Record and brief — Turnock v. Ragsdale
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JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
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No. » Nov 10 1988) =|
- JOSEPH F.SPANICK S|
IN THE Oe
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
BERNARD J. TURNOCK, M.D., M.P.H., Director of
the Illinois Department of Public Health, et al.,
Appellants,
Ve
RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, M.D., et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
NEIL F. HARTIGAN
Attorney General, State of Illinois
ROBERT J. RUIZ
Solicitor General, State of Illinois
100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 917-3000
Attorneys for Appellants
Micuak. J. Hayes *
KATHLEEN KREISEL FLAHAVEN
Rocer P. FLAHAVEN
GLADYS STEVENS
Assistant Attorneys General
100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 917-3654
Of Counsel * Counsel of Record
Printed by Authority of the State of Illinois (P.O. 34272—60— 11-10-88)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Illinois can constitutionally license and regu-
late outpatient surgical facilities in which pregnancy termi-
nations are performed to the same extent it licenses and
regulates outpatient sUrgical facilities in which pregnan-
cy terminations are not performed.
2. Whether a case or controversy existed with respect
to the challenged statutes and regulations which were not
being enforced by the State of Illinois prior to the filing
of the complaint.
3. Whether statutes and regulations establishing stan-
dards for the construction, maintenance and operation of
outpatient surgical facilities are constitutional as applied
to outpatient surgical facilities in which pregnancy termi-
nations are performed.
4. Whether the federal courts can refuse to give effect
to severability requirements, thereby invalidating stat-
utory and regulatory provisions which are constitutional.
il
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The defendants in the district court were Bernard J.
Turnock, M.D., M.P.H., Director of the Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Health; Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney Gen-
eral of Illinois; Gary L. Clayton, the Director of the
Illinois Department of Registration and Education; and
Richard M. Daley, State’s Attorney of Cook County. Tur-
nock, Hartigan and Clayton were the appellants in the
court of appeals. Daley did not file a notice of appeal.
In addition, appellant Stephen F. Selcke, Director of the
Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, is the suc-
cessor in public office to Gary L. Clayton, Director of the
Illinois Department of Professional Regulation.
The plaintiffs in the district court and appellees in the
court of appeals were Richard M. Ragsdale, M.D., Mar-
garet Moe, Northern Illinois Women’s Center, Sarah Roe
and Jane Doe.
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
——_ — —
\ PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................. i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ......... ii
ES cobs cccsccccscccess ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................. vi
Nes cc ec ccccccccces l
eae civic nccccecccccce's 1
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 4
ca ccc ec ccscccces 5
The Evidence Presented ................. 6
Pee 8
PE ED ow cece cece cece. i)
The ASTC Regulations .................. 11
Building Design and Construction Require-
UPPER ERER GGG cas eseccccccscceccs 13
The Constitutional Challenge ............. 14
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUB-
PEPER UER Seeesecccccecccccccccc. 21
A. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED
JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN CHAL-
LENGED PROVISIONS WHICH WERE
NOT BEING ENFORCED ............. 21
iv
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRONEOUS-
LY FOUND THAT THE CHALLENGED
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS VIO-
LATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
PRUNE cacecctscdvercesecenséinuwes 24
C. THE MAJORITY OPINION CONFLICTS
WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT RE-
GARDING SEVERANCE OF PURPORTED-
LY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS . 28
PTET ee ee ee ee ee 30
APPENDIX
(Separate Volume)
App.
PAGE
A—Slip Opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, March 10,
BOD Sk 0hieniccccscresvedannnsausceuneeses l
B— Judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
neals for the Seventh Circuit, March 10, 1988 . 102
C— Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit Amending the Slip
Cele, DOU Bey Gee ck iicccecccussdices 103
D— Amended Order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Denying the
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Re-
hearing En Banc, August 16, 1988 ........ 105
E-—-Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit Denying the Petition
for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc, August 12, 1988 ................ 107
Vv
F— Class Certification and Preliminary Injunction
Order of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ilinois, Eastern Divi-
sion, December 11, 1985 .................:.
G— Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United
States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division, November 27,
Sy sdauned eeu cbuainndes bh osdusseeaue ees
H—Notice of Appeal, November 7, 1988 ......
I— Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act,
111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 94 157-8.1, et seg. .....
J— Health Facilities Planning Act, 111% Ill. Rev.
es es Oe ON ob hone cndseesusaynss
K— Medical Practice Act, 111 Ill. Rev. Stat. € 4400-
L—77 Illinois Administrative Code, Chapter 1,
Pe. OSG a dit addeoans ee ueets
109
112
146
149
193
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases PAGE(S)
Abortion Coalition of Mich., Inc. v. Mich. Dep't
of Public Health, 426 F.Supp. 471 (E.D. Mich.
EPC OTTO C CPE CCUT LOT ETE TET TTC CELTS 26
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) . 26
Baird v. Department of Public Health, 599 F.2d
ee Oe SS eo eheeek es ceeeken Gude 25
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ..........
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commis-
CS, Te Wee Bee GD vc svdececcccsvesss 29
Charles v. Carey, 579 F.Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1988) . 10
C.I.0. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472 (1945) ....... 23
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) ....... 10, 15, 24
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
i ceri wag Renealledess Ouesanbendeces 26
Connecticut v. Menilio, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) ..... 24
El Paso & Northeastern R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215
8 ER ey ee
29
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) ........ 23
Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976) . 25
International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623
yy 8 8: Be SS eee 23
J.N.S., Inc. v. State of Ind., 712 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.
SOD Nees eccceineueuesunsuNenuaseneubenees 23
vil
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'n
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) ........... 26
Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
SEE Stceohsducsdinansce uke odenbase es 10, 27
Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) .......... 23
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) ..... 29
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ...... 15; 18, 19, 24
Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) ... 10
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians,
Gee ee WOe GE RSecensecescccevcssenes 19
Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill.2d 406
BEE ¢6dnndddnsawddecnenckeshnetnedacss 9, 10, 28
Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1986) . 23
Westchester Women’s Health Org. v. Whalen, 475
Papp. Te6 G.DN.Y. WTR) .cccsccccccccss 25, 26
Constitutional Provisions
oe Rg eee eee 2,5
a GE SS PD ous See uducsucnvevaceus 3,5
ee Se CE Un veenpintateccstessneee 3, 5
ee EE UE sh van ecdwesvcusowsnens 3,5
es I, SE, GE cccponccccsecdccenaces 3, 23
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Section 1 .......... 3,4, 5
Vill
Statutes
ne cuwkueeh bones
re er
oR a Ree
OO eae
Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars. 157-8.1 et seq. ..
Pere ere T eT TTT TT TTT TTT TTT TT TTT Tite passim
Health Facilities Planning Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars. 1151 et seg. .. passim
Medical Practice Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, par. 4400-22 ...... passim
Regulations
Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Licensing
Requirements, 77 Ill. Adm. Code, Ch. 1, Sec-
Se Se, NE © cdccccccncctnesnces passim
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
BERNARD J. TURNOCK, M.D., M.P.H., Director of
the Illinois Department of Public Health, et al.,
Appellants,
Vv.
RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, M.D., et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
a
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit entered March 10, 1988 is reported
at 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988) and is reproduced at Ap-
pendix A. On August 12, 1988 the defendants’ petition
for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc was
denied. (Appendix D, E). The memorandum opinion of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois rendered November 27, 1985 is reported at 625
F.Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1985) and is reproduced at Ap-
pendix G.
The judgment order of the United States District Court
entered December 11, 1985 is not reported, but is repro-
duced at Appendix F.
JURISDICTION
This action, brought under 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and
2202 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 challenges the constitu-
tionality of portions of the Illinois Medical Practice Act,
Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act, and Health
Facilities Planning Act. Invoking the jurisdiction of the
District Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 plaintiffs filed
a class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Subsequent to an evidentiary hearing, the District Court
entered on November 27, 1985 and December 11, 1985 a
preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs and enjoined
enforcement of the Acts and rules promulgated thereunder
to the extent any person or facility offers or performs,
or desires to offer or perform first and/or early second
=~
trimester abortions or other abortion-related gynecological
procedures.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit vacated as moot one portion of the Dis-
trict Court’s decision, held unconstitutional the other chal-
lenged provisions, and affirmed the remainder of the deci-
sion. Its judgment was entered on March 10, 1988.
On August 12, 1988 a majority of the members of the
original panel voted to deny the defendants’ petition for
rehearing, and the suggestion for rehearing en banc failed
by an equally divided court. Judges Wood, Posner, Coffey,
Manion, and Kanne voted to grant rehearing en banc. (Ap-
pendix D, E).
Defendants Turnock, Hartigan and Selcke filed their
Notice of Appeal in the Court of Appeals on November
7, 1988. (Appendix H). Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States to review this judgment by appeal
is conferred by 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(2).
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
————_———_—_-
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. Amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
afte
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public r; nor
shall any person be subject for the same oifence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. Const. Amend. IX:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.
U.S. Const. Amend. XI:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Section 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdictior thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein yew
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law whic
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
ails
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
State Statutes
Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars. 157-8.1 et seq.
(Reprinted at Appendix I)
Health Facilities Planning Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars. 1151 et seg.
(Reprinted at Appendix J)
Medical Practice Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, par. 4400-22
(Reprinted at Appendix K)
Regulations
Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center
Licensing Requirements, 77 Ill. Adm. Code, Ch. 1,
Section 205, Subchapter b ~
(Reprinted at Appendix L)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Ragsdale is a medical doctor licensed in Illinois,
who performs abortions as part of his medical practice.
Plaintiff Northern Illinois Women’s Center is an Illinois
corporation which provides abortion services to women
in Rockford, Illinois. Plaintiff Margaret Moe is a regis-
tered nurse and the sole owner of a medical facility in
Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiffs Sarah Roe and Jane Doe
are female citizens of child-bearing age who had abortions
in the past and may seek abortions in the future.
Plaintiffs claimed that the challenged statutes form a
tripartite regulatory scheme which impermissibly restricts
=
the performance of first and second trimester abortions.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the challenged statutes
and regulations were violative of rights secured by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs contended
that the “scheme”’ as applied singles out for discrimina-
_ tory treatment facilities in which abortions are performed
and substantially inhibits a woman from exercising her
right to choose to have an abortion under medically safe
and reasonably inexpensive conditions. Plaintiffs further
averred that the challenged “scheme” impermissibly pre-
vented physicians from implementing a woman’s decision
to choose abortion in that the “scheme’’ mandated that
physicians and facilities comply with allegedly irrational
and arbitrary requirements. (Compl., pars. 1-4).
On September 20, 1985 plaintiff Richard M. Ragsdale,
M.D. filed a motion for preliminary injunction asking the
district court to enjoin defendants from enforcing the chal-
lenged statutes and regulations. Plaintiff Ragsdale claimed
that unless the statutes and regulations were enjoined he
would be unable to perform abortion services after De-
cember 31, 1985.
The State Statutes
The Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act [herein-
after ASTC Act] became law in 1973. (Appendix I). The
stated purpese of the ASTC Act is to provide for the pro-
tection of the public health through the establishment and
enforcement of standards for the construction and opera-
tion of ASTCs. ASTCs by definition are facilities which
are primarily devoted to the performance of surgical pro-
cedures.!
' In addition to ASTCs, the Illinois Department of Public Health
is responsible for licensing and surveying numerous other facilities
(Footnote continued on following page)
i
The Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act [HFP Act]
became law in 1974. (Appendix J). The purpose of the
HFP Act is to attempt to obtain a comprehensive health
care delivery system involving all types of health care
facilities, services and equipment. The HFP Act also rep-
resents an attempt to restrain the rising costs of health
care by preventing unnecessary construction and duplica-
tion of unneeded health care facilities. (App. 166). Types
of health care facilities included within the HFP Act's pro-
visions include those licensed pursuant to the Health Main-
tenance Organization Act, the ASTC Act, the Nursing
Home Care Reform Act of 1979, the Hospital Licensing
Act, and kidney disease treatment centers. (App. 167).
The Medical Practice Act [MPA] provides the licensure
requirements of physicians in Illinois and prohibits the
practice of medicine by any person not holding a valid
license. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111, par. 4401 et seg. (1983).
Now, par. 4400-1 et seg. of the Medical Practice Act of
1987. (Appendix K).
The Evidence Presented
At the time of trial, there were 42 licensed ASTCs in
Illinois. The types of surgical procedures performed in li-
censed ASTCs include plastic surgery, removal of cysts
and tumors, pregnancy terminations, tubal ligations, hernia
repairs and rhinoplasty repairs of the nose. Some surgical
procedures performed in ASTCs, including abortions, are
done so under a general anesthesia. Of the 42 licensed
' continued
which provide health or medical services. These facilities include
blood banks, clinical laboratories, alcohol treatment centers, hos-
pitals, hospices, and nursing homes. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, pars.
601-101 et seg.; 621-101 et seg.; 2301 et seg; 142 et seg.; 6101 et
seq.; and 4151-101 ef seg.
~
ASTCs, 22 indicated that some pregnancy terminations
would be performed.
For the 12 years prior to trial Dr. Ragsdale was the
primary abortion provider in northwestern Illinois. Dr.
Ragsdale is well known as a provider of abortion services
in the Rockford area. In 1973 Dr. Ragsdale opened the
plaintiff Northern Illinois Women’s Center. The Center
primarily provides first and early second trimester abor-
tion services. Dr. Ragsdale performs approximately 3500
abortions per year at his facility. In the 12 years prior
to trial, Dr. Ragsdale had performed in excess of 42,000
abortions.
At the time of trial, Dr. Ragsdale’s facility had been
licensed as an ASTC in Illinois for 12 years. The facility
contained variations from the ASTC regulations. Any such
variances had not substantially affected renewal of Dr.
Ragsdale’s license for those 12 years. Dr. Ragsdale was
then informed by his landlord that his lease would not
be renewed. The nonrenewal of the lease was a result
of the landlord’s decision to expand and renovate its build-
ing and desire to have as tenants doctors who admitted
patients to Rockford Memorial Hospital. Dr. Ragsdale
therefore planned to move his facility. The Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Healt) preliminarily approved his plans
for relocation. In addition, Dr. Ragsdale submitted an ap-
plication for a certificate of need.
On March 14, 1985 Comprehensive Health Planning of
Northern Illinois (CHPNI) held a public meeting regard-
ing the proposed relocation. CHPNI is a federally funded
organization which is a separate entity from the HFP
Board. It is responsible for completing an independent re-
view of a proposed project.
Dr. Ragsdale attended the CHPNI meeting. There were
in Dr. Ragsdale’s opinion some ‘“rational’’ discussions at
ttle
the meeting, and some statements supporting the need
issue. There were, in addition, more statements that there
was no need for the facility. The meeting then degener-
ated into a shouting match over abortion.
Dr. Ragsdale was subsequently informed by CHPNI
that his proposal met the review requirements, including
the need requirement. However, the lease which Dr. Rags-
_ dale had procured was withdrawn by the lessor.
In order to aid his testimony at trial, Dr. Ragsdale de-
termined what it would cost on a rough basis and in broad
terms to comply with the ASTC Act and regulations at
his new facility. Dr. Ragsdale first estimated the cost of
relocation of his practice as a result of the loss of his
lease, and without complying with the ASTC Act and
regulations. Dr. Ragsdale concluded that the cost would
be an additional $22.45 per patient per year.
Dr. Ragsdale also prepared an estimate which repre-
sented his guess as to what it would cost in addition to
the $22.45 in order to bring his new facility into “reason-
able compliance”’ with the ASTC regulations. Dr. Ragsdale
estimated that the cost would be an additional $22.21 per
patient per year.
Abortion Procedures
It is uncontroverted that abortions are surgical pro-
cedures. According to the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses,
there are few surgical procedures given so little atten-
tion and so underrated in its potential hazard as abor-
tion. It is also agreed that all physicians licensed under
the MPA do not have the qualifications, training and ex-
perience to perform safe first and early second trimester
abortions.
Plaintiffs’ expert maintained that medical education in
this country has paid little attention to abortion services.
=
Abortions, more than any other types of procedures, re-
quire much experience and practice. It is not a procedure
which can be done well after a few hundred or even a
few thousand procedures.
There are several factors which affect the safety of first
trimester and early second trimester abortion procedures.
One factor is the skill, experience and professional integri-
ty of the physician performing the abortion. Other factors
include the duration of the pregnancy; choice of abortion
technique; the existence of sterile conditions; the availabil-
ity of qualified staff and appropriate equipment; the avail-
ability of emergency facilities; and the type of anesthesia
which is used.
Enforcement Policies
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Illinois rendered its deci-
sion in Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 I1l.2d 406
(1981). In Marcowitz the court considered a village ordi-
nance which had adopted the definition of an ASTC that
was found in the State ASTC Act. The Supreme Court
of Illinois held that the ordinance was unconstitutional to
the extent that it defined an ASTC to be any facility in
which abortions are performed, irrespective of whether
devoted primarily to that purpose. Marcowitz, 86 IIl.2d
at 420. The court then severed that portion of the defini-
tion of an ASTC from the remainder of the ordinance.
Four days after Marcowitz was decided, the Illinois De-
partment of Public Health, pursuant to a written policy,
ceased to enforce the identical abortion specific portion
of the definition of an ASTC found in the State statute.
Since 1981, therefore, licensure and enforcement proceed-
ings were applicable only to those facilities primarily de-
voted to the performance of surgical procedures.
=_™
In 1982, United States District Judge Charles P. Kocoras
enjoined the Illinois Department of Public Health from
enforcing Section 4 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975
and “any related regulation.” Section 4 was a second tri-
mester hospitalization requirement. The Department inter-
preted this ruling as also enjoining the enforcement of
ASTC Regulation Section 205.740 which prohibited the
performance of second trimester abortions in ASTCs.
(App. 222).
In 1983, this Court decided the cases of City of Akron
v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476 (1983); and Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506
(1983). The decision in Akron reinforced the earlier or-
der, and the Department’s policy of not enforcing Section
205.740 of the Regulations therefore continued.
In December of 1982 or January of 1983 Dr. Ragsdale
was informed that Section 205.740 of the ASTC Regula-
tions was no longer being enforced. As a result, Dr. Rags-
dale began to perform second trimester abortions at his
facility.
In 1983, in Charles v. Carey, 579 F.Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill.
1983), Section 10 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 (the
reporting requirement) was permanently enjoined. As a
result Section 205.760 (App. 223), an abortion specific
reporting requirement of the ASTC Regulations was no
longer enforced. Dr. Ragsdale was informed that this sec-
tion was no longer being enforced.
The Illinois Department of Registration and Education
(now Department of Professional Regulation) has absolute
prosecutorial discretion in the initiation of disciplinary
actions under the Medical Practice Act. Because of the
Marcowitz decision and other decisions concerning the
abortion issue, the challenged portion of the MPA (App.
~ =
193) was not being enforced by the Department to restrict
the performance of all abortions to licensed facilities.
The evidence submitted regarding the State’s enforce-
ment policies in light of various decisions was not contro-
verted.
The ASTC Regulations
There are a total of 59 ASTC Regulations (excluding
subsections). Of that total very few are abortion specific.
Of the abortion specific regulations, as previously noted,
two were not being enforced prior to the filing of plain-
tiffs’ complaint.
Plaintiffs’ experts testified generally that the ASTC
regulations were not medically necessary for the perform-
ance of a safe first or early second trimester abortion.
Certain components of the regulations, however, were ac-
knowledged to be consistent with safe and acceptable stan-
dards of medical care. Moreover, some regulations were
described as belaboring the obvious, the kind of thing any
competent practitioner would do, and superfluous.
For example, Section 205.240 of the regulations provides
that the ASTC is to formulate a written policies and pro-
cedures manual. (App. 213). Dr. Ragsdale described this
requirement as standard medical and administrative prac-
tice.
Likewise, Section 205.230(a) of the regulations provides
that the management of a licensed ASTC is to appoint
a qualified consulting committee. (App. 211). Dr. Ragsdale
testified that this regulation is “belaboring the obvious.”
Similarly, the plaintiffs’ expert testified that either the
medical director or principal physician of an abortion facil-
ity should have staff privileges at the nearest hospital,
or there should be a hospital transfer agreement. Section
=~
205.540(c) of the regulations provides that there should
be written documentation of either a transfer agreement,
a statement that the medical director has admitting privi-
leges, or that each staff physician, podiatrist or dentist
has admitting privileges. (App. 218).
Subpart G of the regulations sets forth additional require-
ments for facilities in which obstetrical/gynecological pro-
cedures are performed. (App. 220-23). This section applies
to abortions as well as other gynecological and obstetric
procedures. Plaintiffs’ expert testified that there are
aspects of Subpart G which are consistent with good stan-
dards of medical practice.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services, Sixth Edi-
tion [ACOG standards], provide that ambulatory care facil-
ities for abortion services should meet the same standards
of care as for other surgical procedures. Section 205.710
of the ASTC regulations contains an essentially identical
provision. (App. 220). The parties’ expert witnesses agreed
with this provision.
Likewise, plaintiffs’ expert testified that counseling is
an indispensable part of a thorough preoperative evalua-
tion and preparation of a patient for an abortion pro-
cedure, and that counseling should include a discussion
of the alternatives for dealing with pregnancy. Section
205.730(b) of the regulations provides that counseling is to
be provided prior to obstetrical/gynecological procedures
following diagnosis of pregnancy. (App. 221).
It is agreed that routine laboratory work for abortion
procedures should include a urine screening exam for preg-
nancy, a hematocrit or hemoglobin, an Rh screening test,
dip stick urinalysis and for black patients a sickle cell test.
Section 205.520(b) of the regulations simply provides that
a hemoglobin or hematocrit is to be performed prior to
—j13—
certain surgical procedures. (App. 216-17). Section 205.73Ma)
provides that prior to obstetrical procedures blood Rh fac-
tor is to be determined and that prior to performing an
abortion procedure the diagnosis of pregnancy is to be
»stablished. (App. 221).
‘t is similarly agreed that after every abortion, removed
tissue should be examined. One of the purposes of the
pathology report is to confirm pregnancies in early stages.
Another purpose is to ensure that fetal parts are present
and to be able to alert patients to the possibility of an
ectopic pregnancy. Section 205.530(c) of the ASTC regula-
tions merely provides that all tissues removed during
surgery are to be examined by a consulting pathologist.
(App. 217).
Building Design and Construction Requirements
Subparts (I) and (J) of the ASTC regulations set forth
various building design, construction standards, and physi-
cal and mechanical requirements. (App. 225-44). Plaintiffs’
expert, who did not consider himself a building design,
construction, or mechanical expert testified that the pro-
visions of Subparts (I) and (J) are not medically necessary
for the operation of a facility in which first and early sec-
ond trimester abortions are to be performed. The defen-
dants introduced evidence demonstrating that many of
these regulations reflect common, accepted and standard
practices.
For example, Section 205.1510 of the regulations pro-
vides that after building heating, ventilating and air condi-
tioning systems are installed they shall be tested and
balanced to ensure that they are in proper working con-
dition. (App. 240). The regulation also provides that upon
completion of the facility, the owner of the ASTC is to
be provided with operating and maintenance instructions.
tailiies
Section 205.1520 provides, among other things, for insula-
tion in the facility and in certain situations for a flame
spread rating in accordance with the National Fire Pro-
tection Association. (App. 240-41). These requirements
were described as standard for health facilities.
Similarly, various regulations dealing with hot water
systems, ventilation systems, and plumbing fixtures were
demonstrated to be standard requirements.
The Constitutional Challenge
The trial conducted by the district court was held on
November 18-22 and 26, 1985. On November 27, 1985 and
December 11, 1985 the district court entered orders grant-
ing Dr. Ragsdale’s motion for preliminary injunction.
In the November 27, 1985 Order, the district court found
that plaintiffs had prevailed on all four traditional factors
the courts must consider in ruling on a motion for prelim-
inary injunction. (App. 129). First, the district court de-
cided that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm with-
out an injunction and that no adequate remedy at law
existed. Specifically, it found that the challenged statutes
and regulations have the effect of raising the cost and
limiting the availability of abortions. (App. 129). In addi-
tion, the district court found that the challenged provi-
sions (1) force complying facilities to raise their fees,
possibly beyond the economic means of some women; (2)
discourage other non-complying facilities from offering
abortion services; and (3) make it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for current abortion facilities to move or new abor-
tion facilities to be constructed. (App. 130). Further, the
district court rejected defendants’ argument that plain-
tiffs could not be irreparably harmed by those statutes
and regulations which are not being enforced. (App. 133).
<=
Next, the district court determined that the threatened
harm to plaintiffs outweighed any possible harm to defen-
dants. (App. 134).
Third, the district court considered the merits of plain-
tiffs’ claims. It utilized the trimester standard established
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as interpreted in City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 426
U.S. 416 (1983) and other cases, to provide the legal frame-
work for the constitutional evaluation of the challenged
statutes and regulations. (App. 134-35).
The district court noted that State regulations having
no significant impact on a woman’s exercise of her abor-
tion right during the first trimester may be permissible
where justified by important State health objectives. It
held, however, that Roe does not stand for the proposi-
tion that general medical regulations which apply to the
performance of first and early second trimester abortions
are per se constitutional. (App. 136). Thus, the district
court concluded that even general regulations which bur-
den a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy
during the first trimester would have to meet the com-
pelling governmental interest requirement. In addition, the
district court decided that a regulation which burdens a
woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy dur-
ing the early second trimester must be reasonably related
to the preservation and protection of maternal health.
(App. 137).
Applying these standards to this case, the district court
found that plaintiffs had demonstrated that the statutory
and regulatory scheme places a burden on a woman’s
right to choose to terminate her pregnancy during the
first and early second trimester. Specifically, it found that
the challenged provisions (1) increase the cost and de-
crease the availability of abortions and (2) may delay the
effectuation of a woman’s decision to abort. (App. 137).
—16—
Further, the district court found that defendants had
failed to produce any evidence of a compelling or even
rational basis for the challenged statutes and regulations.
It noted that defendants had shown that certain regula-
tions are consistent with accepted medical practice, but
that such showing is not equivalent to a demonstration
that the challenged provisions are medically necessary.
Thus, the district court found a reasonable likelihood that
plaintiffs will succeed on the merits. (App. 137-38).
Lastly, the district court determined that the public in-
terest would be served by the issuance of the preliminary
injunction. (App. 139).
The defendants were preliminarily enjoined and restrained
from enforcing the challenged provision of the Medical
Practice Act (MPA); the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment
Center Act (ASTC) and the rules and regulations promul-
gated thereunder; and the Health Facilities Planning Act
(HFP): to the extent any person or facility offers or per-
forms, or desires to offer or perform first and/or early
second trimester abortions or other abortion-related gyne-
cological procedures. (App. 110-11).
The district court also certified the following classes:
(a) a plaintiff class of physicians and surgeons who per-
form or desire to perform abortions in Illinois; (b) a plain-
tiff class of all Illinois women of child-bearing age who
desire or may desire an abortion sometime in the future;
and (c) a defendant class of all State’s Attorneys in Illi-
nois. (App. 110).
On December 11, 1985 the district court orally clarified
portions of its ruling. The district court specified that the
Illinois Department of Public Health is not enjoined from
regulating ASTCs in which abortions are performed or
desired to be performed to the extent that such ASTCs
are performing surgical procedures other than abortions.
=) 7
In addition, the district court specified that in deciding
whether a health care facility was devoted primarily to
the performance of surgical procedures, and therefore re-
quired to be licensed under the ASTC Act, the Illinois
Department of Public Health is not prohibited from count-
ing the number of abortion procedures performed in the
facility. The Department cannot, however, enforce the
regulations as to the abortion procedures performed—but
can enforce the regulations as to other procedures per-
formed at the facility.
Defendants appealed from the district court’s orders to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit. On March 10, 1988 that court rendered its decision
in this matter. (App. 1). The majority opinion affirmed,
with one exception, the district court’s entry of a pre-
liminary injunction. The exception is the challenge to one
ASTC regulation—a second trimester hospitalization re-
quirement—which the majority held was not being en-
forced, was moot, and should have been dismissed. Judge
Coffey submitted a lengthy dissent from the majority
opinion. (App. 34-80).
The majority opinion first considered whether certain
of plaintiffs’ challenges have been mooted by the State’s
policy of nonenforcement. It noted that the voluntary ces-
sation of putatively illegal conduct ordinarily will not moot
a controversy and prevent its adjudication by a federal
court. (App. 10-11). Further, the majority stated that such
cessation does render a controversy moot when there is
no reasonable expectation that the putatively illegal con-
duct will be repeated and that there are no remaining
effects of the alleged violation. (App. 11).
Applying these principles to this case, the majority
found the challenge to the second trimester hospitaliza-
tion requirement is moot because enforcement ceased in
enfin
1983. (App. 11-13). It held, however, that the challenge
to the reporting requirement of the ASTC Act and regula-
tions is not moot because the State did not produce pre-
existing documentation of the nonenforcement policy.
(App. 13). Finally, it held that the challenge to the appli-
cation of the ASTC Act and regulations to first trimester
abortions is not moot. It noted that those requirements
were no longer applied to the occasional abortion provider,
but that such requirements were applied to doctors who
exclusively perform first trimester abortions. Further, the
majority stated that the evidence on this point—testimony
from the legal counsel for the state agency charged with
enforcement authority that the challenged provision of the
MPA was not being enforced—was too ambiguous. (App.
13-14).
In considering the merits of the case, the majority opin-
ion, like the district court, relied upon the “trimester”’
approach of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). (App. 15).
It analyzed various decisions of this Court and stated that
where first trimester abortions are involved, not only
must the impact of the challenged regulations be insignifi-
cant in terms of the woman’s exercise of her right, but
also the regulation must be justified by important state
health objectives. (App. 17).
The majority found that statement consistent with exist-
ing Seventh Circuit precedent which holds that once such
regulations are shown to have more than a de minimus
impact on the abortion decision, the government must
show a compelling basis for the law, i.e., that the burden
is not undue or unjustifiable. (App. 17). Thus, the major-
ity opinion concluded that the district court’s application
_of a “medical necessity” standard was consonant with the
legal framework applicable to this case. (App. 18). Fur-
ther, the majority rejected defendants’ argument that be-
cause the regulations apply to all facilities primarily de-
afin
voted to surgery, those regulations should be reviewed
under a different standard than if they had singled out
abortions. (App. 21). In addition, it decided that the dis-
trict court’s findings that the challenged provisions sub-
stantially burden the effectuation of the abortion decision
were not clearly erroneous. (App. 22).
The first facet of the challenged statutes and regula-
tions which the majority considered was the requirement
that facilities performing abortions be licensed. (App. 23).
It held that under Roe the State may not require separate
licensure of facilities primarily devoted to performing abor-
tions during the first trimester. (App. 24). Once the licens-
ing requirement falls, the majority reasoned that the re-
maining requirements fall with it. (App. 25).
Nevertheless, the majority considered and ruled upon
the constitutionality of three abortion-specific regulations.
First, it construed section 205.730(aX2) (App. 221) to un-
constitutionally require the physician who is to perform
the abortion to also perform a pregnancy test, even if
such test had previously been done by another physi-
cian. (App. 27). Second, the majority held that section
205.730(bX3) (App. 221-22) invalidly requires counseling to
include a discussion of alternatives, citing Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
(App. 27). Third, it construed section 205.730(bX2XD) (App.
221) to unconstitutonally preclude the performing physi-
cian from providing the counseling. (App. 28-29).
The generally applicable regulations regarding physical
plant, equipment, and staffing were also struck down by
the majority. It concluded that these provisions impose
a substantial burden and are not justified by health ob-
jectives. (App. 29-31).
In addition, the majority found the “certificate of need”
proceeding of the Health Facilities Planning Act unconsti-
x
tutional. It held the State’s interest in preventing wasteful
duplication of resources to be insufficient in this context.
(App. 31-32).
Finally, the majority rejected defendants’ request to
sever those provisions which were held unconstitutional.
It reasoned that severance was not appropriate because
the licensure provision had been invalidated. (App. 32).
Further, it found that the challenged provisions were “so
riddled with exceptions resulting from judicial decisions
and nonenforcement policies as to be unintelligible.” Un-
der those circumstances, the majority found that it could
not untangle the constitutional from the unconstitutional
provisions. (App. 32-33).
The dissenting opinion finds that the States are author-
ized under Roe to apply the same licensing standards to
abortion facilities as those applied to facilities perform-
ing similar surgical procedures. (App. 35). Under that stan-
dard, the dissent would enjoin and sever the challenged
portion of the Medical Practice Act and the abortion spe-
cific language of par. 157-8.3(A) of the ASTC Act. (App.
38). It argues that the States are free to regulate ambu-
latory surgical treatment centers, including those perform-
ing abortions, as long as the abortions are not singled out
from other, similar surgical procedures, subject to the ra-
tional basis test governing social and economic legislation.
Under the rational basis test, moreover, the dissent finds
the ASTC Act and IHFP Act constitutional. (App. 64).
In evaluating the abortion-specific statutes and regulations
under the strict scrutiny test, the dissent would uphold
all provisions but one [section 205.730(bX2\D)}. (App. 73).
The dissent finds that the challenged provisions neither
burden the abortion decision or its effectuation and are
justified by important health objectives. (App. 890).
=
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED
ARE SUBSTANTIAL
This appeal is of exceptional importance because the ma-
jority opinion, under the guise of protecting a woman’s
constitutional right to privacy, has exempted outpatient
surgical facilities in which abortions are performed from
general licensure and regulatory provisions. In so doing,
the majority emasculates the duty and authority of the
State of Illinois to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of its citizens by licensing and regulating outpatient surgi-
cal facilities in which first or early second trimester abor-
tions are performed in the same manner that other surgi-
cal facilities are regulated.
Further, the majority opinion is in conflict with deci-
sions of this Court with respect to the jurisdictional issues
presented in this case. The opinion is also in conflict with
decisions of this Court and other courts of appeals with
respect to the authority of the State to license and regu-
late outpatient surgical facilities in which abortions are
performed. Finally, the refusal of the majority opinion to
sever any purportedly unconstitutional provisions is in con-
flict with decisions of this Court.
A.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED JURISDIC-
TION OVER CERTAIN CHALLENGED PROVISIONS
WHICH WERE NOT BEING ENFORCED.
At trial, the defendants introduced evidence that due
to various court decisions which pre-date the complaint
in this matter, certain challenged provisions were not be-
ing enforced by the State. Those provisions are: the abor-
tion specific language of par. 157-8.3 of the ASTC Act
(App. 149-50); Section 205.740 (App. 222) (prohibition of
~29—
second trimester abortions in ASTCs) and 205.760 (App.
223) (abortion specific reporting requirement) of the ASTC
Regulations; and par. 4400-22 of the MPA. (App. 193). This
evidence was not contradicted.
Nonetheless, the majority held with respect to the re-
porting requirement of Section 205.760 that the State’s
position of nonenforcement is ‘‘asserted only in this litiga-
tion.” This conclusion is clearly erroneous. The evidence
reveals that this provision has not been enforced since
1983. With respect to the challenged provision of the
MPA, the majority held that the evidence of nonenforce-
ment is “‘equivocal.” This conclusion is also erroneous.
Legal counsel to the Department of Registration and Edu-
cation (now Department of Professional Regulation) testi-
fied that based upon various decisions in the abortion
area, this section was not being enforced. The plaintiffs
did not introduce any evidence to the contrary.
The defendants argued below that in light of the policies
of nonenforcement which were articulated by the regula-
tory agencies and entered into evidence, plaintiffs had not
presented a justiciable controversy as to certain chal-
lenged provisions. However, the majority opinion utilized
a mootness analysis with respect to those nonenforced pro-
visions. The majority concluded that plaintiffs’ challenge
to the second trimester hospitalization requirement (ASTC
Regulation Section 205.740) (App. 222) was moot. The chal-
lenges to the other unenforced provisions, however, were
not found to be moot.
Preliminarily, however, a mootness analysis is not appro-
priate in this context. Mootness issues arise when a chal-
lenged policy changes after the commencement of litiga-
tion. Here, the enforcement policies are based on court
decisions and determinations which pre-date this lawsuit.
It is axiomatic that the court must look to the state
of affairs as of the filing of the complaint in determining
olin
whether a justiciable controversy exists. /nternational
Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th
Cir. 1980). Even where fundamental rights are allegedly
involved, ‘‘a litigant must establish a more immediate
threat than simply a general policy of enforcing laws.”
J.N.S., Inc. v. State of Ind., 712 F.2d 303, 305 (7th Cir.
1983) (lack of justiciable controversy found in challenge
by seller of sexually explicit materials to state civil RICO
statutes). Thus, the courts should not pass on the constitu-
tionality of challenged provisions which are not being en-
forced. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 507 (1961) (lack of
justiciable controversy found in challenge to prohibition
against provision of contraceptive advice and use of
contraceptive devices); C./.0. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472,
475 (1945) (lack of justiciable controversy found in light
of agreement not to enforce challenged state law).
The majority’s assumption of jurisdiction over the unen-
forced provisions in this case is not only in conflict with
the foregoing decisions regarding justiciability standards,
but also with certain decisions governing the jurisdictional
bar created by the Eleventh Amendment. That amendment
limits the power of federal courts to grant relief in cases
where there are no ongoing violations of federal law.
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 71 (1985). That limita-
tion is applicable even in those instances where mootness
is at issue. Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474, 484 (7th
Cir. 1986). Thus, even if an underlying claim is not moot,
the Eleventh Amendment bars further proceedings in fed-
eral court where there is no continuing conduct the State
must change to comply with federal law. Jd. According-
ly, the majority’s assumption of jurisdiction over unen-
forced provisions is in conflict with decisions governing
justiciability standards and with decisions dealing with
Eleventh Amendment standards because there is no on-
going violation of federal law.
—24—
THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRONEOUSLY FOUND
THAT THE CHALLENGED STATUTES AND REGULA-
TONS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
PRIVACY.
The majority opinion affirmed the district court’s exemp-
tion of abortion procedures from the licensure and regu-
latory provisions which generally apply to outpatient
surgical facilities. In addition, the majority held that ‘the
State may not require separate licensure of facilities pri-
marily devoted to performing abortions.” The majority
opinion is in conflict with decisions of this Court and other
courts of appeals as to the authority of the State to li-
cense and regulate outpatient surgical facilities in which
pregnancy terminations are performed. The State has the
duty and authority to license and regulate such facilities
in the same manner as facilities in which other outpatient
surgical procedures are performed.
This Court has consistently held, even with respect to
first trimester abortions, that the State has an interest
in making sure that certain factual assumptions made in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) continue to exist. As
explained in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 n.12 (1983):
Of course, the State retains an interest in ensuring
the validity of Roe’s factual assumption that “the
first trimester abortion [is] as safe for the woman as
normal childbirth at term,” an assumption that “holds
true only if the abortion is performed by medically
competent personnel under conditions insuring maxi-
mum safety for the woman.”” Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9, 11, 46 L.Ed.2d 152, 96 S.Ct. 170 (1975)
(per curiam).
The ASTC Act seeks to effectuate that interest by “‘assur-
ing that all medical procedures, including abortions, are
—25—
performed under conditions that insure maximum safety.”
(App. 149).
Thus, two other courts of appeals have upheld licensing
standards of outpatient surgical facilities in which preg-
nancy terminations are performed. Baird v. Department
of Public Health, 599 F.2d 1098, 1102 (1st Cir. 1979)
(“There is room under Roe for states to apply the same
licensing standards to abortion facilities as they apply to
like facilities performing medically analogous procedures.’’);
Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976)
(“A state can impose the same regulations on a clinic, spe-
cifically built to perform abortions during the first tri-
mester, that are imposed on other clinics that perform
Surgical procedures requiring approximately the same
degree of skill and care as the performance of first tri-
mester abortions.”’).
In this case, the HFP Act and the ASTC Act, as en-
forced, are abortion-neutral and are applicable to all li-
censed ASTCs, irrespective of the types of surgical pro-
cedures performed. These statutes were clearly enacted
to further the State’s interests in regulating the ever in-
creasing number of outpatient surgical facilities. The State
has responsibilities to its citizens to insure that medical
procedures performed at these facilities are performed un-
der circumstances enhancing their safety. Further, the
State can legitimately seek to establish a comprehensive
and less costly health care delivery system. Those re-
sponsibilities do not cease when an abortion is the surgical
procedure which is to be performed.
In addition, the majority rejected the argument that
abortion-neutral regulations should be scrutinized under
a different standard than abortion-specific regulations. De-
fendants maintain that such argument is clearly supported
by the two previously cited opinions from the First and
Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals. Accord, Westchester
~26—
Women’s Health Org. v. Whalen, 475 F.Supp. 734 (S.D.
N.Y. 1979) (requirements governing “diagnostic and treat-
ment centers” applicable to facilities performing first tri-
mester abortions); Abortion Coalition of Mich. Inc. v.
Mich. Dep't of Public Health, 426 F Supp. 471 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (requirements for “free standing surgical outpatient
facilities” applicable to facilities performing first trimester
abortions).
The argument that abortion-neutral regulations should
be scrutinized under a less exacting standard than abor-
tion-specific regulations is also supported by decisions of
this Court in other contexts. City of Renton v. Playtime
_ Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (standards under
First Amendment for ‘‘content-based” and ‘“‘content-neu-
tral” zoning regulations); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minn. Comm’n of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1983)
(standards under First Amendment for general and special
taxes as applied to the press). Accord, Arcara v. Cloud
Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 3177 (1986)
(First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement
of a public health regulation of general application against
the physical premises in which sexually explicit books and
magazines are sold). Thus, defendants maintain that the
lower courts applied an erroneous legal standard to the
abortion-neutral provisions.
Even if the strict scrutiny test was correctly determined
to apply, the majority erred in determining that plain-
tiffs had established a sufficiently substantial mterference
with the abortion decision. The majority opinion misappre-
hended the testimony regarding the purported cost of
compliance with the State regulations.? While the major-
2 The majority opinion also incorrectly found that Dr. Ragsdale
was permitted to testify as to the substance of his handwritten
(Footnote continued on following page)
—~27—
ity opinion states that Dr. Ragsdale’s estimated com-
pliance with the regulations would entail a per patient
cost of between $25 and $40 (App. 22), the actual testi-
mony was that reasonable compliance would only result
in an estimated $25.21 per patient fee increase. That in-
crease would be reduced to $10.90 after two years and
$3.40 after five years due to the retirement of certain
debts. This increase is de minimis and did not sustain
plaintiffs’ burden of proof even under the standards found
applicable by the majority. (App. 23).
For example, in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476 (1983), this Court considered the impact on
the woman’s exercise of her right to decide whether to
have an abortion caused by the cost of a State required
pathology report. This Court held that the estimated cost
of $19.40 per patient did not “significantly burden a preg-
nant woman’s abortion decision.” Jd. at 490.
Similarly, in the instant matter, plaintiffs’ cost estimates
did not establish a “sufficiently substantial” interference
with a pregnancy termination decision. Thus, the lower
courts erred in applying a strict scrutiny standard to the
challenged provisions, and in determining that those pro-
visions were invalid under that standard.
cost sheets” ( . 67). At the outset, defendants objected to an
use ly Nt, Further objections were raised “on
plaintiffs moved for their admission into evidence
~22—
Cc.
THE MAJORITY OPINION CONFLICTS WITH DECI-
SIONS OF THIS COURT REGARDING SEVERANCE OF
PURPORTEDLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
Assuming, arguendo, that the lower courts appropriately
assumed jurisdiction over the challenged provisions which
are not being enforced, those courts should have severed
any purportedly unconstitutional statutes or regulations.
For instance, the abortion-specific language of par. 157-8.3
of the ASTC Act has not been enforced since 1981 due
to the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Village
of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill.2d 406 (1981). In that
case, the court struck down a portion of a local ordinance
that incorporated the ASTC Act definition of an ASTC.
The disputed portion covered “any facility where a medi-
cal or surgical procedure is performed for the termina-
tion of pregnancy, regardless of whether the facility is
primarily devoted to that purpose.” Jd. at 420. The court
severed that portion, but found the remaining portion of
the ordinance to be “complete in itself and susceptible
to independent enforcement.” Jd. at 421.
In the instant appeal, the majority opinion rejected the
argument that any purportedly unconstitutional provision
be severed. It characterized the regulatory scheme as be-
ing “so riddled with exceptions resulting from judicial
decisions and nonenforcement policies as to be unintelligi-
ble.”” (App. 33).
Defendants submit that a court should focus upon the
provisions independently and on their own merit. Other-
wise, litigants will be encouraged to base their litigation
strategy upon the sheer number or volume of statutes and
regulations to be attacked on constitutional grounds. The
more broad based the attack, the greater the purported
burden on constitutional guarantees.
—29—
As this Court has noted, a court should refrain from
invalidating more of a statute than is necessary. Regan
v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984). It is, moreover,
the duty of the court to “maintain the act in so far as
it is valid.” Jd. at 652, quoting El Paso & Northeastern
R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909). Likewise, this
Court has held that “{ujnless it is evident that the Legis-
lature would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not, the
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully oper-
ative as a law.”” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09
(1976), quoting Champlin Refining Co v. Corporation
Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
Given the ASTC Act’s declared purpose of assuring that
all medical procedures, including abortion be performed
under circumstances insuring maximum safety, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois’ holding on severability in Marco-
witz, and the State’s policy of nonenforcement, there is
no doubt that the abortion-specific language of the ASTC
Act should have been severed if declared unconstitutional.
Likewise, any purportedly unconstitutional provisions of
the HFP Act and the ASTC regulations should have been
severed. By failing to appropriately address the severabil-
ity issue, the majority opinion has improperly frustrated
the intent of the elected representatives of the people
of the State of Illinois. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. at
653.
~30—
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this Court should note probable juris-
diction of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
NEIL F. HARTIGAN
Attorney General, State of Illinois
ROBERT J. RUIZ
Solicitor General, State of Illinois
100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor
i , Illinois 60601
(312) 917-3000
Attorneys for Appellants
Micwae. J. Hayes *
KATHLEEN Ka&eIseL FLAHAVEN
Rocer P. FLanaven
GLapys STEVENS
Assistant Attorneys General
100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 917-3654
Of Counsel * Counsel of Record
November 10, 1988
APPENDIX
88-790 © ‘Tors: |
NOV 10 1988
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JP.
CURRK
OcTOBER TERM, 1988
BERNARD J. TURNOCK, M.D., M.P.H., Director of
the Illinois Department of Public Health, et al..
Appellants,
V
RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, M.D., et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit
APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
NEIL F. HARTIGAN
Attorney General, State of Illinois
ROBERT J. RUIZ
Solicitor General, State of Illinois
100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 917.3000
Attorneys for Appellants
Minar. J. Hayes *
KATHLEEN Kreiset FLAMAVEN
Rocer P. FLAHAVEN
GLADYs STEVENS
Assistant Attorneys General
100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 917-3654
Of Counsel * Counsel of Record
Printed by Authority af.the State of Illinois (P.O. 34259—60— 11-10-88)
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In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
BERNARD J. TURNOCK, M.D., M.P.H., Director of
the Illinois Department of Public Health, et al.,
Appellants,
v.
RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, M.D., et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit
APPENDIX TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
App. 1
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 85-3242
RICHARD M. RAGSDALE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
BERNARD J. TURNOCK, Director of the Illinois
Department of Public Health, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States Distnct Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
No. 85-C-6011—John A. Nordberg, Judge.
ArGuED OcToperR 22, 1986—DecipeEp MArRcH 10, 1988
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, Correy, Circuit Judge,
and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs consist of
a class of all duly licensed physicians and surgeons per
forming or who to perform pregnancy terminations
in Illinois and a class of all women in the State of Illinois
of child-bearing age who desire or may desire an abortion
a8 camatine fs te televe. Defendants are a class of the
State’s Attorneys of all of the counties of the State of
Illinois, the Director of the Illinois Department of Public
' Class certification as to both the defendant and plaintiff classes
was challenged below. The district court granted certification. 625
F. Supp. at 1219-24. That ruling is not challenged on appeal.
App. 2
Health, the Illinois Attorney General, and the Director
of the Illinois Department of Registration and Education.
Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-02, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to the
effect that three Illinois statutes and the regulations there-
under violate the constitutional right to privacy, specifical-
ly to abortion, as established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), and subsequent Supreme Court
cases. This case comes to us on appeal from the district
court’s grant of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion. 625 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Because we be-
lieve certain of the claims are moot, we vacate in part.
In most respects, however, we affirm the preliminary in-
junction.
I
A. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
The statutory and regulatory scheme is somewhat com-
plex. Therefore, we set it out in some detail. Section 16(1)
of the Medical Practice Act (“the MPA”), 111 Ill. Rev.
Stat. ¢ 4433(1), allows for revocation or suspension of the
license of any physician who performs an “elective abor-
tion” in any place other than a licensed Ambulatory Sur-
gical Treatment Center (“ASTC”’), a hospital, or a facil-
ity run by the state or federal governments.? The Am-
2 Section 16(1) of the Medical Practice Act reads, in pertinent
part: :
The Department may revoke, suspend, place on probationary
status, or take any other disciplinary action as the .
ment may deem proper with regard to the license . . . of any
person ... in this state to practice medicine . . . upon any
of the following grounds:
(1) Performance of an elective abortion in any place .. .
other than:
(a) a facility licensed pursuant to the “Ambulatory Sur-
gical Treatment Center Act” . . .;
(Footnote continued on following page)
App. 3
Surgical Treatment Center Act, 111% Ill. Rev.
Stat. 14 157-8.1, et seg. (the “ASTCA” or the “Act”), pro-
vides for the licensure of all ASTCs, which it defines as
“any ... place . . . devoted primarily to . . . the per-
formance of surgical procedures or any facility in which
a medical or surgical procedure is utilized to terminate
a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the facility is de-
voted pri y to this .... 111% IL. Rev. Stat.
{ 157-8.3(A). In addition, plaintiffs have challenged those
sections of the Health Facilities Providers Act, 111% IIl.
Rev. Stat. 44 1151, et seg. (“HFPA’’), which require any-
one seeking to open an ASTC to obtain a certificate of
need for the facility from the t of Public Health
after a public hearing and 1 y review period. See
111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 44 1155-1160.°
2 continued
(b) [a licensed hospital];
(c) an ambulatory surgical treatment center or hospi-
talization or care facility maintained by the State or any
agency thereof . . .;
(d) ambulatory surgical treatment centers, italiza-
sen oF ese tealittien maintained by the Federal ern-
ment, or
(e) surgical treatment centers, hospitaliza-
tion or care facilities maintained by any university or col-
lege established under the laws of Ny Beye
principally by public funds raised by taxation. . . .
* Section 1158 of the Health Facilities Planning Act reads, in per-
tinent part:
.. . When an application for a permit is initially reviewed by
a recognized areawide health ES See oF Ue
Department
conducted in the area or community where the ))-
Sh & caan aul dol ts te Ue cae dl ae
applicant and any interested person to present public testi-
mony concerning the al, denial, renewal or revocation
thereunder, and their application, via the to phy
sicians desiring to perform first and early
abortions. A i , we set forth the ASTCA and its
accompanying in some detail.‘
Act itself is largely procedural in, operation and
ace to the health or safety of the patients or if the
epevater thevecf bas been cnuvisted of 0 distation of eno
: Selected regulations that are discussed in detail in our analysis
infra in the text are set forth in an Appendix to this opinion.
App. 5
tion 157-8.12. Section 157-8.12 provides for a fine of
$10,000 per day for operating a facility without a license
or otherwise the Act. Section 157-8.13 makes the
equation of 0 thalllly to Vattien of Ge Ach @ vende
tions a public nuisance subject to injunction.
Section 157-8.15 provides, in broad terms, for severabil-
ity of the provisions of the Act.
The general regulations under the ASTCA, found in
corridor (5' or 8’ depending on whether stretchers are to
be used) and door (3 or 38") widths. § 205.1310-1390.
an toutes to aeelie tr aaa ar a , and ventila-
we AD ney ifie filter and
airflow between rooms is required. § 205.1540
and
t
App. 6
change in the administrativ ive staff, medical director, staff
physicians, supervising nurse, addition or deletion of sur-
procedures
Association. Sections . Additionally, each facil-
ity must have either a certified medical technician or a
written ne Dareane & parton
required ratory procedures. . A consulting
committee must be established to develop standards of
professional work and a ician must serve as the med-
ical director of the facility. § 250.230.
With regard to equipment, all facilities are required to
have monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, oxygen,
and cardiac pulmonary resuscitation § 205.410.
Additional written procedures are to govern care,
use, sterilization, and of all materials, and
lified 4,
procedures ormed under general anesthesia, local an-
esthesia with sedation, or any termination. A
signed, written informed consent for any procedure is to
App 7
be maintained with the patient's clinical records. § 205.520.
All removed tissues are to be examined by a consulting
pathologist. § 205.530.
Post-operative care regulations provide that any patient
who has had general anesthesia, loca! anesthesia with seda
tion, or termination is required to be observed
for a pated of Gms sufficient to detect any immediate
post ive complications, and that no patient be re-
vsised to lnove tn lane an, ano heuw. 6 Ykbeh, Ad,
tionally, written documentation is required of a transfer
with a licensed hospital within fifteen minutes
the facility, or that the medical director of the ASTC
(or each physician of the ASTC) has admitting priv-
ileges at such a hospital. § 205.540.
Detailed clinical records are also required to be main-
tained. § 205.610. Additionally, facilities are required to
and type of procedures performed, the number and type
of complications reported, the number of patients requir-
ap eee 0 Sepa due to complications, the number
patients returning for follow-up, and the number of
deaths.
The regulations also have an abortion-specifie subpart
which ires: (1) at least one registered professional
nurse with post-graduate education or experience in ob-
stetrical or gynecological nursing, section 205.720; (2) test-
RE and’ reporting of the resulp to the pationt of blood
factor and diag nosis of p , section 205.730(a),
and (3) counseling b somecnd toodieal trained » or
it and who has >» ial interest in the patier..’
ane of risks
205. ). a pe information may be provided
post-operatively, shall be ided if desired by the
patient. Jd. Counseling must place in a room separate
pan in rcenige Suse, ant © cosas’ of they coumatiing
given is to be included in the patient's clinical record. /d.
App. 8
The subpart contains its own reporting requirement which
requires monthly reporting of each “on forms
provided by [the + yy A y, the regula-
tions prohibit an A em partareming Ghevkens o8 pe
+ =_ a gestational age exceeding twelve weeks.
.740.
B. Enforcement Policies
Net all of the provisions of challenged statutes and reg
ulations are being enforced. Since 1981, the Act and regu-
—— of procedures
(including abortions). ee ree
in to Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill.
2d 406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which refused to enforce,
in a criminal proceeding, that of a local ordinance
. ‘ fi j *
outside an A is similarly not being enforced, but the
evidence on this point is equivocal.
The defendants also contend that the on per
formance of second trimester abortions in ASTCs is not
enforced because it was considered the
for
S. 416, 103 8S. Ct. 2481 (1 Planned Parenthood As-
sociation, Inc..v. Asheroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 8. Ct. 2517
(1983); and Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 103 5.
C
App. 9
Ct 2582 (1963). An internal memorandum of the Depart
ment of Pubts Heath Steutg te See
uirement, was enjoined by Judge Kocoras in v.
arey, 579 F. . 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on Charles v. Daley, 749 F 2d
area of northwestern Illinois because his landlord
to renew his lease. The facility which he
was not in full compliance with the ASTCA
tive landlord his lease commitment. In addition,
officials © with enforcing the regulations told him
that they require “consiuerably more substantial
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trimester
dismissed. ore we vacate the portion of the
unction that pertains to it.
a]
However, we do not believe that the challenge to the
ing requirement of the ASTCA and regulations is
! defendants testified that this requirement
is no longer being enforced in light of Charles v. Carey,
579 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), we have reviewed that
decision and cannot find anything in it which remotely
supports the conclusion that the requirement under chal-
a a. ony seperting uirement
by that decision was section 11(d) of Illinois
Abortion Act, which required the reporting to the Depart-
i
ment of the name of any diagnosed as having com-
ications from abortion. more general requirements
are quite different. Unlike its tations of non
district court’s concern that the State’s position on this
provision is asserted only in this litigation.
C
: The challenge to the application of the ASTCA and reg-
‘ulations to first trimester abortions is similarly not moot.
App. 14
While the requirement is apparently no longer applied to
the “occasional” abortion provider, the State continues to
maintain that it is free to apply the ASTCA to abortion
providers whose practice is “primarily devoted to’”’ per-
forming surgery, even if that “surgery” consists exclusive-
ly of first trimester abortions. This is in fact the situation
facing at least one of the named plaintiffs, Dr. Ragsdale.
Additionally, the evidence regarding the suspension/ rev-
ocation sanction in the MPA was, as we have noted, am-
2 A representative of the Department merely tes-
tified that any complaint ing this provision would
be “examined by the General Counsel’s for a deter-
mination of whether there would be any enforcement ac-
tion taken pursuant to that section.” He additionally tes-
tified that “to the best of [his] knowledge” the Depart-
ment would not enforce the section. While we admit that
it would be anomalous for the Department to take the
sition that “occasional” abortion providers need not be
icensed but that performance of such abortions could sub-
ject the physicians to revocation of their licenses to prac-
tice icine, the Department's ition is sufficiently
murky and the sanctions sufficiently 1 severe, that we be-
lieve a live controvery exists sane this requirement.
Doctors should not have to risk loss of their professional
licenses to explore the contours of the asserted non-
enforcement position. :
Ill
On the merits,* we must consider whether the require-
ments of the statutory and regulatory scheme violate the
* On appeal, various of the defendants and amici contend that
the district court did not properly weigh various of the factors
which are normally considered in issuing a preliminary injunction.
We note that the presentation of the case below focused almost
exclusively on the constitutionality vel non of the statutory scheme
or its component parts. None of the parties argued the traditional
factors governing the granting of preliminary relief to the district
(Footnote continued on following page)
App. 15
right to privacy (and to abortion) as established in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 710 (1973), and its prog-
eny. In Roe, the Court first set out the now familiar “tri-
mester” approach:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end
of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the
end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting
its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that
are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother. .
410 U.S. at 164-65, 93 S. Ct. at 732.
In elaborating on this approach, the Court noted that
the State’s interest in the health of the mother becomes
compelling:
6 continied
court. Although no doubt its task was made more difficult by the
lack of assistance from the ies, the district court undertook
a thorough examination of t traditional factors, i.e., the lack
of an adequate remedy at law, irreparable harm, balance of harms,
likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest. We
confine our discussion to the likelihood of success on the inerits,
that is, the governing lega! standards and their relationship to the
facts found below for two related reasons. First, the balancing of
the other factors is typically reviewed on an “abuse of discretion
standard” and we see no » Rng and second, we find insufficient
merit to any of the defendants’ or the amicus’ belated assertions
that this or that factor was given insufficient weight to add to
this already lengthy opinion. -
App. 16
in the light of present medical knowledge, . . . at ap-
roximately the end of the first trimester. This is so
use of the now-established medical fact, . . . that
until the end of the first trimester mortality in abor-
tion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.
It follows that, from and after this point, a State may
regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that
the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health. Examples of per-
missible state regulation in this area are requirements
as to the qualifications of the person who is to per-
aS | ee oe rson;
as tot ility in whi procedure is to be per-
formed, that is, whether it eS ee oe
be a clinic or some other place of less-than- ital
status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period
of pregnancy prior to this “ ing” point, the at-
tending physician, in consultation with his patient, is
free to determine, without ‘or by the State,
that, in his medical a, patient’s pregnancy:
should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the
judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of
interference by the State.
Id. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 731-32.
Since Roe, the Court, along with the lower federal
courts, has on numerous occasions clarified the constitu-
tional standards which apply to regulations aimed at both
first and second trimester abortions. Few restrictions on
first trimester abortions have been upheld. For example,
the Court upheld a requirement that all abortions be per-
formed by a licensed sician. Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9, 96 S. Ct. 170 (1975) (per curiam). This require-
ment, from being endorsed in dictum in Roe, was
upheld “the State retains an interest in ensur-
ing the validity of Roe’s factual assumption that ‘the first
trimester abortion [is] as safe for a woman as normal
childbirth at term,’ an assumption that ‘holds true only
App. 17
if the abortion is performed by medically competent per-
sonnel under tions insuring the maximum safety of
the woman.’” Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 n.12, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2492
n.12 (quoting Menillo, 423 U.S. at 11, 96 S. Ct. at 171).
Likewise, the Court upheld a state-required pathology
examination which ired tissues removed by abortion,
like all other removed tissues, to be examined by a pa-
thologist. Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. v. Ash-
croft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983). This was be-
cause such an examination was considered “absolutely
” from a medical standpoint and “ ‘abnormalities
in the tissue warn of serious, fatal disor-
ders.’ ”’ Jd. at 487-89, 103 S. Ct. at 24. eye bey
the Court, certain regulations of even first trimester
tions that “ ‘have no significant oe the woman’s
exercise of her right [to have an ion] be per-
missible where justified by i t state objec-
tives.’ "’ Jd. at 489-90, 103 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting Akron,
462 U.S. at 430, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (alterations by the
Court)).
The quoted language clearly indicates that, where first
trimester abortions are inv “tony Bey must the im-
of the challenged regulation in terms
do comnts uate al tar Gain also that the
ion must be “justified by important state health
objectives.”” This is consistent with our own case law to
* Appellants make much of
proper standard. See F.2d at
at THE nal th
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App. 20
distinguish between the two. Indeed, as written, due
the (now unenforced) second trimester hospitalization hn
quirement, they originally applied only to first trimester
abortions. Accordingly, as we have in other cases, we ap-
ply the legal standards applicable to restrictions on first
trimester abortions. See Charles I, 627 F.2d at 782:
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of
Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1149 (7th Cir. 1974), cert
420 U.S. 955, 95 S. Ct. 1438 (1975). We - inal os
at liberty to insert the words “except with regard to first
trimester abortions” into either the statute or the regula-
tions. To do so would result in a scheme with little re-
semblance to that enacted by the Illinois legislature or
the Department of Public Health. See Thornburgh v.
8 continued
Much of the testimony below was to the effect j require
ments of the regulations bore little sitasip te a ae
of mg fag trimester abortions as well as first trimester abor-
— should come as little surprise, since the medical pro-
: ures utilized are quite similar if not identical. We remind the
tate of the Supreme Court’s admonition in Akron that:
(I}f it appears that during a substantial porti
trimester the State's regulation Teas ban comet
medical practice, supra, at 2493, the regulation may not be
upheld simply because it may be reasonable for the remain-
ing portion of the trimester. Rather, the State is obligated to
make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations
* Ad yo tok trimester during which its health interest
462 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
Thus, while the trimester approach remains the li
trin cab]
men for weighing the competing interests iaiabeed A -
abortion decision, it does not necessarily follow that all state
regulations of abortion which are keyed to it are reasonable. In-
stead, the state should endeavor to ew its regulations designed
7 further maternal health in medically relevant terms (for exam-
p - certain of the requirements of the statute involved here may
- make sense for late second trimester abortions which are per-
ormed under a general anesthetic, but not for simple “dilation
and evaculation” ;
nde abortions performed early in the second tri-
App. 21
American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2181
(1986).
Defendants suggest that, because the regulations apply
to all facilities primarily devoted to surgery, we must
review them under a different standard than if they had
singled out abortions. We disagree. Defendants have cited
us to no cases, and we have found none, which would jus-
tify such a distinction. In fact, Friendship suggests, albeit
in dictum, exactly the opposite. 505 F.2d at 1153-54; see
also Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352,
361-62 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying strict scrutiny notwith-
standing general applicability of regulations).
We adhere to the statement in Friendship for several
reasons. First, we cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA
was enacted primarily with abortion clinics in mind and
only applied to outpatient surgical clinics generally in an
effort to save the statute from unconstitutionality. See Pf.
Ex. 22-24 (minutes of ASTC Licensing Board meetings).
Secondly, the State cannot, merely by applying the ex-
pedient and conclusory label “‘surgery’’ to a medical pro-
cedure, apply requirements which would be necessary to
major surgical procedures in the abortion context where
they would be wholly inappropriate. It is as much a vice
to treat abortion similarly to dissimilar procedures as it
is to treat it differently from analogous procedures. In
either case, imposition of burdensome requirements which
are completely unnecessary to the performance of safe
abortions is attempted. A prime example of this problem
is the fact that many of the physical plant requirements
of the regulations are designed with procedures to be per-
formed under general anesthesia in mind, although the
testimony in this case clearly established that first and
early second trimester abortions of the type at issue here
are not usually performed using such anesthesia and that,
in fact, the use of a general anesthetic increases the risk
of death and major complications from such procedures.
With the standards enunciated above in mind, we now
turn to evaluation of the constitutionality of the challenged
statutes and regulations.
App. 22
IV
A.
The State initially contends that the plaintiffs have not
met their threshold burden of showing an im
abortion decision. We must reject this conietion The
district court found that the regulations at issue do sub-
stantially burden the effectuation of the decision to have
an abortion. Specifically, the lower court found that the
regulations raised the cost of abortions, by $25-$40 for
abortions performed at Dr. Ragsdale’s clinic, and, more
importantly, that they would limit the availability of abor-
tions in that, unless the regulations were enjoined, the
clinie would close for lack of a suitable location that could
* The Americans United for Life Legal Def
curiae, contends that, because individual laintift De ‘Ragsdale
regardless of the regulations
the relocation of an existi
ment of a new one. As cual. abortion practice or the commence-
to warrant the grant of injunctive relief.
"© Defendants place considerable em i
ant phasis on the alleged] -
— admission of Dr. Ragsdale’s handwritten cost estimates We
a not decide whether these constituted inadmissible hearsa
eae, because Dr. Ragsdale testified at le h, and without
objection, to the substance of the estimates. Therefore, the ad-
mission of the wri : ‘ ;
harmless. written estimates themselves, if error, was surely
App. 23
that this is not a great deal more than the cost of the
pathology examination upheld in Ashcroft, they seem to
have missed the import of that case. The Court did not
hold that the impact was so small that the state was not
required to justify it at all. It merely held that, during
even the first trimester, requirements having an insignifi-
cant impact on the abortion decision were constitutional
“where justified by important State health objectives.”
Thus, the regulations at issue here, which have a greater
financial impact than that in Ashcroft, must be justified
by at least similar state interests.
Additionally, although the financial per-patient cost of
compliance might not seem overwhelming, it is not the
only burden which must be considered. The lack of avail-
ability of abortions caused by the up-front cost and dif-
ficulty of obtaining a complying facility is at least as real
and possibly more burdensome to women seeking abor-
tions. Furthermore, there was testimony of the psycho-
logical burdens which would result from having to undergo
an abortion in a hospital-like facility when the more psy-
chologically comforting setting of a doctor’s office would
serve just as well from a medical standpoint. We cannot
say that these burdens are “de minimus.” Cf. Charles
I, 627 F.2d at 777 (“direct interference” is shown where
impact is not de minimus or where regulation imposes
restrictions “that did not already exist’’). Therefore, they
must be justified by important state health objectives.
B.
The first facet of the scheme we consider is the require-
ment that facilities performing first trimester abortions
be licensed at all. ile this may not seem a particularly
onerous requirement, we note Supreme Court precedent
suggests only that a licensing requirement may be per-
missible in the second trimester. The Court stated in Roe
that the state’s interest in maternal health during the sec-
ond trimester extends to “the facility in which the pro-
cedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be
App. 24
a hospital or may be a clinic of some other place of less-
than-hospital Status; as to the licensing of the facility; and
the like.’’ 410 U.S. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 732. By contrast,
the Court stated that during the first trimester “the at.
tending physician, in consultation with his tient, is free
to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in
his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may
be effectutated by an abortion free from interference by
the State.” Id. (emphasis added).
While we realize that the last quoted statement has
been qualified by the Court in subsequent decisions (that
is, where the “interference” does not have a significant
impact and furthers important state health concerns), we
nonetheless believe it retains force here. Thus, we are
persuaded in this case that the State may not require
separate licensure of facilities primarily devoted to per-
forming abortions.
A primary factor which persuades us is that the State
has in no way shown that performance of first trimester
abortions in physicians’ offices rather than heavily regu-
lated ASTCs in any way undermines the safety of the
operation. We further note that Akron itself seems to re-
ject such an argument. 462 U.S. at 429 n.11. The State
in fact basically concedes that it cannot prevent doctors
from performing at least some abortions in their offices.
To the extent that there is any basis for distinguishing
between a doctor who occasionally performs an abortion
in his office and one whose practice is primarily devoted
to such rocedures, the ions appear to run contrary
to sound health policy. of the expert testimony in the
App. 25
We realize that the Sixth Circuit upheld a similar gen-
eral licensing requirement in Reizen. However, in doing
so, the court did not address a challenge based on the
constitutional right to abortion, but rather an Equal Pro-
tection challenge based upon the physician’s right to prac-
tice. Accordingly, the court applied a highly deferential
“rational basis” standard of review. 743 F.2d at 358-59.
As we have already held, such a standard of review is
not appropriate in this case. Additionally, none of the
evidence of the t mentioned above was apparently
present in Reizen. There, the district court found that a
private physician was more likely to have direct control
over staff and procedures, but that the absence of this
control might characterize a “clinic.” Such findings are
absent in this case.
Purely as a matter of the plain language of the statutory
and regulatory scheme, once the licensing requirement
falls, the remainder of the requirements fal] with it (or,
more properly, are inapplicable). The specific substantive
requirements are not (leaving aside the unenforced re-
quirement that all abortions must be performed in an
ASTC) applicable to abortions, per se, but rather to
ASTCs. In the alternative, however, we analyze those spe-
cific substantive aspects of the regulations focused on at
trial which render the scheme unconstitutional as a whole."
't We do not decide whether particular provisions of the regula-
tions not specifically mentioned in the text would, standing lone,
pass constitutional muster. In particular, the pathology examina-
tion required by the general regulations seems nearly identical to
that upheld in Ashcroft. Also the reporting requirement does not
pear particularly onerous, nor does it ar calculated to raise
the fear of harassment by physicians rhe atients by raising the
spectre of public disclosure. Section 205.60 of the regulations
merely requires a rt of each procedure performed in an ASTC
within ten days, and that such reports be made in such a manner
and at such time so as not to avoid accurate reporting of com-
plications. If complications become known to the ASTC, it is re-
quired to submit a supplemental report. Section 205.620, a non-
abortion-specific reporting requirement, merely requires reporting
(Footnote continued on following page)
App. 26
C.
_The abortion-specific subpart of the regulations is of par-
ticular concern. Many of the requirements set forth in that
subpart seem clearly contrary to either prior Supreme
'! continued
of the number and type of procedures performed, the number and
type of complications reported, the number of patients uirin
transfer to hospitals, the number of patients returning for iow.
up, and the number of deaths. These requirements appear to be
consistent with Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. y Danforth
428 U.S. 52, 79-81, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2846-47 (1976). The requirements
mee og = less — than those previously enjoined. In
articular, the name o is i j i
disclosed to the State. Eee
Additionally, a number of the other general r ul
as though they would wy no real canton at all = te dae
might. Requirements which may fall in this category might include
the general provisions relating to personnel and administrative pro-
cedures governing ASTCs, such as those calling for a written pol-
icles and procedures manual, consulting committee, organization
plan, personnel policies, and maintenance of a sanitary facilit
Similarly, the operative care and post-operative care i “
-— ~ in accord with accepted medical practice. Dr
objected to many of these requirements as “stati ious.”
However, so far as we 0 onan there is => cokened the
to “stating the obvious” even where abortion procedu
.-= res are con-
Fewer of the abortion- 1 i i
discussion in the text, Se ae yy o
testimony below that the counselor qualification requirements of
section 205.730(bX2) were consistent with accepted medical .
tice. Additionally, subsection (1) of the same regulation madly oo
quires, in general terms, that some counseling be given prior to
the performance of an abortion (and that it occur in a room .
rate from the procedure room). As noted in the text infra po
aspects of the counseling requirements suffer from constitutional
defects. Also, section 205.710 merely provides that “Abortions shall
be provided to the _— with the same standards of safety effec.
tiveness, and regard for patients rights as any other health saveien i
Of course, we need not and do j imate it
tionality of any of the sequivamente aonumcand aan Riise
App. 27
Court precedent or our own cases. In particular, we note
that section 205.730(aX2) apparently requires the physi-
cian who is to perform the abortion to also perform a
pregnancy test on the patient regardless of whether such
testing had previously been done by another physician.
We previously invalidated a similar “same doctor’ require-
ment in an Illinois statute. See Charles I, 627 F.2d at 784,
786. The requirement in the instant regulation is, if any-
thing, more burdensome and less justified than the one
we invalidated there, which required only that the per-
forming physician provide the patient with “a true copy’
of her pregnancy test, rather than to possibly conduct a
second test. For the same reasons as in Charles I, the
provision in this case is invalid.
The counseling requirements too suffer from constitu-
tional defects. Section 205.730(bX3) attempts to prescribe
the precise content of such counseling in mandatory terms
applicable to all cases. The regulation states that counsel-
ing “shall include a discussion of alternatives, description
of the procedure to be performed, explanation of the risks
and possible complications.’’ We believe that this provi-
sion, particularly the requirement of a “discussion of alter-
natives” is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). The requirement
“that a specific body of information be given in all cases,
irrespective of the particular needs of the patient, intrudes
upon the discretion of the pregnant woman’s physician
and thereby imposes the ‘undesired and uncomfortable
straitjacket’”’ which the Court has rejected. Jd. at 2179
(quoting Planned Parenthood Association, Inc. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2840 n.8). The
informational requirements of the regulation are certain-
ly not as intrusive or as specific as those previously
stricken by the Court, but they are just as inflexible. Dr.
Ragsdale testified below that some of the information, par-
ticularly the “discussion of alternatives” might not be ap-
propriate for some patients. We agree that “for a patient
with a life-threatening pregnancy, the ‘information’ in its
App. 28
very rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the
physician-patient relationship.” Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at
2180. We bear in mind that, during the second trimester
at least, “the validity of an informed consent requirement
... rests on the State’s interest in protecting the health
of the pregnant woman.” Jd. at 2179 (quoting Akron, 462
U.S. at 443, 103 S. Ct. at 2499). Viewed in this light, the
provision at issue here may, like that in Thornburgh, “‘re-
quire{ ] the dissemination of information that is not rele-
vant to such consent, and thus, it advances no legitimate
state interest.” Jd. at 2180.
Another aspect of the counseling requirements is trou-
bling. Section 205.730(bX2XD) requires that “counselors
shail have no financial interest in the patient’s decision.”
We find it impossible to read this provision in such a way
that it does not, at least in some cases, preclude the per-
forming physician from providing the counseling. This, we
believe, is fundamentally at odds with the emphasis placed
on the patient-physician relationship by Roe anu its prog-
eny. The woman desiring an abortion, according to those
cases, is to reach that decision in consultation with “her
responsible physician.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 93 S. Ct.
at 727; cf. Akron, 462 U.S. at 449, 103 S. Ct. at 2502
(striking down a requirement that the attending physician,
rather than other professionals, must provide the requisite
counseling). The state cannot preclude that dialogue, or
demand that others be a party to it merely because the
physician has a “financial interest” in the woman’s deci-
sion. In all other areas of medicine, the state relies on
the physician’s professional and ethical obligations to pre-
vent his “financial interest” from clouding his perspec-
tive to the detriment of his patient. It may not do other-
wise merely because an abortion decisivn is involved. See
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-200, 93 S. Ct. 739, 750-51
(1973). In Doe, the Court struck down requirements that
an abortion be approved by a hospital abortion committee
and by two other physicians independent of the woman’s
own consulting physician because, inter alia, the state re-
quired such additional approval for “no other voluntary
App. 29
medical or surgical procedure. . . .”’ According to the
Court:
If a physician is licensed by the State, he is recog-
nized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable
clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional cen-
sure and deprivation of his license are available rem-
edies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has
no rational connection with a patient’s needs and un-
duly infringes on the physician’s right to practice.
Id. at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 751.
We believe those principles are equally applicable here.
Accordingly, we hold that the requirement that counsel-
ing be conducted by one who has no “financial interest
in the patient’s decision is unconstitutional.
D.
Of the requirements applicable to ASTCs generally, the
physical plant equipment and staffing requirements, in
particular, seem totally unjustified from a medical stand-
point. The testimony regarding many of the physical plant
requirements makes clear that they have “‘no medical jus-
tification whatsoever” when applied to first and early sec-
ond trimester abortions of the type involved in this case.
According to the testimony, the minimum size require-
ments for examination rooms, procedure rooms, recovery
rooms, and corridors and doors not only are not “medical-
ly necessary,” but do not enhance the safety of the abor-
tion procedure “in any way” and do not have “any medi-
cal justification.” R. Vol. I at 263-72 (testimony of Dr.
Hern); see also R. Vol. I. at = —— mf 2
Ragsdale) (large procedure room “not only medically un-
asuaaae we gh eter poor’). We agree that the re-
quirements that ASTCs performing first and early second
trimester abortion(s) be “the functional equivalent of small
hospitals” are not sufficiently justified by “important state
health objectives’’ to be sustained.
App. 30
Additionally, the ventilation requirements of the regula-
tions, which require specific air pressure relationships be-
tween rooms and specific air change ratios are unrelated
to the safety of first and early second trimester abortions.
The purpose of such requirements is to prevent infection
from airborne bacteria. All of the medical experts, includ-
ing defendants’, testified that airborne bacteria simply is
not relevant to the procedures involved in this case, be-
cause the procedures do not involve an incision. The sole
testimony to the effect that such requirements might be
advisable came from the State’s architectural expert, who
apparently believed that an incision was required. It can
scarcely be doubted that such a witness lacks any exper-
tise to enable him to form an opinion regarding the medi-
cal justification for a particular requirement.!? '
More importantly, perhaps, the defendants failed to ad-
duce any evidence at all of a medical justification for the
physical plant requirements. Although the defendants pro-
test on appeal that plaintiffs’ experts who testified as to
the lack of medical justification were not building and con-
struction experts, the relevant test is whether the stan-
dards are “justified by important state health objectives.”
It seems clear to us that medical experts can offer tes-
timony relevant to that standard, and it is questionable
whether those without a health care background can. As
we have noted above, only defendants’ architectural ex-
pert testified as to the need for the ventilation re-
quirements. This witness similarly testified regarding
room sizes, although he stated that the requirements were
drafted with procedures imvolving general anesthesia in
mind. At one point, he testified that he relies on the
12 Defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Barton, lacked significant ex-
perience performing first trimester abortions. Those which he did
perform were generally performed under a general anesthetic in
a hospital setting. Due to his lack of experience relevant to the
procedures at issue in this case, the district court properly ac-
corded his testimony little weight. Defendants similarly do not rely
on it heavily in this court.
App. 31
physician operating a facility to determine what is medical-
ly required. Linder Dept. at 42.
The structural, equipment, and staffing requirements of
the regulations are quite similar to those invalidated in
Reizen. See 743 F.2d at 364-65. They also bear a remark-
able resemblance to the abortion-specific scheme we inval- _
idated in Friendship. While the evidence in Reizen indi-
cated a per-patient cost increase considerably greater than
that in this case (Friendship did not consider particular-
ized cost estimates), the regulations there, as here, would
have required considerable up-front expenditures. Also,
as we have noted above, per-patierit financial cost is not
the only relevant burden. We have little trouble conclud-
ing that these requirements, which impose a substantial
burden and are not justified by health objectives, are
unconstitutional.
E
We also believe that the “certificate of need” proceeding
requirement of the Health Facilities Planning Act is un-
constitutional. The only interest which the State has ar-
ticulated is the desire to keep costs down under the “cost-
plus” disbursement method which was at one time used
by the State in making certain health care payments for
its residents. Apart from the fact that this interest no
longer exists because the State has discontinued use of
this method, the State has never made such payments for
abortions. Furthermore, the interest cannot be said to be
compelling in any event. While a state may have some
interest in preventing wasteful duplication of resources,
the interest must give way where the exercise of consti-
tutional rights is concerned. Certainly it would be uncon-
stitutional for a state to require that anyone desiring to
publish a newspaper demonstrate “‘need”’ for the publica-
tion, though it can scarcely be gainsaid that at least some
few involve wasteful duplication. Where the exercise of
constitutional rights is concerned, the government may
play no role in determining whether outlets for their ex-
ercise are “needed.”
App. 32
The unconstitutionality of the “certificate of need” pro-
ceedings as applied to ASTCs that wish to perform abor-
tions is exacerbated by the failure of the State to prevent
the process from becoming essentially a public veto of the
ASTCs’ existence. As we noted above, the proceedings
attended by the individual plaintiff physician was allowed
to degenerate into a shouting match between abortion foes
and advocates of free choice. The State’s unwillingness
or inability to confine the proceedings to its even arguably
legitimate goals bolsters our conclusion that this require-
ment cannot stand because it is not justified by any legit-
imate State interest.
V
While, as we have noted above, there may well be
facets of the statute and regulations which would indi-
vidually pass constitutional muster, supra nn. 8 & 11, we
are constrained to affirm the district court’s injunction of
the scheme as a whole. Defendants, citing Zbaraz v. Har-
itgan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985), appeal pending,
No. 85-673 and Charles I, 627 F.2d at 779, urge that we
specifically analyze each provision and sever those portions
which are unconstitutional. However, in neither Zbaraz
nor Charles I were we confronted with a comprehensive
scheme which either applied or not depending on whether
a licensing requirement could stand. In Zbaraz, we noted
that severability applies only to “any provisions which can
be given effect without the invalid provisions,” and that
“severance is improper if the unconstitutional provision
is ‘an integral part of the statutory enactment viewed in
its entirety.’ 763 F.2d at 1545 (quoting Scheinberg v.
Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1981)). Here, where
we are dealing with a licensing scheme and the provision
for separate licensure is itself invalid, not only can none
of the other provisions “be given effect without the in-
valid provisions,” but the licensing provision is certainly
“an integral part” of the scheme as a whole. Additional-
ly, in neither Zbaraz nor Charles I was the scheme
App. 33
already so riddled with exceptions resulting from judicial
decisions and non-enforcement policies as to be unintelligi-
ble. In such circumstances, we simply “cannot untangle
the constitutional from the unconstitutional provisions.
...”’ Mahoning Women’s Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456,
460 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S.
918, 100 S. Ct. 3006 (1980).
As originally written, the statute and regulations rep-
resented at least a coherent, if unconstitutional, whole
which regulated all aspects of abortion practice in Illinois.
However, as a result of various judicial decisions, and the
defendants’ change of enforcement policies in response to
them, the scheme has long since lost that coherence. The
statute and regulations as written bear very little resem-
blance to the way they are currently enforced. As is clear
from portions of our opinion, we have at times encoun-
tered considerable difficulty discerning just what the law
in Illinois is. Yet, the State expects physicians, on pain
of professional censure (possibly including loss of their
licenses) and a $10,000 a day fine, to divine the contours
of the rules under which they must operate.
Under these circumstances, we fully agree with the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mahoning Women’s Center.
There, in invalidating, in its entirety, a local ordinance
that required “the functional equivalent of a hospital” for
first trimester abortions, the court held “ijn this situa-
tion, we do not believe a useful purpose would be served
by attempting to rewrite the minor provisions of the or-
dinance in order to make them constitutional.” 610 F.2d
at 461. We could not agree more.
Accordingly with the exception of the portion of the in-
junction regarding the second trimester hospitalivation re-
quirement, which is VACATED As Moot, the preliminary
injunction is
AFFIRMED.
App. 34
Correy, Circuit Judge, dissenting. A decade and one-
half ago the Supreme Court announced “that the right of
personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that
this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.” Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727 (1973). Today, under the
guise of protecting the woman’s constitutional privacy rights,
the majority holds that the State of Illinois’ health ser-
vices statutory scheme, enacted in an attempt to regulate
the ever-escalating costs of medical care without sacrific-
ing its citizens’ health and safety,'is unconstitutional. Spe-
cifically, now some 14 years after its enactment, the ma-
jority declares the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center
Act, 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 44 157-8.1 et seq. (the “ASTCA” or
the “ASTC Act”) and the regulations promulgated there-
under unconstitutional. holding that the State may noi re-
quire licensure of facilities devoted primarily to performing
semi-complicated (minor) surgery, including first-trimester
abortions. As an alternative approach, the majority chooses
and carves out a select few ASTC regulations among var-
ious others, discusses their validity, and then proceeds to
invalidate those regulatory sections of the ASTC Act that
apply to first-trimester abortion facilities in Illinois, stating
that it was unable to sever those provisions of the Act
it deemed unconstitutional from those that were cunstitu-
tional. Thus, the majority strikes down the ASTCA and
baldly asserts that “the [statutory] scheme has long since
lost . . . coherence.”’ Unfortunately, it is the majority’s
decision, rather than the Illinois legislative scheme, that
lacks coherence.' I am convinced that under Roe and its
! The majority’s precise holding is confusing. On the one hand,
the majority affirms the district court’s preliminary injunction
which only enjo‘ned Illinois from regulating ASTCs to the extent
those facilities were performing abortions. On the other hand, the
majority apparently strikes down not only § 16(1) of the MPA,
but the ASTCA and the IHFPA as well, stating it could not “‘un-
tangle the constitutional from the unconstitutional,” and further
asserts that specific substantive aspects of the statutes and regula-
tions are unconstitutional and “render the scheme unconstitutional
as a whole.”
App. 35
progeny that the individual states have the authority to en-
sure that all surgical procedures, including first-trimester
abortions, are performed “under conditions insuring max-
imum safety for the woman.” Connecticut v. Menillo, 423
U.S. 9, 11, 96 S.Ct. 170, 171 (1975) (per curiam). Certainly
states have the power and authority, if not the duty, to
apply the same licensing standards to abortion facilities
as those applied to facilities performing similar surgical
procedures.? I know of no law to the contrary.
Moreover, the majority decision ignores the legislative
intent and the historical context of the enactment of the
challenged provisions: section 16(1) of the Medical Prac-
tice Act (the ““MPA”’), 111 Ill. Rev. Stat. ¢ 4433(1); the Am-
bulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act, 111% II. Rev. Stat.
€¢ 157-8.1, et seg., and the regulations promulgated
thereunder; and the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act,
111% Il. Rev. Stat. 44 1151, et seq., particularly {4 1155-1160.
Research reveals that the Illinois legislature enacted § 16(1)
of the MPA® intending to limit the performance of abor-
tions only to licensed ambulatory surgical treatment
centers, hospitals, or similar facilities and expressed such
intention by requiring licensure of “‘any facility in which
a medical or surgical procedure is utilized to terminate
a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the facility is de-
voted primarily to this purpose,” (definitions section—
2 As demonstrated, infra, the most significant undisputed fact in
the record is that an abortion, regardless of the trimester in which
it is performed, is considered a surgical ae albeit a minor
— procedure, accompanied al] too frequently by concomitant
medical, physical, and psychological complications.
3 As noted by the majority, § 16(1) of the MPA “allows for revo-
cation or suspension of the license of any physician who performs
an ‘elective abortion’ in any place pe A than a licensed Am-
bulatory Surgical Treatment Center (ASTC), a hospital, or a facili-
ty run by the state or federal governments.” (Emphasis added.)
App. 36
ASTCA, 4 157-8.3(A)).4 However, the legislature’s primary
purpose for enacting the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment
Center Act was to regulate and prescribe safeguards for
the rapidly developing trend of cost-effective ambulatory
surgical medical services. The majority unfortunately dis-
regards tnis primary purpose which provided the impetus
for the enactment of the ASTCA and through mere specu-
lation holds that the ASTCA is solely an abortion stat-
ute. Further, in its determination to do away with the
duly enacted legislation, the majority completely disre-
gards the statute’s severability clauses as if they didn’t
exist, stating it could not “untangle the constitutional from
the unconstitutional’ and thus refuses to give effect to
the chalienged acts. Rather than recognize and effectu-
ate the true intent and legitimate purpose of the acts and
enjoin only those provisions which might impinge on a
woman's limited right to terminate her pregnancy (§ 16(1)
of the MPA, its companion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) and
§ 205.730(bX2XD) of the ASTCA regulations), the majori-
ty, in over-expansive language, declares, “ ‘(W]e do not
believe a useful purpose would be served by attempting
to rewrite minor provisions of the ordinance [in this case
4 € 157-8.3 provides:
‘(A) ‘Ambulatory surgical treatment center’ means any in-
stitution, place or ere devoted primarily to the mainte-
nance and operation of facilities for the performance of surgical
procedures or any facility in which a medical or surgical pro-
cedure is utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of
rily to this
whether the facility is devoted prima rpose. Such
facility shall not provide beds or other accommodations for the
overnight stay of patients. Individual patients shall be dis-
charged in an ambulatory condition without danger to the con-
tinued well being of the patients or shall be transferred to
a hospital.”
(Emphasis added to highlight the clause included in the ASTCA
restricting the availability of an abortion.)
5 The severability clauses of the MPA, ASTCA, and the IHFPA
are found respectively at 111 Ill. Rev. Stat. ¢ 4458, 111% II. Rev.
Stat. ¢ 157-8.15, and 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 4 1166.
App. 37
the statutes and regulations] in order to make them con-
stitutional.’””’ In so holding, the majority improperly sub-
stitutes its judgment for that of the legislature which
enacted the statute because of its concern for the safety
of its citizens. In the end, the majority decision severely
limits (or casts aside) the state’s ability to implement cost-
effective schemes and regulate rapidly developing and
modern methods of providing medical services simply
because abortion (surgical) procedures may be involved.
The majority’s misdirected holding ultimately protects
only the financial interests of abortion providers, like Dr.
Ragsdale, rather thar following the Supreme Court’s lim-
ited mandate in Roe aimed at protecting the patient’s
privacy rights. If we allow the majority’s “reasoning’’ to
stand, surgeons, as well as other ASTC operators whose
facilities are devoted primarily to the performance of abor-
tions, will be allowed to operate without regulation while
those ASTCs primarily performing other types of minor
surgical procedures will remain regulated (assuming the
majority's decision mer y affirms the district court’s
preliminary injunction). Thus having treated facilities
devoted primarily to abortions differently from those fa-
cilities primarily devoted to other surgical procedures, the
majority carves out an “abortionist exception” to the gen-
eral rule that states can reasonably regulate how medical
services are provided to its citizens. Ultimately, the ma-
jority in effect creates a legal vehicle for the non-abor-
tionists primarily performing other surgical procedures to
challenge the ASTCA on equal protection grounds; for
what rational basis exists for regulating ambulatory surgi-
cal centers differently than those facilities, like Ragsdale’s
abortion enterprise, devoted primarily to the termination
of pregnancies?
The task of a reviewing court, contrary to the majori-
ty’s reasoning, is, “of course, . . . to resolve the issue
by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and pre-
dilection.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 116, 93 S.Ct. at 709.
Consistent with this Supreme Court directive, our deci-
sion must neither reflect pro choice nor anti-abortion sen-
App. 38
timent. The Illinois legislation at issue, specifically the
ASTCA, is fundamentally different from other TIilinois
abortion-related legislation and merits thorough, reflective,
and separate consideration. I would enjoin § 16(1) of the
MPA and sever and further enjoin its companion clause
in ¢ 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA requiring licensure of “any
facility in which a medical or surgical procedure is utilized
to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the fa-
cility is devcted primarily to this p se” because these
provisions prevent a physician from performing a first-
trimester abortion in his or her office. Under Roe and
its progeny this prohibition may very well be considered
unconstitutional. I am convinced that the states, including
Illinois, are free to regulate ambulatory surgical treatment
centers, including those performing abortions, as long as
abortions are not singled out from other, similar surgical
procedures, subject only to the well-known rational basis
test governing social and economic legislation. Under the
rational basis test the ASTCA and IHFPA are constitu-
tional. Consistent with this analysis, I further evaluate
the remaining abortion-specific statute sections and regu-
lations* promulgated thereunder under the strict scrutiny
test articulated in Roe and its progeny? and would hold
all but one of these constitutional because these statutory
sections and regulations neither burden the abortion deci-
* For example, q 157-8.6-1 of the ASTCA requires that any cor-
poration operating an ASTC “devoted primarily to providing facil-
ities for abortion” must have a licensed physician who is “actively
engaged in the practice of medicine at the Center, on the board
of directors as a condition of licensure.” Additionally, subpart G
of Title 77 of the Illinois Administrative Code contains abortion-
specific regulations. The validity of all but one of these provisions
is demonstrated, infra.
* I concur with the majority that the challenge to the second-
trimester hospitalizati ~ Rs pny rman is moot. It appears that the
majority effortlessly utilized and applied the severability clause of
the Act to the second-trimester hospital requirement, but lost this
analytical ability with respect to the other challenged provisions.
App. 39
sion nor its effectuation, and are justified with important
health objectives in mind.
When the alleged “tripartite” legislative scheme is thus
analyzed, neither a woman’s right to terminate her preg-
nancy, nor the state’s right to rationally regulate modern
medical services for the protection of its citizens is ad-
versely affected. Thus, I would reverse the district court’s
order enjoining Illinois’ health services laws, except to the
extent it enjoined § 16(1) of the Medical Practice Act, its
companion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA, and
§ 205.730(bX2XD) of the ASTCA regulations.
I
The majority decision properly notes that the ‘‘statutory
and regulatory scheme is somewhat complex,” but then
proceeds to further confuse the challenged acts and their
interrelationships, completely disregarding the legislature's
intent regarding the various acts. The record of the legis-
lative history reveals that § 16(1) of the MPA, 111 Ill. Rev.
Stat. § 4433(1), and the Ambulato “y - Treatment
Center Act (ASTCA), 111% Ill. Rev. Stat. 44 157-8.1, et seq.,
were initially companion bills to the initial comprehensive
Illinois Abortion Act (IAA), 38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 4 81-11, et seg.*
The IAA, § 16(1) of the MPA, and the ASTCA, were
Senate bills (S.B.) 1049, 1050, and 1051, respectively. The
legislative history further reveals that S.B. 1049 and S.B.
* The initial Illinois Abortion Law, 44 81-11, et seg., became ef.
fective July 19, 1973, but was subsequently repealed by the Abor-
tion Law of 1975, effective October 30, 1979. The Abortion Law
of 1975 has been challenged on more than one occasion. See, ¢.9.,
Charles v. Carey, 579 F.Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452
(7th Cir. 1984), a 1 dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles,
106 S.Ct. 1697 (1986). The initial IAA had a com letely different
than the ASTCA and IHFPA. However, t — y con-
uses the purposes of the IAA from that of the A and
IHFPA, and in doing so clouds its ability to analyze the challenged
statutes and regulations.
App. 40
1050 were integrally related; their purpose was to regulate
abortions in Illinois in light of, and in an attempt to com-
ply with, the Supreme Court’s then-recent Roe and Doe
decisions. As noted by the majority, § 16(1) of the MPA
provided for the “revocation or suspension of the license
of any physician who performs ‘elective abortions’ in any
place other than a licensed Ambulatory Surgical Treat-
ment Center (ASTC), a hospital, or a facility run by the
state or federal governments.” Apparently, members of
the Illinois legislature were concerned that the State
would eventually be responsible for the cost of abortions
performed on indigents in hospitals, so to reduce the
State’s anticipated abortion costs, less-expensive ASTC
facilities were included in the list of approved locations
for the performance of pregnancy termination procedures.
At the same time the legislature was debating the regula-
tion of abortions, ASTCs were just coming into existence
and thus not regulated. Thus, S.B. 1051, an i nt
health regulatory bill creating and regulating S, Was
made a companion bill to the abortion bills.
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the ASTCA, un-
like the IAA and § 16(1) of the MPA, was not primarily
enacted for the purpose of regulating abortions. The rec-
ord and legislative history reveal that the ASTC Act
became law in Illinois in 1973 with the express policy of
— maximum safety in all medical procedures, pro-
viding:
“for the better protection of the public health
the development, establishment, and enforcement of
standards (1) for the care of individuals in am
surgical treatment centers, and (2) for the construc-
tion, maintenance and operation of ambulatory surgi-
cal treatment centers, which, in light of advancing
knowledge, will promote safe and adequate treatment
of such individuals in ambulatory surgical treatment
centers.”
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111%, ¢ 157-8.2. Further, the ASTCA
was intended to regulate the cost-effective and rapidly
developing ambulatory outpatient surgical medical ser-
App. 41
vices. The minutes of the March 7, 1974, Ambulatory Sur-
gical Treatment Center Licensing Board meeting provide
relevant historical facts relating to the enactment of the
ASTCA:9
“In July 1971 . . . a member of the hospital licens-
ing board, was appointed chairman of a committee
appointed to formulate regulations for those facilities
that were presently unlicensable. Consideration was
given to a large number of classifications and actually
there were 32 types of health facilities listed... .
On July 12, 1972, the final draft (after four drafts)
of proposed standards were submitted to the Hospital
Licensing Board. . . . [OJn August 16 [a member of
the Board] sent these proposed regulations forward
[to the legislation liaison]. . . . About August 1972
[the Board] began to get involved more with the
% The majority improperly relies on the (STC Licensing Board
minutes for the legislative intent of the act. The March 7, 1974,
minutes conclude that “the legislation was written specifically for
regulation of the performance of abortions.’’ On this basis, the ma-
jority states, ‘First, we cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA
was enacted primarily with abortion clinics in mind and only ap-
plied to outpatient surgical clinics generally in an effort to save
the statute from unconstitutionality.” Initially 7 point out that the
district court specifically and properly rejected the plaintiff's re-
quest to admit the minutes of the licensing board meeting as proof
of the oe intent. Tr. at 616. The district court’s eviden-
tiary ruling was proper because “a court should adhere to the
enacting legislature’s purposes,” Posner, The Federal Courts, p.
279 (1985), rather than post-enactment statements regarding legis-
lative intent, particularly when those statements are not even
made by the legislators involved. The district court received the
licensing board minutes only for the limited purpose of establishing
the Board’s state of mind regarding its decent procedures.
However, the historical facts regarding the development of the
ASTC legislation and regulations are reliable, material, and rele-
vant to understanding the historical context in which the ASTCA
was enacted. Thus, I make limited reference to the minutes of
the Board meeting only to draw attention to the historical facts
contained therein.
App. 42
question of abortions which became the primary tar-
get for discussion.”’ :
The significance of these Board minutes lies in the fact
that as early as 1971 a state agency began preparing the
proposed regulations in response to the changing needs
and practices of medical services. Cost-effective “{f}ree-
standing ambulatory surgical centers (FASCs) are indepen-
dent entities which first opened in 1970. . . . [T]hese
facilities were conceived to fill a gap between the doc-
tor’s office and the hospital for minor surgical procedures
not requiring overnight hospitalization.” Note, Freestand-
ing Emergency Centers: Regulation and Reimbursement,
11 Am. J. L. & Med. 105, 118 (1985).!° “The first success-
ful freestanding ambulatory surgery center (FASC), [well
known as Surgicenter], was opened in February 1970 in
Phoenix, Arizona.”” D. Ermann and J. Gabel, The Chang-
ing Face of American Health Care, Multi-Hospital
System, Emergency Centers, and Surgery Centers, 23
Medical Care 401, 406 (May 1985). As early as 1976 one
commentator observed:
“From a societal point of view, perhaps the greatest
impetus behind the ambulatory lemmas nan is its
potential for reducing the cost of services. This poten-
tial applies to both freestanding and hospital-based
facilities, the two major prototypes for ambulatory
surgery. By eliminating overnight hospital stays, ex-
penditures for hospital services for inpatient health
care, which now account for about 40 percent of our
"© Much has been written regarding trends in ambulatory medical
services, including ambulatory surgical treatment centers. See gen-
erally T. O'Donovan, Ambulatory Surgical Centers, Development
and Management (1976); L. Burns, Ambulatory Surgery, Develop-
ing and Managing Successful Programs (1984); M. Roemer, Am-
bulatory Health Services in America (1981); D. Ermann and J.
Gabel, The Changing Face of American Health Care, 23 Medical
a rear ore a Setting Up and Operating Am-
are Centers in a Competiti is
ep pe petitive Environment, 29 St. Louis
App. 43
total national health expenditure, may be reduced
directly and dramatically, at least on a short-term
basis. By focusing on reducing inpatient surgery (ac-
counting for 60 percent of all hospital expenditures
and about 25 percent of total health care expendi-
tures), ambulatory surgery may further reduce costs.”
T. O’Donovan, Ambulatory Surgical Centers, Development
and Management, p. 143 (1976). Further, by 1984 the
ASTC trend was well established:
“The success of the Phoenix center precipitated rapid
growth of a new type of facility for the delivery of
ambulatory surgery, the freestanding, independent,
ambulatory surgery center. Since that time, the Sur-
gicenter has become a model for an increasing num-
ber of both independent and hospital-sponsored free-
standing ambulatory surgery programs.
According to the Freestanding Ambulatory Surgical
Association (FASA), there are approximately 125 in-
dependent freestanding ambulatory surgery centers,
86 of which are members of FASA. According to
FASA, which has been keeping statistics on its mem-
bers since 1974, the membership performed 94,499
ambulatory surgery procedures in 1981, an increase
of 6 percent over the number performed in 1980. This
figure can be compared to 3.2 million ambulatory
surgical procedures performed by hospitals offering
ambulatory surgery in 1980.”
L. Burns, Ambulatory Surgery, Developing and Manag-
ing Successful Programs, pp. 11-12 (1984). Lastly, I ob-
serve that freestanding ambulatory surgical centers are
properly subject to licensure and regulation (as are the
vast majority of medical facilities performing surgeries)
throughout the country, and not only in Illinois. One
writer pointed out that:
“a FASC must obtain a state CON [Certificate of
Need] in order to build the facility. In some states
FASCs must also seek accreditation. In Illinois,
FASCs are licensed and regulated by the State De-
App. 44
partment of Public Health. In Minnesota, surgical
centers are covered by licensing rules. They must be
staffed and equipped to handle surgical procedures,
anesthesia, and post-surgical care.”
Note, Freestanding Emergency Centers, Regulation and,
Reimbursement, 11 Am. J. L. & Med. 105, 118 (1985).
Obviously the Illinois Legislature was not privy to all
this information regarding ambulatory surgical treatment
centers in 1973, at the time it enacted the ASTCA. How.-
ever, as I stated, the record and legislative history reveal
that the legislature was well aware of the new and fast
developing medical trend in outpatient ambulatory care
and specifically sought to regulate it. During the Senate
debates, state Senator Wooten summarized S.B. 1051 as
follows:
“This is another one of those bills that cuts across
lines in all kinds of ways. The Illinois State Medical
Society asked that it be presented in a series with
the two previous bills [S.B. 1049 and S.B. 1050], one
changing the law relating to abortion, the other chang-
ing the Medical Practices Act. While this has a rela-
tionship to abortion, it actually goes much beyond
that. It [S.B. 1051] provides for the establishment and
licensing of facilities which can perform minor sur-
gery. This would be things like tonsilectomy, hernias,
abortions would be included, facial surgery, plastic
surgery and so on. In other words procedures which
would not require an overnight stay. And indeed
these ambulatory surgical treatment centers are for-
bidden to keep patients overnight. However, those
of you who have kept close to medical practices know
that untoward things can occur at any time, and so
provision is made in here that doctors who function
in such a center must also be licensed to practice
in a hospital nearby so that if any complications oc-
cur they can quickly move the patient to that place.
Now, I handed out an outline to explain to you how
these things would work, definitions, they must get
App. 45
a license, some of these things are left open as to
See The Department would like to “4 a
hand in that. This is something doctors en? een
urging us to do for a couple of years now, a1 a
bulatory surgical treatment centers are... im —
out west. The idea is that they can be a grea ar
ing to a patient. One of the big costs in =
if you remember it’s kind of like a hotel which | om
special services and if you don’t need that overnig it
stay, you can save a great deal of money. So goss
a great savings possible for the patient who needs
this kind of one-day surgical treatment. It does in-
clude abortion, and everything would be rather close-
ly regulated and inspected.
(Emphasis added). Another state senator further pointed
out that: ee ss
“This bill is a good bill. It’s not related In any wa)
Ms pot ti It's sponsored by the Medical ——
tion. There’s nothing wrong with ambulatory medica
services.”
hus, contrary to the majority’s mere speculative anon.
se the legislative history clearly and eae ~~
ports the proposition that the ASTCA was . ena =
primarily to regulate abortions, but rather for the regu
tion of all semi-complicated (minor) surgical proce _
performed in the Se ey | — o
centers. Finally, | observe
the ASTCA’s enactment, Senator Wooten —
stated: “The main thrust of [S.B. 1051] is to ae ged
some money by getting minor surgical co oppo sso "
the hospital where it is hideously expensive and m
clinic.” (Emphasis added).
cord and the legislative history further reveal
aa -_ Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act Pca a
was enacted one year after the enactment of 8 “ .
the MPA and the ASTCA and was clearly not P —
a “tripartite” legislative scheme to limit the availa i “ y
of abortions. The legislative history of the IHF PA reveals
App. 46
that it neither mentions abortions, nor referred to them,
nor was it enacted for purposes of regulating abortions.
The IHFPA was intended to address the problem of ex-
pensive, overexpanded and underpopulated medical facil-
_ ities and underutilized medical equipment in the State of
Illinois. In the words of a legislator, the IHFPA was to
“provide a means for proper planning with local in-
put and decision making to cut down on empty hos-
pital facilities, nursing home facilities, sheltered care
. . . facilities and . . . ambulatory surgical facilities.”
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the legislative history of the acts supports the
valid premise that the legislature intended to regulate
abortions when it enacted the Illinois Abortion Act. It
also appears that section 16(1) of the MPA and its com-
panion clause in ¢ 157-8.3(A) of the ASTC were probably
enacted to prevent abortions from being performed in a
physician’s office. On the contrary, there is no proof in
this record that either the ASTCA or the IHFPA were
enacted primarily to regulate abortions; rather, these laws
were adopted to regulate the delivery of medical services
to its citizens and to attempt to prevent and control the
further unnecessary overexpansion of Illinois’ medical fa-
cilities. That the ASTCA was initially a companion bill
to the abortion bills is more of a historical coincidence
relished by political opportunists who, in this case, ap-
parently fully utilized it to their advantage. As the min-
utes of the licensing board reflect, for whatever their
worth: “Without the public interest in abortions, we would
not have any of the present legislation.” That is to Say
that the state legislators and other interested parties who
were primarily interested in regulating ambulatory medi-
cal services would not have been able to enact the legisla-
tion without the statewide and even nationwide interest
in the abortion question at the time.
The majority, acting and reasoning as if living in a social
and economie vacuum (overlooking the developing nation-
wide trend of ASTCs), ignores the dual purpose of the
App. 47 _
islative scheme presently at issue, selectively carving
a poopie non ‘aie of the ASTCA to support its
abortion theory of enactment. Thus, the majority —F
“As originally written, the statute {I assume the A
and regulations represented at least a coherent, if uncon-
stitutional, whole which regulated all aspects of —-
practice in Illinois.” Having ignored or at least overloo +
the State’s legitimate intent to regulate the new ae rapi :
ly developing trend of ambulatory surgical m = :
vices, the majority treats the ASTCA and the regulations
promulgated thereunder as “mincr _abortion provisions.
Further, the majority rejects the basic principle of a
bility when interpreting the construction of a duly —
legislative enactment which yh yng a ae
, iti ses; an
ae lena penlers the different acts and regulations
and affirms the preliminary injunction. Thus, the majority
limits and fails to effectuate the legitimate legislative =
poses behind the ASTCA. As a noted commentator as
observed, limiting the scope of a legislature s intent =
stitutes undesirable judicial activism as much as a =
sion construing a statute beyond its intended scope. oe
Posner, Statutory Interpretation, in the Classroom =
in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 822 (1983). The
majority’s failure to give full effect to the real and -
mate legislative intent to regulate ASTCs is the basis o
my dissent.
Recently, this court observed:
“I: igration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha ha 42 US. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
(1983), the Supreme Court stated that unconstitution-
al provisions in a statute shail be severed if it ap-
pears that the legislature would have enacted age
tutional provisions of the statute npenaty ; ®)
those provisions. 103 S.Ct. at 2774 (citing Buc “y
vy. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108, 96 S.Ct. 612, 677,
L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)).”
App. 48
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985
aff'd, 108 S.Ct. 479 (1987). The Illinois laws in eames
all have their own severability provisions; ths it is clear
that the Illinois legislature intended that the constitutional
provisions °f the acts should be given effect even if other
provisions were held unconstitutional. Accordingly, I ana-
lyze the challenged Statutes and regulations recognizing
that | severance is improper [only] if the unconstitutional
atte 4 peed noes a of the statutory enactment
in its entirety.’” Jd. (quoting Schein v. Smith,
659 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1981)). On the het hand, the
challenged provisious which burden a woman’s right to
privacy may be severed as long as the severed provisions
do not affect “the cssential purposes of the act.” Jd.
II
The abortionist, Dr. Richard M. Ragsdale, plaintiff- l-
lee, testified at the preliminary injunction Seater that the
alleged “{flirst and major burden (affecting a woman’s right
to terminate her pregnancy] is simply the requirement for
an independent licensure as an abortion provider.” This
licensing requirement, applicable to any physician who
wishes to perform an abortion outside of a hospital, an
ASTC, or other regulated facility, regardless of the gesta-
tional period of the embryo or fetus, was created when
the legislature enacted § 16(1) of the MPA and its com-
panion clause in the ASTC definitions section. As previ-
ously noted by the majority, “{sJection 16(1) of the Medical
Practice Act . . . allows for revocation or suspension of
the license of any physician who performs an ‘elective
abortion’ in any place other than a licensed Ambulatory
Surgical Treatment Center . . -, @ hospital, or a facility
run by the state or federal governments.” The following
clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA is the companion
clause to § 16(1) of the MPA, and brought all surgeons
who wished to perform abortions under the ASTCA li-
censing and regulatory scheme:
App. 49
““*Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center’ means...
any facility in which a medical or surgical procedure
is utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of
whether the facility is devoted primarily to this pur-
Es
Significantly, the defendant-appellant, the State of Illinois,
asserts that it no longer enforces § 16(1) of the MPA. Ad-
ditionally, the majority observes that Illinois alleges that
the clause in ¢ 157-8.3(A) above is no longer being en-
forced, noting that:
“Since 1981, the [ASTC] act and regulations have
been applied only to facilities which are primarily
devoted to the performance of surgical procedures
(including abortions). This enforcement policy was
adopted in response to Village of Oak Lawn v. Mar-
cowitz, 86 Ill.2d 406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which
refused to enforce, in a criminal proceeding, that por-
tion of the local ordinance which incorporated the
ASTCA definition of an ASTC which covered ‘any
facility where a mecical or surgical procedure is per-
formed for the termination of pregnancy, regardless
of whether the facility is primarily devoted to that
, 99
purpose.
The majority holds, and I agree, that Illinois’ alleged non-
enforcement policy does not render the issues moot.
Although several justices have persuasively argued that
Roe v. Wade and its progeny articulate an “unworkable
scheme for constitutionalizing the regulation of abortion,”
Thornburgh v. American Co of Obstetricians, 476 U.S.
747, 814, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2207 (1986) (Justice O’Connor, dis-
senting), or represent a “venture . . . fundamentally mis-
guided since its inception,” Jd. at 786, 106 S.Ct. at 2192
(Justice White, dissenting), this court should be bound by
Roe and its progeny. The Supreme Court’s recent Thorn-
burgh decision “‘reaffirm[ed] the principles laid down in Roe
and Akron.” Id. at 759, 106 S.Ct. at 2178. Thus, we
analyze the abortion licensing requirement created when
the lilinois legislature enacted § 16(1) of the MPA and its
companion provision contained in the ASTC definition of
App. 50
ambulatory surgical treatment center, 4 157-8.3(A), under
the standards articulated in Roe and its progeny.
“In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the ‘right of
privacy, . . . founded in the the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action, .. . is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.’ .. .
* * * *
The Court also has recognized, because abortion is
a medical procedure, that the full vindication of the
woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires that
her physician be given ‘the room he needs to make
his best medical judgment.’.. .
At the same time, the Court in Roe acknowledged
that the woman’s fundamental right ‘is not unquali-
fied and must be considered against important state
interests in abortion.’ . . . But restrictive state reg-
ulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other
fundamental rights subject to searching judicial ex-
amination, must be supported by a compelling state
interest. . . . [The Supreme Court] recognized two
such interests that may justify state regulation of
abortions.
First, a state has an ‘important and legitimate in-
terest in protecting the potentiality of human life.’
. . . Although this interest exists ‘throughout the
course of the woman’s pregnancy,’ . . . it becomes
compelling only at viability, the point at which the
fetus ‘has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother’s womb.’ .. .
Second, because a State has a legitimate concern
with the health of women who undergo abortions, ‘a
State may y assert important interests in safe-
guarding health [and] in maintaining medical stan-
dards.’ . . . [The Court further] held in Roe, however,
that this health interest does not become compelling
until ‘approximately the end of the first trimester’
App. 51
of pregnancy. .. . Until that time, a pregnant woman
must be permitted, in consultation with her physi-
cian, to decide to have an abortion and to effectuate
that decision ‘free of interference by the State.’
This does not mean that a State never may enact
a regulation touching on the woman’s abortion right
during the first weeks of pregnancy. Certain regula-
tions that have no significant impact on the woman’s
exercise of her right may be permissible where jus-
tified by important state health objectives. .
From approximately the end of the first trimester
of pregnancy, the State ‘may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reason-
ably relates to the preservation and protection of
maternal health.’ . . . The State’s discretion to reg-
ulate on this basis does not, however, permit it to
adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted
—_ practice. [The Court has] rejected a State’s
attempt to ban a particular second trimester abor-
tion procedure, where the ban would have increased
the cost and limited the availability of abortions
without promoting important health benefits. .. . Jf
a State requires licensing or undertakes to regulate
the performance of abortions during this period, the
health standards adopted must be ‘legitimately re-
lated to the objective the state seeks to accomplish.’ ”
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416, 426-431, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2490-93 (1983) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added).
Initially one observes that the abortion licensing a
ment as it exists pursuant to § 16(1) of the MPA and the
ASTCA definition, fails to distinguish between first and
second trimester abortions; thus, it prohibits the perfor-
mance of first-trimester abortions in physicians’ offices.
The record reveals that a woman’s qualified right under
Roe to terminate her pregnancy is very probably imper-
missibly burdened because surgeons who would otherwise
perform first-trimester abortions out of their offices are
App. 52
precluded from doing so. Dr. Ragsdale, an abortionist and
a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist, testified
that outpatient abortions, whether performed in a physi-
cian’s office or a clinic, were as safe as an abortion per-
formed in a hospital setting.
Plaintiffs additionally called another alleged abortion ex-
pert, Dr. Warren Martin Hern, a doctor and general prac-
titioner without board certification in the specialty of ob-
stetrics and gynecol ~~ Hern testified that first-trimester
abortions, performed six to eight weeks from the last
menstrual period are “probably the safest surgical pro-
cedure being performed in the United States in this cate-
gory of p ures.”"''! Dr. Hern further testified that the
safest surgical method of first-trimester abortion was the
“vacuum aspiration” method. This procedure is basically
“a suction removal of the uterine contents.’’!?
The State of Illinois’ expert, Dr. John J. Barton, a board-
certified specialist in the fields of obstetrics and gynecol-
ogy, also testified that first-trimester abortions performed
in outpatient facilities (such as physicians’ offices or or ASTCs)
present no greater risk than the risks and complication
'! Dr. Hern defined “in this category of procedures” as “‘pro-
cedures that involve invasion of a body cavity or a major organ
of some kind.”
12 Dr. Hern noted that the fatality rate for abortion was about
five per one million, whereas, the case fatality rate for term de-
livery was about 11 per 100,000 live births, which meant that the
risk of term birth is roximately 25 times greater in terms of
risk of death than abortion. Dr. Hern the abortion sur-
gery risk factors to the risk factors of r types of outpatient
surgery. He testified that “some estimates . . . indicate tonsillec-
tomies are at least twice as dangerous as abortions.” Similarly,
Hern stated — 4 that he Bb. pay a colleague who informed him
that laparoscop resulted in a oon rate of two per
100,000. 0. Hern t testi tested Laparoscopic surgery involves the intro-
duction of a laparoscope into the cavity. pS ©
that permits
a tube, a metal tube, that is hollow and is cometh
the physician to look through it into the cavity is introduced
through the umbilicus, with or without operating instruments.”
App. 53
rates of abortions performed in hospitals. Based on the
medical experts’ testimony, it probable that first-
trimester abortions could be safely performed in the sur-
geon’s office. Thus, it appears that § 16(1) and its com-
panion clause in 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA would limit
the availability of abortions by precluding the performance
of abortions in a physician/surgeon’s office.
In Akron the Supreme Court noted that where the
abortion law “increased the cost and limited the availabil-
ity of abortions,” such a law would probably interfere with
the woman’s decision to have an abortion as well as its ef.-
fectuation. Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2492-93. Further, although
dictum, the Supreme Court noted “that the medical evi-
dence suggests that until approximately the end of the
first trimester, the state’s interest in maternal health would
not be served by regulations that restrict the manner in
which abortions are performed by a licensed ——..
Id. at 2492 n.11. The Court further observed that “un-
complicated abortions generally may be performed in a
physician’s office or an outpatient clinic up to 14 weeks
from the first day of the last menstrual period.” /d.
(American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-G ic Services 54
(5th ed. 1982)). In light of the Supreme ’s caveat
in Akron noting the probability that physicians can per-
form first-trimester abortions in their offices; given the
defendant’s policy of nonenforcement regarding § 16(1)
of the MPA and its companion clause in the ASTC,
{ 157-8.3(A), requiring the licensure of any facility per-
forming even one abortion; and after evaluating the evi-
dence ted during the preliminary injunction hearing
which established that first-trimester abortions performed
in a controlled outpatient setting, including a physician's
office, probably were as safe as abortions performed in
hospitals, I would selectively enjoin the enforcement of
§ 16(1) of the MPA and its companion clause in the ASTCA
definition without destroying the entire act because it is
more likely than not that the plaintiffs would prevail on
the merits in light of present Supreme Court precedent.
App. 54
In so holding, I agree with the Illinois Supreme Court
decision in Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 86 Ill. 2d
406, 427 N.E.2d 36 (1981), which also held that the ASTCA
definition was constitutionally invalid as incorporated in
a local ordinance which “closely resemble{d] the state
(ASTC] act and implementing regulations adopted by the
Department of Health.” Jd. at 38. The local ASTC ordi-
nance also required an “initial license fee of $5,000, plus
annual renewal fees of $2,000." Id. at 39. In Marcowitz
the Illinois court, foreshadowing the caveat in Akron,
stated:
“Given the substantial licensing fee required and the
detailed regulation involved, it seems inevitable that
medical practitioners who might otherwise perform
abortions for their regular patients, but whose facil-
ities were not primarily devoted to surgery, would
choose not to qualify under the ordinance. The right
of a woman considering a first-trimester abortion to
seek the advice and services of her obstetrician, gyne-
cologist, or other physician in whom she has trust
and confidence may not be so drastically curbed.
Id. at 42.
Further, both § 16(1) of the MPA and the pea
definition clause in the ASTCA," can easily severed
from their respective acts without affecting the legisla-
ture’s “essential purposes” for the acts’ enactments. See
Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at Ub4S. The MPA io stanly ene
and eapthl of teing eles Se § 16(1) and
as such will continue to be used inter alia to revoke or
suspend a malfeasant physician’s license. Similarly, the
A A becomes “abortion neutral” once the invalid
clause is removed from the definition of an ASTC. See,
3 The unconstitutional clause of 4 157-8.3(A) of the ASTCA to
be severed reads as follows:
“or any facility in which a medical or surgical
procedure is
utilized to terminate a pregnancy, irrespective of whether the
facility is devoted primarily to this purpose.
App. 55
e.g., Village of Oak Lawn v. Marcowitz, 427 N.E.2d at
.14 So construed, the ASTCA fully effectuates the legis-
lature’s primary purpose for its enactment, i.e., to reg-
ulate the rapidly developing trend of cost-effective am-
bulatory surgical medical units. Thus, the State of Illinois
remains free to license any facility pursuant to the “abor-
tion neutral’ ASTCA “devoted primarily to the mainte-
nance and operation of facilities for performance of sur-
gical procedures,” including an abortion facility, like Dr.
Ragsdale’s, devoted primarily to the performance of abor-
tions.'5 As with other social and economic legislation, the
test traditionally applied is whether or not the law has
a “rational relation” to a valid state objective. See Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Company, 348 U.S. 483, 491, 75
S.Ct. 461, 466 (1955). Thus, I would apply the ‘rational
relation” test to the now “abortion neutral’? ASTCA.
The majority, however, disagrees and would apply the
strict scrutiny test relying on mere dictum in Friendship
Medical Center Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d
1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
There the court observed:
“Furthermore, any proposed regulation, even if ap-
plied universally to ali similar medical procedures,
14 As I discuss, infra, the abortion-specific { 157-8.6-1, as well
as the abortion-specific regulations, are also severable; however,
all but one of these provisions survive the strict standard articu-
lated in Roe.
‘8 The majority baldly asserts that Dr. Ragsdale’s practice con-
sists exclusively of first-trimester abortions even though the record
reveals that e performed some 40,000 abortions between
1973 and 1985. Up until the Illinois court’s 1982 decision in Poe
v. Illinois rtment of Public Health, No. 78-C-4126 (N.D. Il.
1982), which found the second-trimester hospital requirement un-
constitutional, Ragsdale limited his practice to the performance of
first-trimester abortions. However, Ragsdale testified that subse-
= to Poe, he began performing second-trimester abortions. This
viously makes economic sense since the physician had the avail-
able licensed ASTC and would only lose income by refusing to
perform second-trimester abortions.
App. 56
because of the fundamental right of a woman to pro-
cure an abortion during the first trimester, would
have to meet a compelling governmental interest re-
quirement. Thus, any general health regulations
which would apply to first-trimester abortions would
have to be limited so as to give effect to the fun-
damental rights as established by Roe and Doe; that
is, not be burdensome on a woman’s right to decide
to abort a pregnancy. By this we mean that in all
probability nothing broader than general requirements
as to the maintaining of sanitary facilities and general
requirements as to meeting minimal building code
standards would be permissible.”
Id. at 1153-54.
Initially, I point out that Judge Fairchild, concurring,
rejected the Friendship majority’s dictum, stating:
‘Nevertheless, regulation of the safety of all these
procedures, incidentally including first-trimester abor-
tions, through imposition of generally applicable reg-
ulations, would seem to be a valid exercise of the
state’s interest in protecting health and need only
satisfy the traditional [rational basis] test of judicial
scrutiny imposed in this area.”
Id. at 1155 (Fairchild, J., concurring). Because Friend-
ship’s dictum to the contrary “was not refined by the fires
of adversary presentation,” it ‘“‘was not a fully measured
judicial pronouncement,” and thus “not authoritative.”’
United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, ___ (7th Cir.
1988). This caveat is particularly applicable here where
we are construing a legislative act regulating a broad field
of medical services, including minor surgical procedures.
The majority gives two reasons, unsupported by this
record, for relying on the Friendship dictum: “First, we
cannot ignore the fact that the ASTCA was enacted pri-
marily with abortion clinics in mind and only applied to
outpatient surgical clinics generally in an effort to save
the statute from unconstitutionality.” However, as I dem-
App. 57
onstrated in part I, the legislative history establishes the
contrary; the primary purpose of the ASTCA was to reg-
ulate the new cost-effective ASTCs in which semi-compli-
cated (minor) surgery was performed. In effect the ma-
jority puts the cart before the horse because it rests its
analysis of the ASTCA on the quagmire of legal dictum
set forth in Friendship which ultimately clouds and con-
fuses its analysis of the ASTCA.
The majority further states:
“Secondly, the state cannot, merely by applying the
expedient and conclusory label ‘onmney? gn Pe
procedure, apply requirements which would be neces-
sary to major surgical procedures in the abortion con-
text where they would be wholly inappropriate. It
is as much a vice to treat abortion similarly to dis-
similar procedures as it is to treat it differently from
analogous procedures.”’
The majority’s conclusory statement is incredible in light
of the record. First of all, the plaintiff's own medical ex-
perts testified that an abortion was a surg
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