Appendix — Commissioner v. Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1986

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Text

Supreme Court, U.S.

86-490 | ite

SEP 95 i996

j

| —_— .

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

'

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER

Vv.

ILLINOIS CEREAL MILLS, INC.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

ROGER M. OLSEN

Assistant Attorney General

ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR.

Deputy Solicitor General

ALAN I. HoRoOWI!ITz

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JONATHAN S. COHEN

WILLIAM A. WHITLEDGE

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A (court of appeals opinion dated Apr. 28,

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Appendix B (court of appeals order dated Apr. 28,

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Appendix C (tax court opinion dated Aug. 11, 1983).. 25a

Appendix D (tax court decision dated Dec. 24, 1984).. 107a

Appendix E (statutory appendix) —............000000000....... 109a

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APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-1485

ILLINOIS CEREAL MILLS, INC., APPELLEE

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, APPELLANT

On Appeal from the Decision of the

United States Tax Court

Argued October 25, 1985—Decided April 28, 1986*

Before BAUER, Woop and ESCHBACH, Circuit

Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal by the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue from a decision of

the United States Tax Court. The Commissioner ar-

gues the Tax Court erred in holding that ninety-five

percent of the cost of Illinois Cereal Mill’s factory

* This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this

court in regular active service under Circuit Rule 16 on the

question of creating a conflict with A. C. Monk & Co. v. United

States, 686 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1982). No judge voted to

hear this case en banc.

2a

electrical system qualified for the investment tax

credit. We affirm.

I.

IlInois Cereal Mills (“ICM”) conducts a corn mill-

ing business in Paris, Illinois. In 1976, ICM com-

pleted construction of a new specialty mill. The elec-

trical distribution system that provides power to the

specialty mill is contained in a separate room within

the mill building. The system consists of circuit

breakers, transformers, power panels, switchboards,

motor control centers, and associated wiring. It func-

tions to break down the 4,160 volts received from

the electric utility into voltages usable in the mill.

Ninety-five percent of the electrical load entering the

system is used to run mill machinery. The remain-

ing five percent is used for lighting and other gen-

eral building needs.

In its tax return filed for its fiscal year ending

September 30, 1976, ICM treated the entire cost of

the electrical system as an expenditure qualifying

for the investment tax credit. The Commissioner de-

termined that none of the cost qualified and claimed

a deficiency on that basis. The Tax Court held that

ninety-five percent of the cost of the electrical dis-

tribution system qualified for the investment tax

credit because ninety-five percent of its function was

to supply usable power to mill machinery qualifying

for the investment tax credit. The Commissioner ap-

peals. We affirm.

II.

This case concerns the investment tax credit

(“ITC”). The ITC was added to the Internal Rev-

enue Code in 1962. Pub. L. 87-834, 76 Stat. 967

(1962). It is designed to increase economic produc-

tivity, output, and growth by creating a tax incen-

8a

tive for the purchase of machinery, equipment, and

other property used to produce goods or run a busi-

ness. Comdisco v. United States, 756 F.2d 569, 572

(7th Cir. 1985) ; CIR v. Schuyler Grain Co., 411 F.2d

649, 652 (7th Cir. 1969); See, H.R. Rep. No. 1447,

87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1881,

87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962).

The ITC is established in § 38 of the Internal Rev-

enue Code. To qualify for ITC treatment, property

must meet the definition of “section 38 property” |

found at § 48 of the Code. In 1976, the relevant tax

year for this appeal, § 48 read in pertinent part as

follows.

§ 48. Definitions; special rule

(a) Section 38 property—

(1) In general.—Except as provided in this

subsection, the term “section 38 property”

means—

(A) tangible personal property, or

(B) other tangible property (not in-

cluding a building and its structural

components)... .

26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(1) (1976). Thus, the Code estab-

lishes two ways for property to qualify as ITC prop-

erty: (1) by meeting the definition of “tangible per-

sonal property” or (2) by meeting the definition of

“other tangible property” and qualifying as some-

thing other than a building or structural component

of a building.

The labyrinthian analysis developed in the statute,

regulations, cases, and legislative history to deter-

mine whether property qualifies as “tangible personal

property” or “other personal property” (and thus

as § 38 property given ITC treatment) is a meander-

4a

ing path of many steps. We first chart the course,

then venture down it with the facts of this case in

tow.

A.

The test for “tangible personal property” focuses

on whether the property in question is an “inherently

permanent structure.” Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (26

C.F.R.); H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.

11-12 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.

11-12 and 16 (1962). Thus cases and Treasury rul-

ings have determined that property that is easily re-

movable, such that it is likely to accompany the busi-

ness if it should leave the premises, is § 38 property

and qualifies for the ITC.’

1 Consolidated Freightways v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 708 F.2d 1385, 1890 (9th Cir. 1983) (loading docks,

overhead doors, and lights are intended to be permanent and

thus do not qualify as §38 property); Southland Corp. v.

United States, 611 F.2d 348 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (outdoor advertis-

ing signs are § 38 property to extent removable) ; Kramertown

Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 488 F.2d 728, 731

(5th Cir. 1974) (air conditioning/heating units, removable

only to extent necessary for replacement and repair, are not

§ 38 property) ; National Advertising Co. v. United States,

507 F.2d 850 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (outdoor advertising signs are

§ 38 property to extent removable); Alabama Displays v.

United States, 507 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (same); King

Radio Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1973)

(movable partitions are §38 property under permanency

test) ; Minot Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United

States, 435 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1970) (same) ; Hayden Island

v. United States, 380 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D. Or. 1974) (sewage

treatment plant movable from site to site qualifies as § 38

property under permanency test) ; Samis v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 76 T.C. 609, 620-21 (1981) (heating, air

conditioning, and hot/cold water unit is not § 38 property

under permanency test) ; Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Com-

missioner of Internal Revnue, 77 T.C. 349, 404-09 (1981)

5a

If property fails to qualify as tangible personal

property under § 38 because that property is found

to be inherently permanent, all is not lost for the tax-

payer. Such property may still qualify as § 38 prop-

erty under the test for “other tangible property.”

Congress added this separate category to insure that

some property classified as nonpersonal under state

law (such as, heavy immovable machines classified as

fixtures and, therefore, technically real property)

would still qualify for the ITC. Kramertown Co. v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 488 F.2d 728,

731 (5th Cir. 1974); H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong.,

2d Sess. 11-12 (1962); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong.,

2d Sess. 16 (1962).

(outdoor advertising signs are § 38 property to extent remov-

able) ; Scott Paper v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 74

T.C. 187, 172 (1980) (primary electrical system is movable,

therefore, not inherently permanent) ; Whiteco Industries v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 65 T.C. 664 (1975) (out-

door advertising signs are § 38 property to extent removable) ;

Weirick v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 62 T.C. 446,

455-56 (1974) (earthern ski ramps are permanent and thus

not § 38 property, while wooden ski ramps are removable and

qualify as §38 property); Roberts v. Commissioner of In-

ternal Revenue, 60 T.C. 861 (1973) (Astro Needle amusement

ride not personal property under § 38 because inherently per-

manent) ; Everhart v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 61

T.C. 328, 330 (1973) (sewage disposal system not § 38 prop-

erty because not removable) ; Moore v. Commissioner of In-

ternal Revenue, 58 T.C. 1045 (1972), aff’d, 489 F.2d 285 (5th

Cir. 1973) (house trailers are personal property under § 48

as to trailer park owner since removable) ; Estate of Morgan

v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue, 52 T.C. 478 (1969), aff’d

per curiam, 448 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1971) (floating docks

qualify as “tangible personal property” under § 38 because

removable, while permanent pilings do not) ; Rev. Rul. 67-349,

1967-2 Cum. Bull. 48 (wall-to-wall carpeting in motel rooms is

§ 88 property because not permanently installed).

6a

The test for “other tangible property” has three

distinct components. First, property must qualify in-

itially as tangible property of the type intended by

Congress to be covered. Second, it must not be a

building. Third, it must not be a structural compo-

nent of a building.

Congress intended to allow ITC treatment of prop-

erty, even if that property is “inherently permanent,”

if the property relates to the taxpayer’s specific busi-

ness rather than being generally adaptable to most

commercial uses. As the Senate report phrased it,

Congress wanted to allow ITC treatment of “[a]ssets

accessory to the operation of a business.” S. Rep. No.

1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962). Examples

of ITC property cited in the Senate report and in-

corporated into the regulations include “machinery,

printing presses, transportation or office equipment,

refrigerators, individual air-conditioning units, gro-

cery counters, testing equipment, display racks and

shelves, etc.” Jd.; Treas. Reg. §1.48-1(c). Cases

and Treasury rulings have established other exam-

ples.”

2 A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058, 1064-66

(4th Cir. 1982) (generally adaptable electrical equipment not

§ 38 property) ; Consolidated Freightways v. United States,

620 F.2d 862, 874 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (docking platform is not § 38

property because not generally adaptable) ; Brown-Forman

Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1268, 1269 and

1272-73 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (equipment specially designed for

maturing whiskey qualifies as § 88 property) ; Dock Corp. v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 52 T.C. 68 (1968) aff’med.

427 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1970) (oil storage tanks are § 38 prop-

erty) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schuyler Grain,

411 F.2d 649, 651-52 (7th Cir. 1969) (concrete grain storage

bins are § 38 property because specially designed for aerating

and drying) ; Stuppy, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.Supp. 1378,

1384 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (speciality greenhouse is § 38 property

Ta

Property that qualifies initially as the type of

“other property” intended by Congress must also

qualify as something other than a building. The test

for whether property is a building focuses on the

because not generally adaptable) ; Yellow Freight Systems v.

United States, 413 F.Supp. 357 (W.D. Mo. 1975), rev’d. in

part on other grounds, 588 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1976) (fence

around freight yard is § 38 property since especially neces-

sary to protect bailee’s property) ; Brown & Williamson To-

bacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F.Supp. 1283, 1288 (W.D.

Ky. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974)

(tobacco storage sheds are § 38 property because not gen-

erally adaptable); F.P. Wood & Son of Elizabeth City v.

United States, 314 F.Supp. 1205 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (special

grain storage facilities are § 38 property) ; Sherley-Anderson-

Rhea Elevator v. United States, 315 F.Supp. 1055, 1058 (N.™.

Tex. 1970) (same) ; Noell v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-

nue, 66 T.C. 718, 729 (1976) (airport runways are § 38 prop-

erty even though permanent) ; Spartanburg Terminal Co. v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 66 T.C. 916, 938-40 (1976)

(fence around railroad tunnel is § 38 property); Weirick v.

United States, 62 T.C. 446, 451-54 (1974) (ski lift towers are

§38 property even though permanently installed because

special equipment accessory to taxpayer’s business); Mer-

chants Refrigeratoring Co. of Cal. v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 60 T.C. 856 (1973) (specialized freezer room is § 38

property) ; Central Citrus Co. v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 58 T.C. 365 (1972) (blowers and coolers necessary

to meet temperature and humidity requirements of food

processing and “sweet rooms” used to ripen fruit are special-

ized and, therefore § 38 property while electrical appliances

used in general plant operation are not specialized and do not

qualify) ; Ponderosa Mouldings v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 53 T.C. 92 (1969) (sprinkler system not § 38 prop-

erty because not accessory to business even though taxpayer’s

wood moulding business particularly prone to fire) ; Rev. Rul.

79-183, 1979-1 C.B. 44 (special heavy equipment footings are

§ 38 property even though functional as flooring or as lighter

duty footings) ; Rev. Rul. 79-181, 1979-1 C.B. 41 (special high-

ee

8a

appearance of the property, whether the property

functions as a building (such as by providing every-

day working space), and, if the property is a struc-

ture housing other property, whether that structure

is closely related to the property it houses.’ The courts

stress columns are § 38 property because designed to take

abnormal stress from heavy equipment); Rev. Rul. 70-103,

1970-1 Cum. Bull. 6 (fuel tanks, diesel generator, and exhaust

equipment are specialized § 38 property); Rev. Rul. 69-602,

1969-2 Cum. Bull. 6 (propane tanks are specialized § 38 prop-

erty) ; Rev. Rul. 65-79, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 26 (bank vault doors

and drive-up window are specialized § 38 property accessory

to taxpayer’s business).

’ These factors are drawn from the legislative history and

regulations.

The term “building” is to be given its commonly accepted

meaning, that is, a structure or edifice enclosing a space

within its walls, and usually covered by a roof. It is the

basic structure of an improvement to land the purpose of

which is, for example, to provide shelter or housing or to

provide working, office, display, or sales space.

S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962).

The term “building” generally means any structure or

edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually

covered by a roof, the purpose of which is, for example,

to provide shelter or housing, or to provide working, office,

parking, display, or sales space. . . . Such term does not

include (i) a structure which is essentially an item of

machinery or equipment, or (ii) a structure which houses

property used as an integral part of [a qualified use] if

the use of the structure is so closely related to the use

of suck property that the structure clearly can be ex-

pected to be replaced when the property it initially houses

is replaced. Factors which indicate that a structure is

closely related to the use of the property it houses include

the fact that the structure is specifically designed to

provide for the stress and other demands of such prop-

9a

have applied these factors to determine whether

property is a building.*

erty and the fact that the structure could not be eco-

nomically used for other purposes.

Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e) (26 C.F.R.).

* Tamura v. United States, 734 F.°1 470, 471-73 (9th Cir.

1984) (pre-fabricated structures used to store onions are

buildings because not closely related to stored property) ;

Consolidated Freightways v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-

nue, 708 F.2d 1385, 1386-89 (9th Cir. 1983) (truck loading

docks are buildings because they provide working space) ;

A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058, 1063-64

(4th Cir. 1982) (railroad dock and tobacco storage and re-

ceiving rooms are buildings because of appearance and func-

tion) ; Consolidated Freightways v. United States, 620 F.2d

862, 869-73 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (docking facilities are buildings by

appearance and function) ; Yellow Freight System v. United

States, 538 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1976) (freight docks and

inspection lanes are buildings by appearance and function) ;

Thirup v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 508 F.2d 915

(9th Cir. 1974) (greenhouse is not a building by function) ;

Brown-Forman Distillers v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263,

1269-72 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (whiskey maturation facilities are not

buildings based on function) ; Stuppy, Inc. v. United States,

454 F.Supp. 1378 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (speciality greenhouse is

- not a building by appearance and function and because it is

closely related to stored property); Starr Farms v. United

States, 447 F.Supp. 580 (W.D. Ark. 1977) (structures used

to house chickens are buildings because of appearance and

because they are not closely related to stored property) ;

Endres Floral Co. v. United States, 450 F.Supp. 16 (N.D. Ohio

1977) (non-specialty greenhouse is a building by appearance

and function and because it is not closely related to stored

property); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United

States, 369 F.Supp. 1283 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff’d per curiam,

491 F.2d 1258 (6th CirP'1974) (tobacco drying sheds are not

buildings because they provide only incidental working space) ;

Valmont Industries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 73

T.C. 1059, 1070-78 (1980) (galvanizing facility is a building

10a

Even if property qualifies as “other property” and

is not a building, it still may not be § 38 property

if it is a structural component of a building. The test

for “structural components” set out in the regula-

tions and legislative history focuses on whether the

property in question is property “relating to the op-

eration and maintenance of a building.” Treas. Reg.

§ 1.48-1(e) (2) (26 C.F.R.); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th

Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962). Thus, if property re-

lates to building operation and maintenance, it is a

structural component not qualifying for ITC treat-

ment.° The courts have applied this analysis in de-

by function and appearance); Satrum v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 62 T.C. 413 (1974) (chicken coops are not

buildings because no working space is provided) ; Merchants

Refrigerating Co. of Cal. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-

nue, 60 T.C. 856 (1973) refrigeration room is not a building) ;

Central Citrus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C.

365, 370-73 (1972) (“sweet rooms” used to ripen fruit are

not a building).

° The regulations then go on to clarify, however, that even

if property relates to the operation and maintenance of a

building, it may still qualify as § 38 property if it is specially

installed to meet particular manufacturing requirements.

The term “structural components” includes such parts of

a building as walls, . . . electric wiring and lighting fix-

tures ....and other components relating to the operation

and maintenance of a building. However, the term “struc-

tural components” does not include machinery the sole

justification for the installation of which is the fact that

such machinery is required to meet . . . . requirements

which are essential for the operation of other machinery

or the processing of materials or foodstuffs. Machinery

may meet the “sole justification” test provided by the

preceding sentence even though it incidentally provides

for the comfort of employees, or serves, to an insubstan-

lla

termining whether property is a “structural com-

ponent.” °

B.

We now turn to the task of applying this estab-

lished law to the facts of this case. We keep in mind

that the ITC should be construed liberally in light of

its purposes, Comdisco v. United States, 756 F.2d 569,

577 (7th Cir. 1985); Commissioner of Internal Reve-

tial degree, areas where such . . . requirements are not

essential.

Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e) (2) (26 C.F.R.).

® Consolidated Freightways v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 708 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (overhead doors on

loading dock and lighting fixtures are structural components) ;

A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (4th

Cir. 1982) (high bay ceiling built to accommodate height of

certain machinery is structural component) ; Kramertown Co.

v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 488 F.2d 728, 729-30

(5th Cir. 1974) (air conditioning/heating units are structural

components) ; Samis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 76

T.C. 609, 619-20 (1981) (heating, air conditioning and hot/

cold water unit is structural component) ; Scott Paper Co. v.

Commisioner of Internal Revenue, 74 T.C. 137, 186 (1980)

(percentage of primary electrical system allocable to machin-

ery is not structural component) ; Spalding v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, 66 T.C. 1017, 1020 (1976) (fence around

auto salvage yard is not structural component); Coors v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 T.C. 368, 404-05

(1973), aff'd, 519 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1975) (air condition-

ing duct work is structural component) ; Central Citrus Co.

v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 365, 373-74

(1972) (blowers an’ coolers necessary to meet temperature

and humidity requirements of food processing are not struc-

tural components) ; Fort Walton Square v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 54 T.C. 653 (1970) (air conditioning for

individual stores in shopping center is a structural com-

ponent).

eee

12a

nue v. Schuyler Grain Co., 411 F.2d 649, 652 (7th

Cir. 1969), and that the purpose of the ITC is to pro-

mote investment. Comdisco at 572-73; Schuyler Grain

at 652. The burden is on ICM, however, to prove it

is entitled to the ITC. Lockhart Leasing Co. v. United

States, 446 F.2d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1971).

ICM does not contend that its electrical distribution

system is “tangible personal property” under § 48.

The components of the system are not easily remov-

able such that ICM would be expected to take them

along should it vacate the premises. The system is

inherently permanent and only qualifies for ITC treat-

ment if the requirements of “other tangible property”

are met.

The primary disagreement between ICM and the

Commissioner is over whether the ninety-five percent

of ICM’s electrical distribution system that powers

ICM’s equipment is the type of “other tangible prop-

erty” intended by Congress to be allowed ITC treat-

ment. The Commissioner argues that that portion of

the system is not an asset accessory to ICM’s busi-

ness because it is generally adaptable to any business

utilizing heavy equipment compatible with the voltage

output of ICM’s system. The Commissioner points

out that the components of ICM’s electrical distribu-

tion system are not custom made specialty items, but

rather are common “off-the-shelf” goods. ICM admits

that the five percent of the system that supplies power

to the building is certainly not accessory to ICM’s

business and would serve any enterprise that might

subsequently occupy the premises, but contends the

only reason ninety-five percent of its system was in-

stalled was to power ICM’s machines. ICM concludes

from this that ninety-five percent of its system must

be accessory to its business. ICM points out that

13a

under the Commissioner’s broad adaptability test,

even the machines themselves would be disqualified

from ITC treatment because they are adaptable to

the business of another milling enterprise. Finally,

ICM agrees that custom made electrical components

would present a clearer case, but argues that ICM’s

ability to purchase its electrical items from a manu-

facturer’s inventory is otherwise irrelevant to the

question of whether the equipment is special equip-

ment accessory to ICM’s business.

The question is obviously one of determining how

wide to cast the net of adaptability. If we define

adaptability as broadly as the Commissioner would

like, we would in effect be holding that any equip-

ment that may be usable by a subsequent occupant

of the premises, even if that occupant isgin the same

business as the taxpayer, is adaptable and, therefore,

not accessory to the taxpayer’s business. This would

severely curtail the separate category of “other tangi-

ble property.” On the other hand, we must be careful

to avoid the result tentatively urged by ICM in which

any property that is not a building or structural com-

ponent thereof qualifies as § 38 property. This would

completely eliminate any separate requirement that

“other tangible property” be accessory to the tax-

payer’s business.

Viewing ICM’s electrical distribution system in

light of the regulations, legislative history, and case

law, we conclude that the ninety-five percent of that

system powering ICM’s manufacturing equipment is

accessory to ICM’s business and is not so generally

adaptable that it is disqualified from ITC treatment.

The examples cited in the legislative history and regu-

lations make clear that property need not be ex-

traordinarily specialized to qualify for the ITC. Treas.

l4a

Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (26 C.F.R.) (indicating that “ma-

chinery, printing presses, transportation or office

equipment, refrigerators, individual air-conditioning

units, grocery counters, testing equipment, display

racks and shelves” are all accessory to a taxpayer’s

business and qualify for ITC); S. Rep. No. 1881,

87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962) (same). If gro-

cery counters and display racks are not so generally

adaptable that they are disqualified from ITC treat-

ment, we are unable to say that the portion of ICM’s

electrical distribution system that powers its heavy

equipment is disqualified from ITC treatment even if

we accept the Commissioner’s unsupported claim that

ICM’s system produces “standard” voltages used by

most heavy equipment. We find additional support

for this conclusion in the Commissioner’s regulatory

language suggesting that property that is part of a

taxpayer’s building requires no separate showing of

being accessory to the taxpayer’s business. Treas.

Reg. §1.48-1(c) (26 C.F.R.) (“tangible personal

property includes all property (other than structural

components) which is contained in or attached to a

building’).

Furthermore, the case of Scott Paper v. Commis-

sioner of Internal Revenue, 74 T.C. 137 (1980) seems

squarely on point in ICM’s favor. The Tax Court

below expressly relied on Scott Paper to reach its re-

sult in this case, and ICM argues that Scott Paper’s

rationale should control. In Scott Paper, the Tax

Court found that the percentage of the taxpayer’s

“primary electrical system” used to power machinery

qualified for the ITC while the percentage used for

lighting, ventilation, and other building services did

not qualify. The primary electrical system involved

in Scott Paper is apparently the same type of system

l5a

involved in this case. The court in Scott Paper de-

scribed the system as functioning to reduce the volt-

age received from the utility to voltages compatible

with the machinery and as “comprised of a primary

disconnect switch, a transformer, a primary low-

voltage breaker, a bus, meters, and distribution or

secondary breakers.” 74 T.C. at 148. Absent good

reason to reject Scott Paper, its rationale would re-

quire affirmance in this case.

The Commissioner argues that we must reject

Scott Paper for three reasons. First, the Commis-

sioner urges us to follow the Fourth Circuit which,

the Commissioner asserts, rejected Scott Paper in

A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058

(4th Cir. 1982). Second, the Commissioner alleges

that the Tax Court in this case followed Scott Paper

in applying a “functionality test” which is supposedly

now discredited. Finally, the Commissioner asserts

that there is no basis in the law to allow allocation

of the ITC on a partial or percentage basis as done

in Scott Paper and below. We find all three of these

arguments to be without merit, and see no reason to

reject the Scott Paper result.

We are not convinced that Scott Paper and A.C.

Monk are fundamentally irreconcilable. To the ex-

tent they are, however, we disagree with the reason-

ing in Monk and adhere to Scott Paper.

In Monk, the court described the electrical system

involved as follows:

The power company provides electricity to the

exterior of Monk’s factory. Under the system

designed and purchased by Monk, the power is

split at two “switchgear” panel boards—one

supplying power to the factory and the other to

the office structure containing laboratory and

—————oorrreree™ ee — ees ee

16a

computer rooms. Power to the factory is con-

ducted by a large, copper bus duct running the

length of the factory, designed to be simply

tapped to provide power at any location. Tap-

ins feed the electricity through several panel

boards and transformers to motor control boxes

(essentially on-off switches for the machinery).

Power for machinery and for the building it-

self (e.g., lights) comes through the same elec-

trical system. Power to the office flows through

a similar system.

Monk, 686 F.2d at 1065. The district court in Monk

followed Scott Paper and “allowed as a credit the

portion of the system’s costs that could be allocated

to machinery operations.” Jd. On appeal, the Fourth

Circuit rejected the Commissioner’s argument that

no permanently installed electrical system could qual-

ify for the ITC, but also reversed the district court’s

allocation. Jd. The court reversed as error the lower

court’s use of “a narrow function test (i.e., does the

system service machinery?)” and the lower court’s

“allocating a portion of a single system as struc-

tural.” Jd. The court then articulated what it be-

lieved to be the proper analysis.

We believe that the proper approach is, again,

to determine whether the system has more gen-

eral uses than simply operating specific items

of machinery. Thus, if the wiring and other

components of the electrical system could be

adapted to other operations, they are structural

components of the building. For example, wir-

ing providing electricity for lighting is certainly

a structural component, because lighting is a

general need of many manufacturing operations.

Similarly, an electrical system providing power

17a

to machinery is a structural component if the

system can feasibly be adapted to uses other than

the specific machine it was designed to serve.

One method of analyzing the issue would be

to determine whether a manufacturer convert-

ing the building to an alternate process would

be able, with reasonable alterations, to use the

existing system, or whether he would have es-

sentially to scrap the system and install an-

other. Of course, to be considered a structural

component the electrical system need not be

adaptable to all conceivable uses, but only flex-

ible enough that it is not inextricably linked to

the present, specific machinery.

Monk, 686 F.2d at 1065-66. The court then re-

manded for a determination of which components of

the electrical system were generally adaptable and

which were not.

Monk is fundamentally consistent with our ap-

proach and the approach in Scott Paper. The Monk

court recognized that the key inquiry for a perma-

nently installed electrical system is the degree of

adaptability or specialization of that system. It also

recognized that an electrical system can partially

qualify for the ITC.

The Monk court did appear to reject, however, the

Scott Paper method of allocating the portion of the

electrical system that qualifies for ITC treatment by

determining the percentage of that system used to

power manufacturing equipment. The Monk court

preferred a method of looking at each individual com-

ponent of the system and determining whether that

component is itself generally adaptable. To the ex-

tent Monk disapproves of the Scott Paper percentage

18a

allocation method, we must reject the reasoning in

Monk.

The Monk court, and the Commissioner in this

case, assert that there is “no basis in the legislative

history, the regulations or the case law” for allocat-

ing ITC treatment to one percentage of property and

not to the remaining percentage based on different

uses of the property. This is simply wrong. Many

courts have specifically allowed ITC treatment by

percentage allocation based on use. Panhandle East-

ern Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 35, 42

(Ct. Cl. 1981) (property is partially disqualified

from ITC to extent used for personal or entertain-

ment purposes); Sherley-Anderson-Rhea Elevator v.

United States, 315 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (N.D. Tex.

1970) (ITC allowed to extent property used for qual-

ified use); Merchant’s Refrigerating Co. of Cal. v.

Commissioiner of Internal Revenue, 60 T.C. 856, 860

(1973) (portion of structure used solely for storage

is not “building” under § 38 while remainder not so

used is building) ; Central Citrus v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 365, 370-73 (1972)

(same) ; Catron v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

50 T.C. 306 (1968) (same). The legislative history

makes clear that percentage allocations of ITC prop-

erty based on use were expressly contemplated by

Congress. In discussing the requirement that § 38

property be depreciable (a requirement not involved

in this case), the Senate Committee said the follow-

ing.

If an asset is in part subject to an allowance

for depreciation and in part nondepreciable, only

the proportionate part of the asset which is sub-

ject to depreciation will qualify as section 38

property. Thus, if an asset is used 80 percent

— ee

19a

of the time in a trade or business and is used 20

percent of the time for personal purposes, only

80 percent of such property will qualify as sec-

tion 38 property subject to depreciation. Fur-

ther, property does not qualify to the extent it is

treated as property which is used for personal,

living, and family purposes under section 274

(relating to disallowance of certain entertain-

ment, etc., expenses ).

S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962).

In the face of this authority, we cannot accept

Monk’s conclusion that percentage allocation of prop-

erty based on use for ITC purposes is improper.

We also reject the Commissioner’s attack on what

he characterizes as the Tax Court’s “functionality

test.” The Tax Court faced the task of determining

what portions of the electrical distribution system

are assets accessory to ICM’s business. Making this

allocation on the basis of the percentage of the system

used to power machinery is a sensible approach in

accord with the regulations, cases, and legislative his-

tory as outlined above.

Furthermore, the cases cited by the Commissioner

(including Monk) do not stand for the proposition

that the “functionality test” has been generally re-

jected. The Commissioner cites language in Minot

Federal Savings & Loan Association v. United States,

435 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1970) and King Radio

Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1091, 1096 (10th

Cir. 1973) that indicates that whether the movable

partitions involved in those cases “functioned” as

walls was irrelevant in light of the fact that they

were easily removable and thus qualified as “tangi-

ble personal property.” This language is in complete

accord with our analysis and the analysis of the Tax

20a

Court in this case. The initial determination in ITC

cases is whether property is inherently permanent.

Obviously, “functionality” is irrelevant to this in-

quiry as correctly noted by the Minot and King Radio

courts.

Functionality is a useful inquiry, however, in many

areas of ITC law. The King Radio court itself ac-

knowledged that “function” was a useful test to de-

termine whether or not property is a building or

structural component. King Radio, 486 F.2d at 1096.

The .Jonk court also applied functionality to deter-

mine whether a structure is a building. A. C. Monk,

686 F.2d at 1061. The separate requirement (not

involved in this case) that property be utilized for a

qualified use mandates a functionality approach. See

Sherley-Anderson-Rhea Elevator v. United States,

315 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (N.D. Tex. 1970). The

Commissioner himself admits that “functionality” re-

mains as a useful factor in many areas of ITC analy-

sis. He concedes functionality is commonly used to

determine whether property is a storage facility spe-

cially qualifying for ITC treatment, whether property

is a building, and whether property is machinery or

equipment which also specially qualifies for ITC

treatment. Appellant’s Brief, pp. 20-21. In light of

this widespread use, we see no reason to reject Scott

Paper’s use of functionality as a method of allocation

when property only partially qualifies as accessory to

a taxpayer’s business.

The Commissioner’s argument that there is no basis

for partial ITC treatment of property is also without

foundation for the reasons outlined above. Even Monk

supports the allocation of ITC treatment among vari-

ous components of a single electrical system. Monk

simply prefers a part-by-part allocation approach to

——— i ee

2la

the exclusion of an allocation by percentage of use

approach. We recognize that either approach may be

useful and leave the choice of allocation method in

the sound discretion of the trial court.

We new move to the question of whether the

ninety-five percent of ICM’s electrical distribution

system, which is inherently permanent but which is

also accessory to ICM’s business and thus the type

of other tangible property to be considered for ITC

treatment, is a building. The Commissioner does not,

and cannot, seriously contend that ICM’s electrical

system is itself a building. Its appearance is not

that of a building, and it does not provide work space

or otherwise function as a building.

The Commissioner does contend, however, that

ICM’s electrical distribution system is a structural

component of a building. He asserts that all electri-

cal systems are expresly included as structural com-

ponents by the regulation’s classification of “electric

wiring and lighting fixtures” as examples of struc-

tural components. (See footnote 5, supra). He also

asserts that whether property relates to the opera-

tion and maintenance of a building is not the proper

test for whether property is a structural component

of a building. We disagree and uphold the Tax

Court’s determination that the ninety-five percent of

ICM’s system powering mill machinery is not a struc-

tural component.

The phrase “electric wiring and lighting fixtures”

does not include ICM’s electrical distribution system.

The Commissioner himself describes the system as

composed of “circuit breakers, transformers, power

panels, switchboards, motor control centers, and as-

sociated wiring.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 4 (emphasis

added). Clearly there is more to ICM’s system than

22a

electric wiring alone. Both Monk and Scott Paper

declined to adopt the Commissioner’s position that the

phrase “electric wiring and lighting fixtures” dis-

qualified all electrical distribution systems from ITC

treatment, and we also reject that position.

We also see no reason to depart from the language

of the Commissioner’s own regulation establishing the

test for structural components by defining them as

property “relating to the operation and maintenance

of a building.” Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2). The

Commissioner states that close examination of the

regulatory language reveals that the examples pre-

ceding the phrase provide a “comprehensive defini-

tion of the term ‘structural components,’” and “the

phrase [‘other components relating to the operation

and maintenance of the building’] was intended to

do no more than to amplify the idea that items pecu-

liar to the taxpayer’s business operations . . . would

not be classified as ‘structural components’ even

though they were permanently installed and would

be classified as fixtures under local law.” Appellant’s

Brief, pp. 14 and 24.

The Commissioner’s proposed reading of the regu-

lation is obviously strained, contrary to the case law,

See Scott Paper, 74 T.C. at 183; Central Citrus Co.

v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 365, 373-74 (1972); Pon-

derosa Mouldings v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 92, 95

(1969), and confuses the test for “structural com-

ponents” with the test for “other tangible property.”

We also note that the Commissioner’s reading results

in ninety-five percent of ICM’s system qualifying for

ITC treatment anyway. If the examples listed in the

regulation are indeed a comprehensive list of all struc-

tural components, we have already determined that

ICM’s electrical distribution system is not included

ee

23a

in that list and would, therefore, not be disqualified

from ITC treatment as a structural component.

ITI.

In sum, we affirm the Tax Court’s determination

that ninety-five percent of the cost of ICM’s electrical

distribution system qualifies as § 38 property eligible

for the ITC. Although the system is inherently per-

manent, and thus not “tangible personal property”

under § 48(a) (1) (A), the ninety-five percent of the

system that powers ICM’s machinery is “other tangi-

ble property” that is not a building or structural com-

ponent of a building under § 48(a)(1)(B). To the

extent that our holding approving the Tax Court’s

allocation of the ITC to ninety-five percent of the elec-

trical distribution system is inconsistent with the

holding in A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States, 686

F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1982), we respectfully disagree

with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in that case.

The judgment of the Tax Court is hereby in all

respects

AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Ceurt of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

24a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

April 28, 1986

Before

HON. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

HON. HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge

HON. JESSE E. ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge

No. 85-1485

ILLINOIS CEREAL MILLS, INC.,

PETITIONER-APPELLEE

Vv.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States Tax Court

This cause was heard on the record from the United

States Tax Court, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, IT IS ORDERED AND

ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the

said Tax Court in this cause appealed from be, and

the same is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs, in ac-

cordance with the opinion of this Court filed this date.

25a

APPENDIX C

T. C. Memo 1983-469

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

ILLINOIS CEREAL MILLS, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT

Docket Nos. 1619-76, 3013-79 Filed August 11, 1983

Warren C. Seieroe, for the petitioner.

Stephen J. Morrow, for the respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND

OPINION

PARKER, Judge: Respondent determined defi-

ciencies in petitioner’s corporate income taxes as

follows:

Fiscal Year Ending Deficiency

9/30/72 $ 78,773.41

9/30/73 371,139.04

9/30/74 606,078.18

9/30/75 176,717.11

9/30/76 83,330.84

After numerous concessions by both parties as set

out in their stipulation of issues and first supple-

mental stipulation of issues, the following issues re-

main for our decision:

1. Whether certain corn répresented by warehouse

receipts is properly includable in petitioner’s year-

end LIFO inventory ;

2. Whether the price petitioner paid to purchase

a competitor’s Mogul binder business is allocable

26a

among the various intangible assets acquired, and, if

so, the various tax consequences of such an alloca-

tion;

3. Whether structures housing certain industrial

processes qualify as “section 38 property”* for pur-

poses of the investment tax credit, and whether the

useful lives of such structures for purposes of com-

puting depreciation are the same as the useful lives

of the machinery and equipment within the struc-

tures or independent of the useful lives of such ma-

chinery and equipment; * and

_ 4, Whether certain grain storage tanks owned by

petitioner’s subsidiary are assets that come within

Asset Guideline Class “01.1” for purposes of deter-

mining their depreciable useful lives.*

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so

found. The stipulation of facts, first supplemental

stipulation of facts, second supplemental stipulation

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended and in effect

during the taxable years in question, and all references to

Rules are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

*The parties have agreed that if the structures are not

section 38 property, the useful life of each is 25 years; they

have also agreed that the useful life of the machinery and

equipment in each structure is 13.5 years. The parties have

not stipulated that if the structures are section 38 property,

their useful lives are necessarily the same as the useful lives

of the machinery and equipment contained therein; however,

the parties seem to have tried and briefed the matter as if that

were the situation.

’ The parties have agreed upon the useful lives that will

result from this determination.

a ere ee ee oe,

27a

of facts, and all exhibits attached thereto are incorpo-

rated herein by this reference.

Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc. (herein ICM) is a Dela-

ware corporation with its principal office and place

of business at Paris, Illinois, for all times relevant

hereto. ICM filed its corporate income tax returns

using the accrual method of accounting for its fiscal

years ending September 30, 1972 through and in-

cluding September 30, 1976, with the Midwest Serv-

ice Service Center at Kansas City, Missouri. ICM’s

principa! business activity is the operation of a corn

milling business. Incident to this business ICM pur-

chases shelled corn which it processes into various

products including meals, grits, flakes, flours, oil,

starches, and hominy as well as certain specialty

products. These products are used by a number of

different industries including food manufacture, brew-

ing, industrial products, and animal food.

I. LIFO Inventory—Warehouse Receipts

ICM operated a large corn mill in Paris, Illinois,

during the years in issue and for many years prior

thereto. In its business ICM purchased and processed

vast amounts of shelled corn. ICM had storage ca-

pacity for about 1.2 million bushels of shelled corn.

Because of the large quantities of shelled corn it proc-

essed to make its finished goods and because of its

lack of storage capacity for finished goods or for the

various particle sizes left over after a production

run, ICM’s production in excess of existing orders at

any given time was sold as “hominy feed,” which was

used as an animal feed. Although subject te certain

variables, hominy feed usually sold for about $10 per

ton less than raw corn.

28a

Generally, for a dry miller such as ICM that breaks

up the corn by mechanical rather than by chemical

means, “new corn” from the recent harvest has better

milling qualities than “old corn” from the prior year’s

growing season. Generally, unless the “new corn”

comes from a particularly bad harvest year, the new

corn will result in fewer fine particles of the type

that ICM could only dispose of as hominy feed. The

corn harvest usually begins about mid October to

early November in ICM’s geographical area, and in

1974 there was a premature frost that suggested that

the new corn to be harvested that year would be of

an inferior quality.

During all of the years involved and for many

prior years, ICM used the LIFO method of valuing

its inventories of corn. As of September 30, 1973,

ICM included the following in its ending LIFO in-

ventory of corn:

Corn on hand 312,700 bushels

Corn-in-transit 240,129 bushels

Warehouse receipts 200,315 bushels

TOTAL 753,144

The warehouse receipts mentioned above resulted

from a transaction with Cargill, Inc. (“Cargill”).

During September 1973, ICM’s physical inventory

of corn was substantially lower in quantity than it

had been at the beginning of the taxable year. ICM,

by telephone, entered into a transaction with Cargill

on September 28, 1973, whereby six warehouse re-

ceipts, representing 200,315 bushels of No. 5 yellow

corn, would be transferred to ICM on September 28,

1973 and these receipts would be subsequently trans-

ferred back to Cargill on October 1, 1973. The corn

represented by the warehouse receipts was held at all

times by Cargill at its elevators in Chicago, Illinois.

.

;

.

|

29a

As no time did ICM intend to take delivery of the

corn in-kind, but, on the contrary, intended at all

times to deliver the six warehouse receipts back to

Cargill on October 1, 1973, as was required by the

September 28, 1973 agreement of the parties.

As of September 30, 1975, ICM included the fol-

lowing in its ending LIFO inventory of corn:

Corn on hand 293,000 bushels

Warehouse receipt 600,000 bushels

TOTAL 893,000 bushels

The warehouse receipt mentioned above resulted from

a transaction with The Andersons.

During September 1975, ICM’s physical inventory

of corn was substantially lower in quantity than it

had been at the beginning of the taxable year. ICM,

by telephone, entered into a transaction with The

Andersons on September 29, 1975, whereby a ware-

house receipt, representing 600,000 bushes of No. 2

yellow corn, would be transferred to ICM on Septem-

ber 30, 1975, and subsequently transferred back to

The Andersons on October 1, 1975. The corn repre-

sented by the warehouse receipt was at that time the

“old corn” of inferior quality from the preceding

1974 growing season and was held at all times by

The Andersons at its elevators. At no time did ICM

intend to take delivery of the corn in-kind, but, on

the contrary, indeed at all times to deliver the ware-

house receipt back to The Andersons on October 1,

1975, as was required by the September 30, 1975

agreement of the parties.

The transactions with Cargill in 1973 and The

Andersons in 1975 involved exchanges of warehouse

receipts, purchase confirmations, sales confirmations,

and checks. After the initial telephone contact in

30a

each instance, all that was left to be undertaken by

the parties to the transactions was the mechanical

steps of exchanging matching and reversing confir-

mation slips, the delivery and redelivery of warehouse

receipts, and the exchange of checks. ICM’s actual

cash expenditures in these transactions were limited

to $1,368.16 in 1973 (ICM’s draft for $492,776.18

less Cargill‘s draft for $491,408.02) and to $3,000 in

1975 (ICM’s check for $1,698,000 less The Ander-

son’s check for $1,695,000).

Frank Wiggins (“Wiggins”), ICM’s executive vice-

president at the time, and a Mr. Buchanan (“Bu-

chanan”), who worked in ICM’s grain department,

discussed these 1973 and 1975 acquisitions of ware-

house receipts before ICM contacted either Cargill

or The Andersons. During these discussions, both

Wiggins and Buchanan knew that ICM would not be

able to take delivery of the corn represented by the

warehouse receipts and that the only way for ICM

to get title to the corn was to agree to sell it back

to Cargill and to The Andersons so that the corn

would never leave their elevators. ICM’s purpose in

acquiring the corn represented by these warehouse

receipts was not to gain corn inventories to move

into production, but simply to avoid the adverse tax

consequences of having a closing LIFO inventory

amount smaller than the beginning amount (i.e.,

avoid the “liquidation” of its LIFO base).

In his notices of deficiency, respondent determined

that the corn represented by these warehouse receipts

should not Have been included in ICM’s year-end

LIFO inventories. The result of this determination

was a year-end inventory of corn in an amount less

than the beginnii.g inventory, causing a liquidation

ee ee a ee ee eee ee

8la

or recapture of ICM’s LIFO inventory base.‘ Accord-

ingly, respondent decreased ICM’s deduction for cost

of goods sold and increased its income for the fiscal

years ending September 30, 1973, September 30,

1974, and September 30, 1975.° Respondent’s deter-

mination also resulted in an increase in ICM’s deduc-

tion for cost of goods sold for the fiscal year ending

September 30, 1976, reducing its taxable income for

that year.

4 Under the LIFO method of accounting, the most recently

acquired inventory is deemed to have been moved into produc-

tion, and the oldest inventory accumulates in the inventory

balances. Thus, these year-end inventory balances are valued

at their historic acquisition costs, which, over a period of time

and in an inflationary economy, tend to be much less than

current inventory replacement costs. When the LIFO inven-

tory balance at the close of the year is less than the balance

at the beginning of the year, part of the inventory repre-

sented by the beginning year balance becomes a part of the

cost-of-goods-sold deduction for that year. Since this LIFO

inventory deemed a part of current production costs is, by

current standards, grossly undervalued, a LIFO method tax-

payer’s cost-of-goods-sold deduction is less and his adjusted

gross income more than if the LIFO inventory balances had

not decreased. This “transfer’ of low value LIFO inventory

to cost of goods sold caused when year-end inventory bal-

ances are less than beginning balances is called a “liquidation”

or “recapture” or “invasion” of the taxpayer’s LIFO inven-

tory base.

5 In his notice of deficiency in docket No. 1619-76, respond-

ent also determined that certain corn-in-transit was not in-

cludable in ICM’s LIFO inventory for the fiscal years ending

September 30, 1973 and September 30, 1974. His adjustment

was based in part on that determination. Respondent has now

conceded that ICM properly included this corn-in-transit in its

inventory, and this concession will be reflected in the parties’

Rule 155 computations.

32a

II. ICM’s “Mogul” Purchase

One aspect of ICM’s business is the production and

sale of cereal binders, a specialty product used pri-

marily in the foundry industry. Prior to February

of 1974, ICM produced and sold cereal binders under

the names Ceres, Cereatim, and 940.

CPC International, Inc. (“CPC’’) is a large multi-

national corporation having extensive corn-process-

ing facilities in the United States, including plants

at Argo, Illinois, Pekin, Illinois, and-North Kansas

City, Missouri. Prior to February of 1974, CPC pro-

duced and sold cereal binders under the name “Mo-

gul” that competed directly with ICM’s binders, par-

ticularly ICM’s 940. CPC was a “wet” miller that

milled corn by chemical méans.

During 1973, CPC had become dissatisfied with the

profitability of a group of its products, called the pre-

gelatinized starches, which included its cereal binder,

Mogul. Late in 1973 or very early in 1974, CPC de-

cided to dispose of this line of business. CPC also

decided to try to sell its Mogul business to one of the

dry corn millers who produced competing products.

CPC put together a “package” to sell as its Mogul

business, which package included customer lists, pro-

duction equipment if the buyer wanted it, the Mogul

trademarks (registered) and trade name, produc-

tion specifications and technical information for the

Mogul binder, sales assistance in the transition from

CPC to the buyer, including personal calls upon

larger customers, and “technical help in manufactur-

ing or product use.” The first dry corn miller CPC

approached was ICM. |

In late January of 1974, CPC telephoned Joseph

Hasler (“Hassler”), ICM’s sales manager at that

time, inquiring whether ICM was interested in pur-

33a

chasing CPC’s Mogul cereal binder business. Hasler

informed CPC that ICM was indeed interested. Has-

ler then met with Wiggins, ICM’s executive vice-

president, to discuss the offer and the two decided to

“take the next step.”

On or about January 30, 1974, Hasler and Ken

McFall (“McFall”), ICM’s sales service representa-

tive, met with CPC officials at the CPC corporate

headquarters at Inglewood Cliffs, New Jersey, to dis-

cuss the offer. CPC repeated the general terms of its

offer and stated that the price was $300,000. Hasler,

for ICM, tentatively agreed to the purchase price

of $300,000. CPC required this tentative agreement

before it would provide any information about Mo-

gul’s technical qualities, product specifications, or

production methods. After they tentatively agreed

to the purchase price, CPC gave Hasler some rudi-

mentary information regarding business volume,

specifications, and general production methods.

Hasler prepared a memorandum, dated February

1, 1974, outlining CPC’s proposal as follows:

CPC idea

Basically their deal is this. They are willing

to sell us all their trade marks for Mogul and

the logo, which is registered for the U.S. 7

—They will provide complete customer files

edited to delete only proprietary informa-

tion which might relate to other areas

of their business.

—They will provide all of their technical

and research information.

—Everything they have relating to Mogul

will be turned over to us. Equipment can

be available if we want any part of it.

2220S

34a

—Customer lists, prices paid, ete.

—Some technical help from their production

people if required.

—Joint sales calls on key customers and a

letter from them to all customers spelling

out the transition.

—Assisting us in securing as much of the

existing business as possible.

—They will help us in securing the neces-

sary bags if this is a problem as well as

any other problem areas (within reason)

which may come up.

Hasler’s memorandum briefly described CPC’s man-

ufacturing process, and his description indicated that

CPC’s production: of Mogul was almost a by-product

of its overall wet milling process. The memorandum

indicated that the feedstock for the Mogul production

was the third level or third cut within CPC’s slurry,

consisting of 9 to 15 percent protein and starch in

the slurry solution. Hasler’s memorandum also pro-

vided fairly detailed product specifications for Mogul.

The memorandum did not suggest that the feedstock

for the Mogul was pure starch which was the fourth

level or cut in CPC’s slurry. Finally, the memoran-

dum conveyed basic general sales and volume figures.

The memorandum does not specifically mention a

covenant not to compete. The memorandum stated

that CPC wanted to make a final decision on the deal

prior to February 14.

Approximately one week later, on or about Feb-

ruary 6, 1974, Hasler and McFall visited CPC’s plant

in Argo, Illinois, where CPC produced its Mogul

binder. They toured the plant and discussed essen-

Mette en aii i ee el i i eee ee

35a

tially the same topics that had been discussed at the

first meeting. ICM obtained a little more information

regarding Mogul’s specifications, and ICM “cleared

up [its] thinking a little bit on [the] manufacturing

process,” but the record does not indicate exactly

what additional information was obtained at that

time. Afterwards, Hasler and Wiggins met and de-

cided that they wanted “to consummate the deal, and

so advised CPC.”

At a special meeting on February 8, 1974, ICM’s

board of directors approved the following resolution:

RESOLVED, that the Officers of Illinois Cereal

Mills, Inc. are hereby authorized to take such ac-

tion as necessary, and to enter into negotiations

and culminate a contract to acquire the CPC

binder business and to incur such capital costs

to produce the additional binder involved, all as

set forth in the proposal dated February 8, 1974

attached.

The proposal referred to in the ICM Board’s res-

olution provided:

February 8, 1974

CPC Binder Proposal

CPC is desirous of disposing of their binder

business primarily covered by their “Mogul”

trademark, brands, etc.

They propose selling all of this business to us

for $300,000 and will render such assistance as

necessary to implement an orderly transfer.

They also would continue production, sales, etc.,

or any part thereof up to January 1, 1975.

This business would complement and more

than double our present specialty business which

competes with them. The additional volume to be

86a

gained by us in acquiring this business is esti-

mated to be 342,000 cwt. per year. After this

acquisition our business would be anticipated to

total 637,000 cwt./year.

To acquire this business and make this addi-

tional production necessitates removal of our spe-

cialty-department from the corn mill. If we are

going to stay in the specialty business this move

has to be made in any event in order to complete

modernization of our mill.

Neither the Board resolution nor the “CPC Binder

Proposal” makes any express references to a covenant

not to compete.

On February 13, 1974, Wiggins and Hasler met

with Robert Gillespie, then CPC’s vice-president in

charge of its starch business, Merle Mentzer, CPC’s

business manager for its starch business, and Robert

Wells, CPC’s attorney, to close the sale. Before this

meeting, ICM had neither received nor inspected any

proposed contracts of sale, any legal documents re-

lating to the trademarks, any copies of the Mogul

customer list, any credit data, or any additional, more

specific technical information regarding CPC’s manu-

facture of Mogul.

On February 13, 1974, CPC and ICM entered into

two agreements—the Purchase Agreement, involving

ICM’s acquisition of CPC’s Mogul intangible assets,

for the sum of $240,000, and the Manufacturing

Agreement, for the sum of $60,000. The Purchase

Agreement provided as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the

mutual promises and covenants contained herein,

it is mutually agreed as follows:

1. Sale of Business. Seller hereby sells, and

Buyer hereby buys, Sellers MOGUL Cereal

37a

binder business in the present States of the

United States, including its good will and the

business assets enumerated in Paragraph 3 below

(the “Business Assets”, for the consideration

stated in Paragraph 2.

2. Purchase Price. Buyer agrees to pay Seller

a purchase price of Two Hundred and Forty

($240,000) Thousand Dollars payable on the ex-

ecution hereof;

3. The Business Assets. The Business Assets

hereby sold to Buyer consist of the following:

(i) U.S. Registered Trademark “MO-

GUL” (Word), Reg. No. 241,992 (assign-

ment to Buyer attached as Appendix A) ;

(ii) U.S. Registered Trademark “MO-

GUL” (Word and Bull’s Eye Device), Reg.

No. 503,618 (Assignment to Buyer attached

as Appendix B) ;

(iii) Seller’s specification sheet and man-

ufacturing procedure for its “MOGUL”

brand cereal binder (Appendix C) and

copies of current technical data relating to

this product; and

(iv) Seller’s customer list and credit data

connected therewith for “MOGUL” brand

cereal binder, consisting of all customers

who have purchased this product from Seller

during the two year period ending January

31, 1974 (Appendix D).

4. Customer Notification. Promptly after the

execution hereof, Seller shall mail a letter to all

customers on the customer list, in the form at-

tached as Appendix E, advising that Seller has

sold its cereal binder business in the United

States to Buyer and recommending that they con-

Eee

38a

tinue to buy “MOGUL” brand cereal binder from

Buyer.

In addition, Seller shall participate with Buyer

in making one joint sales contact with all major

customers on the customer list during the period

ending July 1, 1984.

5. Covenant Not to Compete. Seller shall not

for a period of five (5) years from the date

hereof (i) engage in the sale of cereal core bind-

ers in the United States having a composition

substantially similar to that of its MOGUL

cereal binder or (ii) use “MOGUL” or any sub-

stantially similar trademark or trade name in

connection with the sale in the United States of

any binder material. * * *

The manufacturing procedures attached to the Pur-

chase Agreement identified the CPC feedstock as 80

percent stripper starch and 20 percent thick boiling

tailings. The manufacturing data also indicated that

dye was added to give the Mogul its yellow color,

whereas ICM’s 940 binder got its yellow color from

the yellow goods (corn grits) used as feedstock. The

Manufacturing Agreement® provided in pertinent

part:

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the

mutual promises and covenants contained herein,

it is mutually agreed as follows:

i. During the period from the execution here-

of until July 1, 1974, and from month to month

thereafter if Buyer’s business requirements so

* The tax consequences to ICM of the Manufacturing Agree-

ment are not at issue in this proceeding, but certain aspects

of it affect some of the issues remaining for our determination.

Me trite sti a he

39a

necessitate, but in no event after December 31,

1974, Manufacturer will continue to manufac-

ture and make available to Buyer such quantities

of MOGUL at up to current quantities to cus-

tomers on the customer list for as long as it is

required to supply an amount of not less than 1.6

million pounds of products per month * * *

* * * * x

2 * * *

During the period ending no later than De-

cember 31, 1974, Manufacturer shall cooperate

with Buyer in handling or referring inquiries

from potential customers for MOGUL cereal

binder, as Buyer may direct.

3. Buyer shall pay Manufacturer a service

fee for its manufacturing services in the amount

of sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00) upon exe-

cution hereof. * * *

Covenant Not to Compete

Wiggins, who negotiated the deal for ICM, is an

attorney and had been ICM’s tax attorney before be-

coming a corporate officer. CPC’s attorney, Wells,

participated in the negotiations. The record does not

establish the reason for the allocation of the $300,000

purchase price between the Purchase Agreement and

the Manufacturing Agreement. ICM did not employ

an appraiser to determine the value of any specific

asset it purcased from CPC, either individually or

as part of the entire Mogul “package.” Neither ICM

nor CPC sought to allocate, purported to allocate, or

discussed the allocation of the $240,000 purchase price

among the various intangible assets reflected in the

40a

Purchase Agreement.’ Neither Wiggins nor Wells

discussed the tax consequenecs of such an allocation,

or of the parties’ failure to make such an allocation.

From the outset of the negotiations, it was clear

that CPC intended to terminate its cereal binder busi-

“ness. Nonetheless, the covenant not to compete was

of considerable value to ICM: CPC was still selling

resin-coated sand in the foundry market in competi-

tion with cereal binders. Because of this, CPC still

had business contacts in ICM’s markets, and because

of its size, had the ability to re-enter the cereal binder

market. Moreover, CPC had an excellent reputation

in the market. Because of this, the covenant was

quite valuable to ICM but was not the only item of

value received in the purchase of the Mogul binder

business.

Technical Data

Cereal binders are used primarily in the foundry

industry. The binder is mixed with sand, water, and

other materials, formed into a core, dried, and baked.

Into the finished mold is poured molten metal; the

core allows the metal to form around what will be

a hollow spot. After the metal hardens into the de-

sired shape, the used core is broken or disintegrates

back into granular sand and is thus removed from

* Wiggins intimated at the trial that the failure to make

an allocation was because CPC was just interested in selling

its assets and ICM was just interested in obtaining the

covenant not to compete. That suggestion is not borne out by

any of the contemporaneous documents or by the testimony

of any of the other participants in the negotiations, and we

reject it. We agree that the covenant not to compete was

important to ICM, but we do not think that it was the only

item of value purchased by ICM.

e+ Ss eee ee eke. ote,

ee

4la

the mold. The most important characteristic of a

binder is its adhesive quality, namely, its ability to

hold together the sand and other materials in the

core.

“Viscosity” is a measure of the resistance or fric-

tion of fluid that flows in fluid systems. Viscosity is

a useful test to determine the adhesive qualities’ of

a binder, and the greater the viscosity, the better tile

binding action and the less binder material is needed

for binding. “Water absorption” refers to the amount

of water taken up by a given amount of a substance:

Although viscosity and water absorption are scien-

tifically different, there is a rough correlation between

the two in cereal binders—higher water absorption

figures generally tend to accompany higher viscosity

figures, and lower water absorption figures generally

tend to accompany lower viscosity figures. However,

material that has ben overcooked in the gelatinization

process, as will be discussed below, can have high

water solubles and low viscosity. For a producer of

cereal binders like ICM, viscosity ranges (high v.

low) may be more important than a specific viscosity

figure. In testing cereal binders, ICM usually meas-

ured water absorption and from those measures

roughly extrapolated general viscosity ranges.

Starch granules must be modified or cooked by

some method in order to provide the requisite ad-

hesive qualities to serve as a foundry binder. This

process is called “gelatinization.” Starch granules are

tempered (moistened), and as these granules imbibe

water they swell to many times their natural size.

Each of these granules contains thousands of starch

molecules, which are very large molecular structures.

Heat enhances the absorption of water into the starch

granules. Eventually, the heat and water cause the

eee

42a

starch granules to break, releasing long molecular

chains of starch. At this point, the starch is said to

be “gelatinized.” The friction of these molecular

chains rubbing against each other generates the ad-

hesive properties of a cereal binder, and viscosity

measures this molecular friction. The longer the

chains of starch molecules, the higher the viscosity

levels, which means greater adhesive strength in the

binder. After these molecular chains of starch have

been released, they become quite fragile. Shearing

forces or excessive temperature at that point will

cause a degeneration of these molecular chains, re-

sulting in lower adhesive strength measured by lower

viscosity levels. Consequently, to produce a binder

with the best adhesive strength requires somewhat

mild temperatures and a minimization of hearing

forces.

Prior to its acquisition of Mogul from CPC, ICM

produced its cereal binders in two ways. ICM pro-

duced its Ceres and Crereatim binders through its

“hot roll” process. ICM started with its No. 5 or

No. 6 grits (yellow goods) as feedstock. This feed-

stock was composed of large chunks of corn, which

were the end result of ICM’s initial processing of

shelled corn, whereby the hull was broken, the germ

and fiber separated, and the endosperm split.* This

feedstock was tempered (moistened), and then trans-

ferred onto two counter rotating steel rolls, which

were heated externally by gas fired flames. The rolls

* No. 5 or No. 6 grits referred to the size of the remaining

split endosperm portion. The number referred to the number

of holes per inch in a mesh grid through which the particular

endosperm portion would pass. No. 5 grits were the endo-

sperm portion that would pass through a grid mesh with holes

5 by 5 (25) per square inch; No. 6 grits meant that the mesh

was 6 by 6 (36) per square inch.

mali Ma

2 ie a ca

43a

actually came into contact with each other. The

tempered feedstock flowed into the nip (the point

where the two rolls contacted each other) and

emerged in a flattened, ribbon-like state. This ma-

terial was then dried and ground into a fine powder,

which was the end product, namely, the binder. The

density (weight per unit of volume) of binders pro-

duced in this method could be varied by varying the

pressure of the rolls used to cook the feedstock.

Because the rolls came into contact with each other,

there was a certain amount of shearing force created.

Some shearing force was necessary in ICM’s hot roll

process. In ICM’s feedstock (Nos. 5 and 6 grits), the

starch granules were encased in a protein matrix,

and shearing force broke down this protein matrix

so that the water could reach the starch granules.

The moisture could not reach the starch granules

until the protein matrix had been breached. An un-

avoidable consequences of this use of shearing force

to break down the protein matrix was that there was

also some degradation of the long starch molecule

chains, reducing somewhat the adhesive qualities of

the resulting binder.

During the early 1960’s ICM began experimenting

with the production of gelatinized corn products by

means of an extrusion process rather than the hot roll

process. Two principal advantages of an extrusion

process were that an extrusion machine would handle

much greater volume and it would accept a much

more varied feedstock, a metal rather than the Nos. 5

and 6 grits required for the hot roll process. This

would permit the conversion into prime products of

ingredients otherwise destined to be sold at a loss as

hominy feed.

44a

ICM’s first extruder was a V.D. Anderson model

which was a rather simple and inexpensive device.

ICM’s feedstock for this extruder was “west end

meal,” a fine corn meal (40 to 60 grits) left over

from other milling operations, and otherwise destined

to be sold as hominy feed. This feedstock was first

tempered (moistened) with water or steam and con-

veyed in a steam-jacketed conveyor into the extruder.

The material was passed through the barrel of the

extruder by means of the turning of a screw. Each

flight of the screw was increasingly closer together.

In this manner, the material would compact at the

end of the screw where pressure was built up. The

heat source was generated by the friction of the screw,

and could be adjusted and controlled somewhat by

external bolts, which varied the size of the flights

through which the screw passed.

As with ICM’s hot roll process, a certain amount

of shearing force was necessary to break down the

protein matrix surrounding the starch granules so

that the starch could gelatinize. However, the Ander-

son extruder generated excessive heat and shearing

force, so that when it broke down the protein matrix,

it also degraded the released starch molecule chains,

thus reducing the adhesive qualities of the resulting

binder. ICM discovered that it could enhance the

adhesive qualities of its extruded binder by mixing

with it the output from its hot roll process and an

additive. In the pure hot roll product, relatively long

starch molecule chains predominated, while in the

pure “Anderson” extrusion product, relatively short

starch molecule chains predominated. The additive

served to re-engineer these starch chains by cross-

linking the long chains of the hot roll product with

the short chains of the extruded product. This re-

ee

45a

sulted in very long molecule chains, and a binder with

high adhesive properties as measured by high viscos-

ity levels. ICM sold this binder under the name 940.

Unlike ICM, which was a “dry” miller, CPC was

a “wet” miller. In wet mills, shelled corn is initially

treated with a sulphuric acid solution which breaks

down the protein matrix or structure of the kernel

into a slurry solution. CPC then separated the vari-

ous components (starch, protein, and oil) out of the

slurry solution. In dry mills, the milling is done

mechanically rather than chemically with the kernel

being physically broken, to permit the separation of

the hull, the oil-bearing germ, and the starch-bearing

endosperm. In a wet mill such as CPC’s, the chemical

process also breaks down the protein matrix encasing

the starch granules, so that shearing forces, like those

necessary in ICM’s milling, are not required to allow

gelatinization of the starch.

The feedstock for CPC’s method of producing its

cereal binder was a lower grade of starch, with some

protein, still in slurry solution form. This solution

was heated to 124 degrees Farenheit, filtered and

dried somewhat (to reduce the mositure content),

and then conveyed to steel rolls. These rolls flattened

the material, which was then flaked, dried, and

ground. Unlike the hot rolls that ICM used, CPC’s

rolls were heated by a steam jacket. Moreover, in-

stead of the rolls being in contact at the nip, CPC’s

rolls had a gap of about two millimeters, which min-

imized the shearing forces that resulted from the

rolls.

As early as 1964, ICM had regularly run lab tests

analyzing the essential properties of Mogul and other

competing binder products and this data was kept on

file. Jack Swarthout has been ICM’s director of re-

search and product development since 1967. At the

————————eVoerereaeooeononwne

46a

time he joined petitioner he had extensive training

and experience in the field of microbiology, and par-

ticularly in starch synthesis and technology. Swarth-

out was well aware of the effects of the Anderson

extruder in breaking down the starch molecular

chains and also had formulated the blend of material

and the additive to counteract these effects in ICM’s

940 binder. During 1968 Swarthout had conducted

laboratory tests looking to the production of foundry

binders by an all-extruder process. To this end he

employed a steam-jacketed extruder which avoided

the “over working” problems of the Anderson ex-

truder, which did not have a steam jacket. These

tests convinced him that a good quality binder com-

parable to ICM’s 940 could be produced entirely from

extruder-produced material. Swarthout had also

visited the facilities of the two manufacturers of

steam-jacketed extruders, Bonnot and Wenger, and

conducted tests on their equipment.

Up until the purchase of CPC’s Mogul and until

ICM’s technical people (including Swarthout) saw

CPC’s Mogul process, ICM believed that CPC’s pro-

duction methods, know-how, and product technical

data would have some value to it. At the time of the

initial CPC offer, ICM knew that CPC was a wet

miller, not a dry miller like ICM. Swarthout under-

stood the fundamental differences between dry mill-

ing and wet milling. Swarthout had seen Hasler’s

memorandum of February 1, 1974, which indicated

that CPC’s milling process was quite different from

ICM’s. However, Hasler was a salesman, not a tech-

nical person, and Swarthout kept a relatively open

mind until he had actually seen CPC’s plant on Feb-

ruary 21, 1974, after the sale. At that time he

learned what the CPC feedstock was made of and

es ee VS

47a

that ICM had no feedstock comparable to it. Mogul’s

yellow color, which ICM then learned was produced

by a dye, had seemed to indicate the contrary, namely

a manufacturing process comparable to ICM’s. ICM

did not acquire any of the equipment CPC used to

produce Mogul, even though it was available as part

of the “package” if ICM had wanted it.

Following the acquisition when Swarthout visited

CPC’s Argo facility where it produced Mogul, it was

immediately apparent to him that there was nothing

in CPC’s methods that could be readily adapted to

ICM’s use. The CPC facility was designed to process

a feedstock consisting of free starch particles (with

some protein) in a slurry solution, which was radi-

cally different from any feedstock that could be pro-

duced by ICM’s dry milling process.

Under the Manufacturing Agreement, CPC was to

continue to produce Mogul for ICM until December

31, 1974, or until ICM was able to go on line with

its own Mogul production. By April 5, 1974, Swarth-

out had determined that ICM could produce a com-

mercial quality binder comparable to its 940 product,

using solely an extrusion process, but “still [had]

not resolved whether a Mogul-like product [could] be

made in this manner.” Swarthout advised ICM’s

president that:

A foundry binder made on an extruder will

never be identical to Mogul B211 in all respects.

There are many differences between Mogul B211

and extruder products, such as: pH, water solu-

bles, protein content, pasting qualities, starch

content, density, etc. We are now trying to sort

out the important differences (from foundry

binder and Sales aspect) from the unimportant

46a

differences which arise when producing Mogul by

a wet starch process on hot rolls.

We would like to have some guidance from

Sales concerning which of the above factors are

critical. This is needed before a final method for

our Mogul production can be decided upon.

By September 30, 1974, ICM had more or less com-

mitted itself to making its new binder, to be sold un-

der the name Mogul, solely through an extrusion

process.

ICM went on line with its own Mogul production

in January of 1976.’ At this time, ICM produced its

Mogul product solely through an extrusion process

using an extruder made by Bonnot. Unlike the Ander-

son extruder, which ICM had used previously, the

Bonnot extruder was steam-jacketed, and fed at 150

pounds per square inch steam pressure, providing an

external source of heat. This use of external heat

meant that the extruder was not required to generate

heat internally through friction, and this reduced

friction also greatly reduced the shearing forces. Be-

cause of the reduced shearing forces and lower tem-

peratures, the breakdown of the long starch molecu-

lar chain was lessened, resulting in a binder with

better adhesive properties than that produced by the

Anderson extruder. Initially, ICM sold as Mogul the

pure product produced by the Bonnot extruder; in

later years, about 1978, ICM introduced an additive

(the same one used in its 940 binder) to enhance

*CPC had stopped producing Mogul for ICM in late June

of 1974 because of a strike at its Argo plant. During this

interim, ICM had marketed a substitute binder, known as

SB-311, in order to attempt to supply the former CPC cus-

tomers. ICM did not use the Mogu! for its own product until

it went into production in January of 1976.

ee ee ee ee ee ee |

mm ow

49a

Mogul’s adhesive properties. ICM developed its

method of producing Mogul largely through its own

research, technology, and experience, but may have

used some of the technical data and information it

obtained from CPC in producing its own Mogul prod-

uct. When ICB began selling its own Mogul prod-

uct, it advised its customers that:

Mogul was developed from over 50 years re-

search. It is well known in the industry as a

high-quality product. Illinois Cereal Mills pur-

chased the brand name and technical informa-

tion necessary to produce Mogul. We are now

manufacturing Mogul to the same high exacting

standards.

The record does not establish that ICM abandoned

any technical data or information it purchased from

CPC.

Customer List

Another of the assets that ICM acquired from

CPC was a list of customers to whom CPC had sold

Mogul in the two years prior to 1974. ICM had

hoped that the CPC customer list would disclose a

new untapped source of customers for its products,

but discovered that it was already selling its own

products to most of those CPC customers. This CPC

customer list contained 440 customers. During 1973,

the year before ICM acquired the Mogul business,

CPC had shipped 43,249,490 pounds (432,494 ewt.")

of Mogul to those 440 customers.

In the Manufacturing Agreement, CPC agreed to

manufacture and supply Mogul to ICM until ICM

1 Hundredweight (units of 100 pounds).

50a

went on line with its own production, or until De-

cember 31, 1974. ICM’s existing plant was inade-

quate to manufacture enough binders to supply both

its own customers and the Mogul customers it ac-

quired from CPC. Consequently, ICM drafted plans

for, and began the construction of, a new production

facility in which it would produce both its former

binder products and its own Mogul. ICM had an-

ticipated that this facility would be operational be-

fore the Manufacturing Agreement expired. The

new specialty mill did not become operational until

January 1976, when ICM came on stream with its

production of Mogul.

Approximately four months after ICM purchased

the Mogul business, CPC had a strike at its Argo

plant and was unable to continue the manufacture

and supply of Mogul pursuant to the Manufacturing

Agreement. ICM immediately acquired the remaining

supply of Mogul that CPC had on hand. CPC never

again produced Mogul for or on behalf of ICM. For

the rest of ICM’s fiscal year 1974, the CPC-produced

Mogul was shipped to the Mogul customers on behalf

of ICM.

In order to continue supplying binders to Mogul

customers while the new facility was under construc-

tion, ICM, during its fiscal year 1975, produced a

substitute binder, SB-311, consisting of a combina-

tion of 940, Ceres, an additive, and extruded binder

material it purchased from a competing dry miller.

ICM did not use the “Mogul” name for this substi-

tute binder. Despite its best efforts, ICM was unable

to produce or procure its substitute binders in suffi-

cient quantities to satisfy the requirements of all

Mogul customers, so it sought to allocate the avail-

able product to supply those who had no alternative

a

5la

source. Had it been available, ICM could have sold

approximately twice as much SB-311 as it did in

1975 and 1976. ICM produced and sold SB-311 in the

amounts of 117,953 ewt. in its fiscal year 1975 and

67,618 ewt. in its fiscal year 1976. Its production of

its own Mogul binder came on line in January of

1976 and sales of SB-311 thereafter fell off sharply

to 16,984 in 1977, 12,691 in 1978, 9,435 in 1979, and

3,608 in 1980. However, ICM produced and sold

81,129 ewt. of Mogul in its fiscal year 1976. Produc-

tion and sales of ICM-produced Mogul thereafter in-

creased to 200,246 for 1977, 211,025 for 1978, and

330,698 for 1979 before declining to 236,393 for 1980.

The shipments of Mogul and the Mogul substitute

(SB-311) to CPC’s former Mogul customers and total

shipments of Mogul and Mogul substitutes were as

summarized below:

Total Sales

Mogu! & SB-311

to All Customers Sales to CPC Mogu! Customers

cwt. as No. of

% of Customers

Fiscal CPC as % of

Year 1973 CPC 1973

Ending cwt. cwt. No. Sales Customers

1973 4 432,494 432,494 440 100% 100%

1974 132,043 132,043 258 31% 59%

9-30-75 125,766 125,766 57 29% 13%

9-30-76 148,747 138,901 59 32% 18%

9-30-77 217,230 168,248 55 30% 13%

9-30-78 223,716 138,655 46 82% 10%

9-30-79 340,133 173,926 44 40% 10%

9-30-80 240,001 114,627 42 27% 10%

11 Sales of Mogul by CPC in its last full calendar year.

12 In fiscal 1974, CPC shipped Mogul to ICM’s Mogul cus-

tomers from February through September 30, 1974, and the

figures for 1974 represent this eight month period only. The

figures are not entirely representative because they omit

52a

ICM marketed its new extrusion process binder

under the brand name “Mogul” and continues to this

day to produce, market, and advertise a binder under

the brand name “Mogul.” To assist ICM in the tran-

sition with the customers, CPC agreed to make joint

sales calls on key customers with petitiuner’s per-

sonnel, to explain the transition and provide their

comments as to why they sold the business to ICM.

In addition, CPC would provide technical sales serv-

ice calls if necessary. Prior to the strike, CPC made

telephone calls to customers, written communications,

and a limited number of personal calls on customers.

ICM contacted the new customers primarily by letter

in conjunction with CPC correspondence. In addi-

tion, personal contacts were made with the major

customers. When ICM finally commenced its own

production of Mogul in January 1976, Dave Longe-

ville, CPC sales administrator, made some contacts

with former Mogul customers, in furtherance of

CPC’s agreement to assist ICM in the transition of

the customers.

CPC’s Mogul sales during 1974 before the sale to ICM and

represent only the shipments of material on hand after the

strike at the Argo plant halted CP°’s production of Mogul.

However, all of the 132,043 ewt. shipped in 1974 was CPC-

produced Mogul. If any of ICM’s SB-311 was sold in 1974,

those figures are not in the record. However, since 7,813 cwt.

of the total 125,766 cwt. shipped to former CPC Mogul cus-

tomers in FYE 9-30-75 was CPC-produced Mogul (125,766

total less 117,953 ewt. SB-311), this suggests that the SB-311

did not become available until ICM’s fiscal year 1975. This

also suggests that any decline in the number of CPC’s former

Mogul customers in fiscal year 1974 can be accounted for by

the decreasing profitability of that line of business, which was

CPC’s reason for selling the Mogul business in the first place,

rather than by reason of the strike at the Argo plant and any

resulting shortages.

ee

58a

Through the acquisition, ICM had hoped to ac-

quire many new customers that it did not know about,

and had hoped that it would secure some of them in

the transition. ICM placed great value on this cus-

tomer list at the time of its Mogul acquisition, for

it considered the acquisition of CPC’s Mogul cus-

tomers to be one of the principal purposes of the

deal. Most of the customers contained on the list

were already customers for ICM’s other binder prod-

ucts, such as Ceres, Cereatim, and 940. ICM con-

tinued to sell these products to a “significant per-

centage” of these customers after its purchase of the

Mogul business. The record does not establish for

any of the post-1974 years the amounts of binders,

other than Mogul and SB-311, that ICM sold to cus-

tomers on CPC’s Mogul customer list after its Mogul

acquisition, nor does the record establish the number

of CPC Mogul customers who purchased non-Mogul

binders from ICM or the amounts of their purchases.

The record does not establish that ICM suffered

any loss in regard to the Mogul customer list it

purchased from CPC.

Trademarks/Trade Names

As part of its acquisition of CPC’s Mogul busi-

ness, ICM obtained CPC’s registered trademarks

for Mogul and its trade named “Mogul.” In the

foundry industry, cereal binders are somewhat fun-

gible, in that one binder can generally be used in

place of another, although different amounts might

be necessary. As used in the foundry industry, how-

ever, there is fairly substantial product loyalty—to

achieve relatively uniform results in the foundry

54a

molds requires consistency in the binder.“ A good

quality binder will be consistent, but this consistency

is eliminated if different brands are used interchange-

ably."* Because of this, most foundries require fairly

substantial product testing before they will approve

a new binder for their own use.

At the time of its Mogul acquisition, ICM re-

garded the Mogul name and trademark as being use-

ful and advantageous but by no means of critical im-

portance to the business. CPC’s Mogul operation

had a good reputation for product quality and serv-

ice. During the period the Mogul name and trade-

mark were not used, ICM sold all of the substitute

product (SB-311) it could produce and could have

sold much more at that time if available. When ICM

introduced its all extruded binder under the Mogul

name in January 1976, following the completion «i

its specialty mill, its sales of the all extruded binder

were not dramatically affected by its use of the

Mogul name and may have been the same with or

without use of the Mogul name. However, in the

period after January 1976 and through 1978, the

sales of SB-311 declined steadily whereas the sales

of ICM’s Mogul increased steadily. While in terms

of numbers of customers, ICM may have lost many

of the Mogul customers it had acquired from CPC, it

continued to sell substantial amounts of Mogul to

those former CPC customers and to sell its other

products to those former CPC customers. After ICM

resumed Mogul sales from its own production, the

18 In this context, consistency means that the same amount

of binder mixed with the same amounts of other ingredients

will have the same end result each time.

14 A different brand binder will require a different amount

when mixed with the other ingredients to generate the desired

end result.

\

55a

trade name was useful in reintroducing Mogul to

some of the larger customers. Also because of the

Mogul name, some of the foundries reduced or elimi-

nated the strict testing they generally required of a

new binder.

Tax Treatment of Mogul Transaction

CPC accounted for this transaction as the sale of a

business and reported the entire $240,000 for tax

purposes as proceeds from the sale or exchange of a

capital asset. ICM accounted for this transaction as

an expense which it labelled as “commission on a

noncompetition agreement.” ICM thus sought to de-

duct the entire $240,000 as an expense on its re-

turn for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1974.

In his notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed the

entire claimed deduction of $240,000.

lII. Section 38 Property and

Useful Lives of Structures

A. Specialty Mill

One line of ICM’s production is called the specialty

products, which includes some food products and var-

ious cereal binders it manufactures for industrial

use. All of these specialty products and binders are

now manufactured in ICM’s specialty mill. The two

processes ICM now uses to produce these specialty

products and binders are the “hot roll” process and

the “Bonnot” process, described above. Before it com-

pleted the new specialty mill in January of 1976, ICM

produced its specialty products in the old corn mill,

using the “hot roll” process and the “Anderson” proc-

ess, described above. After the new specialty mill

was constructed, the machinery and equipment for

the “hot roll” process were physically moved out of

56a

the old corn mill and installed in the new specialty

mill structure. The new machinery and equipment

for the “Bonnot” process were acquired, installed

in the new specialty mill, and placed into operation

before that move occurred. The area in the corn mill

where the “hot roll” process had previously been lo-

cated was then used to expand ICM’s corn mill op-

erations after that move occurred. Once the “hot

roll” process and the “Bonnot” process were in opera-

tion in the specialty mill, only specialty products were

produced in that structure.

As early as July 27, 1973, ICM had established as

objectives the modernization and expansion of its

corn mill and the development of a specialty mill

modernization plan once a cost justification study had

been made on the latter. Preliminary work had al-

ready been started on the corn mill modernization

and expansion plan, but nothing had yet been done

in regard to the specialty mill. ICM’s acquisition of

CPC’s Mogul business in early 1974 necessitated the

expansion of ICM’s specialty products department

and the removal of that department from the corn

mill because its space in the corn mill was inade-

quate to meet ICM’s expandeu production needs and

because ICM needed extra space at the corn mill to

complete its modernization and expansion plans there.

Following ICM’s Mogul acquisition in early 1974,

Herman Kurrelmeier, ICM’s manufacturing vice-

president, in conjunction with Swarthout, designed

the specialty mill. Kurrelmeier was trained as a me-

chanical engineer and had experience designing and

building structures containing industrial processes.

The sequence of design was first to decide upon the

process, next to select equipment components (a key

one here being the extruder), then to design a layout

57a

and arrangement of components which would com-

bine them into a continuous flow unit, next to design

the foundation and superstructure to support and

hold everything together as a functioning unit, and

finally to design a covering or skin to protect the

equipment from the elements and to provide a sani-

tary environment for the production of food and

other specialty products. A mechanical engineer would

use basically the same approach to design any indus-

trial operation; such as a corn mill or an assembly

plant, although those types of operations might re-

quire additional design considerations depending

upon the numbers and needs of workers and the

equipment required for those industrial processes.

The specialty mill required a deeper foundation and

footings than a general use structure, such as a ware-

house or office building, of comparable size would have

required. This was partly because of the weight of

the machinery that would be placed in the mill.”

Additionally, separate footings or pads were required

for certain equipment to isolate the vibration that

would occur when that equipment was in operation.

The cost to ICM of the excavation and footings was

approximately $150,000 to $160,000, while Kurrel-

meier estimated the cost of excavation and footings

for a general purpose structure of comparable size to

be about $40,000. However, the record does not es-

tablish that the general foundation and footings for

1 Part of the additional depth of the foundation was re-

quired by the marshy conditions of the land on which the

specialty mill was built. Unless built on bedrock, a structure

like the specialty mill or any factory involving heavy machin-

ery and equipment would usually require a deeper foundation

than would a general use structure of comparable size, no

matter what the soil conditions were.

is

58a

the specialty mill differed qualitatively or quanita-

tively from the foundation and footings of ICM’s

corn mill or any other factory containing heavy ma-

chinery and equipment.

In the specialty mill, there was a concrete floor

slab for the first and second floors, and the third floor

was made of open steel grating. Some of the pieces

of equipment in the specialty mill extended through

the floor from one level to another, which was also

true of the corn mill.

In the specialty mill there were myriad trenches,

slots, and holes in the floors, in both the concrete

ground floor and the upper floors, all precisely shaped

and positioned to accommodate particular pieces of

machinery or equipment and their functions. These

included drain lines, electrical conduits, and pneu-

matic conveyor lines. Some of these holes housed

equipment that traversed floors. If all the equipment

were removed from the specialty mill, it would be

possible to fill in all of these holes, slots, and trenches.

The record does not establish that these holes, slots,

and trenches differed qualitatively or quantitatively

from those in ICM’s corn mill or any other factory

containing heavy machinery or equipment.

The electrical distribution equipment that ICM in-

stalled in the specialty mill was almost entirely at-

tributable to the equipment that ICM used in its

specialty process, rather than for mere general pur-

pose lighting and power receptacles. While the elec-

trical equipment for the mill cost ICM approximately

$178,000, the cost of electrical equipment for a gen-

eral purpose building of comparable size would have

been about $13,000.**° Approximately 95 percent of

16 In his notice of deficiency, respondent al..cated the total

cost of $178,013 for electrical equipment to section 38 property

59a

the actual electrical load at the specialty mill is at-

tributable to the machinery used in the specialty proc-

esses, rather than to general purpose lighting and

power receptacles.

The specialty mill was enclosed because of the ne-

cessity of protecting the equipment from the elements

and providing a sanitary environment since some

food grade products were produced there. The cover-

ing was a light metal skin, essentially a pre-engi-

neered building, and was the cheapest obtainable type

of covering. The outer shell or covering of the spe-

cialty mill was essentially the same as the outer shell

or covering of Building 7, a warehouse building

which adjoined the specialty mill structure. There

was a loading dock between Building 7 and the spe-

cialty mill structure that could service both struc-

tures.

The specialty mill structure lacked a heating sys-

tem except a few unit heaters to prevent the equip-

ment from freezing during shut-downs. When in

operation, the specialty mill equipment generated

sufficient, if not excessive, heat to warm the building

adequately. However, were the specialty mill equip-

ment to be removed and the structure converted to

another use, it might require the installation of. heat-

ing equipment depending upon the type of equipment

installed and type of use to which the =tructure might

be put.

In operation, the specialty mill is essentially a con-

tinuous and automatic operation involving little hu-

man labor. The feedstock for both the hot roll. process

and the Bonnot process are preumatically blown or

conveyed from the corn mill. For the Bonnot process,

in an amount of $97,907 and to non-section-38 property in an

amount of $80,106.

60a

there is a bin that permits on-site storage of about

a day’s worth of feedstock. There is also a “surge”

bin that permits on-site storage of about 20 to 30

minutes worth of feedstock; however, the primary

purpose of the surge bin is not to store the feedstock

but to regulate the flow of feedstock into the ex-

truders. There is no on-site storage for the hot roll

feedstock but there is a storage area in the corn mill

for this feedstock. There is no storage capacity at

the specialty mill for the finished prodct of either

the hot roll process or the Bonnot process. Instead,

the finished products are pneumatically conveyed

back to:the corn mill for bagging and storage.

The only workers in the specialty mill are the op-

erator or “specialty miller” and his assistant, the

oiler, on each shift. They monitor and maintain the

proper functioning of the equipment. On the first

shift there are also two clean-up people. There is a

cubicle area located, in the specialty mill where the

‘specialty miller actually runs in-process quality

checks on the product. There is also a small office

for the manager of the specialty products depart-

ment and toilet facilities. If mechanical difficulties

develop with any of the machinery or equipment,

maintenance personnel may also be on hand.

The design and construction of the structural

“shell” or covering of the specialty mill are compara-

ble to those of other structures at ICM’s plant, for

example, Building 7, a combination warehouse and

research laboratory, and Building 8, a warehouse.

Moreover, Building 7 is attached to the specialty mill.

However, the internal layouts and functions of the

equipment in these structures are quite different.

Two 10 feet by 10 feet overhead doors were in-

stalled in the specialty mill. Although each com-

6la

ponent or piece of equipment of each of the processes

is essential to producing the finished product, the lay-

out of the equipment in the structure is such that

any component or piece of equipment can be replaced.

Moreover, all of the equipment can be removed with-

out damaging the structure. In its operations in the

manner and at the level as presently conducted, ICM

would have no other use for the specialty mil! struc-

ture if the existing equipment were removed, even if

all the floor holes were filled. However, it would be

possible to use the structure for storage or for the

installation of other industrial processes if ICM

should decide to expand or otherwise change its

present operations.

ICM placed the specialty mill into service during

its fiscal year ending September 30, 1976. The total

cost to ICM of the specialty mill was $1,843,644.46.

On its return for its fiscal year ending September 30,

1976, ICM claimed an investment tax credit for the

entire cost-of the specialty mill. In his notice of defi-

ciency, respondent has determined that $1,295,056.46

of such cost was attributable to section 38 property

and that the remaining $548,588 was attributable to

building costs which do not qualify as section 38

property. Respondent thus disallowed the claimed

credit in regard to this $548,588. On the same re-

turn, ICM also claimed that the specialty mill’s de-

preciable useful life was the same as the machinery

and equipment it housed, and computed its deprecia-

tion deduction accordingly. In his notice of deficiency,

respondent determined that the specialty mill’s de-

preciable useful life was independent of and longer

than that of the machinery and equipment, and con-

sequently he reduced ICM’s allowable deduction for

depreciation.

62a

B. Water Treatment Facility

ICM operated its former water treatment facility

until it was forced to replace the facility due to the

facility’s failure to meet the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency (EPA) and local requirements. The old

facility is approximately 27 feet by 27 feet square

and is three stories high. The location of the old

facility is out of the mainstream of ICM’s manufac-

turing plant, and ICM does not currently need the

area occupied by that facility. In 1975, ICM put into

operation a new water treatment facility. At that

time, ICM simply abandoned in place the old sys-

tem, equipment, and building. Because it produces

foodstuffs, ICM fumigates the old water plant occa-

sionally and does similar ‘“house-keeping,” to control

rodents. birds, and insects. Since 1975, however, ICM

has not used this plant for any of its operations.

Kurrelmeier designed ICM’s new water treatment

facility for the sole function of treating waste water

from the corn mill. As with the specialty mill, his de-

sign sequence was first to decide upon the process to

be used, next to select the components of equipment

needed, then to do a layout and arrangement so that

the various components would function as a unit, next

to design the foundation and superstructure to sup-

port and hold the components in their proper place

so that the system would function as a unit, and

finally to design & skin or covering for the assembled

system.

As with the specialty mill, the new water treat-

ment facility required a substantial foundation and

footings to support the equipment to be located in the

structure. There was substantial underground pip-

ing, and there were holes in the floor for equipment.

The structure itself contained only one steel grating

63a

“floor” forming a partial mezzanine level to support

certain equipment and allow access to it. The rest

was basically open space. The major equipment con-

tained in the facility consisted of two 10,000 gallon

water tanks approximately 16 feet in diameter and

21 feet high, vacuum drums and pumps, filter rolls,

and chlorinating equipment. A maze of piping inter-

laced these components. There is an electrical room

in the new facility that contains electrical motor

controls, starters, and switching gears. This room is

approximately 10 feet by 7 feet. There is also a

storage room in the new plant which is used to store

chlorine and equipment. This room is approximately

10 feet by 6 feet. The new facility had to be enclosed

because it was necessary to protect the equipment

and the process within. The water treatment fa-

cility was enclosed by the cheapest possible roof and

metal structure, essentially a pre-engineered build-

ing just like the enclosure for the specialty mill.

The new water treatment facility operates fairly

automatically, except for the re-coating of the filter

rolls which must be done every day. A water treat-

ment operator works in the new plant during the

first and second shift. The third shift runs unat-

tended. The operator monitors the equipment, but

his basic job is to prepare and apply the coating ma-

terial on the filter rolls. This coating process cannot

be automated and requires more than one eight-hour

shift for coating all of the filter rolls.

The new water treatment facility is located next

to the power or boiler house, with these two struc-

tures sharing a party wall. The height of the new

facility and the adjoining boiler house are the same.

The structural “shell” of the new facility is essen- -

tially the same as that of the boiler house, as well as

iia natalia nena eet

64a

that of the specialty mill (Building 34) and two

warehouses (Buildings 7 and 8). Again, however,

the internal layouts and functions of the equipment

in these structures are quite different.

ICM’s new water treatment facility is located at

the north end of the new boiler plant whereas the

milling operations are all south of the boiler plant.

ICM chose the location of its new facility to take

advantage of the pre-existing gravity flow of the raw

waste water from the corn mill to the old water treat-

ment facility at the north end of ICM’s property and

to utilize that system. If the equipment were re-

moved from the water facility, the remaining struc-

vure would have no useful function in petitioner’s

present milling or manufacturing operations.

It would be feasible to convert the new water

treatment facility into an extension of the boiler

house or into storage space. The new water treat-

ment facility has an overhead door approximately 16

feet wide, and the equipment inside could be disas-

sembled and removed without damage to the struc-

ture. It would be possible to convert the new facility

into a storage facility, but ICM does not have any

present need for such a storage facility.

ICM placed its new water treatinent facility into

service during the fiscal year ending September 30,

1975. Its total cost was $353,375. On its return for

the fiseal year ending September 30, 1975, ICM

claimed an investment tax credit for the entire cost

of the new facility. In his notice of deficiency re-

spondent determined that $105,442 of ICM’s costs

represented “building” costs, which did not qualify as

section 38 property. On its returns for the fiscal

years ending September 30, 1975 and September 30,

1976, ICM also claimed that the depreciable useful

65a

life of the new water treatment facility was the same

as the useful life of the machinery and equipment it

housed, and computed its depreciation deduction ac-

cordingly. In his notice of deficiency, respondent de-

termined that the new water treatment facility’s

depreciable useful life was independent of and longer

than that of the machinery and equipment, and con-

sequently he reduced ICM’s allowable deduction for

depreciation.” :

C. Boiler House

ICM constructed a new boiler house and placed

it into service during the fiscal year ending Septem-

ber 30, 1971. The structure was designed to accom-

~odate two boilers, but only one was installed ini-

tially. The second boiler was not installed at the

time of original construction because ICM did not

have enough money. The initial boiler was a large

Babeock & Wilcox unit (hereinar<cc “B & W”),

which is a model that must be built in place. The

B & W unit required a special pad, involving steel

reinforced concrete pier footings that extended five

feet below ground level and one foot above floor level.

This was separate from the structure’s foundation.

There was substantial underground piping, and there

were sloping drainage trenches, 18 inches wide, and

from 16 to 24 inches deep, around two sides of the

boiler pad. The structure also contained water soft-

ening equipment required by the boiler.

17QOn its return for fiscal year ended September 30, 1975,

ICM also claimed a loss from the abandonment of its old water

treatment facility. Respondent in his statutory notice disal-

lowed this loss. Respondent now concedes that this loss is

allowable in the amount of $18,959, as claimed on the return.

66a

At the time it built the boiler house, ICM did not

put in the foundation or pad for the second boiler

because it had not yet selected a specific boiler. How-

ever, the structure was erected with an access door

large enough so that ICM could move a boiler in

without having to take down any of the structure.

The access door is an overhead door 16 feet wide.

ICM subsequently installed a second boiler in the

boiler house structure. This secend boiler was manu-

factured by Cleaver Brookes and is a model that is

manufactured and assembled at the factory and then

delivered to the site, at which point it is then con-

nected to water and steam lines, put on its founda-

tion, and fired up. The Cleaver Brookes boiler could

be removed in one piece without interference from

the walls of the structure and that is the way the

boiler was originally installed. The B & W boiler

could not be removed from the boiler house in one

piece. However, it could be dismantled and removed

in pieces, the same way it was brought into the boiler

house.

The design and construction of the boiler house’s

structural shell are comparable to those of the new

water treatment facility, (Building 3-D), the spe-

cialty mill (Building 34), and two warehouses

(Buildings 7 and 8). However, the internal layouts

and functions of the equipment inside these struc-

tures are quite different. The boiler house contains

an office that is 10 feet by 18 feet and an electrical

room that is 17 feet by 10 feet. The boilers them-

selves can operate automatically, but under its union

agreement, ICM was required to have an operator in

the power house on each shift to monitor the equip-

ment.

On its tax returns for the fiscal years ending Sep-

tember 30, 1972 through September 30, 1976, ICM

67a

claimed that the boiler house’s depreciable useful life

was the same as the useful life of the machinery and

equipment contained therein. Accordingly, it claimed

depreciation deductions using this useful life. In his

notice of deficiency, respondent determined that the

boiler house’s depreciable useful life was independent

of and longer than the useful life of the machinery

and equipment, and consequently, he disallowed part

of ICM’s claimed depreciation deductions for the

years before the Court.

IV. Useful Lives of Grain Storage Tanks

During the fiscal year ending September 30, 1976,

ICM’s wholly-owned subsidiary, ICM Grain Co. (ICM

Grain), purchased the assets of Metcalf Grain, Inc.,

which was a country elevator located in the town of

Metcalf, about 18 miles from Paris, Illinois. The pur-

chase price of $450,000 was allocable in part to grain

storage tanks, as follows:

Corrugated steel tanks $235,000

Concrete storage tanks 28,200

Bolted steel tanks 27,600

Also during the fiscal year ending September 30,

1976, ICM Grain constructed additional welded steel

grain storage tanks on such premises at a cost of

$430,318.38.

Country elevator facilities such as the Metcalf fa-

cilities owned by ICM Grain provide service to farm-

ers by putting their goods into the marketable chain.

This is the first step in the marketing of the grain

once the farmers have harvested the crops from their

fields. In general, the country elevator buys the

grain from farmers. However, country elevators

store grain for farmers on a storage rental basis.

68a

The choice to store or to sell is the farmer’s. Addi-

tionally, country elevators sometimes dry the corn,

when necessary, to prevent spoilage. This storage

and drying are basically comparable to what farmers

can do on their own farms, to the extent of their

available storage space. In fact, many farmers dry

and store all of their own corn. The facilities for

drying corn at Metcalf were not very modern, pri-

marily using unheated air, and many farmers had

better drying facilities than those at Metcalf.

Since the purchase, ICM Grain has operated the

Metcalf facilities as a typical country elevator. ICM

Grain stood ready to receive the farmers’ grain for

either storage or purchase. Corn accounts for 60 per-

cent to 75 percent of all grain handled at Metcalf and

about 75 percent to 80 percent of the corn received

there is ultimately sold to ICM. Thus, between 45

percent and 60 percent of all grain handled at Met-

calf is sold to ICM. ICM is able to get the best mill-

ing quality corn since it is able to make the highest

bid for local corn due to savings on transportation

costs. However, ICM would make the highest bid for

the best milling quality local corn regardless of its

ownership (through its subsidiary ICM Grain) of the

Metcalf facilities.

Since its incorporation, ICM Grain has purchased

or leased elevators with a total storage capacity of

approximately eight million bushels. All of these ele-

vators are located within 35 miles of ICM’s Paris

facility. ICM’s elevator business, conducted through

ICM Grain, is very profitable, showing a higher re-

turn on ICM’s investment than its milling operations.

In 1980, ICM’s elevator business showed as much net

profit as did its milling business. Neither ICM nor

69a

ICM Grain owns or leases land upon which crops are

grown.

On its consolidated return for the fiscal year end-

ing September 30, 1976, ICM claimed depreciation

deductions upon the storage elevators at ICM Grain’s

Metcalf facility using the useful life provided in re-

spondent’s Asset Guideline Class “01.1” (agricultural

machinery and equipment). Respondent determined

that the elevators were not within Asset Guideline

Class “01.1,” and in ’*s notice of deficiency accord-

ingly recomputed ICM’s depreciation deduction using

longer useful lives.

OPINION

I. LIFO Inventory—Warehouse Receipts

The question here is whether certain corn repre-

sented by warehouse receipts, which ICM purchased

just before the end of its fiscal year and then resold

by prior agreement to its supplier just after the fiscal

year ended, was inclucable in its year-end LIFO in-

ventory, so as to avert the adverse tax consequences

of a “liquidation,” “recapture,” or “invasion” of

ICM’s LIFO inventory base. See footnote 4.

The parties have stipulated that ICM at no time

intended to take delivery of the corn represented by

the warehouse receipts from the Cargill and Ander-

sons transactions and that ICM did not intend to use

that particular corn in its milling operations. ICM

contends that its legal ownership of the corn rep-

resented by the warehouse receipts, coupled with

valid reasons for its low year-end physical inventory

_ of corn, warrants the inclusion of the corn repre-

sented by the warehouse receipts in its year-end

LIFO inventories. ICM also argues that it has en-

70a

gaged in these types of transactions before and that

such transactions are in the nature of a hedge. Re-

spondent argues that since ICM did not acquire the

corn for the purpose of using it in its production, or

for resale to its customers, the corn represented by

the warehouse receipts is not properly includable in

ICM’s inventory. Respondent also contends that

ICM’s acquisition of the corn represented by the

warehouse receipts is a mere paper transaction lack-

ing economic substance into solely for tax benefit, and

thus should be treated as a sham transaction.

ICM uses inventories to account for the corn used

in its milling operations, section 471, and it uses the

LIFO method to compute its inventories. Section 472.

Whether the corn represented by the Cargill and An-

dersons warehouse receipts is properly includable in

ICM’s ending LIFO inventory for 1973 and 1975 de-

pends on the purpose for which ICM acquired and

held that corn. Grant Oil Tool Co. v. United States,

180 Ct. Cl. 633, 381 F. 2d 389, 398 (1967) ; Latimer-

Looney Chevrolet, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 120,

125 (1952). Section 1.471-1, Income Tax Regs., pro-

vides as follows:

In order to reflect taxable income correctly,

inventories at the beginning and end of each

taxable year are necessary in every case in which

the production, purchase, or sale of merchandise

is an income-producing factor. The inventory

should include all finished or partly finished

goods and, in the case of raw materials and sup-

plies, only those which have been acquired for

sale or which will physically become a part of

merchandise intended for sale... . (Emphasis

added. )

Tla

Thus, only property acquired for sale to customers

in the ordinary course of business* or physically

incorporated into finished goods intended for sale to

such customers is properly includable in inventory.

United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698

F. 2d 88 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 462 U.S.

(1983); Francisce Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 47

F. 2d 555, 557 (2d Cir. 1931), revg. and remanding

on another inventory issue 14 B.T.A. 1062 (1929);

Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. v. United States, 80 Ct.

Cl. 488, 9 F. Supp. 577, 584-585 (1935); Spiegel,

May, Stern Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 110, 37

F. 2d 988, 990 (1930); J.E. Mergott Co. v. Commis-

sioner, 11 T.C. 47, 50 (1948), affd. 176 F. 2d 860

(3d Cir. 1949); EB. Rauh & Sons Feriilizer Co. v.

Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 468, 471 (1928); Burroughs

Adding Machine Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 938,

943 (1927).

The recent Second Circuit case of United States

v. Ingredient Technology Corp., supra, is strikingly

similar to the present one.” That case involved sugar

acquired by a refiner with a prearranged resale back

to its supplier after the close of the refiner’s taxable

year. The court held that the sugar was not includ-

able in the taxpayer’s LIFO inventory, stating, 698

F. 2d at 95:

18 ICM does not argue, nor would the record support a find-

ing, that ICM was in the business of buying and reselling

raw corn during the fiscal years ending September 30, 1973

and September 30, 1975.

19 That case was a criminal prosecution for tax evasion, and

this case does not involve any suggestion of fraud; however,

the substantive tax issue is the same in both cases.

72a

We conclude that the concept of inventory

from an accounting point of view and the term

inventory in the applicable Treasury Regulations

would be meaningless were there to be included

in the term or concept property bought, agreed to

be resold, never intended to be utilized in the

trade or business of the taxpayer (except for tax

purposes), and in fact under the corporate tax-

payer’s dominion, control, and at its risk about

as long as the pea in the proverbial shell game is

under the shell.

We agree with the Second Circuit.

We are not persuaded by ICM’s various arguments.

ICM argues that there were valid business reasons

for its low year-end physical corn inventories, reasons

allegedly relating to the milling qualities of the par-

ticular year’s “old” or “new” corn. The record is

inatequate to establish these matters, but even assum-

ing ICM had valid business reasons for its low physi-

eal inventories at times, that would not affect our

decision. The crucial fact is that ICM did not intend

to use the warehouse-receipt corn in its milling busi-

ness. Mere legal ownership of the corn at the end of

ICM’s fiscal year, while necessary, is not sufficient to

make it an inventory item. United States v. Ingredi-

ent Technology Corp., supra at 94; see also Corliss

v. Bowers,_281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930) (actual com-

mand over the property and not mere refinements of

title is determinative for tax purposes).

ICM’s citation to Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v.

United States, 561 F. 2d 190 (10th Cir. 1977) is

inapposite. The court held that the taxpayer there

could use its commodity futures gains and losses

73a

as adjustments to its inventory valuation, since its

commodity transactions were hedges in the nature of

price insurance. Here, ICM’s warehouse-receipts

transactions were not hedges or price insurance in

any form. Moreover, any gain or loss from a hedge

transaction which is accounted for as an adjustment

to ending inventory under Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,

would be limited to the net out-of-pocket gain or loss,

here $1,368.16 for 1973 and $3,000 for 1975. ICM

of course wishes to consider only half of the trans-

action, the alleged purchase, as an adjustment to its

ending inventory.

We also do not attach any significance to the testi-

mony of Wiggins, ICM’s president, that ICM had

engaged in these types of warehouse-receipt transac-

tions in the past. Although consistency in inventory

practices is important, sec. 1.471-2(b), Income Tax

Regs.,” such practices must still clearly reflect the

taxpayer’s income. Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. Commis-

sioner, 357 F. 2d 656, 658 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1966), affg.

42 T.C. 926, 935 (1964); S.C. Toof & Co. v. Com-

misisoner, 21 B.T.A. 916, 934 (1930). We find

Wiggins’ testimony inadequate to establish the nature

of these earlier warehouse-receipts transactions, much

less that this allegedly “consistent” inventory prac-

tice clearly reflected ICM’s income. If the facts in

2° Section 1.471-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides:

{[I]nventory rules cannot be uniform but must give

effect to trade customs which come within the scope of

the best accounting practice in the particular trade or

business. In order to clearly reflect income, the inventory

practice of a taxpayer should be consistent from year to

year, and greater weight is to be given to consistency

than to any particular method of inventorying or basis of

valuation so long as the method or basis used is in accord

with §§ 1.471-1 through 1.471-11.

74a

the earlier years were the same as the facts in this

case, we could not find that such warehouse-receipt

transactions clearly reflected income.

Accordingly, we hold that the corn represented by

the warehouse receipts from the Cargill and Ander-

sons transactions was not properly includable in

ICM’s year-end LIFO inventories.”

II. ICM’s “Mogul” Purchase

In February of 1974, ICM purchased CPC’s Mogul

cereal binder business. Each of the parties to the

sale reported the transaction for tax purposes in the

manner most favorable to it: CPC reported the

transaction as a sale or exchange of a capital asset

while ICM claimed a deduction for the entire purchase

price as a “commission” for a convenant not to com-

pete. CPC is not a party to this litigation. ICM con-

cedes that the treatment on its tax return was in-

correct, and now claims deductions for portions of

the aggregate purchase price allocable among the

various intangible assets acquired. ICM claims (1)

an amortization deduction for the portion allocable

to the covenant not to compete; (2) an abandonment

loss deduction under section 165 for the portion al-

locable to the technical data; and (3) a deduction for

part or all of the portion allocable to the customer

lists (a) as an ordinary and necessary expense under

section 162, (b) as a loss under section 165, or (c)

for depreciation under section 167. In support of his

21 In light of our decision we do not address respondent’s

argument that the transaction constituted a mere sham. But

see United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F. 2d

88, 94 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied U.S. —— (1983) ;

Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F. 2d 399, 412 (2d Cir. 1957)

(L. Hand, J., dissenting).

75a

position that no deductions are allowable, respondent

argues (1) that no allocation of the purchase price

among the various assets is permissible and (2) that,

in any event, ICM has failed to prove its entitlement

to the deductions under the various sections claimed.

We will address respondent’s arguments in that

order.

A. Allocability of Purchase Price

CPC and ICM embodied their transaction in a

Purchase Agreement. Paragraph 1 of that agree-

ment provided that ICM was acquiring CPC’s Mogul

cereal binder business, including goodwill and “busi-

ness assets.” Paragraph 2 provided for a lump sum

purchase price of $240,000, with no allocation of

that amount among the assets. Paragraph 3 listed

the specific “business assets” that ICM was acquir-

ing. Paragraph 4 listed CPC’s affirmative covenants

to ICM (customer notification and joint sales calls).

Paragraph 5 provided CPC’s negative covenant to

ICM (covenant not to compete). Respondent argues

that the Mogul business that ICM acquired is a

“mass” or “indivisible” asset so that there can be no

allocation of the lump sum purchase price among the

various intangible assets acquired. We do not agree.

The sale of a going business may be viewed as a

sale of separate business assets, not as a sale of a

single indivisible entity. Williams v. McGowan, 152

F. 2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Watson v.

Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544, 551-552 (1953). Ac-

cordingly, a lump sum purchase price for a going

business should, if possible, be allocated among the

various assets acquired, including intangible assets,

based on their respective values. Miller v. Commis-

sioner, 56 T.C. 636, 649 (1971). Depending on the

76a

facts of the case, an allocation may not always be

possible.

Generally, the “indivisible asset” theory, upon

which respondent relies, has been applied in cases

where a taxpayer acquires a going concern with the

primary value of the acquisition being goodwill or

going-concern value. In such cases the courts have

sometimes refused to sort out some small portion of

the asset that may be a wasting asset for which a

deduction (usually for depreciation) might other-

wise be allowed. Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 50 T.C. 78, 90 (1968). However,

where the record contains sufficient data to permit an

allocation between the non-depreciable portion and

the depreciable portion of the asset acquired, the

courts have made such allocations. Commissioner v.

Seaboard Finance Co., 367 F. 2d 646 (9th Cir. 1966),

affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Comput-

ing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223

(1975) ; Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc. v. Commis-

sioner, supra at 90-91. Moreover, as this Court has

pointed out, the indivisible asset theory “is designed

to prevent a taxpayer from allocating to relatively

insignificant depreciable assets the price actually paid

for nondepreciable intangibles. It is not intended to

be used to deny an allocation of a part of the pur-

chase price to the depreciable property where such

property is a major factor in the transaction.” Com-

puting & Software, Inc. v. Commissinoer, supra at

234 See also Commissioner v. Seaboard Finance Co.,

supra at 652; Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc. v.

Commissioner, supra at 90-91.

Here ICM did not purchase just goodwill and

going-concern value but purchased technical data,

customer lists and a covenant not to compete. As

77a

discussed below, we have found that the covenant not

to compete was a major factor in ICM’s acquisition

of CPC’s Mogul business, that the covenant had sub-

stantial economic value, and that the covenant was

not a nonseverable adjunct of the goodwill being

transferred. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the

indivisible or mass asset theory is inapplicable to this

case. Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner,

supra. Furthermore, in cases discussing the indi-

visible asset rule, the usual context has been the

question of depreciable versus nondepreciable assets.

Here, the intangible assets acquired may generate

deductions other than depreciation, such as the amor-

tization deduction for a covenant not to compete that

ICM claims. We think that it is equally inappropri-

ate to apply the indivisible asset rule to that situa-

tion, and that we should make an allocation here if

one is otherwise appropriate.

Respondent also argues that-in any event no por-

tion of the purchase price may be allocated to the

covenant not to compete. He argues that the Pur-

chase Agreement clearly allocates the $240,000 pur-

chase price to only the “business assets” and good-

will and that “it is clear that the parties did not

intend that any portion of the purchase price be

allocable to the covenant not to compete.” We dis-

agree. Paragraph 1 of the Purchase Agreement

states that CPC sells and ICM buys the “Mogul cereal

binder business in the present States of the United

States, including its good will and the business assets

enumerated in Paragraph 3 below * * * for the con-

sideration stated in Paragraph 2.” We do not read

this as meaning that the $240,000 was paid just for

goodwill and the enumerated “business assets.” Para-

graph 2 does not allocate the purchase price in any

78a

way, let alone indicate that the covenant not to com-

pete is somehow subsumed in or just a non-severable

adjunct to the goodwill being transferred. On the

contrary the covenant not to compete is discussed

separately and in detail in Paragraph 5 of the Pur-

chase Agreement.

Citing Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F. 2d 305, 308

(2d Cir. 1959), affg. 29 T.C. 129 (1957) and Balda-

relli v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 44, 49 (1973), respond-

ent argues that under the “strong proof” rule ICM

has not presented the “clear and convincing evidence”’

necessary to show “that the parties have an intent

contrary to that expressed in the agreement.” ”

22 Respondent also urges us to apply the “Danielson” rule

(see Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F. 2d 771, 775 (3d Cir.

1967) vacating and remanding 44 T.C. 549 (1965) ) and hold

ICM to the express terms of its agreements absent evidence

sufficient in a suit at common law to alter or revoke the agree- _

ment (fraud, misrepresentation, etc.). In light of our con-

struction of the Purchase Agreement, we need apply neither

the “strong proof” rule nor the “Danielson” rule. However,

in those cases where one of the parties is attempting to vary

the terms of his agreement, the position of this Court is clear.

We will apply the “Danielson” rule in cases appealable to the

Third Circuit under our rule of Golsen v. Commissioner, 54

T.C. 742, 756-758 (1970), affd. 445 F. 2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971),

cert. denied 404 U.S. 940 (1971). However, where the

Circuit Court of Appeals to which an appeal will lie has not

ruled on the “Danielson” issue, we will continue to apply the

strong proof rule, which we consider to be the correct rule

of law. See Major v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 239, 248-249

(1981) ; GC Services Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 406, 412

n. 2 (1979); Baldarelli v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 44, 49-50

(1973); Lucas v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 1022, 1032 n.1

(1972) ; Mittleman v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 171, 175 (1971),

affd. per curiam 464 F. 2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Schmitz v.

Commisioner, 51 T.C. 306, 315-318 (1968), affd. sub nom.

Throndson v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1972).

79a

Again, we disagree. As we read the Purchase Agree-

ment, it makes no allocation of the $240,000 purchase

price among the various assets. “[T]he ‘strong proof’

doctrine is inapplicable herein because none of the

parties is attempting to vary the terms of the con-

tract as written, but merely to construe the terms.”

Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.

72, 82 (1982) (emphasis supplied). Here, as in that

case, the Purchase Agreement expressly provided for

a covenant not to compete but did not make any allo-

cation of the purchase price for that or any other

asset. Where the written agreement makes no alloca-

tion of the lump sum purchase price, we do not be-

lieve that a taxpayer trying to allocate a portion of

such price to the noncompetition covenant is attempt-

ing to vary the terms of his written contract. Of

course, this does not establish that ICM is entitled

to allocate a specific portion of the purchase price

to the covenant not to compete. There are other tests,

discussed below, that ICM must satisfy to show how

much, if any, of the purchase price may be allocated

to the covenant. This, however, is a question of how

much may be allocated to the covenant, and not the

question of whether such an allocation may be made.

Accordingly, this Court may allocate the lump sum

purchase price among the various intangible assets

that ICM purchased.

1. Covenant Not to Compete

To be entitled to amortize a covenant not to com-

pete, a taxpayer must show: (1) that the covenant

had independent economic significance such that we

might conclude that it was a bargained-for element

of the agreement; and (2) that the parties considered

the covenant as a valuable part of the entire consid-

80a

eration for the agreement. See Peterson Machine

Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 79 T.C. at 81, 83;

Levinson v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 380, 389 (1966).

First it is clear that the covenant had significant

independent economic value. Such a conclusion is

apparent when we consider the position of ICM with-

out such a covenant. While it is true that CPC had

decided to abandon its cereal binder business, it made

its decision based strictly on the profitability of that

division. Absent the noncompetition covenant, there

was nothing to prevent CPC from reentering the

cereal binder market in the future if- economic

changes suggested increased profitability. Before its

Mogul sale, CPC was a formidable competitor for

ICM, and, absent the covenant, could have again be-

come an equally formidable competitor. After its

Mogul sale, CPC still retained: (1) the basic starch

biochemistry and technology to produce a cereal bin-

der; (2) the production equipment; (3) its continued

commercial relationship with customers in the foun-

dry industry through its sale of resin coated sand

for use in foundry cores; and (4) its economic re-

sources as a large multinational corporation. Admit-

tedly, CPC could no longer use the name “Mogul,”

because that trademark and trade name had been sold

to ICM. However, ensuring that CPC would not com-

pete against it in the cereal binder market had sub-

stantial economic substance and value to ICM.

As to the second requirement, that the parties have

considered the covenant as a valuable part of the

total consideration, we think ICM meets the standard.

Both Wiggins and Hassler testified that to ICM the

covenant was one of the major assets acquired. Their

testimony is buttressed by the substantial economic

significance of the covenant. We think that CPC also

= al RN sR i Re

8la

considered the covenant to have value. Although the

record of the negotiations is not as complete as we

should like, it is undisputed that by agreeing to the

covenant, CPC limited its future business choices by

promising not to produce and sell cereal binders or

otherwise use the trade name Mogul. In light of the

relative ease with which CPC could have reentered

the cereal binder market absent the noncompetition

covenant and the substantial economic substance and

importance to the buyer of the covenant, we are sat-

isfied that CPC also considered the covenant to be of

value.

Finally, we attach little significance to the fact

that the parties apparently agreed upon a total pur-

chase price at the outset before any agreement on

the specific items to be included in the package, in-

cluding the covenant not to compete, was negotiated.

See Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner,

supra, 79 T.C. at 83; Rudie v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.

131, 1389 (1967). ICM’s tentative acceptance of the

purchase price was a prerequisite to further negotia-

tions, but hardly culminated the negotiations. The

final written agreement contained a five-year cove-

nant not to compete, set out in a separate paragraph

of the document. There is nothing in the record to

suggest that this specific time-limited covenant was

just a part of the general goodwill that was being

transferred to ICM. Based on the entire record, we

are satisfied that the covenant not to compete had

substantial independent economic significance and

that both parties considered it as a valuable part of

the total consideration for the transaction.

While the record is not as clear as we should like,

we think it is appropriate to apply the principle of

Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F. 2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930),

82a

of course bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose

inexactitude is of its own making. See Seaboard

Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 367 F. 2d 646, 652

(9th Cir. 1966), affg. a Memorandum Opinion of

this Court; Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commis-

sioner, supra, 79 T.C. at 86; Computing & Software,

Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 64 T.C. at 235. Under

Cohan v. Commissioner, supra, we find that 20 per-

cent of the total purchase price of $240,000, or

$48,000, is properly allocable to the covenant not to

compete and that amount may be amortized over the

five-year term of the covenant.

2. Technical Data

ICM claims an abandonment loss for the technical

cata which it values at $20,000. Pursuant to the pur-

chase agreement, ICM acquired CPC’s “specification

sheet and manufacturing procedure for its ‘MOGUL’

brand cereal binder . . . and copies of current tech-

nical data relating to this product.” We believe that

this information, all subsumed for our purposes un-

der the heading “Technical Data,” was of value to

ICM when it acquired CPC’s Mogul business. As set

forth in the Fndings of Fact, ICM knew long before

the acquisition that CPC was a “wet miller,” a pro-

duction method incompatible with ICM’s at least in

regard to the feedstock used in the process. Swarth-

out, ICM’s research director, had an indication of

the production methods and feedstock used by CPC

a week before the Purchase Agreement and the Man-

ufacturing Agreement were consummated. On the

other hand, because of CPC’s use of dyes, its Mogul

product looked like ICM’s cereal binders, which sug-

gested to Swarthout that there might be something

similar in their production methods and technical

83a

data that would be useful to ICM. It was not until

after the purchase when Swarthout actually visited

the CPC plant that he learned that little of the CPC

process, at least as it pertained to the feedstock, could

be directly used by ICM. Under Cohan v. Commis-

sioner, supra, we find that 10 percent of the purchase

price of $240,000, or $24,000, is properly allocable

to the technical data.

However, ICM is not entitled to an abandonment

loss for this technical data. While we have found as

a fact that ICM’s method of producing Mogul was

developed primarily through its own research, that

alone does not establish an abandonment loss. To be

entitled to such a loss, ICM must demonstrate an in-

tention to abandon the technical data coupled with

an act of abandonment, both of which must occur

within the taxable year, and both of which must be

shown by the facts presented. Coors Porcelain Co. v.

Commissioner, 52 T.C. 682 (1969), affd. F. 2d 1

(10th Cir. 1970); Boston Elevated Railway Co. v.

Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1084, 1108-1109 (1951), affd.

196 F. 2d 923 (1st Cir. 1952).

We do not believe that ICM’s decision to produce

its Mogul product through an all-extrusion process

using moderate low temperature and low shear ex-

truders either evidences an intention to abandon the

CPC technical data or constitutes an act of abandon-

ment of that data. Indeed, in view of some similar-

ities between CP“’s moderate low temperature and

low shear extruders and those later used by ICM, it

is difficult to view such knowledge and information

as having been abandoned. The fact that this knowl-

edge may not have been directly used in ICM’s Mogul

manufacturing processes is not determinative. Often,

learning what will not work is as useful as learning

84a

what will. By the same token, having one’s own inde-

pendent research and learning corroborated through

the experience and learning of others is also valu-

able. We also believe that ICM can be said to have

“used” CPC’s technical data. While the specific pro-

duction methods ICM used with its yellow goods feed-

stock represented primarily its own research and de-

velopment, what ICM learned from CPC about basic

starch biochemistry and cereal binder manufacturing

processes corroborated its own research and indicated

the method of production that ICM should employ. As

such, it became part of ICM’s capital cost of develop-

ing its “Bonnot” process for producing specialty prod-

ucts through a moderate low temperature and low

shear extruder but with its own dry-milled yellow

goods feedstock. Hence, the technical data was nei-

ther “abandoned” nor otherwise “lost.” * While ICM

seeks to minimize the fact as merely a bit of sales

puffery, we think it not insignificant that when ICM

began to produce its own Mogul binder, it advertised

to its customers as follows:

Mogul was developed from over 50 years re-

search. It is well known in the industry as a

high quality product. Illinois Cereal Mills pur-

chased the brand name and technical informa-

tion necessary to produce Mogul. We are now

manufacturing Mogul to the same high exacting

standards.

23 Nor can ICM claim deductions under other sections—the

technical data clearly has a useful life of over a year, so

expensing under section 162 is improper, and ICM has failed

to prove a depreciable useful life for the technical data, so no

depreciation deduction is allowable. Section 1.167(a)-3, In-

come Tax Regs.

85a

On this record we cannot find an abandonment or

other loss of the technical data and information ICM

purchased from CPC.

8. Goodwill and Going-Concern Value, Trade-

marks and Trade Names, and Customer Lists

We believe that the remaining 70 percent of the

$240,000 total purchase price or $168,000 is allocable

to goodwill and any possible going-concern value, the

trademark and trade names, and customer lists. Be-

cause no tax consequences flow from this allocation,

as we will discuss below, we need not and do not

make any further suballocation of the purchase price

among these various assets.

Essentially, goodwill is the expectancy of continued

customer patronage without contractual compulsion

and for whatever reason. Karan v. Commissioner,

319 F. 2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1963); see also Com-

missioner v. Seaboard Finance Co., supra, 367 F. 2d

at 649; Solitron Devices, Inc. v. Commissioner, 80

T.C. 1, 17-19 (1983), and cases cited therein; Com-

puting & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 64

T.C. at 232-233 and cases cited therein. Going-con-

cern value, as distinguished from goodwill or perhaps

as part of goodwill, is the enhanced value of the ac-

quired assets deriving from “the ability of the ac-

quired business to generate sales without any inter-

ruption because of the takeover.” Winn-Dixie Mont-

gomery, Inc. v. United States, 444 F. 2d 677, 685

n. 12 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Solitron Devices, Inc. v. Com-

missioner, supra, 80 T.C. at 19-20. Neither goodwill

nor going-concern value is subject to depreciation be-

cause the useful life is not susceptible of reasonable

estimation. Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commis-

86a

sioner, 64 T.C. at 232-233, and at 232 at n. 7. Con-

sequently, there is no need to assign separate values

to the goodwill and any possible going-concern value

in this case.

ICM concedes that it is not entitled to a deduction

for the portion of the purchase price attributable to

the trademarks and trade names. Trademarks and

trade names are similarly nondepreciable because

they have no ascertainable useful lives. Norwich

Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 326, 329

(1934). In fact, trademarks and trade names are

generally viewed as a part of the goodwill. Clarke v.

Haberle Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930); Renzie-

hausen v. Lucas, 280 U.S. 387 (19380); Norwich

Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioner, supra. Accordingly,

there is no need to determine what portion of the

remaining purchase price is attributable to the value

of the trademarks and trade names either as a part

of goodwill or independently of goodwill.

. Finally, as to the customer lists there is no reason

to suballocate any portion of the purchase price to

them in this case. Customer lists are generally viewed

as a single “indivisible asset” having an indefinite

life, in the nature of goodwill or inherently insepara-

ble from the purchased goodwill. Golden State Towel

ond Linen Service, Ltd. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl.

300, 373 F. 2d 938 (1967), and cases cited therein;

Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc. v. Commissioner,

supra, 50 T.C. at 87. Of course in those few cases

where customer lists have been found to have a rea-

sonably determinable useful life separate from any

goodwill or going-concern value, the courts have tried

to allocate a portion of the purchase price to such a

depreciable asset. Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Ine.

v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 90-91. See also Commis-

87a

sioner v. Seaboard Finance Co., supra, involving a

similar situation with loan accounts. In this case,

ICM has failed to provide any basis whatsoever for

making any allocation between customer lists and

goodwill and going-concern value or for establishing-

ing the useful life of the customer lists.

ICM is not entitled to a deduction under any of the

sections claimed. No deduction is allowable under

section 162 because the customer lists have a useful

life of over a year. Manhattan Co. of Virginia, Inc.

v. Commissioner, supra, 50 T.C. at 86; Boe v. Com-

missioner, 35 T.C. 720, 725 (1961) and cases cited

therein, affd. 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962). Further-

more, since the customer lists are viewed as a single

indivisible asset, ICM is not entitled to a loss deduc-

tion under section 165; the law does not permit a

deduction for a partial loss of a capital investment.

Golden State Towel and Linen Service, Ltd. v. United

States, supra; Anchor Cleaning Service, Inc. v. Com-

missioner, 22 T.C. 1029, 1034-1035 (1954). In addi-

tion, ICM has failed to prove that in fact a loss of

any sort has occurred. ICM continues to sell Mogul

and binders other than Mogul to a substantial num-

ber or significant percentage of the customers on the

acquired CPC list. Moreover, ICM has not shown

that any loss of business is permanent. Finally, no

deduction is permitted for depreciation under section

167 because ICM has failed to prove the useful life

of the customer lists. Section 1.167(a)-3, Income Tax

Regs.; Rudie v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. at 137-138.

To summarize, we have allocated the lump sum

purchase price of $240,000 among the various assets

as follows:

88a

Covenant not to compete $ 48,000

Techrical data 24,000

Tradematks, trade names,

customer lists, goodwill

and any possible going-

concern value 168,000

The $48,000 allocable to the covenant not to com-

pete is amortizable over the covenant’s five-year life.

No amortization or other deduction is allowable for

any other portion of the purchase price.

III. Section 38 Property and Useful Lives

of Structures

ICM claims an investment tax credit for the total

costs of its new specialty mill and new water treat-

ment plant. ICM also claims that the depreciable use-

ful lives of, the new specialty mill, new water treat-

ment plant, and the boiler house™ are the same as

those of the machinery or equipment housed within

those structures. Respondent argues that these struc-

tures are “buildings,” and thus the portions of the

total construction costs attributable to these struc-

tures do not qualify for the investment tax credit.

Moreover, respondent says that for depreciation pur-

poses the useful lives of these structures are inde-

pendent of and longer than the useful lives of the

machinery or equipment they house. The issue for

24The boiler house, sometimes referred to as the “power

building,” was placed into service prior to the years before

the Court and no investment tax credit can be claimed for

that structure. However, whether or not the structure is a

“building” is in dispute because of the useful life issue. As

in the case of the other structures, ICM argues that the boiler

house is not a building and its useful life is the same as that

of the machinery or equipment contained within it.

89a

}

our decision is whether these three structures—the

new specialty mill, the new water treatment facility,

and the boiler house—are “buildings” so as to be ex-

cluded from the definition in section 48(a) of prop-

erty eligible for the investment tax credit.”

Buildings are not eligible for the investment tax

credit. Section 48(a); sections 1.48-l(c), 1.48-

1(d) (1), Income Tax Regs.” In determining whether

a structure is a “building” and hence not section 38

property, the term “building” is given its commonly

accepted meaning. Samis' v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.

609, 617 (1981); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v.

1

2 These structures are property with respect to which de-

preciation is allowable and which have useful lives of three

years or more, section 48(a), thus leaving the narrow issue

of whether these structures are “buildings.”

26 Section 48(a)(1), as it read during the years before

the Court, provides in pertinent part:

[T]he term “section 38 property” means—

(A) tangible personal property, or

(B) other tangible property (not including a building

and its structural components) but only if such property—

(i) is used as an integral part of manufacturing,

production, or extraction or of furnishing transpor-

tation, communications, electrical energy, gas, preter,

or sewage disposal services * * *.

Section 1.48-1(c), Income Tax Regs., defines “tangible per-

sonal property” as “any tangible property except land and

improvements thereto, such as buildings or other inherently

permanent structures (including items which are structural

components of such buildings or structures) * * *.”

Section 1.48-1(d) (1), Income Tax Regs., defines “other

tangible property” as including “any other tangible property

(but not including a building and its structural components)

used as an integral part of manufacturing * * * [or other

qualifying uses] * * *.”

90a

Commissioner, 74 T.C. 768, 793 (1980), affd. on this

point, 708 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).

Section 1.48-1(e) (1), Income Tax Regs., generally

defines a building as follows:

The term “building” generally means any struc-

ture or edifice enclosing a space within its walls,

and usually covered by a roof, the purpose of

which is, for example, to provide shelter or hous-

ing, or to provide working, office, parking, dis-

play, or sales space. The term includes, for ex-

ample, structures such as apartment houses, fac-

tory and office buildings, warehouses, barns, gar-

ages, railway or bus stations, and stores. * * *

However, the regulation then excludes from the defini-

tion of buildings certain structures that may look like

buildings but do not function as buildings and there-

fore may qualify as section 38 property. Section

1.48-1(e) (1), Income Tax Regs., excludes from the

term “building” —

(i) a structure which is essentially an item of

machinery or equipment, or (ii) a structure

which houses property used as an integral part

of an activity specified in section 48(a) (1) (B)

(i) [such as manufacturing or production] if

the use of the structure is so closely related to the

use of such property that the structure clearly

can be expected to be replaced when the prop-

erty it initially houses is replaced. Factors which

indicate that a structure is closely related to the

use of the property it houses include the fact that

the structure is specifically designed to provide

for the stress and other demands of such prop-

erty and the fact that the structure could not be

economically used for other purposes, Thus, the

9la

term “building” does not include such structures

as oil and gas storage tanks, grain storage bins,

silos, fractioning towers, blast furnaces, basic

oxygen furnaces, coke ovens, brick kilns, and coal

tipples.

Thus, the pertinent regulations define “building”

in terms of both appearance and function. A!though

there may be some disagreement or at least a differ-

ent approach among the courts as to how much weight

is to be accorded to the “appearance test,’”’ no court

has wholly disregarded the appearance test; however,

most of the courts generally regard the “functional

test” as the more important of the two. Compare

Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Commissioner, su-

pra; Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United States,

620 F.2d 862 (Cl. Ct. 1980); and Thirup v. Com-

missioner, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), revg. 59

T.C. 122 (1972) and A.C. Monk & Co. v. United

States, 686 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1982) and Yellow

Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 538 F.2d 790

(8th Cir. 1976).

The appearance test does not help ICM in this case.

Here, the three structures clearly looked like build-

ings, and we do not understand the taxpayer to sug-'

gest otherwise. However, we have not found any case

in this or any other court that holds that appearance

alone is determinative, so we must also consider the

second test as to whether or not the structures func-

tioned as buildings.

The functional test is defined by this Court as

follows:

The functional test inquires whether “the pur-

pose” of the structure at issue is a purpose

ejusdem generis to the purposes described by ex-

ample in the regulations, i.e., “to provide shelter

or housing, or to provide working, office, park-

92a

ing, display, or sales space.” Sec. 1.48-1(e) (1),

Income Tax Regs. The reguiations ask whether

the [structures] perform a function similar to

“apartment houses, factory and office buildings,

warehouses, barns, garages, railway or bus sta-

tions, and stores.” Sec. 1.48-1(e)(1), Income

Tax Regs.

Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Commissioner, su-

pra, 74 T.C. at 795. See also Thirup v. Commissioner,

supra, 508 F.2d at 919.

In applying the functional test, an important but

not determinative factor has been the human activity

within the structure. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.

v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), affg.

on this issue 74 T.C. 768 (1980) ; Thirup v. Commis-

sioner, supra; Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Commis-

sioner, 73 T.C. 1059

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Appendix — Commissioner v. Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc. · 479 U.S. 995 | Frix