Record and brief — Flight Attendants v. Zipes

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No. 88-608-CFX Title: Independent Federation of Flight Attendants,

Status: GRANTED Petitioner

Vv.

Anne B. Zipes, et al.

Docketed:

October 11, 1988 Court: United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

See also:

88-664 Counsel for petitioner: Fehr,Steven A.

Counsel for respondent: Hartunian,Aram A.

Entry Date Note - Proceedings and Orders

1 Oct 11 1988 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.

2 Nov 8 1988 Brief of respondents Anne B. Zipes, et al. in opposition

filed.

3 Nov 16 1988 DISTRIBUTED. December 2, 1988

4 Nov 16 1988 X Reply brief of petitioner Independent Federation of Flight

Attendants filed.

5 Dec 21 1988 REDISTRIBUTED. January 13, 1989

6 Jan 17 1989 Petition GRANTED.

KREIS

7 Feb 16 1989 Record filed.

* Certified copy of C. A. proceedings received.

8 Mar 3 1989 Joint appendix filed.

9 Mar 3 1989 Brief of petitioner Ind. Fed. of Flight Atten. filed.

10 Mar 3 1989 Brief amici curiae of United States and EEOC filed.

11 Mar 3 1989 Brief amicus curiae of International Association of Fire

Fighters, AFL-CIO filed.

12 Mar 3 1989 Brief amicus curiae of Americans United For Life Legal

Defens Fund filed.

13 Mar 8 1989 SET FOR ARGUMENT, APRIL 25, 1989. (2nd CASE)

16 Apr 3 1989 X Brief of respondents Anne B. Zipes, et al. filed.

17 Apr 3 1989 X Brief amici curiae of ACLU, et al. filed.

14 Apr 5 1989 CIRCULATED.

18 Apr 18 1989 X Reply brief of petitioner Ind. Fed. of Flight Atten. filed.

19 Apr 24 1989 Letter from Counsel for petitioner received and

distributed.

20 Apr 24 1989 Record filed.

* Certified copy of original record received.

21 Apr 25 1989 ARGUED.

a

PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

88 -6 08 ) Supreme Court, U.S.

' FILED

No. OCT il 1988

ee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,

Petitioner,

Vv.

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN A. FEHR

(Counsel of Record)

WILLIAM A. JOLLEY

JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER & GORDON

204 West Linwood Boulevard

Kansas City, Missouri 64111

(816) 561-3755

Attorneys for Petitioner

Independent Federation

of Flight Attendants

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

® <i «0

QUESTION PRESENTED

May a court award attorney’s fees in favor of plain-

tiffs and against a labor union-intervenor pursuant to

§ 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), under the same standard by

which fees are awarded in favor of prevailing plaintiffs

and against defendants found to have. violated federal

law, when:

(a) the union-intervenor was neither accused of nor

found to have engaged in any illegal acts, and

(b) the sole purpose of the union’s intervention was

to object (unsuccessfully) to a proposed settle

ment of plaintiffs’ claims which would modify

and/or override provisions of the union’s collective

bargaining agreement and endanger the job secu-

rity of employees in the bargaining unit, not

parties to the litigation, whom the union has an

obligation to represent?

(i)

ii

PARTIES

As is made clear in our Statement of the Case, Peti-

tioner is a labor union and was an intervenor at the

District Court. Trans World Airlines, Ine. (‘ TWA ),

the only defendant below, is not involved in the dispute

for which review is sought and did not participate in

the appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Plaintiffs-Respondents

are a class of TWA flight attendants who were ter-

minated on account of motherhood between July of 1965

and October of 1970.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Nee emememeenes

eee

STATUTE INVOLVED ..................-.....0.-<....-..........-........

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................

A. Preliminary Statement 00000000000. im

B. Procedural History Of This Litigation —...........

C. The Effect Of The Settlement Upon The In-

cumbent Employees ............................cccccccceeeceeeeees

D. The Attorney’s Fees Issues

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................

I. The Importance Of The Issue ..............

II. As Both The Majority And Dissent Below Ex-

pressly Noted, A Conflict Of Authority Exist:

Among The Courts Of Appeals 0...

III. The Case Law From The Other Circuits Only

Adds To The Uncertainty 00000000

A. District of Columbia Circuit

B. Second and Third Circuits

ee

D. Sixth Circuit ............ 0s EES ean ee '

Te en

IV. The Result Below Is In Conflict With Decisions

SR Renita

V. Guidance Is Needed From This Court On The

Question Presented, And This Case Presents

The Ideal Opportunity For The Court To Clar-

A

Neen ccenumesumeeuummmenseses

10

10

13

15

16

17

18

19

19

20

21

24

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

APPENDIX:

Opinion and Judgment of the U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the Seventh C'rcuit dated May 6, 1938..

Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit denying Petition for Rehearing with

Suggestion for Rehearing in Banc dated J uly 22,

DHT... ccassisstsseainks- <oiislbbamensidianmnesteansanenpubniadaiinnnaaent

Opinion and Judgment of the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois dated July

16, 19GB ..nnccceceoveesncncesenneescncccesccrocessenesesenessenensess: sence

Order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois dated September 18, 1986

(modifying its order of July 16, 1986 pursuant

to motions filed under Rule 59, F.R. Civ. P)........

Affidavit of Arthur Teolis (filed with the District

Court on July 15, 1982 as part of IFFA’s Ap-

pendix to briefs filed in opposition to plaintiffs’

request for an award of attorney’s fees) .............

Order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern

District 0:1 Illinois dated June 13, 1982 (award-

ing attorney’s fees from the settlement fund to

emma Gee Bees By) cccccccecccccccecenecsnesssenesssnecrenes

Order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois dated June 23, 1982 (award-

ing attorney’s fees from the settlement fund to

eee Ba TID TBD ann ccccecccesccsnsccercecsttnsentiin'ceses

Memorandum Opinion and Order of the U.S. Dis-

trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois

dated November 20, 1974 (allowing defendant

to file an Amended Answer) ................- aaa aaeedal

Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) ..............-.......-------

GR TI: BT isin ssceccssnstceciencitncsscensoricccmnecmnmenmies

Excerpt from the June 18, 1979 Settlement Agree-

ment between Plaintiffs and TWA ........................

Page

la

24a

38a

4la

43a

44a

idl

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36

EER CI Scene Mme ares eT Re 5

ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101

UI: lati a 2,4

ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636

(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993

CER CE ree. Ce ee aS 2, 4,9

ALSSA v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 630 F.2d

Sa 2,6

ALSSA v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d

Ie I 2,8

Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2nd

RG I een icnteisidapetilalastnitniiate ston tate a 17, 18, 21

Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.

SY idea a a 20

Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988) .... 14, 17,

a. 21, 22

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.

eae eae passim

Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357

i i 5

In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Air-

line Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978) ............ 2, 5,6

Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) ........... 12

Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982)... 12, 21

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424

ie a 12

Freedman v. ALSSA, 730 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 899 (1984) 2,7

General Building Contractors Association, Inc. v.

Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)

Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986)... 16

Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) 13, 17

Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir.

ENED sniceeiisthoneiaiiaeaianiniieneeieatbe nant tee oe 19, 21, 22

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) ............. 13, 14

Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional

Services, 524 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)... 16

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Local 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106

AR, Be: CI i csleteseicsidalidienncensinidatiaibamiandiinabiies 12

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

STITT «sisnienitieeiiieddehiaateeehiceiieeiehiaiebalianeammcisadpiiniimenbtaneeite 5

Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers, 543

ef 8 oe. SS 17

National Resource Defense Council, Inc. v.

Thomas, 801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir., 1986) ............. 16, 17

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S.

I a a ln 10, 12

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council,

478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088 (1986) -................... 16

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council,

US. , 107 S.Ct. 3078 (1987) ................. 16

Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986),

cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 880

WUT. ccccthlcisdeicsdtahepiniglihcetetcldecieiidabisasdeliphdldceeieiasdaipoaiiasdie passim

Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763

A I i cel 18, 19, 22

Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.

| ERTS TR AUR ENO Ne: <a OO 16, 17, 22

Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S.

ERE SAR AE SUT ere 18, 19

Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977) ..................- 12,19

Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631

I Ga NINE siccecnedicinirsetecescdedincsieaiitaniiiciirsiinnetipalipen 18

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553

0 RSIS ES ae as oem Bs ae Sea Le 5

U.S. v. Terminal Transport Co., 653 F.2d 1016

(5th Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989

(RCRD. Pa RETIRE eR ED Ae 19, 20

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385

GPE arene eee ee eee IE passim

STATUTES

ES Re ae Re aa me aR aE 2

SSC TC Oe a 19

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.

EE EL ee en 18

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-——Continued

Civil Rights Acts Page

I I vcirtsinincs-cincnnccusesenenceisiecsemneneniesion- eaten 13

SN eens 13, 17

I passim

Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq. ...............0..... 3, 10, 13

§ 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) _....... 3, 10, 13

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. .......0..000......- passim

§ 706(d) (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)

RCRA EY Rene ATs ey OR a ROR 5

§ 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) _.. 5

§ 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) «200... passim

Clean Air Act

§ 304 (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) 000. 16

§ 307 (f), 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (f) 2.0. 16

Clean Water Act

§ 505 (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1865 (d) ...0. ee. 16

Emergency School Aid Act of 1972

§ 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (repealed) —................ 19

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et

SE ENESEORG SEE Rss Bceier RoR ENON ec a 18

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. ............... 4,18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Price, Protecting Defendant-Intervenors From At-

torneys’ Fee Liability in Civil Rights Cases, 23

Harv. J. on Legis. 579 (1986)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No.

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,

Petitioner,

— Vv.

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Independent Federation of Flight Attend-

ants (“IFFA”), respectfully prays that a writ of cer-

tiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

entered on May 6, 1988.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit is officially reported at 846 F.2d 434,

unofficially reported at 46 FEP 1503, and reprinted in

the Appendix to this Petition at Pet. App. la. The opin-

ion of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois is officially published at 640 F.Supp.

2

i 97, and reprinted

861. unofficially published at 46 FEP 1497,

at Pet. App. 24a. A September 18, 1986 Order of the

District Court modifying its previous judgment has not

been published but is reprinted at Pet. App. 38a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on May 6, 1988. A timely Petition for Rehearing with

Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc was filed on May 19,

1988. The Petition for Rehearing was denied on July

22, 1988, with four Circuit Judges voting to grant re-

hearing in bane, and one not participating. (Pet. App.

22a). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTE INVOLVED

This Petition involves Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, ef seq., specifically Sec-

tion 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides:

In any action or proceeding under this subchapter

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the Commission or the United

States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

costs, and the Commission and the United States shall

be liable for the costs the same as a private person.

1 The opinion below is the seventh Seventh Circuit opinion ”

issue in this litigation. In chronological order, the other six are:

ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1972) :

ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973),

cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); In re Consolidated Pretrial Fre

ceedinas in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978);

ALSSA v. TWA, 630 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980); ALSSA v. TWA,

713 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1983); and Freedman v. ALSSA, 730 F.2d

509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 899 (1984). This litigation has

also produced one Supreme Court opinion, Z'pes v. Trans World Air-

lines, Inc., 4.5 U.S. 385 (1982).

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Preliminary Statement

The federal civil rights statutes contain fee-shifting

provisions authorizing an award of attorney’s fees in

favor of a “prevailing party”. This Court has spoken

to the standards under which these provisions should be

applied when prevailing plaintiffs seek an award of fees

from defendants who stand as proven violators of fed-

eral law; and also when prevailing defendants seek an

award of fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs. Christians-

burg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). The

Court has never spoken to the issue of what standard

is to be applied to other parties who are neither the vic-

tims nor the perpetrators of the alleged discrimination,

but who intervene to be heard because the resolution of

the litigation will affect their rights. That is the ques-

tion squarely presented by this Petition.

Petitioner Independent Federation of Flight Attend-

ants (“IFFA”) is a labor union which was never accused

of discrimination; indeed, IFFA’s predecessor played the

major role in eliminating the discrimination at issue.

IFFA intervened only, as the dissent below noted, when

it became clear that the settlement of this litigation

would override its collective bargaining agreement and

endanger the jobs of its members. The court below none-

theless chose to award fees against IFFA and in favor

of plaintiffs under the same standards by which fees are

“almost automatically” assessed against defendants ad-

judged to have violated the law. The Panel majority

reached this result only over a strong dissent and after

expressly refusing to follow the decision of the Eleventh

Circuit in Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.

1986), cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987).

* We refer nct only to § 706(k) of Title VII, but also to § 204(b)

of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b),

and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which are “substantially identical” to Section

706(k). Christiansbury Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416

(1978).

4

In addition, while IFFA’s Petition for Rehearing was

denied, four judges of the Seventh Circuit voted to grant

rehearing in banc.

B. Procedural History Of This Litigaiton

Since April 1, 1977, IFFA has been certified pursuant

to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.) as the

labor union representing flight attendants in the employ

of Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”). In 1970, the

union which was IFFA’s predecessor, the Airline Stew-

ards and Stewardesses Association (“ALSSA”), filed this

lawsuit as a class action on behalf of all TWA flight at-

tendants who since July 2, 1965 had been terminated due

to TWA’s “no-motherhood” rule. TWA was the sole de-

fendant. The complaint alleged that TWA’s policy vio-

lated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e, et seg. Shortly after the suit was filed,

TWA abandoned its no-motherhood policy pursuant to a

new collective bargaining agreement with ALSSA. In

1971, a settlement was reached which would have allowed

all of the terminated flight attendants to return to work,

with each plaintiff retaining the seniority she held at

the time of her termination. However, the Seventh Cir-

cuit reversed the District Court’s approval of this set-

tlement, perceiving that the union, as class representa-

tive, had a conflict between obligations it owed to Plain-

tiffs and obligations it owed to incumbent flight attend-

ants who might be affected as a result of any settlement.

(Pet. App. 2a-3a); ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc.,

490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993

(1974).2 As a result of this decision, ALSSA was re-

moved as class representative.*

3 For a time this case was consolidated with a similar action

filed against American Airlines.

4 Counsel for Plaintiffs and ALSSA testified (somewhat pro-

phetically) that he supported the first settlement because approxi-

mately 90% of the class faced a serious legal question as to

whether their claims were time-barred. 490 F.2d at 639-40.

5

In 1978, the Seventh Circuit held that TWA’s no-

motherhood policy was indeed illegal, but that the claims

of approximately 92% of the Plaintiffs were untimely.

In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline

Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978). The court held

that TWA had not engaged in a “continuing violation”,

and that the claims of all flight attendants terminated

more than 90 days before the union had filed its first

charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-

mission (EEOC) in 1970 were time-barred pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d).° Id. at 1150. The court then went

on to address Plaintiffs’ secondary argument that TWA

had waived the timeliness defense. The Seventh Circuit

stated that although this claim was questionable,* the

Title VII time limit was a “jurisdictional prerequisite”

which could not be waived. Jd. at 1151. In so ruling,

the court cited statements by the Supreme Court char-

acterizing the Title VII time limit as a “jurisdictional

prerequisite’’.’

Following the issuance of the Consolidated opinion,

Plaintiffs sought certiorari on the jurisdictional issue only

(No. 78-1545) ; no review was sought of the Seventh Cir-

cuit’s ruling that TWA had not engaged in a “continuing

violation” and that most Plaintiffs’ claims were therefore

time-barred. TWA cross-petitioned (No. 78-1549). While

these petitions were pending in June of 1979, the parties

5 The time limit is now 180 days and contained in 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(e).

* The waiver argument is based upon TWA’s failure to set forth

the timeliness defense in its original answer, although it was

included in an amended answer filed in 1974. (Pet. App. 47a).

By 1968, however, the Seventh Circuit was already on record as

characterizing the Title VII time limit as “jurisdictional”. Choate

v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1968).

*™ McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973);

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); United

Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557 n.9 (1977).

6

entered into another settlement: $3,000,000 was to be

divided among the class members, half te the approxi-

mately 30 women with timely claims (Subclass A), and

half to the approximately 400 women whose claims were

time-barred according to the Seventh Circuit (Subclass

B). More importantly, perhaps, each class member was

to be allowed to regain her job (13-18 years later) with

full retroactive competitive seniority. (Pet. App. 3a).

The Settlement Agreement also specifically purported to

supersede existing collective bargaining agreements,

which, of course, included the IFFA-TWA contract.

(Pet. App. 53a). |

At this point, IFFA intervened to object to the “set-

tlement that substantially altered its contract with TWA

and the job security of its members”. (Pet. App. 20a).

We argued (1) that if (as the Seventh Circuit had al-

ready held in Consolidated) there was no subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, the court had no ju-

risdiction to approve the settlement, grant seniority, and

override the collective bargaining agreement; and (2)

regardless of the jurisdictional issue, a grant of seniority

to Plaintiffs was inappropriate here, where Plaintiffs had

failed to prove their claims but instead had settled, and

the grant of seniority would harm innocent incumbent em-

ployees and override the collective bargaining agreement.

Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit over-

ruled our objections and affirmed the settlement. The

District Court held that it had jurisdiction because the

Seventh Circuit opinion finding there was no jurisdic-

tion was not final. The Seventh Circuit held that the

“principles favoring settlements” gave the court juris-

diction to approve and enforce the settlement regardless

of whether there was subject matter jurisdiction to hear

the merits of the claims. ALSSA v. TWA, 630 F.2d 1164,

1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 1980). IFFA petitioned for and

was granted certiorari (No. 80-951), but the Supreme

Court also at the same time granted certiorari on the

7

petitions (Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549) which had been

held in abeyance since 1978. (450 U.S. 979).

The Supreme Court issued its decision sub nom. Zipes

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).* The

Court did not choose to answer the question (presented

by IFFA in No. 80-951) of whether a court had juris-

diction to enforce a settlement when the court believed

it had no subject matter jurisdiction; instead it de-

cided that the Seventh Circuit had been wrong when (in

the Consolidated opinion in 1978) it characterized the

Title VII time-limit as a jurisdictional prerequisite which

could not be waived. The Court held that the time-limit

is not jurisdictional, and could be waived. There was,

therefore, subject matter jurisdiction to approve and en-

force the settlement, and thus the Court affirmed the

order approving the settlement (although for entirely

different reasons than those used by both lower courts).”

C. The Effect Of The Settlement Upon The Incumbent

Employees

Shortly after the Settlement Agreement was signed

in June of 1979, TWA entered into a recessionary period

(as IFFA had feared). Hundreds of flight attendants

were placed on involuntary furlough beginning in Octo-

ber of 1979. TWA hired no flight attendants, and had

no flight attendant vacancies from 1979 until 1983, when

8 TWA’s Cross-Petition in No. 78-1549 was removed from the

calendar prior to briefing and argument (451 U.S. 980) and even-

tually dismissed as improvidently granted (455 U.S. at 392, n.5).

* While the Supreme Court determined that TWA could theo-

retically waive the timeliness defense, neither the Supreme Court

nor the Seventh Circuit nor the District Court ever determined

whether or not such a waiver had occurred (or whether that waiver

could be binding on third parties affected by the resolution of the

case). The Seventh Circuit specifically acknowledged this point in

a post-Zipes opinion in this litigation. Freedman v. ALSSA, 730

F.2d at 512, n.5.

8

Plaintiffs were reemployed. (Pet. App. 4la). Indeed, in

1982, Plaintiffs sought to foree TWA to immediately re-

instate them regardless of whether vacancies existed. The

Seventh Circuit, however, ruled that pursuant to the

Settlement Agreement TWA was not obligated to rehire

Plaintiffs until vacancies existed. ALSSA v. TWA, 713

F.2d 319 (1983).

Of the incumbents furloughed in 1979, more than 150

were never recalled. Those flight attendants effectively

lost their jobs due to the injection of hundreds of Plain-

tiffs into the work force with retroactive competitive

seniority. (Pet. App. 41a).

D. The Attorney’s Fees Issues

Shortly after the Zipes decision in February of 1982,

Plaintiffs’ counsel sought an award of fees of nearly

$1,400,000 from the $3,000,000 settlement fund. The

District Court approved this request in June of 1982.

(Pet. App. 43a, 44a). Of this amount, $1,250,000 went

to counsel for Subclass B based on hourly rates of up to

$160 per hour plus a multiplier of two.

Plaintiffs’ counsel also sought fees from IFFA pur-

suant to § 706(k). In 1986, the District Court awarded

fees against IFFA and in favor of Plaintiffs in the

amount of $180,915.84. (Pet. App. 5a).

IFFA appealed, and a divided panel affirmed on May

6, 1988. In so ruling, the Panel majority acknowledged

that while the Supreme Court (in Christiansburg Gar-

ment) had articulated the standards upon which suc-

cessful plaintiffs should be awarded fees against defend-

ants who are proven violators of federal law, and also

the standard upon which successful defendants could

be awarded fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs, the “Su-

preme Court has never explicitly considered the stand-

ard applicable to a request for an award of fees against

an unsuccessful intervenor .. .” (Pet. App. 9a). The

9

majority then stated its explicit disagreement with the

Eleventh Circuit opinion in Reeves v. Harrell, supra,

which held that parties who intervene in civil rights

cases to claim that the resolution of those cases abridges

their rights should be treated as plaintiffs for attorney’s

fees purposes. (Pet. App. lla, 13a). The majority went

on to affirm the award of fees against IFFA under what

the dissent characterized as “the same standard ap-

plicable to defendants who have violated their employ-

ees’ civil rights.” (Pet. App. 18a-19a).

The dissent found the majority’s result inconsistent

with this Court’s holding in Christiansburg Garment, as

well as the Eleventh Circuit’s in Reeves, with which it

agreed. The dissent also noted the irony of the Panel

majority’s ruling, since the Seventh Circuit itself had

once admonished the union about its duty to represent

the incumbent employees:

[T]his circuit dismissed the incumbent employees’

predecessor union as the plaintiffs’ class representa-

tive specifieally because the union’s interest in rep-

resenting the collective bargaining rights of the in-

cumbent employees conflicted with its position as

class representative. See Air Line Stewards and

Stewardesses Ass’n, Local 550 v. American Airlines,

Inc., 490 F 2d 636, 639-42 (7th Cir. 1973). The

fact that the IFFA did what its members elected

it to do and this circuit expected it to do, that is,

represent the interests of incumbent employees, is

not something that should subject it to Title VII

attorneys’ fees. (Pet. App. 20a).

Finally, the dissent noted that the majority’s result

would have a chilling effect upon the rights of innocent

incumbent employees whose rights are affected by the

resolution of civil rights cases:

Many of these affected employees will have substan-

tial claims that the settlement or remedies violate

their own rights under a collective bargaining agree-

10

ment, Title VII, or even the Constitution. The just

resolution of these cases requires the full participa-

tion of everyone involved. Mechanically assessing

attorneys’ fees against intervening employees who

did not violate anybody’s rights and who are not

fortunate enough to posture themselves as “plain-

tiffs,” will ensure that in many cases only two sides

will be heard in a multi-sided dispute. (Pet. App.

21a).

A timely Petition for Rehearing, with Suggestion for

Rehearing in Bane was filed. On July 22, 1988, rehear-

ing was denied, with four judges voting to grant rehear-

ing. (Pet. App. 22a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Importance Of The Issue

The civil rights fee-shifting statutes by their terms

make no distinction between parties, be they plaintiffs,

defendants, or intervenors. However, in Christiansburg

Garment Co. ». EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Court

held that plaintiffs who prevail against defendants should

ordinarily receive an award of fees unless special cir-

cumstances exist. 434 U.S. at 417. On the other hand,

defendants who prevail against plaintiffs are to receive

an award only upon a finding that the action brought was

“frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation... .”

434 U.S. at 421."

The reasons for ordinarily awarding fees to plaintiffs

(who prevail against defendants) are:

(1) When a district court awards counsel fees to a

prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against

a violator of federal law; and

1 In Christiansburg Garment, the Court was expanding upon the

standards established a decade earlier in Newman v. Piggie Park

Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), a case involving § 204(b)

of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

11

(2) A private plaintiff is the chosen instrument of

Congress and an award of fees will make it

easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring

a meritorious suit.

(434 U.S. at 418, 420).

But these factors, the Court said, are “wholly ab-

sent in the case of a prevailing Title VII defendant.”

(434 U.S. at 418). Prevailing defendants are not ordi-

narily entitled to an award of fees against unsuccessful

plaintiffs. As the Court said:

No matter how honest one’s belief that he had been

the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritor-

ious one’s claim may appear at the outset, the course

of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts

may not emerge until discovery of trial. The law

may change or clarify in the midst of litigation.

Even when the law or the facts appear questionable

or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an

entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit. (434

USS. at 422).

Applying these teachings to the facts of this case, it is

clear that one of the two reasons given for presump-

tively awarding fees to plaintiffs is “wholly absent’.

IFFA did not violate the law; it merely attempted to

enforce its contract and represent the interests of inno-

cent incumbents affected by the settlement. The other

reason given in Christiansburg for awarding fees to pre-

vailing plaintiffs—to make it easier for plaintiffs of lim-

ited means to bring suit—is of tenuous, if any, appli-

cability here. As the dissent below noted, before IFFA

intervened counsel for plaintiffs had already voiced their

intention to seek a seven-figure fee which surely provided

counsel with ample incentive to proceed. Moreover, in

any Title VII case where plaintiffs prevail there will

always be a wrongdoer defendant who may be assessed

12

fees; it is not necessary for innocent and adversely af-

fected employees to pay plaintiffs’ lawyers."

However, the reasons given in Christiansburg Garment

for not routinely awarding fees against plaintiffs have

an almost eerie applicability to the facts of this case.

The law changed dramatically in the midst of litigation.

The District Court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court

each used an entirely different rationale. The appellate

opinion which formed the basis for IFFA’s intervention

at the District Court was reversed. Statements made by

this Court before, in, and after the Zipes opinion make

it clear that IFFA had a very reasonable basis for going

forward.

Accordingly, IFFA believes it should be judged for

attorney’s fees purposes as if it were an unsuccessful

plaintiff. But more is at stake than the soundness of

that position. This Court has shown a distinct sensitivity

to the dilemma of innocent incumbent employees affected

by Title VII remedies, as well as that of unions not

guilty of discrimination which must nonetheless partici-

pate in remedial proceedings. Franks v. Bowman Trans-

portation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 781-2 (1976) (Burger,

C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Team-

sters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 356, n.43 (1977); Zipes v.

TWA, 455 U.S. at 401, n.1 (Powell, J, concurring) ;

Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 240 (1982);

Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984); and

Local 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct.

3063, 3079 (1986). Is the union which participates

in remedial proceedings as required by Teamsters and

which asserts its rights under its contract as well as

11 Tn addition, in Piggie Park the Court noted that a civil rights

plaintiff will often need to seek injunctive relief, an additional rea-

son why plaintiffs should presumptively be entitled to fees. 390 U.S.

at 402. No such considerations are present here. The challenged

policy had been abandoned long before current counsel entered the

case, and thus there was no need to seck any injunctive relief.

-

.

‘

:

:

i

:

13

the interests of its members as perhaps required by its

duty of fair representation risking an almost automatic

award of attorney’s fees against the union if it does not

prevail? Are innocent incumbent employees (or their

unions acting on their behalf) who in remedial proceed-

ings raise the equities of their positions vis-a-vis plain-

tiffs who may have slept upon or settled questionable

claims to be almost automatically assessed attorney’s fees

if their arguments do not prevail? We think the answer

to these questions must be no; but whatever the answer,

those unions and employees are entitled to know it. (At

the moment the answer varies depending upon the judi-

cial circuit in which the case is brought). Before they

embark upon a course of conduct, those unions and em-

ployees should know whether they can afford to voice

their rights. Accordingly, there is a compelling need for

this Court to grant certiorari and decide the question

presented.

II. As Both The Majority And Dissent Below Expressly

Noted, A Conflict Of Authority Exists Among The

Courts Of Appeals

In Reeves, the plaintiffs were black sheriffs who

brought suit against a county government pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983. The suit was settled through

a court-approved decree. White deputy sheriffs subse-

quently intervened and contended (unsuccessfully) that

the consent decree violated their rights. When fees were

sought against the intervenors (pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§$ 1988) ,'* the Eleventh Circuit said:

12 Tn 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was enacted to allow attorneys’ fee

awards in cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The language

of Section 1988—which is the provision at issue in Reeves and

Charles, infra, is virtually identical to the language of § 706(k) of

Title VII and § 204(b) of Title II. It frequently has been said that

Section 1988 was patterned after its Title II and Title VII counter-

parts and should be interpreted in an identical fashion. Hanrahan

v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, n.4 (1980); Hensley v. Eckerhart,

14

In the present case, the intervenors claimed that the

consent decree’s quota provision violated their con-

stitutional rights. Furthermore, it is undisputed that

the intervenors were not responsible for any of the

alleged violations that led to the consent decree or

that they had ever violated the constitutional rights

of any of the members of the plaintiff class. There-

fore, we agree with the district court that the inter-

venors should be characterized as plaintiffs and are

liable for attorney’s fees only if their claims were

frivolous. 791 F.2d at 1484.

The Panel majority in this case flatly rejected the

Reeves holding:

IFFA would have us characterize its posture in this

case precisely as the Eleventh Circuit characterized

the intervenors’ position in Reeves. We decline to do

so. Acceptance of a “functional plaintiff” exception

to the rule favoring fees awards to prevailing Title

VII plaintiffs, in our view, unnecessarily threatens to

undermine what has come to be interpreted as a

deliberate statutory presumption in favor of such

awards to prevailing parties. (Pet. App. lla) ."

The Panel majority did not explain, however, why it

felt plaintiffs should be presumptively entitled to fees

461 U.S. 424, 433, n.7 (1983). Certainly there is no question that

the Seventh Circuit sees no distinction between § 1988 and § 706(k).

(Pet. App. 7a).

13 One day before its decision issued in this case, the same Sev-

enth Circuit Panel, by the same 2-1 vote, affirmed an award of fees

against intervenors in Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.

1988). “Charles involved an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to

section 1988 against three private parties who intervened on the

side of Illinois in a suit challenging the constitutionality of the

State’s criminal abortion statute” (Pet. App. 6a-7a). Rehearing

was sought and denied on July 22, 1988, the same day on which

rehearing was denied in this case (although no judges voted to

grant rehearing in Charles). The facts of the two cases, while quite

different, demonstrate the broad range of individuals and entities

affected by the issue presented. (‘Ve understand that certiorari will

be sought in Charles).

i.

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15

when the party from whom fees are sought is not the

party who violated the law. It did, however, choose to

reemphasize its disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit:

Of even greater concern, however, is our belief

that were we to adopt the “functional plaintiff” ap-

proach articulated in Reeves and advocated by IFFA,

we might very well encourage intervenors, and ulti-

mately defendants, in Title VII lawsuits to manu-

facture constitutionally-derived or statutorily-based

defenses in an attempt to cloak themselves in the

protective guise of functional plaintiffs, in effect ren-

dering them immune from statutory fee liability ex-

cept where their defenses are held to be completely

without merit. (Pet. App. 13a).

The dissent below disagreed:

[T]he application of the Christianburg Garment poli-

cies warrants treating the intervenors as plaintiffs

for attorneys’ fees purposes. See Reeves v. Harrell,

791 F.2d 1481, 1484 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

107 S.Ct. 880 (1987).

(Pet. App. 20a).

Given the acknowledged split of authority on an issue

of obvious importance to many, we submit that certiorar?

should be granted and the issue resolved by this Court.

Ill. The Case Law From The Other Circuits Only Adds

To The Uncertainty

While no other Court of Appeals has faced the issue

presented here as directly as the Eleventh and Seventh

Circuits, several have at least touched upon it. A read-

ing of those cases only serves to reinforce the need for

this Court to decide the issue. Simply put, the state of

the law is unsettled and confused. Decisions from the

District of Columbia, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits

lend support to the position of the Eleventh Circuit (and

the Seventh Circuit dissent), while decisions of the Fifth

and Sixth Circuits arguably give some solace to the

Panel majority below.

16

A. District of Columbia Circuit

The Panel majority acknowledged that Grano v. Barry,

783 F.2d 1104, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1986) lends support to

the position taken by IFFA and the Eleventh Circuit.

(Pet. App. 10a). In Grano, the court affirmed the dis-

trict court’s refusal to award fees under § 1988 against

intervenors on the “functional plaintiff’ theory, saying

such a ruling was within the discretion of the district

court, and citing Kirkland v. New York State Depart-

ment of Correctional Services, 524 F.Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y.

1981), an early and eloquent opinion holding that un-

successful intervenors should not be treated as wrong-

doer defendants for attorney’s fees purposes.

The D.C. Circuit in Grano also cited Sierra Club v.

EPA, 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1985), a case involving

a request for an award of fees against an intervenor

under § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607

(f). In Sierra Club the court refused to award fees

against intervenors whose claims were not frivolous and

whose position was intended to encourage the “effe

tive interpretation and implementation of the Act.” 769

F.2d at 810-11. The court took the same position regard-

ing a claim for fees against intervenors pursuant to

$ 505(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d),

in National Resource Defense Council, Ine. v. Thomas,

801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Sealia, J.). While the

Panel majority below distinguished Thomas on the basis

of slightly different statutory phraseology (Pet. App.

8a, n.5), that distinction is quite dubious since this Court

has made it clear that § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act

(which is substantially identical to the provisions at

issue in Thomas and Sierra Club) should be interpreted

in the same fashion as $1988 (which is substantially

identical to § 706(k)). Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley

Citizens Council, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3095

(1986) ; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Coun-

cil, ——- US. , 107 S.Ct. 3078, 3080, n.1: see also

Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, n.4 (1980).

|

17

The purposes behind these statutes are “nearly iden-

tical”, and there is a common thread: fees are to be

awarded against those who have violated the law. More-

over, those who advance the interests of innocent third

parties affected by the resolution of discrimination cases

clearly have “reasonably attempted to advance the im-

plementation of the Act.” Thomas, 801 F.2d at 467."

Accordingly, it is quite difficult to reconcile Thomas and

Sierra Club with the result below.

B. Second and Third Circuits

The Second Circuit decision in Annunziato v. The

Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2nd Cir. 1984) is also incon-

sistent with the result below, as pointed out by the dis-

sent in Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1078 (7th Cir.

1988). In The Gan, the third-party against whom fees

were sought had purchased a building from a city gov-

ernment. Plaintiffs brought suit against the city and the

purchaser under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and after settlement

sought fees under § 1988. The court refused to award

fees against a party who had not been shown to have

violated the law:

The policy of awarding fees, which is to encourage

civil rights plaintiffs to bring actions to vindicate

their constitutional rights, was furthered in this case

by the district court’s award of fees against the City.

We do not view this policy of encouragement as

applicable to The Gan. It was an innocent third party

caught in the cross-fire between plaintiffs and the

City of New Haven over a municipal practice in

which The Gan had no hand.

(744 F.2d at 253).

14 The Panel majority below cited in support of its position Moten

v. Bricklayers, 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976). (Pet. App. 7a).

However, Moten is a pre-Christiansburg Garment decision where

fees were assessed against an employer association for filing an

appeal when it had never even sought leave to intervene at the

district court. (Jd. at 227 and 239). Accordingly, an award of fees

would likely have been justified in Moten regardless of what stand-

ard was applied.

18

A case with somewhat similar facts is Tunstall v. Of-

fice of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631 (8rd Cir. 1987).

In Tunstall, the Third Circuit, relying on The Gan, re-

fused to award fees under § 1988 against a party who

had purchased plaintiffs’ home from the city, but played

_no role in the city’s allegedly unlawful acts."

C. Ninth Circuit

As the Panel majority below also acknowledged (Pet.

App. 15a), the Ninth Circuit decision in Richardson v.

Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1984), lends

support to IFFA’s position. There, a pilot had sued an

airline claiming illegal discrimination in violation of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29

U.S.C. § 621, et seg. The union intervened claiming that

a settlement and entry of a proposed consent decree would

violate the seniority rights of its members pursuant to

its collective bargaining agreement with the airline. The

union’s contentions were not accepted. However, the court

refused to award fees against the union because the “pol-

icy considerations which underlie the shifting” of at-

torney’s fees did not apply against a party who had not

violated the law. 750 F.2d at 766. The court also, in a

passage quite applicable to this case, noted that the union

was merely fulfitling its duty of fair representation to

its members:

Imposing a fee award would only punish ALPA for

performing an act it was under a duty to do. Under

the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et

seq. (1982) and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.

$ 151 et seq. (1982), unions are given the right to

act as exclusive representatives for all members in

the bargaining unit. This right carries with it a

corresponding duty to represent all members fairly.

Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323

‘5 It does not weaken our case to note that there was a dissent in

The Gan. It only serves to demonstrate (once again) the need for

guidance from a higher authority.

a

:

:

;

19

U.S. 192, 202-03, 65 S.Ct. 226, 232, 89 L.Ed. 173

(1944).

(750 F.2d at 766, emphasis supplied) .**

D. Sixth Circuit

The Sixth Circuit affirmed an award of fees against

an intervenor in Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128

(6th Cir. 1979), a case relied upon by the District Court

here (Pet. App. 33a) and by the Panel majority in

Charles, 846 F.2d at 1068-9.

The intervenor in Haycraft was not a party involved

in the litigation, but merely a county judge who wanted

to provide his own personal plan for solving the area’s

school desegregation problems. Fees were awarded pur-

suant to § 718 of the Emergency School Act of 1972, 20

U.S.C. § 1617 (since repealed), which was textually simi-

lar to § 706(k) and § 1988.""

E. Fifth Circuit

The Panel majority also relied upon U.S. v. Terminal

Transport Co., Inc., 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir., Aug. 12,

1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982)). In that case

the district court had found both employer and union

defendants in violation of Title VII. Following the is-

suance of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977), that

order was modified (in compliance with Teamsters) to

hold that the unions were not in violation of Title VII

16 The Panel majority accurately pointed out that the statute

under which Richardson was decided provides an alternative basis

for the result there. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Nonetheless, we must

note that the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ views are diametrically

opposed in regard to the actions undertaken and obligations owed

by the respective unions as well as the consequences of those actions

and obligations for attorney’s fees purposes.

17 We believe Haycraft can be distinguished on the basis that the

court found intervenor’s coneuct to be in bad faith, which would

have justified an award of fees even if the intervenor were judged

as a plaintiff for attorney’s fees purposes. See 606 F.2d at 133.

20

and not liable for backpay. The Fifth Circuit nonetheless

found the unions liable under § 706(k) for some of plain-

tiffs’ attorney’s fees due to the union’s opposition to sen-

iority relief sought by plaintiffs..* The opinion cites

Christiansburg Garment but contains no discussion of its

principles.’®

IV. The Result Below Is In Conflict With Decisions Of

This Court

Even beyond the confused state of the lower court case

law, the opinion of the Panel majority below cannot be

reconciled with the principles articulated by this Court in

Christiansburg Garment, or with the thrust of several

Supreme Court opinions which deal with the rights of

innocent, affected third parties. See p. 12, supra. We

offer but one more example. Just months after its is-

suance, Zipes was cited by the Court in General Build-

ing Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458

U.S. 375 (1982). There the Court held that an employer

association which had not participated in discrimination

by a union in the operation of an exclusive hiring hall

could not be required to share the cost of a remedial

program. However, Justice Rehnquist said:

This is not to say that defendants in the position of

petitioners might not, upon an appropriate eviden-

tiary showing, be retained in the iawsuit and even

subjected to such minor and ancillary provisions of

an injunctive order as the District Court might find

necessary to grant complete relief to respondents

'* Terminal Transport, however, was obviously not treated as

precedent in Reeves. The Eleventh Circuit is bound to follow all

Fifth Circuit decisions which issued before October 1, 1981, which

would include Terminal Transport. Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206 (11th Cir. 1981). Indeed, Judge Clark was on the panel in both

Reeves and Terminal Transport.

19 The district court case law in this area is also divergent. For

a discussion of those cases, see Price, Protecting Defendant-

Intervenors From Attorneys’ Fee Liability in Civil Rights Cases,

23 Harv.J. on Legis. 579 (1986).

21

from the discrimination they suffered at the hands

of the Union. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982). But that sort of minor

and ancillary relief is not the same, and cannot be

the same, as that awarded against a party found to

have infringed the statutory rights of persons in the

position of respondents.

Absent a supportable finding of liability, we see no

basis for requiring the employers or the associations

to aid either in paying for the cost of the remedial

program as a whole or in establishing and adminis-

tering the training program. 458 U.S. at 399-400.

Although “costs” of a remedial program may not pre-

cisely translate into “costs” under § 706(k), the analogy

is striking. Clearly, a sharp line is to be drawn between

those who violate the law and those caught in the middle

between victim and discriminator. Being held liable for

attorney’s fees under the same standard applied to de-

fendants who violate the law is hardly “minor” or “ancil-

lary”. We cannot believe that the large objectives of

Title VII require that innocent employees carry such a

heavy burden. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. at

240.

V. Guidance Is Needed From This Court On The Question

Presented, And This Case Presents The Ideal Oppor-

tunity For The Court To Clarify The Law

As is obvious from the foregoing, the question pre-

sented needs to be decided by this Court. The issue is

important, the lower courts are badly divided, the scope

of persons affected is immense (e.g., contrast IFFA with

the third-parties against whom fees were sought in

Charles, Haycraft, Reeves and The Gan), and the is-

sue will unquestionably continue to arise until the Court

provides direction. Moreover, we submit that this case

is the perfect case for the Court to give that direction.

Consider the exceptional confluence of factors:

22

1. IFFA had an actual interest in the litigation.

In contrast with some of the cases on this is-

sue (e.g., Haycraft, Sierra Club, and Charles),

IFFA and its members had a direct, discernible

interest in the matters at issue and were assert-

ing their own rights. IFFA was not protecting

the environment in general or voluntarily assist-

ing in the defense of a state statute. Thus, the

“chilling effect” of the result below is directly in

focus.

. The Seventh Circuit told the union to do what it

did. IFFA was acting on the heels of the Seventh

Circuit’s 1973 pronouncement that the union was

legally obliged to represent incumbents who might

be affected by the resolution of the litigation.

How could the union have done otherwise?

3. IFFA was only fulfilling its duty of fair repre-

sentation. By acting in response to the Seventh

Circuit’s warning in a vain attempt to enforce

its contract and safeguard its members’ job secu-

rity, IFFA was only complying with its duty of

fair representation to its members, as the Ninth

Circuit in Richardson and the dissent below sug-

gest. It takes little ingenuity to imagine that if

IFFA had simply refused to represent the inter-

ests of those whose jobs were in jeopardy, those

flight attendants might have sued IFFA. Under

the result below unions will indeed be punished

merely for performing their legal obligations.

. The union filed this suit. The actions of IFFA’s

predecessor made it possible for this suit to be

filed, for TWA’s illegal policy to be eliminated,

for Plaintiffs to regain their jobs, and for Plain-

tiffs’ current counsel to earn their million-dollar-

plus fees. If these facts do not constitute “special

circumstances” which should insulate IFFA from

fee liability, it is difficult to imagine any which

would. Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 418.

23

5. The law changed dramatically during this litiga-

tion and IFFA had an eminently reasonable basis

for going forward. The statement in Christians-

burg Garment that the “course of litigation is

rarely predictable” (434 U.S. at 422) is an under-

statement when applied to this case. The very

substantial nature of the questions raised by

IFFA are well documented by this Court’s prior

grant of certiorari, the dissent below, the four

Circuit Judges who voted to grant rehearing, and

the Eleventh Circuit opinion that accepts IFFA’s

position in its entirety.

6. Before IFFA intervened, Plaintiffs’ counsel was

already in a position to exact enormous fees from

the settlement fund. Thus, awarding more fees

is hardly necessary in order to further the gen-

eral goal of encouraging plaintiffs of limited

means to bring suit. It will merely provide an

additional bonanza for counsel here.

7. As the dissent noted, IFFA intervened only “to

protect its members’ jobs.” (Pet. App. 18a).

It is difficult to believe that such action should

subject IFFA to an award of fees as if IFFA

had violated the law.

In short, if any intervenor or third-party deserves to be

judged by a standard for attorney’s fees liability dif-

ferent from the standard applied to defendants found

guilty of illegal discrimination, it is this one. Accord-

ingly, this is the ideal case for the Court to determine

if any different standard should be applied.

24

CONCLUSION

The writ of certiorari should be granted and the judg-

ment below reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN A. FEHR

(Counsel of Record)

WILLIAM A. JOLLEY

JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER & GORDON

204 West Linwood Boulevard

Kansas City, Missouri 64111

(816) 561-3755

Attorneys for Petitioner

Independent Federation

of Flight Attendants

i eee Me BE a ie ——_

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 86-2731

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

v.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

Defendants,

and

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,

Intervenor-A ppellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division

No. 74 C 2063—Stanley J. Roszkowski, Judge

ARGUED APRIL 23, 1987—-DEcIDED May 6, 1988

Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY, and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

CoFFEY, Circuit Judge. This dispute over liability for

statutory attorneys’ fees has its origins in a 1970 class

action filed by the plaintiffs against Trans World Airlines

(“TWA”) alleging unlawful sex discrimination in viola-

tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

2a

U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. After nearly nine years of litiga-

tion, the plaintiffs entered into a comprehensive settlement

agreement with TWA which was contested by the inter-

venor, the Independent Federation of Flight Attendants

(“IFFA”), on the grounds that the terms of the settle-

ment violated the rights of those TWA flight attendants

not members of the plaintiff class. IFFA’s opposition to

the settlement agreement consumed three years of litiga-

tion culminating in 1982 when the plaintiff class pre-

vailed before the Supreme Court. Subsequently pursuant

to section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k),

plaintiffs’ attorneys successfully petitioned the district

court foi fees incurred in connection with their post-

settlement legal work. We affirm the district court’s

award of post-settlement fees against IFFA as well as its

use of a multiplier in calculating that award.

I. FACTS

The proceedings which pre-date this lawsuit are sum-

marized in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

385 (1982). The plaintiffs brought this class action

against TWA back in 1970, challenging the airline’s pol-

icy of automatically terminating the employment of all

female flight attendants who became mothers while per-

mitting their male counterparts, new fathers, to continue

flying. Soon after the filing of suit by the plaintiffs,

TWA abandoned its “no-motherhood” policy and IFFA’s

predecessor, then represen ing both the plaintiff class and

unaffected flight attendants, entered into a settlement

with TWA. Although the district court approved the

proffered settlement, several disenchanted class members

appealed. We reversed the district court’s approval of the

1971 settlement based upon the conflict we perceived be-

tween the then union’s obligations to the plaintiff class

‘Presumably, although it is not clear from the record, TWA

actually terminated flight attendants upon learning of their

pregnancy.

:

}

:

F

|

|

§

3a

hand and to the then-currently working flight

pons on the other. Air Line Stewards and Steward-

esses Association v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th

Cir. 1973). We ordered IFFA’s predecessor to be re-

placed as the class representative.

Following reinstatement of the lawsuit, the district

court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-

ment, concluding that TWA’s “no-motherhood policy

violated Title VII’s proscription against discrimination

in employment on the basis of sex. We affirmed the dis-

trict court’s finding of unlawful employment discrimina-

tion but held that the claims of a number of the mem-

bers of the class were barred because charges had not

been timely filed with the Equal Employment Opportun-

ity Commission (“EEOC”). In re Consolidated Pretrial

Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th

Cir. 1978). Our holding on the timeliness issue neces-

sitated that we divide the plaintiff class into two groups

—Sub Class A, class members whose EEOC charges were

timely, and Sub Class B, those whose charges were un-

timely—and that we remand the case with respect to the

timely claims of Sub Class A.

Prior to any action in the district court in response

to our remand, the parties reached a settlement which

provided, inter alia, that TWA establish a $3,000,000

settlement fund to benefit all class members and that each

class member be credited with full company and union

seniority from the date of her termination by the airline.

IFFA, the union certified to act as the collective-bargain-

ing agent both for those TWA flight attendants not af-

fected by the airline’s discontinued “no-motherhood pol-

icy and for flight attendants hired since the termination

of the plaintiffs, sought and received permission to inter-

vene in the lawsuit to object to the settlement. Specifi-

cally, IFFA opposed the proposed Settlement on two

grounds: first, that the untimely filing of charges with

4a

the EEOC by members of Sub Class B left the district

court without jurisdiction to consider equitable relief af-

fecting them, and second, that reinstatement of the plain-

tiffs with full retroactive “competitive” seniority ? would

violate the collective bargaining agreement then in place

between TWA and the union’s incumbent members. Af-

ter three days of hearings, during which time IFFA had

an opportunity to air its objections, the district court

approved the settlement agreement and expressly found

that “full restoration of retroactive seniority will not

have an unusual adverse impact upon currently employed

flight attendants in a manner which is not typical of

other Title VII cases ....” (Mem. Op., November 8

1979 at 2.)

IFFA appealed, arguing that in light of this court’s

earlier decision that the timely filing of an EEOC charge

was a jurisdictional prerequisite, the district court erred

in holding that it retained jurisdiction to approve the set-

tlement agreement with respect to Sub Class B. Once

again, we ruled in fayor of the plaintiffs and affirmed

the district court, reasoning that “the principles favor-

ing settlement of class action lawsuits remain the same

regardless of whether the disputed legal issues center on

the jurisdiction of the court over the action.” Air Line

Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. Trans World Air-

lines, Inc., 630 F.2d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1980). We also

affirmed use of the remedy of retroactive competitive

seniority for eligible class members; in our view the set-

tlement responded appropriately both to TWA’s past acts

of discrimination as well as to the tangible consequences

of those past acts. Id.

* Ordinarily, “seniority” determines an employees’ entitlement to

benefits earned under an employment contract. “Competitive senior-

ity,” on the other hand, is used to allocate entitlements to benefits

among competing employees; for example, shift assignments; are

rogative in scheduling vacation: training opportunities; ete. .

5a

IFFA filed a petition for certiorari. The Supreme

Court granted the petition and consolidated it with an

earlier petition filed by the plaintiffs, consideration of

which the Court had deferred in light of the then-ongoing

settlement negotiations between the plaintiffs and TWA.

The plaintiffs had sought review of our prior decision

holding that timely filing of EEOC charges constituted a

jurisdictional prerequisite which barred the claims of

Sub Class B. IFFA, on the other hand, petitioned for re-

view of our ruling that the terms of the settlement agree-

ment—the reinstatement of discharged flight attendants

with retroactive competitive seniority—did not imper-

missibly infringe upon the collectively-bargained for

rights of incumbent flight attendants. In Zipes v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982), the Court

held that we had been mistaken in construing the filing

requirement of Title VII, Section 2000e-5(e), as being

jurisdictional but agreed that reinstatement of the plain-

tiffs with full retroactive competitive seniority was a

remedy both authorized by Title VII and appropriate in

these circumstances.

Having been twice vindicated in the Supreme Court,

plaintiffs’ attorneys petitioned the district court for an

award of fees against IFFA for their successful defense

of the settlement agreement. In turn, the district court

assessed IF FA $57,258 as fees for counsel for Sub Class

A and $171,747 (comprised of a “lodestar” figure of

$85,873.50 increased by a multipler of 2) as fees for

counsel for Sub Class B. Air Line Stewards v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ill. 1986).

Subsequently, upon motion, the district court lowered the

multiplier used to compute the fees for Sub Class B from

2 to 1.44, yielding an award to counsel of $123,657.84.

IFFA’s total liability for fees incurred solely as a result

of its challenge to the settlement agreement thus cur-

rently stands at $180, 915.84.

6a

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, IFFA asserts that the fee-shifting provision

of Title VII, section 706(k),* does not authorize an award

of attorneys’ fees against an intervening party which

has not been accused of a violation of federal law and

which, in an effort to protect the rights of its members,

raises arguments analogous to those a plaintiff would

ordinarily make. Alternatively, in the event we disagree

with its interpretation of section 706(k), IFFA points

to certain “special circumstances” which it claims render

an award of fees inappropriate. Finally, IFFA argues

that even if the district court’s decision to award fees is

upheld, the use of a multiplier to increase the amount of

the award to counsel for Sub Class B was improper. We

consider these arguments in turn.

A. Liability of “Innocent” Intervening Parties

In Charles v. Daley, Nos. 86-1552 and 86-3137, slip op.

(7th Cir. May 5, 1988), we addressed the question

whether an “innocent” third party intervenor-defendant

can be held liable for the attorneys’ fees incurred by a

prevailing party under the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees

Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.4 Charles involved an

award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1988 against

three private parties who intervened on the side of IIli-

nois in a suit challenging the constitutionality of the

* Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides in relevant

part:

In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in

its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the

[Equal Opportunity Employment] Commission or the Lnited

States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs ....

* Section 1988 states in pertinent part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections

1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public

Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other _

than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of

the costs.

7a

State’s criminal abortion statute. In finding against the

intervening defendants and in favor of the prevailing

plaintiffs in Charles, we held, that although the langvage

of section 1988 does not explicitly enumerate those

against whom an award of fees may be imposed, the

overriding purpose of the statute—to encourage the vin-

dication of civil rights by ‘private attorneys general’—

would be furthered by interpreting section 1988 to in-

clude fee awards against unsuccessful intervening de-

fendants, regardless of whether the intervenor could ac-

tually be found to be a violator of federal law under 42

U.S.C. $1983. Id. at 12-13; see also Akron Center for

Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp.

1268 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (Section 1988 fees awarded in

part against private intervenors who joined City of

Akron in defending constitutionality of local abortion

ordinance). We are unpersuaded that the facts of the

instant case require us to adopt a different rule under

Title VII: not only is the operative language of section

706(k) virtually identical to that used in section 1988,

but the Supreme Court has previously observed that in

considering awards of attorneys’ fees, courts should con-

sult related attorneys’ fees statutes and case law. See

Hensley v. ickerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) ; see

also Zabk: ‘icz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 549 n.9

(7th Cir. 1986). Moreover, other circuits applying Title

VII’s fee award provision have construed the statute to

allow fee awards against “innocent” defendants and in-

tervenors. See e.g., Allen v. Terminal Transport Co.,

Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1195, 1202 (N.D. G . 1980) (union

defendant guilty of no discrimination hed partially liable

for Title VII attorneys’ fees due to opposition to consent

decree affecting its members), aff'd, 653 F.2d 1016 (5th

Cir. 1981) ; Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers,

543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (business association

seeking unsuccessfully to intervene in appeal of a Title

VII lawsuit assessed fees despite having engaged in no

8a -

‘unlawful activity) ; Thompson v. Sawyer, 586 F. Supp.

635 (D. D.C. 1984) (Title VII attorneys’ fees imposed

against non-party union for unsuccessful attempts at in-

tervention to challenge relief attained by plaintiffs) .°

IFFA raises a related argument which proceeds from

the premise that, because its role in opposing the settle-

ment agreement was more closely analogous to that of

a plaintiff than to that of a defendant, it should be held

liable for fees only if its intervention in the lawsuit can

5IFFA cites Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763 (9th

Cir. 1984), in support of its contention that only those found to be

violators of federal law may be held liable for statutory attorneys’

fees. Richardson, however, is clearly distinguishable from the case

at bar. In Richardson, a pilots’ union intervened unsuccessfully in

a lawsuit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“ADEA”) to contest the fairness of a consent decree reached in

the underlying litigation. The decree was ultimately approved by

the district court and Richardson, the prevailing party in the origi-

nal ADEA action, petitioned the court for statutory attorneys’ fees

against the union. Both the district court and, on appeal, the Ninth

Circuit rejected Richardson’s petition for fees but not, as IFFA

would have us believe, because the union itself was innocent of any

violation of federal law. Instead, Richardson was denied fees be-

cause the pertinent provision of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b),

provides for an award of fees only against an offending “employer.”

There is, of course, no such limiting language respecting those

against whom fees may be imposed in section 706(k) of Title VII;

thus, we are in no way precluded by Richardson from imposing fees

against IFFA here.

Similarly, IFFA points to Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. v. Thomas, 801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.), in which

the District of Columbia Circuit refused to award attorneys’ fees,

pursuant to the attorney fee provision of the Clean Water Act, 23

U.S.C. § 1365(d), against an intervenor guilty of no violation of

federal law. In affirming the district court’s denial of fees against

the intervenor in Thomas, the court specifically noted that the

statutory language employed in section 1365(d) was neither text-

ually similar to the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (and by cxtension

section 706(k) of Title VII) nor susceptible to the same pro-

prevailing party interpretation that courts have accorded section

1988. Jd. £01 F.2d at 461 n.3.

9a

be deemed frivolous or unreasonable. The district court

rejected the intervenor’s “functional plaintiff” argument

and we concur.

It is settled law that a prevailing Title VII plaintiff

is presumptively entitled to fees. Albemarle Paper Co.

v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Zabkowicz, 789 F.2d at

548. However, in Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.0.C.,

434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a more

rigorous standard of eligibility applies when prevailing

Title VII defendants seek to recover fees from unsuc-

cessful plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court held that pre-

vailing defendants are entitled to an award of fees only

upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous,

unreasonable or without foundation.” Jd. at 421. While

the Supreme Court has never explicitly considered the

standard applicable to a request for an award of fees

against an unsuccessful intervenor, IFFA urges that be-

cause it intervened solely to assert the rights of its non-

discriminating incumbent members, it should be viewed,

in practical terms, as a plaintiff, and hence assessed at-

torneys’ fees only if its opposition to the settlement was

found to have been groundless.* In the instant case, the

district court made no such finding.

The most recent exposition of IFFA’s “functional plain-

tiff’ argument appears to have been made in Reeves v.

Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107

S. Ct. 880 (1987). In Reeves, a case apparently not

brought to the district court’s attention, white police offi-

cers intervened to challenge the constitutionality of a con-

sent decree entered into by black police officers and the

Sheriff’s Office of Bibb County, Georgia. The black officers

brought suit against the Sheriff’s Office alleging racial

discrimination in job assignments and promotions in vio-

lation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The intervenors ar-

6 In Charles v. Daley, Nos. 86-1552 and 86-3137, slip op. (7th Cir.

May 5, 1988) we explicitly declined to consider such an argument

because it had been raised only in an amicus brief.

10a

gued that the terms of the consent decree, which called

for promotion of black officers on an equal basis with

white officers, would in turn discriminate against them

on the basis of race. Although the plaintiffs ultimately

prevailed over the intervenors’ challenge to the consent

decree, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision on the issue of sec-

tion 1988 fees expressly recognized the importance of the

countervailing constitutional claims raised by the inter-

vening white officers. Indeed, the court found the role

of the intervenors in Reeves to be the functional equiv-

alent to that of plaintiffs.7 In so holding, the court sug-

gested that such a result was required if defendants

with good faith constitutional claims of their own were

not to be deterred from litigating them for fear of stat-

utory fee liability.’ Jd. at 1484; see also Grano v. Barry,

783 F.2d 1104, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Kirkland v. New

York State Department of Correctional Services, 574 F.

Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“{Florcing interve-

nors to bring their constitutional claims only at the risk

of becoming liable for their opponents’ fees if they do not

prevail may substantially deter such intervention . . . he

7 In the legislative colloquy preceding passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

Congress specifically recognized that the vindication of civil rights

need not always be the task of a plaintiff: “In the large majority of

cases the party or parties seeking to enforce such rights will be the

plaintiff and/or plaintiff-intervenors. However, in the procedural

posture of some cases, the parties seeking to enforce such rights

may be the defendants or defendant-intervenors.” S. Rep. No. 1011,

94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 n.4. While thus cognizant of the fact that

defendants, too, may be in a position to assert important constitu-

tional and statutory rights, nothing in section 1988’s legislative

history contradicts its plain language or suggests that any factor

other than a party’s success should be determinative of entitlement

to or, conversely, liability for fees.

* Although the Eleventh Circuit found the intervenors to be func-

tionally equivalent to plaintiffs for purposes of liability for Title

VII attorneys’ fees, the court found their intervention to have been

untimely and thus, in the end, susceptible to the imposition of fee

liability under Christianburg.

lla

aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 520 F.2d

420 (2nd Cir. 1975). IFFA would have us characterize its

posture in this case precisely as the Eleventh Circuit

characterized the intervenors’ position in Reeves. We

decline to do so. Acceptance of a “functional plaintiff

exception tothe rule favoring fee awards to prevailing

Title VII plaintiffs, in our view, unnecessarily threatens

to undermine what has come to be interpreted as a de-

liberate statutory presumption in favor of such awards

to prevailing parties.

One need only look to the plain language of section

706(k) to discover that Congress intended only one class

of litigants, prevailing parties, be eligible to recover at-

torneys’ fees expended in Title VII litigation. Con-

versely, nowhere does section 706(k) expressly exclude

any class of litigants from liability for such awards.

While we are not unmindful that a literal interpretation

of section 706(k) may, from time to time, result in the

imposition of a fee award against a party whose sole in-

volvement in a Title VII lawsuit is limited to an asser-

tion of countervailing constitutional rights (7.e., the in-

tervenors in Reeves), we are nonetheless bound to apply

the fee award provision of Title VII as it is written, not

as it might have been written. See e.g. United States v.

American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 US. 534, 543

(1940) (plain meaning of statute must be given effect

unless doing so would result in “absurd” or futile re-

sults or results so unreasonable as to be plainly at vari-

ance with the policy of the legislation as a whole). Sec-

tion 706(k) unequivocally endorses fee awards to pre-

vailing Title VII parties; the plaintiffs in the case at bar

prevailed and, consequently, are entitled to the fees

awarded them by the district court.

IFFA contends that such narrow and syllogistic rea-

soning places undue importance upon the nominal align-

ment of the parties. For example, IFFA argues that had

it waited until after approval of the settlement between

12a

the plantiffs and TWA and then filed a separate action

of its own contesting the validity of the agreement, it

could not have been held liable for the fees incurred in

connection with even a successful defense of the settle-

ment by either the plaintiff class or TWA. Thus, IFFA

asserts that it could have escaped section 706(k) liability

merely by deciding to file its own independent lawsuit,

ene which would not have identified the union’s interests

with those of TWA in the underlying litigation. Assum-

ing for the moment that a subsequent suit by IFFA

would not be barred as untimely,® the fact that such a

procedural loophole exists in Title VII’s statutory scheme

constitutes a flaw that must be addressed to Congress,

not to the federal courts. Cf. Kennedy v. Whitehurst,

690 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Arguments cen-

tering on the inequities caused by the absence of fee-

shifting are properly addressed to the Congress and not

to the courts.”). The settlement phase of this case pitted

the plaintiff class against intervening defendant IFFA;

that IFFA now regrets having chosen to proceed as an

intervenor does not relieve it from having to bear the fi-

nancial consequences of that decision.’®

* In Marino v. Ortiz, 108 S. Ct. 586 (1988), the Supreme Court, by

an equally divided panel, let stand a court of appeals decision

affirming a district court’s dismissal of a separate suit challenging

a consent decree brought by nonparties to the underlying Title VII

litigation. Failure by the nonparties to have joined the lawsuit

earlier as either co-defendants or intervenors rendered their subse-

quent action attacking the consent decree an “impermissible col-

lateral attack.” Marino v. Oritz, 866 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir.

1986). It therefore remains unclear whether a subsequent collateral

attack of a Title VII settlement by nonparties to the original law-

suit could be employed as a strategy by prospective intervenors to

escape statutory fee liability.

1°The dissent characterizes as “unjust” our decision to impose

fee liability upon IFFA, which admittedly was in no way responsi-

ble for TWA’s breach of Title VII. Moreover, the dissent asserts

that “[djenying fee awards against . . . intervenors will not signifi-

13a

Of even greater concern, however, is our belief that

were we to adopt the “functional plaintiff” approach ar-

ticulated in Reeves and advocated by IFFA, we might

very well encourage intervenors, and untimely defend-

ants, in Title VII lawsuits to manufacture constitution-

ally-derived or statutorily-based defenses in an attempt

to cloak themselves in the protective guise of functional

plaintiffs, in effect rendering them immune from statutory

fee liability except where their defenses are held to be

completely without merit. See Christianburg, 434 U.S. at

421. Congress has authorized attorneys’ fees awards in

employment discrimination cases as an inducement to

individuals—both lawyers and laymen alike—to bring

lawsuits as private attorneys general and thereby aid in

the enforcement of Title VII; acceptance by the courts of

a “functional plaintiff’ exception to Title vil fee lia-

bility could substantially undermine this crucial incen-

tive to ordinary citizens to enforce this Nation’s civil

rights laws in circumstances where the government sim-

ply cannot. We are not inclined to look favorably upon

such a potentially injurious exception to this long-standing

legislative scheme.

B. Special Circumstances

Despite the general rule that prevailing parties in Title

VII litigation are presumptively entitled to attorneys

fees, the Supreme Court has held that fees may be with-

held where certain narrowly defined “special circum-

stances” are present that would render an award of fees

unjust. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 415; Christian-

burg, 434 U.S. at 417. IFFA contends that two such

cantly diminish plaintiffs’ ability to attract counsel.” The instant

case, however, demonstrates the fallacy of the dissent's reasoning.

Absent the possibility of recovering their attorneys fees from

IFFA, the prevailing plaintiffs would likely have been hardpressed

to come up with sufficient funds to attract counsel willing to

defend their settlement before the district court, this court and,

finally, the Supreme Court.

l4a

“special circumstances” exist in the instant case. First,

as the exclusive bargaining representative of its mem-

bers, IFFA claims that it was obliged, under the judi-

cially implied duty of fair representation, to intervene

in the plaintiffs’ Title VII lawsuit in an effort to set

aside the parties’ settlement agreement, which adversely

affected the collectively-bargained for rights of its mem-

bers. Such compulsory participation, argues IFFA, surely

constitutes a special circumstance vitiating any liability

for Title VII fees. In addition, IFFA posits as a second

special circumstance the fact that the plaintiffs have al-

ready been awarded a generous and more than adequate

sum—in excess of $1,250,000—as attorneys’ fees in con-

nection with the pre-settlement phase of this litigation

and hence no further award of fees is necessary. We are

persuaded that neither asserted “special circumstances”

justifies withholding an award of fees to the plaintiffs

and their counsel.

Initially, IFFA is mistaken when it claims that the

duty of fair representation, first recognized by the Su-

preme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,

323 U.S. 192 (1944), required it to join this lawsuit to

contest the validity of the settlement agreement reached

between the plaintiffs and TWA. Steele, a case arising

under the Railway Labor Act, held that “when Congress

empowered unions to bargain exclusively for all employ-

ees in a particular bargaining unit, and thereby sub-

ordinated individual interests to the interests of the

unit as a whole, it imposed on unions a correlative duty

inseparable from the power of representation to exercise

that authority fairly.” International Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46 (1979). A

union must thus represent fairly the interests of all bar-

gaining-unit members during the negotiation, administra-

tion and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957). In particular,

a union breaches its duty of fair representation only

15a

“when [its] conduct toward a member of the collective

bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad

faith,” as, for example, when it “arbitrarily ignore[s] a

meritorious grievance or process[es] it in [a] perfunc-

tory fashion.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91

(1967) ; Foust, 442 U.S. at 47.

Notwithstanding IFFA’s assertions to the contrary,

the duty of fair representation does not and never has

been construed to guarantee that an employee or bar-

gaining unit has an absolute right to have a grievance

or other action brought on its behalf, see Vaca, 386 U.S.

at 191; Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Co.,

697 F.2d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1983); but see Richardson

v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1984) (im-

position of fee award against intervening union “would

only punish it for performing an act it was under a duty

to do”). In fact, in a conscious effort to minimize fed-

eral judicial intervention in labor disputes, unions have

consistently been accorded considerable discretion in de-

ciding whether and to what extent employee grievances

should be prosecuted. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,

345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953) (“A wide range of reason-

ableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining repre-

sentative in serving the unit it represents . . .”) ; see also

Rupe v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 679 F.2d 685,

691 (7th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Armsted Industries, Inc.,

656 F.2d 1245, 1250 (7th Cir. 1981); Peterson v. Ken-

nedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985); Hart v.

National Homes Corp., 668 F.2d 791, 794 n.4 (5th Cir.

1982): N.L.R.B. v. American Postal Workers Union, 618

F.2d 1249, 1255 (8th Cir. 1980). Rather than requiring

the initiation and pursuit of employee grievances by

labor unions, the duty of fair representation merely sets

forth standards to be adhered to by unions in determin-

ing not to prosecute or appeal grievances brought to them

by their members. See N.L.R.B. v. Local 139, Interna-

tional Union of Operating Engineers, 796 F.2d 985, 992-

16a

93 (7th Cir. 1986); United Independent Flight Officers

v. United Airlines, 756 F.2d 1274, 1281 (7th Cir. 1985).

IF FA was thus in no way compelled to intervene in this

lawsuit and, accordingly, its decision to so proceed does

not constitute a “special circumstance” abrogating its fee

liability under section 706(k).

IFFA’s second posited “special circumstance” also fails

to persuade us that the district court’s award of fees to

the plaintiffs was in any way inappropriate. The union

argues that because plaintiffs’ counsel received an “enor-

mous” fee for their work performed in connection with

the pre-settlement phase of this lawsuit, any additional

award of fees for counsel’s post-settlement legal work

constitutes a windfall. Not only are objections here to

the size of the district court’s pre-settlement fee award

belated, but that fee award is entirely irrelevant for pur-

poses of evaluating the district court’s post-settlement fee

award. While fee-shifting statutes are not designed “as

a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of

attorneys,” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3098 (1986), fee-shifting stat-

utes are designed to reimburse plaintiffs for reasonable

legal fees expended in certain types of lawsuits. IFFA

has pointed to no errors in the district court’s calculation

of the plaintiffs’ post-settlement fees (i.e., number of at-

torney hours claimed or hourly rates sought); its only

contention is that counsel were over-compensated by the

district court’s earlier award and thus any further award

amounts to an abuse of discretion. The post-settlement

proceedings in this case, directed at attacking the very

essence of this lawsuit’s successful and carefully crafted

resolution, have already consumed in excess of two years

of litigation and have included arguments before the dis-

trict court, this court and the Supreme Court; accord-

ingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

decision to reimburse the plaintiffs fully for the fees they

incurred during this important and procedurally separate

phase of litigation.

17a

~C. Enhancement of the “lodestar” figure

After calculating the lodestar sum to which counsel for

Sub Class B were entitled from IFFA, the district court,

employing a multiplier of 1.44, adjusted its fee award up-

ward by $37,984.65 to account for the delay in time be-

tween the filing of Sub Class B’s post-settlement fee peti-

tion in May 1982 and the date of the court’s actual fee

award in September 1986. We have noted on at least two

previous occasions that enhancement of a fee award to

compensate counsel for the time-value of money (another

way of saying delay in payment), while by no means

mandatory, is certainly within a district court’s discre-

tion. See Ohio Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776

F.2d 646, 660 (7th Cir. 1985); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal,

Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 770 n.6 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,

461 U.S. 956 (1983). Moreover, in Pennsylvania v. Dela-

ware Valley Citizens’ Council, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987),

decided after oral argument in this case and holding that

lodestar adjustments based upon the risk of nonpayment

are inappropriate, the Supreme Court observed, “[Wle

do not suggest, however, that adjustments for delay are

inconsistent with the typical fee-shifting statute.” Jd.

at 3082.

In the instant case, the district court, through indepen-

dent research, determined that a long-term Treasury

Note purchased at about the time of Sub Class B’s fee

petition would have yielded its purchaser approximately

714% per-year, representing a multipiier of 1.44. This

multiplier was, in turn, used to augment the district

court’s basic lodestar figure. Although a strong presump-

tion exists that at the time a fee petition is filed the lode-

star figure represents the “reasonable” fee to which sec-

tion 706(k) entitles prevailing parties, see e.g. Pennsyl-

vania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 106 S. Ct.

3088, 3098 (1986), the pasage of time and the economic

vicissitudes inherent therein are capable of eroding a fee

award to such an extent that, in real terms, it no longer

18a

represents a “reasonable” approximation of the vaiue of

the legal services intended to be compensated. It is for

this very reason that courts frequently award prejudg-

ment interest. Regardless of the method employed (use of

a multiplier or an award of prejudgment interest), an

equitable adjustment of the lodestar to offset a five year

delay in payment does not, in the circumstances presented

by this case, constitute an abuse of discretion." Delaware

Valley, 107 S. Ct. at 3082; cf. Michaels v. Michaels, 767

F.2d 1185, 1204 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he decision to

award prejudgment interest rates in the sound discretion

of the district court.”’), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057

(1986). Accordingly, the district court’s award of

$123,657.84 against IFFA for post-settlement fees is up-

held in its entirety.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold (i) that the district court acted properly in

holding IFFA liable for statutory attorneys’ fees under

section 706(k) of Title VII and (ii) that the district

court’s use of a multiplier to enhance Sub Class B’s fee

award did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED

MANION, Circuit Judge, dissenting. To protect its mem-

bers’ jobs, the IFFA intervened in this litigation and pre-

sented a substantial, good-faith challenge to the settle-

ment between plaintiffs and TWA. When the IFFA’s

challenge ultimately proved unsuccessful, the district

court awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs as “prevailing

parties” against the IFFA under the same standard ap-

11 But see Library of Congress v. Shaw, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986)

wherein the Supreme Court held that, as distinct from a private

defendant's liability for fees, the federal government's traditional

pet from an award of interest could not be circumvented by

enhancing a lodestar to compensate for a delay in ivi ay

ment. Jd. at 2965. Gaited ane

19a

plicable to defendants who have violated their employees’

civil rights. The majority upholds this award. I respect-

fully dissent.’

In Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412

(1978), the Supreme Court made clear that the standards

under which § 706(k) fees are awarded must be assessed

in light of the policies underlying that statute. Under

§ 706(k), a prevailing plaintiff is presumptively entitled

to fees from a defendant held liable on the merits unless

special circumstances would render awarding fees unjust.

Id. at 416-17. A prevailing defendant, however, is not

allowed to recover fees from a plaintiff uniess “the plain-

tiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-

dation... .” Jd. at 421. The reason for this distinction

is not contained in the statute’s express language. The

statute refers only to “prevailing parties.” The Supreme

Court, however, set forth three reasons for distinguishing

between defendants and plaintiffs. First, § 706(k) sought

to facilitate the enforcement of the civil rights laws

through “private attorneys general.” Id. at 416-18. Sec-

ond, granting prevailing defendants attorneys’ fees as a

matter of course would act as a significant disincentive

for plaintiffs to bring civil rights suits. Jd. at 421-22.

Third, “when a district court awards counsel fees to a

prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a viola-

tor of federal law.” Jd. at 418.

1 In Charles v. Daley, Nos. 86-1552 and 86-3137, slip op. (7th Cir.

May 5, 1988), this circuit recently held that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing

party” against intervening defendants who were not liable on the

merits of plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. I dissented in that

case on the ground that the plaintiffs could not be deemed to have

“prevailed” against defendants who were not liable to the plaintiffs

on the merits. Likewise, I believe that § 706(k) should not have

been applied in this case because plaintiffs did not obtain any relief

on the merits against the intervening union on their Title VII

claims. Because § 706(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 have the same opera-

tive language concerning prevailing parties, however, Charles re-

suires that plaintiffs be treated as prevailing parties against the

IFFA.

20a

In this case, the IFFA intervened to assert the federal

collective bargaining rights of the incumbent employees.

In addition, neither the IFFA nor the incumbent employ-

ees were in any way responsible for the “no-motherhood”

policy that spawned the underlying litigation and ultimate

settlement. In such a situation, the application of the

Christianburg Garment policies warrants treating the in-

tervenors as plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees purposes. See

Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481, 1484 (11th Cir. 1986),

cert. denied; 107-S.Ct. 880 (1987). As there is no dispute

that the IFFA presented a substantial, good-faith chal-

lenge to the settlement, the assessment of fees against it

was inappropriate. Moreover, regardless of how the

IFFA’s posture in this litigation is characterized, the cir-

cumstances of this case render the award of fees unjust.

In the settlement negotiations between plaintiffs and

TWA, neither side had a strong interest in protecting the

jobs of TWA’s incumbent employees. Plaintiffs obviously

had a strong interest in regaining their old jobs. TWA’s

primary interest was in settling the lawsuit. TWA was

going to have a full complement of flight attendants

whether they came from the plaintiffs’ or incumbent em-

ployees’ ranks. While the IFFA may not have had a legal

obligation to intervene, it certainly would have been

unusual for the IFFA to simply ignore a settlement that

substantially altered its contract with TWA and the job

security of its members. In fact, this circuit dismissed the

incumbent employees’ predecessor union as the plaintiffs’

class representative specifically because the union’s in-

terest in representing the collective bargaining rights of

the incumbent employees conflicted with its position as

class representative. See Air Line Stewards and Stew-

ardesses Ass’n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490

F.2d 636, 639-42 (7th Cir. 1973). The fact that the IFFA

did what its members elected it to do and this circuit ex-

pected it to do, that is, represent the interests of incum-

bent employees, is not something that should subject it

to Title VII attorneys’ fees.

2la

Moreover, the policy of encouraging “private attorneys

general” to enforce Title VII does not warrant imposing

fees against the IFFA. Section 706(k) seeks to encour-

age plaintiffs to bring suits against defendants who vio-

late federal law. This policy has attenuated, if any, rele-

vance to intervenors like the IFFA who did not violate

Title VII. In addition, denying fee awards against such

intervenors will not significantly diminish plaintiffs’ abil-

ity to attract counsel. This is aptly demonstrated in the

present case where plaintiffs’ counsel has already re-

ceived more than $1,250,000 from the $3,000,000 settle-

ment.

Rather than encouraging persons to act as “private

attorneys general,” the majority’s construction of

§ 706(k) will have quite the opposite effect. Title VII

lawsuits often affect many employees other than the

named plaintiffs. The settlement of a Title VII suit or

the granting of remedies by a court may leave some em-

ployees in a less desirable employment position or out

of a job altogether. Many of these affected employees

will have substantial claims that the settlement or rem-

edies violate their own rights under a collective bargain-

ing agreement, Title VII, or even the Constitution. The

just resolution of these cases requires the full participa-

tion of everyone involved. Mechanically assessing attor-

neys’ fees against intervening employees who did not

violate anybody’s rights and who are not fortunate

enough to posture themselves as “plaintiffs,” will ensure

that in many cases only two sides will be heard in a

multi-sided dispute.

I would reverse the district court’s award of attorneys’

fees.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

22a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

July 22, 1988

Before

HON. WALTER J. CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge

Hon. JOHN L. CoFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 86-2731

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

VS.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, et al.,

Defendants,

and

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,

Intervenor-A ppellant. —

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Western Division

No. 74 C 2063—Stanley J. Roszkowski, Judge

23a

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing in banc filed in the above-

entitled cause by appellant, a vote of the active members

of the Court was requested,* and a majority ** of the

active members of the Court have voted to deny a re-

hearing in banc. A majority of the judges on the orig-

inal panel have voted to deny the petition for rehearing.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the foresaid petition for rehear-

ing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

* Judge Ripple did not participate in the consideration of the

petition for rehearing in banc.

** Chief Judge Bauer, Judge Flaum, Judge Manion, and Judge

Kanne voted to grant rehearing in banc.

24a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

No. 70 C 2071

AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,

Loca. 500, TWU, AFL-CIO, et ai.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, et a/.,

Defendants.

No. 74 C 2063

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,

LocaL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO and

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the court are attorneys’ fee petition by counsel

for both Class A and B plaintiffs. Counsel for Class A

plaintiffs seek $57,288 in fees from the Independent Fed-

eration of Flight Attendants (“IFFA”). Counsel for

Class B plaintiffs seek $177,725 in fees’ from the IFFA

' Including $5,978 in out-of-pocket expenses.

25a

and $73,711.85 from defendant Trans World Airlines,

Inc. (“TWA”). For the reasons stated herein, Class A

plaintiffs’ fee petition is granted in its entirety. IFFA

is ordered to reimburse the settlement fund $57,258, the

amount of Class A attorneys’ fees. Class B plaintiffs’

petition for fees is denied as to TWA and granted as

to IFFA.

I. BACKGROUND

This extremely complex case was brought as a chal-

lenge to TWA’s practice of routinely discharging preg-

nant stewardesses.* Sex discrimination charges were filed

with the EEOC in June of 1970. The charges were filed

by several TWA stewardesses who had fallen victim to

TWA’s discriminatory practice and by their former col-

lective bargaining representative, the Air Line Stewards

and Stewardesses Association (“ALSSA’’). In August,

1970, after the EEOC proceedings were completed, this

action was filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seg.®

The case was brought as a class action on behalf of

(1) all stewardesses who had suffered a pregnancy-based

firing after July 2, 1965 (the effective date of Title

VII); and, (2) all then-employed stewardesses who might

become pregnant. The named plaintiffs were ALSSA

and the terminated stewardesses who had filed with the

EEOC. The complaint sought reinstatement, retroactive

seniority and backpay for those class members who had

been fired and an injunction against future pregnancy-

based firings for the then-employed stewardesses.

In October 1970, ALSSA entered into a collective bar-

gaining agreement with TWA that eliminated future

pregnancy-based discharges.

2 American Airlines, Inc. had a similar practice and was at one

time a defendant in this action. American’s involvement in this

case is irrelevant to the instant fee petition.

8 Consolidated Case Number 70 C 2071.

26a

In September of 1971, TWA and ALSSA reached an

agreement designed to settle this case. The agreement

provided that previously terminated stewardesses could

return to work as openings occurred. The agreement

abandoned the claims for retroactive seniority and back-

pay. Despite the objections of various class members,

Judge Perry approved this settlement agreement on

March 17, 1972. 7

The dissatisfied class members appealed entry of the

settlement order and on September 11, 1973, the Seventh

Circuit reversed the order. The Seventh Circuit re-

manded the case with instructions that “one or more of

the named plaintiffs or other members of the class... .

replace ALSSA as the representatives of the class.”

ALSSA v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 643

(7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).

TWA and ALSSA had entered into another agreement

during the pendency of the appeal. Under this agree-

ment, TWA would rehire all class members except those

who refused to relinquish their litigation rights, again

without backpay or retroactive seniority. This agree-

ment formed the basis for a second EEOC charge and

later a suit against TWA and ALSSA.*

Following remand, proper class representatives were

appointed and notice was sent to potential class mem-

bers. In September, 1974, TWA sought leave to amend

its answer to include a third affirmative defense. In this

affirmative defense, TWA asserted that the majority of

the class members’ claims were barred since they had

not filed charges with the EEOC within 90 days of their

discharge.© While granting the amendment, Judge Mc-

* Consolidated Case Number 74 C 2063.

5 At the time this case was filed, Title VII required charges to be

filed with the EEOC within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employ-

ment practice. In 1972, this period was extended to 180 days. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).

27a

Laren cautioned that TWA’s delay in pleading the de-

fense might well constitute a waiver.

On October 15, 1976, Judge McGarr denied TWA’s

motion to restrict the class to those stewardesses that had

filed with the EEOC within 90 days of their discharge.

While Judge McGarr agreed that the 90 day filing re-

quirement was a jurisdictional prerequisite not subject

to waiver, he held that any violation by TWA continued

against all class members until the challenged policy

was changed. Thus, the 90 day requirement was satis-

fied for all class members by the June 1970 EEOC

charges.

On October 19, 1976, Judge McGarr granted the plain-

tiff class’s motion for summary judgment as to liability.

At TWA’s request, both the liability order and the ear-

lier jurisdiction order were certified for immediate ap-

peal. The Seventh Circuit allowed interlocutory review

and subsequently affirmed the summary judgment as to

TWA’s Title VII liability. In re Consolidated Pretrial

Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1979). As to the

jurisdictional issue, however, the Seventh Circuit de-

clined “to extend the continuing violation theory .. . to

include in the plaintiff class those employees who were

permanently terminated more than 90 days before the

filing of EEOC charges.” Jd. at 1149. The Seventh Cir-

cuit’s ruling effectively barred the claims of approxi-

mately 92% of the plaintiff class. See Zipes v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 390 (1982).

The Seventh Circuit stayed its mandate pending the

filing of petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court.

A petition was in fact filed by the plaintiff class (No.

78-1545) and TWA cross-petitioned (No. 78-1549). The

Supreme Court granted motions to defer consideration

of the petitions, however, pending completion of settle-

ment negotiations in the district court. 442 U.S. 916

(1979).

28a

As a result of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling it was nec-

essary to divide the plaintiff class into two sub classes.

Class A plaintiffs were those stewardesses who had been

fired within 90 days of the original EEOC charges.

Class B consisted of those stewardesses who had been

fired prior to that time.

Plaintiffs and TWA continued settlement negotiations.

The proposed settlement agreement they eventually came

up with provided that TWA would pay $3 million for

pro rata distribution between the two plaintiff classes.

The agreement also provided each class member with

full retroactive company seniority. The agreement speci-

fied that competitive (union) seniority has to be decided

by the court.

Following submission of the proposed settlement to

this court, ALSSA’s successor union, the Independent

Federation of Flight Attendants (‘IFFA”), intervened

and objected to the grant of any seniority. IFFA chal-

lenged this court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate seniority.

Despite IFFA’s challenge, in October 1979, this court

approved the settlement agreement and granted full ret-

roactive competitive seniority.

IFFA appealed. In June of 1980, the Seventh Circuit

held that despite its earlier decision that the Class B

plaintiffs’ claims were jurisdictionally defective, this

court had jurisdiction to approve the settlement which

compromised on that issue. ALSSA v. Trans World Air-

lines, Inc., 630 F.2d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1980). The

Seventh Circuit also affirmed this court’s grant of full

retroactive union seniority. Id.

IFFA petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. On

March 9, 1981, the Supreme Court issued a writ of cer-

tiorari on IFFA’s petition (No. 80-951) and also on the

still-pending earlier petitions of the plaintiff class (No.

78-1545) (the class B jurisdictional issue) and TWA

(No. 78-1549) (the liability issue). See 450, U.S. 979

29a

(1981). TWA’s petition was shortly thereafter removed

from argument, see 451 U.S. 980 (1980), and was ulti-

mately dismissed as improvidently granted. 455 U.S. at

392 n. 5.

On February 24, 1982, the Supreme Court issued its

landmark decision in Zipes. The Court in Zipes reversed

the Seventh Circuit’s 1979 decision that the claims of the

Class B plaintiffs were barred. The Zipes Court held that

Title VII’s filing requirement was subject to waiver like

any other statute of limitations. 455 U.S. at 392-398.

The Court also found IFFA’s claims meritless. Jd. at

398-401.

II. DISCUSSION

The instant fee petitions were filed by counsel for both

Class A and Class B plaintiffs. Council for Class A plain-

tiffs seek an award against IFFA for those fees gener-

ated by IFFA’s intervention in this case. Counsel for

Class B seek fees both from IFFA for time spent defend-

ing IFFA’s attacks upon this court’s award of competi-

tive seniority and from TWA for one-half of the time

spent in the Supreme Court after certiorari was granted.

The petition against TWA will be discussed first.

A. FEES From TWA

Despite the arguments of counsel for Class B plaintiffs,

a review of plaintiffs’ 1979 settlement agreement with

TWA discloses that TWA’s liability for any attorney’s

fees was fully resolved by that settlement agreement. The

settlement agreement expressly excludes TWA from

liability for any future payments, including fees.

Section II of the settlement agreements sets forth the

purpose of the settlement:

“II, This Agreement is entered into between Trans

World Airlines, Ine. (hereinafter referred to as

‘TWA’) and the undersigned representatives of the

class for the purpose of compromising, settling and

30a

terminating all litigation of the lawsuits {including,

but not limited to, the petitions for writs of certio-

rari now pending in U.S. Supreme Court, dockets

numbers 78-1545 and 78-1549) and putting finally

to rest all of the claims, issues and questions of fact

and law which have or might have been raised on the

facts alleged in the pleadings.”

The petitions for certiorari were thus expressly addressed

by the settlement.

Section III A of the settlement agreement provides that

TWA would pay $3,000,000 to settle the case. One half of

this amount was to go to the members of each Class.

TWA’s liability for attorney’s fees was expressly in-

cluded within the $3,000,000:

After deduction therefrom of all amounts awarded

by the court for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, costs and

expenses of litigation, the net amount will be pro-

rated among the class members as provided in Sec-

tion IV hereof. TWA has no responsibility concern-

ing the calculations or allocations of the total amount

among the class members or for fees, costs and

expenses.

Thus, in paying the $3,000,000, TWA paid for all at-

torneys fees awardable against it in the litigation.

Plaintiffs point to the last sentence of Section III.A.

quoted above to argue that TWA was only absolved of

the responsibility of “calculating” or “allocating” the

total amount of attorneys’ fees, not the responsibility to

pay fees. Plaintiffs’ out of context emphasis on this one

sentence misinterprets the clear intent of Section III.A.

This section contemplated that all attorneys’ fees assess-

able against TWA would come from the $3,000,000. Since

the amount of fees was then unknewn, however, the sen-

tence referenced by plaintiffs merely provides that plain-

tiffs, rather than TWA, would be left with the task of

“calculating” and “allocating” fees.

3la

Section III.D. of the settlement agreement provides

that:

D. TWA will have no monetary or other obligation

to any member of the class or to any representative

or attorney for the class unless expressly provided

in this Agreement.

Plaintiffs read this provision as meaning that TWA is

liable for the Supreme Court attorneys fees absent an

express agreement to the contrary. Plaintiffs again mis-

read the clear language of the settlement agreement.

Plaintiffs argue that they could “hardly be deemed to

have anticipated that the litigation with TWA would

continue after the Settlement Agreement.” Both Sections

Il and X of the agreement however refer specifically to

the petitions for certiorari. Plaintiffs were also fully

aware of IFFAs objections to the settlement and must

have anticipated further contest from IFFA.

The underlying thrust of Class B plaintiffs’ attack

against TWA is that the attorney’s fees generated by the

necessity of fighting for the settlement in the Supreme

Court were caused by TWA’s litigation activities. As is

clear from this court’s May 6, 1982 order in this case,

however, the post-settlement litigation was solely the re-

sult of IFFA’s challenge to the settlement agreement.

As this court stated in the May 6 order at page 2:

When the terms of an agreement are plain and

clear, interpretation of that agreement is a matter

of law to be left to the court. [citations omitted].

The settlement agreement in this case clearly provides

that the portion of the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees recover-

able from TWA are to be paid only out of the $3,000,000

settlement. The settlement agreement is clear on this

point and this court is bound by that agreement. See

Sealy Mattress Co. of Michigan, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., 789

32a

F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1986) (consent decrees to be

construed strictly and “within its four corners’). Class

B plaintiffs’ have received over one and one quarter mil-

lion dollars in attorney’s fees from TWA under the agree-

ment. Class B plaintiffs’ petition for further fees from

TWA is therefore denied.

B. FEES From IFFA

1. Liability for Fees

IF FA’s principal argument against an award of fees

is that it was in essence a “plaintiff” in this case and

should therefore be subject to the fee standard set down

in Christianburg Garment Corp. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412

(1978). In Christianburg Garment the Supreme Court

held that when a prevailing Title VII defendant seeks fees

against a losing plaintiff, a more rigorous standard ap-

plies than when a prevailing plaintiff seeks fees. A pre-

vailing plaintiff is awarded fees almost automatically.

See Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 548 (7th

Cir. 1986). A prevailing defendant however is only

awarded fees if the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, un-

‘easonable, or groundless.” Christianburg Garment, 434

U.S. at 422.

As Class B plaintiffs point out, under Christianburg

Garment the court’s focus is on who is seeking fees not,

as the IFFA asserts, on who fees are sought against.

Plaintiffs are the “chosen instrument of Congress to

vindicate ‘a policy . . . of the highest priority’ ”, 434 U.S.

at 418, and Title VII’s fee provision was included to

“make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring

a meritorious suit.” Jd. at 421. See also Zabkowicz, 789

F.2d at 552. No such lofty policy considerations are

present when considering whether to award fees to a

prevailing defendant; fees are only available to Title VII

defendants to “deter the bringing of lawsuits without

foundation.” Chr stianburqg Garment, 434 U.S. at 420.

33a

The error in IFFA’s attempt at focusing this court’s

attention on its plaintiff-like posture in this case is thus

apparent. Fees are here sought by the prevailing plain-

tiffs. Fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs are encouraged

and nothing requires them to show that their opponent’s

position was “frivolous” or maintained in bad faith. See

Eichman v. Linden & Sons, Inc., 752 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir.

1985) ; Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1985).

IF FA without question opposed plaintiffs in this case.

Neither does IFFA’s assertion that intervenors enjoy

special immunity from Title VII fees find support in

case law. In Moten v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plaster-

ers, 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court awarded

fees against an “intervenor-union”® that had presented

objections to a Title VII settlement agreement. Based

on the union’s objections, the plaintiffs were compelled

to mount a defense “in order to maintain their hard won

settlement agreement.” Moten, 543 F.2d at 239. The

Moten court concluded that: “We think the liberal pur-

poses of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) are furthered by, and

provide authority for, an award against the [union].”

Id. The fee award in Moten was not, as IFFA suggests,

based on the frivolous of the union’s position. See also

Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979).

Similarly, in Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., 486

F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd sub nom., U.S. v.

Terminal Transport Co., 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 102 S. Ct. 1613 (1981) fees were awarded

against an intervenor-union even though the union was

not liable for the underlying Title VII discrimination:

(T]he unions have committed no actionable wrong

here.... However, fees are not being taxed against

the unions because the seniority perpetuated dis-

* The union had never formally presented a motion to intervene.

The resulting disruption to the ultimately upheld settlement was

the same as if the union had properly intervened.

34a

crimination, albeit innocently; rather, they partici-

patea substantially in opposing the legitimate de-

mands of the plaintiff class, so the unions should

share the costs to the class.

486 F. Supp. at 1202. After discussing Moten and Hay-

craft, the Allen court concluded that the unions were

liable for fees stating:

Notwithstanding the present arguments of the unions

to the contrary, the actions of the labor defendants

compelled the plaintiff class to defend its settlement

and intensify its effort for further relief.

The Fifth Circuit not only affirmed the fee award, but

remanded the case for assessment of additional costs and

fees associated with the union’s appeal. 653 F.2d at

1022.

While the cases in this area are not numerous they

are consistent. See Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503

F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974); Akron Center for Reproduc-

tive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D.

Ohio 19841; Thompson v. Sawyer, 586 F. Supp. 635

(D.D.C. 1984) (currently on appeal, D.C. Cir. 285-5264.

Cf. Robideau v. O’Brien, 525 F. Supp. 878 (E.D. Mich.

1981) (§ 1988). Unsuccessful Title VII union inter-

venors are, like unsuccessful Title VII defendants, con-

sistently held responsible for attorneys’ fees.

The only case which arguably support IFi 4’s position

focused on the union’s “good faith” in intervening and

thus misapprehended the nature of the inquiry that de-

termines a fee award against an intervenor-union. Se:

Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correction

Services, 525 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). It is note-

worthy that shortly after Kirkland, that same court

awarded fees against a union-intervenor in circumstances

nearly identical to this case. Vulcan Society of West-

chester County v. Fire Department, 533 F. Supp. 1054

(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The summary in Vulcan closely re-

35a

flects the facts underlying this case and persuasively

suggests the propriety of a fee award against IFFA:

[The union-intervenors] litigated vigorously in op-

position to many of plaintiffs’ objectives, and strug-

gled to prevent settlements the unions felt were

against their interests. Their efforts imposed sub-

stantial costs upen plaintiffs, and plaintiffs pre-

vailed over the unions’ opposition on most of the

issues involved, and particularly in obtaining settle

ments which the unions opposed.

533 F. Supp. at 1062. See also City of Akron, 604 F.

Supp. at 1273.

It is indisputable that both plaintiff classes in this

case prevailed. The case was hard fought and was

brought-during the infancy of Title VII. Due to the

continued efforts of plaintiffs’ attorneys, the classes won

in this court, in the Seventh Circuit, and finally in the

Supreme Court. Because of the IFFA’s intervention, the

plaintiff classes’ ultimate victory was delayed and came

at a greatly increased cost. This court considers it fair

and just that IFFA now reimburse plaintiffs for the

extra cost attributable only to their intervention.

2. Amount of Fees for Class B

Counsel for Class B plaintiffs have more than ade-

quately documented and justified the fee award that they

request. Their efforts on behalf of the plaintiff class were

of the highest caliber throughout and are further well-

reflected in their fee petition. Only a few comments are

necessary at this point to dispose of IFFA’s objections.’

7IFFA raises a handful of additional objections besides those

listed. For example, IFFA asserts that the fee provisions of the

Title VII apply only to “litigated judgments” rather than settle-

ment. This argument, as well as the others raised. are without

merit. See Lovell v. City of Kankakee, 783 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1986

36a

a. Fee multipliers are appropriate in this type of com-

plex and protracted Title VII action. See Bium v. Sten-

son, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel

Workers, 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974). Plain-

tiffs’ attorneys have cited countless other cases support-

ing this point. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in

Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Award Attorneys’ Fees

Against the Union at 16-17. No purpose is served by re-

citing those cases here.

b. This court can properly award fees for time spent

in this court as well as time spent on appeal. See Ekanem

v. The Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County,

Indiana, 778 F.2d 1254, 1257, (7th Cir. 1985).

ce. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to compensation

for-the work underlying preparation of the instant fee

dispute. Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d at 1231, 1235-36

(7th Cir. 1980).

d. Class B plaintiffs obtained the services of Attorney

Raymond Randolph to assist in preparing for arguments

in the Supreme Court. The duplication of effort caused

by hiring Mr. Randolph is only reflected in the approxi-

mately twenty-five hours of time he spent reviewing the

extensive history of this case. Mr. Randolph’s requested

time is reasonable and is fully compensable.

e. Plaintiffs’ counsel are entitled to reimbursement

for their out-of-pocket expenses. Zabkowicz, 78° F.2d at

553-54.

f. This court is not required to use different hourly

rates for different types (e.g. in-court versus out-of-

court) of work. Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629 (7th

Cir. 1985).

3. Amount of Fees for Class A

Counsel for Class A plaintiffs are entitled to a fee

award against the IFFA for the same reasons stated

above for the Class B attorneys. The Class A attorneys

37a

already have recovered the $57,258 in fees at issue from

the settlement fund. IFFA is thus ordered to reimburse

the fund in this amount.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the petition for attor-

neys’ fees against TWA is denied. The petitions of Class

A and Class B plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees against IFFA

are granted. Class B plaintiffs are awarded $171,747 in

fees and $5,978 in expenses. IFFA is to pay the $57,258

awarded to Class A plaintiffs into the settlement fund.

ENTER:

s/ Stanley J. Roszkowski

STANLEY J. ROSZKOWSKI

Judge

United States District Court

DATED: July 16, 1986

38a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

No. 70 C 2071

AIR LINE STEWARDS and STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,

LecaL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC..

Defendants.

No. 74 C 2063

ANNE B. ZIPES, et ai...

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

AIR LINE STEWARDS and STEW ARDESSES ASSOCIATION,

Ls CAL 550. TWL. AFL-CIO and

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES. INC..

esi vss

De Z nda i fs.

ORDER

t are motions by the attorneys for sub-

“plaintiffs” attorneys”) and the Inde-

{f Flight Attendants (the “Union” )

| the attorney’s fee awarded t plaintiffs’ -attor-

r the reasons stated herein, the award is

Plaintiffs’ attorneys are awarded $123,657.84

y's fees

39a

DISCUSSION

On July 16, 1986, this court gave plaintiffs’ attorneys

a “lodestar” attorney’s fee award of $85,873.50. Based

on the “high caliber” of legal work performed by these

attorneys on behalf of their clients, they were also

awarded a loadstar multiplier of two. Plaintiffs’ attor-

neys total attorney’s fee award was therefore $171,747.00.

Following entry of the July 16 order, the parties called

this court’s attention to the recent Supreme Court deci-

sion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Coun-

cil, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (198%). In Delaware Valley the

Court held that:

Because considerations concerning the quality of a

prevailing party’s council’s representation normally

are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate, the over-

all quality of performance ordinarily should not be

used to adjust the lodestar, thus removing the dam-

age of “double counting.”

106 S. Ct. at 3099. Based on this holding, the Union has

moved this court to amend the attorney’s fee award by

striking the multiplier.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys have also moved to amend the

attorney’s fee award based on Delaware Valley. Plain-

tiffs’ attorneys point out that Delaware Valley did not

totally preclude the use of fee multipliers. Specifically,

the Delaware Valley Court left open the question of

whether the contingent nature of a case could justify

awarding a fee multiplier. 106 S. Ct. at 3100. Accord-

ingly, plaintiffs’ attorneys request a multiplier based on

the contingent nature of this case. Alternatively, they

contend that the delay in receiving compensation man-

dates an upward adjustment of the fee award to reflect

the time value of money.

Whether prevailing attorneys can ever be awarded ad-

ditional compensation based on the contingent nature of

a case, such an award is inappropriate in this case.

40a

Plaintiffs’ attorneys were fully compensated for any con-

tingencies in the earlier $1-1/4 million fee award which

included a multiplier of two.

This court agrees, however, that plaintiffs’ attorneys

should be compensated for the time delay in payment. The

Seventh Circuit has recognized that an upward adjust-

ment to a fee award for this reason is permissible. Ohio-

Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776

F.2d 646, 660 (7th Cir. 1985) (fee award may compen-

sate attorneys for time value of money). This is espe-

cially true in cases like this one where none of the delay

in payment was caused by the attorneys seeking fees.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys suggests that the prime rate

should be used to adjust the attorney’s fees award. In

this court’s opinion, government treasury notes reflect a

more realistic rate of return.! Through independent re-

search, this court has discovered that a long-term trea-

sury note purchased approximately five years ago would

have given its purchaser an average return of approxi-

mately 7-1/2% to 8% per year. The more conservative

estimate of 7-1/2% would result in an attorney’s fee

multiplier of 1.44.* Plaintiffs’ attorneys are therefore

awarded $123,657.84 in attorney’s fees ($85,873.50 times

1.44).

ENTER:

‘s/ Stanley J. Roszkowski

STANLEY J. ROSZKOWSKI

Judge

United States District Court

DATED: Sept. 18, 1986

1 It 1s of course impossible to know how plaintiffs’ attorneys would

have in fact used the money.

* The formula for determining the applicable multiplier is (1 +r)"

where “r” equals the rate of interest and “n” equals the number of

years for which interest is sought. See Davidson. Stickney and

Weil, Financial Accounting, Appendix B (4th Ed. 1985). In this

case “r” is 0.075 and “n” is 5.

4la

AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR TEOLIS

(Filed in the District Court on July 15, 1982, as part

of Intervenor IFFA’s Appendix to Memorandum Briefs

In Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Request For An Award Of

Attorneys Fees And In Regard To Amount Of Attorneys

Fees Requested By Plaintiffs)

Arthur Teolis, being first duly sworn and upon his

oath, deposes and says:

1. I am, and since April 1, 1977, have been, President

of the Independent Federation of Flight Attendants

(IFFA), a labor organization certified by the National

Mediation Board as exclusive bargaining representative

of all Flight Attendants in the employ of Trans World

Airlines, Ine. (TWA).

2. The last date on which TWA hired Flight Attend-

ants was May 31, 1979.

3. Under the terms of Article 12 of the collective bar-

gaining agreement in effect between IFFA and TWA.

furlough (layoff due to reduction in force) and recall

from furlough are based on seniority (length of service)

with TWA.

4. On October 31, 1979, TWA furloughed one hundred

and sixty-seven (167) Flight Attendants. Since that

date, TWA has furloughed an additional four hundred

and twenty-two (422) Flight Attendants. None of these

five hundred and seventy-nine (579) furloughed Flight

Attendants have been recalled to employment with TWA.

Included in the number of Flight Attendants furloughed

and not recalled are Flight Attendants hired by TWA on

April 7, 1977.

5. Under Article 12 (F) of the IFFA-TWA collective

bargaining agreement, Flight Attendants on furlough

for three (3) years are removed from the seniority list

and lose their right to recall.

42a

6. On October 31, 1982, the one hundred and sixty-

seven (167) Flight Attendants furloughed on October 31,

1979 will, unless recalled prior thereto, be removed from

the seniority list and lose their right to recall.

7. IFFA has been advised by TWA that it does not

anticipate a recall of furloughed Flight Attendants prior

to October 31, 1982.

8. On dates subsequent to October 31, 1982, the re-

maining four hundred and twenty-two (422) furloughed

Flight Attendants will, unless recalled, lose their right

to recall upon three years subsequent to their respective

furlough dates.

/s/ Arthur Teolis

ARTHUR TEOLIS

Subseribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of July,

1982.

/s/ Felice Wetter

FELICE WETTER

43a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

HONORABLE STANLEY J. ROSZKOWSKI, Presidi ng Judge

Cause Nos. 70C 2071 and 74C 2063

AIR LINE STEWARDS

VS.

TWA

June 13, 1982

ORDER

It is ordered that the defendant TWA shall pay from

Subclass A’s portion of the settlement fund the following

amounts:

1. The amount of $89,362 shall be paid to Kevin

M. Forde for attorney fees.

bo

The amount of $25,155 shall be paid to Ann C.

O’Laughlin as attorney fees.

3. The amount of $1,613.44 to Kevin M. Forde as

reimbursement of expenses.

44a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

No. 70 C 2071

AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,

LocaL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO, et ai.,

Plaintiffs,

—vs—

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 74 C 2063

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Plaintiffs.

—Vs-—

AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION,

LocaL 550, TWU, AFL-CIO and

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendants.

ORDER RELATING TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES

AND EXPENSES FROM THE SETTLEMENT FUND

This Court has considered the joint petition of Press-

man & Hartunian and Arnold I. Shure, Professional Cor-

poration, for award of attorneys’ fees and reimburse-

ment of expenses out of the settlement fund. This Court

conducted a hearing on June 15, 1982 pursuant to notice

to all parties and class members and no class member or

any other person has objected to the petition.

45a

—. - The Court finds that Petitioners’ statements of hours,

hourly rates and expenses are reasonable and the Court

accepts them as being correct.

The Court further finds that this litigation was pro-

tracted, burdensome and fraught with contingent risks

to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. The quality of the legal serv-

ices has been excellent and long delay has occurred with-

out compensation. These factors justify the multiple (2

times hourly rates) which the Petitioners seek.

This Court finds that these Petitioners are entitled to

attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses from the

settlement fund, as follows:

Attorneys Fees: $1,250,000

Expenses: 24,330

Accordingly, it is ordered that Defendant Trans World

Airlines pay to Pressman & Hartunian and Arnold I.

Shure, Professional Corporation, the total sum of $1,274,-

330 for attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses,

in the following manner: within 30 days after trans-

mission to TWA of the data called for in Part IV of the

Settlement Agreement, said sum shall be deposited into

an escrow. The terms of the escrow shall require pay-

ment to Pressman & Hartunian forty-five (45) days af-

ter the date called for in Part IV of the Settlement

Agreement if no timely notice of appeal from this order

is filed, for distribution by Pressman & Hartunian pur-

suant to their agreements with Messrs. Shure and Ran-

dolph. Income earned during the escrow shall belong to

Petitioners. If the parties are unable to agree on either

the choice of an escrowee or the other terms of the es-

crow, this Court will resolve the dispute on motion and

due notice.

This order relates only to attorneys’ fees and expenses

from the settlement fund. The proceedings on the claims

OO

46a 47a

tor attorneys’ fees against Trans World Airlines and the ; . (Caption—Nos. 70 C 2069, 70 C 2071) . .

Union will continue as previously scheduled. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Trans World Airlines shall make the distributions to

the class members as and when required under Part IV (Entered November 20, 1974)

of the Settlement Agreement. These actions are class action Title VII equal employ-

This order is a final judgment to be entered forthwith ment sex discrimination Cases challenging the practice

under Rule 54, F.R.C.P. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), of Trans World Airlines and American Airlines of ter-

F.R.C.P., this Court finds that there is no just reason minating the employment of pregnant stewardesses. The

for delay. cases are now before the Court on defendants’ motions

; ENTER: to amend their answers to include the affirmative defense

of the statute of limitations.’ Plaintiffs oppose these mo-

/s/ Stanley J. Roszkowski tions, asserting that (1) defendants have been guilty of

STANLEY J. RoSzKowskKI unreasonable delay in asserting this defense, and (2)

Judge justice does not require defendants’ being granted leave

to amend because it would be unduly prejudicial to plain-

AGREED AS TO FORM: tiffs.

The following facts are relevant to disposition of these

s/ Laurence A. Carton motions:

Coon a ee The complaints were filed on August 18, 1970, and de-

fendants’ answers were submitted to the Court on Sep-

tember 30, 1970.2 There were no further proceedings in

Court until July 16, 1971, when a settlement agreement

— was filed. But in the interim the airlines and the union

ARNOLD I. SHURE

' Aram A. Hartunian

ARAM A. HARTUNIAN

na

sf

1 The statute of limitations for Title VII actions is contained in

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5e. At the time these actions were filed, the

Date: June 17, 1982 statute provided that to sustain an action under Title VII a charge

must have been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission within 90 days after the alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred. The time limit was increased to 180 days by the

amendment of March 24, 1972 (P.L. 92-261, § 4).

* Defendants’ answers contained two other affirmative defenses:

first, that defendants’ conduct was based upon a continuing policy

which was a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-

sary to the normal operation’ of defendant’s business within the

meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(e),” and the second, that the policy

is “pursuant to a ‘system which measures earnings by quantity and

qualify or production’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(h).”

48a

amended their labor agreements to eliminate pregnancy

as a ground for termination, and negotiated the settle-

ment agreement. The hearing on that agreement began

on March 10, 1972; the intervening delays was caused

by the effort of the EEOC to intervene, including its

appeal to the Seventh Circuit. On April 11, 1972, sev-

eral plaintiffs filed their notices of appeal from the order

approving the settlement agreement. Their appellants’

brief was not filed until February 5, 1973. The Seventh

Circuit decision reversing the order approving settlement

was issued on December 23, 1973,° the Supreme Court

denied a writ of certiorari on May 13, 1974. The case

was assigned to this Court on July 11, 1974. TWA and

American then filed their motions to amend the answers

on September 11, 1974, the date set by the Court for a

status report.

F. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall

be freely given when justice so requires.””’ The Supreme

Court in Farman vy. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)

held that this mandate is to be heeded, stating:

“In the absence of any apparent or declared rea-

son—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory mo-

tive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to

cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed,

undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment,

etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require,

be ‘freely given.’ ”

In the instant actions, plaintiffs could be unduly prej-

udiced by amendment. The absence of the defense of

3In Air Line Stew. & S. Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines,

490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), the court of Appeals reversed the

settlement order previously entared in these actions. The court held

that the Union could not act as representative of the individual

stewardesses terminated because of conflict of interest in the Union

over such matters as seniority. Moreover, the court determined that

these actions should proceed as R. F. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) class actions

instead of F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) class actions.

49a

limitations could have been considered by the present

plaintiffs when they rejected the union-airlines settlement

agreement and appealed the orders approving settlement

to the Seventh Circuit. At that time plaintiffs could rea-

sonably believe that the pleadings were completed espe-

cially considering the class allegations contained in these

actions. Notice of the proposed settlement to members

of the classes invited “any interested person.or attorney”

to inspect “all pleadings and other documents in the ac-

tion.” None of the documents apparently contained any

notice of the statute of limitations defense although the

Union’s attorney did mention the possibility of the de-

fense during oral hearings on the settlement agreement.

Plaintiffs also argue that even if undue prejudice can-

not be shown, defendants should not be allowed to amend

because they have been guilty of undue delay in asserting

the limitations defense. Defendants justify their delay

in filing the defense on three grounds: (1) legal uncer-

tainty about availability of the defense; (2) active par-

ticipation in the aborted settlement negotiations and (3)

no district court judge had jurisdiction over the actions

while the various appeals were pending.

Defendants assert that when the complainants were

filed in 1970, there had been few decisions construing the

limitations problems inherent in Title VII class actions.

It is important to note, however, that defendants do not

claim that the limitations language of the statute was

ambiguous, nor do defendants assert that there were no

cases to rely on for guidance. In fact, defendants cite a

1969 case, Burney v. North American Rockwell, 302 F.

Supp. 86 (C. D. Cal. 1969), to support their substantive

point that the Title VII statute of limitations affects

unnamed class plaintiffs as well as named or individual

plaintiffs.

Moreover, defendants make no showing how these pro-

ceedings could have prevented them from making a mo-

50a

tion to the Court to amend their answers, particularly

when defendants original answers contained two other

affirmative defenses. Additionally, the existence of this

defense, properly plead, should have been a factor in

defendants’ posture during this stage of the litigation.

That defendants failed to fully investigate the legal

status of plaintiffs’ claims at that time only demonstrates

that defendants may not have completely prepared dur-

ing settlement negotiations, not that the negotiations

themselves prevented defendants from presenting their

legal arguments to the Court.

Defendants’ third argument that the pending appeals

prevented them from amending also seems inequitous.

While it is true that for substantial periods since filing

in 1970 no district court judge had jurisdiction over

these cases, defendants do not satisfactorily explain why

when the district court did have jurisdiction (from filing

in 1970 to April 1972), they made no motion to amend.

Defendants’ delay in pleading the defense of limita-

tions may well ultimately constitute a waiver of the de-

fense; at this juncture, however, the Court is not con-

vinced to a legal certainty that pleading of the defense

shall not be allowed. Under the liberal pleading rules

contained in Rule 15, defendants should be entitled to

prove through discovery techniques or otherwise that the

plaintiffs suffered no prejudice or that the delay in

amendment was excusable. Defendants’ motion to amend

their answers is granted.‘

IT Is SO ORDERED.

Entered:

/s/ R. W. McLaren

United States District Judge

Dated: November 18, 1974.

* Of course, this disposition of defendants’ motions is not in-

tended to express any ultimate views on the waiver or laches issues

or the substantive applicability of the 180 day statute of limitations.

5la

Section 706(k) of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k)

Attorney’s fee; liability of Commission

and United States for costs

(k) In any action or proceeding under this subchapter

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the Commission or the United States,

a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the

Commission and the United States shall be liable for

costs the same as a private person.

52a

42 U.S.C. § 1988

Proceedings in vindication of civil rights; attorney’s fees

The jurisdiction in civil and crimnal matters conferred

on the district courts by the provisions of this Title, and

of Title “CIVIL RIGHTS,” and of Title “CRIMES,” for

the protection of all persons in the United States in their

civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised

and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United

States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same

into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted

to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary

to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against

law, the common law, as modified and changed by the con-

stitution and statutes of the State wherein the court hay-

ing jurisdiction of such civil or criminal] cause is held, so

far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution

and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and

govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the

cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction

of punishment on the party found guilty. In any action

or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,

1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public

Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-

ney’s fee as part of the costs. *

53a

EXCERPT FROM THE JUNE 18, 1979

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN

PLAINTIFFS AND TWA

XIII. EXCLUSIVITY

Nothing contained in any other agreement or writing

and no right or obligation which has arisen or accrued

outside of this Settlement Agreement (including prior,

current and future labor agreements) shall be deemed to

modify, change or diminish the rights and obligations

which arise under this Agreement.

OPPOSITION

BRIEF |

Supreme Court of the United States

@ctoher Term, 1988

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,

Petitioner,

v.

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AraM A. HARTUNIAN

(Counsel of Record)

RosBert M. WEISSBOURD

Puy.uis L. CROCKER

HARTUNIAN, FUTTERMAN

& Howarp, CHTD.

122 South Michigan Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 427-3600

Attorneys for Respondents

ANNE B. Zires, et al.

American Reprographics Management, Inc.™ (312) 332-ARMI (800-999-6239)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

pr Uh gf ty) li

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD NOT BE

ena tad ink the didevedincersueedededs l

ee cet ecbeniedaseseces. l

I. THERE ARE NO CONFLICTS WITHIN THE

CIRCUITS THAT ARE RELEVANT TO THIS

A. Since The Union Was Not A “Functional

Plaintiff’, The Outcome Would Have

Been The Same In The Eleventh And D.C.

a Re i cdeedbesdcceccs 2

B. The Result Would Have Been The Same

In The Second And Third Circuits ............ 4

C. The Ninth Circuit Is Not In Conflict With

EE ee 6

Il. THE FEE AWARD WAS WELL WITHIN THE

DISCRETION OF THE COURTS BELOW ....... 6

NN ee cceehuad bud oaweseseus 7

APPENDIX:

Excerpt from Petition For Award of At-

torneys’ Fees And Reimbursement of

SE oso ol uch eae taba eked tess la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Association v.

American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973) ..... 5

Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc.,

TES FCT, fe 3 eee 4

Charlies v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir., 1988) ....... 4

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.0O.C.,

434 UD. 428 COGTED .. «00s cancévdesesueeeeeel 2, 6, 7

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,

434 US. 767, TO6-TEB CAG GED oo ckcccscanusceeseeeee 6

Grano v. Berry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ........ 4

Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986)

cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987) ................... 3

Richardson v. Alaska Airlines,

yr DA © f ft) eee. 6

Turnstall v. Office of Judicial Support [etc.,]

- Pe T iTislege 3 | eee 4

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385

1. ere 3,6

Statute

Tithe VEL, FOB GD... oc cccvceccesssenseus eee passim

No. 88-608

Jn The

Supreme Court of the United States

@ctober Term, 1988

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,

Petitioner,

v.

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD

NOT BE GRANTED

Summary Of Argument

Since the Union did not assert Title VII rights or

Constitutional rights, there is no conflict within the

circuits that is relevant to this case.

All of the Circuits deem innocence of a federal

violation to be an insufficient reason to deny an award

of attorneys’ fees where an intervenor chose to and

became the prevailing plaintiffs principal protagonist,

as was the case here.

2

Since the Plaintiffs prevailed against the Union on

the questions of liability, jurisdiction, and seniority relief,

and the Union did not demonstrate any unusual circum-

stances, Plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorneys’

fees within the discretion of the district court.

I. THERE ARE NO CONFLICTS WITHIN

THE CIRCUITS THAT ARE RELEVANT

TO THIS CASE

A. Since The Union Was Not A “Func-

tional Plaintiff, The Outcome Would

Have Been The Same [In The Elev-

enth And D.C. Circuits

In Section 706(k) of Title VII, Congress carved out

an exception to the “American Rule” by leaving it to

the court’s discretion whether to award attorneys’ fees

to the prevailing party. In Christiansburg Garment Co.

v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412 (1978), this Court established

the standard for exercising that discretion: a prevailing

plaintiff will ordinarily be awarded attorneys’ fees, but

a losing plaintiff will be required to pay the defendant’s

attorneys’ fees only when the plaintiff's case is frivolous,

unreasonable or without foundation. 434 U.S. at 422.

Christiansburg thus arms Title VII plaintiffs with

both a sword and a shield. Both are keyed to the plaintiffs

acting as Congress’ chosen instrument for enforcing Title

VII. 434 U.S. at 419. The almost automatic recovery of

fees to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs enhances the

prospects of their obtaining competent counsel. The

almost automatic immunity from being required to pay

the attorneys’ fees of successful defendants serves the

same underlying purpose.

The doctrine of Christiansburg might logically be

expanded to protect not only those parties who are Title

VII plaintiffs but also those parties who, acting like

3

Plaintiffs, assert their own Title VII rights. However,

wearing the mantle of a “functional plaintiff’ means

more than merely being a party who asserts a right. A

losing plaintiff is spared the attorneys’ fees of a winning

defendant not simply because he is a plaintiff; it is

because he is a plaintiff who asserts Title VII rights,

thereby acting as Congress’ chosen instrument for the

enforcement of Title VII.

In resisting the Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain seniority

relief, the Union asserted rights, but not Title VIJ rights,

as is clearly shown in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

455 U.S. 385 (1982), the case in which the Union opposed

Plaintiffs. The Union argued that the court lacked

jurisdiction to implement the settlement agreement, 455

U.S. at 393, and that seniority relief could not be granted

to Plaintiffs in the absence of either: 1) a finding of

discrimination with respect to the members of Subclass

B, 455 U.S. at 399, or 2) a finding that the Union itself

had been guilty of discrimination.! 455 U.S. at 400.

The extent to which the Seventh Circuit disagreed

with the “functional plaintiff’ analysis of the Eleventh

Circuit in Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986),

cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987) is thus irrelevant to this

case. Since the Union did not assert Title VII rights, even

the Eleventh Circuit would have imposed the Plaintiffs’

attorneys’ fees upon the Union. Put another way, even

if the Seventh Circuit agreed completely with the Elev-

enth Circuit, it would have awarded the Plaintiffs’

1 Tronically, the Union here makes the same argument against

liability for the prevailing Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees that the

Union advanced in Zipes against the Plaintiffs obtaining

seniority relief. In Zipes, this Court found “meritless” the

Union’s contention that relief was not forthcoming to the

Plaintiffs because the Union had not been guilty of wrong-

doing. 455 U.S. at 400.

4

attorneys’ fees against the union.

Similarly, there is no relevant conflict between the

Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits. In Grano v.

Berry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the lower court’s

denial of fees against the intervenor was affirmed because

of the special circumstance of the intervenor’s assertion

of Constitutional rights. 783 F.2d at 1112. Here, the Union

did not assert any Constitutional rights.

If a case is presented in which both the winner and

the loser assert either Title VII or Constitutional rights,

the losing party against whom attorneys’ fees are

awarded would arguably have standing to seek resolution

of the “conflicts” promenaded in Petitioner’s brief. This

is not such a case.

B. The Result Would Have Been The

Same In The Second And Third

Circuits

In Turnstall v. Office of Judicial Support [etc.], 820

F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Annunziato v. The Gan,

Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1984), fees were denied to

prevailing plaintiffs against parties who were named as

nominal defendants in order to secure complete relief.

As stated in The Gan, the third party against whom fees

were sought was “caught in a cross-fire between plaintiffs

and [the principal defendants)’. 744 F.2d at 253. In these

respects there is no conflict because nothing in the

opinion below indicates that the Seventh Circuit would

have ruled differently in that situation.

2 The distinction was aptly voted by the Seventh Circuit in

Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1065 (n. 11) (7th Cir. 1988),

where “the intervenors voluntarily thrust themselves into the

lawsuit and... tenaciously engaged the plaintiffs in a

protracted and costly court battle. ...”.

5

Here, the Union opposed the Plaintiff class (Resp.

App., 12a) in every way. The Union not only resisted

the restoration of competitive seniority, but by its own

choice fought the Plaintiffs all over again on the principal

issue of the liability phase of the case. The Union’s chosen

stance in this case does not faintly resemble an innocent

party caught in a cross-fire between the principal adver-

saries. In fact, during the period covered by the fees issue

(1979-1982), the Union was the Plaintiff class’s only

adversary.

At the inception of this case in 1970, the Union

(actually the predecessor union, then representing the

same incumbent union members) posed as the represen-

tative of the class members and attempted to give away

their rights in a proposed settlement that would have

pleased only TWA and the Union. That settlement

agreement was disapproved and the Union was ejected

as the representative of the class. See Air Line Stewards

& Stewardesses Association v. American Airlines, 490

F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973). The union was not heard from

again until 6 years later, when the class finally received

meaningful relief in a second settlement agreement. In

that settlement, TWA gave up its argument that the late

EEOC filings of some of the class members (“Sub Class

B’’) deprived the court of jurisdiction. When the Union

intervened in 1979, it promptly picked up the cudgel which

TWA had dropped, and argued that the entire settlement

agreement was unenforceable for want of jurisdiction.

In doing so, the Union became the class’ adversary to

the same extent that TWA had been up to that time.’

Had the Union been successful, the class would have

received nothing — no monetary relief, no right to return

3 As pointed out by the Seventh Circuit, “The settlement phase

of this case pitted the plaintiff class against intervening

defendant IFFA”’. (Resp. App., 12a)

6

to work, no company seniority, and no competitive

seniority. With TWA cheering from the sidelines, the

Union took the case all the way to this Court, where

the class finally prevailed. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

455 U.S. 385 (1982).

C. The Ninth Circuit Is Not In Conflict

With The Seventh Circuit

In Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763 (9th

Cir. 1984), fees were denied not because the intervenor

union was innocent of violating federal law, but because

29 U.S.C. 626(b) provides for attorneys’ fees only against

an offending “employer’’. (See Resp. App. 82, fn. 5). Also,

Richardson is not contra the Seventh Circuit on the

question whether an attorneys’ fees award should be

imposed on a party who had an obligation to intervene

and fight the case. The union simply had no such

obligation here. (See Resp. App. 14a-16a).

II. THE FEE AWARD WAS WELL WITHIN THE

DISCRETION OF THE COURTS BELOW

The policy considerations underlying 706(k) militate

strongly against exempting unions from liability for

attorneys’ fees incurred by Title VII plaintiffs at the relief

stage. The fees provision was included to make it easier

for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious

suit. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. Rightful place

seniority is an integral part of the remedy. Franks v.

Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-766 (1976).

Every Title VII plaintiff ought to know that even after

proving discrimination, meaningful relief will not be

forthcoming without militant opposition from the incum-

bent employees, usually headed up by a well heeled union.

After 9 years of legal combat with TWA, the class

7

members spent 32 more years litigating with the Union.‘

The uniqueness of these facts rendered this case

tailor-made for the exercise of discretion under the

dictates of Christianburg, and for the same reason,

inappropriate for review by this Court.

CONCLUSION

If there are any conflicts between the circuits, this

case does not present the issues which relate to the

conflicts. Granting certiorari could serve no purpose other

than to review the district court’s exercise of discretion.

AraM A. HarRTUNIAN

(Counsel of Record)

Rosert M. WE!IssBouURD

Puy.uis L. CROCKER

HARTUNIAN, FUTTERMAN

& Howarp, CHTD.

122 South Michigan Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60603

(312) 427-3600

Attorneys for Respondents

ANNE B. ZiPes, et al.

4 In the 3% years of satisfying the Union’s thirst for litigation,

the Plaintiffs’ lawyers put in 942.2 hours. (Resp. App., pp. 1)

Getting paid for those 3% years has (so far) taken another

6 years.

APPENDIX

(Excerpt from Petition For

Award Of Attorney’s Fees And

Reimbursement of Expenses)

la

B. From The Union

Petitioners defended the class members against the

Union’s attacks upon this Court’s award of competitive

seniority, first in the this Court, then in the Union’s

appeal to the Seventh Circuit, and finally in the Supreme

Court where this Court’s seniority Order was affirmed.

In the following table, the Union is charged with all of

the time spent in this Court on the retroactive-seniority

dispute, all of the time spent in the Union’s appeal to

the Seventh Circuit and the Union’s petition for certiorari,

and one-half of the 473.2 hours spent in the Supreme

Court. (The other one-half is attributed to TWA).

For these hours, Petitioners request a multiple of 2

times billing rates, resulting in fees from the Union in

the amount of $172,107 plus $5,978.39 in expenses.

FEES VS. THE UNION (AT MULTIPLE OF 2)

Hours Billing Rate Am’treq’d

Aram A. Hartunian 322.75 160 103,280

A.R. Randolph 149.60 150 44,880

Mr. Randolph’s

Associates 21.5 100 4,300

Joel M. Hellman 15.75 90 2,835

Ronald Futterman 8.75 125 2,187

Arnold Shure 48.75 150 14,625

Total fees vs. the Union $172,107

Expenses:

District Court: $1,233.47

Court of Appeals: 1,015.07

Supreme Court (One-half of total) 3,729.85

Total expenses chargeable to union $5,978.39

(See detail at App. pp.2-3)

Total fees and costs vs. the Union $178,085.39

Supreme Court, U.S. _

FILED

3, NOV 16 1988

No. 88-608 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,

Petitioner,

ANNE B. ZIPES, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

STEVEN A. FEHR

(Counsel of Record)

WILLIAM A. JOLLEY

JOLLEY, WALSH, HAGER & GORDON

204 West Linwood Boulevard

Kansas City, Missouri 64111

(816) 561-3755

Attorneys for Petitioner

Independent Federation

of Fliaht Attendants

8861 9T AON @® Er, ¢0

QGQatig

SN ‘uno swaidng

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

a eieneiceliotnnns 1

RITES LN ee ae a NS 3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Annunziato v. The Gan, Inc., 744 F.2d 244 (2nd

I ae aaiseieninaadiuunionne 2,3

Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988) ...... 2

Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1986) .... 2

Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986),

cert. denied, —— U.S. ——, 107 S.Ct. 880

a a edaisinanhinnes 1,2

Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763 (9th

es HITED sniecesebinsatincstinndseninidsestsnentsseniensidanindsdinentiesiodittnntemnes 2

Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631

I a ciseicammnannts 2,3

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) ............ EE ee eo 3

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

AED i RSS SORRY OT Re SS DA 2

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. ............. 2

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-608

INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS,

Pet

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Record and brief — Flight Attendants v. Zipes · 491 U.S. 754 | Frix