Record and brief — Turnock v. Ragsdale

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JURISDICTIONAL

STATEMENT

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No. » Nov 10 1988) =|

- JOSEPH F.SPANICK S|

IN THE Oe

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

BERNARD J. TURNOCK, M.D., M.P.H., Director of

the Illinois Department of Public Health, et al.,

Appellants,

Ve

RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, M.D., et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

NEIL F. HARTIGAN

Attorney General, State of Illinois

ROBERT J. RUIZ

Solicitor General, State of Illinois

100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917-3000

Attorneys for Appellants

Micuak. J. Hayes *

KATHLEEN KREISEL FLAHAVEN

Rocer P. FLAHAVEN

GLADYS STEVENS

Assistant Attorneys General

100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917-3654

Of Counsel * Counsel of Record

Printed by Authority of the State of Illinois (P.O. 34272—60— 11-10-88)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Illinois can constitutionally license and regu-

late outpatient surgical facilities in which pregnancy termi-

nations are performed to the same extent it licenses and

regulates outpatient sUrgical facilities in which pregnan-

cy terminations are not performed.

2. Whether a case or controversy existed with respect

to the challenged statutes and regulations which were not

being enforced by the State of Illinois prior to the filing

of the complaint.

3. Whether statutes and regulations establishing stan-

dards for the construction, maintenance and operation of

outpatient surgical facilities are constitutional as applied

to outpatient surgical facilities in which pregnancy termi-

nations are performed.

4. Whether the federal courts can refuse to give effect

to severability requirements, thereby invalidating stat-

utory and regulatory provisions which are constitutional.

il

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The defendants in the district court were Bernard J.

Turnock, M.D., M.P.H., Director of the Illinois Depart-

ment of Public Health; Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney Gen-

eral of Illinois; Gary L. Clayton, the Director of the

Illinois Department of Registration and Education; and

Richard M. Daley, State’s Attorney of Cook County. Tur-

nock, Hartigan and Clayton were the appellants in the

court of appeals. Daley did not file a notice of appeal.

In addition, appellant Stephen F. Selcke, Director of the

Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, is the suc-

cessor in public office to Gary L. Clayton, Director of the

Illinois Department of Professional Regulation.

The plaintiffs in the district court and appellees in the

court of appeals were Richard M. Ragsdale, M.D., Mar-

garet Moe, Northern Illinois Women’s Center, Sarah Roe

and Jane Doe.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

——_ — —

\ PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ......... ii

ES cobs cccsccccscccess ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................. vi

Nes cc ec ccccccccces l

eae civic nccccecccccce's 1

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 4

ca ccc ec ccscccces 5

The Evidence Presented ................. 6

Pee 8

PE ED ow cece cece cece. i)

The ASTC Regulations .................. 11

Building Design and Construction Require-

UPPER ERER GGG cas eseccccccscceccs 13

The Constitutional Challenge ............. 14

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUB-

PEPER UER Seeesecccccecccccccccc. 21

A. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED

JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN CHAL-

LENGED PROVISIONS WHICH WERE

NOT BEING ENFORCED ............. 21

iv

B. THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRONEOUS-

LY FOUND THAT THE CHALLENGED

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS VIO-

LATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

PRUNE cacecctscdvercesecenséinuwes 24

C. THE MAJORITY OPINION CONFLICTS

WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT RE-

GARDING SEVERANCE OF PURPORTED-

LY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS . 28

PTET ee ee ee ee ee 30

APPENDIX

(Separate Volume)

App.

PAGE

A—Slip Opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, March 10,

BOD Sk 0hieniccccscresvedannnsausceuneeses l

B— Judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

neals for the Seventh Circuit, March 10, 1988 . 102

C— Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit Amending the Slip

Cele, DOU Bey Gee ck iicccecccussdices 103

D— Amended Order of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Denying the

Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Re-

hearing En Banc, August 16, 1988 ........ 105

E-—-Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit Denying the Petition

for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing

En Banc, August 12, 1988 ................ 107

Vv

F— Class Certification and Preliminary Injunction

Order of the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Ilinois, Eastern Divi-

sion, December 11, 1985 .................:.

G— Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United

States District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, Eastern Division, November 27,

Sy sdauned eeu cbuainndes bh osdusseeaue ees

H—Notice of Appeal, November 7, 1988 ......

I— Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act,

111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 94 157-8.1, et seg. .....

J— Health Facilities Planning Act, 111% Ill. Rev.

es es Oe ON ob hone cndseesusaynss

K— Medical Practice Act, 111 Ill. Rev. Stat. € 4400-

L—77 Illinois Administrative Code, Chapter 1,

Pe. OSG a dit addeoans ee ueets

109

112

146

149

193

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases PAGE(S)

Abortion Coalition of Mich., Inc. v. Mich. Dep't

of Public Health, 426 F.Supp. 471 (E.D. Mich.

EPC OTTO C CPE CCUT LOT ETE TET TTC CELTS 26

Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) . 26

Baird v. Department of Public Health, 599 F.2d

ee Oe SS eo eheeek es ceeeken Gude 25

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ..........

Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commis-

CS, Te Wee Bee GD vc svdececcccsvesss 29

Charles v. Carey, 579 F.Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1988) . 10

C.I.0. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472 (1945) ....... 23

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive

Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) ....... 10, 15, 24

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.

i ceri wag Renealledess Ouesanbendeces 26

Connecticut v. Menilio, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) ..... 24

El Paso & Northeastern R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215

8 ER ey ee

29

Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) ........ 23

Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976) . 25

International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623

yy 8 8: Be SS eee 23

J.N.S., Inc. v. State of Ind., 712 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.

SOD Nees eccceineueuesunsuNenuaseneubenees 23

vil

Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'n

of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) ........... 26

Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.

SEE Stceohsducsdinansce uke odenbase es 10, 27

Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) .......... 23

Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) ..... 29

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ...... 15; 18, 19, 24

Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) ... 10

Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians,

Gee ee WOe GE RSecensecescccevcssenes 19

Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill.2d 406

BEE ¢6dnndddnsawddecnenckeshnetnedacss 9, 10, 28

Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1986) . 23

Westchester Women’s Health Org. v. Whalen, 475

Papp. Te6 G.DN.Y. WTR) .cccsccccccccss 25, 26

Constitutional Provisions

oe Rg eee eee 2,5

a GE SS PD ous See uducsucnvevaceus 3,5

ee Se CE Un veenpintateccstessneee 3, 5

ee EE UE sh van ecdwesvcusowsnens 3,5

es I, SE, GE cccponccccsecdccenaces 3, 23

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Section 1 .......... 3,4, 5

Vill

Statutes

ne cuwkueeh bones

re er

oR a Ree

OO eae

Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act,

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars. 157-8.1 et seq. ..

Pere ere T eT TTT TT TTT TTT TTT TT TTT Tite passim

Health Facilities Planning Act,

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars. 1151 et seg. .. passim

Medical Practice Act,

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, par. 4400-22 ...... passim

Regulations

Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Licensing

Requirements, 77 Ill. Adm. Code, Ch. 1, Sec-

Se Se, NE © cdccccccncctnesnces passim

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

BERNARD J. TURNOCK, M.D., M.P.H., Director of

the Illinois Department of Public Health, et al.,

Appellants,

Vv.

RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, M.D., et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

a

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit entered March 10, 1988 is reported

at 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988) and is reproduced at Ap-

pendix A. On August 12, 1988 the defendants’ petition

for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc was

denied. (Appendix D, E). The memorandum opinion of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois rendered November 27, 1985 is reported at 625

F.Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1985) and is reproduced at Ap-

pendix G.

The judgment order of the United States District Court

entered December 11, 1985 is not reported, but is repro-

duced at Appendix F.

JURISDICTION

This action, brought under 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and

2202 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 challenges the constitu-

tionality of portions of the Illinois Medical Practice Act,

Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act, and Health

Facilities Planning Act. Invoking the jurisdiction of the

District Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 plaintiffs filed

a class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

Subsequent to an evidentiary hearing, the District Court

entered on November 27, 1985 and December 11, 1985 a

preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs and enjoined

enforcement of the Acts and rules promulgated thereunder

to the extent any person or facility offers or performs,

or desires to offer or perform first and/or early second

=~

trimester abortions or other abortion-related gynecological

procedures.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit vacated as moot one portion of the Dis-

trict Court’s decision, held unconstitutional the other chal-

lenged provisions, and affirmed the remainder of the deci-

sion. Its judgment was entered on March 10, 1988.

On August 12, 1988 a majority of the members of the

original panel voted to deny the defendants’ petition for

rehearing, and the suggestion for rehearing en banc failed

by an equally divided court. Judges Wood, Posner, Coffey,

Manion, and Kanne voted to grant rehearing en banc. (Ap-

pendix D, E).

Defendants Turnock, Hartigan and Selcke filed their

Notice of Appeal in the Court of Appeals on November

7, 1988. (Appendix H). Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

of the United States to review this judgment by appeal

is conferred by 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(2).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

————_———_—_-

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. Amend. I:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-

ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-

ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of

grievances.

afte

U.S. Const. Amend. IV:

The right of the people to secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-

ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-

scribing the place to be searched, and the person or

things to be seized.

U.S. Const. Amend. V:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment

or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-

ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when

in actual service in time of War or public r; nor

shall any person be subject for the same oifence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Const. Amend. IX:

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain

rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage

others retained by the people.

U.S. Const. Amend. XI:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-

menced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens

or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdictior thereof, are citizens

of the United States and of the State wherein yew

reside. No State shall make or enforce any law whic

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens

of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

ails

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-

tion the equal protection of the laws.

State Statutes

Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act,

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars. 157-8.1 et seq.

(Reprinted at Appendix I)

Health Facilities Planning Act,

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars. 1151 et seg.

(Reprinted at Appendix J)

Medical Practice Act,

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, par. 4400-22

(Reprinted at Appendix K)

Regulations

Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center

Licensing Requirements, 77 Ill. Adm. Code, Ch. 1,

Section 205, Subchapter b ~

(Reprinted at Appendix L)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Ragsdale is a medical doctor licensed in Illinois,

who performs abortions as part of his medical practice.

Plaintiff Northern Illinois Women’s Center is an Illinois

corporation which provides abortion services to women

in Rockford, Illinois. Plaintiff Margaret Moe is a regis-

tered nurse and the sole owner of a medical facility in

Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiffs Sarah Roe and Jane Doe

are female citizens of child-bearing age who had abortions

in the past and may seek abortions in the future.

Plaintiffs claimed that the challenged statutes form a

tripartite regulatory scheme which impermissibly restricts

=

the performance of first and second trimester abortions.

Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the challenged statutes

and regulations were violative of rights secured by the

First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs contended

that the “scheme”’ as applied singles out for discrimina-

_ tory treatment facilities in which abortions are performed

and substantially inhibits a woman from exercising her

right to choose to have an abortion under medically safe

and reasonably inexpensive conditions. Plaintiffs further

averred that the challenged “scheme” impermissibly pre-

vented physicians from implementing a woman’s decision

to choose abortion in that the “scheme’’ mandated that

physicians and facilities comply with allegedly irrational

and arbitrary requirements. (Compl., pars. 1-4).

On September 20, 1985 plaintiff Richard M. Ragsdale,

M.D. filed a motion for preliminary injunction asking the

district court to enjoin defendants from enforcing the chal-

lenged statutes and regulations. Plaintiff Ragsdale claimed

that unless the statutes and regulations were enjoined he

would be unable to perform abortion services after De-

cember 31, 1985.

The State Statutes

The Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act [herein-

after ASTC Act] became law in 1973. (Appendix I). The

stated purpese of the ASTC Act is to provide for the pro-

tection of the public health through the establishment and

enforcement of standards for the construction and opera-

tion of ASTCs. ASTCs by definition are facilities which

are primarily devoted to the performance of surgical pro-

cedures.!

' In addition to ASTCs, the Illinois Department of Public Health

is responsible for licensing and surveying numerous other facilities

(Footnote continued on following page)

i

The Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act [HFP Act]

became law in 1974. (Appendix J). The purpose of the

HFP Act is to attempt to obtain a comprehensive health

care delivery system involving all types of health care

facilities, services and equipment. The HFP Act also rep-

resents an attempt to restrain the rising costs of health

care by preventing unnecessary construction and duplica-

tion of unneeded health care facilities. (App. 166). Types

of health care facilities included within the HFP Act's pro-

visions include those licensed pursuant to the Health Main-

tenance Organization Act, the ASTC Act, the Nursing

Home Care Reform Act of 1979, the Hospital Licensing

Act, and kidney disease treatment centers. (App. 167).

The Medical Practice Act [MPA] provides the licensure

requirements of physicians in Illinois and prohibits the

practice of medicine by any person not holding a valid

license. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, par. 4401 et seg. (1983).

Now, par. 4400-1 et seg. of the Medical Practice Act of

1987. (Appendix K).

The Evidence Presented

At the time of trial, there were 42 licensed ASTCs in

Illinois. The types of surgical procedures performed in li-

censed ASTCs include plastic surgery, removal of cysts

and tumors, pregnancy terminations, tubal ligations, hernia

repairs and rhinoplasty repairs of the nose. Some surgical

procedures performed in ASTCs, including abortions, are

done so under a general anesthesia. Of the 42 licensed

' continued

which provide health or medical services. These facilities include

blood banks, clinical laboratories, alcohol treatment centers, hos-

pitals, hospices, and nursing homes. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars.

601-101 et seg.; 621-101 et seg.; 2301 et seg; 142 et seg.; 6101 et

seq.; and 4151-101 ef seg.

~

ASTCs, 22 indicated that some pregnancy terminations

would be performed.

For the 12 years prior to trial Dr. Ragsdale was the

primary abortion provider in northwestern Illinois. Dr.

Ragsdale is well known as a provider of abortion services

in the Rockford area. In 1973 Dr. Ragsdale opened the

plaintiff Northern Illinois Women’s Center. The Center

primarily provides first and early second trimester abor-

tion services. Dr. Ragsdale performs approximately 3500

abortions per year at his facility. In the 12 years prior

to trial, Dr. Ragsdale had performed in excess of 42,000

abortions.

At the time of trial, Dr. Ragsdale’s facility had been

licensed as an ASTC in Illinois for 12 years. The facility

contained variations from the ASTC regulations. Any such

variances had not substantially affected renewal of Dr.

Ragsdale’s license for those 12 years. Dr. Ragsdale was

then informed by his landlord that his lease would not

be renewed. The nonrenewal of the lease was a result

of the landlord’s decision to expand and renovate its build-

ing and desire to have as tenants doctors who admitted

patients to Rockford Memorial Hospital. Dr. Ragsdale

therefore planned to move his facility. The Illinois Depart-

ment of Public Healt) preliminarily approved his plans

for relocation. In addition, Dr. Ragsdale submitted an ap-

plication for a certificate of need.

On March 14, 1985 Comprehensive Health Planning of

Northern Illinois (CHPNI) held a public meeting regard-

ing the proposed relocation. CHPNI is a federally funded

organization which is a separate entity from the HFP

Board. It is responsible for completing an independent re-

view of a proposed project.

Dr. Ragsdale attended the CHPNI meeting. There were

in Dr. Ragsdale’s opinion some ‘“rational’’ discussions at

ttle

the meeting, and some statements supporting the need

issue. There were, in addition, more statements that there

was no need for the facility. The meeting then degener-

ated into a shouting match over abortion.

Dr. Ragsdale was subsequently informed by CHPNI

that his proposal met the review requirements, including

the need requirement. However, the lease which Dr. Rags-

_ dale had procured was withdrawn by the lessor.

In order to aid his testimony at trial, Dr. Ragsdale de-

termined what it would cost on a rough basis and in broad

terms to comply with the ASTC Act and regulations at

his new facility. Dr. Ragsdale first estimated the cost of

relocation of his practice as a result of the loss of his

lease, and without complying with the ASTC Act and

regulations. Dr. Ragsdale concluded that the cost would

be an additional $22.45 per patient per year.

Dr. Ragsdale also prepared an estimate which repre-

sented his guess as to what it would cost in addition to

the $22.45 in order to bring his new facility into “reason-

able compliance”’ with the ASTC regulations. Dr. Ragsdale

estimated that the cost would be an additional $22.21 per

patient per year.

Abortion Procedures

It is uncontroverted that abortions are surgical pro-

cedures. According to the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses,

there are few surgical procedures given so little atten-

tion and so underrated in its potential hazard as abor-

tion. It is also agreed that all physicians licensed under

the MPA do not have the qualifications, training and ex-

perience to perform safe first and early second trimester

abortions.

Plaintiffs’ expert maintained that medical education in

this country has paid little attention to abortion services.

=

Abortions, more than any other types of procedures, re-

quire much experience and practice. It is not a procedure

which can be done well after a few hundred or even a

few thousand procedures.

There are several factors which affect the safety of first

trimester and early second trimester abortion procedures.

One factor is the skill, experience and professional integri-

ty of the physician performing the abortion. Other factors

include the duration of the pregnancy; choice of abortion

technique; the existence of sterile conditions; the availabil-

ity of qualified staff and appropriate equipment; the avail-

ability of emergency facilities; and the type of anesthesia

which is used.

Enforcement Policies

In 1981, the Supreme Court of Illinois rendered its deci-

sion in Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 I1l.2d 406

(1981). In Marcowitz the court considered a village ordi-

nance which had adopted the definition of an ASTC that

was found in the State ASTC Act. The Supreme Court

of Illinois held that the ordinance was unconstitutional to

the extent that it defined an ASTC to be any facility in

which abortions are performed, irrespective of whether

devoted primarily to that purpose. Marcowitz, 86 IIl.2d

at 420. The court then severed that portion of the defini-

tion of an ASTC from the remainder of the ordinance.

Four days after Marcowitz was decided, the Illinois De-

partment of Public Health, pursuant to a written policy,

ceased to enforce the identical abortion specific portion

of the definition of an ASTC found in the State statute.

Since 1981, therefore, licensure and enforcement proceed-

ings were applicable only to those facilities primarily de-

voted to the performance of surgical procedures.

=_™

In 1982, United States District Judge Charles P. Kocoras

enjoined the Illinois Department of Public Health from

enforcing Section 4 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975

and “any related regulation.” Section 4 was a second tri-

mester hospitalization requirement. The Department inter-

preted this ruling as also enjoining the enforcement of

ASTC Regulation Section 205.740 which prohibited the

performance of second trimester abortions in ASTCs.

(App. 222).

In 1983, this Court decided the cases of City of Akron

v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.

416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462

U.S. 476 (1983); and Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506

(1983). The decision in Akron reinforced the earlier or-

der, and the Department’s policy of not enforcing Section

205.740 of the Regulations therefore continued.

In December of 1982 or January of 1983 Dr. Ragsdale

was informed that Section 205.740 of the ASTC Regula-

tions was no longer being enforced. As a result, Dr. Rags-

dale began to perform second trimester abortions at his

facility.

In 1983, in Charles v. Carey, 579 F.Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill.

1983), Section 10 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 (the

reporting requirement) was permanently enjoined. As a

result Section 205.760 (App. 223), an abortion specific

reporting requirement of the ASTC Regulations was no

longer enforced. Dr. Ragsdale was informed that this sec-

tion was no longer being enforced.

The Illinois Department of Registration and Education

(now Department of Professional Regulation) has absolute

prosecutorial discretion in the initiation of disciplinary

actions under the Medical Practice Act. Because of the

Marcowitz decision and other decisions concerning the

abortion issue, the challenged portion of the MPA (App.

~ =

193) was not being enforced by the Department to restrict

the performance of all abortions to licensed facilities.

The evidence submitted regarding the State’s enforce-

ment policies in light of various decisions was not contro-

verted.

The ASTC Regulations

There are a total of 59 ASTC Regulations (excluding

subsections). Of that total very few are abortion specific.

Of the abortion specific regulations, as previously noted,

two were not being enforced prior to the filing of plain-

tiffs’ complaint.

Plaintiffs’ experts testified generally that the ASTC

regulations were not medically necessary for the perform-

ance of a safe first or early second trimester abortion.

Certain components of the regulations, however, were ac-

knowledged to be consistent with safe and acceptable stan-

dards of medical care. Moreover, some regulations were

described as belaboring the obvious, the kind of thing any

competent practitioner would do, and superfluous.

For example, Section 205.240 of the regulations provides

that the ASTC is to formulate a written policies and pro-

cedures manual. (App. 213). Dr. Ragsdale described this

requirement as standard medical and administrative prac-

tice.

Likewise, Section 205.230(a) of the regulations provides

that the management of a licensed ASTC is to appoint

a qualified consulting committee. (App. 211). Dr. Ragsdale

testified that this regulation is “belaboring the obvious.”

Similarly, the plaintiffs’ expert testified that either the

medical director or principal physician of an abortion facil-

ity should have staff privileges at the nearest hospital,

or there should be a hospital transfer agreement. Section

=~

205.540(c) of the regulations provides that there should

be written documentation of either a transfer agreement,

a statement that the medical director has admitting privi-

leges, or that each staff physician, podiatrist or dentist

has admitting privileges. (App. 218).

Subpart G of the regulations sets forth additional require-

ments for facilities in which obstetrical/gynecological pro-

cedures are performed. (App. 220-23). This section applies

to abortions as well as other gynecological and obstetric

procedures. Plaintiffs’ expert testified that there are

aspects of Subpart G which are consistent with good stan-

dards of medical practice.

The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’

Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services, Sixth Edi-

tion [ACOG standards], provide that ambulatory care facil-

ities for abortion services should meet the same standards

of care as for other surgical procedures. Section 205.710

of the ASTC regulations contains an essentially identical

provision. (App. 220). The parties’ expert witnesses agreed

with this provision.

Likewise, plaintiffs’ expert testified that counseling is

an indispensable part of a thorough preoperative evalua-

tion and preparation of a patient for an abortion pro-

cedure, and that counseling should include a discussion

of the alternatives for dealing with pregnancy. Section

205.730(b) of the regulations provides that counseling is to

be provided prior to obstetrical/gynecological procedures

following diagnosis of pregnancy. (App. 221).

It is agreed that routine laboratory work for abortion

procedures should include a urine screening exam for preg-

nancy, a hematocrit or hemoglobin, an Rh screening test,

dip stick urinalysis and for black patients a sickle cell test.

Section 205.520(b) of the regulations simply provides that

a hemoglobin or hematocrit is to be performed prior to

—j13—

certain surgical procedures. (App. 216-17). Section 205.73Ma)

provides that prior to obstetrical procedures blood Rh fac-

tor is to be determined and that prior to performing an

abortion procedure the diagnosis of pregnancy is to be

»stablished. (App. 221).

‘t is similarly agreed that after every abortion, removed

tissue should be examined. One of the purposes of the

pathology report is to confirm pregnancies in early stages.

Another purpose is to ensure that fetal parts are present

and to be able to alert patients to the possibility of an

ectopic pregnancy. Section 205.530(c) of the ASTC regula-

tions merely provides that all tissues removed during

surgery are to be examined by a consulting pathologist.

(App. 217).

Building Design and Construction Requirements

Subparts (I) and (J) of the ASTC regulations set forth

various building design, construction standards, and physi-

cal and mechanical requirements. (App. 225-44). Plaintiffs’

expert, who did not consider himself a building design,

construction, or mechanical expert testified that the pro-

visions of Subparts (I) and (J) are not medically necessary

for the operation of a facility in which first and early sec-

ond trimester abortions are to be performed. The defen-

dants introduced evidence demonstrating that many of

these regulations reflect common, accepted and standard

practices.

For example, Section 205.1510 of the regulations pro-

vides that after building heating, ventilating and air condi-

tioning systems are installed they shall be tested and

balanced to ensure that they are in proper working con-

dition. (App. 240). The regulation also provides that upon

completion of the facility, the owner of the ASTC is to

be provided with operating and maintenance instructions.

tailiies

Section 205.1520 provides, among other things, for insula-

tion in the facility and in certain situations for a flame

spread rating in accordance with the National Fire Pro-

tection Association. (App. 240-41). These requirements

were described as standard for health facilities.

Similarly, various regulations dealing with hot water

systems, ventilation systems, and plumbing fixtures were

demonstrated to be standard requirements.

The Constitutional Challenge

The trial conducted by the district court was held on

November 18-22 and 26, 1985. On November 27, 1985 and

December 11, 1985 the district court entered orders grant-

ing Dr. Ragsdale’s motion for preliminary injunction.

In the November 27, 1985 Order, the district court found

that plaintiffs had prevailed on all four traditional factors

the courts must consider in ruling on a motion for prelim-

inary injunction. (App. 129). First, the district court de-

cided that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm with-

out an injunction and that no adequate remedy at law

existed. Specifically, it found that the challenged statutes

and regulations have the effect of raising the cost and

limiting the availability of abortions. (App. 129). In addi-

tion, the district court found that the challenged provi-

sions (1) force complying facilities to raise their fees,

possibly beyond the economic means of some women; (2)

discourage other non-complying facilities from offering

abortion services; and (3) make it difficult, if not impossi-

ble, for current abortion facilities to move or new abor-

tion facilities to be constructed. (App. 130). Further, the

district court rejected defendants’ argument that plain-

tiffs could not be irreparably harmed by those statutes

and regulations which are not being enforced. (App. 133).

<=

Next, the district court determined that the threatened

harm to plaintiffs outweighed any possible harm to defen-

dants. (App. 134).

Third, the district court considered the merits of plain-

tiffs’ claims. It utilized the trimester standard established

in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as interpreted in City

of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 426

U.S. 416 (1983) and other cases, to provide the legal frame-

work for the constitutional evaluation of the challenged

statutes and regulations. (App. 134-35).

The district court noted that State regulations having

no significant impact on a woman’s exercise of her abor-

tion right during the first trimester may be permissible

where justified by important State health objectives. It

held, however, that Roe does not stand for the proposi-

tion that general medical regulations which apply to the

performance of first and early second trimester abortions

are per se constitutional. (App. 136). Thus, the district

court concluded that even general regulations which bur-

den a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy

during the first trimester would have to meet the com-

pelling governmental interest requirement. In addition, the

district court decided that a regulation which burdens a

woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy dur-

ing the early second trimester must be reasonably related

to the preservation and protection of maternal health.

(App. 137).

Applying these standards to this case, the district court

found that plaintiffs had demonstrated that the statutory

and regulatory scheme places a burden on a woman’s

right to choose to terminate her pregnancy during the

first and early second trimester. Specifically, it found that

the challenged provisions (1) increase the cost and de-

crease the availability of abortions and (2) may delay the

effectuation of a woman’s decision to abort. (App. 137).

—16—

Further, the district court found that defendants had

failed to produce any evidence of a compelling or even

rational basis for the challenged statutes and regulations.

It noted that defendants had shown that certain regula-

tions are consistent with accepted medical practice, but

that such showing is not equivalent to a demonstration

that the challenged provisions are medically necessary.

Thus, the district court found a reasonable likelihood that

plaintiffs will succeed on the merits. (App. 137-38).

Lastly, the district court determined that the public in-

terest would be served by the issuance of the preliminary

injunction. (App. 139).

The defendants were preliminarily enjoined and restrained

from enforcing the challenged provision of the Medical

Practice Act (MPA); the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment

Center Act (ASTC) and the rules and regulations promul-

gated thereunder; and the Health Facilities Planning Act

(HFP): to the extent any person or facility offers or per-

forms, or desires to offer or perform first and/or early

second trimester abortions or other abortion-related gyne-

cological procedures. (App. 110-11).

The district court also certified the following classes:

(a) a plaintiff class of physicians and surgeons who per-

form or desire to perform abortions in Illinois; (b) a plain-

tiff class of all Illinois women of child-bearing age who

desire or may desire an abortion sometime in the future;

and (c) a defendant class of all State’s Attorneys in Illi-

nois. (App. 110).

On December 11, 1985 the district court orally clarified

portions of its ruling. The district court specified that the

Illinois Department of Public Health is not enjoined from

regulating ASTCs in which abortions are performed or

desired to be performed to the extent that such ASTCs

are performing surgical procedures other than abortions.

=) 7

In addition, the district court specified that in deciding

whether a health care facility was devoted primarily to

the performance of surgical procedures, and therefore re-

quired to be licensed under the ASTC Act, the Illinois

Department of Public Health is not prohibited from count-

ing the number of abortion procedures performed in the

facility. The Department cannot, however, enforce the

regulations as to the abortion procedures performed—but

can enforce the regulations as to other procedures per-

formed at the facility.

Defendants appealed from the district court’s orders to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-

cuit. On March 10, 1988 that court rendered its decision

in this matter. (App. 1). The majority opinion affirmed,

with one exception, the district court’s entry of a pre-

liminary injunction. The exception is the challenge to one

ASTC regulation—a second trimester hospitalization re-

quirement—which the majority held was not being en-

forced, was moot, and should have been dismissed. Judge

Coffey submitted a lengthy dissent from the majority

opinion. (App. 34-80).

The majority opinion first considered whether certain

of plaintiffs’ challenges have been mooted by the State’s

policy of nonenforcement. It noted that the voluntary ces-

sation of putatively illegal conduct ordinarily will not moot

a controversy and prevent its adjudication by a federal

court. (App. 10-11). Further, the majority stated that such

cessation does render a controversy moot when there is

no reasonable expectation that the putatively illegal con-

duct will be repeated and that there are no remaining

effects of the alleged violation. (App. 11).

Applying these principles to this case, the majority

found the challenge to the second trimester hospitaliza-

tion requirement is moot because enforcement ceased in

enfin

1983. (App. 11-13). It held, however, that the challenge

to the reporting requirement of the ASTC Act and regula-

tions is not moot because the State did not produce pre-

existing documentation of the nonenforcement policy.

(App. 13). Finally, it held that the challenge to the appli-

cation of the ASTC Act and regulations to first trimester

abortions is not moot. It noted that those requirements

were no longer applied to the occasional abortion provider,

but that such requirements were applied to doctors who

exclusively perform first trimester abortions. Further, the

majority stated that the evidence on this point—testimony

from the legal counsel for the state agency charged with

enforcement authority that the challenged provision of the

MPA was not being enforced—was too ambiguous. (App.

13-14).

In considering the merits of the case, the majority opin-

ion, like the district court, relied upon the “trimester”’

approach of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). (App. 15).

It analyzed various decisions of this Court and stated that

where first trimester abortions are involved, not only

must the impact of the challenged regulations be insignifi-

cant in terms of the woman’s exercise of her right, but

also the regulation must be justified by important state

health objectives. (App. 17).

The majority found that statement consistent with exist-

ing Seventh Circuit precedent which holds that once such

regulations are shown to have more than a de minimus

impact on the abortion decision, the government must

show a compelling basis for the law, i.e., that the burden

is not undue or unjustifiable. (App. 17). Thus, the major-

ity opinion concluded that the district court’s application

_of a “medical necessity” standard was consonant with the

legal framework applicable to this case. (App. 18). Fur-

ther, the majority rejected defendants’ argument that be-

cause the regulations apply to all facilities primarily de-

afin

voted to surgery, those regulations should be reviewed

under a different standard than if they had singled out

abortions. (App. 21). In addition, it decided that the dis-

trict court’s findings that the challenged provisions sub-

stantially burden the effectuation of the abortion decision

were not clearly erroneous. (App. 22).

The first facet of the challenged statutes and regula-

tions which the majority considered was the requirement

that facilities performing abortions be licensed. (App. 23).

It held that under Roe the State may not require separate

licensure of facilities primarily devoted to performing abor-

tions during the first trimester. (App. 24). Once the licens-

ing requirement falls, the majority reasoned that the re-

maining requirements fall with it. (App. 25).

Nevertheless, the majority considered and ruled upon

the constitutionality of three abortion-specific regulations.

First, it construed section 205.730(aX2) (App. 221) to un-

constitutionally require the physician who is to perform

the abortion to also perform a pregnancy test, even if

such test had previously been done by another physi-

cian. (App. 27). Second, the majority held that section

205.730(bX3) (App. 221-22) invalidly requires counseling to

include a discussion of alternatives, citing Thornburgh v.

American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).

(App. 27). Third, it construed section 205.730(bX2XD) (App.

221) to unconstitutonally preclude the performing physi-

cian from providing the counseling. (App. 28-29).

The generally applicable regulations regarding physical

plant, equipment, and staffing were also struck down by

the majority. It concluded that these provisions impose

a substantial burden and are not justified by health ob-

jectives. (App. 29-31).

In addition, the majority found the “certificate of need”

proceeding of the Health Facilities Planning Act unconsti-

x

tutional. It held the State’s interest in preventing wasteful

duplication of resources to be insufficient in this context.

(App. 31-32).

Finally, the majority rejected defendants’ request to

sever those provisions which were held unconstitutional.

It reasoned that severance was not appropriate because

the licensure provision had been invalidated. (App. 32).

Further, it found that the challenged provisions were “so

riddled with exceptions resulting from judicial decisions

and nonenforcement policies as to be unintelligible.” Un-

der those circumstances, the majority found that it could

not untangle the constitutional from the unconstitutional

provisions. (App. 32-33).

The dissenting opinion finds that the States are author-

ized under Roe to apply the same licensing standards to

abortion facilities as those applied to facilities perform-

ing similar surgical procedures. (App. 35). Under that stan-

dard, the dissent would enjoin and sever the challenged

portion of the Medical Practice Act and the abortion spe-

cific language of par. 157-8.3(A) of the ASTC Act. (App.

38). It argues that the States are free to regulate ambu-

latory surgical treatment centers, including those perform-

ing abortions, as long as the abortions are not singled out

from other, similar surgical procedures, subject to the ra-

tional basis test governing social and economic legislation.

Under the rational basis test, moreover, the dissent finds

the ASTC Act and IHFP Act constitutional. (App. 64).

In evaluating the abortion-specific statutes and regulations

under the strict scrutiny test, the dissent would uphold

all provisions but one [section 205.730(bX2\D)}. (App. 73).

The dissent finds that the challenged provisions neither

burden the abortion decision or its effectuation and are

justified by important health objectives. (App. 890).

=

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

ARE SUBSTANTIAL

This appeal is of exceptional importance because the ma-

jority opinion, under the guise of protecting a woman’s

constitutional right to privacy, has exempted outpatient

surgical facilities in which abortions are performed from

general licensure and regulatory provisions. In so doing,

the majority emasculates the duty and authority of the

State of Illinois to protect the health, safety, and welfare

of its citizens by licensing and regulating outpatient surgi-

cal facilities in which first or early second trimester abor-

tions are performed in the same manner that other surgi-

cal facilities are regulated.

Further, the majority opinion is in conflict with deci-

sions of this Court with respect to the jurisdictional issues

presented in this case. The opinion is also in conflict with

decisions of this Court and other courts of appeals with

respect to the authority of the State to license and regu-

late outpatient surgical facilities in which abortions are

performed. Finally, the refusal of the majority opinion to

sever any purportedly unconstitutional provisions is in con-

flict with decisions of this Court.

A.

THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED JURISDIC-

TION OVER CERTAIN CHALLENGED PROVISIONS

WHICH WERE NOT BEING ENFORCED.

At trial, the defendants introduced evidence that due

to various court decisions which pre-date the complaint

in this matter, certain challenged provisions were not be-

ing enforced by the State. Those provisions are: the abor-

tion specific language of par. 157-8.3 of the ASTC Act

(App. 149-50); Section 205.740 (App. 222) (prohibition of

~29—

second trimester abortions in ASTCs) and 205.760 (App.

223) (abortion specific reporting requirement) of the ASTC

Regulations; and par. 4400-22 of the MPA. (App. 193). This

evidence was not contradicted.

Nonetheless, the majority held with respect to the re-

porting requirement of Section 205.760 that the State’s

position of nonenforcement is ‘‘asserted only in this litiga-

tion.” This conclusion is clearly erroneous. The evidence

reveals that this provision has not been enforced since

1983. With respect to the challenged provision of the

MPA, the majority held that the evidence of nonenforce-

ment is “‘equivocal.” This conclusion is also erroneous.

Legal counsel to the Department of Registration and Edu-

cation (now Department of Professional Regulation) testi-

fied that based upon various decisions in the abortion

area, this section was not being enforced. The plaintiffs

did not introduce any evidence to the contrary.

The defendants argued below that in light of the policies

of nonenforcement which were articulated by the regula-

tory agencies and entered into evidence, plaintiffs had not

presented a justiciable controversy as to certain chal-

lenged provisions. However, the majority opinion utilized

a mootness analysis with respect to those nonenforced pro-

visions. The majority concluded that plaintiffs’ challenge

to the second trimester hospitalization requirement (ASTC

Regulation Section 205.740) (App. 222) was moot. The chal-

lenges to the other unenforced provisions, however, were

not found to be moot.

Preliminarily, however, a mootness analysis is not appro-

priate in this context. Mootness issues arise when a chal-

lenged policy changes after the commencement of litiga-

tion. Here, the enforcement policies are based on court

decisions and determinations which pre-date this lawsuit.

It is axiomatic that the court must look to the state

of affairs as of the filing of the complaint in determining

olin

whether a justiciable controversy exists. /nternational

Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th

Cir. 1980). Even where fundamental rights are allegedly

involved, ‘‘a litigant must establish a more immediate

threat than simply a general policy of enforcing laws.”

J.N.S., Inc. v. State of Ind., 712 F.2d 303, 305 (7th Cir.

1983) (lack of justiciable controversy found in challenge

by seller of sexually explicit materials to state civil RICO

statutes). Thus, the courts should not pass on the constitu-

tionality of challenged provisions which are not being en-

forced. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 507 (1961) (lack of

justiciable controversy found in challenge to prohibition

against provision of contraceptive advice and use of

contraceptive devices); C./.0. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472,

475 (1945) (lack of justiciable controversy found in light

of agreement not to enforce challenged state law).

The majority’s assumption of jurisdiction over the unen-

forced provisions in this case is not only in conflict with

the foregoing decisions regarding justiciability standards,

but also with certain decisions governing the jurisdictional

bar created by the Eleventh Amendment. That amendment

limits the power of federal courts to grant relief in cases

where there are no ongoing violations of federal law.

Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 71 (1985). That limita-

tion is applicable even in those instances where mootness

is at issue. Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474, 484 (7th

Cir. 1986). Thus, even if an underlying claim is not moot,

the Eleventh Amendment bars further proceedings in fed-

eral court where there is no continuing conduct the State

must change to comply with federal law. Jd. According-

ly, the majority’s assumption of jurisdiction over unen-

forced provisions is in conflict with decisions governing

justiciability standards and with decisions dealing with

Eleventh Amendment standards because there is no on-

going violation of federal law.

—24—

THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRONEOUSLY FOUND

THAT THE CHALLENGED STATUTES AND REGULA-

TONS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

PRIVACY.

The majority opinion affirmed the district court’s exemp-

tion of abortion procedures from the licensure and regu-

latory provisions which generally apply to outpatient

surgical facilities. In addition, the majority held that ‘the

State may not require separate licensure of facilities pri-

marily devoted to performing abortions.” The majority

opinion is in conflict with decisions of this Court and other

courts of appeals as to the authority of the State to li-

cense and regulate outpatient surgical facilities in which

pregnancy terminations are performed. The State has the

duty and authority to license and regulate such facilities

in the same manner as facilities in which other outpatient

surgical procedures are performed.

This Court has consistently held, even with respect to

first trimester abortions, that the State has an interest

in making sure that certain factual assumptions made in

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) continue to exist. As

explained in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-

tive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 n.12 (1983):

Of course, the State retains an interest in ensuring

the validity of Roe’s factual assumption that “the

first trimester abortion [is] as safe for the woman as

normal childbirth at term,” an assumption that “holds

true only if the abortion is performed by medically

competent personnel under conditions insuring maxi-

mum safety for the woman.”” Connecticut v. Menillo,

423 U.S. 9, 11, 46 L.Ed.2d 152, 96 S.Ct. 170 (1975)

(per curiam).

The ASTC Act seeks to effectuate that interest by “‘assur-

ing that all medical procedures, including abortions, are

—25—

performed under conditions that insure maximum safety.”

(App. 149).

Thus, two other courts of appeals have upheld licensing

standards of outpatient surgical facilities in which preg-

nancy terminations are performed. Baird v. Department

of Public Health, 599 F.2d 1098, 1102 (1st Cir. 1979)

(“There is room under Roe for states to apply the same

licensing standards to abortion facilities as they apply to

like facilities performing medically analogous procedures.’’);

Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976)

(“A state can impose the same regulations on a clinic, spe-

cifically built to perform abortions during the first tri-

mester, that are imposed on other clinics that perform

Surgical procedures requiring approximately the same

degree of skill and care as the performance of first tri-

mester abortions.”’).

In this case, the HFP Act and the ASTC Act, as en-

forced, are abortion-neutral and are applicable to all li-

censed ASTCs, irrespective of the types of surgical pro-

cedures performed. These statutes were clearly enacted

to further the State’s interests in regulating the ever in-

creasing number of outpatient surgical facilities. The State

has responsibilities to its citizens to insure that medical

procedures performed at these facilities are performed un-

der circumstances enhancing their safety. Further, the

State can legitimately seek to establish a comprehensive

and less costly health care delivery system. Those re-

sponsibilities do not cease when an abortion is the surgical

procedure which is to be performed.

In addition, the majority rejected the argument that

abortion-neutral regulations should be scrutinized under

a different standard than abortion-specific regulations. De-

fendants maintain that such argument is clearly supported

by the two previously cited opinions from the First and

Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals. Accord, Westchester

~26—

Women’s Health Org. v. Whalen, 475 F.Supp. 734 (S.D.

N.Y. 1979) (requirements governing “diagnostic and treat-

ment centers” applicable to facilities performing first tri-

mester abortions); Abortion Coalition of Mich. Inc. v.

Mich. Dep't of Public Health, 426 F Supp. 471 (E.D. Mich.

1977) (requirements for “free standing surgical outpatient

facilities” applicable to facilities performing first trimester

abortions).

The argument that abortion-neutral regulations should

be scrutinized under a less exacting standard than abor-

tion-specific regulations is also supported by decisions of

this Court in other contexts. City of Renton v. Playtime

_ Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (standards under

First Amendment for ‘‘content-based” and ‘“‘content-neu-

tral” zoning regulations); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.

v. Minn. Comm’n of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1983)

(standards under First Amendment for general and special

taxes as applied to the press). Accord, Arcara v. Cloud

Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 3177 (1986)

(First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement

of a public health regulation of general application against

the physical premises in which sexually explicit books and

magazines are sold). Thus, defendants maintain that the

lower courts applied an erroneous legal standard to the

abortion-neutral provisions.

Even if the strict scrutiny test was correctly determined

to apply, the majority erred in determining that plain-

tiffs had established a sufficiently substantial mterference

with the abortion decision. The majority opinion misappre-

hended the testimony regarding the purported cost of

compliance with the State regulations.? While the major-

2 The majority opinion also incorrectly found that Dr. Ragsdale

was permitted to testify as to the substance of his handwritten

(Footnote continued on following page)

—~27—

ity opinion states that Dr. Ragsdale’s estimated com-

pliance with the regulations would entail a per patient

cost of between $25 and $40 (App. 22), the actual testi-

mony was that reasonable compliance would only result

in an estimated $25.21 per patient fee increase. That in-

crease would be reduced to $10.90 after two years and

$3.40 after five years due to the retirement of certain

debts. This increase is de minimis and did not sustain

plaintiffs’ burden of proof even under the standards found

applicable by the majority. (App. 23).

For example, in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,

462 U.S. 476 (1983), this Court considered the impact on

the woman’s exercise of her right to decide whether to

have an abortion caused by the cost of a State required

pathology report. This Court held that the estimated cost

of $19.40 per patient did not “significantly burden a preg-

nant woman’s abortion decision.” Jd. at 490.

Similarly, in the instant matter, plaintiffs’ cost estimates

did not establish a “sufficiently substantial” interference

with a pregnancy termination decision. Thus, the lower

courts erred in applying a strict scrutiny standard to the

challenged provisions, and in determining that those pro-

visions were invalid under that standard.

cost sheets” ( . 67). At the outset, defendants objected to an

use ly Nt, Further objections were raised “on

plaintiffs moved for their admission into evidence

~22—

Cc.

THE MAJORITY OPINION CONFLICTS WITH DECI-

SIONS OF THIS COURT REGARDING SEVERANCE OF

PURPORTEDLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.

Assuming, arguendo, that the lower courts appropriately

assumed jurisdiction over the challenged provisions which

are not being enforced, those courts should have severed

any purportedly unconstitutional statutes or regulations.

For instance, the abortion-specific language of par. 157-8.3

of the ASTC Act has not been enforced since 1981 due

to the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Village

of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill.2d 406 (1981). In that

case, the court struck down a portion of a local ordinance

that incorporated the ASTC Act definition of an ASTC.

The disputed portion covered “any facility where a medi-

cal or surgical procedure is performed for the termina-

tion of pregnancy, regardless of whether the facility is

primarily devoted to that purpose.” Jd. at 420. The court

severed that portion, but found the remaining portion of

the ordinance to be “complete in itself and susceptible

to independent enforcement.” Jd. at 421.

In the instant appeal, the majority opinion rejected the

argument that any purportedly unconstitutional provision

be severed. It characterized the regulatory scheme as be-

ing “so riddled with exceptions resulting from judicial

decisions and nonenforcement policies as to be unintelligi-

ble.”” (App. 33).

Defendants submit that a court should focus upon the

provisions independently and on their own merit. Other-

wise, litigants will be encouraged to base their litigation

strategy upon the sheer number or volume of statutes and

regulations to be attacked on constitutional grounds. The

more broad based the attack, the greater the purported

burden on constitutional guarantees.

—29—

As this Court has noted, a court should refrain from

invalidating more of a statute than is necessary. Regan

v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984). It is, moreover,

the duty of the court to “maintain the act in so far as

it is valid.” Jd. at 652, quoting El Paso & Northeastern

R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909). Likewise, this

Court has held that “{ujnless it is evident that the Legis-

lature would not have enacted those provisions which are

within its power, independently of that which is not, the

invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully oper-

ative as a law.”” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09

(1976), quoting Champlin Refining Co v. Corporation

Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).

Given the ASTC Act’s declared purpose of assuring that

all medical procedures, including abortion be performed

under circumstances insuring maximum safety, the Su-

preme Court of Illinois’ holding on severability in Marco-

witz, and the State’s policy of nonenforcement, there is

no doubt that the abortion-specific language of the ASTC

Act should have been severed if declared unconstitutional.

Likewise, any purportedly unconstitutional provisions of

the HFP Act and the ASTC regulations should have been

severed. By failing to appropriately address the severabil-

ity issue, the majority opinion has improperly frustrated

the intent of the elected representatives of the people

of the State of Illinois. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. at

653.

~30—

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should note probable juris-

diction of this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

NEIL F. HARTIGAN

Attorney General, State of Illinois

ROBERT J. RUIZ

Solicitor General, State of Illinois

100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor

i , Illinois 60601

(312) 917-3000

Attorneys for Appellants

Micwae. J. Hayes *

KATHLEEN Ka&eIseL FLAHAVEN

Rocer P. FLanaven

GLapys STEVENS

Assistant Attorneys General

100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917-3654

Of Counsel * Counsel of Record

November 10, 1988

APPENDIX

88-790 © ‘Tors: |

NOV 10 1988

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JP.

CURRK

OcTOBER TERM, 1988

BERNARD J. TURNOCK, M.D., M.P.H., Director of

the Illinois Department of Public Health, et al..

Appellants,

V

RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, M.D., et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

NEIL F. HARTIGAN

Attorney General, State of Illinois

ROBERT J. RUIZ

Solicitor General, State of Illinois

100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917.3000

Attorneys for Appellants

Minar. J. Hayes *

KATHLEEN Kreiset FLAMAVEN

Rocer P. FLAHAVEN

GLADYs STEVENS

Assistant Attorneys General

100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917-3654

Of Counsel * Counsel of Record

Printed by Authority af.the State of Illinois (P.O. 34259—60— 11-10-88)

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In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

BERNARD J. TURNOCK, M.D., M.P.H., Director of

the Illinois Department of Public Health, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, M.D., et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

App. 1

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-3242

RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

BERNARD J. TURNOCK, Director of the Illinois

Department of Public Health, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States Distnct Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 85-C-6011—John A. Nordberg, Judge.

ArGuED OcToperR 22, 1986—DecipeEp MArRcH 10, 1988

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, Correy, Circuit Judge,

and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs consist of

a class of all duly licensed physicians and surgeons per

forming or who to perform pregnancy terminations

in Illinois and a class of all women in the State of Illinois

of child-bearing age who desire or may desire an abortion

a8 camatine fs te televe. Defendants are a class of the

State’s Attorneys of all of the counties of the State of

Illinois, the Director of the Illinois Department of Public

' Class certification as to both the defendant and plaintiff classes

was challenged below. The district court granted certification. 625

F. Supp. at 1219-24. That ruling is not challenged on appeal.

App. 2

Health, the Illinois Attorney General, and the Director

of the Illinois Department of Registration and Education.

Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2201-02, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to the

effect that three Illinois statutes and the regulations there-

under violate the constitutional right to privacy, specifical-

ly to abortion, as established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), and subsequent Supreme Court

cases. This case comes to us on appeal from the district

court’s grant of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc-

tion. 625 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Because we be-

lieve certain of the claims are moot, we vacate in part.

In most respects, however, we affirm the preliminary in-

junction.

I

A. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions

The statutory and regulatory scheme is somewhat com-

plex. Therefore, we set it out in some detail. Section 16(1)

of the Medical Practice Act (“the MPA”), 111 Ill. Rev.

Stat. ¢ 4433(1), allows for revocation or suspension of the

license of any physician who performs an “elective abor-

tion” in any place other than a licensed Ambulatory Sur-

gical Treatment Center (“ASTC”’), a hospital, or a facil-

ity run by the state or federal governments.? The Am-

2 Section 16(1) of the Medical Practice Act reads, in pertinent

part: :

The Department may revoke, suspend, place on probationary

status, or take any other disciplinary action as the .

ment may deem proper with regard to the license . . . of any

person ... in this state to practice medicine . . . upon any

of the following grounds:

(1) Performance of an elective abortion in any place .. .

other than:

(a) a facility licensed pursuant to the “Ambulatory Sur-

gical Treatment Center Act” . . .;

(Footnote continued on following page)

App. 3

Surgical Treatment Center Act, 111% Ill. Rev.

Stat. 14 157-8.1, et seg. (the “ASTCA” or the “Act”), pro-

vides for the licensure of all ASTCs, which it defines as

“any ... place . . . devoted primarily to . . . the per-

formance of surgical procedures or any facility in which

a medical or surgical procedure is utilized to terminate

a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the facility is de-

voted pri y to this .... 111% IL. Rev. Stat.

{ 157-8.3(A). In addition, plaintiffs have challenged those

sections of the Health Facilities Providers Act, 111% IIl.

Rev. Stat. 44 1151, et seg. (“HFPA’’), which require any-

one seeking to open an ASTC to obtain a certificate of

need for the facility from the t of Public Health

after a public hearing and 1 y review period. See

111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 44 1155-1160.°

2 continued

(b) [a licensed hospital];

(c) an ambulatory surgical treatment center or hospi-

talization or care facility maintained by the State or any

agency thereof . . .;

(d) ambulatory surgical treatment centers, italiza-

sen oF ese tealittien maintained by the Federal ern-

ment, or

(e) surgical treatment centers, hospitaliza-

tion or care facilities maintained by any university or col-

lege established under the laws of Ny Beye

principally by public funds raised by taxation. . . .

* Section 1158 of the Health Facilities Planning Act reads, in per-

tinent part:

.. . When an application for a permit is initially reviewed by

a recognized areawide health ES See oF Ue

Department

conducted in the area or community where the ))-

Sh & caan aul dol ts te Ue cae dl ae

applicant and any interested person to present public testi-

mony concerning the al, denial, renewal or revocation

thereunder, and their application, via the to phy

sicians desiring to perform first and early

abortions. A i , we set forth the ASTCA and its

accompanying in some detail.‘

Act itself is largely procedural in, operation and

ace to the health or safety of the patients or if the

epevater thevecf bas been cnuvisted of 0 distation of eno

: Selected regulations that are discussed in detail in our analysis

infra in the text are set forth in an Appendix to this opinion.

App. 5

tion 157-8.12. Section 157-8.12 provides for a fine of

$10,000 per day for operating a facility without a license

or otherwise the Act. Section 157-8.13 makes the

equation of 0 thalllly to Vattien of Ge Ach @ vende

tions a public nuisance subject to injunction.

Section 157-8.15 provides, in broad terms, for severabil-

ity of the provisions of the Act.

The general regulations under the ASTCA, found in

corridor (5' or 8’ depending on whether stretchers are to

be used) and door (3 or 38") widths. § 205.1310-1390.

an toutes to aeelie tr aaa ar a , and ventila-

we AD ney ifie filter and

airflow between rooms is required. § 205.1540

and

t

App. 6

change in the administrativ ive staff, medical director, staff

physicians, supervising nurse, addition or deletion of sur-

procedures

Association. Sections . Additionally, each facil-

ity must have either a certified medical technician or a

written ne Dareane & parton

required ratory procedures. . A consulting

committee must be established to develop standards of

professional work and a ician must serve as the med-

ical director of the facility. § 250.230.

With regard to equipment, all facilities are required to

have monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, oxygen,

and cardiac pulmonary resuscitation § 205.410.

Additional written procedures are to govern care,

use, sterilization, and of all materials, and

lified 4,

procedures ormed under general anesthesia, local an-

esthesia with sedation, or any termination. A

signed, written informed consent for any procedure is to

App 7

be maintained with the patient's clinical records. § 205.520.

All removed tissues are to be examined by a consulting

pathologist. § 205.530.

Post-operative care regulations provide that any patient

who has had general anesthesia, loca! anesthesia with seda

tion, or termination is required to be observed

for a pated of Gms sufficient to detect any immediate

post ive complications, and that no patient be re-

vsised to lnove tn lane an, ano heuw. 6 Ykbeh, Ad,

tionally, written documentation is required of a transfer

with a licensed hospital within fifteen minutes

the facility, or that the medical director of the ASTC

(or each physician of the ASTC) has admitting priv-

ileges at such a hospital. § 205.540.

Detailed clinical records are also required to be main-

tained. § 205.610. Additionally, facilities are required to

and type of procedures performed, the number and type

of complications reported, the number of patients requir-

ap eee 0 Sepa due to complications, the number

patients returning for follow-up, and the number of

deaths.

The regulations also have an abortion-specifie subpart

which ires: (1) at least one registered professional

nurse with post-graduate education or experience in ob-

stetrical or gynecological nursing, section 205.720; (2) test-

RE and’ reporting of the resulp to the pationt of blood

factor and diag nosis of p , section 205.730(a),

and (3) counseling b somecnd toodieal trained » or

it and who has >» ial interest in the patier..’

ane of risks

205. ). a pe information may be provided

post-operatively, shall be ided if desired by the

patient. Jd. Counseling must place in a room separate

pan in rcenige Suse, ant © cosas’ of they coumatiing

given is to be included in the patient's clinical record. /d.

App. 8

The subpart contains its own reporting requirement which

requires monthly reporting of each “on forms

provided by [the + yy A y, the regula-

tions prohibit an A em partareming Ghevkens o8 pe

+ =_ a gestational age exceeding twelve weeks.

.740.

B. Enforcement Policies

Net all of the provisions of challenged statutes and reg

ulations are being enforced. Since 1981, the Act and regu-

—— of procedures

(including abortions). ee ree

in to Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill.

2d 406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which refused to enforce,

in a criminal proceeding, that of a local ordinance

. ‘ fi j *

outside an A is similarly not being enforced, but the

evidence on this point is equivocal.

The defendants also contend that the on per

formance of second trimester abortions in ASTCs is not

enforced because it was considered the

for

S. 416, 103 8S. Ct. 2481 (1 Planned Parenthood As-

sociation, Inc..v. Asheroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 8. Ct. 2517

(1983); and Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 103 5.

C

App. 9

Ct 2582 (1963). An internal memorandum of the Depart

ment of Pubts Heath Steutg te See

uirement, was enjoined by Judge Kocoras in v.

arey, 579 F. . 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part on Charles v. Daley, 749 F 2d

area of northwestern Illinois because his landlord

to renew his lease. The facility which he

was not in full compliance with the ASTCA

tive landlord his lease commitment. In addition,

officials © with enforcing the regulations told him

that they require “consiuerably more substantial

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trimester

dismissed. ore we vacate the portion of the

unction that pertains to it.

a]

However, we do not believe that the challenge to the

ing requirement of the ASTCA and regulations is

! defendants testified that this requirement

is no longer being enforced in light of Charles v. Carey,

579 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), we have reviewed that

decision and cannot find anything in it which remotely

supports the conclusion that the requirement under chal-

a a. ony seperting uirement

by that decision was section 11(d) of Illinois

Abortion Act, which required the reporting to the Depart-

i

ment of the name of any diagnosed as having com-

ications from abortion. more general requirements

are quite different. Unlike its tations of non

district court’s concern that the State’s position on this

provision is asserted only in this litigation.

C

: The challenge to the application of the ASTCA and reg-

‘ulations to first trimester abortions is similarly not moot.

App. 14

While the requirement is apparently no longer applied to

the “occasional” abortion provider, the State continues to

maintain that it is free to apply the ASTCA to abortion

providers whose practice is “primarily devoted to’”’ per-

forming surgery, even if that “surgery” consists exclusive-

ly of first trimester abortions. This is in fact the situation

facing at least one of the named plaintiffs, Dr. Ragsdale.

Additionally, the evidence regarding the suspension/ rev-

ocation sanction in the MPA was, as we have noted, am-

2 A representative of the Department merely tes-

tified that any complaint ing this provision would

be “examined by the General Counsel’s for a deter-

mination of whether there would be any enforcement ac-

tion taken pursuant to that section.” He additionally tes-

tified that “to the best of [his] knowledge” the Depart-

ment would not enforce the section. While we admit that

it would be anomalous for the Department to take the

sition that “occasional” abortion providers need not be

icensed but that performance of such abortions could sub-

ject the physicians to revocation of their licenses to prac-

tice icine, the Department's ition is sufficiently

murky and the sanctions sufficiently 1 severe, that we be-

lieve a live controvery exists sane this requirement.

Doctors should not have to risk loss of their professional

licenses to explore the contours of the asserted non-

enforcement position. :

Ill

On the merits,* we must consider whether the require-

ments of the statutory and regulatory scheme violate the

* On appeal, various of the defendants and amici contend that

the district court did not properly weigh various of the factors

which are normally considered in issuing a preliminary injunction.

We note that the presentation of the case below focused almost

exclusively on the constitutionality vel non of the statutory scheme

or its component parts. None of the parties argued the traditional

factors governing the granting of preliminary relief to the district

(Footnote continued on following page)

App. 15

right to privacy (and to abortion) as established in Roe

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 710 (1973), and its prog-

eny. In Roe, the Court first set out the now familiar “tri-

mester” approach:

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end

of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its

effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of

the pregnant woman's attending physician.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the

end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting

its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it

chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that

are reasonably related to maternal health.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State

in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human

life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe

abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate

medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or

health of the mother. .

410 U.S. at 164-65, 93 S. Ct. at 732.

In elaborating on this approach, the Court noted that

the State’s interest in the health of the mother becomes

compelling:

6 continied

court. Although no doubt its task was made more difficult by the

lack of assistance from the ies, the district court undertook

a thorough examination of t traditional factors, i.e., the lack

of an adequate remedy at law, irreparable harm, balance of harms,

likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest. We

confine our discussion to the likelihood of success on the inerits,

that is, the governing lega! standards and their relationship to the

facts found below for two related reasons. First, the balancing of

the other factors is typically reviewed on an “abuse of discretion

standard” and we see no » Rng and second, we find insufficient

merit to any of the defendants’ or the amicus’ belated assertions

that this or that factor was given insufficient weight to add to

this already lengthy opinion. -

App. 16

in the light of present medical knowledge, . . . at ap-

roximately the end of the first trimester. This is so

use of the now-established medical fact, . . . that

until the end of the first trimester mortality in abor-

tion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.

It follows that, from and after this point, a State may

regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that

the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation

and protection of maternal health. Examples of per-

missible state regulation in this area are requirements

as to the qualifications of the person who is to per-

aS | ee oe rson;

as tot ility in whi procedure is to be per-

formed, that is, whether it eS ee oe

be a clinic or some other place of less-than- ital

status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.

This means, on the other hand, that, for the period

of pregnancy prior to this “ ing” point, the at-

tending physician, in consultation with his patient, is

free to determine, without ‘or by the State,

that, in his medical a, patient’s pregnancy:

should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the

judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of

interference by the State.

Id. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.

Since Roe, the Court, along with the lower federal

courts, has on numerous occasions clarified the constitu-

tional standards which apply to regulations aimed at both

first and second trimester abortions. Few restrictions on

first trimester abortions have been upheld. For example,

the Court upheld a requirement that all abortions be per-

formed by a licensed sician. Connecticut v. Menillo,

423 U.S. 9, 96 S. Ct. 170 (1975) (per curiam). This require-

ment, from being endorsed in dictum in Roe, was

upheld “the State retains an interest in ensur-

ing the validity of Roe’s factual assumption that ‘the first

trimester abortion [is] as safe for a woman as normal

childbirth at term,’ an assumption that ‘holds true only

App. 17

if the abortion is performed by medically competent per-

sonnel under tions insuring the maximum safety of

the woman.’” Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive

Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 n.12, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2492

n.12 (quoting Menillo, 423 U.S. at 11, 96 S. Ct. at 171).

Likewise, the Court upheld a state-required pathology

examination which ired tissues removed by abortion,

like all other removed tissues, to be examined by a pa-

thologist. Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. v. Ash-

croft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983). This was be-

cause such an examination was considered “absolutely

” from a medical standpoint and “ ‘abnormalities

in the tissue warn of serious, fatal disor-

ders.’ ”’ Jd. at 487-89, 103 S. Ct. at 24. eye bey

the Court, certain regulations of even first trimester

tions that “ ‘have no significant oe the woman’s

exercise of her right [to have an ion] be per-

missible where justified by i t state objec-

tives.’ "’ Jd. at 489-90, 103 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting Akron,

462 U.S. at 430, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (alterations by the

Court)).

The quoted language clearly indicates that, where first

trimester abortions are inv “tony Bey must the im-

of the challenged regulation in terms

do comnts uate al tar Gain also that the

ion must be “justified by important state health

objectives.”” This is consistent with our own case law to

* Appellants make much of

proper standard. See F.2d at

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App. 20

distinguish between the two. Indeed, as written, due

the (now unenforced) second trimester hospitalization hn

quirement, they originally applied only to first trimester

abortions. Accordingly, as we have in other cases, we ap-

ply the legal standards applicable to restrictions on first

trimester abortions. See Charles I, 627 F.2d at 782:

Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of

Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1149 (7th Cir. 1974), cert

420 U.S. 955, 95 S. Ct. 1438 (1975). We - inal os

at liberty to insert the words “except with regard to first

trimester abortions” into either the statute or the regula-

tions. To do so would result in a scheme with little re-

semblance to that enacted by the Illinois legislature or

the Department of Public Health. See Thornburgh v.

8 continued

Much of the testimony below was to the effect j require

ments of the regulations bore little sitasip te a ae

of mg fag trimester abortions as well as first trimester abor-

— should come as little surprise, since the medical pro-

: ures utilized are quite similar if not identical. We remind the

tate of the Supreme Court’s admonition in Akron that:

(I}f it appears that during a substantial porti

trimester the State's regulation Teas ban comet

medical practice, supra, at 2493, the regulation may not be

upheld simply because it may be reasonable for the remain-

ing portion of the trimester. Rather, the State is obligated to

make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations

* Ad yo tok trimester during which its health interest

462 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. at 2495.

Thus, while the trimester approach remains the li

trin cab]

men for weighing the competing interests iaiabeed A -

abortion decision, it does not necessarily follow that all state

regulations of abortion which are keyed to it are reasonable. In-

stead, the state should endeavor to ew its regulations designed

7 further maternal health in medically relevant terms (for exam-

p - certain of the requirements of the statute involved here may

- make sense for late second trimester abortions which are per-

ormed under a general anesthetic, but not for simple “dilation

and evaculation” ;

nde abortions performed early in the second tri-

App. 21

American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2181

(1986).

Defendants suggest that, because the regulations apply

to all facilities primarily devoted to surgery, we must

review them under a different standard than if they had

singled out abortions. We disagree. Defendants have cited

us to no cases, and we have found none, which would jus-

tify such a distinction. In fact, Friendship suggests, albeit

in dictum, exactly the opposite. 505 F.2d at 1153-54; see

also Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352,

361-62 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying strict scrutiny notwith-

standing general applicability of regulations).

We adhere to the statement in Friendship for several

reasons. First, we cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA

was enacted primarily with abortion clinics in mind and

only applied to outpatient surgical clinics generally in an

effort to save the statute from unconstitutionality. See Pf.

Ex. 22-24 (minutes of ASTC Licensing Board meetings).

Secondly, the State cannot, merely by applying the ex-

pedient and conclusory label “‘surgery’’ to a medical pro-

cedure, apply requirements which would be necessary to

major surgical procedures in the abortion context where

they would be wholly inappropriate. It is as much a vice

to treat abortion similarly to dissimilar procedures as it

is to treat it differently from analogous procedures. In

either case, imposition of burdensome requirements which

are completely unnecessary to the performance of safe

abortions is attempted. A prime example of this problem

is the fact that many of the physical plant requirements

of the regulations are designed with procedures to be per-

formed under general anesthesia in mind, although the

testimony in this case clearly established that first and

early second trimester abortions of the type at issue here

are not usually performed using such anesthesia and that,

in fact, the use of a general anesthetic increases the risk

of death and major complications from such procedures.

With the standards enunciated above in mind, we now

turn to evaluation of the constitutionality of the challenged

statutes and regulations.

App. 22

IV

A.

The State initially contends that the plaintiffs have not

met their threshold burden of showing an im

abortion decision. We must reject this conietion The

district court found that the regulations at issue do sub-

stantially burden the effectuation of the decision to have

an abortion. Specifically, the lower court found that the

regulations raised the cost of abortions, by $25-$40 for

abortions performed at Dr. Ragsdale’s clinic, and, more

importantly, that they would limit the availability of abor-

tions in that, unless the regulations were enjoined, the

clinie would close for lack of a suitable location that could

* The Americans United for Life Legal Def

curiae, contends that, because individual laintift De ‘Ragsdale

regardless of the regulations

the relocation of an existi

ment of a new one. As cual. abortion practice or the commence-

to warrant the grant of injunctive relief.

"© Defendants place considerable em i

ant phasis on the alleged] -

— admission of Dr. Ragsdale’s handwritten cost estimates We

a not decide whether these constituted inadmissible hearsa

eae, because Dr. Ragsdale testified at le h, and without

objection, to the substance of the estimates. Therefore, the ad-

mission of the wri : ‘ ;

harmless. written estimates themselves, if error, was surely

App. 23

that this is not a great deal more than the cost of the

pathology examination upheld in Ashcroft, they seem to

have missed the import of that case. The Court did not

hold that the impact was so small that the state was not

required to justify it at all. It merely held that, during

even the first trimester, requirements having an insignifi-

cant impact on the abortion decision were constitutional

“where justified by important State health objectives.”

Thus, the regulations at issue here, which have a greater

financial impact than that in Ashcroft, must be justified

by at least similar state interests.

Additionally, although the financial per-patient cost of

compliance might not seem overwhelming, it is not the

only burden which must be considered. The lack of avail-

ability of abortions caused by the up-front cost and dif-

ficulty of obtaining a complying facility is at least as real

and possibly more burdensome to women seeking abor-

tions. Furthermore, there was testimony of the psycho-

logical burdens which would result from having to undergo

an abortion in a hospital-like facility when the more psy-

chologically comforting setting of a doctor’s office would

serve just as well from a medical standpoint. We cannot

say that these burdens are “de minimus.” Cf. Charles

I, 627 F.2d at 777 (“direct interference” is shown where

impact is not de minimus or where regulation imposes

restrictions “that did not already exist’’). Therefore, they

must be justified by important state health objectives.

B.

The first facet of the scheme we consider is the require-

ment that facilities performing first trimester abortions

be licensed at all. ile this may not seem a particularly

onerous requirement, we note Supreme Court precedent

suggests only that a licensing requirement may be per-

missible in the second trimester. The Court stated in Roe

that the state’s interest in maternal health during the sec-

ond trimester extends to “the facility in which the pro-

cedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be

App. 24

a hospital or may be a clinic of some other place of less-

than-hospital Status; as to the licensing of the facility; and

the like.’’ 410 U.S. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 732. By contrast,

the Court stated that during the first trimester “the at.

tending physician, in consultation with his tient, is free

to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in

his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be

terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may

be effectutated by an abortion free from interference by

the State.” Id. (emphasis added).

While we realize that the last quoted statement has

been qualified by the Court in subsequent decisions (that

is, where the “interference” does not have a significant

impact and furthers important state health concerns), we

nonetheless believe it retains force here. Thus, we are

persuaded in this case that the State may not require

separate licensure of facilities primarily devoted to per-

forming abortions.

A primary factor which persuades us is that the State

has in no way shown that performance of first trimester

abortions in physicians’ offices rather than heavily regu-

lated ASTCs in any way undermines the safety of the

operation. We further note that Akron itself seems to re-

ject such an argument. 462 U.S. at 429 n.11. The State

in fact basically concedes that it cannot prevent doctors

from performing at least some abortions in their offices.

To the extent that there is any basis for distinguishing

between a doctor who occasionally performs an abortion

in his office and one whose practice is primarily devoted

to such rocedures, the ions appear to run contrary

to sound health policy. of the expert testimony in the

App. 25

We realize that the Sixth Circuit upheld a similar gen-

eral licensing requirement in Reizen. However, in doing

so, the court did not address a challenge based on the

constitutional right to abortion, but rather an Equal Pro-

tection challenge based upon the physician’s right to prac-

tice. Accordingly, the court applied a highly deferential

“rational basis” standard of review. 743 F.2d at 358-59.

As we have already held, such a standard of review is

not appropriate in this case. Additionally, none of the

evidence of the t mentioned above was apparently

present in Reizen. There, the district court found that a

private physician was more likely to have direct control

over staff and procedures, but that the absence of this

control might characterize a “clinic.” Such findings are

absent in this case.

Purely as a matter of the plain language of the statutory

and regulatory scheme, once the licensing requirement

falls, the remainder of the requirements fal] with it (or,

more properly, are inapplicable). The specific substantive

requirements are not (leaving aside the unenforced re-

quirement that all abortions must be performed in an

ASTC) applicable to abortions, per se, but rather to

ASTCs. In the alternative, however, we analyze those spe-

cific substantive aspects of the regulations focused on at

trial which render the scheme unconstitutional as a whole."

't We do not decide whether particular provisions of the regula-

tions not specifically mentioned in the text would, standing lone,

pass constitutional muster. In particular, the pathology examina-

tion required by the general regulations seems nearly identical to

that upheld in Ashcroft. Also the reporting requirement does not

pear particularly onerous, nor does it ar calculated to raise

the fear of harassment by physicians rhe atients by raising the

spectre of public disclosure. Section 205.60 of the regulations

merely requires a rt of each procedure performed in an ASTC

within ten days, and that such reports be made in such a manner

and at such time so as not to avoid accurate reporting of com-

plications. If complications become known to the ASTC, it is re-

quired to submit a supplemental report. Section 205.620, a non-

abortion-specific reporting requirement, merely requires reporting

(Footnote continued on following page)

App. 26

C.

_The abortion-specific subpart of the regulations is of par-

ticular concern. Many of the requirements set forth in that

subpart seem clearly contrary to either prior Supreme

'! continued

of the number and type of procedures performed, the number and

type of complications reported, the number of patients uirin

transfer to hospitals, the number of patients returning for iow.

up, and the number of deaths. These requirements appear to be

consistent with Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. y Danforth

428 U.S. 52, 79-81, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2846-47 (1976). The requirements

mee og = less — than those previously enjoined. In

articular, the name o is i j i

disclosed to the State. Eee

Additionally, a number of the other general r ul

as though they would wy no real canton at all = te dae

might. Requirements which may fall in this category might include

the general provisions relating to personnel and administrative pro-

cedures governing ASTCs, such as those calling for a written pol-

icles and procedures manual, consulting committee, organization

plan, personnel policies, and maintenance of a sanitary facilit

Similarly, the operative care and post-operative care i “

-— ~ in accord with accepted medical practice. Dr

objected to many of these requirements as “stati ious.”

However, so far as we 0 onan there is => cokened the

to “stating the obvious” even where abortion procedu

.-= res are con-

Fewer of the abortion- 1 i i

discussion in the text, Se ae yy o

testimony below that the counselor qualification requirements of

section 205.730(bX2) were consistent with accepted medical .

tice. Additionally, subsection (1) of the same regulation madly oo

quires, in general terms, that some counseling be given prior to

the performance of an abortion (and that it occur in a room .

rate from the procedure room). As noted in the text infra po

aspects of the counseling requirements suffer from constitutional

defects. Also, section 205.710 merely provides that “Abortions shall

be provided to the _— with the same standards of safety effec.

tiveness, and regard for patients rights as any other health saveien i

Of course, we need not and do j imate it

tionality of any of the sequivamente aonumcand aan Riise

App. 27

Court precedent or our own cases. In particular, we note

that section 205.730(aX2) apparently requires the physi-

cian who is to perform the abortion to also perform a

pregnancy test on the patient regardless of whether such

testing had previously been done by another physician.

We previously invalidated a similar “same doctor’ require-

ment in an Illinois statute. See Charles I, 627 F.2d at 784,

786. The requirement in the instant regulation is, if any-

thing, more burdensome and less justified than the one

we invalidated there, which required only that the per-

forming physician provide the patient with “a true copy’

of her pregnancy test, rather than to possibly conduct a

second test. For the same reasons as in Charles I, the

provision in this case is invalid.

The counseling requirements too suffer from constitu-

tional defects. Section 205.730(bX3) attempts to prescribe

the precise content of such counseling in mandatory terms

applicable to all cases. The regulation states that counsel-

ing “shall include a discussion of alternatives, description

of the procedure to be performed, explanation of the risks

and possible complications.’’ We believe that this provi-

sion, particularly the requirement of a “discussion of alter-

natives” is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s

recent decision in Thornburgh v. American College of

Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). The requirement

“that a specific body of information be given in all cases,

irrespective of the particular needs of the patient, intrudes

upon the discretion of the pregnant woman’s physician

and thereby imposes the ‘undesired and uncomfortable

straitjacket’”’ which the Court has rejected. Jd. at 2179

(quoting Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. v. Dan-

forth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2840 n.8). The

informational requirements of the regulation are certain-

ly not as intrusive or as specific as those previously

stricken by the Court, but they are just as inflexible. Dr.

Ragsdale testified below that some of the information, par-

ticularly the “discussion of alternatives” might not be ap-

propriate for some patients. We agree that “for a patient

with a life-threatening pregnancy, the ‘information’ in its

App. 28

very rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the

physician-patient relationship.” Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at

2180. We bear in mind that, during the second trimester

at least, “the validity of an informed consent requirement

... rests on the State’s interest in protecting the health

of the pregnant woman.” Jd. at 2179 (quoting Akron, 462

U.S. at 443, 103 S. Ct. at 2499). Viewed in this light, the

provision at issue here may, like that in Thornburgh, “‘re-

quire{ ] the dissemination of information that is not rele-

vant to such consent, and thus, it advances no legitimate

state interest.” Jd. at 2180.

Another aspect of the counseling requirements is trou-

bling. Section 205.730(bX2XD) requires that “counselors

shail have no financial interest in the patient’s decision.”

We find it impossible to read this provision in such a way

that it does not, at least in some cases, preclude the per-

forming physician from providing the counseling. This, we

believe, is fundamentally at odds with the emphasis placed

on the patient-physician relationship by Roe anu its prog-

eny. The woman desiring an abortion, according to those

cases, is to reach that decision in consultation with “her

responsible physician.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 93 S. Ct.

at 727; cf. Akron, 462 U.S. at 449, 103 S. Ct. at 2502

(striking down a requirement that the attending physician,

rather than other professionals, must provide the requisite

counseling). The state cannot preclude that dialogue, or

demand that others be a party to it merely because the

physician has a “financial interest” in the woman’s deci-

sion. In all other areas of medicine, the state relies on

the physician’s professional and ethical obligations to pre-

vent his “financial interest” from clouding his perspec-

tive to the detriment of his patient. It may not do other-

wise merely because an abortion decisivn is involved. See

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-200, 93 S. Ct. 739, 750-51

(1973). In Doe, the Court struck down requirements that

an abortion be approved by a hospital abortion committee

and by two other physicians independent of the woman’s

own consulting physician because, inter alia, the state re-

quired such additional approval for “no other voluntary

App. 29

medical or surgical procedure. . . .”’ According to the

Court:

If a physician is licensed by the State, he is recog-

nized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable

clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional cen-

sure and deprivation of his license are available rem-

edies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has

no rational connection with a patient’s needs and un-

duly infringes on the physician’s right to practice.

Id. at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 751.

We believe those principles are equally applicable here.

Accordingly, we hold that the requirement that counsel-

ing be conducted by one who has no “financial interest

in the patient’s decision is unconstitutional.

D.

Of the requirements applicable to ASTCs generally, the

physical plant equipment and staffing requirements, in

particular, seem totally unjustified from a medical stand-

point. The testimony regarding many of the physical plant

requirements makes clear that they have “‘no medical jus-

tification whatsoever” when applied to first and early sec-

ond trimester abortions of the type involved in this case.

According to the testimony, the minimum size require-

ments for examination rooms, procedure rooms, recovery

rooms, and corridors and doors not only are not “medical-

ly necessary,” but do not enhance the safety of the abor-

tion procedure “in any way” and do not have “any medi-

cal justification.” R. Vol. I at 263-72 (testimony of Dr.

Hern); see also R. Vol. I. at = —— mf 2

Ragsdale) (large procedure room “not only medically un-

asuaaae we gh eter poor’). We agree that the re-

quirements that ASTCs performing first and early second

trimester abortion(s) be “the functional equivalent of small

hospitals” are not sufficiently justified by “important state

health objectives’’ to be sustained.

App. 30

Additionally, the ventilation requirements of the regula-

tions, which require specific air pressure relationships be-

tween rooms and specific air change ratios are unrelated

to the safety of first and early second trimester abortions.

The purpose of such requirements is to prevent infection

from airborne bacteria. All of the medical experts, includ-

ing defendants’, testified that airborne bacteria simply is

not relevant to the procedures involved in this case, be-

cause the procedures do not involve an incision. The sole

testimony to the effect that such requirements might be

advisable came from the State’s architectural expert, who

apparently believed that an incision was required. It can

scarcely be doubted that such a witness lacks any exper-

tise to enable him to form an opinion regarding the medi-

cal justification for a particular requirement.!? '

More importantly, perhaps, the defendants failed to ad-

duce any evidence at all of a medical justification for the

physical plant requirements. Although the defendants pro-

test on appeal that plaintiffs’ experts who testified as to

the lack of medical justification were not building and con-

struction experts, the relevant test is whether the stan-

dards are “justified by important state health objectives.”

It seems clear to us that medical experts can offer tes-

timony relevant to that standard, and it is questionable

whether those without a health care background can. As

we have noted above, only defendants’ architectural ex-

pert testified as to the need for the ventilation re-

quirements. This witness similarly testified regarding

room sizes, although he stated that the requirements were

drafted with procedures imvolving general anesthesia in

mind. At one point, he testified that he relies on the

12 Defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Barton, lacked significant ex-

perience performing first trimester abortions. Those which he did

perform were generally performed under a general anesthetic in

a hospital setting. Due to his lack of experience relevant to the

procedures at issue in this case, the district court properly ac-

corded his testimony little weight. Defendants similarly do not rely

on it heavily in this court.

App. 31

physician operating a facility to determine what is medical-

ly required. Linder Dept. at 42.

The structural, equipment, and staffing requirements of

the regulations are quite similar to those invalidated in

Reizen. See 743 F.2d at 364-65. They also bear a remark-

able resemblance to the abortion-specific scheme we inval- _

idated in Friendship. While the evidence in Reizen indi-

cated a per-patient cost increase considerably greater than

that in this case (Friendship did not consider particular-

ized cost estimates), the regulations there, as here, would

have required considerable up-front expenditures. Also,

as we have noted above, per-patierit financial cost is not

the only relevant burden. We have little trouble conclud-

ing that these requirements, which impose a substantial

burden and are not justified by health objectives, are

unconstitutional.

E

We also believe that the “certificate of need” proceeding

requirement of the Health Facilities Planning Act is un-

constitutional. The only interest which the State has ar-

ticulated is the desire to keep costs down under the “cost-

plus” disbursement method which was at one time used

by the State in making certain health care payments for

its residents. Apart from the fact that this interest no

longer exists because the State has discontinued use of

this method, the State has never made such payments for

abortions. Furthermore, the interest cannot be said to be

compelling in any event. While a state may have some

interest in preventing wasteful duplication of resources,

the interest must give way where the exercise of consti-

tutional rights is concerned. Certainly it would be uncon-

stitutional for a state to require that anyone desiring to

publish a newspaper demonstrate “‘need”’ for the publica-

tion, though it can scarcely be gainsaid that at least some

few involve wasteful duplication. Where the exercise of

constitutional rights is concerned, the government may

play no role in determining whether outlets for their ex-

ercise are “needed.”

App. 32

The unconstitutionality of the “certificate of need” pro-

ceedings as applied to ASTCs that wish to perform abor-

tions is exacerbated by the failure of the State to prevent

the process from becoming essentially a public veto of the

ASTCs’ existence. As we noted above, the proceedings

attended by the individual plaintiff physician was allowed

to degenerate into a shouting match between abortion foes

and advocates of free choice. The State’s unwillingness

or inability to confine the proceedings to its even arguably

legitimate goals bolsters our conclusion that this require-

ment cannot stand because it is not justified by any legit-

imate State interest.

V

While, as we have noted above, there may well be

facets of the statute and regulations which would indi-

vidually pass constitutional muster, supra nn. 8 & 11, we

are constrained to affirm the district court’s injunction of

the scheme as a whole. Defendants, citing Zbaraz v. Har-

itgan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985), appeal pending,

No. 85-673 and Charles I, 627 F.2d at 779, urge that we

specifically analyze each provision and sever those portions

which are unconstitutional. However, in neither Zbaraz

nor Charles I were we confronted with a comprehensive

scheme which either applied or not depending on whether

a licensing requirement could stand. In Zbaraz, we noted

that severability applies only to “any provisions which can

be given effect without the invalid provisions,” and that

“severance is improper if the unconstitutional provision

is ‘an integral part of the statutory enactment viewed in

its entirety.’ 763 F.2d at 1545 (quoting Scheinberg v.

Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1981)). Here, where

we are dealing with a licensing scheme and the provision

for separate licensure is itself invalid, not only can none

of the other provisions “be given effect without the in-

valid provisions,” but the licensing provision is certainly

“an integral part” of the scheme as a whole. Additional-

ly, in neither Zbaraz nor Charles I was the scheme

App. 33

already so riddled with exceptions resulting from judicial

decisions and non-enforcement policies as to be unintelligi-

ble. In such circumstances, we simply “cannot untangle

the constitutional from the unconstitutional provisions.

...”’ Mahoning Women’s Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456,

460 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S.

918, 100 S. Ct. 3006 (1980).

As originally written, the statute and regulations rep-

resented at least a coherent, if unconstitutional, whole

which regulated all aspects of abortion practice in Illinois.

However, as a result of various judicial decisions, and the

defendants’ change of enforcement policies in response to

them, the scheme has long since lost that coherence. The

statute and regulations as written bear very little resem-

blance to the way they are currently enforced. As is clear

from portions of our opinion, we have at times encoun-

tered considerable difficulty discerning just what the law

in Illinois is. Yet, the State expects physicians, on pain

of professional censure (possibly including loss of their

licenses) and a $10,000 a day fine, to divine the contours

of the rules under which they must operate.

Under these circumstances, we fully agree with the

Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mahoning Women’s Center.

There, in invalidating, in its entirety, a local ordinance

that required “the functional equivalent of a hospital” for

first trimester abortions, the court held “ijn this situa-

tion, we do not believe a useful purpose would be served

by attempting to rewrite the minor provisions of the or-

dinance in order to make them constitutional.” 610 F.2d

at 461. We could not agree more.

Accordingly with the exception of the portion of the in-

junction regarding the second trimester hospitalivation re-

quirement, which is VACATED As Moot, the preliminary

injunction is

AFFIRMED.

App. 34

Correy, Circuit Judge, dissenting. A decade and one-

half ago the Supreme Court announced “that the right of

personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that

this right is not unqualified and must be considered against

important state interests in regulation.” Roe v. Wade, 410

U.S. 113, 154, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727 (1973). Today, under the

guise of protecting the woman’s constitutional privacy rights,

the majority holds that the State of Illinois’ health ser-

vices statutory scheme, enacted in an attempt to regulate

the ever-escalating costs of medical care without sacrific-

ing its citizens’ health and safety,'is unconstitutional. Spe-

cifically, now some 14 years after its enactment, the ma-

jority declares the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center

Act, 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 44 157-8.1 et seq. (the “ASTCA” or

the “ASTC Act”) and the regulations promulgated there-

under unconstitutional. holding that the State may noi re-

quire licensure of facilities devoted primarily to performing

semi-complicated (minor) surgery, including first-trimester

abortions. As an alternative approach, the majority chooses

and carves out a select few ASTC regulations among var-

ious others, discusses their validity, and then proceeds to

invalidate those regulatory sections of the ASTC Act that

apply to first-trimester abortion facilities in Illinois, stating

that it was unable to sever those provisions of the Act

it deemed unconstitutional from those that were cunstitu-

tional. Thus, the majority strikes down the ASTCA and

baldly asserts that “the [statutory] scheme has long since

lost . . . coherence.”’ Unfortunately, it is the majority’s

decision, rather than the Illinois legislative scheme, that

lacks coherence.' I am convinced that under Roe and its

! The majority’s precise holding is confusing. On the one hand,

the majority affirms the district court’s preliminary injunction

which only enjo‘ned Illinois from regulating ASTCs to the extent

those facilities were performing abortions. On the other hand, the

majority apparently strikes down not only § 16(1) of the MPA,

but the ASTCA and the IHFPA as well, stating it could not “‘un-

tangle the constitutional from the unconstitutional,” and further

asserts that specific substantive aspects of the statutes and regula-

tions are unconstitutional and “render the scheme unconstitutional

as a whole.”

App. 35

progeny that the individual states have the authority to en-

sure that all surgical procedures, including first-trimester

abortions, are performed “under conditions insuring max-

imum safety for the woman.” Connecticut v. Menillo, 423

U.S. 9, 11, 96 S.Ct. 170, 171 (1975) (per curiam). Certainly

states have the power and authority, if not the duty, to

apply the same licensing standards to abortion facilities

as those applied to facilities performing similar surgical

procedures.? I know of no law to the contrary.

Moreover, the majority decision ignores the legislative

intent and the historical context of the enactment of the

challenged provisions: section 16(1) of the Medical Prac-

tice Act (the ““MPA”’), 111 Ill. Rev. Stat. ¢ 4433(1); the Am-

bulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act, 111% II. Rev. Stat.

€¢ 157-8.1, et seg., and the regulations promulgated

thereunder; and the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act,

111% Il. Rev. Stat. 44 1151, et seq., particularly {4 1155-1160.

Research reveals that the Illinois legislature enacted § 16(1)

of the MPA® intending to limit the performance of abor-

tions only to licensed ambulatory surgical treatment

centers, hospitals, or similar facilities and expressed such

intention by requiring licensure of “‘any facility in which

a medical or surgical procedure is utilized to terminate

a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the facility is de-

voted primarily to this purpose,” (definitions section—

2 As demonstrated, infra, the most significant undisputed fact in

the record is that an abortion, regardless of the trimester in which

it is performed, is considered a surgical ae albeit a minor

— procedure, accompanied al] too frequently by concomitant

medical, physical, and psychological complications.

3 As noted by the majority, § 16(1) of the MPA “allows for revo-

cation or suspension of the license of any physician who performs

an ‘elective abortion’ in any place pe A than a licensed Am-

bulatory Surgical Treatment Center (ASTC), a hospital, or a facili-

ty run by the state or federal governments.” (Emphasis added.)

App. 36

ASTCA, 4 157-8.3(A)).4 However, the legislature’s primary

purpose for enacting the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment

Center Act was to regulate and prescribe safeguards for

the rapidly developing trend of cost-effective ambulatory

surgical medical services. The majority unfortunately dis-

regards tnis primary purpose which provided the impetus

for the enactment of the ASTCA and through mere specu-

lation holds that the ASTCA is solely an abortion stat-

ute. Further, in its determination to do away with the

duly enacted legislation, the majority completely disre-

gards the statute’s severability clauses as if they didn’t

exist, stating it could not “untangle the constitutional from

the unconstitutional’ and thus refuses to give effect to

the chalienged acts. Rather than recognize and effectu-

ate the true intent and legitimate purpose of the acts and

enjoin only those provisions which might impinge on a

woman's limited right to terminate her pregnancy (§ 16(1)

of the MPA, its companion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) and

§ 205.730(bX2XD) of the ASTCA regulations), the majori-

ty, in over-expansive language, declares, “ ‘(W]e do not

believe a useful purpose would be served by attempting

to rewrite minor provisions of the ordinance [in this case

4 € 157-8.3 provides:

‘(A) ‘Ambulatory surgical treatment center’ means any in-

stitution, place or ere devoted primarily to the mainte-

nance and operation of facilities for the performance of surgical

procedures or any facility in which a medical or surgical pro-

cedure is utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of

rily to this

whether the facility is devoted prima rpose. Such

facility shall not provide beds or other accommodations for the

overnight stay of patients. Individual patients shall be dis-

charged in an ambulatory condition without danger to the con-

tinued well being of the patients or shall be transferred to

a hospital.”

(Emphasis added to highlight the clause included in the ASTCA

restricting the availability of an abortion.)

5 The severability clauses of the MPA, ASTCA, and the IHFPA

are found respectively at 111 Ill. Rev. Stat. ¢ 4458, 111% II. Rev.

Stat. ¢ 157-8.15, and 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 4 1166.

App. 37

the statutes and regulations] in order to make them con-

stitutional.’””’ In so holding, the majority improperly sub-

stitutes its judgment for that of the legislature which

enacted the statute because of its concern for the safety

of its citizens. In the end, the majority decision severely

limits (or casts aside) the state’s ability to implement cost-

effective schemes and regulate rapidly developing and

modern methods of providing medical services simply

because abortion (surgical) procedures may be involved.

The majority’s misdirected holding ultimately protects

only the financial interests of abortion providers, like Dr.

Ragsdale, rather thar following the Supreme Court’s lim-

ited mandate in Roe aimed at protecting the patient’s

privacy rights. If we allow the majority’s “reasoning’’ to

stand, surgeons, as well as other ASTC operators whose

facilities are devoted primarily to the performance of abor-

tions, will be allowed to operate without regulation while

those ASTCs primarily performing other types of minor

surgical procedures will remain regulated (assuming the

majority's decision mer y affirms the district court’s

preliminary injunction). Thus having treated facilities

devoted primarily to abortions differently from those fa-

cilities primarily devoted to other surgical procedures, the

majority carves out an “abortionist exception” to the gen-

eral rule that states can reasonably regulate how medical

services are provided to its citizens. Ultimately, the ma-

jority in effect creates a legal vehicle for the non-abor-

tionists primarily performing other surgical procedures to

challenge the ASTCA on equal protection grounds; for

what rational basis exists for regulating ambulatory surgi-

cal centers differently than those facilities, like Ragsdale’s

abortion enterprise, devoted primarily to the termination

of pregnancies?

The task of a reviewing court, contrary to the majori-

ty’s reasoning, is, “of course, . . . to resolve the issue

by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and pre-

dilection.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 116, 93 S.Ct. at 709.

Consistent with this Supreme Court directive, our deci-

sion must neither reflect pro choice nor anti-abortion sen-

App. 38

timent. The Illinois legislation at issue, specifically the

ASTCA, is fundamentally different from other TIilinois

abortion-related legislation and merits thorough, reflective,

and separate consideration. I would enjoin § 16(1) of the

MPA and sever and further enjoin its companion clause

in ¢ 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA requiring licensure of “any

facility in which a medical or surgical procedure is utilized

to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the fa-

cility is devcted primarily to this p se” because these

provisions prevent a physician from performing a first-

trimester abortion in his or her office. Under Roe and

its progeny this prohibition may very well be considered

unconstitutional. I am convinced that the states, including

Illinois, are free to regulate ambulatory surgical treatment

centers, including those performing abortions, as long as

abortions are not singled out from other, similar surgical

procedures, subject only to the well-known rational basis

test governing social and economic legislation. Under the

rational basis test the ASTCA and IHFPA are constitu-

tional. Consistent with this analysis, I further evaluate

the remaining abortion-specific statute sections and regu-

lations* promulgated thereunder under the strict scrutiny

test articulated in Roe and its progeny? and would hold

all but one of these constitutional because these statutory

sections and regulations neither burden the abortion deci-

* For example, q 157-8.6-1 of the ASTCA requires that any cor-

poration operating an ASTC “devoted primarily to providing facil-

ities for abortion” must have a licensed physician who is “actively

engaged in the practice of medicine at the Center, on the board

of directors as a condition of licensure.” Additionally, subpart G

of Title 77 of the Illinois Administrative Code contains abortion-

specific regulations. The validity of all but one of these provisions

is demonstrated, infra.

* I concur with the majority that the challenge to the second-

trimester hospitalizati ~ Rs pny rman is moot. It appears that the

majority effortlessly utilized and applied the severability clause of

the Act to the second-trimester hospital requirement, but lost this

analytical ability with respect to the other challenged provisions.

App. 39

sion nor its effectuation, and are justified with important

health objectives in mind.

When the alleged “tripartite” legislative scheme is thus

analyzed, neither a woman’s right to terminate her preg-

nancy, nor the state’s right to rationally regulate modern

medical services for the protection of its citizens is ad-

versely affected. Thus, I would reverse the district court’s

order enjoining Illinois’ health services laws, except to the

extent it enjoined § 16(1) of the Medical Practice Act, its

companion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA, and

§ 205.730(bX2XD) of the ASTCA regulations.

I

The majority decision properly notes that the ‘‘statutory

and regulatory scheme is somewhat complex,” but then

proceeds to further confuse the challenged acts and their

interrelationships, completely disregarding the legislature's

intent regarding the various acts. The record of the legis-

lative history reveals that § 16(1) of the MPA, 111 Ill. Rev.

Stat. § 4433(1), and the Ambulato “y - Treatment

Center Act (ASTCA), 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 44 157-8.1, et seq.,

were initially companion bills to the initial comprehensive

Illinois Abortion Act (IAA), 38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 4 81-11, et seg.*

The IAA, § 16(1) of the MPA, and the ASTCA, were

Senate bills (S.B.) 1049, 1050, and 1051, respectively. The

legislative history further reveals that S.B. 1049 and S.B.

* The initial Illinois Abortion Law, 44 81-11, et seg., became ef.

fective July 19, 1973, but was subsequently repealed by the Abor-

tion Law of 1975, effective October 30, 1979. The Abortion Law

of 1975 has been challenged on more than one occasion. See, ¢.9.,

Charles v. Carey, 579 F.Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part on other grounds, Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452

(7th Cir. 1984), a 1 dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles,

106 S.Ct. 1697 (1986). The initial IAA had a com letely different

than the ASTCA and IHFPA. However, t — y con-

uses the purposes of the IAA from that of the A and

IHFPA, and in doing so clouds its ability to analyze the challenged

statutes and regulations.

App. 40

1050 were integrally related; their purpose was to regulate

abortions in Illinois in light of, and in an attempt to com-

ply with, the Supreme Court’s then-recent Roe and Doe

decisions. As noted by the majority, § 16(1) of the MPA

provided for the “revocation or suspension of the license

of any physician who performs ‘elective abortions’ in any

place other than a licensed Ambulatory Surgical Treat-

ment Center (ASTC), a hospital, or a facility run by the

state or federal governments.” Apparently, members of

the Illinois legislature were concerned that the State

would eventually be responsible for the cost of abortions

performed on indigents in hospitals, so to reduce the

State’s anticipated abortion costs, less-expensive ASTC

facilities were included in the list of approved locations

for the performance of pregnancy termination procedures.

At the same time the legislature was debating the regula-

tion of abortions, ASTCs were just coming into existence

and thus not regulated. Thus, S.B. 1051, an i nt

health regulatory bill creating and regulating S, Was

made a companion bill to the abortion bills.

Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the ASTCA, un-

like the IAA and § 16(1) of the MPA, was not primarily

enacted for the purpose of regulating abortions. The rec-

ord and legislative history reveal that the ASTC Act

became law in Illinois in 1973 with the express policy of

— maximum safety in all medical procedures, pro-

viding:

“for the better protection of the public health

the development, establishment, and enforcement of

standards (1) for the care of individuals in am

surgical treatment centers, and (2) for the construc-

tion, maintenance and operation of ambulatory surgi-

cal treatment centers, which, in light of advancing

knowledge, will promote safe and adequate treatment

of such individuals in ambulatory surgical treatment

centers.”

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, ¢ 157-8.2. Further, the ASTCA

was intended to regulate the cost-effective and rapidly

developing ambulatory outpatient surgical medical ser-

App. 41

vices. The minutes of the March 7, 1974, Ambulatory Sur-

gical Treatment Center Licensing Board meeting provide

relevant historical facts relating to the enactment of the

ASTCA:9

“In July 1971 . . . a member of the hospital licens-

ing board, was appointed chairman of a committee

appointed to formulate regulations for those facilities

that were presently unlicensable. Consideration was

given to a large number of classifications and actually

there were 32 types of health facilities listed... .

On July 12, 1972, the final draft (after four drafts)

of proposed standards were submitted to the Hospital

Licensing Board. . . . [OJn August 16 [a member of

the Board] sent these proposed regulations forward

[to the legislation liaison]. . . . About August 1972

[the Board] began to get involved more with the

% The majority improperly relies on the (STC Licensing Board

minutes for the legislative intent of the act. The March 7, 1974,

minutes conclude that “the legislation was written specifically for

regulation of the performance of abortions.’’ On this basis, the ma-

jority states, ‘First, we cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA

was enacted primarily with abortion clinics in mind and only ap-

plied to outpatient surgical clinics generally in an effort to save

the statute from unconstitutionality.” Initially 7 point out that the

district court specifically and properly rejected the plaintiff's re-

quest to admit the minutes of the licensing board meeting as proof

of the oe intent. Tr. at 616. The district court’s eviden-

tiary ruling was proper because “a court should adhere to the

enacting legislature’s purposes,” Posner, The Federal Courts, p.

279 (1985), rather than post-enactment statements regarding legis-

lative intent, particularly when those statements are not even

made by the legislators involved. The district court received the

licensing board minutes only for the limited purpose of establishing

the Board’s state of mind regarding its decent procedures.

However, the historical facts regarding the development of the

ASTC legislation and regulations are reliable, material, and rele-

vant to understanding the historical context in which the ASTCA

was enacted. Thus, I make limited reference to the minutes of

the Board meeting only to draw attention to the historical facts

contained therein.

App. 42

question of abortions which became the primary tar-

get for discussion.”’ :

The significance of these Board minutes lies in the fact

that as early as 1971 a state agency began preparing the

proposed regulations in response to the changing needs

and practices of medical services. Cost-effective “{f}ree-

standing ambulatory surgical centers (FASCs) are indepen-

dent entities which first opened in 1970. . . . [T]hese

facilities were conceived to fill a gap between the doc-

tor’s office and the hospital for minor surgical procedures

not requiring overnight hospitalization.” Note, Freestand-

ing Emergency Centers: Regulation and Reimbursement,

11 Am. J. L. & Med. 105, 118 (1985).!° “The first success-

ful freestanding ambulatory surgery center (FASC), [well

known as Surgicenter], was opened in February 1970 in

Phoenix, Arizona.”” D. Ermann and J. Gabel, The Chang-

ing Face of American Health Care, Multi-Hospital

System, Emergency Centers, and Surgery Centers, 23

Medical Care 401, 406 (May 1985). As early as 1976 one

commentator observed:

“From a societal point of view, perhaps the greatest

impetus behind the ambulatory lemmas nan is its

potential for reducing the cost of services. This poten-

tial applies to both freestanding and hospital-based

facilities, the two major prototypes for ambulatory

surgery. By eliminating overnight hospital stays, ex-

penditures for hospital services for inpatient health

care, which now account for about 40 percent of our

"© Much has been written regarding trends in ambulatory medical

services, including ambulatory surgical treatment centers. See gen-

erally T. O'Donovan, Ambulatory Surgical Centers, Development

and Management (1976); L. Burns, Ambulatory Surgery, Develop-

ing and Managing Successful Programs (1984); M. Roemer, Am-

bulatory Health Services in America (1981); D. Ermann and J.

Gabel, The Changing Face of American Health Care, 23 Medical

a rear ore a Setting Up and Operating Am-

are Centers in a Competiti is

ep pe petitive Environment, 29 St. Louis

App. 43

total national health expenditure, may be reduced

directly and dramatically, at least on a short-term

basis. By focusing on reducing inpatient surgery (ac-

counting for 60 percent of all hospital expenditures

and about 25 percent of total health care expendi-

tures), ambulatory surgery may further reduce costs.”

T. O’Donovan, Ambulatory Surgical Centers, Development

and Management, p. 143 (1976). Further, by 1984 the

ASTC trend was well established:

“The success of the Phoenix center precipitated rapid

growth of a new type of facility for the delivery of

ambulatory surgery, the freestanding, independent,

ambulatory surgery center. Since that time, the Sur-

gicenter has become a model for an increasing num-

ber of both independent and hospital-sponsored free-

standing ambulatory surgery programs.

According to the Freestanding Ambulatory Surgical

Association (FASA), there are approximately 125 in-

dependent freestanding ambulatory surgery centers,

86 of which are members of FASA. According to

FASA, which has been keeping statistics on its mem-

bers since 1974, the membership performed 94,499

ambulatory surgery procedures in 1981, an increase

of 6 percent over the number performed in 1980. This

figure can be compared to 3.2 million ambulatory

surgical procedures performed by hospitals offering

ambulatory surgery in 1980.”

L. Burns, Ambulatory Surgery, Developing and Manag-

ing Successful Programs, pp. 11-12 (1984). Lastly, I ob-

serve that freestanding ambulatory surgical centers are

properly subject to licensure and regulation (as are the

vast majority of medical facilities performing surgeries)

throughout the country, and not only in Illinois. One

writer pointed out that:

“a FASC must obtain a state CON [Certificate of

Need] in order to build the facility. In some states

FASCs must also seek accreditation. In Illinois,

FASCs are licensed and regulated by the State De-

App. 44

partment of Public Health. In Minnesota, surgical

centers are covered by licensing rules. They must be

staffed and equipped to handle surgical procedures,

anesthesia, and post-surgical care.”

Note, Freestanding Emergency Centers, Regulation and,

Reimbursement, 11 Am. J. L. & Med. 105, 118 (1985).

Obviously the Illinois Legislature was not privy to all

this information regarding ambulatory surgical treatment

centers in 1973, at the time it enacted the ASTCA. How.-

ever, as I stated, the record and legislative history reveal

that the legislature was well aware of the new and fast

developing medical trend in outpatient ambulatory care

and specifically sought to regulate it. During the Senate

debates, state Senator Wooten summarized S.B. 1051 as

follows:

“This is another one of those bills that cuts across

lines in all kinds of ways. The Illinois State Medical

Society asked that it be presented in a series with

the two previous bills [S.B. 1049 and S.B. 1050], one

changing the law relating to abortion, the other chang-

ing the Medical Practices Act. While this has a rela-

tionship to abortion, it actually goes much beyond

that. It [S.B. 1051] provides for the establishment and

licensing of facilities which can perform minor sur-

gery. This would be things like tonsilectomy, hernias,

abortions would be included, facial surgery, plastic

surgery and so on. In other words procedures which

would not require an overnight stay. And indeed

these ambulatory surgical treatment centers are for-

bidden to keep patients overnight. However, those

of you who have kept close to medical practices know

that untoward things can occur at any time, and so

provision is made in here that doctors who function

in such a center must also be licensed to practice

in a hospital nearby so that if any complications oc-

cur they can quickly move the patient to that place.

Now, I handed out an outline to explain to you how

these things would work, definitions, they must get

App. 45

a license, some of these things are left open as to

See The Department would like to “4 a

hand in that. This is something doctors en? een

urging us to do for a couple of years now, a1 a

bulatory surgical treatment centers are... im —

out west. The idea is that they can be a grea ar

ing to a patient. One of the big costs in =

if you remember it’s kind of like a hotel which | om

special services and if you don’t need that overnig it

stay, you can save a great deal of money. So goss

a great savings possible for the patient who needs

this kind of one-day surgical treatment. It does in-

clude abortion, and everything would be rather close-

ly regulated and inspected.

(Emphasis added). Another state senator further pointed

out that: ee ss

“This bill is a good bill. It’s not related In any wa)

Ms pot ti It's sponsored by the Medical ——

tion. There’s nothing wrong with ambulatory medica

services.”

hus, contrary to the majority’s mere speculative anon.

se the legislative history clearly and eae ~~

ports the proposition that the ASTCA was . ena =

primarily to regulate abortions, but rather for the regu

tion of all semi-complicated (minor) surgical proce _

performed in the Se ey | — o

centers. Finally, | observe

the ASTCA’s enactment, Senator Wooten —

stated: “The main thrust of [S.B. 1051] is to ae ged

some money by getting minor surgical co oppo sso "

the hospital where it is hideously expensive and m

clinic.” (Emphasis added).

cord and the legislative history further reveal

aa -_ Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act Pca a

was enacted one year after the enactment of 8 “ .

the MPA and the ASTCA and was clearly not P —

a “tripartite” legislative scheme to limit the availa i “ y

of abortions. The legislative history of the IHF PA reveals

App. 46

that it neither mentions abortions, nor referred to them,

nor was it enacted for purposes of regulating abortions.

The IHFPA was intended to address the problem of ex-

pensive, overexpanded and underpopulated medical facil-

_ ities and underutilized medical equipment in the State of

Illinois. In the words of a legislator, the IHFPA was to

“provide a means for proper planning with local in-

put and decision making to cut down on empty hos-

pital facilities, nursing home facilities, sheltered care

. . . facilities and . . . ambulatory surgical facilities.”

(Emphasis added).

Thus, the legislative history of the acts supports the

valid premise that the legislature intended to regulate

abortions when it enacted the Illinois Abortion Act. It

also appears that section 16(1) of the MPA and its com-

panion clause in ¢ 157-8.3(A) of the ASTC were probably

enacted to prevent abortions from being performed in a

physician’s office. On the contrary, there is no proof in

this record that either the ASTCA or the IHFPA were

enacted primarily to regulate abortions; rather, these laws

were adopted to regulate the delivery of medical services

to its citizens and to attempt to prevent and control the

further unnecessary overexpansion of Illinois’ medical fa-

cilities. That the ASTCA was initially a companion bill

to the abortion bills is more of a historical coincidence

relished by political opportunists who, in this case, ap-

parently fully utilized it to their advantage. As the min-

utes of the licensing board reflect, for whatever their

worth: “Without the public interest in abortions, we would

not have any of the present legislation.” That is to Say

that the state legislators and other interested parties who

were primarily interested in regulating ambulatory medi-

cal services would not have been able to enact the legisla-

tion without the statewide and even nationwide interest

in the abortion question at the time.

The majority, acting and reasoning as if living in a social

and economie vacuum (overlooking the developing nation-

wide trend of ASTCs), ignores the dual purpose of the

App. 47 _

islative scheme presently at issue, selectively carving

a poopie non ‘aie of the ASTCA to support its

abortion theory of enactment. Thus, the majority —F

“As originally written, the statute {I assume the A

and regulations represented at least a coherent, if uncon-

stitutional, whole which regulated all aspects of —-

practice in Illinois.” Having ignored or at least overloo +

the State’s legitimate intent to regulate the new ae rapi :

ly developing trend of ambulatory surgical m = :

vices, the majority treats the ASTCA and the regulations

promulgated thereunder as “mincr _abortion provisions.

Further, the majority rejects the basic principle of a

bility when interpreting the construction of a duly —

legislative enactment which yh yng a ae

, iti ses; an

ae lena penlers the different acts and regulations

and affirms the preliminary injunction. Thus, the majority

limits and fails to effectuate the legitimate legislative =

poses behind the ASTCA. As a noted commentator as

observed, limiting the scope of a legislature s intent =

stitutes undesirable judicial activism as much as a =

sion construing a statute beyond its intended scope. oe

Posner, Statutory Interpretation, in the Classroom =

in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 822 (1983). The

majority’s failure to give full effect to the real and -

mate legislative intent to regulate ASTCs is the basis o

my dissent.

Recently, this court observed:

“I: igration and Naturalization Service v.

Chadha ha 42 US. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317

(1983), the Supreme Court stated that unconstitution-

al provisions in a statute shail be severed if it ap-

pears that the legislature would have enacted age

tutional provisions of the statute npenaty ; ®)

those provisions. 103 S.Ct. at 2774 (citing Buc “y

vy. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108, 96 S.Ct. 612, 677,

L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)).”

App. 48

Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985

aff'd, 108 S.Ct. 479 (1987). The Illinois laws in eames

all have their own severability provisions; ths it is clear

that the Illinois legislature intended that the constitutional

provisions °f the acts should be given effect even if other

provisions were held unconstitutional. Accordingly, I ana-

lyze the challenged Statutes and regulations recognizing

that | severance is improper [only] if the unconstitutional

atte 4 peed noes a of the statutory enactment

in its entirety.’” Jd. (quoting Schein v. Smith,

659 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1981)). On the het hand, the

challenged provisious which burden a woman’s right to

privacy may be severed as long as the severed provisions

do not affect “the cssential purposes of the act.” Jd.

II

The abortionist, Dr. Richard M. Ragsdale, plaintiff- l-

lee, testified at the preliminary injunction Seater that the

alleged “{flirst and major burden (affecting a woman’s right

to terminate her pregnancy] is simply the requirement for

an independent licensure as an abortion provider.” This

licensing requirement, applicable to any physician who

wishes to perform an abortion outside of a hospital, an

ASTC, or other regulated facility, regardless of the gesta-

tional period of the embryo or fetus, was created when

the legislature enacted § 16(1) of the MPA and its com-

panion clause in the ASTC definitions section. As previ-

ously noted by the majority, “{sJection 16(1) of the Medical

Practice Act . . . allows for revocation or suspension of

the license of any physician who performs an ‘elective

abortion’ in any place other than a licensed Ambulatory

Surgical Treatment Center . . -, @ hospital, or a facility

run by the state or federal governments.” The following

clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA is the companion

clause to § 16(1) of the MPA, and brought all surgeons

who wished to perform abortions under the ASTCA li-

censing and regulatory scheme:

App. 49

““*Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center’ means...

any facility in which a medical or surgical procedure

is utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of

whether the facility is devoted primarily to this pur-

Es

Significantly, the defendant-appellant, the State of Illinois,

asserts that it no longer enforces § 16(1) of the MPA. Ad-

ditionally, the majority observes that Illinois alleges that

the clause in ¢ 157-8.3(A) above is no longer being en-

forced, noting that:

“Since 1981, the [ASTC] act and regulations have

been applied only to facilities which are primarily

devoted to the performance of surgical procedures

(including abortions). This enforcement policy was

adopted in response to Village of Oak Lawn v. Mar-

cowitz, 86 Ill.2d 406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which

refused to enforce, in a criminal proceeding, that por-

tion of the local ordinance which incorporated the

ASTCA definition of an ASTC which covered ‘any

facility where a mecical or surgical procedure is per-

formed for the termination of pregnancy, regardless

of whether the facility is primarily devoted to that

, 99

purpose.

The majority holds, and I agree, that Illinois’ alleged non-

enforcement policy does not render the issues moot.

Although several justices have persuasively argued that

Roe v. Wade and its progeny articulate an “unworkable

scheme for constitutionalizing the regulation of abortion,”

Thornburgh v. American Co of Obstetricians, 476 U.S.

747, 814, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2207 (1986) (Justice O’Connor, dis-

senting), or represent a “venture . . . fundamentally mis-

guided since its inception,” Jd. at 786, 106 S.Ct. at 2192

(Justice White, dissenting), this court should be bound by

Roe and its progeny. The Supreme Court’s recent Thorn-

burgh decision “‘reaffirm[ed] the principles laid down in Roe

and Akron.” Id. at 759, 106 S.Ct. at 2178. Thus, we

analyze the abortion licensing requirement created when

the lilinois legislature enacted § 16(1) of the MPA and its

companion provision contained in the ASTC definition of

App. 50

ambulatory surgical treatment center, 4 157-8.3(A), under

the standards articulated in Roe and its progeny.

“In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the ‘right of

privacy, . . . founded in the the Fourteenth Amend-

ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions

upon state action, .. . is broad enough to encompass

a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her

pregnancy.’ .. .

* * * *

The Court also has recognized, because abortion is

a medical procedure, that the full vindication of the

woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires that

her physician be given ‘the room he needs to make

his best medical judgment.’.. .

At the same time, the Court in Roe acknowledged

that the woman’s fundamental right ‘is not unquali-

fied and must be considered against important state

interests in abortion.’ . . . But restrictive state reg-

ulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other

fundamental rights subject to searching judicial ex-

amination, must be supported by a compelling state

interest. . . . [The Supreme Court] recognized two

such interests that may justify state regulation of

abortions.

First, a state has an ‘important and legitimate in-

terest in protecting the potentiality of human life.’

. . . Although this interest exists ‘throughout the

course of the woman’s pregnancy,’ . . . it becomes

compelling only at viability, the point at which the

fetus ‘has the capability of meaningful life outside the

mother’s womb.’ .. .

Second, because a State has a legitimate concern

with the health of women who undergo abortions, ‘a

State may y assert important interests in safe-

guarding health [and] in maintaining medical stan-

dards.’ . . . [The Court further] held in Roe, however,

that this health interest does not become compelling

until ‘approximately the end of the first trimester’

App. 51

of pregnancy. .. . Until that time, a pregnant woman

must be permitted, in consultation with her physi-

cian, to decide to have an abortion and to effectuate

that decision ‘free of interference by the State.’

This does not mean that a State never may enact

a regulation touching on the woman’s abortion right

during the first weeks of pregnancy. Certain regula-

tions that have no significant impact on the woman’s

exercise of her right may be permissible where jus-

tified by important state health objectives. .

From approximately the end of the first trimester

of pregnancy, the State ‘may regulate the abortion

procedure to the extent that the regulation reason-

ably relates to the preservation and protection of

maternal health.’ . . . The State’s discretion to reg-

ulate on this basis does not, however, permit it to

adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted

—_ practice. [The Court has] rejected a State’s

attempt to ban a particular second trimester abor-

tion procedure, where the ban would have increased

the cost and limited the availability of abortions

without promoting important health benefits. .. . Jf

a State requires licensing or undertakes to regulate

the performance of abortions during this period, the

health standards adopted must be ‘legitimately re-

lated to the objective the state seeks to accomplish.’ ”

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,

462 U.S. 416, 426-431, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2490-93 (1983) (cita-

tions omitted) (emphasis added).

Initially one observes that the abortion licensing a

ment as it exists pursuant to § 16(1) of the MPA and the

ASTCA definition, fails to distinguish between first and

second trimester abortions; thus, it prohibits the perfor-

mance of first-trimester abortions in physicians’ offices.

The record reveals that a woman’s qualified right under

Roe to terminate her pregnancy is very probably imper-

missibly burdened because surgeons who would otherwise

perform first-trimester abortions out of their offices are

App. 52

precluded from doing so. Dr. Ragsdale, an abortionist and

a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist, testified

that outpatient abortions, whether performed in a physi-

cian’s office or a clinic, were as safe as an abortion per-

formed in a hospital setting.

Plaintiffs additionally called another alleged abortion ex-

pert, Dr. Warren Martin Hern, a doctor and general prac-

titioner without board certification in the specialty of ob-

stetrics and gynecol ~~ Hern testified that first-trimester

abortions, performed six to eight weeks from the last

menstrual period are “probably the safest surgical pro-

cedure being performed in the United States in this cate-

gory of p ures.”"''! Dr. Hern further testified that the

safest surgical method of first-trimester abortion was the

“vacuum aspiration” method. This procedure is basically

“a suction removal of the uterine contents.’’!?

The State of Illinois’ expert, Dr. John J. Barton, a board-

certified specialist in the fields of obstetrics and gynecol-

ogy, also testified that first-trimester abortions performed

in outpatient facilities (such as physicians’ offices or or ASTCs)

present no greater risk than the risks and complication

'! Dr. Hern defined “in this category of procedures” as “‘pro-

cedures that involve invasion of a body cavity or a major organ

of some kind.”

12 Dr. Hern noted that the fatality rate for abortion was about

five per one million, whereas, the case fatality rate for term de-

livery was about 11 per 100,000 live births, which meant that the

risk of term birth is roximately 25 times greater in terms of

risk of death than abortion. Dr. Hern the abortion sur-

gery risk factors to the risk factors of r types of outpatient

surgery. He testified that “some estimates . . . indicate tonsillec-

tomies are at least twice as dangerous as abortions.” Similarly,

Hern stated — 4 that he Bb. pay a colleague who informed him

that laparoscop resulted in a oon rate of two per

100,000. 0. Hern t testi tested Laparoscopic surgery involves the intro-

duction of a laparoscope into the cavity. pS ©

that permits

a tube, a metal tube, that is hollow and is cometh

the physician to look through it into the cavity is introduced

through the umbilicus, with or without operating instruments.”

App. 53

rates of abortions performed in hospitals. Based on the

medical experts’ testimony, it probable that first-

trimester abortions could be safely performed in the sur-

geon’s office. Thus, it appears that § 16(1) and its com-

panion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA would limit

the availability of abortions by precluding the performance

of abortions in a physician/surgeon’s office.

In Akron the Supreme Court noted that where the

abortion law “increased the cost and limited the availabil-

ity of abortions,” such a law would probably interfere with

the woman’s decision to have an abortion as well as its ef.-

fectuation. Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2492-93. Further, although

dictum, the Supreme Court noted “that the medical evi-

dence suggests that until approximately the end of the

first trimester, the state’s interest in maternal health would

not be served by regulations that restrict the manner in

which abortions are performed by a licensed ——..

Id. at 2492 n.11. The Court further observed that “un-

complicated abortions generally may be performed in a

physician’s office or an outpatient clinic up to 14 weeks

from the first day of the last menstrual period.” /d.

(American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

(ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-G ic Services 54

(5th ed. 1982)). In light of the Supreme ’s caveat

in Akron noting the probability that physicians can per-

form first-trimester abortions in their offices; given the

defendant’s policy of nonenforcement regarding § 16(1)

of the MPA and its companion clause in the ASTC,

{ 157-8.3(A), requiring the licensure of any facility per-

forming even one abortion; and after evaluating the evi-

dence ted during the preliminary injunction hearing

which established that first-trimester abortions performed

in a controlled outpatient setting, including a physician's

office, probably were as safe as abortions performed in

hospitals, I would selectively enjoin the enforcement of

§ 16(1) of the MPA and its companion clause in the ASTCA

definition without destroying the entire act because it is

more likely than not that the plaintiffs would prevail on

the merits in light of present Supreme Court precedent.

App. 54

In so holding, I agree with the Illinois Supreme Court

decision in Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill. 2d

406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which also held that the ASTCA

definition was constitutionally invalid as incorporated in

a local ordinance which “closely resemble{d] the state

(ASTC] act and implementing regulations adopted by the

Department of Health.” Jd. at 38. The local ASTC ordi-

nance also required an “initial license fee of $5,000, plus

annual renewal fees of $2,000." Id. at 39. In Marcowitz

the Illinois court, foreshadowing the caveat in Akron,

stated:

“Given the substantial licensing fee required and the

detailed regulation involved, it seems inevitable that

medical practitioners who might otherwise perform

abortions for their regular patients, but whose facil-

ities were not primarily devoted to surgery, would

choose not to qualify under the ordinance. The right

of a woman considering a first-trimester abortion to

seek the advice and services of her obstetrician, gyne-

cologist, or other physician in whom she has trust

and confidence may not be so drastically curbed.

Id. at 42.

Further, both § 16(1) of the MPA and the pea

definition clause in the ASTCA," can easily severed

from their respective acts without affecting the legisla-

ture’s “essential purposes” for the acts’ enactments. See

Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at Ub4S. The MPA io stanly ene

and eapthl of teing eles Se § 16(1) and

as such will continue to be used inter alia to revoke or

suspend a malfeasant physician’s license. Similarly, the

A A becomes “abortion neutral” once the invalid

clause is removed from the definition of an ASTC. See,

3 The unconstitutional clause of 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA to

be severed reads as follows:

“or any facility in which a medical or surgical

procedure is

utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the

facility is devoted primarily to this purpose.

App. 55

e.g., Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 427 N.E.2d at

.14 So construed, the ASTCA fully effectuates the legis-

lature’s primary purpose for its enactment, i.e., to reg-

ulate the rapidly developing trend of cost-effective am-

bulatory surgical medical units. Thus, the State of Illinois

remains free to license any facility pursuant to the “abor-

tion neutral’ ASTCA “devoted primarily to the mainte-

nance and operation of facilities for performance of sur-

gical procedures,” including an abortion facility, like Dr.

Ragsdale’s, devoted primarily to the performance of abor-

tions.'5 As with other social and economic legislation, the

test traditionally applied is whether or not the law has

a “rational relation” to a valid state objective. See Wil-

liamson v. Lee Optical Company, 348 U.S. 483, 491, 75

S.Ct. 461, 466 (1955). Thus, I would apply the ‘rational

relation” test to the now “abortion neutral’? ASTCA.

The majority, however, disagrees and would apply the

strict scrutiny test relying on mere dictum in Friendship

Medical Center Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d

1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).

There the court observed:

“Furthermore, any proposed regulation, even if ap-

plied universally to ali similar medical procedures,

14 As I discuss, infra, the abortion-specific { 157-8.6-1, as well

as the abortion-specific regulations, are also severable; however,

all but one of these provisions survive the strict standard articu-

lated in Roe.

‘8 The majority baldly asserts that Dr. Ragsdale’s practice con-

sists exclusively of first-trimester abortions even though the record

reveals that e performed some 40,000 abortions between

1973 and 1985. Up until the Illinois court’s 1982 decision in Poe

v. Illinois rtment of Public Health, No. 78-C-4126 (N.D. Il.

1982), which found the second-trimester hospital requirement un-

constitutional, Ragsdale limited his practice to the performance of

first-trimester abortions. However, Ragsdale testified that subse-

= to Poe, he began performing second-trimester abortions. This

viously makes economic sense since the physician had the avail-

able licensed ASTC and would only lose income by refusing to

perform second-trimester abortions.

App. 56

because of the fundamental right of a woman to pro-

cure an abortion during the first trimester, would

have to meet a compelling governmental interest re-

quirement. Thus, any general health regulations

which would apply to first-trimester abortions would

have to be limited so as to give effect to the fun-

damental rights as established by Roe and Doe; that

is, not be burdensome on a woman’s right to decide

to abort a pregnancy. By this we mean that in all

probability nothing broader than general requirements

as to the maintaining of sanitary facilities and general

requirements as to meeting minimal building code

standards would be permissible.”

Id. at 1153-54.

Initially, I point out that Judge Fairchild, concurring,

rejected the Friendship majority’s dictum, stating:

‘Nevertheless, regulation of the safety of all these

procedures, incidentally including first-trimester abor-

tions, through imposition of generally applicable reg-

ulations, would seem to be a valid exercise of the

state’s interest in protecting health and need only

satisfy the traditional [rational basis] test of judicial

scrutiny imposed in this area.”

Id. at 1155 (Fairchild, J., concurring). Because Friend-

ship’s dictum to the contrary “was not refined by the fires

of adversary presentation,” it ‘“‘was not a fully measured

judicial pronouncement,” and thus “not authoritative.”’

United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, ___ (7th Cir.

1988). This caveat is particularly applicable here where

we are construing a legislative act regulating a broad field

of medical services, including minor surgical procedures.

The majority gives two reasons, unsupported by this

record, for relying on the Friendship dictum: “First, we

cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA was enacted pri-

marily with abortion clinics in mind and only applied to

outpatient surgical clinics generally in an effort to save

the statute from unconstitutionality.” However, as I dem-

App. 57

onstrated in part I, the legislative history establishes the

contrary; the primary purpose of the ASTCA was to reg-

ulate the new cost-effective ASTCs in which semi-compli-

cated (minor) surgery was performed. In effect the ma-

jority puts the cart before the horse because it rests its

analysis of the ASTCA on the quagmire of legal dictum

set forth in Friendship which ultimately clouds and con-

fuses its analysis of the ASTCA.

The majority further states:

“Secondly, the state cannot, merely by applying the

expedient and conclusory label ‘onmney? gn Pe

procedure, apply requirements which would be neces-

sary to major surgical procedures in the abortion con-

text where they would be wholly inappropriate. It

is as much a vice to treat abortion similarly to dis-

similar procedures as it is to treat it differently from

analogous procedures.”’

The majority’s conclusory statement is incredible in light

of the record. First of all, the plaintiff's own medical ex-

perts testified that an abortion was a surg

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