Record and brief — Flight Attendants v. Zipes
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No. 88-608-CFX Title: Independent Federation of Flight Attendants,
Status: GRANTED Petitioner
Vv.
Anne B. Zipes, et al.
Docketed:
October 11, 1988 Court: United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
See also:
88-664 Counsel for petitioner: Fehr,Steven A.
Counsel for respondent: Hartunian,Aram A.
Entry Date Note - Proceedings and Orders
1 Oct 11 1988 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.
2 Nov 8 1988 Brief of respondents Anne B. Zipes, et al. in opposition
filed.
3 Nov 16 1988 DISTRIBUTED. December 2, 1988
4 Nov 16 1988 X Reply brief of petitioner Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants filed.
5 Dec 21 1988 REDISTRIBUTED. January 13, 1989
6 Jan 17 1989 Petition GRANTED.
KREIS
7 Feb 16 1989 Record filed.
* Certified copy of C. A. proceedings received.
8 Mar 3 1989 Joint appendix filed.
9 Mar 3 1989 Brief of petitioner Ind. Fed. of Flight Atten. filed.
10 Mar 3 1989 Brief amici curiae of United States and EEOC filed.
11 Mar 3 1989 Brief amicus curiae of International Association of Fire
Fighters, AFL-CIO filed.
12 Mar 3 1989 Brief amicus curiae of Americans United For Life Legal
Defens Fund filed.
13 Mar 8 1989 SET FOR ARGUMENT, APRIL 25, 1989. (2nd CASE)
16 Apr 3 1989 X Brief of respondents Anne B. Zipes, et al. filed.
17 Apr 3 1989 X Brief amici curiae of ACLU, et al. filed.
14 Apr 5 1989 CIRCULATED.
18 Apr 18 1989 X Reply brief of petitioner Ind. Fed. of Flight Atten. filed.
19 Apr 24 1989 Letter from Counsel for petitioner received and
distributed.
20 Apr 24 1989 Record filed.
* Certified copy of original record received.
21 Apr 25 1989 ARGUED.
a
PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
88 -6 08 ) Supreme Court, U.S.
' FILED
No. OCT il 1988
ee
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Petitioner,
Vv.
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN A. FEHR
(Counsel of Record)
WILLIAM A. JOLLEY
JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER & GORDON
204 West Linwood Boulevard
Kansas City, Missouri 64111
(816) 561-3755
Attorneys for Petitioner
Independent Federation
of Flight Attendants
WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
® <i «0
QUESTION PRESENTED
May a court award attorney’s fees in favor of plain-
tiffs and against a labor union-intervenor pursuant to
§ 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), under the same standard by
which fees are awarded in favor of prevailing plaintiffs
and against defendants found to have. violated federal
law, when:
(a) the union-intervenor was neither accused of nor
found to have engaged in any illegal acts, and
(b) the sole purpose of the union’s intervention was
to object (unsuccessfully) to a proposed settle
ment of plaintiffs’ claims which would modify
and/or override provisions of the union’s collective
bargaining agreement and endanger the job secu-
rity of employees in the bargaining unit, not
parties to the litigation, whom the union has an
obligation to represent?
(i)
ii
PARTIES
As is made clear in our Statement of the Case, Peti-
tioner is a labor union and was an intervenor at the
District Court. Trans World Airlines, Ine. (‘ TWA ),
the only defendant below, is not involved in the dispute
for which review is sought and did not participate in
the appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Plaintiffs-Respondents
are a class of TWA flight attendants who were ter-
minated on account of motherhood between July of 1965
and October of 1970.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Nee emememeenes
eee
STATUTE INVOLVED ..................-.....0.-<....-..........-........
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................
A. Preliminary Statement 00000000000. im
B. Procedural History Of This Litigation —...........
C. The Effect Of The Settlement Upon The In-
cumbent Employees ............................cccccccceeeceeeeees
D. The Attorney’s Fees Issues
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................
I. The Importance Of The Issue ..............
II. As Both The Majority And Dissent Below Ex-
pressly Noted, A Conflict Of Authority Exist:
Among The Courts Of Appeals 0...
III. The Case Law From The Other Circuits Only
Adds To The Uncertainty 00000000
A. District of Columbia Circuit
B. Second and Third Circuits
ee
D. Sixth Circuit ............ 0s EES ean ee '
Te en
IV. The Result Below Is In Conflict With Decisions
SR Renita
V. Guidance Is Needed From This Court On The
Question Presented, And This Case Presents
The Ideal Opportunity For The Court To Clar-
A
Neen ccenumesumeeuummmenseses
10
10
13
15
16
17
18
19
19
20
21
24
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
APPENDIX:
Opinion and Judgment of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh C'rcuit dated May 6, 1938..
Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit denying Petition for Rehearing with
Suggestion for Rehearing in Banc dated J uly 22,
DHT... ccassisstsseainks- <oiislbbamensidianmnesteansanenpubniadaiinnnaaent
Opinion and Judgment of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois dated July
16, 19GB ..nnccceceoveesncncesenneescncccesccrocessenesesenessenensess: sence
Order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois dated September 18, 1986
(modifying its order of July 16, 1986 pursuant
to motions filed under Rule 59, F.R. Civ. P)........
Affidavit of Arthur Teolis (filed with the District
Court on July 15, 1982 as part of IFFA’s Ap-
pendix to briefs filed in opposition to plaintiffs’
request for an award of attorney’s fees) .............
Order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District 0:1 Illinois dated June 13, 1982 (award-
ing attorney’s fees from the settlement fund to
emma Gee Bees By) cccccccecccccccecenecsnesssenesssnecrenes
Order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois dated June 23, 1982 (award-
ing attorney’s fees from the settlement fund to
eee Ba TID TBD ann ccccecccesccsnsccercecsttnsentiin'ceses
Memorandum Opinion and Order of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois
dated November 20, 1974 (allowing defendant
to file an Amended Answer) ................- aaa aaeedal
Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) ..............-.......-------
GR TI: BT isin ssceccssnstceciencitncsscensoricccmnecmnmenmies
Excerpt from the June 18, 1979 Settlement Agree-
ment between Plaintiffs and TWA ........................
Page
la
24a
38a
4la
43a
44a
idl
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
EER CI Scene Mme ares eT Re 5
ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101
UI: lati a 2,4
ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
CER CE ree. Ce ee aS 2, 4,9
ALSSA v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 630 F.2d
Sa 2,6
ALSSA v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d
Ie I 2,8
Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2nd
RG I een icnteisidapetilalastnitniiate ston tate a 17, 18, 21
Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.
SY idea a a 20
Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988) .... 14, 17,
a. 21, 22
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
eae eae passim
Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357
i i 5
In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Air-
line Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978) ............ 2, 5,6
Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) ........... 12
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982)... 12, 21
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424
ie a 12
Freedman v. ALSSA, 730 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 899 (1984) 2,7
General Building Contractors Association, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)
Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986)... 16
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) 13, 17
Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir.
ENED sniceeiisthoneiaiiaeaianiniieneeieatbe nant tee oe 19, 21, 22
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) ............. 13, 14
Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional
Services, 524 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)... 16
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Local 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106
AR, Be: CI i csleteseicsidalidienncensinidatiaibamiandiinabiies 12
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
STITT «sisnienitieeiiieddehiaateeehiceiieeiehiaiebalianeammcisadpiiniimenbtaneeite 5
Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers, 543
ef 8 oe. SS 17
National Resource Defense Council, Inc. v.
Thomas, 801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir., 1986) ............. 16, 17
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S.
I a a ln 10, 12
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council,
478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088 (1986) -................... 16
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council,
US. , 107 S.Ct. 3078 (1987) ................. 16
Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 880
WUT. ccccthlcisdeicsdtahepiniglihcetetcldecieiidabisasdeliphdldceeieiasdaipoaiiasdie passim
Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763
A I i cel 18, 19, 22
Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.
| ERTS TR AUR ENO Ne: <a OO 16, 17, 22
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S.
ERE SAR AE SUT ere 18, 19
Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977) ..................- 12,19
Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631
I Ga NINE siccecnedicinirsetecescdedincsieaiitaniiiciirsiinnetipalipen 18
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553
0 RSIS ES ae as oem Bs ae Sea Le 5
U.S. v. Terminal Transport Co., 653 F.2d 1016
(5th Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989
(RCRD. Pa RETIRE eR ED Ae 19, 20
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385
GPE arene eee ee eee IE passim
STATUTES
ES Re ae Re aa me aR aE 2
SSC TC Oe a 19
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
EE EL ee en 18
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-——Continued
Civil Rights Acts Page
I I vcirtsinincs-cincnnccusesenenceisiecsemneneniesion- eaten 13
SN eens 13, 17
I passim
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq. ...............0..... 3, 10, 13
§ 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) _....... 3, 10, 13
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. .......0..000......- passim
§ 706(d) (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)
RCRA EY Rene ATs ey OR a ROR 5
§ 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) _.. 5
§ 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) «200... passim
Clean Air Act
§ 304 (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) 000. 16
§ 307 (f), 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (f) 2.0. 16
Clean Water Act
§ 505 (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1865 (d) ...0. ee. 16
Emergency School Aid Act of 1972
§ 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (repealed) —................ 19
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et
SE ENESEORG SEE Rss Bceier RoR ENON ec a 18
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. ............... 4,18
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Price, Protecting Defendant-Intervenors From At-
torneys’ Fee Liability in Civil Rights Cases, 23
Harv. J. on Legis. 579 (1986)
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
No.
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Petitioner,
— Vv.
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner, Independent Federation of Flight Attend-
ants (“IFFA”), respectfully prays that a writ of cer-
tiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
entered on May 6, 1988.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit is officially reported at 846 F.2d 434,
unofficially reported at 46 FEP 1503, and reprinted in
the Appendix to this Petition at Pet. App. la. The opin-
ion of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois is officially published at 640 F.Supp.
2
i 97, and reprinted
861. unofficially published at 46 FEP 1497,
at Pet. App. 24a. A September 18, 1986 Order of the
District Court modifying its previous judgment has not
been published but is reprinted at Pet. App. 38a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on May 6, 1988. A timely Petition for Rehearing with
Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc was filed on May 19,
1988. The Petition for Rehearing was denied on July
22, 1988, with four Circuit Judges voting to grant re-
hearing in bane, and one not participating. (Pet. App.
22a). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTE INVOLVED
This Petition involves Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, ef seq., specifically Sec-
tion 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the Commission or the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs, and the Commission and the United States shall
be liable for the costs the same as a private person.
1 The opinion below is the seventh Seventh Circuit opinion ”
issue in this litigation. In chronological order, the other six are:
ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1972) :
ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); In re Consolidated Pretrial Fre
ceedinas in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978);
ALSSA v. TWA, 630 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980); ALSSA v. TWA,
713 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1983); and Freedman v. ALSSA, 730 F.2d
509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 899 (1984). This litigation has
also produced one Supreme Court opinion, Z'pes v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 4.5 U.S. 385 (1982).
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Preliminary Statement
The federal civil rights statutes contain fee-shifting
provisions authorizing an award of attorney’s fees in
favor of a “prevailing party”. This Court has spoken
to the standards under which these provisions should be
applied when prevailing plaintiffs seek an award of fees
from defendants who stand as proven violators of fed-
eral law; and also when prevailing defendants seek an
award of fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs. Christians-
burg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). The
Court has never spoken to the issue of what standard
is to be applied to other parties who are neither the vic-
tims nor the perpetrators of the alleged discrimination,
but who intervene to be heard because the resolution of
the litigation will affect their rights. That is the ques-
tion squarely presented by this Petition.
Petitioner Independent Federation of Flight Attend-
ants (“IFFA”) is a labor union which was never accused
of discrimination; indeed, IFFA’s predecessor played the
major role in eliminating the discrimination at issue.
IFFA intervened only, as the dissent below noted, when
it became clear that the settlement of this litigation
would override its collective bargaining agreement and
endanger the jobs of its members. The court below none-
theless chose to award fees against IFFA and in favor
of plaintiffs under the same standards by which fees are
“almost automatically” assessed against defendants ad-
judged to have violated the law. The Panel majority
reached this result only over a strong dissent and after
expressly refusing to follow the decision of the Eleventh
Circuit in Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987).
* We refer nct only to § 706(k) of Title VII, but also to § 204(b)
of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b),
and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which are “substantially identical” to Section
706(k). Christiansbury Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416
(1978).
4
In addition, while IFFA’s Petition for Rehearing was
denied, four judges of the Seventh Circuit voted to grant
rehearing in banc.
B. Procedural History Of This Litigaiton
Since April 1, 1977, IFFA has been certified pursuant
to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.) as the
labor union representing flight attendants in the employ
of Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”). In 1970, the
union which was IFFA’s predecessor, the Airline Stew-
ards and Stewardesses Association (“ALSSA”), filed this
lawsuit as a class action on behalf of all TWA flight at-
tendants who since July 2, 1965 had been terminated due
to TWA’s “no-motherhood” rule. TWA was the sole de-
fendant. The complaint alleged that TWA’s policy vio-
lated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seg. Shortly after the suit was filed,
TWA abandoned its no-motherhood policy pursuant to a
new collective bargaining agreement with ALSSA. In
1971, a settlement was reached which would have allowed
all of the terminated flight attendants to return to work,
with each plaintiff retaining the seniority she held at
the time of her termination. However, the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed the District Court’s approval of this set-
tlement, perceiving that the union, as class representa-
tive, had a conflict between obligations it owed to Plain-
tiffs and obligations it owed to incumbent flight attend-
ants who might be affected as a result of any settlement.
(Pet. App. 2a-3a); ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc.,
490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
(1974).2 As a result of this decision, ALSSA was re-
moved as class representative.*
3 For a time this case was consolidated with a similar action
filed against American Airlines.
4 Counsel for Plaintiffs and ALSSA testified (somewhat pro-
phetically) that he supported the first settlement because approxi-
mately 90% of the class faced a serious legal question as to
whether their claims were time-barred. 490 F.2d at 639-40.
5
In 1978, the Seventh Circuit held that TWA’s no-
motherhood policy was indeed illegal, but that the claims
of approximately 92% of the Plaintiffs were untimely.
In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline
Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978). The court held
that TWA had not engaged in a “continuing violation”,
and that the claims of all flight attendants terminated
more than 90 days before the union had filed its first
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) in 1970 were time-barred pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d).° Id. at 1150. The court then went
on to address Plaintiffs’ secondary argument that TWA
had waived the timeliness defense. The Seventh Circuit
stated that although this claim was questionable,* the
Title VII time limit was a “jurisdictional prerequisite”
which could not be waived. Jd. at 1151. In so ruling,
the court cited statements by the Supreme Court char-
acterizing the Title VII time limit as a “jurisdictional
prerequisite’’.’
Following the issuance of the Consolidated opinion,
Plaintiffs sought certiorari on the jurisdictional issue only
(No. 78-1545) ; no review was sought of the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s ruling that TWA had not engaged in a “continuing
violation” and that most Plaintiffs’ claims were therefore
time-barred. TWA cross-petitioned (No. 78-1549). While
these petitions were pending in June of 1979, the parties
5 The time limit is now 180 days and contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e).
* The waiver argument is based upon TWA’s failure to set forth
the timeliness defense in its original answer, although it was
included in an amended answer filed in 1974. (Pet. App. 47a).
By 1968, however, the Seventh Circuit was already on record as
characterizing the Title VII time limit as “jurisdictional”. Choate
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1968).
*™ McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557 n.9 (1977).
6
entered into another settlement: $3,000,000 was to be
divided among the class members, half te the approxi-
mately 30 women with timely claims (Subclass A), and
half to the approximately 400 women whose claims were
time-barred according to the Seventh Circuit (Subclass
B). More importantly, perhaps, each class member was
to be allowed to regain her job (13-18 years later) with
full retroactive competitive seniority. (Pet. App. 3a).
The Settlement Agreement also specifically purported to
supersede existing collective bargaining agreements,
which, of course, included the IFFA-TWA contract.
(Pet. App. 53a). |
At this point, IFFA intervened to object to the “set-
tlement that substantially altered its contract with TWA
and the job security of its members”. (Pet. App. 20a).
We argued (1) that if (as the Seventh Circuit had al-
ready held in Consolidated) there was no subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, the court had no ju-
risdiction to approve the settlement, grant seniority, and
override the collective bargaining agreement; and (2)
regardless of the jurisdictional issue, a grant of seniority
to Plaintiffs was inappropriate here, where Plaintiffs had
failed to prove their claims but instead had settled, and
the grant of seniority would harm innocent incumbent em-
ployees and override the collective bargaining agreement.
Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit over-
ruled our objections and affirmed the settlement. The
District Court held that it had jurisdiction because the
Seventh Circuit opinion finding there was no jurisdic-
tion was not final. The Seventh Circuit held that the
“principles favoring settlements” gave the court juris-
diction to approve and enforce the settlement regardless
of whether there was subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the merits of the claims. ALSSA v. TWA, 630 F.2d 1164,
1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 1980). IFFA petitioned for and
was granted certiorari (No. 80-951), but the Supreme
Court also at the same time granted certiorari on the
7
petitions (Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549) which had been
held in abeyance since 1978. (450 U.S. 979).
The Supreme Court issued its decision sub nom. Zipes
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).* The
Court did not choose to answer the question (presented
by IFFA in No. 80-951) of whether a court had juris-
diction to enforce a settlement when the court believed
it had no subject matter jurisdiction; instead it de-
cided that the Seventh Circuit had been wrong when (in
the Consolidated opinion in 1978) it characterized the
Title VII time-limit as a jurisdictional prerequisite which
could not be waived. The Court held that the time-limit
is not jurisdictional, and could be waived. There was,
therefore, subject matter jurisdiction to approve and en-
force the settlement, and thus the Court affirmed the
order approving the settlement (although for entirely
different reasons than those used by both lower courts).”
C. The Effect Of The Settlement Upon The Incumbent
Employees
Shortly after the Settlement Agreement was signed
in June of 1979, TWA entered into a recessionary period
(as IFFA had feared). Hundreds of flight attendants
were placed on involuntary furlough beginning in Octo-
ber of 1979. TWA hired no flight attendants, and had
no flight attendant vacancies from 1979 until 1983, when
8 TWA’s Cross-Petition in No. 78-1549 was removed from the
calendar prior to briefing and argument (451 U.S. 980) and even-
tually dismissed as improvidently granted (455 U.S. at 392, n.5).
* While the Supreme Court determined that TWA could theo-
retically waive the timeliness defense, neither the Supreme Court
nor the Seventh Circuit nor the District Court ever determined
whether or not such a waiver had occurred (or whether that waiver
could be binding on third parties affected by the resolution of the
case). The Seventh Circuit specifically acknowledged this point in
a post-Zipes opinion in this litigation. Freedman v. ALSSA, 730
F.2d at 512, n.5.
8
Plaintiffs were reemployed. (Pet. App. 4la). Indeed, in
1982, Plaintiffs sought to foree TWA to immediately re-
instate them regardless of whether vacancies existed. The
Seventh Circuit, however, ruled that pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement TWA was not obligated to rehire
Plaintiffs until vacancies existed. ALSSA v. TWA, 713
F.2d 319 (1983).
Of the incumbents furloughed in 1979, more than 150
were never recalled. Those flight attendants effectively
lost their jobs due to the injection of hundreds of Plain-
tiffs into the work force with retroactive competitive
seniority. (Pet. App. 41a).
D. The Attorney’s Fees Issues
Shortly after the Zipes decision in February of 1982,
Plaintiffs’ counsel sought an award of fees of nearly
$1,400,000 from the $3,000,000 settlement fund. The
District Court approved this request in June of 1982.
(Pet. App. 43a, 44a). Of this amount, $1,250,000 went
to counsel for Subclass B based on hourly rates of up to
$160 per hour plus a multiplier of two.
Plaintiffs’ counsel also sought fees from IFFA pur-
suant to § 706(k). In 1986, the District Court awarded
fees against IFFA and in favor of Plaintiffs in the
amount of $180,915.84. (Pet. App. 5a).
IFFA appealed, and a divided panel affirmed on May
6, 1988. In so ruling, the Panel majority acknowledged
that while the Supreme Court (in Christiansburg Gar-
ment) had articulated the standards upon which suc-
cessful plaintiffs should be awarded fees against defend-
ants who are proven violators of federal law, and also
the standard upon which successful defendants could
be awarded fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs, the “Su-
preme Court has never explicitly considered the stand-
ard applicable to a request for an award of fees against
an unsuccessful intervenor .. .” (Pet. App. 9a). The
9
majority then stated its explicit disagreement with the
Eleventh Circuit opinion in Reeves v. Harrell, supra,
which held that parties who intervene in civil rights
cases to claim that the resolution of those cases abridges
their rights should be treated as plaintiffs for attorney’s
fees purposes. (Pet. App. lla, 13a). The majority went
on to affirm the award of fees against IFFA under what
the dissent characterized as “the same standard ap-
plicable to defendants who have violated their employ-
ees’ civil rights.” (Pet. App. 18a-19a).
The dissent found the majority’s result inconsistent
with this Court’s holding in Christiansburg Garment, as
well as the Eleventh Circuit’s in Reeves, with which it
agreed. The dissent also noted the irony of the Panel
majority’s ruling, since the Seventh Circuit itself had
once admonished the union about its duty to represent
the incumbent employees:
[T]his circuit dismissed the incumbent employees’
predecessor union as the plaintiffs’ class representa-
tive specifieally because the union’s interest in rep-
resenting the collective bargaining rights of the in-
cumbent employees conflicted with its position as
class representative. See Air Line Stewards and
Stewardesses Ass’n, Local 550 v. American Airlines,
Inc., 490 F 2d 636, 639-42 (7th Cir. 1973). The
fact that the IFFA did what its members elected
it to do and this circuit expected it to do, that is,
represent the interests of incumbent employees, is
not something that should subject it to Title VII
attorneys’ fees. (Pet. App. 20a).
Finally, the dissent noted that the majority’s result
would have a chilling effect upon the rights of innocent
incumbent employees whose rights are affected by the
resolution of civil rights cases:
Many of these affected employees will have substan-
tial claims that the settlement or remedies violate
their own rights under a collective bargaining agree-
10
ment, Title VII, or even the Constitution. The just
resolution of these cases requires the full participa-
tion of everyone involved. Mechanically assessing
attorneys’ fees against intervening employees who
did not violate anybody’s rights and who are not
fortunate enough to posture themselves as “plain-
tiffs,” will ensure that in many cases only two sides
will be heard in a multi-sided dispute. (Pet. App.
21a).
A timely Petition for Rehearing, with Suggestion for
Rehearing in Bane was filed. On July 22, 1988, rehear-
ing was denied, with four judges voting to grant rehear-
ing. (Pet. App. 22a).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Importance Of The Issue
The civil rights fee-shifting statutes by their terms
make no distinction between parties, be they plaintiffs,
defendants, or intervenors. However, in Christiansburg
Garment Co. ». EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Court
held that plaintiffs who prevail against defendants should
ordinarily receive an award of fees unless special cir-
cumstances exist. 434 U.S. at 417. On the other hand,
defendants who prevail against plaintiffs are to receive
an award only upon a finding that the action brought was
“frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation... .”
434 U.S. at 421."
The reasons for ordinarily awarding fees to plaintiffs
(who prevail against defendants) are:
(1) When a district court awards counsel fees to a
prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against
a violator of federal law; and
1 In Christiansburg Garment, the Court was expanding upon the
standards established a decade earlier in Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), a case involving § 204(b)
of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
11
(2) A private plaintiff is the chosen instrument of
Congress and an award of fees will make it
easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring
a meritorious suit.
(434 U.S. at 418, 420).
But these factors, the Court said, are “wholly ab-
sent in the case of a prevailing Title VII defendant.”
(434 U.S. at 418). Prevailing defendants are not ordi-
narily entitled to an award of fees against unsuccessful
plaintiffs. As the Court said:
No matter how honest one’s belief that he had been
the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritor-
ious one’s claim may appear at the outset, the course
of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts
may not emerge until discovery of trial. The law
may change or clarify in the midst of litigation.
Even when the law or the facts appear questionable
or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an
entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit. (434
USS. at 422).
Applying these teachings to the facts of this case, it is
clear that one of the two reasons given for presump-
tively awarding fees to plaintiffs is “wholly absent’.
IFFA did not violate the law; it merely attempted to
enforce its contract and represent the interests of inno-
cent incumbents affected by the settlement. The other
reason given in Christiansburg for awarding fees to pre-
vailing plaintiffs—to make it easier for plaintiffs of lim-
ited means to bring suit—is of tenuous, if any, appli-
cability here. As the dissent below noted, before IFFA
intervened counsel for plaintiffs had already voiced their
intention to seek a seven-figure fee which surely provided
counsel with ample incentive to proceed. Moreover, in
any Title VII case where plaintiffs prevail there will
always be a wrongdoer defendant who may be assessed
12
fees; it is not necessary for innocent and adversely af-
fected employees to pay plaintiffs’ lawyers."
However, the reasons given in Christiansburg Garment
for not routinely awarding fees against plaintiffs have
an almost eerie applicability to the facts of this case.
The law changed dramatically in the midst of litigation.
The District Court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court
each used an entirely different rationale. The appellate
opinion which formed the basis for IFFA’s intervention
at the District Court was reversed. Statements made by
this Court before, in, and after the Zipes opinion make
it clear that IFFA had a very reasonable basis for going
forward.
Accordingly, IFFA believes it should be judged for
attorney’s fees purposes as if it were an unsuccessful
plaintiff. But more is at stake than the soundness of
that position. This Court has shown a distinct sensitivity
to the dilemma of innocent incumbent employees affected
by Title VII remedies, as well as that of unions not
guilty of discrimination which must nonetheless partici-
pate in remedial proceedings. Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 781-2 (1976) (Burger,
C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Team-
sters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 356, n.43 (1977); Zipes v.
TWA, 455 U.S. at 401, n.1 (Powell, J, concurring) ;
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 240 (1982);
Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984); and
Local 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct.
3063, 3079 (1986). Is the union which participates
in remedial proceedings as required by Teamsters and
which asserts its rights under its contract as well as
11 Tn addition, in Piggie Park the Court noted that a civil rights
plaintiff will often need to seek injunctive relief, an additional rea-
son why plaintiffs should presumptively be entitled to fees. 390 U.S.
at 402. No such considerations are present here. The challenged
policy had been abandoned long before current counsel entered the
case, and thus there was no need to seck any injunctive relief.
-
.
‘
:
:
i
:
13
the interests of its members as perhaps required by its
duty of fair representation risking an almost automatic
award of attorney’s fees against the union if it does not
prevail? Are innocent incumbent employees (or their
unions acting on their behalf) who in remedial proceed-
ings raise the equities of their positions vis-a-vis plain-
tiffs who may have slept upon or settled questionable
claims to be almost automatically assessed attorney’s fees
if their arguments do not prevail? We think the answer
to these questions must be no; but whatever the answer,
those unions and employees are entitled to know it. (At
the moment the answer varies depending upon the judi-
cial circuit in which the case is brought). Before they
embark upon a course of conduct, those unions and em-
ployees should know whether they can afford to voice
their rights. Accordingly, there is a compelling need for
this Court to grant certiorari and decide the question
presented.
II. As Both The Majority And Dissent Below Expressly
Noted, A Conflict Of Authority Exists Among The
Courts Of Appeals
In Reeves, the plaintiffs were black sheriffs who
brought suit against a county government pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983. The suit was settled through
a court-approved decree. White deputy sheriffs subse-
quently intervened and contended (unsuccessfully) that
the consent decree violated their rights. When fees were
sought against the intervenors (pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§$ 1988) ,'* the Eleventh Circuit said:
12 Tn 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was enacted to allow attorneys’ fee
awards in cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The language
of Section 1988—which is the provision at issue in Reeves and
Charles, infra, is virtually identical to the language of § 706(k) of
Title VII and § 204(b) of Title II. It frequently has been said that
Section 1988 was patterned after its Title II and Title VII counter-
parts and should be interpreted in an identical fashion. Hanrahan
v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, n.4 (1980); Hensley v. Eckerhart,
14
In the present case, the intervenors claimed that the
consent decree’s quota provision violated their con-
stitutional rights. Furthermore, it is undisputed that
the intervenors were not responsible for any of the
alleged violations that led to the consent decree or
that they had ever violated the constitutional rights
of any of the members of the plaintiff class. There-
fore, we agree with the district court that the inter-
venors should be characterized as plaintiffs and are
liable for attorney’s fees only if their claims were
frivolous. 791 F.2d at 1484.
The Panel majority in this case flatly rejected the
Reeves holding:
IFFA would have us characterize its posture in this
case precisely as the Eleventh Circuit characterized
the intervenors’ position in Reeves. We decline to do
so. Acceptance of a “functional plaintiff” exception
to the rule favoring fees awards to prevailing Title
VII plaintiffs, in our view, unnecessarily threatens to
undermine what has come to be interpreted as a
deliberate statutory presumption in favor of such
awards to prevailing parties. (Pet. App. lla) ."
The Panel majority did not explain, however, why it
felt plaintiffs should be presumptively entitled to fees
461 U.S. 424, 433, n.7 (1983). Certainly there is no question that
the Seventh Circuit sees no distinction between § 1988 and § 706(k).
(Pet. App. 7a).
13 One day before its decision issued in this case, the same Sev-
enth Circuit Panel, by the same 2-1 vote, affirmed an award of fees
against intervenors in Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.
1988). “Charles involved an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to
section 1988 against three private parties who intervened on the
side of Illinois in a suit challenging the constitutionality of the
State’s criminal abortion statute” (Pet. App. 6a-7a). Rehearing
was sought and denied on July 22, 1988, the same day on which
rehearing was denied in this case (although no judges voted to
grant rehearing in Charles). The facts of the two cases, while quite
different, demonstrate the broad range of individuals and entities
affected by the issue presented. (‘Ve understand that certiorari will
be sought in Charles).
i.
|
15
when the party from whom fees are sought is not the
party who violated the law. It did, however, choose to
reemphasize its disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit:
Of even greater concern, however, is our belief
that were we to adopt the “functional plaintiff” ap-
proach articulated in Reeves and advocated by IFFA,
we might very well encourage intervenors, and ulti-
mately defendants, in Title VII lawsuits to manu-
facture constitutionally-derived or statutorily-based
defenses in an attempt to cloak themselves in the
protective guise of functional plaintiffs, in effect ren-
dering them immune from statutory fee liability ex-
cept where their defenses are held to be completely
without merit. (Pet. App. 13a).
The dissent below disagreed:
[T]he application of the Christianburg Garment poli-
cies warrants treating the intervenors as plaintiffs
for attorneys’ fees purposes. See Reeves v. Harrell,
791 F.2d 1481, 1484 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 880 (1987).
(Pet. App. 20a).
Given the acknowledged split of authority on an issue
of obvious importance to many, we submit that certiorar?
should be granted and the issue resolved by this Court.
Ill. The Case Law From The Other Circuits Only Adds
To The Uncertainty
While no other Court of Appeals has faced the issue
presented here as directly as the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits, several have at least touched upon it. A read-
ing of those cases only serves to reinforce the need for
this Court to decide the issue. Simply put, the state of
the law is unsettled and confused. Decisions from the
District of Columbia, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits
lend support to the position of the Eleventh Circuit (and
the Seventh Circuit dissent), while decisions of the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits arguably give some solace to the
Panel majority below.
16
A. District of Columbia Circuit
The Panel majority acknowledged that Grano v. Barry,
783 F.2d 1104, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1986) lends support to
the position taken by IFFA and the Eleventh Circuit.
(Pet. App. 10a). In Grano, the court affirmed the dis-
trict court’s refusal to award fees under § 1988 against
intervenors on the “functional plaintiff’ theory, saying
such a ruling was within the discretion of the district
court, and citing Kirkland v. New York State Depart-
ment of Correctional Services, 524 F.Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), an early and eloquent opinion holding that un-
successful intervenors should not be treated as wrong-
doer defendants for attorney’s fees purposes.
The D.C. Circuit in Grano also cited Sierra Club v.
EPA, 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1985), a case involving
a request for an award of fees against an intervenor
under § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607
(f). In Sierra Club the court refused to award fees
against intervenors whose claims were not frivolous and
whose position was intended to encourage the “effe
tive interpretation and implementation of the Act.” 769
F.2d at 810-11. The court took the same position regard-
ing a claim for fees against intervenors pursuant to
$ 505(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d),
in National Resource Defense Council, Ine. v. Thomas,
801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Sealia, J.). While the
Panel majority below distinguished Thomas on the basis
of slightly different statutory phraseology (Pet. App.
8a, n.5), that distinction is quite dubious since this Court
has made it clear that § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act
(which is substantially identical to the provisions at
issue in Thomas and Sierra Club) should be interpreted
in the same fashion as $1988 (which is substantially
identical to § 706(k)). Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens Council, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3095
(1986) ; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Coun-
cil, ——- US. , 107 S.Ct. 3078, 3080, n.1: see also
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, n.4 (1980).
|
17
The purposes behind these statutes are “nearly iden-
tical”, and there is a common thread: fees are to be
awarded against those who have violated the law. More-
over, those who advance the interests of innocent third
parties affected by the resolution of discrimination cases
clearly have “reasonably attempted to advance the im-
plementation of the Act.” Thomas, 801 F.2d at 467."
Accordingly, it is quite difficult to reconcile Thomas and
Sierra Club with the result below.
B. Second and Third Circuits
The Second Circuit decision in Annunziato v. The
Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2nd Cir. 1984) is also incon-
sistent with the result below, as pointed out by the dis-
sent in Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1078 (7th Cir.
1988). In The Gan, the third-party against whom fees
were sought had purchased a building from a city gov-
ernment. Plaintiffs brought suit against the city and the
purchaser under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and after settlement
sought fees under § 1988. The court refused to award
fees against a party who had not been shown to have
violated the law:
The policy of awarding fees, which is to encourage
civil rights plaintiffs to bring actions to vindicate
their constitutional rights, was furthered in this case
by the district court’s award of fees against the City.
We do not view this policy of encouragement as
applicable to The Gan. It was an innocent third party
caught in the cross-fire between plaintiffs and the
City of New Haven over a municipal practice in
which The Gan had no hand.
(744 F.2d at 253).
14 The Panel majority below cited in support of its position Moten
v. Bricklayers, 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976). (Pet. App. 7a).
However, Moten is a pre-Christiansburg Garment decision where
fees were assessed against an employer association for filing an
appeal when it had never even sought leave to intervene at the
district court. (Jd. at 227 and 239). Accordingly, an award of fees
would likely have been justified in Moten regardless of what stand-
ard was applied.
18
A case with somewhat similar facts is Tunstall v. Of-
fice of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631 (8rd Cir. 1987).
In Tunstall, the Third Circuit, relying on The Gan, re-
fused to award fees under § 1988 against a party who
had purchased plaintiffs’ home from the city, but played
_no role in the city’s allegedly unlawful acts."
C. Ninth Circuit
As the Panel majority below also acknowledged (Pet.
App. 15a), the Ninth Circuit decision in Richardson v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1984), lends
support to IFFA’s position. There, a pilot had sued an
airline claiming illegal discrimination in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. § 621, et seg. The union intervened claiming that
a settlement and entry of a proposed consent decree would
violate the seniority rights of its members pursuant to
its collective bargaining agreement with the airline. The
union’s contentions were not accepted. However, the court
refused to award fees against the union because the “pol-
icy considerations which underlie the shifting” of at-
torney’s fees did not apply against a party who had not
violated the law. 750 F.2d at 766. The court also, in a
passage quite applicable to this case, noted that the union
was merely fulfitling its duty of fair representation to
its members:
Imposing a fee award would only punish ALPA for
performing an act it was under a duty to do. Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq. (1982) and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
$ 151 et seq. (1982), unions are given the right to
act as exclusive representatives for all members in
the bargaining unit. This right carries with it a
corresponding duty to represent all members fairly.
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323
‘5 It does not weaken our case to note that there was a dissent in
The Gan. It only serves to demonstrate (once again) the need for
guidance from a higher authority.
a
:
:
;
19
U.S. 192, 202-03, 65 S.Ct. 226, 232, 89 L.Ed. 173
(1944).
(750 F.2d at 766, emphasis supplied) .**
D. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit affirmed an award of fees against
an intervenor in Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128
(6th Cir. 1979), a case relied upon by the District Court
here (Pet. App. 33a) and by the Panel majority in
Charles, 846 F.2d at 1068-9.
The intervenor in Haycraft was not a party involved
in the litigation, but merely a county judge who wanted
to provide his own personal plan for solving the area’s
school desegregation problems. Fees were awarded pur-
suant to § 718 of the Emergency School Act of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1617 (since repealed), which was textually simi-
lar to § 706(k) and § 1988.""
E. Fifth Circuit
The Panel majority also relied upon U.S. v. Terminal
Transport Co., Inc., 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir., Aug. 12,
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982)). In that case
the district court had found both employer and union
defendants in violation of Title VII. Following the is-
suance of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977), that
order was modified (in compliance with Teamsters) to
hold that the unions were not in violation of Title VII
16 The Panel majority accurately pointed out that the statute
under which Richardson was decided provides an alternative basis
for the result there. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Nonetheless, we must
note that the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ views are diametrically
opposed in regard to the actions undertaken and obligations owed
by the respective unions as well as the consequences of those actions
and obligations for attorney’s fees purposes.
17 We believe Haycraft can be distinguished on the basis that the
court found intervenor’s coneuct to be in bad faith, which would
have justified an award of fees even if the intervenor were judged
as a plaintiff for attorney’s fees purposes. See 606 F.2d at 133.
20
and not liable for backpay. The Fifth Circuit nonetheless
found the unions liable under § 706(k) for some of plain-
tiffs’ attorney’s fees due to the union’s opposition to sen-
iority relief sought by plaintiffs..* The opinion cites
Christiansburg Garment but contains no discussion of its
principles.’®
IV. The Result Below Is In Conflict With Decisions Of
This Court
Even beyond the confused state of the lower court case
law, the opinion of the Panel majority below cannot be
reconciled with the principles articulated by this Court in
Christiansburg Garment, or with the thrust of several
Supreme Court opinions which deal with the rights of
innocent, affected third parties. See p. 12, supra. We
offer but one more example. Just months after its is-
suance, Zipes was cited by the Court in General Build-
ing Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458
U.S. 375 (1982). There the Court held that an employer
association which had not participated in discrimination
by a union in the operation of an exclusive hiring hall
could not be required to share the cost of a remedial
program. However, Justice Rehnquist said:
This is not to say that defendants in the position of
petitioners might not, upon an appropriate eviden-
tiary showing, be retained in the iawsuit and even
subjected to such minor and ancillary provisions of
an injunctive order as the District Court might find
necessary to grant complete relief to respondents
'* Terminal Transport, however, was obviously not treated as
precedent in Reeves. The Eleventh Circuit is bound to follow all
Fifth Circuit decisions which issued before October 1, 1981, which
would include Terminal Transport. Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206 (11th Cir. 1981). Indeed, Judge Clark was on the panel in both
Reeves and Terminal Transport.
19 The district court case law in this area is also divergent. For
a discussion of those cases, see Price, Protecting Defendant-
Intervenors From Attorneys’ Fee Liability in Civil Rights Cases,
23 Harv.J. on Legis. 579 (1986).
21
from the discrimination they suffered at the hands
of the Union. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982). But that sort of minor
and ancillary relief is not the same, and cannot be
the same, as that awarded against a party found to
have infringed the statutory rights of persons in the
position of respondents.
Absent a supportable finding of liability, we see no
basis for requiring the employers or the associations
to aid either in paying for the cost of the remedial
program as a whole or in establishing and adminis-
tering the training program. 458 U.S. at 399-400.
Although “costs” of a remedial program may not pre-
cisely translate into “costs” under § 706(k), the analogy
is striking. Clearly, a sharp line is to be drawn between
those who violate the law and those caught in the middle
between victim and discriminator. Being held liable for
attorney’s fees under the same standard applied to de-
fendants who violate the law is hardly “minor” or “ancil-
lary”. We cannot believe that the large objectives of
Title VII require that innocent employees carry such a
heavy burden. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. at
240.
V. Guidance Is Needed From This Court On The Question
Presented, And This Case Presents The Ideal Oppor-
tunity For The Court To Clarify The Law
As is obvious from the foregoing, the question pre-
sented needs to be decided by this Court. The issue is
important, the lower courts are badly divided, the scope
of persons affected is immense (e.g., contrast IFFA with
the third-parties against whom fees were sought in
Charles, Haycraft, Reeves and The Gan), and the is-
sue will unquestionably continue to arise until the Court
provides direction. Moreover, we submit that this case
is the perfect case for the Court to give that direction.
Consider the exceptional confluence of factors:
22
1. IFFA had an actual interest in the litigation.
In contrast with some of the cases on this is-
sue (e.g., Haycraft, Sierra Club, and Charles),
IFFA and its members had a direct, discernible
interest in the matters at issue and were assert-
ing their own rights. IFFA was not protecting
the environment in general or voluntarily assist-
ing in the defense of a state statute. Thus, the
“chilling effect” of the result below is directly in
focus.
. The Seventh Circuit told the union to do what it
did. IFFA was acting on the heels of the Seventh
Circuit’s 1973 pronouncement that the union was
legally obliged to represent incumbents who might
be affected by the resolution of the litigation.
How could the union have done otherwise?
3. IFFA was only fulfilling its duty of fair repre-
sentation. By acting in response to the Seventh
Circuit’s warning in a vain attempt to enforce
its contract and safeguard its members’ job secu-
rity, IFFA was only complying with its duty of
fair representation to its members, as the Ninth
Circuit in Richardson and the dissent below sug-
gest. It takes little ingenuity to imagine that if
IFFA had simply refused to represent the inter-
ests of those whose jobs were in jeopardy, those
flight attendants might have sued IFFA. Under
the result below unions will indeed be punished
merely for performing their legal obligations.
. The union filed this suit. The actions of IFFA’s
predecessor made it possible for this suit to be
filed, for TWA’s illegal policy to be eliminated,
for Plaintiffs to regain their jobs, and for Plain-
tiffs’ current counsel to earn their million-dollar-
plus fees. If these facts do not constitute “special
circumstances” which should insulate IFFA from
fee liability, it is difficult to imagine any which
would. Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 418.
23
5. The law changed dramatically during this litiga-
tion and IFFA had an eminently reasonable basis
for going forward. The statement in Christians-
burg Garment that the “course of litigation is
rarely predictable” (434 U.S. at 422) is an under-
statement when applied to this case. The very
substantial nature of the questions raised by
IFFA are well documented by this Court’s prior
grant of certiorari, the dissent below, the four
Circuit Judges who voted to grant rehearing, and
the Eleventh Circuit opinion that accepts IFFA’s
position in its entirety.
6. Before IFFA intervened, Plaintiffs’ counsel was
already in a position to exact enormous fees from
the settlement fund. Thus, awarding more fees
is hardly necessary in order to further the gen-
eral goal of encouraging plaintiffs of limited
means to bring suit. It will merely provide an
additional bonanza for counsel here.
7. As the dissent noted, IFFA intervened only “to
protect its members’ jobs.” (Pet. App. 18a).
It is difficult to believe that such action should
subject IFFA to an award of fees as if IFFA
had violated the law.
In short, if any intervenor or third-party deserves to be
judged by a standard for attorney’s fees liability dif-
ferent from the standard applied to defendants found
guilty of illegal discrimination, it is this one. Accord-
ingly, this is the ideal case for the Court to determine
if any different standard should be applied.
24
CONCLUSION
The writ of certiorari should be granted and the judg-
ment below reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVEN A. FEHR
(Counsel of Record)
WILLIAM A. JOLLEY
JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER & GORDON
204 West Linwood Boulevard
Kansas City, Missouri 64111
(816) 561-3755
Attorneys for Petitioner
Independent Federation
of Flight Attendants
i eee Me BE a ie ——_
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 86-2731
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
v.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., et al.,
Defendants,
and
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Intervenor-A ppellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division
No. 74 C 2063—Stanley J. Roszkowski, Judge
ARGUED APRIL 23, 1987—-DEcIDED May 6, 1988
Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY, and MANION, Circuit
Judges.
CoFFEY, Circuit Judge. This dispute over liability for
statutory attorneys’ fees has its origins in a 1970 class
action filed by the plaintiffs against Trans World Airlines
(“TWA”) alleging unlawful sex discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
2a
U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. After nearly nine years of litiga-
tion, the plaintiffs entered into a comprehensive settlement
agreement with TWA which was contested by the inter-
venor, the Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
(“IFFA”), on the grounds that the terms of the settle-
ment violated the rights of those TWA flight attendants
not members of the plaintiff class. IFFA’s opposition to
the settlement agreement consumed three years of litiga-
tion culminating in 1982 when the plaintiff class pre-
vailed before the Supreme Court. Subsequently pursuant
to section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k),
plaintiffs’ attorneys successfully petitioned the district
court foi fees incurred in connection with their post-
settlement legal work. We affirm the district court’s
award of post-settlement fees against IFFA as well as its
use of a multiplier in calculating that award.
I. FACTS
The proceedings which pre-date this lawsuit are sum-
marized in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385 (1982). The plaintiffs brought this class action
against TWA back in 1970, challenging the airline’s pol-
icy of automatically terminating the employment of all
female flight attendants who became mothers while per-
mitting their male counterparts, new fathers, to continue
flying. Soon after the filing of suit by the plaintiffs,
TWA abandoned its “no-motherhood” policy and IFFA’s
predecessor, then represen ing both the plaintiff class and
unaffected flight attendants, entered into a settlement
with TWA. Although the district court approved the
proffered settlement, several disenchanted class members
appealed. We reversed the district court’s approval of the
1971 settlement based upon the conflict we perceived be-
tween the then union’s obligations to the plaintiff class
‘Presumably, although it is not clear from the record, TWA
actually terminated flight attendants upon learning of their
pregnancy.
:
}
:
F
|
|
§
3a
hand and to the then-currently working flight
pons on the other. Air Line Stewards and Steward-
esses Association v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th
Cir. 1973). We ordered IFFA’s predecessor to be re-
placed as the class representative.
Following reinstatement of the lawsuit, the district
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-
ment, concluding that TWA’s “no-motherhood policy
violated Title VII’s proscription against discrimination
in employment on the basis of sex. We affirmed the dis-
trict court’s finding of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion but held that the claims of a number of the mem-
bers of the class were barred because charges had not
been timely filed with the Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission (“EEOC”). In re Consolidated Pretrial
Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th
Cir. 1978). Our holding on the timeliness issue neces-
sitated that we divide the plaintiff class into two groups
—Sub Class A, class members whose EEOC charges were
timely, and Sub Class B, those whose charges were un-
timely—and that we remand the case with respect to the
timely claims of Sub Class A.
Prior to any action in the district court in response
to our remand, the parties reached a settlement which
provided, inter alia, that TWA establish a $3,000,000
settlement fund to benefit all class members and that each
class member be credited with full company and union
seniority from the date of her termination by the airline.
IFFA, the union certified to act as the collective-bargain-
ing agent both for those TWA flight attendants not af-
fected by the airline’s discontinued “no-motherhood pol-
icy and for flight attendants hired since the termination
of the plaintiffs, sought and received permission to inter-
vene in the lawsuit to object to the settlement. Specifi-
cally, IFFA opposed the proposed Settlement on two
grounds: first, that the untimely filing of charges with
4a
the EEOC by members of Sub Class B left the district
court without jurisdiction to consider equitable relief af-
fecting them, and second, that reinstatement of the plain-
tiffs with full retroactive “competitive” seniority ? would
violate the collective bargaining agreement then in place
between TWA and the union’s incumbent members. Af-
ter three days of hearings, during which time IFFA had
an opportunity to air its objections, the district court
approved the settlement agreement and expressly found
that “full restoration of retroactive seniority will not
have an unusual adverse impact upon currently employed
flight attendants in a manner which is not typical of
other Title VII cases ....” (Mem. Op., November 8
1979 at 2.)
IFFA appealed, arguing that in light of this court’s
earlier decision that the timely filing of an EEOC charge
was a jurisdictional prerequisite, the district court erred
in holding that it retained jurisdiction to approve the set-
tlement agreement with respect to Sub Class B. Once
again, we ruled in fayor of the plaintiffs and affirmed
the district court, reasoning that “the principles favor-
ing settlement of class action lawsuits remain the same
regardless of whether the disputed legal issues center on
the jurisdiction of the court over the action.” Air Line
Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 630 F.2d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1980). We also
affirmed use of the remedy of retroactive competitive
seniority for eligible class members; in our view the set-
tlement responded appropriately both to TWA’s past acts
of discrimination as well as to the tangible consequences
of those past acts. Id.
* Ordinarily, “seniority” determines an employees’ entitlement to
benefits earned under an employment contract. “Competitive senior-
ity,” on the other hand, is used to allocate entitlements to benefits
among competing employees; for example, shift assignments; are
rogative in scheduling vacation: training opportunities; ete. .
5a
IFFA filed a petition for certiorari. The Supreme
Court granted the petition and consolidated it with an
earlier petition filed by the plaintiffs, consideration of
which the Court had deferred in light of the then-ongoing
settlement negotiations between the plaintiffs and TWA.
The plaintiffs had sought review of our prior decision
holding that timely filing of EEOC charges constituted a
jurisdictional prerequisite which barred the claims of
Sub Class B. IFFA, on the other hand, petitioned for re-
view of our ruling that the terms of the settlement agree-
ment—the reinstatement of discharged flight attendants
with retroactive competitive seniority—did not imper-
missibly infringe upon the collectively-bargained for
rights of incumbent flight attendants. In Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982), the Court
held that we had been mistaken in construing the filing
requirement of Title VII, Section 2000e-5(e), as being
jurisdictional but agreed that reinstatement of the plain-
tiffs with full retroactive competitive seniority was a
remedy both authorized by Title VII and appropriate in
these circumstances.
Having been twice vindicated in the Supreme Court,
plaintiffs’ attorneys petitioned the district court for an
award of fees against IFFA for their successful defense
of the settlement agreement. In turn, the district court
assessed IF FA $57,258 as fees for counsel for Sub Class
A and $171,747 (comprised of a “lodestar” figure of
$85,873.50 increased by a multipler of 2) as fees for
counsel for Sub Class B. Air Line Stewards v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Subsequently, upon motion, the district court lowered the
multiplier used to compute the fees for Sub Class B from
2 to 1.44, yielding an award to counsel of $123,657.84.
IFFA’s total liability for fees incurred solely as a result
of its challenge to the settlement agreement thus cur-
rently stands at $180, 915.84.
6a
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, IFFA asserts that the fee-shifting provision
of Title VII, section 706(k),* does not authorize an award
of attorneys’ fees against an intervening party which
has not been accused of a violation of federal law and
which, in an effort to protect the rights of its members,
raises arguments analogous to those a plaintiff would
ordinarily make. Alternatively, in the event we disagree
with its interpretation of section 706(k), IFFA points
to certain “special circumstances” which it claims render
an award of fees inappropriate. Finally, IFFA argues
that even if the district court’s decision to award fees is
upheld, the use of a multiplier to increase the amount of
the award to counsel for Sub Class B was improper. We
consider these arguments in turn.
A. Liability of “Innocent” Intervening Parties
In Charles v. Daley, Nos. 86-1552 and 86-3137, slip op.
(7th Cir. May 5, 1988), we addressed the question
whether an “innocent” third party intervenor-defendant
can be held liable for the attorneys’ fees incurred by a
prevailing party under the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees
Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.4 Charles involved an
award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1988 against
three private parties who intervened on the side of IIli-
nois in a suit challenging the constitutionality of the
* Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides in relevant
part:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
[Equal Opportunity Employment] Commission or the Lnited
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs ....
* Section 1988 states in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public
Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other _
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of
the costs.
7a
State’s criminal abortion statute. In finding against the
intervening defendants and in favor of the prevailing
plaintiffs in Charles, we held, that although the langvage
of section 1988 does not explicitly enumerate those
against whom an award of fees may be imposed, the
overriding purpose of the statute—to encourage the vin-
dication of civil rights by ‘private attorneys general’—
would be furthered by interpreting section 1988 to in-
clude fee awards against unsuccessful intervening de-
fendants, regardless of whether the intervenor could ac-
tually be found to be a violator of federal law under 42
U.S.C. $1983. Id. at 12-13; see also Akron Center for
Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp.
1268 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (Section 1988 fees awarded in
part against private intervenors who joined City of
Akron in defending constitutionality of local abortion
ordinance). We are unpersuaded that the facts of the
instant case require us to adopt a different rule under
Title VII: not only is the operative language of section
706(k) virtually identical to that used in section 1988,
but the Supreme Court has previously observed that in
considering awards of attorneys’ fees, courts should con-
sult related attorneys’ fees statutes and case law. See
Hensley v. ickerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) ; see
also Zabk: ‘icz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 549 n.9
(7th Cir. 1986). Moreover, other circuits applying Title
VII’s fee award provision have construed the statute to
allow fee awards against “innocent” defendants and in-
tervenors. See e.g., Allen v. Terminal Transport Co.,
Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1195, 1202 (N.D. G . 1980) (union
defendant guilty of no discrimination hed partially liable
for Title VII attorneys’ fees due to opposition to consent
decree affecting its members), aff'd, 653 F.2d 1016 (5th
Cir. 1981) ; Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers,
543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (business association
seeking unsuccessfully to intervene in appeal of a Title
VII lawsuit assessed fees despite having engaged in no
8a -
‘unlawful activity) ; Thompson v. Sawyer, 586 F. Supp.
635 (D. D.C. 1984) (Title VII attorneys’ fees imposed
against non-party union for unsuccessful attempts at in-
tervention to challenge relief attained by plaintiffs) .°
IFFA raises a related argument which proceeds from
the premise that, because its role in opposing the settle-
ment agreement was more closely analogous to that of
a plaintiff than to that of a defendant, it should be held
liable for fees only if its intervention in the lawsuit can
5IFFA cites Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763 (9th
Cir. 1984), in support of its contention that only those found to be
violators of federal law may be held liable for statutory attorneys’
fees. Richardson, however, is clearly distinguishable from the case
at bar. In Richardson, a pilots’ union intervened unsuccessfully in
a lawsuit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) to contest the fairness of a consent decree reached in
the underlying litigation. The decree was ultimately approved by
the district court and Richardson, the prevailing party in the origi-
nal ADEA action, petitioned the court for statutory attorneys’ fees
against the union. Both the district court and, on appeal, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Richardson’s petition for fees but not, as IFFA
would have us believe, because the union itself was innocent of any
violation of federal law. Instead, Richardson was denied fees be-
cause the pertinent provision of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b),
provides for an award of fees only against an offending “employer.”
There is, of course, no such limiting language respecting those
against whom fees may be imposed in section 706(k) of Title VII;
thus, we are in no way precluded by Richardson from imposing fees
against IFFA here.
Similarly, IFFA points to Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Thomas, 801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.), in which
the District of Columbia Circuit refused to award attorneys’ fees,
pursuant to the attorney fee provision of the Clean Water Act, 23
U.S.C. § 1365(d), against an intervenor guilty of no violation of
federal law. In affirming the district court’s denial of fees against
the intervenor in Thomas, the court specifically noted that the
statutory language employed in section 1365(d) was neither text-
ually similar to the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (and by cxtension
section 706(k) of Title VII) nor susceptible to the same pro-
prevailing party interpretation that courts have accorded section
1988. Jd. £01 F.2d at 461 n.3.
9a
be deemed frivolous or unreasonable. The district court
rejected the intervenor’s “functional plaintiff” argument
and we concur.
It is settled law that a prevailing Title VII plaintiff
is presumptively entitled to fees. Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Zabkowicz, 789 F.2d at
548. However, in Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.0.C.,
434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a more
rigorous standard of eligibility applies when prevailing
Title VII defendants seek to recover fees from unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court held that pre-
vailing defendants are entitled to an award of fees only
upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation.” Jd. at 421. While
the Supreme Court has never explicitly considered the
standard applicable to a request for an award of fees
against an unsuccessful intervenor, IFFA urges that be-
cause it intervened solely to assert the rights of its non-
discriminating incumbent members, it should be viewed,
in practical terms, as a plaintiff, and hence assessed at-
torneys’ fees only if its opposition to the settlement was
found to have been groundless.* In the instant case, the
district court made no such finding.
The most recent exposition of IFFA’s “functional plain-
tiff’ argument appears to have been made in Reeves v.
Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 880 (1987). In Reeves, a case apparently not
brought to the district court’s attention, white police offi-
cers intervened to challenge the constitutionality of a con-
sent decree entered into by black police officers and the
Sheriff’s Office of Bibb County, Georgia. The black officers
brought suit against the Sheriff’s Office alleging racial
discrimination in job assignments and promotions in vio-
lation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The intervenors ar-
6 In Charles v. Daley, Nos. 86-1552 and 86-3137, slip op. (7th Cir.
May 5, 1988) we explicitly declined to consider such an argument
because it had been raised only in an amicus brief.
10a
gued that the terms of the consent decree, which called
for promotion of black officers on an equal basis with
white officers, would in turn discriminate against them
on the basis of race. Although the plaintiffs ultimately
prevailed over the intervenors’ challenge to the consent
decree, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision on the issue of sec-
tion 1988 fees expressly recognized the importance of the
countervailing constitutional claims raised by the inter-
vening white officers. Indeed, the court found the role
of the intervenors in Reeves to be the functional equiv-
alent to that of plaintiffs.7 In so holding, the court sug-
gested that such a result was required if defendants
with good faith constitutional claims of their own were
not to be deterred from litigating them for fear of stat-
utory fee liability.’ Jd. at 1484; see also Grano v. Barry,
783 F.2d 1104, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Kirkland v. New
York State Department of Correctional Services, 574 F.
Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“{Florcing interve-
nors to bring their constitutional claims only at the risk
of becoming liable for their opponents’ fees if they do not
prevail may substantially deter such intervention . . . he
7 In the legislative colloquy preceding passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
Congress specifically recognized that the vindication of civil rights
need not always be the task of a plaintiff: “In the large majority of
cases the party or parties seeking to enforce such rights will be the
plaintiff and/or plaintiff-intervenors. However, in the procedural
posture of some cases, the parties seeking to enforce such rights
may be the defendants or defendant-intervenors.” S. Rep. No. 1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 n.4. While thus cognizant of the fact that
defendants, too, may be in a position to assert important constitu-
tional and statutory rights, nothing in section 1988’s legislative
history contradicts its plain language or suggests that any factor
other than a party’s success should be determinative of entitlement
to or, conversely, liability for fees.
* Although the Eleventh Circuit found the intervenors to be func-
tionally equivalent to plaintiffs for purposes of liability for Title
VII attorneys’ fees, the court found their intervention to have been
untimely and thus, in the end, susceptible to the imposition of fee
liability under Christianburg.
lla
aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 520 F.2d
420 (2nd Cir. 1975). IFFA would have us characterize its
posture in this case precisely as the Eleventh Circuit
characterized the intervenors’ position in Reeves. We
decline to do so. Acceptance of a “functional plaintiff
exception tothe rule favoring fee awards to prevailing
Title VII plaintiffs, in our view, unnecessarily threatens
to undermine what has come to be interpreted as a de-
liberate statutory presumption in favor of such awards
to prevailing parties.
One need only look to the plain language of section
706(k) to discover that Congress intended only one class
of litigants, prevailing parties, be eligible to recover at-
torneys’ fees expended in Title VII litigation. Con-
versely, nowhere does section 706(k) expressly exclude
any class of litigants from liability for such awards.
While we are not unmindful that a literal interpretation
of section 706(k) may, from time to time, result in the
imposition of a fee award against a party whose sole in-
volvement in a Title VII lawsuit is limited to an asser-
tion of countervailing constitutional rights (7.e., the in-
tervenors in Reeves), we are nonetheless bound to apply
the fee award provision of Title VII as it is written, not
as it might have been written. See e.g. United States v.
American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 US. 534, 543
(1940) (plain meaning of statute must be given effect
unless doing so would result in “absurd” or futile re-
sults or results so unreasonable as to be plainly at vari-
ance with the policy of the legislation as a whole). Sec-
tion 706(k) unequivocally endorses fee awards to pre-
vailing Title VII parties; the plaintiffs in the case at bar
prevailed and, consequently, are entitled to the fees
awarded them by the district court.
IFFA contends that such narrow and syllogistic rea-
soning places undue importance upon the nominal align-
ment of the parties. For example, IFFA argues that had
it waited until after approval of the settlement between
12a
the plantiffs and TWA and then filed a separate action
of its own contesting the validity of the agreement, it
could not have been held liable for the fees incurred in
connection with even a successful defense of the settle-
ment by either the plaintiff class or TWA. Thus, IFFA
asserts that it could have escaped section 706(k) liability
merely by deciding to file its own independent lawsuit,
ene which would not have identified the union’s interests
with those of TWA in the underlying litigation. Assum-
ing for the moment that a subsequent suit by IFFA
would not be barred as untimely,® the fact that such a
procedural loophole exists in Title VII’s statutory scheme
constitutes a flaw that must be addressed to Congress,
not to the federal courts. Cf. Kennedy v. Whitehurst,
690 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Arguments cen-
tering on the inequities caused by the absence of fee-
shifting are properly addressed to the Congress and not
to the courts.”). The settlement phase of this case pitted
the plaintiff class against intervening defendant IFFA;
that IFFA now regrets having chosen to proceed as an
intervenor does not relieve it from having to bear the fi-
nancial consequences of that decision.’®
* In Marino v. Ortiz, 108 S. Ct. 586 (1988), the Supreme Court, by
an equally divided panel, let stand a court of appeals decision
affirming a district court’s dismissal of a separate suit challenging
a consent decree brought by nonparties to the underlying Title VII
litigation. Failure by the nonparties to have joined the lawsuit
earlier as either co-defendants or intervenors rendered their subse-
quent action attacking the consent decree an “impermissible col-
lateral attack.” Marino v. Oritz, 866 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir.
1986). It therefore remains unclear whether a subsequent collateral
attack of a Title VII settlement by nonparties to the original law-
suit could be employed as a strategy by prospective intervenors to
escape statutory fee liability.
1°The dissent characterizes as “unjust” our decision to impose
fee liability upon IFFA, which admittedly was in no way responsi-
ble for TWA’s breach of Title VII. Moreover, the dissent asserts
that “[djenying fee awards against . . . intervenors will not signifi-
13a
Of even greater concern, however, is our belief that
were we to adopt the “functional plaintiff” approach ar-
ticulated in Reeves and advocated by IFFA, we might
very well encourage intervenors, and untimely defend-
ants, in Title VII lawsuits to manufacture constitution-
ally-derived or statutorily-based defenses in an attempt
to cloak themselves in the protective guise of functional
plaintiffs, in effect rendering them immune from statutory
fee liability except where their defenses are held to be
completely without merit. See Christianburg, 434 U.S. at
421. Congress has authorized attorneys’ fees awards in
employment discrimination cases as an inducement to
individuals—both lawyers and laymen alike—to bring
lawsuits as private attorneys general and thereby aid in
the enforcement of Title VII; acceptance by the courts of
a “functional plaintiff’ exception to Title vil fee lia-
bility could substantially undermine this crucial incen-
tive to ordinary citizens to enforce this Nation’s civil
rights laws in circumstances where the government sim-
ply cannot. We are not inclined to look favorably upon
such a potentially injurious exception to this long-standing
legislative scheme.
B. Special Circumstances
Despite the general rule that prevailing parties in Title
VII litigation are presumptively entitled to attorneys
fees, the Supreme Court has held that fees may be with-
held where certain narrowly defined “special circum-
stances” are present that would render an award of fees
unjust. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 415; Christian-
burg, 434 U.S. at 417. IFFA contends that two such
cantly diminish plaintiffs’ ability to attract counsel.” The instant
case, however, demonstrates the fallacy of the dissent's reasoning.
Absent the possibility of recovering their attorneys fees from
IFFA, the prevailing plaintiffs would likely have been hardpressed
to come up with sufficient funds to attract counsel willing to
defend their settlement before the district court, this court and,
finally, the Supreme Court.
l4a
“special circumstances” exist in the instant case. First,
as the exclusive bargaining representative of its mem-
bers, IFFA claims that it was obliged, under the judi-
cially implied duty of fair representation, to intervene
in the plaintiffs’ Title VII lawsuit in an effort to set
aside the parties’ settlement agreement, which adversely
affected the collectively-bargained for rights of its mem-
bers. Such compulsory participation, argues IFFA, surely
constitutes a special circumstance vitiating any liability
for Title VII fees. In addition, IFFA posits as a second
special circumstance the fact that the plaintiffs have al-
ready been awarded a generous and more than adequate
sum—in excess of $1,250,000—as attorneys’ fees in con-
nection with the pre-settlement phase of this litigation
and hence no further award of fees is necessary. We are
persuaded that neither asserted “special circumstances”
justifies withholding an award of fees to the plaintiffs
and their counsel.
Initially, IFFA is mistaken when it claims that the
duty of fair representation, first recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944), required it to join this lawsuit to
contest the validity of the settlement agreement reached
between the plaintiffs and TWA. Steele, a case arising
under the Railway Labor Act, held that “when Congress
empowered unions to bargain exclusively for all employ-
ees in a particular bargaining unit, and thereby sub-
ordinated individual interests to the interests of the
unit as a whole, it imposed on unions a correlative duty
inseparable from the power of representation to exercise
that authority fairly.” International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46 (1979). A
union must thus represent fairly the interests of all bar-
gaining-unit members during the negotiation, administra-
tion and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957). In particular,
a union breaches its duty of fair representation only
15a
“when [its] conduct toward a member of the collective
bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith,” as, for example, when it “arbitrarily ignore[s] a
meritorious grievance or process[es] it in [a] perfunc-
tory fashion.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91
(1967) ; Foust, 442 U.S. at 47.
Notwithstanding IFFA’s assertions to the contrary,
the duty of fair representation does not and never has
been construed to guarantee that an employee or bar-
gaining unit has an absolute right to have a grievance
or other action brought on its behalf, see Vaca, 386 U.S.
at 191; Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co.,
697 F.2d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1983); but see Richardson
v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1984) (im-
position of fee award against intervening union “would
only punish it for performing an act it was under a duty
to do”). In fact, in a conscious effort to minimize fed-
eral judicial intervention in labor disputes, unions have
consistently been accorded considerable discretion in de-
ciding whether and to what extent employee grievances
should be prosecuted. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953) (“A wide range of reason-
ableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining repre-
sentative in serving the unit it represents . . .”) ; see also
Rupe v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 679 F.2d 685,
691 (7th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Armsted Industries, Inc.,
656 F.2d 1245, 1250 (7th Cir. 1981); Peterson v. Ken-
nedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985); Hart v.
National Homes Corp., 668 F.2d 791, 794 n.4 (5th Cir.
1982): N.L.R.B. v. American Postal Workers Union, 618
F.2d 1249, 1255 (8th Cir. 1980). Rather than requiring
the initiation and pursuit of employee grievances by
labor unions, the duty of fair representation merely sets
forth standards to be adhered to by unions in determin-
ing not to prosecute or appeal grievances brought to them
by their members. See N.L.R.B. v. Local 139, Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, 796 F.2d 985, 992-
16a
93 (7th Cir. 1986); United Independent Flight Officers
v. United Airlines, 756 F.2d 1274, 1281 (7th Cir. 1985).
IF FA was thus in no way compelled to intervene in this
lawsuit and, accordingly, its decision to so proceed does
not constitute a “special circumstance” abrogating its fee
liability under section 706(k).
IFFA’s second posited “special circumstance” also fails
to persuade us that the district court’s award of fees to
the plaintiffs was in any way inappropriate. The union
argues that because plaintiffs’ counsel received an “enor-
mous” fee for their work performed in connection with
the pre-settlement phase of this lawsuit, any additional
award of fees for counsel’s post-settlement legal work
constitutes a windfall. Not only are objections here to
the size of the district court’s pre-settlement fee award
belated, but that fee award is entirely irrelevant for pur-
poses of evaluating the district court’s post-settlement fee
award. While fee-shifting statutes are not designed “as
a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of
attorneys,” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Council, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3098 (1986), fee-shifting stat-
utes are designed to reimburse plaintiffs for reasonable
legal fees expended in certain types of lawsuits. IFFA
has pointed to no errors in the district court’s calculation
of the plaintiffs’ post-settlement fees (i.e., number of at-
torney hours claimed or hourly rates sought); its only
contention is that counsel were over-compensated by the
district court’s earlier award and thus any further award
amounts to an abuse of discretion. The post-settlement
proceedings in this case, directed at attacking the very
essence of this lawsuit’s successful and carefully crafted
resolution, have already consumed in excess of two years
of litigation and have included arguments before the dis-
trict court, this court and the Supreme Court; accord-
ingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision to reimburse the plaintiffs fully for the fees they
incurred during this important and procedurally separate
phase of litigation.
17a
~C. Enhancement of the “lodestar” figure
After calculating the lodestar sum to which counsel for
Sub Class B were entitled from IFFA, the district court,
employing a multiplier of 1.44, adjusted its fee award up-
ward by $37,984.65 to account for the delay in time be-
tween the filing of Sub Class B’s post-settlement fee peti-
tion in May 1982 and the date of the court’s actual fee
award in September 1986. We have noted on at least two
previous occasions that enhancement of a fee award to
compensate counsel for the time-value of money (another
way of saying delay in payment), while by no means
mandatory, is certainly within a district court’s discre-
tion. See Ohio Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776
F.2d 646, 660 (7th Cir. 1985); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 770 n.6 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 956 (1983). Moreover, in Pennsylvania v. Dela-
ware Valley Citizens’ Council, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987),
decided after oral argument in this case and holding that
lodestar adjustments based upon the risk of nonpayment
are inappropriate, the Supreme Court observed, “[Wle
do not suggest, however, that adjustments for delay are
inconsistent with the typical fee-shifting statute.” Jd.
at 3082.
In the instant case, the district court, through indepen-
dent research, determined that a long-term Treasury
Note purchased at about the time of Sub Class B’s fee
petition would have yielded its purchaser approximately
714% per-year, representing a multipiier of 1.44. This
multiplier was, in turn, used to augment the district
court’s basic lodestar figure. Although a strong presump-
tion exists that at the time a fee petition is filed the lode-
star figure represents the “reasonable” fee to which sec-
tion 706(k) entitles prevailing parties, see e.g. Pennsyl-
vania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 106 S. Ct.
3088, 3098 (1986), the pasage of time and the economic
vicissitudes inherent therein are capable of eroding a fee
award to such an extent that, in real terms, it no longer
18a
represents a “reasonable” approximation of the vaiue of
the legal services intended to be compensated. It is for
this very reason that courts frequently award prejudg-
ment interest. Regardless of the method employed (use of
a multiplier or an award of prejudgment interest), an
equitable adjustment of the lodestar to offset a five year
delay in payment does not, in the circumstances presented
by this case, constitute an abuse of discretion." Delaware
Valley, 107 S. Ct. at 3082; cf. Michaels v. Michaels, 767
F.2d 1185, 1204 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he decision to
award prejudgment interest rates in the sound discretion
of the district court.”’), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057
(1986). Accordingly, the district court’s award of
$123,657.84 against IFFA for post-settlement fees is up-
held in its entirety.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold (i) that the district court acted properly in
holding IFFA liable for statutory attorneys’ fees under
section 706(k) of Title VII and (ii) that the district
court’s use of a multiplier to enhance Sub Class B’s fee
award did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED
MANION, Circuit Judge, dissenting. To protect its mem-
bers’ jobs, the IFFA intervened in this litigation and pre-
sented a substantial, good-faith challenge to the settle-
ment between plaintiffs and TWA. When the IFFA’s
challenge ultimately proved unsuccessful, the district
court awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs as “prevailing
parties” against the IFFA under the same standard ap-
11 But see Library of Congress v. Shaw, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986)
wherein the Supreme Court held that, as distinct from a private
defendant's liability for fees, the federal government's traditional
pet from an award of interest could not be circumvented by
enhancing a lodestar to compensate for a delay in ivi ay
ment. Jd. at 2965. Gaited ane
19a
plicable to defendants who have violated their employees’
civil rights. The majority upholds this award. I respect-
fully dissent.’
In Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978), the Supreme Court made clear that the standards
under which § 706(k) fees are awarded must be assessed
in light of the policies underlying that statute. Under
§ 706(k), a prevailing plaintiff is presumptively entitled
to fees from a defendant held liable on the merits unless
special circumstances would render awarding fees unjust.
Id. at 416-17. A prevailing defendant, however, is not
allowed to recover fees from a plaintiff uniess “the plain-
tiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation... .” Jd. at 421. The reason for this distinction
is not contained in the statute’s express language. The
statute refers only to “prevailing parties.” The Supreme
Court, however, set forth three reasons for distinguishing
between defendants and plaintiffs. First, § 706(k) sought
to facilitate the enforcement of the civil rights laws
through “private attorneys general.” Id. at 416-18. Sec-
ond, granting prevailing defendants attorneys’ fees as a
matter of course would act as a significant disincentive
for plaintiffs to bring civil rights suits. Jd. at 421-22.
Third, “when a district court awards counsel fees to a
prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a viola-
tor of federal law.” Jd. at 418.
1 In Charles v. Daley, Nos. 86-1552 and 86-3137, slip op. (7th Cir.
May 5, 1988), this circuit recently held that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing
party” against intervening defendants who were not liable on the
merits of plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. I dissented in that
case on the ground that the plaintiffs could not be deemed to have
“prevailed” against defendants who were not liable to the plaintiffs
on the merits. Likewise, I believe that § 706(k) should not have
been applied in this case because plaintiffs did not obtain any relief
on the merits against the intervening union on their Title VII
claims. Because § 706(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 have the same opera-
tive language concerning prevailing parties, however, Charles re-
suires that plaintiffs be treated as prevailing parties against the
IFFA.
20a
In this case, the IFFA intervened to assert the federal
collective bargaining rights of the incumbent employees.
In addition, neither the IFFA nor the incumbent employ-
ees were in any way responsible for the “no-motherhood”
policy that spawned the underlying litigation and ultimate
settlement. In such a situation, the application of the
Christianburg Garment policies warrants treating the in-
tervenors as plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees purposes. See
Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481, 1484 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied; 107-S.Ct. 880 (1987). As there is no dispute
that the IFFA presented a substantial, good-faith chal-
lenge to the settlement, the assessment of fees against it
was inappropriate. Moreover, regardless of how the
IFFA’s posture in this litigation is characterized, the cir-
cumstances of this case render the award of fees unjust.
In the settlement negotiations between plaintiffs and
TWA, neither side had a strong interest in protecting the
jobs of TWA’s incumbent employees. Plaintiffs obviously
had a strong interest in regaining their old jobs. TWA’s
primary interest was in settling the lawsuit. TWA was
going to have a full complement of flight attendants
whether they came from the plaintiffs’ or incumbent em-
ployees’ ranks. While the IFFA may not have had a legal
obligation to intervene, it certainly would have been
unusual for the IFFA to simply ignore a settlement that
substantially altered its contract with TWA and the job
security of its members. In fact, this circuit dismissed the
incumbent employees’ predecessor union as the plaintiffs’
class representative specifically because the union’s in-
terest in representing the collective bargaining rights of
the incumbent employees conflicted with its position as
class representative. See Air Line Stewards and Stew-
ardesses Ass’n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490
F.2d 636, 639-42 (7th Cir. 1973). The fact that the IFFA
did what its members elected it to do and this circuit ex-
pected it to do, that is, represent the interests of incum-
bent employees, is not something that should subject it
to Title VII attorneys’ fees.
2la
Moreover, the policy of encouraging “private attorneys
general” to enforce Title VII does not warrant imposing
fees against the IFFA. Section 706(k) seeks to encour-
age plaintiffs to bring suits against defendants who vio-
late federal law. This policy has attenuated, if any, rele-
vance to intervenors like the IFFA who did not violate
Title VII. In addition, denying fee awards against such
intervenors will not significantly diminish plaintiffs’ abil-
ity to attract counsel. This is aptly demonstrated in the
present case where plaintiffs’ counsel has already re-
ceived more than $1,250,000 from the $3,000,000 settle-
ment.
Rather than encouraging persons to act as “private
attorneys general,” the majority’s construction of
§ 706(k) will have quite the opposite effect. Title VII
lawsuits often affect many employees other than the
named plaintiffs. The settlement of a Title VII suit or
the granting of remedies by a court may leave some em-
ployees in a less desirable employment position or out
of a job altogether. Many of these affected employees
will have substantial claims that the settlement or rem-
edies violate their own rights under a collective bargain-
ing agreement, Title VII, or even the Constitution. The
just resolution of these cases requires the full participa-
tion of everyone involved. Mechanically assessing attor-
neys’ fees against intervening employees who did not
violate anybody’s rights and who are not fortunate
enough to posture themselves as “plaintiffs,” will ensure
that in many cases only two sides will be heard in a
multi-sided dispute.
I would reverse the district court’s award of attorneys’
fees.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
22a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604
July 22, 1988
Before
HON. WALTER J. CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge
Hon. JOHN L. CoFFEY, Circuit Judge
Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
No. 86-2731
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
VS.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, et al.,
Defendants,
and
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Intervenor-A ppellant. —
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, Western Division
No. 74 C 2063—Stanley J. Roszkowski, Judge
23a
ORDER
On consideration of the petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing in banc filed in the above-
entitled cause by appellant, a vote of the active members
of the Court was requested,* and a majority ** of the
active members of the Court have voted to deny a re-
hearing in banc. A majority of the judges on the orig-
inal panel have voted to deny the petition for rehearing.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the foresaid petition for rehear-
ing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.
* Judge Ripple did not participate in the consideration of the
petition for rehearing in banc.
** Chief Judge Bauer, Judge Flaum, Judge Manion, and Judge
Kanne voted to grant rehearing in banc.
24a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 70 C 2071
AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,
Loca. 500, TWU, AFL-CIO, et ai.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, et a/.,
Defendants.
No. 74 C 2063
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,
LocaL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO and
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the court are attorneys’ fee petition by counsel
for both Class A and B plaintiffs. Counsel for Class A
plaintiffs seek $57,288 in fees from the Independent Fed-
eration of Flight Attendants (“IFFA”). Counsel for
Class B plaintiffs seek $177,725 in fees’ from the IFFA
' Including $5,978 in out-of-pocket expenses.
25a
and $73,711.85 from defendant Trans World Airlines,
Inc. (“TWA”). For the reasons stated herein, Class A
plaintiffs’ fee petition is granted in its entirety. IFFA
is ordered to reimburse the settlement fund $57,258, the
amount of Class A attorneys’ fees. Class B plaintiffs’
petition for fees is denied as to TWA and granted as
to IFFA.
I. BACKGROUND
This extremely complex case was brought as a chal-
lenge to TWA’s practice of routinely discharging preg-
nant stewardesses.* Sex discrimination charges were filed
with the EEOC in June of 1970. The charges were filed
by several TWA stewardesses who had fallen victim to
TWA’s discriminatory practice and by their former col-
lective bargaining representative, the Air Line Stewards
and Stewardesses Association (“ALSSA’’). In August,
1970, after the EEOC proceedings were completed, this
action was filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seg.®
The case was brought as a class action on behalf of
(1) all stewardesses who had suffered a pregnancy-based
firing after July 2, 1965 (the effective date of Title
VII); and, (2) all then-employed stewardesses who might
become pregnant. The named plaintiffs were ALSSA
and the terminated stewardesses who had filed with the
EEOC. The complaint sought reinstatement, retroactive
seniority and backpay for those class members who had
been fired and an injunction against future pregnancy-
based firings for the then-employed stewardesses.
In October 1970, ALSSA entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with TWA that eliminated future
pregnancy-based discharges.
2 American Airlines, Inc. had a similar practice and was at one
time a defendant in this action. American’s involvement in this
case is irrelevant to the instant fee petition.
8 Consolidated Case Number 70 C 2071.
26a
In September of 1971, TWA and ALSSA reached an
agreement designed to settle this case. The agreement
provided that previously terminated stewardesses could
return to work as openings occurred. The agreement
abandoned the claims for retroactive seniority and back-
pay. Despite the objections of various class members,
Judge Perry approved this settlement agreement on
March 17, 1972. 7
The dissatisfied class members appealed entry of the
settlement order and on September 11, 1973, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the order. The Seventh Circuit re-
manded the case with instructions that “one or more of
the named plaintiffs or other members of the class... .
replace ALSSA as the representatives of the class.”
ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 643
(7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
TWA and ALSSA had entered into another agreement
during the pendency of the appeal. Under this agree-
ment, TWA would rehire all class members except those
who refused to relinquish their litigation rights, again
without backpay or retroactive seniority. This agree-
ment formed the basis for a second EEOC charge and
later a suit against TWA and ALSSA.*
Following remand, proper class representatives were
appointed and notice was sent to potential class mem-
bers. In September, 1974, TWA sought leave to amend
its answer to include a third affirmative defense. In this
affirmative defense, TWA asserted that the majority of
the class members’ claims were barred since they had
not filed charges with the EEOC within 90 days of their
discharge.© While granting the amendment, Judge Mc-
* Consolidated Case Number 74 C 2063.
5 At the time this case was filed, Title VII required charges to be
filed with the EEOC within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice. In 1972, this period was extended to 180 days. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).
27a
Laren cautioned that TWA’s delay in pleading the de-
fense might well constitute a waiver.
On October 15, 1976, Judge McGarr denied TWA’s
motion to restrict the class to those stewardesses that had
filed with the EEOC within 90 days of their discharge.
While Judge McGarr agreed that the 90 day filing re-
quirement was a jurisdictional prerequisite not subject
to waiver, he held that any violation by TWA continued
against all class members until the challenged policy
was changed. Thus, the 90 day requirement was satis-
fied for all class members by the June 1970 EEOC
charges.
On October 19, 1976, Judge McGarr granted the plain-
tiff class’s motion for summary judgment as to liability.
At TWA’s request, both the liability order and the ear-
lier jurisdiction order were certified for immediate ap-
peal. The Seventh Circuit allowed interlocutory review
and subsequently affirmed the summary judgment as to
TWA’s Title VII liability. In re Consolidated Pretrial
Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1979). As to the
jurisdictional issue, however, the Seventh Circuit de-
clined “to extend the continuing violation theory .. . to
include in the plaintiff class those employees who were
permanently terminated more than 90 days before the
filing of EEOC charges.” Jd. at 1149. The Seventh Cir-
cuit’s ruling effectively barred the claims of approxi-
mately 92% of the plaintiff class. See Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 390 (1982).
The Seventh Circuit stayed its mandate pending the
filing of petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
A petition was in fact filed by the plaintiff class (No.
78-1545) and TWA cross-petitioned (No. 78-1549). The
Supreme Court granted motions to defer consideration
of the petitions, however, pending completion of settle-
ment negotiations in the district court. 442 U.S. 916
(1979).
28a
As a result of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling it was nec-
essary to divide the plaintiff class into two sub classes.
Class A plaintiffs were those stewardesses who had been
fired within 90 days of the original EEOC charges.
Class B consisted of those stewardesses who had been
fired prior to that time.
Plaintiffs and TWA continued settlement negotiations.
The proposed settlement agreement they eventually came
up with provided that TWA would pay $3 million for
pro rata distribution between the two plaintiff classes.
The agreement also provided each class member with
full retroactive company seniority. The agreement speci-
fied that competitive (union) seniority has to be decided
by the court.
Following submission of the proposed settlement to
this court, ALSSA’s successor union, the Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants (‘IFFA”), intervened
and objected to the grant of any seniority. IFFA chal-
lenged this court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate seniority.
Despite IFFA’s challenge, in October 1979, this court
approved the settlement agreement and granted full ret-
roactive competitive seniority.
IFFA appealed. In June of 1980, the Seventh Circuit
held that despite its earlier decision that the Class B
plaintiffs’ claims were jurisdictionally defective, this
court had jurisdiction to approve the settlement which
compromised on that issue. ALSSA v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 630 F.2d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1980). The
Seventh Circuit also affirmed this court’s grant of full
retroactive union seniority. Id.
IFFA petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. On
March 9, 1981, the Supreme Court issued a writ of cer-
tiorari on IFFA’s petition (No. 80-951) and also on the
still-pending earlier petitions of the plaintiff class (No.
78-1545) (the class B jurisdictional issue) and TWA
(No. 78-1549) (the liability issue). See 450, U.S. 979
29a
(1981). TWA’s petition was shortly thereafter removed
from argument, see 451 U.S. 980 (1980), and was ulti-
mately dismissed as improvidently granted. 455 U.S. at
392 n. 5.
On February 24, 1982, the Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Zipes. The Court in Zipes reversed
the Seventh Circuit’s 1979 decision that the claims of the
Class B plaintiffs were barred. The Zipes Court held that
Title VII’s filing requirement was subject to waiver like
any other statute of limitations. 455 U.S. at 392-398.
The Court also found IFFA’s claims meritless. Jd. at
398-401.
II. DISCUSSION
The instant fee petitions were filed by counsel for both
Class A and Class B plaintiffs. Council for Class A plain-
tiffs seek an award against IFFA for those fees gener-
ated by IFFA’s intervention in this case. Counsel for
Class B seek fees both from IFFA for time spent defend-
ing IFFA’s attacks upon this court’s award of competi-
tive seniority and from TWA for one-half of the time
spent in the Supreme Court after certiorari was granted.
The petition against TWA will be discussed first.
A. FEES From TWA
Despite the arguments of counsel for Class B plaintiffs,
a review of plaintiffs’ 1979 settlement agreement with
TWA discloses that TWA’s liability for any attorney’s
fees was fully resolved by that settlement agreement. The
settlement agreement expressly excludes TWA from
liability for any future payments, including fees.
Section II of the settlement agreements sets forth the
purpose of the settlement:
“II, This Agreement is entered into between Trans
World Airlines, Ine. (hereinafter referred to as
‘TWA’) and the undersigned representatives of the
class for the purpose of compromising, settling and
30a
terminating all litigation of the lawsuits {including,
but not limited to, the petitions for writs of certio-
rari now pending in U.S. Supreme Court, dockets
numbers 78-1545 and 78-1549) and putting finally
to rest all of the claims, issues and questions of fact
and law which have or might have been raised on the
facts alleged in the pleadings.”
The petitions for certiorari were thus expressly addressed
by the settlement.
Section III A of the settlement agreement provides that
TWA would pay $3,000,000 to settle the case. One half of
this amount was to go to the members of each Class.
TWA’s liability for attorney’s fees was expressly in-
cluded within the $3,000,000:
After deduction therefrom of all amounts awarded
by the court for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, costs and
expenses of litigation, the net amount will be pro-
rated among the class members as provided in Sec-
tion IV hereof. TWA has no responsibility concern-
ing the calculations or allocations of the total amount
among the class members or for fees, costs and
expenses.
Thus, in paying the $3,000,000, TWA paid for all at-
torneys fees awardable against it in the litigation.
Plaintiffs point to the last sentence of Section III.A.
quoted above to argue that TWA was only absolved of
the responsibility of “calculating” or “allocating” the
total amount of attorneys’ fees, not the responsibility to
pay fees. Plaintiffs’ out of context emphasis on this one
sentence misinterprets the clear intent of Section III.A.
This section contemplated that all attorneys’ fees assess-
able against TWA would come from the $3,000,000. Since
the amount of fees was then unknewn, however, the sen-
tence referenced by plaintiffs merely provides that plain-
tiffs, rather than TWA, would be left with the task of
“calculating” and “allocating” fees.
3la
Section III.D. of the settlement agreement provides
that:
D. TWA will have no monetary or other obligation
to any member of the class or to any representative
or attorney for the class unless expressly provided
in this Agreement.
Plaintiffs read this provision as meaning that TWA is
liable for the Supreme Court attorneys fees absent an
express agreement to the contrary. Plaintiffs again mis-
read the clear language of the settlement agreement.
Plaintiffs argue that they could “hardly be deemed to
have anticipated that the litigation with TWA would
continue after the Settlement Agreement.” Both Sections
Il and X of the agreement however refer specifically to
the petitions for certiorari. Plaintiffs were also fully
aware of IFFAs objections to the settlement and must
have anticipated further contest from IFFA.
The underlying thrust of Class B plaintiffs’ attack
against TWA is that the attorney’s fees generated by the
necessity of fighting for the settlement in the Supreme
Court were caused by TWA’s litigation activities. As is
clear from this court’s May 6, 1982 order in this case,
however, the post-settlement litigation was solely the re-
sult of IFFA’s challenge to the settlement agreement.
As this court stated in the May 6 order at page 2:
When the terms of an agreement are plain and
clear, interpretation of that agreement is a matter
of law to be left to the court. [citations omitted].
The settlement agreement in this case clearly provides
that the portion of the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees recover-
able from TWA are to be paid only out of the $3,000,000
settlement. The settlement agreement is clear on this
point and this court is bound by that agreement. See
Sealy Mattress Co. of Michigan, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., 789
32a
F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1986) (consent decrees to be
construed strictly and “within its four corners’). Class
B plaintiffs’ have received over one and one quarter mil-
lion dollars in attorney’s fees from TWA under the agree-
ment. Class B plaintiffs’ petition for further fees from
TWA is therefore denied.
B. FEES From IFFA
1. Liability for Fees
IF FA’s principal argument against an award of fees
is that it was in essence a “plaintiff” in this case and
should therefore be subject to the fee standard set down
in Christianburg Garment Corp. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978). In Christianburg Garment the Supreme Court
held that when a prevailing Title VII defendant seeks fees
against a losing plaintiff, a more rigorous standard ap-
plies than when a prevailing plaintiff seeks fees. A pre-
vailing plaintiff is awarded fees almost automatically.
See Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 548 (7th
Cir. 1986). A prevailing defendant however is only
awarded fees if the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, un-
‘easonable, or groundless.” Christianburg Garment, 434
U.S. at 422.
As Class B plaintiffs point out, under Christianburg
Garment the court’s focus is on who is seeking fees not,
as the IFFA asserts, on who fees are sought against.
Plaintiffs are the “chosen instrument of Congress to
vindicate ‘a policy . . . of the highest priority’ ”, 434 U.S.
at 418, and Title VII’s fee provision was included to
“make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring
a meritorious suit.” Jd. at 421. See also Zabkowicz, 789
F.2d at 552. No such lofty policy considerations are
present when considering whether to award fees to a
prevailing defendant; fees are only available to Title VII
defendants to “deter the bringing of lawsuits without
foundation.” Chr stianburqg Garment, 434 U.S. at 420.
33a
The error in IFFA’s attempt at focusing this court’s
attention on its plaintiff-like posture in this case is thus
apparent. Fees are here sought by the prevailing plain-
tiffs. Fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs are encouraged
and nothing requires them to show that their opponent’s
position was “frivolous” or maintained in bad faith. See
Eichman v. Linden & Sons, Inc., 752 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir.
1985) ; Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1985).
IF FA without question opposed plaintiffs in this case.
Neither does IFFA’s assertion that intervenors enjoy
special immunity from Title VII fees find support in
case law. In Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plaster-
ers, 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court awarded
fees against an “intervenor-union”® that had presented
objections to a Title VII settlement agreement. Based
on the union’s objections, the plaintiffs were compelled
to mount a defense “in order to maintain their hard won
settlement agreement.” Moten, 543 F.2d at 239. The
Moten court concluded that: “We think the liberal pur-
poses of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are furthered by, and
provide authority for, an award against the [union].”
Id. The fee award in Moten was not, as IFFA suggests,
based on the frivolous of the union’s position. See also
Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979).
Similarly, in Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., 486
F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd sub nom., U.S. v.
Terminal Transport Co., 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1613 (1981) fees were awarded
against an intervenor-union even though the union was
not liable for the underlying Title VII discrimination:
(T]he unions have committed no actionable wrong
here.... However, fees are not being taxed against
the unions because the seniority perpetuated dis-
* The union had never formally presented a motion to intervene.
The resulting disruption to the ultimately upheld settlement was
the same as if the union had properly intervened.
34a
crimination, albeit innocently; rather, they partici-
patea substantially in opposing the legitimate de-
mands of the plaintiff class, so the unions should
share the costs to the class.
486 F. Supp. at 1202. After discussing Moten and Hay-
craft, the Allen court concluded that the unions were
liable for fees stating:
Notwithstanding the present arguments of the unions
to the contrary, the actions of the labor defendants
compelled the plaintiff class to defend its settlement
and intensify its effort for further relief.
The Fifth Circuit not only affirmed the fee award, but
remanded the case for assessment of additional costs and
fees associated with the union’s appeal. 653 F.2d at
1022.
While the cases in this area are not numerous they
are consistent. See Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503
F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974); Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D.
Ohio 19841; Thompson v. Sawyer, 586 F. Supp. 635
(D.D.C. 1984) (currently on appeal, D.C. Cir. 285-5264.
Cf. Robideau v. O’Brien, 525 F. Supp. 878 (E.D. Mich.
1981) (§ 1988). Unsuccessful Title VII union inter-
venors are, like unsuccessful Title VII defendants, con-
sistently held responsible for attorneys’ fees.
The only case which arguably support IFi 4’s position
focused on the union’s “good faith” in intervening and
thus misapprehended the nature of the inquiry that de-
termines a fee award against an intervenor-union. Se:
Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correction
Services, 525 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). It is note-
worthy that shortly after Kirkland, that same court
awarded fees against a union-intervenor in circumstances
nearly identical to this case. Vulcan Society of West-
chester County v. Fire Department, 533 F. Supp. 1054
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The summary in Vulcan closely re-
35a
flects the facts underlying this case and persuasively
suggests the propriety of a fee award against IFFA:
[The union-intervenors] litigated vigorously in op-
position to many of plaintiffs’ objectives, and strug-
gled to prevent settlements the unions felt were
against their interests. Their efforts imposed sub-
stantial costs upen plaintiffs, and plaintiffs pre-
vailed over the unions’ opposition on most of the
issues involved, and particularly in obtaining settle
ments which the unions opposed.
533 F. Supp. at 1062. See also City of Akron, 604 F.
Supp. at 1273.
It is indisputable that both plaintiff classes in this
case prevailed. The case was hard fought and was
brought-during the infancy of Title VII. Due to the
continued efforts of plaintiffs’ attorneys, the classes won
in this court, in the Seventh Circuit, and finally in the
Supreme Court. Because of the IFFA’s intervention, the
plaintiff classes’ ultimate victory was delayed and came
at a greatly increased cost. This court considers it fair
and just that IFFA now reimburse plaintiffs for the
extra cost attributable only to their intervention.
2. Amount of Fees for Class B
Counsel for Class B plaintiffs have more than ade-
quately documented and justified the fee award that they
request. Their efforts on behalf of the plaintiff class were
of the highest caliber throughout and are further well-
reflected in their fee petition. Only a few comments are
necessary at this point to dispose of IFFA’s objections.’
7IFFA raises a handful of additional objections besides those
listed. For example, IFFA asserts that the fee provisions of the
Title VII apply only to “litigated judgments” rather than settle-
ment. This argument, as well as the others raised. are without
merit. See Lovell v. City of Kankakee, 783 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1986
36a
a. Fee multipliers are appropriate in this type of com-
plex and protracted Title VII action. See Bium v. Sten-
son, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Workers, 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974). Plain-
tiffs’ attorneys have cited countless other cases support-
ing this point. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Award Attorneys’ Fees
Against the Union at 16-17. No purpose is served by re-
citing those cases here.
b. This court can properly award fees for time spent
in this court as well as time spent on appeal. See Ekanem
v. The Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County,
Indiana, 778 F.2d 1254, 1257, (7th Cir. 1985).
ce. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to compensation
for-the work underlying preparation of the instant fee
dispute. Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d at 1231, 1235-36
(7th Cir. 1980).
d. Class B plaintiffs obtained the services of Attorney
Raymond Randolph to assist in preparing for arguments
in the Supreme Court. The duplication of effort caused
by hiring Mr. Randolph is only reflected in the approxi-
mately twenty-five hours of time he spent reviewing the
extensive history of this case. Mr. Randolph’s requested
time is reasonable and is fully compensable.
e. Plaintiffs’ counsel are entitled to reimbursement
for their out-of-pocket expenses. Zabkowicz, 78° F.2d at
553-54.
f. This court is not required to use different hourly
rates for different types (e.g. in-court versus out-of-
court) of work. Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629 (7th
Cir. 1985).
3. Amount of Fees for Class A
Counsel for Class A plaintiffs are entitled to a fee
award against the IFFA for the same reasons stated
above for the Class B attorneys. The Class A attorneys
37a
already have recovered the $57,258 in fees at issue from
the settlement fund. IFFA is thus ordered to reimburse
the fund in this amount.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the petition for attor-
neys’ fees against TWA is denied. The petitions of Class
A and Class B plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees against IFFA
are granted. Class B plaintiffs are awarded $171,747 in
fees and $5,978 in expenses. IFFA is to pay the $57,258
awarded to Class A plaintiffs into the settlement fund.
ENTER:
s/ Stanley J. Roszkowski
STANLEY J. ROSZKOWSKI
Judge
United States District Court
DATED: July 16, 1986
38a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 70 C 2071
AIR LINE STEWARDS and STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,
LecaL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC..
Defendants.
No. 74 C 2063
ANNE B. ZIPES, et ai...
Plaintiffs,
Vs.
AIR LINE STEWARDS and STEW ARDESSES ASSOCIATION,
Ls CAL 550. TWL. AFL-CIO and
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES. INC..
esi vss
De Z nda i fs.
ORDER
t are motions by the attorneys for sub-
“plaintiffs” attorneys”) and the Inde-
{f Flight Attendants (the “Union” )
| the attorney’s fee awarded t plaintiffs’ -attor-
r the reasons stated herein, the award is
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are awarded $123,657.84
y's fees
39a
DISCUSSION
On July 16, 1986, this court gave plaintiffs’ attorneys
a “lodestar” attorney’s fee award of $85,873.50. Based
on the “high caliber” of legal work performed by these
attorneys on behalf of their clients, they were also
awarded a loadstar multiplier of two. Plaintiffs’ attor-
neys total attorney’s fee award was therefore $171,747.00.
Following entry of the July 16 order, the parties called
this court’s attention to the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Coun-
cil, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (198%). In Delaware Valley the
Court held that:
Because considerations concerning the quality of a
prevailing party’s council’s representation normally
are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate, the over-
all quality of performance ordinarily should not be
used to adjust the lodestar, thus removing the dam-
age of “double counting.”
106 S. Ct. at 3099. Based on this holding, the Union has
moved this court to amend the attorney’s fee award by
striking the multiplier.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys have also moved to amend the
attorney’s fee award based on Delaware Valley. Plain-
tiffs’ attorneys point out that Delaware Valley did not
totally preclude the use of fee multipliers. Specifically,
the Delaware Valley Court left open the question of
whether the contingent nature of a case could justify
awarding a fee multiplier. 106 S. Ct. at 3100. Accord-
ingly, plaintiffs’ attorneys request a multiplier based on
the contingent nature of this case. Alternatively, they
contend that the delay in receiving compensation man-
dates an upward adjustment of the fee award to reflect
the time value of money.
Whether prevailing attorneys can ever be awarded ad-
ditional compensation based on the contingent nature of
a case, such an award is inappropriate in this case.
40a
Plaintiffs’ attorneys were fully compensated for any con-
tingencies in the earlier $1-1/4 million fee award which
included a multiplier of two.
This court agrees, however, that plaintiffs’ attorneys
should be compensated for the time delay in payment. The
Seventh Circuit has recognized that an upward adjust-
ment to a fee award for this reason is permissible. Ohio-
Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776
F.2d 646, 660 (7th Cir. 1985) (fee award may compen-
sate attorneys for time value of money). This is espe-
cially true in cases like this one where none of the delay
in payment was caused by the attorneys seeking fees.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys suggests that the prime rate
should be used to adjust the attorney’s fees award. In
this court’s opinion, government treasury notes reflect a
more realistic rate of return.! Through independent re-
search, this court has discovered that a long-term trea-
sury note purchased approximately five years ago would
have given its purchaser an average return of approxi-
mately 7-1/2% to 8% per year. The more conservative
estimate of 7-1/2% would result in an attorney’s fee
multiplier of 1.44.* Plaintiffs’ attorneys are therefore
awarded $123,657.84 in attorney’s fees ($85,873.50 times
1.44).
ENTER:
‘s/ Stanley J. Roszkowski
STANLEY J. ROSZKOWSKI
Judge
United States District Court
DATED: Sept. 18, 1986
1 It 1s of course impossible to know how plaintiffs’ attorneys would
have in fact used the money.
* The formula for determining the applicable multiplier is (1 +r)"
where “r” equals the rate of interest and “n” equals the number of
years for which interest is sought. See Davidson. Stickney and
Weil, Financial Accounting, Appendix B (4th Ed. 1985). In this
case “r” is 0.075 and “n” is 5.
4la
AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR TEOLIS
(Filed in the District Court on July 15, 1982, as part
of Intervenor IFFA’s Appendix to Memorandum Briefs
In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Request For An Award Of
Attorneys Fees And In Regard To Amount Of Attorneys
Fees Requested By Plaintiffs)
Arthur Teolis, being first duly sworn and upon his
oath, deposes and says:
1. I am, and since April 1, 1977, have been, President
of the Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
(IFFA), a labor organization certified by the National
Mediation Board as exclusive bargaining representative
of all Flight Attendants in the employ of Trans World
Airlines, Ine. (TWA).
2. The last date on which TWA hired Flight Attend-
ants was May 31, 1979.
3. Under the terms of Article 12 of the collective bar-
gaining agreement in effect between IFFA and TWA.
furlough (layoff due to reduction in force) and recall
from furlough are based on seniority (length of service)
with TWA.
4. On October 31, 1979, TWA furloughed one hundred
and sixty-seven (167) Flight Attendants. Since that
date, TWA has furloughed an additional four hundred
and twenty-two (422) Flight Attendants. None of these
five hundred and seventy-nine (579) furloughed Flight
Attendants have been recalled to employment with TWA.
Included in the number of Flight Attendants furloughed
and not recalled are Flight Attendants hired by TWA on
April 7, 1977.
5. Under Article 12 (F) of the IFFA-TWA collective
bargaining agreement, Flight Attendants on furlough
for three (3) years are removed from the seniority list
and lose their right to recall.
42a
6. On October 31, 1982, the one hundred and sixty-
seven (167) Flight Attendants furloughed on October 31,
1979 will, unless recalled prior thereto, be removed from
the seniority list and lose their right to recall.
7. IFFA has been advised by TWA that it does not
anticipate a recall of furloughed Flight Attendants prior
to October 31, 1982.
8. On dates subsequent to October 31, 1982, the re-
maining four hundred and twenty-two (422) furloughed
Flight Attendants will, unless recalled, lose their right
to recall upon three years subsequent to their respective
furlough dates.
/s/ Arthur Teolis
ARTHUR TEOLIS
Subseribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of July,
1982.
/s/ Felice Wetter
FELICE WETTER
43a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
HONORABLE STANLEY J. ROSZKOWSKI, Presidi ng Judge
Cause Nos. 70C 2071 and 74C 2063
AIR LINE STEWARDS
VS.
TWA
June 13, 1982
ORDER
It is ordered that the defendant TWA shall pay from
Subclass A’s portion of the settlement fund the following
amounts:
1. The amount of $89,362 shall be paid to Kevin
M. Forde for attorney fees.
bo
The amount of $25,155 shall be paid to Ann C.
O’Laughlin as attorney fees.
3. The amount of $1,613.44 to Kevin M. Forde as
reimbursement of expenses.
44a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 70 C 2071
AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,
LocaL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO, et ai.,
Plaintiffs,
—vs—
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
No. 74 C 2063
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Plaintiffs.
—Vs-—
AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,
LocaL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO and
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER RELATING TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND EXPENSES FROM THE SETTLEMENT FUND
This Court has considered the joint petition of Press-
man & Hartunian and Arnold I. Shure, Professional Cor-
poration, for award of attorneys’ fees and reimburse-
ment of expenses out of the settlement fund. This Court
conducted a hearing on June 15, 1982 pursuant to notice
to all parties and class members and no class member or
any other person has objected to the petition.
45a
—. - The Court finds that Petitioners’ statements of hours,
hourly rates and expenses are reasonable and the Court
accepts them as being correct.
The Court further finds that this litigation was pro-
tracted, burdensome and fraught with contingent risks
to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. The quality of the legal serv-
ices has been excellent and long delay has occurred with-
out compensation. These factors justify the multiple (2
times hourly rates) which the Petitioners seek.
This Court finds that these Petitioners are entitled to
attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses from the
settlement fund, as follows:
Attorneys Fees: $1,250,000
Expenses: 24,330
Accordingly, it is ordered that Defendant Trans World
Airlines pay to Pressman & Hartunian and Arnold I.
Shure, Professional Corporation, the total sum of $1,274,-
330 for attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses,
in the following manner: within 30 days after trans-
mission to TWA of the data called for in Part IV of the
Settlement Agreement, said sum shall be deposited into
an escrow. The terms of the escrow shall require pay-
ment to Pressman & Hartunian forty-five (45) days af-
ter the date called for in Part IV of the Settlement
Agreement if no timely notice of appeal from this order
is filed, for distribution by Pressman & Hartunian pur-
suant to their agreements with Messrs. Shure and Ran-
dolph. Income earned during the escrow shall belong to
Petitioners. If the parties are unable to agree on either
the choice of an escrowee or the other terms of the es-
crow, this Court will resolve the dispute on motion and
due notice.
This order relates only to attorneys’ fees and expenses
from the settlement fund. The proceedings on the claims
OO
46a 47a
tor attorneys’ fees against Trans World Airlines and the ; . (Caption—Nos. 70 C 2069, 70 C 2071) . .
Union will continue as previously scheduled. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Trans World Airlines shall make the distributions to
the class members as and when required under Part IV (Entered November 20, 1974)
of the Settlement Agreement. These actions are class action Title VII equal employ-
This order is a final judgment to be entered forthwith ment sex discrimination Cases challenging the practice
under Rule 54, F.R.C.P. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), of Trans World Airlines and American Airlines of ter-
F.R.C.P., this Court finds that there is no just reason minating the employment of pregnant stewardesses. The
for delay. cases are now before the Court on defendants’ motions
; ENTER: to amend their answers to include the affirmative defense
of the statute of limitations.’ Plaintiffs oppose these mo-
/s/ Stanley J. Roszkowski tions, asserting that (1) defendants have been guilty of
STANLEY J. RoSzKowskKI unreasonable delay in asserting this defense, and (2)
Judge justice does not require defendants’ being granted leave
to amend because it would be unduly prejudicial to plain-
AGREED AS TO FORM: tiffs.
The following facts are relevant to disposition of these
s/ Laurence A. Carton motions:
Coon a ee The complaints were filed on August 18, 1970, and de-
fendants’ answers were submitted to the Court on Sep-
tember 30, 1970.2 There were no further proceedings in
Court until July 16, 1971, when a settlement agreement
— was filed. But in the interim the airlines and the union
ARNOLD I. SHURE
' Aram A. Hartunian
ARAM A. HARTUNIAN
na
sf
1 The statute of limitations for Title VII actions is contained in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5e. At the time these actions were filed, the
Date: June 17, 1982 statute provided that to sustain an action under Title VII a charge
must have been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission within 90 days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred. The time limit was increased to 180 days by the
amendment of March 24, 1972 (P.L. 92-261, § 4).
* Defendants’ answers contained two other affirmative defenses:
first, that defendants’ conduct was based upon a continuing policy
which was a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation’ of defendant’s business within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(e),” and the second, that the policy
is “pursuant to a ‘system which measures earnings by quantity and
qualify or production’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h).”
48a
amended their labor agreements to eliminate pregnancy
as a ground for termination, and negotiated the settle-
ment agreement. The hearing on that agreement began
on March 10, 1972; the intervening delays was caused
by the effort of the EEOC to intervene, including its
appeal to the Seventh Circuit. On April 11, 1972, sev-
eral plaintiffs filed their notices of appeal from the order
approving the settlement agreement. Their appellants’
brief was not filed until February 5, 1973. The Seventh
Circuit decision reversing the order approving settlement
was issued on December 23, 1973,° the Supreme Court
denied a writ of certiorari on May 13, 1974. The case
was assigned to this Court on July 11, 1974. TWA and
American then filed their motions to amend the answers
on September 11, 1974, the date set by the Court for a
status report.
F. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall
be freely given when justice so requires.””’ The Supreme
Court in Farman vy. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)
held that this mandate is to be heeded, stating:
“In the absence of any apparent or declared rea-
son—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory mo-
tive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment,
etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require,
be ‘freely given.’ ”
In the instant actions, plaintiffs could be unduly prej-
udiced by amendment. The absence of the defense of
3In Air Line Stew. & S. Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines,
490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), the court of Appeals reversed the
settlement order previously entared in these actions. The court held
that the Union could not act as representative of the individual
stewardesses terminated because of conflict of interest in the Union
over such matters as seniority. Moreover, the court determined that
these actions should proceed as R. F. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) class actions
instead of F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) class actions.
49a
limitations could have been considered by the present
plaintiffs when they rejected the union-airlines settlement
agreement and appealed the orders approving settlement
to the Seventh Circuit. At that time plaintiffs could rea-
sonably believe that the pleadings were completed espe-
cially considering the class allegations contained in these
actions. Notice of the proposed settlement to members
of the classes invited “any interested person.or attorney”
to inspect “all pleadings and other documents in the ac-
tion.” None of the documents apparently contained any
notice of the statute of limitations defense although the
Union’s attorney did mention the possibility of the de-
fense during oral hearings on the settlement agreement.
Plaintiffs also argue that even if undue prejudice can-
not be shown, defendants should not be allowed to amend
because they have been guilty of undue delay in asserting
the limitations defense. Defendants justify their delay
in filing the defense on three grounds: (1) legal uncer-
tainty about availability of the defense; (2) active par-
ticipation in the aborted settlement negotiations and (3)
no district court judge had jurisdiction over the actions
while the various appeals were pending.
Defendants assert that when the complainants were
filed in 1970, there had been few decisions construing the
limitations problems inherent in Title VII class actions.
It is important to note, however, that defendants do not
claim that the limitations language of the statute was
ambiguous, nor do defendants assert that there were no
cases to rely on for guidance. In fact, defendants cite a
1969 case, Burney v. North American Rockwell, 302 F.
Supp. 86 (C. D. Cal. 1969), to support their substantive
point that the Title VII statute of limitations affects
unnamed class plaintiffs as well as named or individual
plaintiffs.
Moreover, defendants make no showing how these pro-
ceedings could have prevented them from making a mo-
50a
tion to the Court to amend their answers, particularly
when defendants original answers contained two other
affirmative defenses. Additionally, the existence of this
defense, properly plead, should have been a factor in
defendants’ posture during this stage of the litigation.
That defendants failed to fully investigate the legal
status of plaintiffs’ claims at that time only demonstrates
that defendants may not have completely prepared dur-
ing settlement negotiations, not that the negotiations
themselves prevented defendants from presenting their
legal arguments to the Court.
Defendants’ third argument that the pending appeals
prevented them from amending also seems inequitous.
While it is true that for substantial periods since filing
in 1970 no district court judge had jurisdiction over
these cases, defendants do not satisfactorily explain why
when the district court did have jurisdiction (from filing
in 1970 to April 1972), they made no motion to amend.
Defendants’ delay in pleading the defense of limita-
tions may well ultimately constitute a waiver of the de-
fense; at this juncture, however, the Court is not con-
vinced to a legal certainty that pleading of the defense
shall not be allowed. Under the liberal pleading rules
contained in Rule 15, defendants should be entitled to
prove through discovery techniques or otherwise that the
plaintiffs suffered no prejudice or that the delay in
amendment was excusable. Defendants’ motion to amend
their answers is granted.‘
IT Is SO ORDERED.
Entered:
/s/ R. W. McLaren
United States District Judge
Dated: November 18, 1974.
* Of course, this disposition of defendants’ motions is not in-
tended to express any ultimate views on the waiver or laches issues
or the substantive applicability of the 180 day statute of limitations.
5la
Section 706(k) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k)
Attorney’s fee; liability of Commission
and United States for costs
(k) In any action or proceeding under this subchapter
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the Commission or the United States,
a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the
Commission and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.
52a
42 U.S.C. § 1988
Proceedings in vindication of civil rights; attorney’s fees
The jurisdiction in civil and crimnal matters conferred
on the district courts by the provisions of this Title, and
of Title “CIVIL RIGHTS,” and of Title “CRIMES,” for
the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same
into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against
law, the common law, as modified and changed by the con-
stitution and statutes of the State wherein the court hay-
ing jurisdiction of such civil or criminal] cause is held, so
far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction
of punishment on the party found guilty. In any action
or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public
Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney’s fee as part of the costs. *
53a
EXCERPT FROM THE JUNE 18, 1979
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
PLAINTIFFS AND TWA
XIII. EXCLUSIVITY
Nothing contained in any other agreement or writing
and no right or obligation which has arisen or accrued
outside of this Settlement Agreement (including prior,
current and future labor agreements) shall be deemed to
modify, change or diminish the rights and obligations
which arise under this Agreement.
OPPOSITION
BRIEF |
Supreme Court of the United States
@ctoher Term, 1988
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Petitioner,
v.
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Respondents.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
AraM A. HARTUNIAN
(Counsel of Record)
RosBert M. WEISSBOURD
Puy.uis L. CROCKER
HARTUNIAN, FUTTERMAN
& Howarp, CHTD.
122 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 427-3600
Attorneys for Respondents
ANNE B. Zires, et al.
American Reprographics Management, Inc.™ (312) 332-ARMI (800-999-6239)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
pr Uh gf ty) li
REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD NOT BE
ena tad ink the didevedincersueedededs l
ee cet ecbeniedaseseces. l
I. THERE ARE NO CONFLICTS WITHIN THE
CIRCUITS THAT ARE RELEVANT TO THIS
A. Since The Union Was Not A “Functional
Plaintiff’, The Outcome Would Have
Been The Same In The Eleventh And D.C.
a Re i cdeedbesdcceccs 2
B. The Result Would Have Been The Same
In The Second And Third Circuits ............ 4
C. The Ninth Circuit Is Not In Conflict With
EE ee 6
Il. THE FEE AWARD WAS WELL WITHIN THE
DISCRETION OF THE COURTS BELOW ....... 6
NN ee cceehuad bud oaweseseus 7
APPENDIX:
Excerpt from Petition For Award of At-
torneys’ Fees And Reimbursement of
SE oso ol uch eae taba eked tess la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Association v.
American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973) ..... 5
Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc.,
TES FCT, fe 3 eee 4
Charlies v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir., 1988) ....... 4
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.0O.C.,
434 UD. 428 COGTED .. «00s cancévdesesueeeeeel 2, 6, 7
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
434 US. 767, TO6-TEB CAG GED oo ckcccscanusceeseeeee 6
Grano v. Berry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ........ 4
Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986)
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987) ................... 3
Richardson v. Alaska Airlines,
yr DA © f ft) eee. 6
Turnstall v. Office of Judicial Support [etc.,]
- Pe T iTislege 3 | eee 4
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385
1. ere 3,6
Statute
Tithe VEL, FOB GD... oc cccvceccesssenseus eee passim
No. 88-608
Jn The
Supreme Court of the United States
@ctober Term, 1988
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Petitioner,
v.
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Respondents.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD
NOT BE GRANTED
Summary Of Argument
Since the Union did not assert Title VII rights or
Constitutional rights, there is no conflict within the
circuits that is relevant to this case.
All of the Circuits deem innocence of a federal
violation to be an insufficient reason to deny an award
of attorneys’ fees where an intervenor chose to and
became the prevailing plaintiffs principal protagonist,
as was the case here.
2
Since the Plaintiffs prevailed against the Union on
the questions of liability, jurisdiction, and seniority relief,
and the Union did not demonstrate any unusual circum-
stances, Plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorneys’
fees within the discretion of the district court.
I. THERE ARE NO CONFLICTS WITHIN
THE CIRCUITS THAT ARE RELEVANT
TO THIS CASE
A. Since The Union Was Not A “Func-
tional Plaintiff, The Outcome Would
Have Been The Same [In The Elev-
enth And D.C. Circuits
In Section 706(k) of Title VII, Congress carved out
an exception to the “American Rule” by leaving it to
the court’s discretion whether to award attorneys’ fees
to the prevailing party. In Christiansburg Garment Co.
v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412 (1978), this Court established
the standard for exercising that discretion: a prevailing
plaintiff will ordinarily be awarded attorneys’ fees, but
a losing plaintiff will be required to pay the defendant’s
attorneys’ fees only when the plaintiff's case is frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation. 434 U.S. at 422.
Christiansburg thus arms Title VII plaintiffs with
both a sword and a shield. Both are keyed to the plaintiffs
acting as Congress’ chosen instrument for enforcing Title
VII. 434 U.S. at 419. The almost automatic recovery of
fees to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs enhances the
prospects of their obtaining competent counsel. The
almost automatic immunity from being required to pay
the attorneys’ fees of successful defendants serves the
same underlying purpose.
The doctrine of Christiansburg might logically be
expanded to protect not only those parties who are Title
VII plaintiffs but also those parties who, acting like
3
Plaintiffs, assert their own Title VII rights. However,
wearing the mantle of a “functional plaintiff’ means
more than merely being a party who asserts a right. A
losing plaintiff is spared the attorneys’ fees of a winning
defendant not simply because he is a plaintiff; it is
because he is a plaintiff who asserts Title VII rights,
thereby acting as Congress’ chosen instrument for the
enforcement of Title VII.
In resisting the Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain seniority
relief, the Union asserted rights, but not Title VIJ rights,
as is clearly shown in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
455 U.S. 385 (1982), the case in which the Union opposed
Plaintiffs. The Union argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction to implement the settlement agreement, 455
U.S. at 393, and that seniority relief could not be granted
to Plaintiffs in the absence of either: 1) a finding of
discrimination with respect to the members of Subclass
B, 455 U.S. at 399, or 2) a finding that the Union itself
had been guilty of discrimination.! 455 U.S. at 400.
The extent to which the Seventh Circuit disagreed
with the “functional plaintiff’ analysis of the Eleventh
Circuit in Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987) is thus irrelevant to this
case. Since the Union did not assert Title VII rights, even
the Eleventh Circuit would have imposed the Plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees upon the Union. Put another way, even
if the Seventh Circuit agreed completely with the Elev-
enth Circuit, it would have awarded the Plaintiffs’
1 Tronically, the Union here makes the same argument against
liability for the prevailing Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees that the
Union advanced in Zipes against the Plaintiffs obtaining
seniority relief. In Zipes, this Court found “meritless” the
Union’s contention that relief was not forthcoming to the
Plaintiffs because the Union had not been guilty of wrong-
doing. 455 U.S. at 400.
4
attorneys’ fees against the union.
Similarly, there is no relevant conflict between the
Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits. In Grano v.
Berry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the lower court’s
denial of fees against the intervenor was affirmed because
of the special circumstance of the intervenor’s assertion
of Constitutional rights. 783 F.2d at 1112. Here, the Union
did not assert any Constitutional rights.
If a case is presented in which both the winner and
the loser assert either Title VII or Constitutional rights,
the losing party against whom attorneys’ fees are
awarded would arguably have standing to seek resolution
of the “conflicts” promenaded in Petitioner’s brief. This
is not such a case.
B. The Result Would Have Been The
Same In The Second And Third
Circuits
In Turnstall v. Office of Judicial Support [etc.], 820
F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Annunziato v. The Gan,
Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1984), fees were denied to
prevailing plaintiffs against parties who were named as
nominal defendants in order to secure complete relief.
As stated in The Gan, the third party against whom fees
were sought was “caught in a cross-fire between plaintiffs
and [the principal defendants)’. 744 F.2d at 253. In these
respects there is no conflict because nothing in the
opinion below indicates that the Seventh Circuit would
have ruled differently in that situation.
2 The distinction was aptly voted by the Seventh Circuit in
Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1065 (n. 11) (7th Cir. 1988),
where “the intervenors voluntarily thrust themselves into the
lawsuit and... tenaciously engaged the plaintiffs in a
protracted and costly court battle. ...”.
5
Here, the Union opposed the Plaintiff class (Resp.
App., 12a) in every way. The Union not only resisted
the restoration of competitive seniority, but by its own
choice fought the Plaintiffs all over again on the principal
issue of the liability phase of the case. The Union’s chosen
stance in this case does not faintly resemble an innocent
party caught in a cross-fire between the principal adver-
saries. In fact, during the period covered by the fees issue
(1979-1982), the Union was the Plaintiff class’s only
adversary.
At the inception of this case in 1970, the Union
(actually the predecessor union, then representing the
same incumbent union members) posed as the represen-
tative of the class members and attempted to give away
their rights in a proposed settlement that would have
pleased only TWA and the Union. That settlement
agreement was disapproved and the Union was ejected
as the representative of the class. See Air Line Stewards
& Stewardesses Association v. American Airlines, 490
F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973). The union was not heard from
again until 6 years later, when the class finally received
meaningful relief in a second settlement agreement. In
that settlement, TWA gave up its argument that the late
EEOC filings of some of the class members (“Sub Class
B’’) deprived the court of jurisdiction. When the Union
intervened in 1979, it promptly picked up the cudgel which
TWA had dropped, and argued that the entire settlement
agreement was unenforceable for want of jurisdiction.
In doing so, the Union became the class’ adversary to
the same extent that TWA had been up to that time.’
Had the Union been successful, the class would have
received nothing — no monetary relief, no right to return
3 As pointed out by the Seventh Circuit, “The settlement phase
of this case pitted the plaintiff class against intervening
defendant IFFA”’. (Resp. App., 12a)
6
to work, no company seniority, and no competitive
seniority. With TWA cheering from the sidelines, the
Union took the case all the way to this Court, where
the class finally prevailed. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
455 U.S. 385 (1982).
C. The Ninth Circuit Is Not In Conflict
With The Seventh Circuit
In Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763 (9th
Cir. 1984), fees were denied not because the intervenor
union was innocent of violating federal law, but because
29 U.S.C. 626(b) provides for attorneys’ fees only against
an offending “employer’’. (See Resp. App. 82, fn. 5). Also,
Richardson is not contra the Seventh Circuit on the
question whether an attorneys’ fees award should be
imposed on a party who had an obligation to intervene
and fight the case. The union simply had no such
obligation here. (See Resp. App. 14a-16a).
II. THE FEE AWARD WAS WELL WITHIN THE
DISCRETION OF THE COURTS BELOW
The policy considerations underlying 706(k) militate
strongly against exempting unions from liability for
attorneys’ fees incurred by Title VII plaintiffs at the relief
stage. The fees provision was included to make it easier
for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious
suit. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. Rightful place
seniority is an integral part of the remedy. Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-766 (1976).
Every Title VII plaintiff ought to know that even after
proving discrimination, meaningful relief will not be
forthcoming without militant opposition from the incum-
bent employees, usually headed up by a well heeled union.
After 9 years of legal combat with TWA, the class
7
members spent 32 more years litigating with the Union.‘
The uniqueness of these facts rendered this case
tailor-made for the exercise of discretion under the
dictates of Christianburg, and for the same reason,
inappropriate for review by this Court.
CONCLUSION
If there are any conflicts between the circuits, this
case does not present the issues which relate to the
conflicts. Granting certiorari could serve no purpose other
than to review the district court’s exercise of discretion.
AraM A. HarRTUNIAN
(Counsel of Record)
Rosert M. WE!IssBouURD
Puy.uis L. CROCKER
HARTUNIAN, FUTTERMAN
& Howarp, CHTD.
122 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 427-3600
Attorneys for Respondents
ANNE B. ZiPes, et al.
4 In the 3% years of satisfying the Union’s thirst for litigation,
the Plaintiffs’ lawyers put in 942.2 hours. (Resp. App., pp. 1)
Getting paid for those 3% years has (so far) taken another
6 years.
APPENDIX
(Excerpt from Petition For
Award Of Attorney’s Fees And
Reimbursement of Expenses)
la
B. From The Union
Petitioners defended the class members against the
Union’s attacks upon this Court’s award of competitive
seniority, first in the this Court, then in the Union’s
appeal to the Seventh Circuit, and finally in the Supreme
Court where this Court’s seniority Order was affirmed.
In the following table, the Union is charged with all of
the time spent in this Court on the retroactive-seniority
dispute, all of the time spent in the Union’s appeal to
the Seventh Circuit and the Union’s petition for certiorari,
and one-half of the 473.2 hours spent in the Supreme
Court. (The other one-half is attributed to TWA).
For these hours, Petitioners request a multiple of 2
times billing rates, resulting in fees from the Union in
the amount of $172,107 plus $5,978.39 in expenses.
FEES VS. THE UNION (AT MULTIPLE OF 2)
Hours Billing Rate Am’treq’d
Aram A. Hartunian 322.75 160 103,280
A.R. Randolph 149.60 150 44,880
Mr. Randolph’s
Associates 21.5 100 4,300
Joel M. Hellman 15.75 90 2,835
Ronald Futterman 8.75 125 2,187
Arnold Shure 48.75 150 14,625
Total fees vs. the Union $172,107
Expenses:
District Court: $1,233.47
Court of Appeals: 1,015.07
Supreme Court (One-half of total) 3,729.85
Total expenses chargeable to union $5,978.39
(See detail at App. pp.2-3)
Total fees and costs vs. the Union $178,085.39
Supreme Court, U.S. _
FILED
3, NOV 16 1988
No. 88-608 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Petitioner,
ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
STEVEN A. FEHR
(Counsel of Record)
WILLIAM A. JOLLEY
JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER & GORDON
204 West Linwood Boulevard
Kansas City, Missouri 64111
(816) 561-3755
Attorneys for Petitioner
Independent Federation
of Fliaht Attendants
8861 9T AON @® Er, ¢0
QGQatig
SN ‘uno swaidng
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
a eieneiceliotnnns 1
RITES LN ee ae a NS 3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2nd
I ae aaiseieninaadiuunionne 2,3
Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988) ...... 2
Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986) .... 2
Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 880
a a edaisinanhinnes 1,2
Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763 (9th
es HITED sniecesebinsatincstinndseninidsestsnentsseniensidanindsdinentiesiodittnntemnes 2
Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631
I a ciseicammnannts 2,3
STATUTES
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) ............ EE ee eo 3
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
AED i RSS SORRY OT Re SS DA 2
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. ............. 2
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
No. 88-608
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,
Pet
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