Appendix — Commissioner v. Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1986
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Supreme Court, U.S.
86-490 | ite
SEP 95 i996
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| —_— .
Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
'
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER
Vv.
ILLINOIS CEREAL MILLS, INC.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
ROGER M. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR.
Deputy Solicitor General
ALAN I. HoRoOWI!ITz
Assistant to the Solicitor General
JONATHAN S. COHEN
WILLIAM A. WHITLEDGE
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix A (court of appeals opinion dated Apr. 28,
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Appendix B (court of appeals order dated Apr. 28,
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Appendix C (tax court opinion dated Aug. 11, 1983).. 25a
Appendix D (tax court decision dated Dec. 24, 1984).. 107a
Appendix E (statutory appendix) —............000000000....... 109a
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APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 85-1485
ILLINOIS CEREAL MILLS, INC., APPELLEE
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, APPELLANT
On Appeal from the Decision of the
United States Tax Court
Argued October 25, 1985—Decided April 28, 1986*
Before BAUER, Woop and ESCHBACH, Circuit
Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue from a decision of
the United States Tax Court. The Commissioner ar-
gues the Tax Court erred in holding that ninety-five
percent of the cost of Illinois Cereal Mill’s factory
* This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this
court in regular active service under Circuit Rule 16 on the
question of creating a conflict with A. C. Monk & Co. v. United
States, 686 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1982). No judge voted to
hear this case en banc.
2a
electrical system qualified for the investment tax
credit. We affirm.
I.
IlInois Cereal Mills (“ICM”) conducts a corn mill-
ing business in Paris, Illinois. In 1976, ICM com-
pleted construction of a new specialty mill. The elec-
trical distribution system that provides power to the
specialty mill is contained in a separate room within
the mill building. The system consists of circuit
breakers, transformers, power panels, switchboards,
motor control centers, and associated wiring. It func-
tions to break down the 4,160 volts received from
the electric utility into voltages usable in the mill.
Ninety-five percent of the electrical load entering the
system is used to run mill machinery. The remain-
ing five percent is used for lighting and other gen-
eral building needs.
In its tax return filed for its fiscal year ending
September 30, 1976, ICM treated the entire cost of
the electrical system as an expenditure qualifying
for the investment tax credit. The Commissioner de-
termined that none of the cost qualified and claimed
a deficiency on that basis. The Tax Court held that
ninety-five percent of the cost of the electrical dis-
tribution system qualified for the investment tax
credit because ninety-five percent of its function was
to supply usable power to mill machinery qualifying
for the investment tax credit. The Commissioner ap-
peals. We affirm.
II.
This case concerns the investment tax credit
(“ITC”). The ITC was added to the Internal Rev-
enue Code in 1962. Pub. L. 87-834, 76 Stat. 967
(1962). It is designed to increase economic produc-
tivity, output, and growth by creating a tax incen-
8a
tive for the purchase of machinery, equipment, and
other property used to produce goods or run a busi-
ness. Comdisco v. United States, 756 F.2d 569, 572
(7th Cir. 1985) ; CIR v. Schuyler Grain Co., 411 F.2d
649, 652 (7th Cir. 1969); See, H.R. Rep. No. 1447,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1881,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962).
The ITC is established in § 38 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. To qualify for ITC treatment, property
must meet the definition of “section 38 property” |
found at § 48 of the Code. In 1976, the relevant tax
year for this appeal, § 48 read in pertinent part as
follows.
§ 48. Definitions; special rule
(a) Section 38 property—
(1) In general.—Except as provided in this
subsection, the term “section 38 property”
means—
(A) tangible personal property, or
(B) other tangible property (not in-
cluding a building and its structural
components)... .
26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(1) (1976). Thus, the Code estab-
lishes two ways for property to qualify as ITC prop-
erty: (1) by meeting the definition of “tangible per-
sonal property” or (2) by meeting the definition of
“other tangible property” and qualifying as some-
thing other than a building or structural component
of a building.
The labyrinthian analysis developed in the statute,
regulations, cases, and legislative history to deter-
mine whether property qualifies as “tangible personal
property” or “other personal property” (and thus
as § 38 property given ITC treatment) is a meander-
4a
ing path of many steps. We first chart the course,
then venture down it with the facts of this case in
tow.
A.
The test for “tangible personal property” focuses
on whether the property in question is an “inherently
permanent structure.” Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (26
C.F.R.); H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
11-12 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
11-12 and 16 (1962). Thus cases and Treasury rul-
ings have determined that property that is easily re-
movable, such that it is likely to accompany the busi-
ness if it should leave the premises, is § 38 property
and qualifies for the ITC.’
1 Consolidated Freightways v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 708 F.2d 1385, 1890 (9th Cir. 1983) (loading docks,
overhead doors, and lights are intended to be permanent and
thus do not qualify as §38 property); Southland Corp. v.
United States, 611 F.2d 348 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (outdoor advertis-
ing signs are § 38 property to extent removable) ; Kramertown
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 488 F.2d 728, 731
(5th Cir. 1974) (air conditioning/heating units, removable
only to extent necessary for replacement and repair, are not
§ 38 property) ; National Advertising Co. v. United States,
507 F.2d 850 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (outdoor advertising signs are
§ 38 property to extent removable); Alabama Displays v.
United States, 507 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (same); King
Radio Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1973)
(movable partitions are §38 property under permanency
test) ; Minot Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United
States, 435 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1970) (same) ; Hayden Island
v. United States, 380 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D. Or. 1974) (sewage
treatment plant movable from site to site qualifies as § 38
property under permanency test) ; Samis v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 76 T.C. 609, 620-21 (1981) (heating, air
conditioning, and hot/cold water unit is not § 38 property
under permanency test) ; Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revnue, 77 T.C. 349, 404-09 (1981)
5a
If property fails to qualify as tangible personal
property under § 38 because that property is found
to be inherently permanent, all is not lost for the tax-
payer. Such property may still qualify as § 38 prop-
erty under the test for “other tangible property.”
Congress added this separate category to insure that
some property classified as nonpersonal under state
law (such as, heavy immovable machines classified as
fixtures and, therefore, technically real property)
would still qualify for the ITC. Kramertown Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 488 F.2d 728,
731 (5th Cir. 1974); H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11-12 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 16 (1962).
(outdoor advertising signs are § 38 property to extent remov-
able) ; Scott Paper v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 74
T.C. 187, 172 (1980) (primary electrical system is movable,
therefore, not inherently permanent) ; Whiteco Industries v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 65 T.C. 664 (1975) (out-
door advertising signs are § 38 property to extent removable) ;
Weirick v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 62 T.C. 446,
455-56 (1974) (earthern ski ramps are permanent and thus
not § 38 property, while wooden ski ramps are removable and
qualify as §38 property); Roberts v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 60 T.C. 861 (1973) (Astro Needle amusement
ride not personal property under § 38 because inherently per-
manent) ; Everhart v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 61
T.C. 328, 330 (1973) (sewage disposal system not § 38 prop-
erty because not removable) ; Moore v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 58 T.C. 1045 (1972), aff’d, 489 F.2d 285 (5th
Cir. 1973) (house trailers are personal property under § 48
as to trailer park owner since removable) ; Estate of Morgan
v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue, 52 T.C. 478 (1969), aff’d
per curiam, 448 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1971) (floating docks
qualify as “tangible personal property” under § 38 because
removable, while permanent pilings do not) ; Rev. Rul. 67-349,
1967-2 Cum. Bull. 48 (wall-to-wall carpeting in motel rooms is
§ 88 property because not permanently installed).
6a
The test for “other tangible property” has three
distinct components. First, property must qualify in-
itially as tangible property of the type intended by
Congress to be covered. Second, it must not be a
building. Third, it must not be a structural compo-
nent of a building.
Congress intended to allow ITC treatment of prop-
erty, even if that property is “inherently permanent,”
if the property relates to the taxpayer’s specific busi-
ness rather than being generally adaptable to most
commercial uses. As the Senate report phrased it,
Congress wanted to allow ITC treatment of “[a]ssets
accessory to the operation of a business.” S. Rep. No.
1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962). Examples
of ITC property cited in the Senate report and in-
corporated into the regulations include “machinery,
printing presses, transportation or office equipment,
refrigerators, individual air-conditioning units, gro-
cery counters, testing equipment, display racks and
shelves, etc.” Jd.; Treas. Reg. §1.48-1(c). Cases
and Treasury rulings have established other exam-
ples.”
2 A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058, 1064-66
(4th Cir. 1982) (generally adaptable electrical equipment not
§ 38 property) ; Consolidated Freightways v. United States,
620 F.2d 862, 874 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (docking platform is not § 38
property because not generally adaptable) ; Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1268, 1269 and
1272-73 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (equipment specially designed for
maturing whiskey qualifies as § 88 property) ; Dock Corp. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 52 T.C. 68 (1968) aff’med.
427 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1970) (oil storage tanks are § 38 prop-
erty) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schuyler Grain,
411 F.2d 649, 651-52 (7th Cir. 1969) (concrete grain storage
bins are § 38 property because specially designed for aerating
and drying) ; Stuppy, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.Supp. 1378,
1384 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (speciality greenhouse is § 38 property
Ta
Property that qualifies initially as the type of
“other property” intended by Congress must also
qualify as something other than a building. The test
for whether property is a building focuses on the
because not generally adaptable) ; Yellow Freight Systems v.
United States, 413 F.Supp. 357 (W.D. Mo. 1975), rev’d. in
part on other grounds, 588 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1976) (fence
around freight yard is § 38 property since especially neces-
sary to protect bailee’s property) ; Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F.Supp. 1283, 1288 (W.D.
Ky. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974)
(tobacco storage sheds are § 38 property because not gen-
erally adaptable); F.P. Wood & Son of Elizabeth City v.
United States, 314 F.Supp. 1205 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (special
grain storage facilities are § 38 property) ; Sherley-Anderson-
Rhea Elevator v. United States, 315 F.Supp. 1055, 1058 (N.™.
Tex. 1970) (same) ; Noell v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 66 T.C. 718, 729 (1976) (airport runways are § 38 prop-
erty even though permanent) ; Spartanburg Terminal Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 66 T.C. 916, 938-40 (1976)
(fence around railroad tunnel is § 38 property); Weirick v.
United States, 62 T.C. 446, 451-54 (1974) (ski lift towers are
§38 property even though permanently installed because
special equipment accessory to taxpayer’s business); Mer-
chants Refrigeratoring Co. of Cal. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 60 T.C. 856 (1973) (specialized freezer room is § 38
property) ; Central Citrus Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 58 T.C. 365 (1972) (blowers and coolers necessary
to meet temperature and humidity requirements of food
processing and “sweet rooms” used to ripen fruit are special-
ized and, therefore § 38 property while electrical appliances
used in general plant operation are not specialized and do not
qualify) ; Ponderosa Mouldings v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 53 T.C. 92 (1969) (sprinkler system not § 38 prop-
erty because not accessory to business even though taxpayer’s
wood moulding business particularly prone to fire) ; Rev. Rul.
79-183, 1979-1 C.B. 44 (special heavy equipment footings are
§ 38 property even though functional as flooring or as lighter
duty footings) ; Rev. Rul. 79-181, 1979-1 C.B. 41 (special high-
ee
8a
appearance of the property, whether the property
functions as a building (such as by providing every-
day working space), and, if the property is a struc-
ture housing other property, whether that structure
is closely related to the property it houses.’ The courts
stress columns are § 38 property because designed to take
abnormal stress from heavy equipment); Rev. Rul. 70-103,
1970-1 Cum. Bull. 6 (fuel tanks, diesel generator, and exhaust
equipment are specialized § 38 property); Rev. Rul. 69-602,
1969-2 Cum. Bull. 6 (propane tanks are specialized § 38 prop-
erty) ; Rev. Rul. 65-79, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 26 (bank vault doors
and drive-up window are specialized § 38 property accessory
to taxpayer’s business).
’ These factors are drawn from the legislative history and
regulations.
The term “building” is to be given its commonly accepted
meaning, that is, a structure or edifice enclosing a space
within its walls, and usually covered by a roof. It is the
basic structure of an improvement to land the purpose of
which is, for example, to provide shelter or housing or to
provide working, office, display, or sales space.
S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962).
The term “building” generally means any structure or
edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually
covered by a roof, the purpose of which is, for example,
to provide shelter or housing, or to provide working, office,
parking, display, or sales space. . . . Such term does not
include (i) a structure which is essentially an item of
machinery or equipment, or (ii) a structure which houses
property used as an integral part of [a qualified use] if
the use of the structure is so closely related to the use
of suck property that the structure clearly can be ex-
pected to be replaced when the property it initially houses
is replaced. Factors which indicate that a structure is
closely related to the use of the property it houses include
the fact that the structure is specifically designed to
provide for the stress and other demands of such prop-
9a
have applied these factors to determine whether
property is a building.*
erty and the fact that the structure could not be eco-
nomically used for other purposes.
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e) (26 C.F.R.).
* Tamura v. United States, 734 F.°1 470, 471-73 (9th Cir.
1984) (pre-fabricated structures used to store onions are
buildings because not closely related to stored property) ;
Consolidated Freightways v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 708 F.2d 1385, 1386-89 (9th Cir. 1983) (truck loading
docks are buildings because they provide working space) ;
A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058, 1063-64
(4th Cir. 1982) (railroad dock and tobacco storage and re-
ceiving rooms are buildings because of appearance and func-
tion) ; Consolidated Freightways v. United States, 620 F.2d
862, 869-73 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (docking facilities are buildings by
appearance and function) ; Yellow Freight System v. United
States, 538 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1976) (freight docks and
inspection lanes are buildings by appearance and function) ;
Thirup v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 508 F.2d 915
(9th Cir. 1974) (greenhouse is not a building by function) ;
Brown-Forman Distillers v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263,
1269-72 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (whiskey maturation facilities are not
buildings based on function) ; Stuppy, Inc. v. United States,
454 F.Supp. 1378 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (speciality greenhouse is
- not a building by appearance and function and because it is
closely related to stored property); Starr Farms v. United
States, 447 F.Supp. 580 (W.D. Ark. 1977) (structures used
to house chickens are buildings because of appearance and
because they are not closely related to stored property) ;
Endres Floral Co. v. United States, 450 F.Supp. 16 (N.D. Ohio
1977) (non-specialty greenhouse is a building by appearance
and function and because it is not closely related to stored
property); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United
States, 369 F.Supp. 1283 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff’d per curiam,
491 F.2d 1258 (6th CirP'1974) (tobacco drying sheds are not
buildings because they provide only incidental working space) ;
Valmont Industries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 73
T.C. 1059, 1070-78 (1980) (galvanizing facility is a building
10a
Even if property qualifies as “other property” and
is not a building, it still may not be § 38 property
if it is a structural component of a building. The test
for “structural components” set out in the regula-
tions and legislative history focuses on whether the
property in question is property “relating to the op-
eration and maintenance of a building.” Treas. Reg.
§ 1.48-1(e) (2) (26 C.F.R.); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962). Thus, if property re-
lates to building operation and maintenance, it is a
structural component not qualifying for ITC treat-
ment.° The courts have applied this analysis in de-
by function and appearance); Satrum v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 62 T.C. 413 (1974) (chicken coops are not
buildings because no working space is provided) ; Merchants
Refrigerating Co. of Cal. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 60 T.C. 856 (1973) refrigeration room is not a building) ;
Central Citrus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C.
365, 370-73 (1972) (“sweet rooms” used to ripen fruit are
not a building).
° The regulations then go on to clarify, however, that even
if property relates to the operation and maintenance of a
building, it may still qualify as § 38 property if it is specially
installed to meet particular manufacturing requirements.
The term “structural components” includes such parts of
a building as walls, . . . electric wiring and lighting fix-
tures ....and other components relating to the operation
and maintenance of a building. However, the term “struc-
tural components” does not include machinery the sole
justification for the installation of which is the fact that
such machinery is required to meet . . . . requirements
which are essential for the operation of other machinery
or the processing of materials or foodstuffs. Machinery
may meet the “sole justification” test provided by the
preceding sentence even though it incidentally provides
for the comfort of employees, or serves, to an insubstan-
lla
termining whether property is a “structural com-
ponent.” °
B.
We now turn to the task of applying this estab-
lished law to the facts of this case. We keep in mind
that the ITC should be construed liberally in light of
its purposes, Comdisco v. United States, 756 F.2d 569,
577 (7th Cir. 1985); Commissioner of Internal Reve-
tial degree, areas where such . . . requirements are not
essential.
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e) (2) (26 C.F.R.).
® Consolidated Freightways v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 708 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (overhead doors on
loading dock and lighting fixtures are structural components) ;
A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (4th
Cir. 1982) (high bay ceiling built to accommodate height of
certain machinery is structural component) ; Kramertown Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 488 F.2d 728, 729-30
(5th Cir. 1974) (air conditioning/heating units are structural
components) ; Samis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 76
T.C. 609, 619-20 (1981) (heating, air conditioning and hot/
cold water unit is structural component) ; Scott Paper Co. v.
Commisioner of Internal Revenue, 74 T.C. 137, 186 (1980)
(percentage of primary electrical system allocable to machin-
ery is not structural component) ; Spalding v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 66 T.C. 1017, 1020 (1976) (fence around
auto salvage yard is not structural component); Coors v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 T.C. 368, 404-05
(1973), aff'd, 519 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1975) (air condition-
ing duct work is structural component) ; Central Citrus Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 365, 373-74
(1972) (blowers an’ coolers necessary to meet temperature
and humidity requirements of food processing are not struc-
tural components) ; Fort Walton Square v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 54 T.C. 653 (1970) (air conditioning for
individual stores in shopping center is a structural com-
ponent).
eee
12a
nue v. Schuyler Grain Co., 411 F.2d 649, 652 (7th
Cir. 1969), and that the purpose of the ITC is to pro-
mote investment. Comdisco at 572-73; Schuyler Grain
at 652. The burden is on ICM, however, to prove it
is entitled to the ITC. Lockhart Leasing Co. v. United
States, 446 F.2d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1971).
ICM does not contend that its electrical distribution
system is “tangible personal property” under § 48.
The components of the system are not easily remov-
able such that ICM would be expected to take them
along should it vacate the premises. The system is
inherently permanent and only qualifies for ITC treat-
ment if the requirements of “other tangible property”
are met.
The primary disagreement between ICM and the
Commissioner is over whether the ninety-five percent
of ICM’s electrical distribution system that powers
ICM’s equipment is the type of “other tangible prop-
erty” intended by Congress to be allowed ITC treat-
ment. The Commissioner argues that that portion of
the system is not an asset accessory to ICM’s busi-
ness because it is generally adaptable to any business
utilizing heavy equipment compatible with the voltage
output of ICM’s system. The Commissioner points
out that the components of ICM’s electrical distribu-
tion system are not custom made specialty items, but
rather are common “off-the-shelf” goods. ICM admits
that the five percent of the system that supplies power
to the building is certainly not accessory to ICM’s
business and would serve any enterprise that might
subsequently occupy the premises, but contends the
only reason ninety-five percent of its system was in-
stalled was to power ICM’s machines. ICM concludes
from this that ninety-five percent of its system must
be accessory to its business. ICM points out that
13a
under the Commissioner’s broad adaptability test,
even the machines themselves would be disqualified
from ITC treatment because they are adaptable to
the business of another milling enterprise. Finally,
ICM agrees that custom made electrical components
would present a clearer case, but argues that ICM’s
ability to purchase its electrical items from a manu-
facturer’s inventory is otherwise irrelevant to the
question of whether the equipment is special equip-
ment accessory to ICM’s business.
The question is obviously one of determining how
wide to cast the net of adaptability. If we define
adaptability as broadly as the Commissioner would
like, we would in effect be holding that any equip-
ment that may be usable by a subsequent occupant
of the premises, even if that occupant isgin the same
business as the taxpayer, is adaptable and, therefore,
not accessory to the taxpayer’s business. This would
severely curtail the separate category of “other tangi-
ble property.” On the other hand, we must be careful
to avoid the result tentatively urged by ICM in which
any property that is not a building or structural com-
ponent thereof qualifies as § 38 property. This would
completely eliminate any separate requirement that
“other tangible property” be accessory to the tax-
payer’s business.
Viewing ICM’s electrical distribution system in
light of the regulations, legislative history, and case
law, we conclude that the ninety-five percent of that
system powering ICM’s manufacturing equipment is
accessory to ICM’s business and is not so generally
adaptable that it is disqualified from ITC treatment.
The examples cited in the legislative history and regu-
lations make clear that property need not be ex-
traordinarily specialized to qualify for the ITC. Treas.
l4a
Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (26 C.F.R.) (indicating that “ma-
chinery, printing presses, transportation or office
equipment, refrigerators, individual air-conditioning
units, grocery counters, testing equipment, display
racks and shelves” are all accessory to a taxpayer’s
business and qualify for ITC); S. Rep. No. 1881,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962) (same). If gro-
cery counters and display racks are not so generally
adaptable that they are disqualified from ITC treat-
ment, we are unable to say that the portion of ICM’s
electrical distribution system that powers its heavy
equipment is disqualified from ITC treatment even if
we accept the Commissioner’s unsupported claim that
ICM’s system produces “standard” voltages used by
most heavy equipment. We find additional support
for this conclusion in the Commissioner’s regulatory
language suggesting that property that is part of a
taxpayer’s building requires no separate showing of
being accessory to the taxpayer’s business. Treas.
Reg. §1.48-1(c) (26 C.F.R.) (“tangible personal
property includes all property (other than structural
components) which is contained in or attached to a
building’).
Furthermore, the case of Scott Paper v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 74 T.C. 137 (1980) seems
squarely on point in ICM’s favor. The Tax Court
below expressly relied on Scott Paper to reach its re-
sult in this case, and ICM argues that Scott Paper’s
rationale should control. In Scott Paper, the Tax
Court found that the percentage of the taxpayer’s
“primary electrical system” used to power machinery
qualified for the ITC while the percentage used for
lighting, ventilation, and other building services did
not qualify. The primary electrical system involved
in Scott Paper is apparently the same type of system
l5a
involved in this case. The court in Scott Paper de-
scribed the system as functioning to reduce the volt-
age received from the utility to voltages compatible
with the machinery and as “comprised of a primary
disconnect switch, a transformer, a primary low-
voltage breaker, a bus, meters, and distribution or
secondary breakers.” 74 T.C. at 148. Absent good
reason to reject Scott Paper, its rationale would re-
quire affirmance in this case.
The Commissioner argues that we must reject
Scott Paper for three reasons. First, the Commis-
sioner urges us to follow the Fourth Circuit which,
the Commissioner asserts, rejected Scott Paper in
A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058
(4th Cir. 1982). Second, the Commissioner alleges
that the Tax Court in this case followed Scott Paper
in applying a “functionality test” which is supposedly
now discredited. Finally, the Commissioner asserts
that there is no basis in the law to allow allocation
of the ITC on a partial or percentage basis as done
in Scott Paper and below. We find all three of these
arguments to be without merit, and see no reason to
reject the Scott Paper result.
We are not convinced that Scott Paper and A.C.
Monk are fundamentally irreconcilable. To the ex-
tent they are, however, we disagree with the reason-
ing in Monk and adhere to Scott Paper.
In Monk, the court described the electrical system
involved as follows:
The power company provides electricity to the
exterior of Monk’s factory. Under the system
designed and purchased by Monk, the power is
split at two “switchgear” panel boards—one
supplying power to the factory and the other to
the office structure containing laboratory and
—————oorrreree™ ee — ees ee
16a
computer rooms. Power to the factory is con-
ducted by a large, copper bus duct running the
length of the factory, designed to be simply
tapped to provide power at any location. Tap-
ins feed the electricity through several panel
boards and transformers to motor control boxes
(essentially on-off switches for the machinery).
Power for machinery and for the building it-
self (e.g., lights) comes through the same elec-
trical system. Power to the office flows through
a similar system.
Monk, 686 F.2d at 1065. The district court in Monk
followed Scott Paper and “allowed as a credit the
portion of the system’s costs that could be allocated
to machinery operations.” Jd. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the Commissioner’s argument that
no permanently installed electrical system could qual-
ify for the ITC, but also reversed the district court’s
allocation. Jd. The court reversed as error the lower
court’s use of “a narrow function test (i.e., does the
system service machinery?)” and the lower court’s
“allocating a portion of a single system as struc-
tural.” Jd. The court then articulated what it be-
lieved to be the proper analysis.
We believe that the proper approach is, again,
to determine whether the system has more gen-
eral uses than simply operating specific items
of machinery. Thus, if the wiring and other
components of the electrical system could be
adapted to other operations, they are structural
components of the building. For example, wir-
ing providing electricity for lighting is certainly
a structural component, because lighting is a
general need of many manufacturing operations.
Similarly, an electrical system providing power
17a
to machinery is a structural component if the
system can feasibly be adapted to uses other than
the specific machine it was designed to serve.
One method of analyzing the issue would be
to determine whether a manufacturer convert-
ing the building to an alternate process would
be able, with reasonable alterations, to use the
existing system, or whether he would have es-
sentially to scrap the system and install an-
other. Of course, to be considered a structural
component the electrical system need not be
adaptable to all conceivable uses, but only flex-
ible enough that it is not inextricably linked to
the present, specific machinery.
Monk, 686 F.2d at 1065-66. The court then re-
manded for a determination of which components of
the electrical system were generally adaptable and
which were not.
Monk is fundamentally consistent with our ap-
proach and the approach in Scott Paper. The Monk
court recognized that the key inquiry for a perma-
nently installed electrical system is the degree of
adaptability or specialization of that system. It also
recognized that an electrical system can partially
qualify for the ITC.
The Monk court did appear to reject, however, the
Scott Paper method of allocating the portion of the
electrical system that qualifies for ITC treatment by
determining the percentage of that system used to
power manufacturing equipment. The Monk court
preferred a method of looking at each individual com-
ponent of the system and determining whether that
component is itself generally adaptable. To the ex-
tent Monk disapproves of the Scott Paper percentage
18a
allocation method, we must reject the reasoning in
Monk.
The Monk court, and the Commissioner in this
case, assert that there is “no basis in the legislative
history, the regulations or the case law” for allocat-
ing ITC treatment to one percentage of property and
not to the remaining percentage based on different
uses of the property. This is simply wrong. Many
courts have specifically allowed ITC treatment by
percentage allocation based on use. Panhandle East-
ern Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 35, 42
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (property is partially disqualified
from ITC to extent used for personal or entertain-
ment purposes); Sherley-Anderson-Rhea Elevator v.
United States, 315 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (N.D. Tex.
1970) (ITC allowed to extent property used for qual-
ified use); Merchant’s Refrigerating Co. of Cal. v.
Commissioiner of Internal Revenue, 60 T.C. 856, 860
(1973) (portion of structure used solely for storage
is not “building” under § 38 while remainder not so
used is building) ; Central Citrus v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 365, 370-73 (1972)
(same) ; Catron v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
50 T.C. 306 (1968) (same). The legislative history
makes clear that percentage allocations of ITC prop-
erty based on use were expressly contemplated by
Congress. In discussing the requirement that § 38
property be depreciable (a requirement not involved
in this case), the Senate Committee said the follow-
ing.
If an asset is in part subject to an allowance
for depreciation and in part nondepreciable, only
the proportionate part of the asset which is sub-
ject to depreciation will qualify as section 38
property. Thus, if an asset is used 80 percent
— ee
19a
of the time in a trade or business and is used 20
percent of the time for personal purposes, only
80 percent of such property will qualify as sec-
tion 38 property subject to depreciation. Fur-
ther, property does not qualify to the extent it is
treated as property which is used for personal,
living, and family purposes under section 274
(relating to disallowance of certain entertain-
ment, etc., expenses ).
S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962).
In the face of this authority, we cannot accept
Monk’s conclusion that percentage allocation of prop-
erty based on use for ITC purposes is improper.
We also reject the Commissioner’s attack on what
he characterizes as the Tax Court’s “functionality
test.” The Tax Court faced the task of determining
what portions of the electrical distribution system
are assets accessory to ICM’s business. Making this
allocation on the basis of the percentage of the system
used to power machinery is a sensible approach in
accord with the regulations, cases, and legislative his-
tory as outlined above.
Furthermore, the cases cited by the Commissioner
(including Monk) do not stand for the proposition
that the “functionality test” has been generally re-
jected. The Commissioner cites language in Minot
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. United States,
435 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1970) and King Radio
Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1091, 1096 (10th
Cir. 1973) that indicates that whether the movable
partitions involved in those cases “functioned” as
walls was irrelevant in light of the fact that they
were easily removable and thus qualified as “tangi-
ble personal property.” This language is in complete
accord with our analysis and the analysis of the Tax
20a
Court in this case. The initial determination in ITC
cases is whether property is inherently permanent.
Obviously, “functionality” is irrelevant to this in-
quiry as correctly noted by the Minot and King Radio
courts.
Functionality is a useful inquiry, however, in many
areas of ITC law. The King Radio court itself ac-
knowledged that “function” was a useful test to de-
termine whether or not property is a building or
structural component. King Radio, 486 F.2d at 1096.
The .Jonk court also applied functionality to deter-
mine whether a structure is a building. A. C. Monk,
686 F.2d at 1061. The separate requirement (not
involved in this case) that property be utilized for a
qualified use mandates a functionality approach. See
Sherley-Anderson-Rhea Elevator v. United States,
315 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (N.D. Tex. 1970). The
Commissioner himself admits that “functionality” re-
mains as a useful factor in many areas of ITC analy-
sis. He concedes functionality is commonly used to
determine whether property is a storage facility spe-
cially qualifying for ITC treatment, whether property
is a building, and whether property is machinery or
equipment which also specially qualifies for ITC
treatment. Appellant’s Brief, pp. 20-21. In light of
this widespread use, we see no reason to reject Scott
Paper’s use of functionality as a method of allocation
when property only partially qualifies as accessory to
a taxpayer’s business.
The Commissioner’s argument that there is no basis
for partial ITC treatment of property is also without
foundation for the reasons outlined above. Even Monk
supports the allocation of ITC treatment among vari-
ous components of a single electrical system. Monk
simply prefers a part-by-part allocation approach to
——— i ee
2la
the exclusion of an allocation by percentage of use
approach. We recognize that either approach may be
useful and leave the choice of allocation method in
the sound discretion of the trial court.
We new move to the question of whether the
ninety-five percent of ICM’s electrical distribution
system, which is inherently permanent but which is
also accessory to ICM’s business and thus the type
of other tangible property to be considered for ITC
treatment, is a building. The Commissioner does not,
and cannot, seriously contend that ICM’s electrical
system is itself a building. Its appearance is not
that of a building, and it does not provide work space
or otherwise function as a building.
The Commissioner does contend, however, that
ICM’s electrical distribution system is a structural
component of a building. He asserts that all electri-
cal systems are expresly included as structural com-
ponents by the regulation’s classification of “electric
wiring and lighting fixtures” as examples of struc-
tural components. (See footnote 5, supra). He also
asserts that whether property relates to the opera-
tion and maintenance of a building is not the proper
test for whether property is a structural component
of a building. We disagree and uphold the Tax
Court’s determination that the ninety-five percent of
ICM’s system powering mill machinery is not a struc-
tural component.
The phrase “electric wiring and lighting fixtures”
does not include ICM’s electrical distribution system.
The Commissioner himself describes the system as
composed of “circuit breakers, transformers, power
panels, switchboards, motor control centers, and as-
sociated wiring.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 4 (emphasis
added). Clearly there is more to ICM’s system than
22a
electric wiring alone. Both Monk and Scott Paper
declined to adopt the Commissioner’s position that the
phrase “electric wiring and lighting fixtures” dis-
qualified all electrical distribution systems from ITC
treatment, and we also reject that position.
We also see no reason to depart from the language
of the Commissioner’s own regulation establishing the
test for structural components by defining them as
property “relating to the operation and maintenance
of a building.” Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2). The
Commissioner states that close examination of the
regulatory language reveals that the examples pre-
ceding the phrase provide a “comprehensive defini-
tion of the term ‘structural components,’” and “the
phrase [‘other components relating to the operation
and maintenance of the building’] was intended to
do no more than to amplify the idea that items pecu-
liar to the taxpayer’s business operations . . . would
not be classified as ‘structural components’ even
though they were permanently installed and would
be classified as fixtures under local law.” Appellant’s
Brief, pp. 14 and 24.
The Commissioner’s proposed reading of the regu-
lation is obviously strained, contrary to the case law,
See Scott Paper, 74 T.C. at 183; Central Citrus Co.
v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 365, 373-74 (1972); Pon-
derosa Mouldings v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 92, 95
(1969), and confuses the test for “structural com-
ponents” with the test for “other tangible property.”
We also note that the Commissioner’s reading results
in ninety-five percent of ICM’s system qualifying for
ITC treatment anyway. If the examples listed in the
regulation are indeed a comprehensive list of all struc-
tural components, we have already determined that
ICM’s electrical distribution system is not included
ee
23a
in that list and would, therefore, not be disqualified
from ITC treatment as a structural component.
ITI.
In sum, we affirm the Tax Court’s determination
that ninety-five percent of the cost of ICM’s electrical
distribution system qualifies as § 38 property eligible
for the ITC. Although the system is inherently per-
manent, and thus not “tangible personal property”
under § 48(a) (1) (A), the ninety-five percent of the
system that powers ICM’s machinery is “other tangi-
ble property” that is not a building or structural com-
ponent of a building under § 48(a)(1)(B). To the
extent that our holding approving the Tax Court’s
allocation of the ITC to ninety-five percent of the elec-
trical distribution system is inconsistent with the
holding in A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686
F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1982), we respectfully disagree
with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in that case.
The judgment of the Tax Court is hereby in all
respects
AFFIRMED.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Ceurt of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
24a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604
April 28, 1986
Before
HON. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
HON. HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge
HON. JESSE E. ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge
No. 85-1485
ILLINOIS CEREAL MILLS, INC.,
PETITIONER-APPELLEE
Vv.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States Tax Court
This cause was heard on the record from the United
States Tax Court, and was argued by counsel.
On consideration whereof, IT IS ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the
said Tax Court in this cause appealed from be, and
the same is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs, in ac-
cordance with the opinion of this Court filed this date.
25a
APPENDIX C
T. C. Memo 1983-469
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ILLINOIS CEREAL MILLS, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT
Docket Nos. 1619-76, 3013-79 Filed August 11, 1983
Warren C. Seieroe, for the petitioner.
Stephen J. Morrow, for the respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND
OPINION
PARKER, Judge: Respondent determined defi-
ciencies in petitioner’s corporate income taxes as
follows:
Fiscal Year Ending Deficiency
9/30/72 $ 78,773.41
9/30/73 371,139.04
9/30/74 606,078.18
9/30/75 176,717.11
9/30/76 83,330.84
After numerous concessions by both parties as set
out in their stipulation of issues and first supple-
mental stipulation of issues, the following issues re-
main for our decision:
1. Whether certain corn répresented by warehouse
receipts is properly includable in petitioner’s year-
end LIFO inventory ;
2. Whether the price petitioner paid to purchase
a competitor’s Mogul binder business is allocable
26a
among the various intangible assets acquired, and, if
so, the various tax consequences of such an alloca-
tion;
3. Whether structures housing certain industrial
processes qualify as “section 38 property”* for pur-
poses of the investment tax credit, and whether the
useful lives of such structures for purposes of com-
puting depreciation are the same as the useful lives
of the machinery and equipment within the struc-
tures or independent of the useful lives of such ma-
chinery and equipment; * and
_ 4, Whether certain grain storage tanks owned by
petitioner’s subsidiary are assets that come within
Asset Guideline Class “01.1” for purposes of deter-
mining their depreciable useful lives.*
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so
found. The stipulation of facts, first supplemental
stipulation of facts, second supplemental stipulation
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended and in effect
during the taxable years in question, and all references to
Rules are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
*The parties have agreed that if the structures are not
section 38 property, the useful life of each is 25 years; they
have also agreed that the useful life of the machinery and
equipment in each structure is 13.5 years. The parties have
not stipulated that if the structures are section 38 property,
their useful lives are necessarily the same as the useful lives
of the machinery and equipment contained therein; however,
the parties seem to have tried and briefed the matter as if that
were the situation.
’ The parties have agreed upon the useful lives that will
result from this determination.
a ere ee ee oe,
27a
of facts, and all exhibits attached thereto are incorpo-
rated herein by this reference.
Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc. (herein ICM) is a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal office and place
of business at Paris, Illinois, for all times relevant
hereto. ICM filed its corporate income tax returns
using the accrual method of accounting for its fiscal
years ending September 30, 1972 through and in-
cluding September 30, 1976, with the Midwest Serv-
ice Service Center at Kansas City, Missouri. ICM’s
principa! business activity is the operation of a corn
milling business. Incident to this business ICM pur-
chases shelled corn which it processes into various
products including meals, grits, flakes, flours, oil,
starches, and hominy as well as certain specialty
products. These products are used by a number of
different industries including food manufacture, brew-
ing, industrial products, and animal food.
I. LIFO Inventory—Warehouse Receipts
ICM operated a large corn mill in Paris, Illinois,
during the years in issue and for many years prior
thereto. In its business ICM purchased and processed
vast amounts of shelled corn. ICM had storage ca-
pacity for about 1.2 million bushels of shelled corn.
Because of the large quantities of shelled corn it proc-
essed to make its finished goods and because of its
lack of storage capacity for finished goods or for the
various particle sizes left over after a production
run, ICM’s production in excess of existing orders at
any given time was sold as “hominy feed,” which was
used as an animal feed. Although subject te certain
variables, hominy feed usually sold for about $10 per
ton less than raw corn.
28a
Generally, for a dry miller such as ICM that breaks
up the corn by mechanical rather than by chemical
means, “new corn” from the recent harvest has better
milling qualities than “old corn” from the prior year’s
growing season. Generally, unless the “new corn”
comes from a particularly bad harvest year, the new
corn will result in fewer fine particles of the type
that ICM could only dispose of as hominy feed. The
corn harvest usually begins about mid October to
early November in ICM’s geographical area, and in
1974 there was a premature frost that suggested that
the new corn to be harvested that year would be of
an inferior quality.
During all of the years involved and for many
prior years, ICM used the LIFO method of valuing
its inventories of corn. As of September 30, 1973,
ICM included the following in its ending LIFO in-
ventory of corn:
Corn on hand 312,700 bushels
Corn-in-transit 240,129 bushels
Warehouse receipts 200,315 bushels
TOTAL 753,144
The warehouse receipts mentioned above resulted
from a transaction with Cargill, Inc. (“Cargill”).
During September 1973, ICM’s physical inventory
of corn was substantially lower in quantity than it
had been at the beginning of the taxable year. ICM,
by telephone, entered into a transaction with Cargill
on September 28, 1973, whereby six warehouse re-
ceipts, representing 200,315 bushels of No. 5 yellow
corn, would be transferred to ICM on September 28,
1973 and these receipts would be subsequently trans-
ferred back to Cargill on October 1, 1973. The corn
represented by the warehouse receipts was held at all
times by Cargill at its elevators in Chicago, Illinois.
.
;
.
|
29a
As no time did ICM intend to take delivery of the
corn in-kind, but, on the contrary, intended at all
times to deliver the six warehouse receipts back to
Cargill on October 1, 1973, as was required by the
September 28, 1973 agreement of the parties.
As of September 30, 1975, ICM included the fol-
lowing in its ending LIFO inventory of corn:
Corn on hand 293,000 bushels
Warehouse receipt 600,000 bushels
TOTAL 893,000 bushels
The warehouse receipt mentioned above resulted from
a transaction with The Andersons.
During September 1975, ICM’s physical inventory
of corn was substantially lower in quantity than it
had been at the beginning of the taxable year. ICM,
by telephone, entered into a transaction with The
Andersons on September 29, 1975, whereby a ware-
house receipt, representing 600,000 bushes of No. 2
yellow corn, would be transferred to ICM on Septem-
ber 30, 1975, and subsequently transferred back to
The Andersons on October 1, 1975. The corn repre-
sented by the warehouse receipt was at that time the
“old corn” of inferior quality from the preceding
1974 growing season and was held at all times by
The Andersons at its elevators. At no time did ICM
intend to take delivery of the corn in-kind, but, on
the contrary, indeed at all times to deliver the ware-
house receipt back to The Andersons on October 1,
1975, as was required by the September 30, 1975
agreement of the parties.
The transactions with Cargill in 1973 and The
Andersons in 1975 involved exchanges of warehouse
receipts, purchase confirmations, sales confirmations,
and checks. After the initial telephone contact in
30a
each instance, all that was left to be undertaken by
the parties to the transactions was the mechanical
steps of exchanging matching and reversing confir-
mation slips, the delivery and redelivery of warehouse
receipts, and the exchange of checks. ICM’s actual
cash expenditures in these transactions were limited
to $1,368.16 in 1973 (ICM’s draft for $492,776.18
less Cargill‘s draft for $491,408.02) and to $3,000 in
1975 (ICM’s check for $1,698,000 less The Ander-
son’s check for $1,695,000).
Frank Wiggins (“Wiggins”), ICM’s executive vice-
president at the time, and a Mr. Buchanan (“Bu-
chanan”), who worked in ICM’s grain department,
discussed these 1973 and 1975 acquisitions of ware-
house receipts before ICM contacted either Cargill
or The Andersons. During these discussions, both
Wiggins and Buchanan knew that ICM would not be
able to take delivery of the corn represented by the
warehouse receipts and that the only way for ICM
to get title to the corn was to agree to sell it back
to Cargill and to The Andersons so that the corn
would never leave their elevators. ICM’s purpose in
acquiring the corn represented by these warehouse
receipts was not to gain corn inventories to move
into production, but simply to avoid the adverse tax
consequences of having a closing LIFO inventory
amount smaller than the beginning amount (i.e.,
avoid the “liquidation” of its LIFO base).
In his notices of deficiency, respondent determined
that the corn represented by these warehouse receipts
should not Have been included in ICM’s year-end
LIFO inventories. The result of this determination
was a year-end inventory of corn in an amount less
than the beginnii.g inventory, causing a liquidation
ee ee a ee ee eee ee
8la
or recapture of ICM’s LIFO inventory base.‘ Accord-
ingly, respondent decreased ICM’s deduction for cost
of goods sold and increased its income for the fiscal
years ending September 30, 1973, September 30,
1974, and September 30, 1975.° Respondent’s deter-
mination also resulted in an increase in ICM’s deduc-
tion for cost of goods sold for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1976, reducing its taxable income for
that year.
4 Under the LIFO method of accounting, the most recently
acquired inventory is deemed to have been moved into produc-
tion, and the oldest inventory accumulates in the inventory
balances. Thus, these year-end inventory balances are valued
at their historic acquisition costs, which, over a period of time
and in an inflationary economy, tend to be much less than
current inventory replacement costs. When the LIFO inven-
tory balance at the close of the year is less than the balance
at the beginning of the year, part of the inventory repre-
sented by the beginning year balance becomes a part of the
cost-of-goods-sold deduction for that year. Since this LIFO
inventory deemed a part of current production costs is, by
current standards, grossly undervalued, a LIFO method tax-
payer’s cost-of-goods-sold deduction is less and his adjusted
gross income more than if the LIFO inventory balances had
not decreased. This “transfer’ of low value LIFO inventory
to cost of goods sold caused when year-end inventory bal-
ances are less than beginning balances is called a “liquidation”
or “recapture” or “invasion” of the taxpayer’s LIFO inven-
tory base.
5 In his notice of deficiency in docket No. 1619-76, respond-
ent also determined that certain corn-in-transit was not in-
cludable in ICM’s LIFO inventory for the fiscal years ending
September 30, 1973 and September 30, 1974. His adjustment
was based in part on that determination. Respondent has now
conceded that ICM properly included this corn-in-transit in its
inventory, and this concession will be reflected in the parties’
Rule 155 computations.
32a
II. ICM’s “Mogul” Purchase
One aspect of ICM’s business is the production and
sale of cereal binders, a specialty product used pri-
marily in the foundry industry. Prior to February
of 1974, ICM produced and sold cereal binders under
the names Ceres, Cereatim, and 940.
CPC International, Inc. (“CPC’’) is a large multi-
national corporation having extensive corn-process-
ing facilities in the United States, including plants
at Argo, Illinois, Pekin, Illinois, and-North Kansas
City, Missouri. Prior to February of 1974, CPC pro-
duced and sold cereal binders under the name “Mo-
gul” that competed directly with ICM’s binders, par-
ticularly ICM’s 940. CPC was a “wet” miller that
milled corn by chemical méans.
During 1973, CPC had become dissatisfied with the
profitability of a group of its products, called the pre-
gelatinized starches, which included its cereal binder,
Mogul. Late in 1973 or very early in 1974, CPC de-
cided to dispose of this line of business. CPC also
decided to try to sell its Mogul business to one of the
dry corn millers who produced competing products.
CPC put together a “package” to sell as its Mogul
business, which package included customer lists, pro-
duction equipment if the buyer wanted it, the Mogul
trademarks (registered) and trade name, produc-
tion specifications and technical information for the
Mogul binder, sales assistance in the transition from
CPC to the buyer, including personal calls upon
larger customers, and “technical help in manufactur-
ing or product use.” The first dry corn miller CPC
approached was ICM. |
In late January of 1974, CPC telephoned Joseph
Hasler (“Hassler”), ICM’s sales manager at that
time, inquiring whether ICM was interested in pur-
33a
chasing CPC’s Mogul cereal binder business. Hasler
informed CPC that ICM was indeed interested. Has-
ler then met with Wiggins, ICM’s executive vice-
president, to discuss the offer and the two decided to
“take the next step.”
On or about January 30, 1974, Hasler and Ken
McFall (“McFall”), ICM’s sales service representa-
tive, met with CPC officials at the CPC corporate
headquarters at Inglewood Cliffs, New Jersey, to dis-
cuss the offer. CPC repeated the general terms of its
offer and stated that the price was $300,000. Hasler,
for ICM, tentatively agreed to the purchase price
of $300,000. CPC required this tentative agreement
before it would provide any information about Mo-
gul’s technical qualities, product specifications, or
production methods. After they tentatively agreed
to the purchase price, CPC gave Hasler some rudi-
mentary information regarding business volume,
specifications, and general production methods.
Hasler prepared a memorandum, dated February
1, 1974, outlining CPC’s proposal as follows:
CPC idea
Basically their deal is this. They are willing
to sell us all their trade marks for Mogul and
the logo, which is registered for the U.S. 7
—They will provide complete customer files
edited to delete only proprietary informa-
tion which might relate to other areas
of their business.
—They will provide all of their technical
and research information.
—Everything they have relating to Mogul
will be turned over to us. Equipment can
be available if we want any part of it.
2220S
34a
—Customer lists, prices paid, ete.
—Some technical help from their production
people if required.
—Joint sales calls on key customers and a
letter from them to all customers spelling
out the transition.
—Assisting us in securing as much of the
existing business as possible.
—They will help us in securing the neces-
sary bags if this is a problem as well as
any other problem areas (within reason)
which may come up.
Hasler’s memorandum briefly described CPC’s man-
ufacturing process, and his description indicated that
CPC’s production: of Mogul was almost a by-product
of its overall wet milling process. The memorandum
indicated that the feedstock for the Mogul production
was the third level or third cut within CPC’s slurry,
consisting of 9 to 15 percent protein and starch in
the slurry solution. Hasler’s memorandum also pro-
vided fairly detailed product specifications for Mogul.
The memorandum did not suggest that the feedstock
for the Mogul was pure starch which was the fourth
level or cut in CPC’s slurry. Finally, the memoran-
dum conveyed basic general sales and volume figures.
The memorandum does not specifically mention a
covenant not to compete. The memorandum stated
that CPC wanted to make a final decision on the deal
prior to February 14.
Approximately one week later, on or about Feb-
ruary 6, 1974, Hasler and McFall visited CPC’s plant
in Argo, Illinois, where CPC produced its Mogul
binder. They toured the plant and discussed essen-
Mette en aii i ee el i i eee ee
35a
tially the same topics that had been discussed at the
first meeting. ICM obtained a little more information
regarding Mogul’s specifications, and ICM “cleared
up [its] thinking a little bit on [the] manufacturing
process,” but the record does not indicate exactly
what additional information was obtained at that
time. Afterwards, Hasler and Wiggins met and de-
cided that they wanted “to consummate the deal, and
so advised CPC.”
At a special meeting on February 8, 1974, ICM’s
board of directors approved the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that the Officers of Illinois Cereal
Mills, Inc. are hereby authorized to take such ac-
tion as necessary, and to enter into negotiations
and culminate a contract to acquire the CPC
binder business and to incur such capital costs
to produce the additional binder involved, all as
set forth in the proposal dated February 8, 1974
attached.
The proposal referred to in the ICM Board’s res-
olution provided:
February 8, 1974
CPC Binder Proposal
CPC is desirous of disposing of their binder
business primarily covered by their “Mogul”
trademark, brands, etc.
They propose selling all of this business to us
for $300,000 and will render such assistance as
necessary to implement an orderly transfer.
They also would continue production, sales, etc.,
or any part thereof up to January 1, 1975.
This business would complement and more
than double our present specialty business which
competes with them. The additional volume to be
86a
gained by us in acquiring this business is esti-
mated to be 342,000 cwt. per year. After this
acquisition our business would be anticipated to
total 637,000 cwt./year.
To acquire this business and make this addi-
tional production necessitates removal of our spe-
cialty-department from the corn mill. If we are
going to stay in the specialty business this move
has to be made in any event in order to complete
modernization of our mill.
Neither the Board resolution nor the “CPC Binder
Proposal” makes any express references to a covenant
not to compete.
On February 13, 1974, Wiggins and Hasler met
with Robert Gillespie, then CPC’s vice-president in
charge of its starch business, Merle Mentzer, CPC’s
business manager for its starch business, and Robert
Wells, CPC’s attorney, to close the sale. Before this
meeting, ICM had neither received nor inspected any
proposed contracts of sale, any legal documents re-
lating to the trademarks, any copies of the Mogul
customer list, any credit data, or any additional, more
specific technical information regarding CPC’s manu-
facture of Mogul.
On February 13, 1974, CPC and ICM entered into
two agreements—the Purchase Agreement, involving
ICM’s acquisition of CPC’s Mogul intangible assets,
for the sum of $240,000, and the Manufacturing
Agreement, for the sum of $60,000. The Purchase
Agreement provided as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
mutual promises and covenants contained herein,
it is mutually agreed as follows:
1. Sale of Business. Seller hereby sells, and
Buyer hereby buys, Sellers MOGUL Cereal
37a
binder business in the present States of the
United States, including its good will and the
business assets enumerated in Paragraph 3 below
(the “Business Assets”, for the consideration
stated in Paragraph 2.
2. Purchase Price. Buyer agrees to pay Seller
a purchase price of Two Hundred and Forty
($240,000) Thousand Dollars payable on the ex-
ecution hereof;
3. The Business Assets. The Business Assets
hereby sold to Buyer consist of the following:
(i) U.S. Registered Trademark “MO-
GUL” (Word), Reg. No. 241,992 (assign-
ment to Buyer attached as Appendix A) ;
(ii) U.S. Registered Trademark “MO-
GUL” (Word and Bull’s Eye Device), Reg.
No. 503,618 (Assignment to Buyer attached
as Appendix B) ;
(iii) Seller’s specification sheet and man-
ufacturing procedure for its “MOGUL”
brand cereal binder (Appendix C) and
copies of current technical data relating to
this product; and
(iv) Seller’s customer list and credit data
connected therewith for “MOGUL” brand
cereal binder, consisting of all customers
who have purchased this product from Seller
during the two year period ending January
31, 1974 (Appendix D).
4. Customer Notification. Promptly after the
execution hereof, Seller shall mail a letter to all
customers on the customer list, in the form at-
tached as Appendix E, advising that Seller has
sold its cereal binder business in the United
States to Buyer and recommending that they con-
Eee
38a
tinue to buy “MOGUL” brand cereal binder from
Buyer.
In addition, Seller shall participate with Buyer
in making one joint sales contact with all major
customers on the customer list during the period
ending July 1, 1984.
5. Covenant Not to Compete. Seller shall not
for a period of five (5) years from the date
hereof (i) engage in the sale of cereal core bind-
ers in the United States having a composition
substantially similar to that of its MOGUL
cereal binder or (ii) use “MOGUL” or any sub-
stantially similar trademark or trade name in
connection with the sale in the United States of
any binder material. * * *
The manufacturing procedures attached to the Pur-
chase Agreement identified the CPC feedstock as 80
percent stripper starch and 20 percent thick boiling
tailings. The manufacturing data also indicated that
dye was added to give the Mogul its yellow color,
whereas ICM’s 940 binder got its yellow color from
the yellow goods (corn grits) used as feedstock. The
Manufacturing Agreement® provided in pertinent
part:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
mutual promises and covenants contained herein,
it is mutually agreed as follows:
i. During the period from the execution here-
of until July 1, 1974, and from month to month
thereafter if Buyer’s business requirements so
* The tax consequences to ICM of the Manufacturing Agree-
ment are not at issue in this proceeding, but certain aspects
of it affect some of the issues remaining for our determination.
Me trite sti a he
39a
necessitate, but in no event after December 31,
1974, Manufacturer will continue to manufac-
ture and make available to Buyer such quantities
of MOGUL at up to current quantities to cus-
tomers on the customer list for as long as it is
required to supply an amount of not less than 1.6
million pounds of products per month * * *
* * * * x
2 * * *
During the period ending no later than De-
cember 31, 1974, Manufacturer shall cooperate
with Buyer in handling or referring inquiries
from potential customers for MOGUL cereal
binder, as Buyer may direct.
3. Buyer shall pay Manufacturer a service
fee for its manufacturing services in the amount
of sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00) upon exe-
cution hereof. * * *
Covenant Not to Compete
Wiggins, who negotiated the deal for ICM, is an
attorney and had been ICM’s tax attorney before be-
coming a corporate officer. CPC’s attorney, Wells,
participated in the negotiations. The record does not
establish the reason for the allocation of the $300,000
purchase price between the Purchase Agreement and
the Manufacturing Agreement. ICM did not employ
an appraiser to determine the value of any specific
asset it purcased from CPC, either individually or
as part of the entire Mogul “package.” Neither ICM
nor CPC sought to allocate, purported to allocate, or
discussed the allocation of the $240,000 purchase price
among the various intangible assets reflected in the
40a
Purchase Agreement.’ Neither Wiggins nor Wells
discussed the tax consequenecs of such an allocation,
or of the parties’ failure to make such an allocation.
From the outset of the negotiations, it was clear
that CPC intended to terminate its cereal binder busi-
“ness. Nonetheless, the covenant not to compete was
of considerable value to ICM: CPC was still selling
resin-coated sand in the foundry market in competi-
tion with cereal binders. Because of this, CPC still
had business contacts in ICM’s markets, and because
of its size, had the ability to re-enter the cereal binder
market. Moreover, CPC had an excellent reputation
in the market. Because of this, the covenant was
quite valuable to ICM but was not the only item of
value received in the purchase of the Mogul binder
business.
Technical Data
Cereal binders are used primarily in the foundry
industry. The binder is mixed with sand, water, and
other materials, formed into a core, dried, and baked.
Into the finished mold is poured molten metal; the
core allows the metal to form around what will be
a hollow spot. After the metal hardens into the de-
sired shape, the used core is broken or disintegrates
back into granular sand and is thus removed from
* Wiggins intimated at the trial that the failure to make
an allocation was because CPC was just interested in selling
its assets and ICM was just interested in obtaining the
covenant not to compete. That suggestion is not borne out by
any of the contemporaneous documents or by the testimony
of any of the other participants in the negotiations, and we
reject it. We agree that the covenant not to compete was
important to ICM, but we do not think that it was the only
item of value purchased by ICM.
e+ Ss eee ee eke. ote,
ee
4la
the mold. The most important characteristic of a
binder is its adhesive quality, namely, its ability to
hold together the sand and other materials in the
core.
“Viscosity” is a measure of the resistance or fric-
tion of fluid that flows in fluid systems. Viscosity is
a useful test to determine the adhesive qualities’ of
a binder, and the greater the viscosity, the better tile
binding action and the less binder material is needed
for binding. “Water absorption” refers to the amount
of water taken up by a given amount of a substance:
Although viscosity and water absorption are scien-
tifically different, there is a rough correlation between
the two in cereal binders—higher water absorption
figures generally tend to accompany higher viscosity
figures, and lower water absorption figures generally
tend to accompany lower viscosity figures. However,
material that has ben overcooked in the gelatinization
process, as will be discussed below, can have high
water solubles and low viscosity. For a producer of
cereal binders like ICM, viscosity ranges (high v.
low) may be more important than a specific viscosity
figure. In testing cereal binders, ICM usually meas-
ured water absorption and from those measures
roughly extrapolated general viscosity ranges.
Starch granules must be modified or cooked by
some method in order to provide the requisite ad-
hesive qualities to serve as a foundry binder. This
process is called “gelatinization.” Starch granules are
tempered (moistened), and as these granules imbibe
water they swell to many times their natural size.
Each of these granules contains thousands of starch
molecules, which are very large molecular structures.
Heat enhances the absorption of water into the starch
granules. Eventually, the heat and water cause the
eee
42a
starch granules to break, releasing long molecular
chains of starch. At this point, the starch is said to
be “gelatinized.” The friction of these molecular
chains rubbing against each other generates the ad-
hesive properties of a cereal binder, and viscosity
measures this molecular friction. The longer the
chains of starch molecules, the higher the viscosity
levels, which means greater adhesive strength in the
binder. After these molecular chains of starch have
been released, they become quite fragile. Shearing
forces or excessive temperature at that point will
cause a degeneration of these molecular chains, re-
sulting in lower adhesive strength measured by lower
viscosity levels. Consequently, to produce a binder
with the best adhesive strength requires somewhat
mild temperatures and a minimization of hearing
forces.
Prior to its acquisition of Mogul from CPC, ICM
produced its cereal binders in two ways. ICM pro-
duced its Ceres and Crereatim binders through its
“hot roll” process. ICM started with its No. 5 or
No. 6 grits (yellow goods) as feedstock. This feed-
stock was composed of large chunks of corn, which
were the end result of ICM’s initial processing of
shelled corn, whereby the hull was broken, the germ
and fiber separated, and the endosperm split.* This
feedstock was tempered (moistened), and then trans-
ferred onto two counter rotating steel rolls, which
were heated externally by gas fired flames. The rolls
* No. 5 or No. 6 grits referred to the size of the remaining
split endosperm portion. The number referred to the number
of holes per inch in a mesh grid through which the particular
endosperm portion would pass. No. 5 grits were the endo-
sperm portion that would pass through a grid mesh with holes
5 by 5 (25) per square inch; No. 6 grits meant that the mesh
was 6 by 6 (36) per square inch.
mali Ma
2 ie a ca
43a
actually came into contact with each other. The
tempered feedstock flowed into the nip (the point
where the two rolls contacted each other) and
emerged in a flattened, ribbon-like state. This ma-
terial was then dried and ground into a fine powder,
which was the end product, namely, the binder. The
density (weight per unit of volume) of binders pro-
duced in this method could be varied by varying the
pressure of the rolls used to cook the feedstock.
Because the rolls came into contact with each other,
there was a certain amount of shearing force created.
Some shearing force was necessary in ICM’s hot roll
process. In ICM’s feedstock (Nos. 5 and 6 grits), the
starch granules were encased in a protein matrix,
and shearing force broke down this protein matrix
so that the water could reach the starch granules.
The moisture could not reach the starch granules
until the protein matrix had been breached. An un-
avoidable consequences of this use of shearing force
to break down the protein matrix was that there was
also some degradation of the long starch molecule
chains, reducing somewhat the adhesive qualities of
the resulting binder.
During the early 1960’s ICM began experimenting
with the production of gelatinized corn products by
means of an extrusion process rather than the hot roll
process. Two principal advantages of an extrusion
process were that an extrusion machine would handle
much greater volume and it would accept a much
more varied feedstock, a metal rather than the Nos. 5
and 6 grits required for the hot roll process. This
would permit the conversion into prime products of
ingredients otherwise destined to be sold at a loss as
hominy feed.
44a
ICM’s first extruder was a V.D. Anderson model
which was a rather simple and inexpensive device.
ICM’s feedstock for this extruder was “west end
meal,” a fine corn meal (40 to 60 grits) left over
from other milling operations, and otherwise destined
to be sold as hominy feed. This feedstock was first
tempered (moistened) with water or steam and con-
veyed in a steam-jacketed conveyor into the extruder.
The material was passed through the barrel of the
extruder by means of the turning of a screw. Each
flight of the screw was increasingly closer together.
In this manner, the material would compact at the
end of the screw where pressure was built up. The
heat source was generated by the friction of the screw,
and could be adjusted and controlled somewhat by
external bolts, which varied the size of the flights
through which the screw passed.
As with ICM’s hot roll process, a certain amount
of shearing force was necessary to break down the
protein matrix surrounding the starch granules so
that the starch could gelatinize. However, the Ander-
son extruder generated excessive heat and shearing
force, so that when it broke down the protein matrix,
it also degraded the released starch molecule chains,
thus reducing the adhesive qualities of the resulting
binder. ICM discovered that it could enhance the
adhesive qualities of its extruded binder by mixing
with it the output from its hot roll process and an
additive. In the pure hot roll product, relatively long
starch molecule chains predominated, while in the
pure “Anderson” extrusion product, relatively short
starch molecule chains predominated. The additive
served to re-engineer these starch chains by cross-
linking the long chains of the hot roll product with
the short chains of the extruded product. This re-
ee
45a
sulted in very long molecule chains, and a binder with
high adhesive properties as measured by high viscos-
ity levels. ICM sold this binder under the name 940.
Unlike ICM, which was a “dry” miller, CPC was
a “wet” miller. In wet mills, shelled corn is initially
treated with a sulphuric acid solution which breaks
down the protein matrix or structure of the kernel
into a slurry solution. CPC then separated the vari-
ous components (starch, protein, and oil) out of the
slurry solution. In dry mills, the milling is done
mechanically rather than chemically with the kernel
being physically broken, to permit the separation of
the hull, the oil-bearing germ, and the starch-bearing
endosperm. In a wet mill such as CPC’s, the chemical
process also breaks down the protein matrix encasing
the starch granules, so that shearing forces, like those
necessary in ICM’s milling, are not required to allow
gelatinization of the starch.
The feedstock for CPC’s method of producing its
cereal binder was a lower grade of starch, with some
protein, still in slurry solution form. This solution
was heated to 124 degrees Farenheit, filtered and
dried somewhat (to reduce the mositure content),
and then conveyed to steel rolls. These rolls flattened
the material, which was then flaked, dried, and
ground. Unlike the hot rolls that ICM used, CPC’s
rolls were heated by a steam jacket. Moreover, in-
stead of the rolls being in contact at the nip, CPC’s
rolls had a gap of about two millimeters, which min-
imized the shearing forces that resulted from the
rolls.
As early as 1964, ICM had regularly run lab tests
analyzing the essential properties of Mogul and other
competing binder products and this data was kept on
file. Jack Swarthout has been ICM’s director of re-
search and product development since 1967. At the
————————eVoerereaeooeononwne
46a
time he joined petitioner he had extensive training
and experience in the field of microbiology, and par-
ticularly in starch synthesis and technology. Swarth-
out was well aware of the effects of the Anderson
extruder in breaking down the starch molecular
chains and also had formulated the blend of material
and the additive to counteract these effects in ICM’s
940 binder. During 1968 Swarthout had conducted
laboratory tests looking to the production of foundry
binders by an all-extruder process. To this end he
employed a steam-jacketed extruder which avoided
the “over working” problems of the Anderson ex-
truder, which did not have a steam jacket. These
tests convinced him that a good quality binder com-
parable to ICM’s 940 could be produced entirely from
extruder-produced material. Swarthout had also
visited the facilities of the two manufacturers of
steam-jacketed extruders, Bonnot and Wenger, and
conducted tests on their equipment.
Up until the purchase of CPC’s Mogul and until
ICM’s technical people (including Swarthout) saw
CPC’s Mogul process, ICM believed that CPC’s pro-
duction methods, know-how, and product technical
data would have some value to it. At the time of the
initial CPC offer, ICM knew that CPC was a wet
miller, not a dry miller like ICM. Swarthout under-
stood the fundamental differences between dry mill-
ing and wet milling. Swarthout had seen Hasler’s
memorandum of February 1, 1974, which indicated
that CPC’s milling process was quite different from
ICM’s. However, Hasler was a salesman, not a tech-
nical person, and Swarthout kept a relatively open
mind until he had actually seen CPC’s plant on Feb-
ruary 21, 1974, after the sale. At that time he
learned what the CPC feedstock was made of and
es ee VS
47a
that ICM had no feedstock comparable to it. Mogul’s
yellow color, which ICM then learned was produced
by a dye, had seemed to indicate the contrary, namely
a manufacturing process comparable to ICM’s. ICM
did not acquire any of the equipment CPC used to
produce Mogul, even though it was available as part
of the “package” if ICM had wanted it.
Following the acquisition when Swarthout visited
CPC’s Argo facility where it produced Mogul, it was
immediately apparent to him that there was nothing
in CPC’s methods that could be readily adapted to
ICM’s use. The CPC facility was designed to process
a feedstock consisting of free starch particles (with
some protein) in a slurry solution, which was radi-
cally different from any feedstock that could be pro-
duced by ICM’s dry milling process.
Under the Manufacturing Agreement, CPC was to
continue to produce Mogul for ICM until December
31, 1974, or until ICM was able to go on line with
its own Mogul production. By April 5, 1974, Swarth-
out had determined that ICM could produce a com-
mercial quality binder comparable to its 940 product,
using solely an extrusion process, but “still [had]
not resolved whether a Mogul-like product [could] be
made in this manner.” Swarthout advised ICM’s
president that:
A foundry binder made on an extruder will
never be identical to Mogul B211 in all respects.
There are many differences between Mogul B211
and extruder products, such as: pH, water solu-
bles, protein content, pasting qualities, starch
content, density, etc. We are now trying to sort
out the important differences (from foundry
binder and Sales aspect) from the unimportant
46a
differences which arise when producing Mogul by
a wet starch process on hot rolls.
We would like to have some guidance from
Sales concerning which of the above factors are
critical. This is needed before a final method for
our Mogul production can be decided upon.
By September 30, 1974, ICM had more or less com-
mitted itself to making its new binder, to be sold un-
der the name Mogul, solely through an extrusion
process.
ICM went on line with its own Mogul production
in January of 1976.’ At this time, ICM produced its
Mogul product solely through an extrusion process
using an extruder made by Bonnot. Unlike the Ander-
son extruder, which ICM had used previously, the
Bonnot extruder was steam-jacketed, and fed at 150
pounds per square inch steam pressure, providing an
external source of heat. This use of external heat
meant that the extruder was not required to generate
heat internally through friction, and this reduced
friction also greatly reduced the shearing forces. Be-
cause of the reduced shearing forces and lower tem-
peratures, the breakdown of the long starch molecu-
lar chain was lessened, resulting in a binder with
better adhesive properties than that produced by the
Anderson extruder. Initially, ICM sold as Mogul the
pure product produced by the Bonnot extruder; in
later years, about 1978, ICM introduced an additive
(the same one used in its 940 binder) to enhance
*CPC had stopped producing Mogul for ICM in late June
of 1974 because of a strike at its Argo plant. During this
interim, ICM had marketed a substitute binder, known as
SB-311, in order to attempt to supply the former CPC cus-
tomers. ICM did not use the Mogu! for its own product until
it went into production in January of 1976.
ee ee ee ee ee ee |
mm ow
49a
Mogul’s adhesive properties. ICM developed its
method of producing Mogul largely through its own
research, technology, and experience, but may have
used some of the technical data and information it
obtained from CPC in producing its own Mogul prod-
uct. When ICB began selling its own Mogul prod-
uct, it advised its customers that:
Mogul was developed from over 50 years re-
search. It is well known in the industry as a
high-quality product. Illinois Cereal Mills pur-
chased the brand name and technical informa-
tion necessary to produce Mogul. We are now
manufacturing Mogul to the same high exacting
standards.
The record does not establish that ICM abandoned
any technical data or information it purchased from
CPC.
Customer List
Another of the assets that ICM acquired from
CPC was a list of customers to whom CPC had sold
Mogul in the two years prior to 1974. ICM had
hoped that the CPC customer list would disclose a
new untapped source of customers for its products,
but discovered that it was already selling its own
products to most of those CPC customers. This CPC
customer list contained 440 customers. During 1973,
the year before ICM acquired the Mogul business,
CPC had shipped 43,249,490 pounds (432,494 ewt.")
of Mogul to those 440 customers.
In the Manufacturing Agreement, CPC agreed to
manufacture and supply Mogul to ICM until ICM
1 Hundredweight (units of 100 pounds).
50a
went on line with its own production, or until De-
cember 31, 1974. ICM’s existing plant was inade-
quate to manufacture enough binders to supply both
its own customers and the Mogul customers it ac-
quired from CPC. Consequently, ICM drafted plans
for, and began the construction of, a new production
facility in which it would produce both its former
binder products and its own Mogul. ICM had an-
ticipated that this facility would be operational be-
fore the Manufacturing Agreement expired. The
new specialty mill did not become operational until
January 1976, when ICM came on stream with its
production of Mogul.
Approximately four months after ICM purchased
the Mogul business, CPC had a strike at its Argo
plant and was unable to continue the manufacture
and supply of Mogul pursuant to the Manufacturing
Agreement. ICM immediately acquired the remaining
supply of Mogul that CPC had on hand. CPC never
again produced Mogul for or on behalf of ICM. For
the rest of ICM’s fiscal year 1974, the CPC-produced
Mogul was shipped to the Mogul customers on behalf
of ICM.
In order to continue supplying binders to Mogul
customers while the new facility was under construc-
tion, ICM, during its fiscal year 1975, produced a
substitute binder, SB-311, consisting of a combina-
tion of 940, Ceres, an additive, and extruded binder
material it purchased from a competing dry miller.
ICM did not use the “Mogul” name for this substi-
tute binder. Despite its best efforts, ICM was unable
to produce or procure its substitute binders in suffi-
cient quantities to satisfy the requirements of all
Mogul customers, so it sought to allocate the avail-
able product to supply those who had no alternative
a
5la
source. Had it been available, ICM could have sold
approximately twice as much SB-311 as it did in
1975 and 1976. ICM produced and sold SB-311 in the
amounts of 117,953 ewt. in its fiscal year 1975 and
67,618 ewt. in its fiscal year 1976. Its production of
its own Mogul binder came on line in January of
1976 and sales of SB-311 thereafter fell off sharply
to 16,984 in 1977, 12,691 in 1978, 9,435 in 1979, and
3,608 in 1980. However, ICM produced and sold
81,129 ewt. of Mogul in its fiscal year 1976. Produc-
tion and sales of ICM-produced Mogul thereafter in-
creased to 200,246 for 1977, 211,025 for 1978, and
330,698 for 1979 before declining to 236,393 for 1980.
The shipments of Mogul and the Mogul substitute
(SB-311) to CPC’s former Mogul customers and total
shipments of Mogul and Mogul substitutes were as
summarized below:
Total Sales
Mogu! & SB-311
to All Customers Sales to CPC Mogu! Customers
cwt. as No. of
% of Customers
Fiscal CPC as % of
Year 1973 CPC 1973
Ending cwt. cwt. No. Sales Customers
1973 4 432,494 432,494 440 100% 100%
1974 132,043 132,043 258 31% 59%
9-30-75 125,766 125,766 57 29% 13%
9-30-76 148,747 138,901 59 32% 18%
9-30-77 217,230 168,248 55 30% 13%
9-30-78 223,716 138,655 46 82% 10%
9-30-79 340,133 173,926 44 40% 10%
9-30-80 240,001 114,627 42 27% 10%
11 Sales of Mogul by CPC in its last full calendar year.
12 In fiscal 1974, CPC shipped Mogul to ICM’s Mogul cus-
tomers from February through September 30, 1974, and the
figures for 1974 represent this eight month period only. The
figures are not entirely representative because they omit
52a
ICM marketed its new extrusion process binder
under the brand name “Mogul” and continues to this
day to produce, market, and advertise a binder under
the brand name “Mogul.” To assist ICM in the tran-
sition with the customers, CPC agreed to make joint
sales calls on key customers with petitiuner’s per-
sonnel, to explain the transition and provide their
comments as to why they sold the business to ICM.
In addition, CPC would provide technical sales serv-
ice calls if necessary. Prior to the strike, CPC made
telephone calls to customers, written communications,
and a limited number of personal calls on customers.
ICM contacted the new customers primarily by letter
in conjunction with CPC correspondence. In addi-
tion, personal contacts were made with the major
customers. When ICM finally commenced its own
production of Mogul in January 1976, Dave Longe-
ville, CPC sales administrator, made some contacts
with former Mogul customers, in furtherance of
CPC’s agreement to assist ICM in the transition of
the customers.
CPC’s Mogul sales during 1974 before the sale to ICM and
represent only the shipments of material on hand after the
strike at the Argo plant halted CP°’s production of Mogul.
However, all of the 132,043 ewt. shipped in 1974 was CPC-
produced Mogul. If any of ICM’s SB-311 was sold in 1974,
those figures are not in the record. However, since 7,813 cwt.
of the total 125,766 cwt. shipped to former CPC Mogul cus-
tomers in FYE 9-30-75 was CPC-produced Mogul (125,766
total less 117,953 ewt. SB-311), this suggests that the SB-311
did not become available until ICM’s fiscal year 1975. This
also suggests that any decline in the number of CPC’s former
Mogul customers in fiscal year 1974 can be accounted for by
the decreasing profitability of that line of business, which was
CPC’s reason for selling the Mogul business in the first place,
rather than by reason of the strike at the Argo plant and any
resulting shortages.
ee
58a
Through the acquisition, ICM had hoped to ac-
quire many new customers that it did not know about,
and had hoped that it would secure some of them in
the transition. ICM placed great value on this cus-
tomer list at the time of its Mogul acquisition, for
it considered the acquisition of CPC’s Mogul cus-
tomers to be one of the principal purposes of the
deal. Most of the customers contained on the list
were already customers for ICM’s other binder prod-
ucts, such as Ceres, Cereatim, and 940. ICM con-
tinued to sell these products to a “significant per-
centage” of these customers after its purchase of the
Mogul business. The record does not establish for
any of the post-1974 years the amounts of binders,
other than Mogul and SB-311, that ICM sold to cus-
tomers on CPC’s Mogul customer list after its Mogul
acquisition, nor does the record establish the number
of CPC Mogul customers who purchased non-Mogul
binders from ICM or the amounts of their purchases.
The record does not establish that ICM suffered
any loss in regard to the Mogul customer list it
purchased from CPC.
Trademarks/Trade Names
As part of its acquisition of CPC’s Mogul busi-
ness, ICM obtained CPC’s registered trademarks
for Mogul and its trade named “Mogul.” In the
foundry industry, cereal binders are somewhat fun-
gible, in that one binder can generally be used in
place of another, although different amounts might
be necessary. As used in the foundry industry, how-
ever, there is fairly substantial product loyalty—to
achieve relatively uniform results in the foundry
54a
molds requires consistency in the binder.“ A good
quality binder will be consistent, but this consistency
is eliminated if different brands are used interchange-
ably."* Because of this, most foundries require fairly
substantial product testing before they will approve
a new binder for their own use.
At the time of its Mogul acquisition, ICM re-
garded the Mogul name and trademark as being use-
ful and advantageous but by no means of critical im-
portance to the business. CPC’s Mogul operation
had a good reputation for product quality and serv-
ice. During the period the Mogul name and trade-
mark were not used, ICM sold all of the substitute
product (SB-311) it could produce and could have
sold much more at that time if available. When ICM
introduced its all extruded binder under the Mogul
name in January 1976, following the completion «i
its specialty mill, its sales of the all extruded binder
were not dramatically affected by its use of the
Mogul name and may have been the same with or
without use of the Mogul name. However, in the
period after January 1976 and through 1978, the
sales of SB-311 declined steadily whereas the sales
of ICM’s Mogul increased steadily. While in terms
of numbers of customers, ICM may have lost many
of the Mogul customers it had acquired from CPC, it
continued to sell substantial amounts of Mogul to
those former CPC customers and to sell its other
products to those former CPC customers. After ICM
resumed Mogul sales from its own production, the
18 In this context, consistency means that the same amount
of binder mixed with the same amounts of other ingredients
will have the same end result each time.
14 A different brand binder will require a different amount
when mixed with the other ingredients to generate the desired
end result.
\
55a
trade name was useful in reintroducing Mogul to
some of the larger customers. Also because of the
Mogul name, some of the foundries reduced or elimi-
nated the strict testing they generally required of a
new binder.
Tax Treatment of Mogul Transaction
CPC accounted for this transaction as the sale of a
business and reported the entire $240,000 for tax
purposes as proceeds from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset. ICM accounted for this transaction as
an expense which it labelled as “commission on a
noncompetition agreement.” ICM thus sought to de-
duct the entire $240,000 as an expense on its re-
turn for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1974.
In his notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed the
entire claimed deduction of $240,000.
lII. Section 38 Property and
Useful Lives of Structures
A. Specialty Mill
One line of ICM’s production is called the specialty
products, which includes some food products and var-
ious cereal binders it manufactures for industrial
use. All of these specialty products and binders are
now manufactured in ICM’s specialty mill. The two
processes ICM now uses to produce these specialty
products and binders are the “hot roll” process and
the “Bonnot” process, described above. Before it com-
pleted the new specialty mill in January of 1976, ICM
produced its specialty products in the old corn mill,
using the “hot roll” process and the “Anderson” proc-
ess, described above. After the new specialty mill
was constructed, the machinery and equipment for
the “hot roll” process were physically moved out of
56a
the old corn mill and installed in the new specialty
mill structure. The new machinery and equipment
for the “Bonnot” process were acquired, installed
in the new specialty mill, and placed into operation
before that move occurred. The area in the corn mill
where the “hot roll” process had previously been lo-
cated was then used to expand ICM’s corn mill op-
erations after that move occurred. Once the “hot
roll” process and the “Bonnot” process were in opera-
tion in the specialty mill, only specialty products were
produced in that structure.
As early as July 27, 1973, ICM had established as
objectives the modernization and expansion of its
corn mill and the development of a specialty mill
modernization plan once a cost justification study had
been made on the latter. Preliminary work had al-
ready been started on the corn mill modernization
and expansion plan, but nothing had yet been done
in regard to the specialty mill. ICM’s acquisition of
CPC’s Mogul business in early 1974 necessitated the
expansion of ICM’s specialty products department
and the removal of that department from the corn
mill because its space in the corn mill was inade-
quate to meet ICM’s expandeu production needs and
because ICM needed extra space at the corn mill to
complete its modernization and expansion plans there.
Following ICM’s Mogul acquisition in early 1974,
Herman Kurrelmeier, ICM’s manufacturing vice-
president, in conjunction with Swarthout, designed
the specialty mill. Kurrelmeier was trained as a me-
chanical engineer and had experience designing and
building structures containing industrial processes.
The sequence of design was first to decide upon the
process, next to select equipment components (a key
one here being the extruder), then to design a layout
57a
and arrangement of components which would com-
bine them into a continuous flow unit, next to design
the foundation and superstructure to support and
hold everything together as a functioning unit, and
finally to design a covering or skin to protect the
equipment from the elements and to provide a sani-
tary environment for the production of food and
other specialty products. A mechanical engineer would
use basically the same approach to design any indus-
trial operation; such as a corn mill or an assembly
plant, although those types of operations might re-
quire additional design considerations depending
upon the numbers and needs of workers and the
equipment required for those industrial processes.
The specialty mill required a deeper foundation and
footings than a general use structure, such as a ware-
house or office building, of comparable size would have
required. This was partly because of the weight of
the machinery that would be placed in the mill.”
Additionally, separate footings or pads were required
for certain equipment to isolate the vibration that
would occur when that equipment was in operation.
The cost to ICM of the excavation and footings was
approximately $150,000 to $160,000, while Kurrel-
meier estimated the cost of excavation and footings
for a general purpose structure of comparable size to
be about $40,000. However, the record does not es-
tablish that the general foundation and footings for
1 Part of the additional depth of the foundation was re-
quired by the marshy conditions of the land on which the
specialty mill was built. Unless built on bedrock, a structure
like the specialty mill or any factory involving heavy machin-
ery and equipment would usually require a deeper foundation
than would a general use structure of comparable size, no
matter what the soil conditions were.
is
58a
the specialty mill differed qualitatively or quanita-
tively from the foundation and footings of ICM’s
corn mill or any other factory containing heavy ma-
chinery and equipment.
In the specialty mill, there was a concrete floor
slab for the first and second floors, and the third floor
was made of open steel grating. Some of the pieces
of equipment in the specialty mill extended through
the floor from one level to another, which was also
true of the corn mill.
In the specialty mill there were myriad trenches,
slots, and holes in the floors, in both the concrete
ground floor and the upper floors, all precisely shaped
and positioned to accommodate particular pieces of
machinery or equipment and their functions. These
included drain lines, electrical conduits, and pneu-
matic conveyor lines. Some of these holes housed
equipment that traversed floors. If all the equipment
were removed from the specialty mill, it would be
possible to fill in all of these holes, slots, and trenches.
The record does not establish that these holes, slots,
and trenches differed qualitatively or quantitatively
from those in ICM’s corn mill or any other factory
containing heavy machinery or equipment.
The electrical distribution equipment that ICM in-
stalled in the specialty mill was almost entirely at-
tributable to the equipment that ICM used in its
specialty process, rather than for mere general pur-
pose lighting and power receptacles. While the elec-
trical equipment for the mill cost ICM approximately
$178,000, the cost of electrical equipment for a gen-
eral purpose building of comparable size would have
been about $13,000.**° Approximately 95 percent of
16 In his notice of deficiency, respondent al..cated the total
cost of $178,013 for electrical equipment to section 38 property
59a
the actual electrical load at the specialty mill is at-
tributable to the machinery used in the specialty proc-
esses, rather than to general purpose lighting and
power receptacles.
The specialty mill was enclosed because of the ne-
cessity of protecting the equipment from the elements
and providing a sanitary environment since some
food grade products were produced there. The cover-
ing was a light metal skin, essentially a pre-engi-
neered building, and was the cheapest obtainable type
of covering. The outer shell or covering of the spe-
cialty mill was essentially the same as the outer shell
or covering of Building 7, a warehouse building
which adjoined the specialty mill structure. There
was a loading dock between Building 7 and the spe-
cialty mill structure that could service both struc-
tures.
The specialty mill structure lacked a heating sys-
tem except a few unit heaters to prevent the equip-
ment from freezing during shut-downs. When in
operation, the specialty mill equipment generated
sufficient, if not excessive, heat to warm the building
adequately. However, were the specialty mill equip-
ment to be removed and the structure converted to
another use, it might require the installation of. heat-
ing equipment depending upon the type of equipment
installed and type of use to which the =tructure might
be put.
In operation, the specialty mill is essentially a con-
tinuous and automatic operation involving little hu-
man labor. The feedstock for both the hot roll. process
and the Bonnot process are preumatically blown or
conveyed from the corn mill. For the Bonnot process,
in an amount of $97,907 and to non-section-38 property in an
amount of $80,106.
60a
there is a bin that permits on-site storage of about
a day’s worth of feedstock. There is also a “surge”
bin that permits on-site storage of about 20 to 30
minutes worth of feedstock; however, the primary
purpose of the surge bin is not to store the feedstock
but to regulate the flow of feedstock into the ex-
truders. There is no on-site storage for the hot roll
feedstock but there is a storage area in the corn mill
for this feedstock. There is no storage capacity at
the specialty mill for the finished prodct of either
the hot roll process or the Bonnot process. Instead,
the finished products are pneumatically conveyed
back to:the corn mill for bagging and storage.
The only workers in the specialty mill are the op-
erator or “specialty miller” and his assistant, the
oiler, on each shift. They monitor and maintain the
proper functioning of the equipment. On the first
shift there are also two clean-up people. There is a
cubicle area located, in the specialty mill where the
‘specialty miller actually runs in-process quality
checks on the product. There is also a small office
for the manager of the specialty products depart-
ment and toilet facilities. If mechanical difficulties
develop with any of the machinery or equipment,
maintenance personnel may also be on hand.
The design and construction of the structural
“shell” or covering of the specialty mill are compara-
ble to those of other structures at ICM’s plant, for
example, Building 7, a combination warehouse and
research laboratory, and Building 8, a warehouse.
Moreover, Building 7 is attached to the specialty mill.
However, the internal layouts and functions of the
equipment in these structures are quite different.
Two 10 feet by 10 feet overhead doors were in-
stalled in the specialty mill. Although each com-
6la
ponent or piece of equipment of each of the processes
is essential to producing the finished product, the lay-
out of the equipment in the structure is such that
any component or piece of equipment can be replaced.
Moreover, all of the equipment can be removed with-
out damaging the structure. In its operations in the
manner and at the level as presently conducted, ICM
would have no other use for the specialty mil! struc-
ture if the existing equipment were removed, even if
all the floor holes were filled. However, it would be
possible to use the structure for storage or for the
installation of other industrial processes if ICM
should decide to expand or otherwise change its
present operations.
ICM placed the specialty mill into service during
its fiscal year ending September 30, 1976. The total
cost to ICM of the specialty mill was $1,843,644.46.
On its return for its fiscal year ending September 30,
1976, ICM claimed an investment tax credit for the
entire cost-of the specialty mill. In his notice of defi-
ciency, respondent has determined that $1,295,056.46
of such cost was attributable to section 38 property
and that the remaining $548,588 was attributable to
building costs which do not qualify as section 38
property. Respondent thus disallowed the claimed
credit in regard to this $548,588. On the same re-
turn, ICM also claimed that the specialty mill’s de-
preciable useful life was the same as the machinery
and equipment it housed, and computed its deprecia-
tion deduction accordingly. In his notice of deficiency,
respondent determined that the specialty mill’s de-
preciable useful life was independent of and longer
than that of the machinery and equipment, and con-
sequently he reduced ICM’s allowable deduction for
depreciation.
62a
B. Water Treatment Facility
ICM operated its former water treatment facility
until it was forced to replace the facility due to the
facility’s failure to meet the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and local requirements. The old
facility is approximately 27 feet by 27 feet square
and is three stories high. The location of the old
facility is out of the mainstream of ICM’s manufac-
turing plant, and ICM does not currently need the
area occupied by that facility. In 1975, ICM put into
operation a new water treatment facility. At that
time, ICM simply abandoned in place the old sys-
tem, equipment, and building. Because it produces
foodstuffs, ICM fumigates the old water plant occa-
sionally and does similar ‘“house-keeping,” to control
rodents. birds, and insects. Since 1975, however, ICM
has not used this plant for any of its operations.
Kurrelmeier designed ICM’s new water treatment
facility for the sole function of treating waste water
from the corn mill. As with the specialty mill, his de-
sign sequence was first to decide upon the process to
be used, next to select the components of equipment
needed, then to do a layout and arrangement so that
the various components would function as a unit, next
to design the foundation and superstructure to sup-
port and hold the components in their proper place
so that the system would function as a unit, and
finally to design & skin or covering for the assembled
system.
As with the specialty mill, the new water treat-
ment facility required a substantial foundation and
footings to support the equipment to be located in the
structure. There was substantial underground pip-
ing, and there were holes in the floor for equipment.
The structure itself contained only one steel grating
63a
“floor” forming a partial mezzanine level to support
certain equipment and allow access to it. The rest
was basically open space. The major equipment con-
tained in the facility consisted of two 10,000 gallon
water tanks approximately 16 feet in diameter and
21 feet high, vacuum drums and pumps, filter rolls,
and chlorinating equipment. A maze of piping inter-
laced these components. There is an electrical room
in the new facility that contains electrical motor
controls, starters, and switching gears. This room is
approximately 10 feet by 7 feet. There is also a
storage room in the new plant which is used to store
chlorine and equipment. This room is approximately
10 feet by 6 feet. The new facility had to be enclosed
because it was necessary to protect the equipment
and the process within. The water treatment fa-
cility was enclosed by the cheapest possible roof and
metal structure, essentially a pre-engineered build-
ing just like the enclosure for the specialty mill.
The new water treatment facility operates fairly
automatically, except for the re-coating of the filter
rolls which must be done every day. A water treat-
ment operator works in the new plant during the
first and second shift. The third shift runs unat-
tended. The operator monitors the equipment, but
his basic job is to prepare and apply the coating ma-
terial on the filter rolls. This coating process cannot
be automated and requires more than one eight-hour
shift for coating all of the filter rolls.
The new water treatment facility is located next
to the power or boiler house, with these two struc-
tures sharing a party wall. The height of the new
facility and the adjoining boiler house are the same.
The structural “shell” of the new facility is essen- -
tially the same as that of the boiler house, as well as
iia natalia nena eet
64a
that of the specialty mill (Building 34) and two
warehouses (Buildings 7 and 8). Again, however,
the internal layouts and functions of the equipment
in these structures are quite different.
ICM’s new water treatment facility is located at
the north end of the new boiler plant whereas the
milling operations are all south of the boiler plant.
ICM chose the location of its new facility to take
advantage of the pre-existing gravity flow of the raw
waste water from the corn mill to the old water treat-
ment facility at the north end of ICM’s property and
to utilize that system. If the equipment were re-
moved from the water facility, the remaining struc-
vure would have no useful function in petitioner’s
present milling or manufacturing operations.
It would be feasible to convert the new water
treatment facility into an extension of the boiler
house or into storage space. The new water treat-
ment facility has an overhead door approximately 16
feet wide, and the equipment inside could be disas-
sembled and removed without damage to the struc-
ture. It would be possible to convert the new facility
into a storage facility, but ICM does not have any
present need for such a storage facility.
ICM placed its new water treatinent facility into
service during the fiscal year ending September 30,
1975. Its total cost was $353,375. On its return for
the fiseal year ending September 30, 1975, ICM
claimed an investment tax credit for the entire cost
of the new facility. In his notice of deficiency re-
spondent determined that $105,442 of ICM’s costs
represented “building” costs, which did not qualify as
section 38 property. On its returns for the fiscal
years ending September 30, 1975 and September 30,
1976, ICM also claimed that the depreciable useful
65a
life of the new water treatment facility was the same
as the useful life of the machinery and equipment it
housed, and computed its depreciation deduction ac-
cordingly. In his notice of deficiency, respondent de-
termined that the new water treatment facility’s
depreciable useful life was independent of and longer
than that of the machinery and equipment, and con-
sequently he reduced ICM’s allowable deduction for
depreciation.” :
C. Boiler House
ICM constructed a new boiler house and placed
it into service during the fiscal year ending Septem-
ber 30, 1971. The structure was designed to accom-
~odate two boilers, but only one was installed ini-
tially. The second boiler was not installed at the
time of original construction because ICM did not
have enough money. The initial boiler was a large
Babeock & Wilcox unit (hereinar<cc “B & W”),
which is a model that must be built in place. The
B & W unit required a special pad, involving steel
reinforced concrete pier footings that extended five
feet below ground level and one foot above floor level.
This was separate from the structure’s foundation.
There was substantial underground piping, and there
were sloping drainage trenches, 18 inches wide, and
from 16 to 24 inches deep, around two sides of the
boiler pad. The structure also contained water soft-
ening equipment required by the boiler.
17QOn its return for fiscal year ended September 30, 1975,
ICM also claimed a loss from the abandonment of its old water
treatment facility. Respondent in his statutory notice disal-
lowed this loss. Respondent now concedes that this loss is
allowable in the amount of $18,959, as claimed on the return.
66a
At the time it built the boiler house, ICM did not
put in the foundation or pad for the second boiler
because it had not yet selected a specific boiler. How-
ever, the structure was erected with an access door
large enough so that ICM could move a boiler in
without having to take down any of the structure.
The access door is an overhead door 16 feet wide.
ICM subsequently installed a second boiler in the
boiler house structure. This secend boiler was manu-
factured by Cleaver Brookes and is a model that is
manufactured and assembled at the factory and then
delivered to the site, at which point it is then con-
nected to water and steam lines, put on its founda-
tion, and fired up. The Cleaver Brookes boiler could
be removed in one piece without interference from
the walls of the structure and that is the way the
boiler was originally installed. The B & W boiler
could not be removed from the boiler house in one
piece. However, it could be dismantled and removed
in pieces, the same way it was brought into the boiler
house.
The design and construction of the boiler house’s
structural shell are comparable to those of the new
water treatment facility, (Building 3-D), the spe-
cialty mill (Building 34), and two warehouses
(Buildings 7 and 8). However, the internal layouts
and functions of the equipment inside these struc-
tures are quite different. The boiler house contains
an office that is 10 feet by 18 feet and an electrical
room that is 17 feet by 10 feet. The boilers them-
selves can operate automatically, but under its union
agreement, ICM was required to have an operator in
the power house on each shift to monitor the equip-
ment.
On its tax returns for the fiscal years ending Sep-
tember 30, 1972 through September 30, 1976, ICM
67a
claimed that the boiler house’s depreciable useful life
was the same as the useful life of the machinery and
equipment contained therein. Accordingly, it claimed
depreciation deductions using this useful life. In his
notice of deficiency, respondent determined that the
boiler house’s depreciable useful life was independent
of and longer than the useful life of the machinery
and equipment, and consequently, he disallowed part
of ICM’s claimed depreciation deductions for the
years before the Court.
IV. Useful Lives of Grain Storage Tanks
During the fiscal year ending September 30, 1976,
ICM’s wholly-owned subsidiary, ICM Grain Co. (ICM
Grain), purchased the assets of Metcalf Grain, Inc.,
which was a country elevator located in the town of
Metcalf, about 18 miles from Paris, Illinois. The pur-
chase price of $450,000 was allocable in part to grain
storage tanks, as follows:
Corrugated steel tanks $235,000
Concrete storage tanks 28,200
Bolted steel tanks 27,600
Also during the fiscal year ending September 30,
1976, ICM Grain constructed additional welded steel
grain storage tanks on such premises at a cost of
$430,318.38.
Country elevator facilities such as the Metcalf fa-
cilities owned by ICM Grain provide service to farm-
ers by putting their goods into the marketable chain.
This is the first step in the marketing of the grain
once the farmers have harvested the crops from their
fields. In general, the country elevator buys the
grain from farmers. However, country elevators
store grain for farmers on a storage rental basis.
68a
The choice to store or to sell is the farmer’s. Addi-
tionally, country elevators sometimes dry the corn,
when necessary, to prevent spoilage. This storage
and drying are basically comparable to what farmers
can do on their own farms, to the extent of their
available storage space. In fact, many farmers dry
and store all of their own corn. The facilities for
drying corn at Metcalf were not very modern, pri-
marily using unheated air, and many farmers had
better drying facilities than those at Metcalf.
Since the purchase, ICM Grain has operated the
Metcalf facilities as a typical country elevator. ICM
Grain stood ready to receive the farmers’ grain for
either storage or purchase. Corn accounts for 60 per-
cent to 75 percent of all grain handled at Metcalf and
about 75 percent to 80 percent of the corn received
there is ultimately sold to ICM. Thus, between 45
percent and 60 percent of all grain handled at Met-
calf is sold to ICM. ICM is able to get the best mill-
ing quality corn since it is able to make the highest
bid for local corn due to savings on transportation
costs. However, ICM would make the highest bid for
the best milling quality local corn regardless of its
ownership (through its subsidiary ICM Grain) of the
Metcalf facilities.
Since its incorporation, ICM Grain has purchased
or leased elevators with a total storage capacity of
approximately eight million bushels. All of these ele-
vators are located within 35 miles of ICM’s Paris
facility. ICM’s elevator business, conducted through
ICM Grain, is very profitable, showing a higher re-
turn on ICM’s investment than its milling operations.
In 1980, ICM’s elevator business showed as much net
profit as did its milling business. Neither ICM nor
69a
ICM Grain owns or leases land upon which crops are
grown.
On its consolidated return for the fiscal year end-
ing September 30, 1976, ICM claimed depreciation
deductions upon the storage elevators at ICM Grain’s
Metcalf facility using the useful life provided in re-
spondent’s Asset Guideline Class “01.1” (agricultural
machinery and equipment). Respondent determined
that the elevators were not within Asset Guideline
Class “01.1,” and in ’*s notice of deficiency accord-
ingly recomputed ICM’s depreciation deduction using
longer useful lives.
OPINION
I. LIFO Inventory—Warehouse Receipts
The question here is whether certain corn repre-
sented by warehouse receipts, which ICM purchased
just before the end of its fiscal year and then resold
by prior agreement to its supplier just after the fiscal
year ended, was inclucable in its year-end LIFO in-
ventory, so as to avert the adverse tax consequences
of a “liquidation,” “recapture,” or “invasion” of
ICM’s LIFO inventory base. See footnote 4.
The parties have stipulated that ICM at no time
intended to take delivery of the corn represented by
the warehouse receipts from the Cargill and Ander-
sons transactions and that ICM did not intend to use
that particular corn in its milling operations. ICM
contends that its legal ownership of the corn rep-
resented by the warehouse receipts, coupled with
valid reasons for its low year-end physical inventory
_ of corn, warrants the inclusion of the corn repre-
sented by the warehouse receipts in its year-end
LIFO inventories. ICM also argues that it has en-
70a
gaged in these types of transactions before and that
such transactions are in the nature of a hedge. Re-
spondent argues that since ICM did not acquire the
corn for the purpose of using it in its production, or
for resale to its customers, the corn represented by
the warehouse receipts is not properly includable in
ICM’s inventory. Respondent also contends that
ICM’s acquisition of the corn represented by the
warehouse receipts is a mere paper transaction lack-
ing economic substance into solely for tax benefit, and
thus should be treated as a sham transaction.
ICM uses inventories to account for the corn used
in its milling operations, section 471, and it uses the
LIFO method to compute its inventories. Section 472.
Whether the corn represented by the Cargill and An-
dersons warehouse receipts is properly includable in
ICM’s ending LIFO inventory for 1973 and 1975 de-
pends on the purpose for which ICM acquired and
held that corn. Grant Oil Tool Co. v. United States,
180 Ct. Cl. 633, 381 F. 2d 389, 398 (1967) ; Latimer-
Looney Chevrolet, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 120,
125 (1952). Section 1.471-1, Income Tax Regs., pro-
vides as follows:
In order to reflect taxable income correctly,
inventories at the beginning and end of each
taxable year are necessary in every case in which
the production, purchase, or sale of merchandise
is an income-producing factor. The inventory
should include all finished or partly finished
goods and, in the case of raw materials and sup-
plies, only those which have been acquired for
sale or which will physically become a part of
merchandise intended for sale... . (Emphasis
added. )
Tla
Thus, only property acquired for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business* or physically
incorporated into finished goods intended for sale to
such customers is properly includable in inventory.
United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698
F. 2d 88 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 462 U.S.
(1983); Francisce Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 47
F. 2d 555, 557 (2d Cir. 1931), revg. and remanding
on another inventory issue 14 B.T.A. 1062 (1929);
Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. v. United States, 80 Ct.
Cl. 488, 9 F. Supp. 577, 584-585 (1935); Spiegel,
May, Stern Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 110, 37
F. 2d 988, 990 (1930); J.E. Mergott Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 11 T.C. 47, 50 (1948), affd. 176 F. 2d 860
(3d Cir. 1949); EB. Rauh & Sons Feriilizer Co. v.
Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 468, 471 (1928); Burroughs
Adding Machine Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 938,
943 (1927).
The recent Second Circuit case of United States
v. Ingredient Technology Corp., supra, is strikingly
similar to the present one.” That case involved sugar
acquired by a refiner with a prearranged resale back
to its supplier after the close of the refiner’s taxable
year. The court held that the sugar was not includ-
able in the taxpayer’s LIFO inventory, stating, 698
F. 2d at 95:
18 ICM does not argue, nor would the record support a find-
ing, that ICM was in the business of buying and reselling
raw corn during the fiscal years ending September 30, 1973
and September 30, 1975.
19 That case was a criminal prosecution for tax evasion, and
this case does not involve any suggestion of fraud; however,
the substantive tax issue is the same in both cases.
72a
We conclude that the concept of inventory
from an accounting point of view and the term
inventory in the applicable Treasury Regulations
would be meaningless were there to be included
in the term or concept property bought, agreed to
be resold, never intended to be utilized in the
trade or business of the taxpayer (except for tax
purposes), and in fact under the corporate tax-
payer’s dominion, control, and at its risk about
as long as the pea in the proverbial shell game is
under the shell.
We agree with the Second Circuit.
We are not persuaded by ICM’s various arguments.
ICM argues that there were valid business reasons
for its low year-end physical corn inventories, reasons
allegedly relating to the milling qualities of the par-
ticular year’s “old” or “new” corn. The record is
inatequate to establish these matters, but even assum-
ing ICM had valid business reasons for its low physi-
eal inventories at times, that would not affect our
decision. The crucial fact is that ICM did not intend
to use the warehouse-receipt corn in its milling busi-
ness. Mere legal ownership of the corn at the end of
ICM’s fiscal year, while necessary, is not sufficient to
make it an inventory item. United States v. Ingredi-
ent Technology Corp., supra at 94; see also Corliss
v. Bowers,_281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930) (actual com-
mand over the property and not mere refinements of
title is determinative for tax purposes).
ICM’s citation to Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v.
United States, 561 F. 2d 190 (10th Cir. 1977) is
inapposite. The court held that the taxpayer there
could use its commodity futures gains and losses
73a
as adjustments to its inventory valuation, since its
commodity transactions were hedges in the nature of
price insurance. Here, ICM’s warehouse-receipts
transactions were not hedges or price insurance in
any form. Moreover, any gain or loss from a hedge
transaction which is accounted for as an adjustment
to ending inventory under Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,
would be limited to the net out-of-pocket gain or loss,
here $1,368.16 for 1973 and $3,000 for 1975. ICM
of course wishes to consider only half of the trans-
action, the alleged purchase, as an adjustment to its
ending inventory.
We also do not attach any significance to the testi-
mony of Wiggins, ICM’s president, that ICM had
engaged in these types of warehouse-receipt transac-
tions in the past. Although consistency in inventory
practices is important, sec. 1.471-2(b), Income Tax
Regs.,” such practices must still clearly reflect the
taxpayer’s income. Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 357 F. 2d 656, 658 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1966), affg.
42 T.C. 926, 935 (1964); S.C. Toof & Co. v. Com-
misisoner, 21 B.T.A. 916, 934 (1930). We find
Wiggins’ testimony inadequate to establish the nature
of these earlier warehouse-receipts transactions, much
less that this allegedly “consistent” inventory prac-
tice clearly reflected ICM’s income. If the facts in
2° Section 1.471-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides:
{[I]nventory rules cannot be uniform but must give
effect to trade customs which come within the scope of
the best accounting practice in the particular trade or
business. In order to clearly reflect income, the inventory
practice of a taxpayer should be consistent from year to
year, and greater weight is to be given to consistency
than to any particular method of inventorying or basis of
valuation so long as the method or basis used is in accord
with §§ 1.471-1 through 1.471-11.
74a
the earlier years were the same as the facts in this
case, we could not find that such warehouse-receipt
transactions clearly reflected income.
Accordingly, we hold that the corn represented by
the warehouse receipts from the Cargill and Ander-
sons transactions was not properly includable in
ICM’s year-end LIFO inventories.”
II. ICM’s “Mogul” Purchase
In February of 1974, ICM purchased CPC’s Mogul
cereal binder business. Each of the parties to the
sale reported the transaction for tax purposes in the
manner most favorable to it: CPC reported the
transaction as a sale or exchange of a capital asset
while ICM claimed a deduction for the entire purchase
price as a “commission” for a convenant not to com-
pete. CPC is not a party to this litigation. ICM con-
cedes that the treatment on its tax return was in-
correct, and now claims deductions for portions of
the aggregate purchase price allocable among the
various intangible assets acquired. ICM claims (1)
an amortization deduction for the portion allocable
to the covenant not to compete; (2) an abandonment
loss deduction under section 165 for the portion al-
locable to the technical data; and (3) a deduction for
part or all of the portion allocable to the customer
lists (a) as an ordinary and necessary expense under
section 162, (b) as a loss under section 165, or (c)
for depreciation under section 167. In support of his
21 In light of our decision we do not address respondent’s
argument that the transaction constituted a mere sham. But
see United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F. 2d
88, 94 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S. —— (1983) ;
Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F. 2d 399, 412 (2d Cir. 1957)
(L. Hand, J., dissenting).
75a
position that no deductions are allowable, respondent
argues (1) that no allocation of the purchase price
among the various assets is permissible and (2) that,
in any event, ICM has failed to prove its entitlement
to the deductions under the various sections claimed.
We will address respondent’s arguments in that
order.
A. Allocability of Purchase Price
CPC and ICM embodied their transaction in a
Purchase Agreement. Paragraph 1 of that agree-
ment provided that ICM was acquiring CPC’s Mogul
cereal binder business, including goodwill and “busi-
ness assets.” Paragraph 2 provided for a lump sum
purchase price of $240,000, with no allocation of
that amount among the assets. Paragraph 3 listed
the specific “business assets” that ICM was acquir-
ing. Paragraph 4 listed CPC’s affirmative covenants
to ICM (customer notification and joint sales calls).
Paragraph 5 provided CPC’s negative covenant to
ICM (covenant not to compete). Respondent argues
that the Mogul business that ICM acquired is a
“mass” or “indivisible” asset so that there can be no
allocation of the lump sum purchase price among the
various intangible assets acquired. We do not agree.
The sale of a going business may be viewed as a
sale of separate business assets, not as a sale of a
single indivisible entity. Williams v. McGowan, 152
F. 2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Watson v.
Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544, 551-552 (1953). Ac-
cordingly, a lump sum purchase price for a going
business should, if possible, be allocated among the
various assets acquired, including intangible assets,
based on their respective values. Miller v. Commis-
sioner, 56 T.C. 636, 649 (1971). Depending on the
76a
facts of the case, an allocation may not always be
possible.
Generally, the “indivisible asset” theory, upon
which respondent relies, has been applied in cases
where a taxpayer acquires a going concern with the
primary value of the acquisition being goodwill or
going-concern value. In such cases the courts have
sometimes refused to sort out some small portion of
the asset that may be a wasting asset for which a
deduction (usually for depreciation) might other-
wise be allowed. Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 78, 90 (1968). However,
where the record contains sufficient data to permit an
allocation between the non-depreciable portion and
the depreciable portion of the asset acquired, the
courts have made such allocations. Commissioner v.
Seaboard Finance Co., 367 F. 2d 646 (9th Cir. 1966),
affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Comput-
ing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223
(1975) ; Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, supra at 90-91. Moreover, as this Court has
pointed out, the indivisible asset theory “is designed
to prevent a taxpayer from allocating to relatively
insignificant depreciable assets the price actually paid
for nondepreciable intangibles. It is not intended to
be used to deny an allocation of a part of the pur-
chase price to the depreciable property where such
property is a major factor in the transaction.” Com-
puting & Software, Inc. v. Commissinoer, supra at
234 See also Commissioner v. Seaboard Finance Co.,
supra at 652; Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra at 90-91.
Here ICM did not purchase just goodwill and
going-concern value but purchased technical data,
customer lists and a covenant not to compete. As
77a
discussed below, we have found that the covenant not
to compete was a major factor in ICM’s acquisition
of CPC’s Mogul business, that the covenant had sub-
stantial economic value, and that the covenant was
not a nonseverable adjunct of the goodwill being
transferred. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the
indivisible or mass asset theory is inapplicable to this
case. Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra. Furthermore, in cases discussing the indi-
visible asset rule, the usual context has been the
question of depreciable versus nondepreciable assets.
Here, the intangible assets acquired may generate
deductions other than depreciation, such as the amor-
tization deduction for a covenant not to compete that
ICM claims. We think that it is equally inappropri-
ate to apply the indivisible asset rule to that situa-
tion, and that we should make an allocation here if
one is otherwise appropriate.
Respondent also argues that-in any event no por-
tion of the purchase price may be allocated to the
covenant not to compete. He argues that the Pur-
chase Agreement clearly allocates the $240,000 pur-
chase price to only the “business assets” and good-
will and that “it is clear that the parties did not
intend that any portion of the purchase price be
allocable to the covenant not to compete.” We dis-
agree. Paragraph 1 of the Purchase Agreement
states that CPC sells and ICM buys the “Mogul cereal
binder business in the present States of the United
States, including its good will and the business assets
enumerated in Paragraph 3 below * * * for the con-
sideration stated in Paragraph 2.” We do not read
this as meaning that the $240,000 was paid just for
goodwill and the enumerated “business assets.” Para-
graph 2 does not allocate the purchase price in any
78a
way, let alone indicate that the covenant not to com-
pete is somehow subsumed in or just a non-severable
adjunct to the goodwill being transferred. On the
contrary the covenant not to compete is discussed
separately and in detail in Paragraph 5 of the Pur-
chase Agreement.
Citing Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F. 2d 305, 308
(2d Cir. 1959), affg. 29 T.C. 129 (1957) and Balda-
relli v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 44, 49 (1973), respond-
ent argues that under the “strong proof” rule ICM
has not presented the “clear and convincing evidence”’
necessary to show “that the parties have an intent
contrary to that expressed in the agreement.” ”
22 Respondent also urges us to apply the “Danielson” rule
(see Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F. 2d 771, 775 (3d Cir.
1967) vacating and remanding 44 T.C. 549 (1965) ) and hold
ICM to the express terms of its agreements absent evidence
sufficient in a suit at common law to alter or revoke the agree- _
ment (fraud, misrepresentation, etc.). In light of our con-
struction of the Purchase Agreement, we need apply neither
the “strong proof” rule nor the “Danielson” rule. However,
in those cases where one of the parties is attempting to vary
the terms of his agreement, the position of this Court is clear.
We will apply the “Danielson” rule in cases appealable to the
Third Circuit under our rule of Golsen v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 742, 756-758 (1970), affd. 445 F. 2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied 404 U.S. 940 (1971). However, where the
Circuit Court of Appeals to which an appeal will lie has not
ruled on the “Danielson” issue, we will continue to apply the
strong proof rule, which we consider to be the correct rule
of law. See Major v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 239, 248-249
(1981) ; GC Services Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 406, 412
n. 2 (1979); Baldarelli v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 44, 49-50
(1973); Lucas v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 1022, 1032 n.1
(1972) ; Mittleman v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 171, 175 (1971),
affd. per curiam 464 F. 2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Schmitz v.
Commisioner, 51 T.C. 306, 315-318 (1968), affd. sub nom.
Throndson v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1972).
79a
Again, we disagree. As we read the Purchase Agree-
ment, it makes no allocation of the $240,000 purchase
price among the various assets. “[T]he ‘strong proof’
doctrine is inapplicable herein because none of the
parties is attempting to vary the terms of the con-
tract as written, but merely to construe the terms.”
Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.
72, 82 (1982) (emphasis supplied). Here, as in that
case, the Purchase Agreement expressly provided for
a covenant not to compete but did not make any allo-
cation of the purchase price for that or any other
asset. Where the written agreement makes no alloca-
tion of the lump sum purchase price, we do not be-
lieve that a taxpayer trying to allocate a portion of
such price to the noncompetition covenant is attempt-
ing to vary the terms of his written contract. Of
course, this does not establish that ICM is entitled
to allocate a specific portion of the purchase price
to the covenant not to compete. There are other tests,
discussed below, that ICM must satisfy to show how
much, if any, of the purchase price may be allocated
to the covenant. This, however, is a question of how
much may be allocated to the covenant, and not the
question of whether such an allocation may be made.
Accordingly, this Court may allocate the lump sum
purchase price among the various intangible assets
that ICM purchased.
1. Covenant Not to Compete
To be entitled to amortize a covenant not to com-
pete, a taxpayer must show: (1) that the covenant
had independent economic significance such that we
might conclude that it was a bargained-for element
of the agreement; and (2) that the parties considered
the covenant as a valuable part of the entire consid-
80a
eration for the agreement. See Peterson Machine
Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 79 T.C. at 81, 83;
Levinson v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 380, 389 (1966).
First it is clear that the covenant had significant
independent economic value. Such a conclusion is
apparent when we consider the position of ICM with-
out such a covenant. While it is true that CPC had
decided to abandon its cereal binder business, it made
its decision based strictly on the profitability of that
division. Absent the noncompetition covenant, there
was nothing to prevent CPC from reentering the
cereal binder market in the future if- economic
changes suggested increased profitability. Before its
Mogul sale, CPC was a formidable competitor for
ICM, and, absent the covenant, could have again be-
come an equally formidable competitor. After its
Mogul sale, CPC still retained: (1) the basic starch
biochemistry and technology to produce a cereal bin-
der; (2) the production equipment; (3) its continued
commercial relationship with customers in the foun-
dry industry through its sale of resin coated sand
for use in foundry cores; and (4) its economic re-
sources as a large multinational corporation. Admit-
tedly, CPC could no longer use the name “Mogul,”
because that trademark and trade name had been sold
to ICM. However, ensuring that CPC would not com-
pete against it in the cereal binder market had sub-
stantial economic substance and value to ICM.
As to the second requirement, that the parties have
considered the covenant as a valuable part of the
total consideration, we think ICM meets the standard.
Both Wiggins and Hassler testified that to ICM the
covenant was one of the major assets acquired. Their
testimony is buttressed by the substantial economic
significance of the covenant. We think that CPC also
= al RN sR i Re
8la
considered the covenant to have value. Although the
record of the negotiations is not as complete as we
should like, it is undisputed that by agreeing to the
covenant, CPC limited its future business choices by
promising not to produce and sell cereal binders or
otherwise use the trade name Mogul. In light of the
relative ease with which CPC could have reentered
the cereal binder market absent the noncompetition
covenant and the substantial economic substance and
importance to the buyer of the covenant, we are sat-
isfied that CPC also considered the covenant to be of
value.
Finally, we attach little significance to the fact
that the parties apparently agreed upon a total pur-
chase price at the outset before any agreement on
the specific items to be included in the package, in-
cluding the covenant not to compete, was negotiated.
See Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra, 79 T.C. at 83; Rudie v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
131, 1389 (1967). ICM’s tentative acceptance of the
purchase price was a prerequisite to further negotia-
tions, but hardly culminated the negotiations. The
final written agreement contained a five-year cove-
nant not to compete, set out in a separate paragraph
of the document. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that this specific time-limited covenant was
just a part of the general goodwill that was being
transferred to ICM. Based on the entire record, we
are satisfied that the covenant not to compete had
substantial independent economic significance and
that both parties considered it as a valuable part of
the total consideration for the transaction.
While the record is not as clear as we should like,
we think it is appropriate to apply the principle of
Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F. 2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930),
82a
of course bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose
inexactitude is of its own making. See Seaboard
Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 367 F. 2d 646, 652
(9th Cir. 1966), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of
this Court; Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, supra, 79 T.C. at 86; Computing & Software,
Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 64 T.C. at 235. Under
Cohan v. Commissioner, supra, we find that 20 per-
cent of the total purchase price of $240,000, or
$48,000, is properly allocable to the covenant not to
compete and that amount may be amortized over the
five-year term of the covenant.
2. Technical Data
ICM claims an abandonment loss for the technical
cata which it values at $20,000. Pursuant to the pur-
chase agreement, ICM acquired CPC’s “specification
sheet and manufacturing procedure for its ‘MOGUL’
brand cereal binder . . . and copies of current tech-
nical data relating to this product.” We believe that
this information, all subsumed for our purposes un-
der the heading “Technical Data,” was of value to
ICM when it acquired CPC’s Mogul business. As set
forth in the Fndings of Fact, ICM knew long before
the acquisition that CPC was a “wet miller,” a pro-
duction method incompatible with ICM’s at least in
regard to the feedstock used in the process. Swarth-
out, ICM’s research director, had an indication of
the production methods and feedstock used by CPC
a week before the Purchase Agreement and the Man-
ufacturing Agreement were consummated. On the
other hand, because of CPC’s use of dyes, its Mogul
product looked like ICM’s cereal binders, which sug-
gested to Swarthout that there might be something
similar in their production methods and technical
83a
data that would be useful to ICM. It was not until
after the purchase when Swarthout actually visited
the CPC plant that he learned that little of the CPC
process, at least as it pertained to the feedstock, could
be directly used by ICM. Under Cohan v. Commis-
sioner, supra, we find that 10 percent of the purchase
price of $240,000, or $24,000, is properly allocable
to the technical data.
However, ICM is not entitled to an abandonment
loss for this technical data. While we have found as
a fact that ICM’s method of producing Mogul was
developed primarily through its own research, that
alone does not establish an abandonment loss. To be
entitled to such a loss, ICM must demonstrate an in-
tention to abandon the technical data coupled with
an act of abandonment, both of which must occur
within the taxable year, and both of which must be
shown by the facts presented. Coors Porcelain Co. v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 682 (1969), affd. F. 2d 1
(10th Cir. 1970); Boston Elevated Railway Co. v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1084, 1108-1109 (1951), affd.
196 F. 2d 923 (1st Cir. 1952).
We do not believe that ICM’s decision to produce
its Mogul product through an all-extrusion process
using moderate low temperature and low shear ex-
truders either evidences an intention to abandon the
CPC technical data or constitutes an act of abandon-
ment of that data. Indeed, in view of some similar-
ities between CP“’s moderate low temperature and
low shear extruders and those later used by ICM, it
is difficult to view such knowledge and information
as having been abandoned. The fact that this knowl-
edge may not have been directly used in ICM’s Mogul
manufacturing processes is not determinative. Often,
learning what will not work is as useful as learning
84a
what will. By the same token, having one’s own inde-
pendent research and learning corroborated through
the experience and learning of others is also valu-
able. We also believe that ICM can be said to have
“used” CPC’s technical data. While the specific pro-
duction methods ICM used with its yellow goods feed-
stock represented primarily its own research and de-
velopment, what ICM learned from CPC about basic
starch biochemistry and cereal binder manufacturing
processes corroborated its own research and indicated
the method of production that ICM should employ. As
such, it became part of ICM’s capital cost of develop-
ing its “Bonnot” process for producing specialty prod-
ucts through a moderate low temperature and low
shear extruder but with its own dry-milled yellow
goods feedstock. Hence, the technical data was nei-
ther “abandoned” nor otherwise “lost.” * While ICM
seeks to minimize the fact as merely a bit of sales
puffery, we think it not insignificant that when ICM
began to produce its own Mogul binder, it advertised
to its customers as follows:
Mogul was developed from over 50 years re-
search. It is well known in the industry as a
high quality product. Illinois Cereal Mills pur-
chased the brand name and technical informa-
tion necessary to produce Mogul. We are now
manufacturing Mogul to the same high exacting
standards.
23 Nor can ICM claim deductions under other sections—the
technical data clearly has a useful life of over a year, so
expensing under section 162 is improper, and ICM has failed
to prove a depreciable useful life for the technical data, so no
depreciation deduction is allowable. Section 1.167(a)-3, In-
come Tax Regs.
85a
On this record we cannot find an abandonment or
other loss of the technical data and information ICM
purchased from CPC.
8. Goodwill and Going-Concern Value, Trade-
marks and Trade Names, and Customer Lists
We believe that the remaining 70 percent of the
$240,000 total purchase price or $168,000 is allocable
to goodwill and any possible going-concern value, the
trademark and trade names, and customer lists. Be-
cause no tax consequences flow from this allocation,
as we will discuss below, we need not and do not
make any further suballocation of the purchase price
among these various assets.
Essentially, goodwill is the expectancy of continued
customer patronage without contractual compulsion
and for whatever reason. Karan v. Commissioner,
319 F. 2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1963); see also Com-
missioner v. Seaboard Finance Co., supra, 367 F. 2d
at 649; Solitron Devices, Inc. v. Commissioner, 80
T.C. 1, 17-19 (1983), and cases cited therein; Com-
puting & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 64
T.C. at 232-233 and cases cited therein. Going-con-
cern value, as distinguished from goodwill or perhaps
as part of goodwill, is the enhanced value of the ac-
quired assets deriving from “the ability of the ac-
quired business to generate sales without any inter-
ruption because of the takeover.” Winn-Dixie Mont-
gomery, Inc. v. United States, 444 F. 2d 677, 685
n. 12 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Solitron Devices, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, supra, 80 T.C. at 19-20. Neither goodwill
nor going-concern value is subject to depreciation be-
cause the useful life is not susceptible of reasonable
estimation. Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commis-
86a
sioner, 64 T.C. at 232-233, and at 232 at n. 7. Con-
sequently, there is no need to assign separate values
to the goodwill and any possible going-concern value
in this case.
ICM concedes that it is not entitled to a deduction
for the portion of the purchase price attributable to
the trademarks and trade names. Trademarks and
trade names are similarly nondepreciable because
they have no ascertainable useful lives. Norwich
Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 326, 329
(1934). In fact, trademarks and trade names are
generally viewed as a part of the goodwill. Clarke v.
Haberle Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930); Renzie-
hausen v. Lucas, 280 U.S. 387 (19380); Norwich
Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioner, supra. Accordingly,
there is no need to determine what portion of the
remaining purchase price is attributable to the value
of the trademarks and trade names either as a part
of goodwill or independently of goodwill.
. Finally, as to the customer lists there is no reason
to suballocate any portion of the purchase price to
them in this case. Customer lists are generally viewed
as a single “indivisible asset” having an indefinite
life, in the nature of goodwill or inherently insepara-
ble from the purchased goodwill. Golden State Towel
ond Linen Service, Ltd. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl.
300, 373 F. 2d 938 (1967), and cases cited therein;
Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra, 50 T.C. at 87. Of course in those few cases
where customer lists have been found to have a rea-
sonably determinable useful life separate from any
goodwill or going-concern value, the courts have tried
to allocate a portion of the purchase price to such a
depreciable asset. Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Ine.
v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 90-91. See also Commis-
87a
sioner v. Seaboard Finance Co., supra, involving a
similar situation with loan accounts. In this case,
ICM has failed to provide any basis whatsoever for
making any allocation between customer lists and
goodwill and going-concern value or for establishing-
ing the useful life of the customer lists.
ICM is not entitled to a deduction under any of the
sections claimed. No deduction is allowable under
section 162 because the customer lists have a useful
life of over a year. Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc.
v. Commissioner, supra, 50 T.C. at 86; Boe v. Com-
missioner, 35 T.C. 720, 725 (1961) and cases cited
therein, affd. 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962). Further-
more, since the customer lists are viewed as a single
indivisible asset, ICM is not entitled to a loss deduc-
tion under section 165; the law does not permit a
deduction for a partial loss of a capital investment.
Golden State Towel and Linen Service, Ltd. v. United
States, supra; Anchor Cleaning Service, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 22 T.C. 1029, 1034-1035 (1954). In addi-
tion, ICM has failed to prove that in fact a loss of
any sort has occurred. ICM continues to sell Mogul
and binders other than Mogul to a substantial num-
ber or significant percentage of the customers on the
acquired CPC list. Moreover, ICM has not shown
that any loss of business is permanent. Finally, no
deduction is permitted for depreciation under section
167 because ICM has failed to prove the useful life
of the customer lists. Section 1.167(a)-3, Income Tax
Regs.; Rudie v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. at 137-138.
To summarize, we have allocated the lump sum
purchase price of $240,000 among the various assets
as follows:
88a
Covenant not to compete $ 48,000
Techrical data 24,000
Tradematks, trade names,
customer lists, goodwill
and any possible going-
concern value 168,000
The $48,000 allocable to the covenant not to com-
pete is amortizable over the covenant’s five-year life.
No amortization or other deduction is allowable for
any other portion of the purchase price.
III. Section 38 Property and Useful Lives
of Structures
ICM claims an investment tax credit for the total
costs of its new specialty mill and new water treat-
ment plant. ICM also claims that the depreciable use-
ful lives of, the new specialty mill, new water treat-
ment plant, and the boiler house™ are the same as
those of the machinery or equipment housed within
those structures. Respondent argues that these struc-
tures are “buildings,” and thus the portions of the
total construction costs attributable to these struc-
tures do not qualify for the investment tax credit.
Moreover, respondent says that for depreciation pur-
poses the useful lives of these structures are inde-
pendent of and longer than the useful lives of the
machinery or equipment they house. The issue for
24The boiler house, sometimes referred to as the “power
building,” was placed into service prior to the years before
the Court and no investment tax credit can be claimed for
that structure. However, whether or not the structure is a
“building” is in dispute because of the useful life issue. As
in the case of the other structures, ICM argues that the boiler
house is not a building and its useful life is the same as that
of the machinery or equipment contained within it.
89a
}
our decision is whether these three structures—the
new specialty mill, the new water treatment facility,
and the boiler house—are “buildings” so as to be ex-
cluded from the definition in section 48(a) of prop-
erty eligible for the investment tax credit.”
Buildings are not eligible for the investment tax
credit. Section 48(a); sections 1.48-l(c), 1.48-
1(d) (1), Income Tax Regs.” In determining whether
a structure is a “building” and hence not section 38
property, the term “building” is given its commonly
accepted meaning. Samis' v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.
609, 617 (1981); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v.
1
2 These structures are property with respect to which de-
preciation is allowable and which have useful lives of three
years or more, section 48(a), thus leaving the narrow issue
of whether these structures are “buildings.”
26 Section 48(a)(1), as it read during the years before
the Court, provides in pertinent part:
[T]he term “section 38 property” means—
(A) tangible personal property, or
(B) other tangible property (not including a building
and its structural components) but only if such property—
(i) is used as an integral part of manufacturing,
production, or extraction or of furnishing transpor-
tation, communications, electrical energy, gas, preter,
or sewage disposal services * * *.
Section 1.48-1(c), Income Tax Regs., defines “tangible per-
sonal property” as “any tangible property except land and
improvements thereto, such as buildings or other inherently
permanent structures (including items which are structural
components of such buildings or structures) * * *.”
Section 1.48-1(d) (1), Income Tax Regs., defines “other
tangible property” as including “any other tangible property
(but not including a building and its structural components)
used as an integral part of manufacturing * * * [or other
qualifying uses] * * *.”
90a
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 768, 793 (1980), affd. on this
point, 708 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
Section 1.48-1(e) (1), Income Tax Regs., generally
defines a building as follows:
The term “building” generally means any struc-
ture or edifice enclosing a space within its walls,
and usually covered by a roof, the purpose of
which is, for example, to provide shelter or hous-
ing, or to provide working, office, parking, dis-
play, or sales space. The term includes, for ex-
ample, structures such as apartment houses, fac-
tory and office buildings, warehouses, barns, gar-
ages, railway or bus stations, and stores. * * *
However, the regulation then excludes from the defini-
tion of buildings certain structures that may look like
buildings but do not function as buildings and there-
fore may qualify as section 38 property. Section
1.48-1(e) (1), Income Tax Regs., excludes from the
term “building” —
(i) a structure which is essentially an item of
machinery or equipment, or (ii) a structure
which houses property used as an integral part
of an activity specified in section 48(a) (1) (B)
(i) [such as manufacturing or production] if
the use of the structure is so closely related to the
use of such property that the structure clearly
can be expected to be replaced when the prop-
erty it initially houses is replaced. Factors which
indicate that a structure is closely related to the
use of the property it houses include the fact that
the structure is specifically designed to provide
for the stress and other demands of such prop-
erty and the fact that the structure could not be
economically used for other purposes, Thus, the
9la
term “building” does not include such structures
as oil and gas storage tanks, grain storage bins,
silos, fractioning towers, blast furnaces, basic
oxygen furnaces, coke ovens, brick kilns, and coal
tipples.
Thus, the pertinent regulations define “building”
in terms of both appearance and function. A!though
there may be some disagreement or at least a differ-
ent approach among the courts as to how much weight
is to be accorded to the “appearance test,’”’ no court
has wholly disregarded the appearance test; however,
most of the courts generally regard the “functional
test” as the more important of the two. Compare
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Commissioner, su-
pra; Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United States,
620 F.2d 862 (Cl. Ct. 1980); and Thirup v. Com-
missioner, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), revg. 59
T.C. 122 (1972) and A.C. Monk & Co. v. United
States, 686 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1982) and Yellow
Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 538 F.2d 790
(8th Cir. 1976).
The appearance test does not help ICM in this case.
Here, the three structures clearly looked like build-
ings, and we do not understand the taxpayer to sug-'
gest otherwise. However, we have not found any case
in this or any other court that holds that appearance
alone is determinative, so we must also consider the
second test as to whether or not the structures func-
tioned as buildings.
The functional test is defined by this Court as
follows:
The functional test inquires whether “the pur-
pose” of the structure at issue is a purpose
ejusdem generis to the purposes described by ex-
ample in the regulations, i.e., “to provide shelter
or housing, or to provide working, office, park-
92a
ing, display, or sales space.” Sec. 1.48-1(e) (1),
Income Tax Regs. The reguiations ask whether
the [structures] perform a function similar to
“apartment houses, factory and office buildings,
warehouses, barns, garages, railway or bus sta-
tions, and stores.” Sec. 1.48-1(e)(1), Income
Tax Regs.
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Commissioner, su-
pra, 74 T.C. at 795. See also Thirup v. Commissioner,
supra, 508 F.2d at 919.
In applying the functional test, an important but
not determinative factor has been the human activity
within the structure. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), affg.
on this issue 74 T.C. 768 (1980) ; Thirup v. Commis-
sioner, supra; Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 1059
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