actually meant to deal with imagined evils

ranging from unsafe automobiles to adulterated liquor.

As legislative history and court decisions confirm, these

are not the controlling statutes on such matters. Stat-

utes such as the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21

U.S.C. $301 et seq., the National Traffic and Motor Ve-

hicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1391 et seqg., and the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seqg., govern the contents

and labelling of cosmetics and the safety and emissions

of cars—whether imported or domestic and whether sold

by an “authorized” or an “independent” distributor.

Likewise, federal and state warranty, labelling and con-

sumer protection statutes, such as the Fair Packaging

and Labelling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1451 et seqg., and the

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.,

govern the responsibility of retailers, distributors and

manufacturers (whether foreign or domestic) for con-

sumer goods.

A. Protection Of Trademarks

Respondents apparently no longer contend that the

Customs Service regulations are inconsistent with Sec-

tion 42 of the Lanham Act. It is certainly difficult to

argue that parallel imports violate Section 42, since no

8 See statements ot William Propst 711, John M. Bauersfeld

5, Ely Steinfeld {13 (J.A. 2 No. 28 Atts. 1, 4, 6). For example,

K mart spent over $495 million on product promotion in 1986.

5

“copying or simulating” is involved. Respondents’ con-

cession is significant because courts, Congress and the

Customs Service have traditionally considered the Lan-

ham Act together with Section 526 when deciding the ex-

tent to which the importation of genuine trademarked

goods can be prevented. This was the genesis of Section

526, when the Second Circuit held in Katzel® that the

Trademark Act of 1905 did not protect the bona fide

purchase of trademark rights by an independent Ameri-

ean firm. Since 1922, virtually every congressional

and judicial ™ discussion of parallel imports has relied

on both Section 526 and Section 42 of the Lanham Act,

and the Customs Service has consistently relied on both

as the authority for its regulations.» For example, the

1936 regulations, which permitted the importation of

trademarked goods manufactured abroad where the for-

eign and domestic trademarks were “owned by the same

person, partnership, association or corporation”, relied

upon both Section 526 and the Trademark Act.”

When these two statutes are considered together and

construed consistently, the only possible conclusion is

that Congress intended trademarked goods to be freely

imported except in the very specific Katzel situation—

to prevent fraud on the independent American purchaser

of the domestic rights to a foreign trademark.

The Ninth Circuit recently emphasized the proper

application of the Lanham Act to parallel imports."* In

A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd,

260 U.S. 689 (1923).

10 See K mart’s February 21, 1987 brief at 24-31.

11 See K mart’s February 21, 1987 brief at 1 n.1.

12 See Art. 517, Customs Regulations of 1931 (J.A. 21-22); 19

C.F.R. § 11.14 (1946) (J.A. 45-46) ; 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1969) (J.A.

67).

13] Fed. Reg. 1,725 (1936) (T.D. 48,537) (J.A. 27-28).

14In two cases, the Second Circuit has seriously confused the

law of_parallel imports by failing to consider the 1984 Lanham Act

6

NEC Electronics, Inc. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Inc., 810

F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987), the court held that the

Katzel decision “presuppose[s] the American [trade-

mark] owner’s real independence from the foreign manu-

facturer, and courts interpreting Katzel have repeatedly

emphasized this factor.” 810 F.2d at 1510. The court

of appeals also acknowledged that the Customs Service

“has for decades made an exception to section 526 in

cases where the American trademark owner and the

foreign producer are under common control.” 810 F.2d

at 1510 n.4 (emphasis added).

The court further recognized that NEC and its affili-

ates were themselves responsible for the parallel imports:

If NEC-Japan chooses to sell abroad at lower

prices than those it could obtain for the identical

product here, that is its business. In doing so, how-

ever, it cannot look to United States trademark law

to insulate the American market or to vitiate the

effects of international trade. This country’s trade-

mark law does not offer NEC-Japan a vehicle for

establishing a worldwide discriminatory pricing

scheme simply through the expedient of setting up

an American subsidiary with nominal title to its

mark.

810 F.2d at 1511.

Respondents would have this Court endorse such a

scheme.

amendments which defined the indicia of a genuine trademark.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B). Moreover, the court ignored the

legislative history which confirmed the legality of parallel imports.

S. Rep. No. 98-526, 98th Cong, 2d Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in

1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3627, 3629. Petitions for

certiorari are pending in both El Greco Leather Products Co. v.

Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), and Original Ap-

palachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 26

(2d Cir. 1987).

7

B. Protection Of American Interests

Respondents characterize Petitioners’ interpretation of

Section 526 as xenophobic.” But Section 526 by its terms

protects only “a citizen of” or “a corporation or asso-

ciation created or organized within” the United States

which is also “domiciled in the United States,” and the

legislative history confirms this bias against foreign

companies.*®

Although Respondents have now proffered a plethora

of complex corporate structures to test the limits of the

Customs Service regulations, the court below recognized

the predominant distribution system at issue:

This situation typically arises when a foreign pro-

ducer creates an American subsidiary that then

registers the American trademark.

790 F.2d at 904."

To escape antitrust liability for their price-fixing and

distributional restraints, COPIAT and its amici argue

vigorously that the foreign producer and its American

subsidiary are a single entity which cannot conspire with

itself..* If each of these parent-subsidiary combinations

15 The Katzel decision itself was xenophobic, since the plaintiff

was perceived to have been cheated by the French company from

which it purchased trademark rights.

- 16 While Congress in 1922 did not envision the complex structure

of the modern multinational corporation, there is no reason to

assume that it would have favored such an entity over American

consumers.

17 Chief Judge Weinstein described the corporate structure of a

COPIAT member as follows:

Hattori and its American subsidiaries do maintain some inde-

pendence—about as much as the egg and vegetables in a west-

ern omelette.

Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1341

(E.D.N.Y. 1981).

18 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,

771 (1984). Respondents alternatively argue that at most they

engage in vertical price-fixing, which should no longer be regarded

8

is a single entity, with a foreign company exercising

control, that entity has no right—under the literal words

of Section 526—to exclude goods that it has sold abroad.

On the other hand, if the domestic subsidiary is considered

the agent of its foreign parent, Congress in 1922 stated

that parallel imports could not be excluded:

The mere fact of a foreigner having a trade-

mark and-registering that trade-mark in the United

States through an agency, of course, would not be

affected by this provision [i.e., Section 526].

62 Cong. Ree. S 11,605 (Aug. 19, 1922) (statement of

Sen. McCumber) .’®

Congress recently confirmed that it considers a foreign

manufacturer and its American subsidiary a _ single

entity by refusing to recognize the supposed independence

of Toshiba America, Inc., the wholly-owned Toshiba sub-

sidiary which markets consumer electronics in the United

States. Congress voted to ban the importation and sale

of Toshiba products because one of Toshiba’s Japanese

subsidiaries, at most a “half-sister” of Toshiba America,

as per se illegal under the antitrust laws. Respondents’ May 7,

1987 Brief at 39. This position is questionable both as a matter of

law and as a matter of fact.

Recent events confirm that the Customs Service regulations pro-

tect American consumers from horizontal price-fixing conspiracies.

For example, the Electronics Industries Association of Korea,

whose members distribute through wholly-owned American sub-

sidiaries, recently announced that it was “voluntarily placing re-

straints—in the form of price floors—on exports [of consumer

electronics products} to the U.S.” and would consider imposing

export restrictions to keep retail prices high. Wall Street Journal,

Aug. 29, 1987, at 2. Where an entire industry adopts such a posi-

tion, parallel imports are the only source of interbrand or intra-

brand price competition.

19 Likewise the Customs Service regulations have, since at least

1936, expressly recognized that Section 526 does not apply where

the foreign and domestic trademarks “are owned by the same per-

son, partnership, association, or corporation.” 1 Fed. Reg. 1,725

(1936) (T.D. 48,537) (J.A. 27-28).

©

9

Inc., had sold secret submarine technology to the Soviet

Union.”

C. Regulatory Authority

Respondents argue that Congress, in granting general

rulemaking authority,’ did not intend the Customs Serv-

ice to interpret or construe Section 526, because Section

526 itself contains no delegation of rulemaking authority;

on the other hand, where Congress intended the Customs

Service to have such authority in particular areas, it

made specific, limited delegations of such authority.

This argument has been rejected, perhaps most dra-

matically in connection with the delegation of rulemaking

authority to the Federal Trade Commission. The District

of Columbia Circuit held that although Congress had

specifically given the FTC rulemaking authority in cer-

tain particular areas, this did not preclude the agency

from relying on a general delegation of authority to issue

broad, substantive rules with the full force and effect of

law.”

The Customs Service regulations on parallel imports

are entitled to similar treatment.

Il. BOTH CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC HAVE LONG

RELIED ON THE CUSTOMS SERVICE REGULA-

TIONS

Respondents argue vigorously that the Customs Serv-

ice regulations are neither long-standing nor consistent.

However, at the end, Respondents are forced to admit

that a multinational enterprise with both American and

foreign arms has not been allowed to preclude importa-

20 The Senate voted 95-2 to ban the importation of Toshiba prod-

ucts. House conferees on the Trade Bill were directed to accept

such prohibitions to protect national defense. See 133 Cong. Rec.

H 7,303-7,304 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).

2119 U.S.C. § 66; 19 U.S.C. § 1624.

22 National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 695-

697 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).

10

tion of goods bearing a United States trademark since

at least 1936.*° Nor can Respondents point to a single

instance when the Customs Service has issued a regula-

tion or public decision supporting their reading of Sec-

tion 526. |

The attacks which Respondents have launched against

the various Customs Service regulations in effect since

1936 are largely linguistic. For example, Respondents

argue that the Customs Service was somehow inconsist-

ent in 1953 when it amended the regulation expressly to

allow admission of trademarked goods manufactured

abroad by “related companies’.** Respondents ignore,

however, that the related company language, if it

changed the Customs Service regulation at all, broadened

the class of trademarked goods which could be imported

freely into the United States. At no time since 1936 has

Customs ever indicated that Section 526 could be the

basis for precluding all imports of trademarked -goods

manufactured abroad by a multinational enterprise.

It is clear that Congress has had this understanding of

Customs Service regulations for some time.** Indeed,

even those legislators who oppose parallel imports are

constrained to admit that the Customs Service regulation

presently allows such imports.**

23 While we recognize that Section 526 was directed toward goods

manufactured abroad by a foreign company, it should not be con-

strued to permit a United States company to preclude the im-

portation of trademarked goods which its own subsidiary has

manufactured abrvad. Indeed, such a construction would apparently

be contrary to the Lanham Act, which only prohibits the sale of

copies, simulations or counterfeits.

*4T.D. 53,399 (1953) (J.A. 55, 56). See Respondents’ May 7,

1987 Brief at 44.

25 See S. Rep. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted

in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3627, 3629.

26 See 133 Cong. Rec. S 11,893-11,894 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1987).

11

Under the circumstances, American companies which

have been dealing in parallel imports have had every

right to rely upon the Customs Service regulations.

These companies have brought price competition to the

market which would not exist if it were not for their

reliance and their efforts.

CONCLUSION

Respondents have not advanced any credible reason

now to overturn the Customs Service regulations of

which Congress has been apprised and on which a sub-

stantial domestic industry has relied for over five

decades. The rules of statutory construction and con-

siderations of public policy mandate that the regulations

be upheld.

For these reasons and those set forth in K mart’s

February 21, 1987 Brief, the judgment of the court of

appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT W. STEELE *

ROBERT E. HEBDA

Steele & Fornaciari

Suite 850

2020 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-1857

(202) 887-1779

JAMES C. TUTTLE

Assistant General Counsel

Antitrust and International

K mart Corporation

International Headquarters

3100 West Big Beaver Road

Troy, Michigan 48084

(313) 643-1688

Attorneys for Petitioner

K mart Corporation

September 22, 1987 * Counsel of Record

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