Amicus Curiae Brief — Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.

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No. 86-473

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1986

GWALTNEY OF SMITHFIELD, LTD.,

Petitioner ,

Ve

CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, INC.,

and

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE,

CONNECTICUT BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

ASSOCIATION,

IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Wayne S. Henderson*

Patrick W. Hanifin

New England Legal Foundation

55 Union Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

(617) 367-0174

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

*Counsel of Record

November 22, 1986

MOTION OF CONNECTICUT BUSINESS

AND INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS

ants Guar IN SUPPORT OF

R CERTIORARI

Pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Rules of

the Supreme Court, the Connecticut

Business and Industry Association ("CBIA")

moves the Court for leave to file its

brief amicus curiae (bound with this

motion) in support of the petition for

certiorari.

CBIA is an organization of firms which

operate in the State of Connecticut. CBIA

presents the opinions of its members on

environmental policy and other public

issues to government agencies and

legisiators. It has sponsored meetings

between member firms and government

agencies to encourage compliance with the

environmental laws by fostering

cooperation between business and

government.

However, under the rule adopted by the

court below and by the District Court for

the District of Connecticut in Connecticut

Fund for the Environment and Natural

Resources Defense Council v. The Job

Plating Co., Inmc., 623 F.Supp. 207 (1985),

members of CBIA that have cooperated fully

with the government and are complying with

the Clean Water Act are still subject to

multimillion dollar penalties for past

violations in suits brought by private

parties.

Members of CBIA frequently have been

targets of citizen suits brought under the

Clean Water Act. Of 47 citizen Notices of

Intent filed in Connecticut, approximately

42 were fled against members of CBIA or

their subsidiaries. Of 32 citizen suits

known to have been filed in Connecticut,

all but one were filed against past or

present members of CBIA. These members

have paid over a million dollars in

settlements, much of which has been paid

2

————eo =“

as environmental contributions in lieu of

civil penalties for past violations of the

Act. Other suits are pending. Respondent

Natural Resources Defense Council has been

a plaintiff in all the citizen suits

brought against members of CBIA.

CBIA has requested the consent of the

parties to the filing of its amicus brief

in support of the petition for certiorari.

The Petitioner, Gwaltney of Smithfield,

Ltd., has consented, as evidenced by the

letter from its counsel, Hogan & Hartson,

attached to the filing letter enclosed

herewith. The Natural Resources Defense

Council has declined to give its consent.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., has

failed to respond to CBIA's request for

consent.

Amicus believes that it will present

arguments in favor of granting certiorari

which will not be presented by the parties

to this action or by other amici. CBIA

a a eee tee

offers a broader perspective gained from

an ongoing study of citizen suits under

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365.

This study has shown that in the last

four years there has been a sudden flood

of such suits across the country. Over

five hundred notices of intent to file

such suits have been issued in at least 38

states and all ten of EPA's regions. The

lower courts are divided and in need of

guidance on whether to accept the recently

advanced theory that defendants who are in

full compliance with the Act are still

liable for multimillion dollar civil

penalties for past violations.

Research also shows that most of this

sudden increase in litigation is the work

of a small number of organizations. The

threat of large civil penalties for

indisputable past violations is frequently

used to influence defendants to accept

settlements which include payments to the

————————————

plaintiff, or to a related organization or

project, together with attorneys’ fees.

This incentive to sue for private gain

conflicts with the expressed intent of

Congress. It also frustrates efforts to

foster compliance with the law.

Permittees, such as the members of CBIA,

who have cooperated fully with official

regulations may nonetheless face

conflicting demands from freelance

"regulators".

This broader perspective on the issues

is peculiarly within CBIA's understanding,

both from its direct experience with its

members in Connecticut, and from its

investigation into the nationwide scope of

the current citizen suits practice. For

the foregoing reasons, CBIA prays that

this Court grant its motion for leave to

file the accompanying brief amicus curiae.

By its Attorneys,

Wayne S. Henderson, Esquire

Patrick W. Hanifin, Esquire

New England Legal Foundation

55 Union Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

(617) 367-0174

EE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the citizen suits provision of

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365,

authorizes citizens to bring suit for

civil penalties for past violations

against defendants who are currently in

full compliance with the Act?

VX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES eeeeeeeeeeeee 2

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

OF AMICUS CURIAE eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 1

INTRODUCTION AND

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .cceeeeeceeeed

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....eeeeeeeeeeed

ARGUMENT

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS IN CONFLICT

WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER

FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, AND

WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT,

AND MIS-READS THE STATUTORY

LANGUAGE ccccccccccsccsesesess 10

A. The Ruling of the

Fourth Circuit Below

Squarely Conflicts With the

Rule in the Fifth and

Seventh Circuits, and With

This Court's Opinion in

Middlesex

COUNTY. cececceceececcees 10

B. The Legislative History

Establishes Congress’ Intent

to Limit Citizen Suits to

Abatement of Current

ViolationS. .ccsecececcessess 17

ll. THE LOWER COURTS ARE FACED WITH

AN INCREASING NUMBER OF SUCH

CITIZEN SUITS, AND ARE IN NEED

OF GUIDANCE FROM THIS

COURT «. cccccccccsccccccccssses 24

A. The Extent of Citizen Suit

Litigation Has _ Increased

Dramatically Over the Past

Four Y@@rs. ssscessccceses 24

B. The Plaintiffs’ Pattern of

Use of Citizen Suits

Conflicts With the

Congressional Intent In

Enacting The Provision. .. 29

GETED «ccccccccococcccoeecec eo» 43

|

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Al

-Supp.

(N.D.N.Y. 1986) errr TTTTT TTT TT is.

Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural

Resources — Council v. Bethlehem

Steel Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. 1694

> . 985) eee eee eeeenneeeeneee 31

City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid

= Cling ,

604 ros 1008 (7th Cir. 1979),

cert.denied 444 U.S. 1025

11980) oeeee eee wenee 11,13,14,16

Consumer Products Safety Commission

v. GTE Sylvania,

447 U8 103 102,108 (1960) ....... 18

Connecticut Fund for the Environment and

Natural RA r Defense Council v.

Brid rt Be Ss Co.,

0. - - . Conn. Oct. 23,

1984) CORO 36

Connecticut Fund for the Environment and

Natural 1 rces Defense Council

v.Contract Plotin Co.,

631 F.Supp. 12

(D. Conn. 1986) ccccccccccceses 39

Connecticut Fund for the Environment and

Natur esources Defense Council v.

Job Plating Co., inc.,

623 F.Supp. 207

(D. Conn. BEBO Peocccccccoccee 17 ,32,39

ii

Connecticut Fund for the Environment and

Wate Resources Defense Council Vv.

liner Ine:

o. = 86 (D. Conn.

Jan. 30, 1985) Cette eeeeeeeeeeceeee 36

Pines Vv. Nestingtouse Electric Corp.,

-Supp.

(M.D. Pa 1985) eee ee ee eee ee eee 17,31

F riends ot the Earth v. Facet Enterprises ,

-Supp.

(W.D. N.Y. 1984) eee ee eee ee eee 31

Hamker v. iamand Shamrock Chemical Co.,

(5th Cir. 1985) eeeee 11-13,20,22-23

June 12,

1984) CCST HEC Ree eee 38

lilinois v. vutboard wate Corp., 619

. . ir. » ¥ ted

and ag. 453 U.S. 917 (i96T) on

remand, F.2d 473

th ir. 1982) eee ee eee ee eee 14

CTH THEE EEE EE EES 31

Middlesex

(1981) Dee 12-15,22-23

iii

a

Pa Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba

rp.,

2i Bniv't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1390, 1393,

(D.R.I. 1984), 22 Env't Rep. Cas.

(BNA) 1999

(D.R.I. 1985) eevee eneneeeeeeee 14,16

Sierra lub v. Aluminum Compan of

nes

-Supp. 842

(N.D.N.Y. 1984) e*eneeeveeeeeeeeee 35

Sierra DV. mer R &

?

-2d 1013 (M.D. La. 1985)

+: _. ¢ temanetnete

Sierra Club v. Hanna Furnace rp.,

F.Supp.

(W.D.N.Y. 1985) seen eeeeeeeeee 17

Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defense

1983) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeere 36

Sierra Club v. Keystone Au ve Pla

No. HM 64-4020 (D. Md. May 30,

1986) eevee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee® 35

Sierra Club v. Monochem, No. 84147B (M.D.

(5th Cir.) eee ener 16

Sierra Club v. Philips ECG,

No. W.D. N.Y. Jan. 25,

1983) *eeeeneeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeeeee 36

iv

ep . (BNA) 1050 (D.

Mass. 1984) ee ee ee eee eee eee eee eee 17

F.Supp. 103 (D. N.J. 1986)

ities 31

Oo. 63-685 (D. N.J. Jan. 19,

1984) ithe eee 2 38

Student Interest R h of

> upp.

(D. N.J. 1985) ee ee ee 16,37

Stud

(D. N.J. Nov. 16, 1985) see ee ee @ © 35

Studen b In t R rch of

-Supp.

(D. N.J. 1985) eee ee ee eee ee eee 31

Statutes and Regulations

26 U.S.C.

$2462 eC eee eee eee eee eee 31

33 U.S.C.

DESIG cccccccccccccccccccccccccecse 9

DESID ccccccccccccccccccsccecccccse 92

BETES cccccccccccccccececcocccees 3,11

EEE

42 U.S.C.

$6972 e*eeeeeeeeee ee eee eeeeeee eee ee 6

GOGOL Of SOG cecceccereeeeeeeeeeees 6

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499,

40 C.F.R. §122.41(1)(4) see eee eeeeeee 30

EPA Civil Penalty Policy, Env't Rep. (BNA)

(Fed Laws) 41:2991 (1984) ..cccceeeee &

islativ terial

Vol. 1 eeeeee ee eee eee eee eee eee e 18-20 , 22

Vol. 2 *eeeeeereeee eee eee eeeeeee 19.22.34

S. Rep. No. 414, 82nd Cong., ist Sess. at

79-81, eee in 1972 U.S. Code Cong.

& Ad. News, » 2 at 3745 ... 19,22,34

Weter_

109. a gpwodes niet

Other Authorities

D.P. Jones, Activists Pressure Polluters.

t, October 6, 1986

see eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee eee 40

Environmental Law Institute, itizen

2 ts: An A is _of tizen

nforcement tions Inder

EP.

eee ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 53.25.30

vi

- Rep nv - Inst.) 10407

(1984) Se CTP eee ee eee eee eee 34

Petition for Writ of Certiorari of

Gwaltney of Smithfield. Ltd.

ieee eee eee ee 5.12.13, 28.33.42

Vii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Connecticut Business and Industry

Association ("CBIA") is the _ largest

business organization in the State of

Connecticut, having 6300 members who

employ a total workforce of over 700 , 000

employees. CBIA presents the views of its

members on public policy and legal issues

to legislative and judicial authorities.

CBIA and its members have been

directly involved in the issue that is

before the Court. Of the 47 Citizen

Notices of Intent filed in Connecticut

since 1983, approximately 42 have named

CBIA members as defendants.

The interest of CBIA is more fully set

forth in its Motion for Leave to File

Brief as Amicus Curiae, above.

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The amicus, Connecticut Business and

Industry Association, adopts and

incorporates by reference the Statement of

the Case of Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,

in its Petition for Certiorari.

The amicus also submits, however, that

a broader perspective on the issues herein

is both relevant and important to this

Court's consideration of the Petition.

This case presents a question of statutory

interpretation which will not only

determine the interests of the parties

immediately before the Court, but will

also provide guidance to the many lower

courts which are confronting a rising

flood of such litigation naticnwide.

The citizen suits provision of the

Clean Water Act, which was enacted in

1972, was used only infrequently during

the first decade of its existence. During

the four years from 1978 through 1981, for

example, an average of fewer than five

such suits per year were filed.?

Since late in 1982, however, there has

been a dramatic increase in citizen suits

under the Clean Water Act. The increase

appears to have been at least accompanied,

if not in large part fueled, by the theory

that such suits are available not merely

for abatement actions for ongoing

violations, but for civil penalty claims

for past violations.

Beginning in late 1982, the United

States Environmental Protection Agency has

kept a log of all citizen notices of

intent to sue, required by $505 of the

Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365, filed with its

headquarters in Washington. In the

1. Environmental Law Institute,

Citizen Suits: An Analysis of

Citizen Enforcement Actions Under

EPA-Administered Statutes (1984)

(hereinafter "ELI Study") at

I11-10 ,27,29.

four-year period from September of 1982 to

August, 1986, at least 558 citizen suit

notices have been filed with EPA.”

The statute does not require notice to

EPA upon the subsequent filing of

litigation, and the percentage of citizen

Suit notices which have resulted in suit

is difficult to ascertain. Investigation

has thus far disclosed that at least 135

of the notices have been followed by the

filing of a federal court Complaint, but

the true figure is certainly higher. At

least 298 of the 558 notices, or roughly

93 percent, have been filed by one of only

six private organizations: the Natural

2. This is a minimum figure, as the

true numbers are likely in fact

to be higher. Some notices are

filed with EPA regional offices

and do not appear in EPA's

Washington files. Freedom of

Information Act requests are

pending with the remaining five

EPA regions.

Resources Defense Council, the Atlantic

States Legal Foundation, Connecticut Fund

for the Environment, Friends of the Earth,

Sierra Club, and the Student Public

Interest Research Group of New Jersey.

The amicus offers these facts

principally in support of three

propositions. First, the issue involved

in this matter is one only recently raised

by plaintiffs, and is of increasingly

widespread importance to an increasing

number of lower courts. The sheer number

of cases brought, together with the vast

potential for future cases not only under

the Clean Water Act,” but also under the

corresponding provisions of other federal

3. As of January, 1984, roughly

65,000 permits had been issued

under the Clean Water Act.

Petition for Certiorari of

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.

(hereinafter "Petition") p. 23.

Ss

environmental statutes, * indicate the

importance of the need for guidance to the

lower courts on the _ availability of

jurisdiction for such suits when past

violations are claimed.

Second, the use of citizen suits for

civil penalties for past violations, and

the plaintiffs’ common tactic of

settlement, raise questions concerning the

incentive to such litigation. Congress

made clear its intent to enact a provision

4. Provisions for citizen suits for

civil penalties against any

person “who is alleged to be in

violation" of the law exist in

the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act, (RCRA) 42 U.S.C.

§6972 (1984) (penaities of up to

$25,000 per day of violation);

and in the Superfund Amendments

and Reauthorization Act of 1986,

Pub.L. 99-499,§206, adding new

$310 to the $Comprehensive

Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act

(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq.

(penalties of up to $25,000 per

day of violation for a first

offense and up to $75,000 per day

for subsequent offenses).

6

ar

the use of which would be motivated solely

by concerns of public health and welfare.

Currently, however, the threat of steep

civil penalties under the Act is

frequently used to influence defendants to

accept settlement demands which include a

financial contribution either directly to

the plaintiff organization, or to &

related organization or an environmental

project, together with costs and attorneys

fees. The incentive to sue, particularly

for litigating environmental

organizations, has become less one of

concern for the public health and welfare,

and more one of private gain for the

organization.

And finally, the plaintiffs’

interpretation of the statute is improper

for reasons of public policy. The

increasing use of citizen suits in

instances where the responsible

environmental agency has_ specifically

chosen to ensure compliance by means other

than the exercise of its civil penelty

authority interferes with efforts to bring

permittees into full and prompt

compliance. Granting to citizen groups an

enforcement power in important respects

equal to, rather than supplementary of,

the Administrator's inevitably leads to

inconsistencies of application and

Significant disagreement with the

regulation and enforcement methods and

priorities of the responsible agencies.

For all of the above reasons, the amicus

submits that this Court's grant of the

requested writ is both necessary and

appropriate to clarify a question of law

which is of increasing importance to the

lower courts.

ee attainments

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision of the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals below directly conflicts

with decisions of this Court and of the

Fifth and Seventh Circuits, which have

clearly stated that the citizen suits

provision of the Clean Water Act provides

jurisdiction only for current or ongoing

violations.

The District Court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over this suit because

the Clean Water Act was not being

violated at the time suit was filed. The

statutory language and the legislative

history establish Congress's intent that

citizen suits be available for the purpose

of abatement of ongoing violations, and

not for claims for civil penalties for

past violations.

The lower courts are divided and need

guidance on what is becoming a common

variety of suit. The extent of citizen

Suit litigation has increased

Substantially over the past several years.

Congress intended to enact a citizen

Suits provision which would be used purely

for the purpose of protecting the public

health and welfare. As the provision is

Curreutly being used, however, it provides

a private incentive to suit which

conflicts with the intent of Congress.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DSCISION BELOW IS IN CONFLICT WITH

THE DECISIONS OF OTHER FEDERAL COURTS OF

APPEALS, AND WITH A DECISION OF THIS

COURT, AND MIS-READS THE STATUTORY

LANGUAGE.

A. The Ruling of the Fourth Circuit

Below Squarely Conflicts With the Rule

in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, and

With This Court's Opinion in Middlesex

County.

The Clean Water Act provides for

federal jurisdiction over citizen suits

against a private party only if that party

10

"ig alleged to be in violation" of an

effluent standard or limitation. 33

U.S.C. §1365(a)(1). This jurisdictional

requirement is clearly stated in _ the

present tense, and does not grant

jurisdiction over a party alleged to have

violated a standard at some time in the

past.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,

with reference also to decisions of the

Seventh Circuit and of this Court, has

provided the clearest ruling on the issue,

in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical

Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (1985):

By its ordinary meaning, the

language of §1365 requires’ an

allegation of an ongoing violation . .

. « Hamker asserts that "to be in

violation of" means "to have

violated"; however this interpretation

obviously strains the grammar of the

statute and diverges from its ordinary

meaning. "(Section 1365] does not

provide for suits against parties

alleged to have violated an effluent

standard or limitation in the past. .

. ." City of Evansville v. Kentucky

Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008, 1014

(7th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 444 U.S.

11

: )

1025 (1980) (cited with approval in

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.

National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1,

(18, n.28] (1981).

The Court below expressly disagreed

with Hamker, finding that the language of

the statute can be read "to comprehend

unlawful conduct that occurred only prior

to the filing of a lawsuit." Petition for

Writ of Certioriari (hereinafter

"Petition") at 8a. Relying, as to the

central issue, exclusively on_ district

court precedents, the Fourth Circuit held

that "citizen suits ..., seeking civil

penalties for permit violations committed

entirely in the past, are permitted under

§505(a)." Id. at 17a.

A clearer statement more squarely in

conflict with Hamker could not be devised.

In Hamker the Fifth Circuit plainly held

that "prospective relief is the only kind

of relief authorized by the Act's citizen

Suit provision, and that civil penalties

are available ‘only as prospective

relief.'"" Id. at 15a, citing Hamker, 7956

F.2d at 398-99. The Court below conceded

the direct conflict between its reading of

the statute and that of Hamker. While

suggesting that "it could be argued that

Hamker is distinguishable on its facts,"

the Court declared that even if it is not

distinguishable, "we decline to follow it

to the extent that it holds that §505(a)

of the Clean Water Act does not permit

citizen suits seeking civil penalties for

past violations." Petition at 15a.

The Court also acknowledged contrary

language by the Seventh Circuit in City ol

Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling,

604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980), and by this

Court in Middlesex County Sewerage

Authority v. National Sea Clammers

Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). According

to the Court below, any statements in

13

"sali

Middlesex County "limiting the scope of

citizen suits to prospective relief were

mere dicta," while the Seventh Circuit's

comments in City of Evansville regarding

the unavailability of civil penalties for

past violations were “wholly unnecessary

to its decision." Petition at 16a, and n.

14, citing City of Evansville, 604 F.2d at

1014; Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.,

619 F.2d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated

and remanded, 453 U.S. 917 (1981), on

remand, 680 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982): and

Pawtuxet Cove Marina v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,

21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1390, 1393

(D.R.I. 1984).

The Fourth Circuit may not, however,

so easily dismiss as inapposite statements

of statutory interpretation which are

central to the holdings of City of

Evansville and of Middlesex County. Both

cases presented claims for damages

pursuant to an implied private right of

14

action under the Clean Water Act, and the

analysis necessarily demanded an

examination of the nature and adequacy of

the remedies which the Act expressly does

provide.

It was in this context that the

Seventh Circuit and this Court made clear

reference to the limited nature of the

citizen's right of action explicitly

contained in the statute, and did so in

terms plainly inconsistent with the theory

of the instant case. The citizen suits

provision “allows suits under the Act by

private citizens, but authorizes only

prospective relief," 453 U.S. at 6

(emphasis supplied); and permits private

citizens "to sue for injunctions’ to

enforce" the statute. Id. at 14. The

structure of the Act and its legislative

history underscore "the limited nature of

the citizen suits being authorized." Id.

a 37. Be ae And according to the

15

Seventh Circuit:

: (The citizen Suits provision]

authorizes a civil action against a

party "alleged to be in violation" of

effluent Standards’ or _ limitations

under the Act.... It does not provide

for suits against parties alleged to

have violated an effluent Standard or

limitation in the past or for recovery

of damages.

City of Evansville, 604 F.2d at 1014

(emphasis supplied).

The district courts are Similarly

divided. District Courts in Louisiana,

Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber & Chemical

Corp., 621 F.2d 1013 (M.D. La. 1985) ,app.

pending, No. 85-3763 (5th Cir.), Sierra

Club vy. Monochem, No. 84147B (M.D. La.

1985) app. pending, No. 85-3762 (5th

Cir.); and Rhode Island, Pawtuxet Cove

Marina, Inc., v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 21

Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1390, 1393 (1984),

22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1999 (1985), have

ruled that there is no jurisdiction over

such suits. Courts in New Jersey, e.g.

Student Public Interest Research Group v.

16

Monsanto Co., 600 F.Supp. 1474 (1985);

Massachusetts, Sierra Club and Natural

Resources Defense Council v. Raytheon, 22

Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1050 (1984);

Connecticut, Connecticut Fund for the

Environment and Natural Resources Defense

Council v. The Job Plating Co., Inc., 623

F.Supp. 207 (1985); New York, Sierra Club

ve. Hanna Furnace Corp., 636 F.Supp. 527

(W.D.N.Y. 1985), Atlantic States Legal

Foundation v. Al Tech Specialty Steel

Corp., 635 F.Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y., 1986);

Pennsylvania, Fishel v. Westinghouse

Electric Corp., 640 F.Supp. 442 (M.D.Pa.

1985), and Virginia, in the instant suit,

have reached the opposite conclusion.

B. The Legislative History

Establishes Congress's Intent to

Limit Citizen Suits to Abatement

of Current Violations.

Congress intended in the Clean Water

Act to write a statute whose meaning would

be clear on its face. "[WJe have tried in

17

this legislation not to leave the final

evaluation of the bill to legislative

history, but instead to write into law as

Clearly as possible the intent of the

Congress." Remarks of Sen. Muskie during

Senate debate, A _ Legislative History of

the Water Pollution Control Amendments of

1972 ("Leg. Hist."), Vol 1 at 163-164

(1973).

Where the language of a statute is

plain on its face, the courts. are

constrained to apply that language, and

not to re-fashion the wording according to

its own perception of how Congress must

have meant the provision to be phrased.

Consumer Products Safety Commission v. GTE

Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).

Resort to the legislative history for

interpretive guidance, however, further

underscores that Congress intended to

authorize citizen suits only to "abate"

ongoing violations of the Act. See S.

18

Rep. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 79-81,

reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News, vol. 2 at 3745 ("USCCAN") and in 2

Leg Hist. at 1482, 1497. "Abate" means "to

put an end to." Webster's New World

Dictionary, p. 2 (1976). Other comments

in the legislative history support this

interpretation. The purpose of the

citizen suits provision was described as

permitting citizens to "seek compliance .

» »« with the Act," Water Pollution Control

Legislation, Hearings Before the

Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of

the Committee on Public Works, United

States Senate, 92d Congress, lst Sess.,

Serial No. 92-H9 at 109; "to abate a

violation," id. at 114; and to sue "for

the purpose of abating pollution," Id. at

707 (comment of Sen. Eagleton). "[A]

citizen can obtain an _ injunction but

cannot obtain money damages for himself."

1 Leg. Hist. at 220-21 (comment of Sen.

19

Bayh).

Congress expressed concern that the

citizen suits provision be restricted to

abatement rather than be a source of funds

for private persons and groups. 1 Leg.

Hist. at 674. The Fifth Circuit pointed

out in Hamker that permitting citizen

suits for past violations would defeat

this Congressional intent:

If §1365 were interpreted as

permitting citizen suits ffor civil

penalties for past violations, all

state damage claims which could be

brought under pendent jurisdiction

could be litigated in a ‘federal forum,

thus undermining congressional intent

to.limit the burden on the district

courts. Since the Act provides for

awards oof attorney's fees and

expenses, there would be a _ substantial

incentive to bring suit under the Act

rather than in state court.

756 F.2d at 396.

The citizen suits provision of the

Clean Air Act of 1970, which provided for

citizen suits for the first time, and

which formed the model for the Water Act

version, was the subject of extensive

20

debate over fears that it would clog an

already congested federal court system.

R. Schwartz & D. P. Hackett, Citizen Suits

Against Private Industry Under the Clean

Water Act, 17 Natural Resources Lawyer 327

(1984) (herinafter Schwartz & Hackett) at

328. Concern was expressed over the

possibility of frivolous, harassing or

duplicative suits and conflicts between

EPA policy and citizens’ strategy. Id. at

328-29. In response Senator Hart arguec

that the inability Oi plaintifis to

collect damages would limit the number oi

suits filed. Id.

The addition in the Clean Water Act of

a provision empowering the Courts to

assess "any appropriate civil penalties"

was not discussed in the legislative

history, Schwartz & Hackett at 331, except

to specify that any such penalties be paid

into the federal Treasury. Congress

considered and specifically rejected the

21

of allowing citizens to _ collect

if the penalties. ]

Leg. Hist. at

220-21 (comment of Sen. Bayh). The Senate

nittee Report on the Amendments stated,

should be noted that any penalties

sed would be

scellaneous receipts

deposited as

and not be

ered by the complainant." Report of

Senate Public Works

Comm. at 79,

nted in 2 Leg. Hist. at 1497.

1is Court has recognizec. as has the

ircuit in Hamker, that "one of the

congressional purposes behind

ting citizen suits was to preclude the

ssibility that §1365 suits would place

1due burden on the federal courts."

Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396.

‘T]he legislative history of the

(Clean Air] Act contains’ explicit

indications that private enforcement

suits were intended to be limited to

the injunctive relief expressly

provided for. Senator Hart, for

example, stated:

It has been argued,

onferring additional!

~~)

however, that

rights on the

citizen may burden the courts unduly.

I would argue that the citizen suit

provision of §1358 has been carefully

drafted to prevent this consequence

from arising. First of all, it should

be noted that the bill makes no

provision for damages to the

individual. It therefore provides no

incentives to suit other than _ to

protect the health and _ welfare of

those suing and _ others _ similarly

Situated. It will be the rare, rather

than the ordinary, person, I suspect,

who, with no hope ci financial gain

and the very real prospect of

financial loss, will initiate court

action under this bill." 116 Cong.

Rec. 33104 (1970).

Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 17, n. 27 (emphasis

supplied). It was this measure,

incorporated in the Clean Water Act, which

Senator Muskie recognized as a

"restrictive" citizen Suits provision.

Scwartz & Hackett, at 330. See also,

Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396 (availability of

citizen suit for civil penalties for past

violations, because Act allows for

attorneys’ fee awards and expenses, would

undermine congressional intent to limit

actions to those brought solely to protect

health and welfare.)

The present use of the citizen suits

provision for civil penalty claims for

past violations directly conflicts’ with

this expression of Congressional intent.

Il. THE LOWER COURTS ARE FACED WITH AN

INCREASING NUMBER OF SUCH CITIZEN SUITS,

AND ARE IN NEED OF GUIDANCE FROM THIS

COURT.

A. The Extent of Citizen Suit

Litigation Has Increased

Dramatically Over the Past Four

Years.

This Court's jurisdiction is

appropriate in this matter also to provide

guidance to the increasing numbers of

district courts which are required to

confront the issue. Litigation under the

citizen suits provision of the Clean Water

Act has become, since late in 1982,

increasingly common, and similar private

rights of action exist under both RCRA and

CERCLA as recently amended.

From its enactment in 1972 until late

in 1982, the citizen suits provision of

the Clean Water Act was rarely used.

During the four years from 1978 through

1981, for example, an average of fewer

than five per year were filed nationwide.

ELI Study III-10, 27, 29.

Beginning in late 1982 with the filing

of a group of 14 by one law office, the

numbers of such suits have increased

dramatically. Although EPA's records are

apparently not complete, they do reveal

that in the four years since that time at

least 558 notices have been filed. See

Chart, Appendix A, attached hereto. What

percentage of these notices have

subsequently been followed by litigation

is not yet fully known, but it is Known

that at least 135 have resulted in federal

court Complaints. If Connecticut is any

guide the numbers are likely to be even

higher. Of 47 notices of intent filed in

Connecticut from 1983 to date, 32 (68%)

are Known to have led to federal court

litigation.”

The citizen suit notices have been

well distributed geographically, with each

of the ten EPA Regions and at least 36

states and the District of Columbia

represented. The principal activity has

been in Pennsylvania (90 notices), New

York (73), Connecticut (47), New Jersey

(36), Louisiana (34), Massachusetts (33),

Texas (31), California (24), and Ohio

(22).

The identity of the plaintiff groups

responsible for the upsurge of notices is

De By another account, of the 108

citizen suit notices filed in

1983 alone, 62 led to _ federal

court suits, which together

requested approximately $100

million in _ penalties. Lewis,

"Environmentalists' Authority to

Sue Industry for Civil Penalties

Is Unconstitutional Under the

Separation of Power Doctrine," 16

Envir. Law Rep. 10101, 10102

(1986).

26

not nearly so _ diverse. Most of the

citizen suit notices known to have been

filed since September of 1982 -- 298 of

the 558 notices, or 53% -- have been filed

by or on behalf of only six organizations:

Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra

Club, Friends of the Earth, Atlantic

States Legal Foundation, Connecticut Fund

for the Environment, and New Jersey Publi

Interest Research Group. All six are

ither parties or amici in the instant

case. [hey often jo in filing notices

There is, of course, nothing per se

improper in the fact that so large a share

6. The Natural Resources Defense

Council has filed 106 notices;

Sierra Club has filed 121;

Friends of the Earth, 37 ;

Atlantic States Legal Foundation,

"6; Connecticut Fund for the

Environment, 42; and New Jersey

Public Interest Research Group,

38. These figures total more

than 298 because of the frequent

joint filings.

~

4

t

ee ee

of this litigation and threatened

litigation is carried on by so limited a

cast of plaintiffs. But the extent of the

plaintiffs’ practice in this area, and the

pattern which it follows, combine to lend

weight to the argument that this use of

the citizen suits provision, which appears

to be fueled in large part by the theory

that such suits are available for past

violations, is a far cry from _ what

Congress ever intended.

7. The time lag involved in the

preparation and filing of the

Discharge Monitoring Reports on

which the notices are based, and

the incompleteness of the

information the amicus has yet

received, combine to make it all

but impossible at this point to

say what portion of the citizen

suits notices or complaints filed

relate, as in the instant case,

to purely past violations. It is

known that more than 20 such

claims have thus far reached the

stage of reported decisions,

Petition at 22, n.15, so the

numbers of those brought and

unreported, settled, or _ still

pending is likely to be

considerably higher. What is

28

B. The Plaintifis' Pattern of Use of

Citizen Suits Conflicts With the

Congressional Intent In Enacting

The Provision.

Far from displaying a_ motivation

solely to protect the public health and

welfare, the current pattern and practice

of those groups’ responsible for the

upsurge in Clean Water Act citizen suit

filings instead appears to demonstrate

[Footnote Continued]

plainly apparent from a review of

the EPA files, however, is that

virtually every notice contains

Claims for civil penalties for

past’ violations, whether’ the

defendant is presently in

compliance or not. It is,

therefore, in a very real sense

that the recent increase in

citizen suits is fueled by the

availability of civil penalties

for past violations.

that the primary motivating factors in

such actions, particularly as to past

violations, are that the threat of steep

civil penalties may serve as a spur to

settlement, and that attorneys fees are

available to fund the effort.

Holders of NPDES permits under the Act

are required to monitor their own effluent

discharges, and to file monthly Discharge

Monitoring Reports. 33 1.S.C.

§1318(a)(3)(A); 40 C.F.R. §122.41(1)(4).

These DMRs are public records, and it is a

simple matter for a _ potential plaintiff

organization to review them, compare the

numerical reports with the permit limits,

and establish technical violations of the

Act. ELI Study at I-7, V-2, V-12. Courts

have generally ruled that the DMKRs

constitute admissions, and some have held

that they provide conclusive evidence of

violation of he statute's strict

30

liability standard. .

Under a rule of law that permits civil

penalty Suits for violations which

occurred as long as five years prior to

the date of suit,” a permittee whose DMRs

display even the slightest violation over

the previous five. years is likely to be

8. Locust Lane v. Swatara Township

Authority, 636 F.Supp. 534 (M.D.

Pa. 1986); Student Public

Interest Research Group of New

Jersey v. Jersey Central Power

Co., 642 F.Supp. 103 (D.N.J.

1966).

9. While occasional courts have held

there to be no statute of

limitations for such actions, and

have therefore permitted

plaintifis to go back

indefinitely, Student Public

Interest Research Group of New

Jersey v. Tennaco Polymers, 602

F.Supp. 1394 (D.N.J. 1985),

Fishel v. Westinghouse Electric

Corp., 640 F.Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa.

1985), the more usual rule is to

imply the general federal penalty

Statute of limitations of five

years. 28 U.S.C. §2462. Friends

of the Earth Ve Facet

Enterprises, 618 F.Supp. 532

(W.D.N.Y. 1984); Chesapeake Bay

Foundation and Natural Resources

31

disposed to settlement)”. The statute

sets a civil penalty of "$10,000 per day

of such violation," 33 U.S.C. §1319(d),

and some courts, including the Court below

10.

[Footnote Continued]

Defense Council v. Bethlehem

Stee! Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas.

1894 (D.Md. 1985); Conn. Fund for

the Environment and_ Natural

Resources Defense Council v. Job

Plating Co., Inc., 623 F.Supp.

207 (D.Conn 1985); Atlantic

States Legal Foundation v. Al

Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635

F.Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).

The plaintiff organizations may

profess to some _ degree _ of

reasonable judgment in choosing

to pursue only those violations

which have reached a_ certain

level of significance, but two

points in response are worthy of

note. First, whatever’ the

enforcement priorities set by the

plaintiff organizations, they are

bound to differ from those of EPA

and the_- state environmental

agencies which by statute are

given the responsibility to make

such priority judgments. And

second, the rule of law which

enables these plaintiff

organizations to pursue. their

litigation and settlement

campaign is one which will apply

32

in the instant matter, have interpreted

that provision to permit an assessment of

up to $300,000 for violation of a single

monthly average limitation. Petition at

18a - 22a. Given the severity of the

potential penalty, plus attorneys' fees to

the plaintiff and the defense costs of

litigating the matter, and given the

unavailability of other than _ equitable

defenses, a defendant is faced with little

choice but to settle.

The settlement terms proferred by the

plaintiff organizations provide further

(Footnote Continued]

to all plaintiffs, including

those less responsible in their

judgments. A citizen suit for

even a single minor and technical

violation of the Act five years

prior to the filing of a

Complaint will be made possible

by the plaintiffs' statutory

reading. Since a DMR admits

liability, and since the statute

provides a strict liability

standard, $10,000 potential

penalty, and attorneys fees in

any event, there is little if any

incentive not to sue for even the

most trivial violation.

33

demonstration that the current tactic

diverges’ significantly from Congress's

intended result. Civil penalties assessed

under the Act were meant for deposit in

the Treasury, Report of the Senate Public

Works Comm. at p. 79, reprinted in 2 Leg.

Hist. at 1497, but the settlements which

plaintiffs demand often require various

environmental contributions in lieu of

penalties.

As a starting point, the environmental

groups frequently inform target

companies that their settlement goals

include entry of a consent decree

containing the following provisions:

1. civil penalties or alternatively,

a contribution of a comparable amount

to an environmental project located in

the same state,. . «+ -

4. reimbursement for the plaintiffs'

attorney's fees and litigation costs.

Schwartz & Hackett at 328 (1984). See

also, J. Miller, Private Enforcement of

Federal Pollution Control Laws Part III,

14 Env'l L. Rep.( Env't L. Inst.) 10407,

10426 (1984) Consent decrees in citizen

34

Suits brought by environmental groups

have typically included payments of

$20,000 to $400,000 to environmental

Organizations in lieu of civil penalties

to the U.S. Treasury.?! The agreements

sometimes provide for a_e schedule of

penalties to be paid to environmental

groups in the event that the defendant

violates the consent decree; these

penalties may amount to far more than the

ll. E.g., Sierra Club v. Keystone

Automotive Plating Co., No. HM

84-4020, (D.Md., May 30, 1986)

($400,000 to the Nature

Conservancy); Student Public

Interest Research Group of New

Jersey Vv. Ragen Precision

Industries, No. 83-1604 (D.N.J.

Nov. 16, 1985) ($100,000 to the

Passaic River Coalition); Sierra

Club v. Aluminum Company of

America, 985 F.Supp. 842

(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (consent decree

Oct. 5, 1984) ($87,400 to the

Adirondack Historical Association

for environmental education

projects and conservation).

: , 12

"contribution". In some

instances, the plaintiffs have themselves

tne beneficiaries of these

13

payments. Typically, these sums are

lescribed as "contributions" to tax-exempt

rganizations.

E.g., Connecticut Fund for the

Environment and Natural Resources

Defense Council v. Bridgeport

Brass Company, No. H-84-955

(D.Conn. Oct. 23, 1984) ($30,000

to the Open Space Institute, an

organization with the same

address as the NRDC, plus up to

$86,000 more in noncompliance

penalties payable to the same

organization).

E.g., Sierra Club and Natural

Resources Defense Council v.

Interpace Corp., No. 83-0127C,

(W.D.N.Y., Feb. 14, 1983)

($25, 000 for environmental

projects selected by plaintiffs) ;

Sierra Club v. Philips ECG, No.

83-52T (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1983)

($15,000 to be used by Sierra

Club for projects of its choice

relating to Seneca River).

E.g., Connecticut Fund for the

Environment and Natural Resources

Defense Council v. Pfizer Inc.,

No. H 85-86 (D.Conn. Jan. 30,

1985) (at least $25,000 to "The

Open Space Institute, a 501C(3)

tax exempt charitable

organization").

36

The United States has protested that

payments to private groups in lieu of

civil penalties are improper and may be

illegal, /° but such agreements have

nonetheless been approved by the district

courts.

In addition to contributions in lieu

of penalties, the consent agreements

usually provide for substantial attorneys

fees and other litigation charges to be

paid to the plaintiff organizations. Such

fees sometimes exceed the amount of the

15. In its amicus brief in the court

below, the United States argued

that "all civil penalties

assessed in this action must be

deposited with the United States

Treasury." Brief at n. 18. In

its amicus brief on the

constitutionality of the citizen

suits provision in Student Public

Interest Research Group of New

Jersey v. Monsanto, 600 F.Supp.

1474 (D.N.J. 1984), the United

States went so far as to argue

that an environmental plaintiff

whicn settled a citizen suit for

a payment ‘to itself couid be

37

penalty or “contribution." aS

A comprehensive picture of the pattern

of citizen suits on a nationwide basis is

difficult to provide. But a view of those

notices filed in Connecticut is at least

instructive, and may be representative of

the nationwide practice.

16.

[Footnote Continued)

considered in violation of the

Miscellaneous Fees Act, 31 U.S.C.

§3302(c), which requires "l(a]

person having custody or

possession of public money" to

deposit it in the Treasury.

Brief, n. 31.

E.g., Student Public Interest

Research Group of New Jersey and

Natural Resources Defense Council

v. J.1. Baker Chemical Co., No.

83-685, (D.N.J., Jan. 19, 1984)

($10,000 civil penalty payable to

U.S. Treasury and $29,000 in

attorneys’ fees and other costs

payable to plaintiffs); Hudson

River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., and

Natural Resources Defense Council

v. White Mop Wringer Co., No.

82-CV-1306 (N.D.N.Y., June 12,

1984) ($15,000 to Open Space

Iastitute and up to $23,000

attorneys fees and other

litigation expenses).

38

The sudden upsurge of citizen suit

activity in Connecticut began in

September, 1983, with the filing of 21

Notices of Intent. The Notices were filed

jointly by the Connecticut Fund for the

Environment and the Natural Resources

Defense Council, and, except for the

recitation of the particulars of the

discharges, locations, and dates which

allegedly violated the Act, the format and

language of each Notice is identical.

From 1983 through the present date,

47 Notices are known to have been filed in

Connecticut, 42 of which have been filed

by CFE and NRDC. Of those 42 Notices

filed, two have gone to judgment on the

merits, )’ and three are still pending.

17. CFE and NRDC vy. Job Plating Co.,

623 F.Supp. 207 (1985), Motion

for Summary Judgment decided in

favor of plaintiffs on Sept. 27,

1985, on basis that jurisdiction

is available for civil penalties

for purely past violations,

39

The remaining 37 have been settled, 10

prior to the filing of a Complaint and the

other 27 after suit had been instituted.

According to a recent newspaper

accounting, the settlements of the 28

litigation cases in Connecticut have

netted at least $916,500 in environmental

contributions in lieu of penalties, and an

additional $484,250 in attorneys fees to

the plaintiff organizations. D.P. Jones,

"Activists Pressure Polluters", Hartford

Courant, October 6, 1986, p. 1, quoting

counsel for CFE. Figures for the 10

matters settled prior to suit are not

known.

(Footnote Continued]

settled for $77,500 after Court

referred parties to Gwaltney

lower court ruling for

plaintiffs; CFE and NRDC vy.

Contract Plating Co., 631 F.Supp.

1291 (1986), citizen suit barred

by State's diligent prosecution

of prior suit.

40

These figures are presented not in dispute

of their appropriateness as to any given

case or fact pattern -- at least with

regard to any civil penalties in the

nature of prospective relief -- but only

to offer some indication of the magnitude

of the current use of the citizen suit

Strategy, and particularly by a small

group of six organizations. The

availability of environmental

contributions, sometimes directly to the

plaintiff organization itself, as well as

substantial attorneys fees for what is a

relatively simple assembly-line type of

litigation, provides 4 significant

incentive to bring such litigation. This

Congress clearly did not intend in the

citizen suits provision of the Clean Water

Act.

One further point of pragmatism should

perhaps be noted. The enforcement powers

of the EPA and its delegated state

41

agencies granted by the Act include both

injunctive relief and penalty provisions.

The primary goal of the statute being to

achieve full and prompt compliance, a

regulatory authority may well choose to

forego the imposition of a penalty as a

means, whether informally by discussion or

more formally by consent order, to

persuade a more immediate or comprehensive

corrective measure. This flexibility to

determine the appropriate enforcement

priorities is reflected in the EPA

Enforcement Policy. EPA Civil Penalty

Policy, Env't Rep. (BNA) (Fed Laws)

41:2991 (1984). That the use of citizen

suits for civil penalties for purely past

violations interferes with the setting ol

such enforcement priorities is apparent

from the facts of the instant case.

Gwaltney undertook corrective measures

to bring itself into full compliance, all

with notice to and the approval of the

42

em

State Water Control Board, which then

declined to press for penalties for past

violations. Petition at 3-4. To allow

private citizen groups to pick up the

enforcement cudgel which the agency, in

the exercise of its responsibility to

achieve compliance, had chosen to let lie,

is both impermissible under the Act and

unwise public policy.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the

amicus respectfully submits that this

Court should grant the petition for writ

of certiorari in this case.

CONNECTICUT BUSINESS AND

INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,

Amicus Curiae,

By its attorneys,

Wayne S. Henderson*

Patrick W. Hanifin

New England Legal Foundation

) 55 Union Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

(617) 367-0174

* Counsel of Record

| 43

APPENDIX A

CITIZEN SUIT NOTICES

All Notices Filed By Major

Year Notices Environmental Groups*

1978 1 Unknown

1979 ) Unknown

1980 6 Unknown

1981 6 Unknown

1982 19 15

1983 110 72

1984 174 124

1985 138 42

1986 ** 118 _45

TOTALS 558 298

*

**

Natural Resources Defense Council, Atlantic

States Legal Foundation, Connecticut Fund

for the Environment, Friends of the Earth,

Sierra Club, Student Public’ Interest

Research Group of New Jersey.

Partial results through approximately

September, 1986.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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