Amicus Curiae Brief — Miller v. Florida

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No. 86-5344

in The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1986

James Ernest Miller,

Petitioner,

State of Florida,

Respondent

——- <>

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Florida

Alvin Bronstein Gerald D. Stern

David B. Goldstein (Counsel of Record

Counsel for ACLA Steven E. Landers

335 W. 43rd Street Ann J. Holtwick

New York, New York Philip R. White

10036 Paul. Weiss, Rifkind

(212) 944-9800 Wharton & Uarrison

1285 Avenue of the

Michelle Ivy Americas

Counsel for ACL New York, New York

of Florida 10019

225 N.I 34th Street (212) 373-30

Miami, Florida

33054

(305) §76-2336

No. 86-5344

JAMES ERNEST

Respondent.

of Certiorari to the Supreme

Court of Florida

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF

AMICI CURIAE, THE AMERICAN CIVII

LIBERTIES UNION AND THE AMERICAN

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF FLORIDA,

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

af . — oo , 7 _

The American Civil Liber

("ACLU"™ ana the Americ

tt)

cr?

{)

‘

7 7? % .

Liberties Union of Florida

hae

—_

”

—

ier

ly move for leave to file

brief amici curiae. The

has consented to the

this brief; the respondent

is a nationwide,

mn organization of more than

rsons dedicated to preserv-

Stecting the civil rights

liberties guaranteed by

;

}

ie)

worked to defend basic

onal rights of all persons,

the rights of those accuse

filed briefs as counsel for a party

or as amicus curiae in many cases

involving the constitutional rights

of those accused and convicted of

crimes. Accordingly, we move to fil

this brief amici curiae to bring that

experience to bear on the important

questions presented by this case.

Respectfully submitted,

r _S Jfem—

GERALD D. STERN

Counsel of Record

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10019

(212) 373-300C

. a. & -a« ie;

January lj, LiZvo i

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ......

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....cscscccces

The Use of Amended Guide-

lines To Sentence an

{fender for Crimes

Committed Prior to Their

Effective Date Violates

the Ex Post Facto Clause

of the Constitution .........

TFL 7.T cer TF TO}

_ NCLUSION *eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S

167 (1925) ceseevesseeeeeeeees 17, 1Y¥, 24

Bowdoin v. State, 464 So.2d

596 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1985) wcceeseeeseeeseeessseens be

Calder v. Bull, 2 U.S.

385 (1790) wawweveeeeeeeeneees LE

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S.

282 (1977) wes eeveeeeeeeeseens passim

Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S.

377 (1894) ceceeeeseseseeesees 24

Gibson v. Mississippi, 162

U.S. 565 (1896) ceeceevveevees 24

Hendrix v. State, 475 So. 2d

1218 (Fla. 1985) weeeesesveces 8

opt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574

(1BB4) ..ccccccceececeseeeeeces

In re Medley, 134 U.S. l€

*ee<e#eeee#ee#.°5feee#e#e#ee#e+f°fee#ee#e#e##s#e# *

ee © @e#eeee*ee#e#e#e#*#e#e#e®

SS...

Mallet v. North Carolina,

181 U.S. 589 (1901) wee eaaes 24

Malloy v. South Carolina,

237 U.S. 180 (1915) ...cseeees 24

Miller v. State, 468 So. 2d

1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

A9GS) cccoccses TRELELELELIELIELTE 12

Mitchell v. State, 458 So.2d

10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

TEED eueseeeeeseecesesecoces 7

State v. Bentley, 475 So. 2d

255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

BPOOD SCeeeeeeseeeseeseeseeeseser ~

State v. Caride, 473 So. 2d

1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

Bn eesesseocceneseseoeeeeses -

State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d

G54 (FSG. 29GB) ccocceccecececs 18, 30

State v. Miller, 488 So. 2d

SSe CFSRe SOOO) covecocecececs 12, 18

Thomas v. State, 461 So.2d

234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

TAUOSG) coececcocceceeeeeeeeees 8

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24

(1981) ccccccccesccsesecseccees passim

Federal and State Con tutional

and Statutory Provisio

U.S. Constitution Article I

Section 10 ccccceeseeseccesecs 1]

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.082(C)

(WeSt 1985) ..cceeeeseeneceees 27

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.001

(WeSt 1985) wceeeessvsscscceces

Fla. R. Crim. ! ; L see eceees passim

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.988 «w«weeeeces passim

In re Rules of Criminal

Procedure (Sentencing

Guidelines), 439 So. 2d

848 (Fla 1983) sceccccessesess

The Florida Bar Amendment to

Rules of Criminal Procedure

(Sentencing Guidelines), 451

SO 2g 824 (Fla. 1984) «.e«««es

mp, Determine sentencing:

he Promises and Perils of

entencing Guidelines, 68

‘Y-L.J. 1 (1979) ............. 5

von Hirsch, Constructing

Guidelines for Sentencing:

The Critical Choices for

the Minnesota Sentencing

Guidelines Commission, 5

Hamline L.Rev. 164 (1982 pees -

rs = ©

_ -— -—

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

uidelines, wW

ch had th

Florida's amended sentencing

effect

ana ACLU of Florida, i

@e American Civil Liberties

:* fully

in the attached Motion for

, >... = — «

iie Brief of Amici Curiae.

STATEMENT OF THE case’

On April 25, 1984, James

Ernest Miller was charged with sexual

battery in Broward County, Florida.

Mr. Miller was convicted of sexual

battery on August 30, 1984, and, on

October 2, 1984, he was sentenced in

accordance with the existing Florida

sentencing guidelines to seven years

in prison. (Pet. at 2)

l/ The amici curiae adopt the

Statement of the Case set forth

in Petitioner's Brief. The

Statement of the Case set forth

here is meant only to highlight

the important facts relevant to

the question presented in this

case. The facts are drawn from

Mr. Miller's Petition for

Certiorari (hereinafter "Pet. at

—

Sentencing Guidelines (the

"Original Guidelines") first went

into effect in Florida on October l,

1983. In June 1984, the Florida

Legislature approved amendments to

the Original Guidelines (the “Amended

Guidelines") which went into effect

on July 1, 1984. Thus, between the

time of Mr. Miller's crime and the

time he was sentenced, Florida's

Original Guidelines had been changed,

and Mr. Miller was sentenced under

the new Amended Guidelines, rathér

than under the original Guidelines.

(Pet. at 3)

This switch from the

Original Guidelines to the Amended

Guidelines had a substantial impact

on the sentence received by

Mr. Miller. Under Florida's

guidelines systen, *’ points are

assigned to various characteristics

of the crime and the offender. §5¢e

Fla. R. Crim P. 3.988. These charac~-

teristics include the severity of the

crime, injury to the victim and the

prior record of the offender. Id.

Point totals correspond to a

2/ Florida is just one of a number

of states which have adopted a

system of sentencing guidelines.

For a discussion of sentencing

guidelines schemes used in other

states and the trend toward

determinate sentencing generally

see Crump, Determinate Senten-

cing: The Promises and Perils

of Sentencing Guidelines, 68 Ky.

L.J. 1 (1979); von Hirsch,

Sentencing: The Critical

Choices for the Minnesota

Sentencing Guidelines Com-

mission, 5 Hamline L. Rev. 164

(1982).

Presumptive sentence 168 the sentence

a ffender MOTMaliy Can expect tc

ece @ upon nvictionr The senten-

Ang Court’s discretion to impose a

Sentence outside the narrow rance set

Orth in the guidelines is very

~ = ' : ’ 7 , a"

Limited. Florida's Rules of Criminal]

Dy-r ~ — rm) 4m 4 & Dae rovid th >

rioceqcure expiicitiy provi e nat

“(G)epartures from the guideline

range should be avoided..." Pia.

‘yy!

Crim. P. 3.701(d) (11). Enhance-

ment or mitigation of the presumptive

sentence must be accompanied by

written reasons. Jd. These reasons

must be clear and convincing and

based upon facts proved beyond a

reasonable doubt at trial. id. ll

sentences below or above the range

set forth in the guidelines are tnen

subject to appellate review, and wii

be revised if clear and convincing

reasons for departing from the

guidelines do not appear on the

record. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.001(5)

(West 1965); see also Mitchel) v.

State, 458 So. 2€ 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1984).

A Florida court's discre-

tion to sentence outside the guide-

lines is extremely circumscribed.

For example, a sentence differing

from the presumptive sentence cannot

be justified by factors already

incorporated into the guidelines.2/

ic. As the Supreme Court of Florida

has recognized, the very purpose of

the system is to discourage judges

from imposing sentences inconsistent

with the guidelines. Hendrix v.

3/ Thus, for example, a judge

cannot justify a sentence

outside the guidelines range on

the basis that defendant used a

gun to commit the crime. See

Vv. State, 464 So.2d 596

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The

Florida courts have also

rejected several other reasons

for enhancing or mitigating the

presumptive sentence. See State

v. Bentley, 475 So. 2d 255 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (preg-

nancy); State v. Caride, 473 So.

24 1362 (Fla. Dist. ct. App.

1985) (prison overcrowding) ;

Thomas v. State, 461 So .2d 234

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

(defendant's alleged belief that

he could make a better living by

stealing). See also Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.701(d) (11).

State, 475 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Fla.

1985).

The Amended Guidelines at

issue in this case increased the

points assigned for sexual offenses

in the Original Guidelines by more

than twenty percent. */ Since the

number of points closely corresponds

to a predetermined sentencing range,

the base sentence for sexual offenses

was effectively increased. Thus,

despite the fact that at the time

4/ Compare In re Rules of Criminal

Procedure (Sentencing Guide-

lines), 439 So. 2d 848 (Fla.

1983) (assigning 132 points to

second degree sexual offenses)

(Sentencing Guidelines), 451 So.

2d 824 (Fla. 1984) (assigning

158 points to second degree

sexual offenses).

Mr. Miller committed his offense, a

defendant convicted of sexual battery

would, under the Original Guidelines,

receive a maximum sentence of four

and one-half years, Mr. Miller, under

the Amended Guidelines, received a

sentence of seven years. >’ As a

5/ Under the Original Guidelines,

Mr. Miller's sentence would have

been determined as follows: 132

points for the primary base

offense (sexual battery in the

second degree), 49 points for

secondary offenses included in

the indictment, 10 points for

his prior record, and 40 points

for the degree of the victim's

injury, yielding a total of 229

points and a presumptive -en-

tence of three and one-half to

four and one-half years. Under

the Amended Guidelines, the

points assigned for the sec-

ondary offenses, and the prior

record and victim injury, remain

the same, but an additional 8

points are assigned for Mr.

(Continued)

result of a mere coincidence in the

timing of the effective date of the

Amended Guidelines and Mr. Miller's

sentences, he unexpectedly received a

sentence that was nearly double that

he would have received under the

Original Guidelines, which were in

effect at the crime was committed.

On appeal, the Florida

Court of Appeal vacated Mr. Miller's

sentence, because the use of the

Amended Guidelines in sentencing Mr.

Miller violated the Ex Post Facto

Clause of Article ), Section 10, of

(Continued)

Miller's primary offense,

increasing his point total to

257. The additional points

increased the presumptive

sentence to five and one-half to

seven years.

the Constitution by increasing the

sentence for a crime after it had

beer committed. Miller v. Florida,

466 So. 24 1018 (Fla. Dist. ct. App.

1985).

The Florida Supreme Court

reversed, holding that the changes

embodied in the Amended Guidelines

were merely “procedural” and did not

substantively alter the punishment

Mr. Miller could expect to receive.

ptate v. Miller, 488 So. 2d 820 (Fla.

1986).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The use of the Amended

Guidelines to determine Mr. Miller's

sentence is a plain violation of the

Constitution's ban on ex post facto

laws. The meaning of the Ex Post

Facto Clause of the Constitution is

simple and straightforward: the

punishment for a crime cannot be

increased after the crime has been

committed.

There can be no doubt that

the amendment of the Original Guide-

lines substantively changed the

sentence received by Mr. Miller. By

assigning point values to the various

characteristics of a crime, Florida's

sentencing guidelines fix a narrow

range within which it is permissible

to sentence a particular offender.

Further, Florida law severely

restricts the discretion of the judge

to impose punishment other than that

prescribed by the guidelines. The

sentence as determined by the guide-

lines is the sentence an offender can

normally expect to receive. Hence,

changes in the point values asso-

ciated with the crime, such as those

embodied in the Amended Guidelines,

change punishment.

Further, the fact that

Mr. Miller was sentenced under the

Amended Guidelines, rather than the

Original Guidelines, plainly worked

to his detriment, since it resulted

in a longer sentence, and the Amended

Guidelines were jntended to achieve

precisely that result.

Finally, it is i

that the Amended Guideiine

applied by the Florida Cou

retrospective. The Florid

Court has expressly held th

Amended Guidelines apply t

committed prior to their e

date.

In sum, in their

and effect, the Amended Gu

are precisely the type of

and potentially vindictive

tion” the Ex Post Facto Ci

pronibits. Weaver v. Grah

U.S 24, 29 (1981 The a

Ss, as

ris, are

A ipreme

cr?

operati

idelines

“arbitrary

ARGUMENT

THE USE OF AMENDED GUIDELINES TO

SENTENCE AN OFFENDER FOR CRIMES

COMMITTED PRIOR TO THEIR ENACT-

MENT VIOLATES THE EX POST FACTO

__—SLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION _

Since the earliest days of

the Republic, it has been settied

that “every law that changes the

punishment, and inflicts a greater

punishment, than the law annexed to

the crime when committed,” violates

the Constitutional prohibition of ex

post facto laws. Calder v. Bull, 2

U.S. 385, 390 (1790); accord, in re

Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890). In

order to run afoul of the prohibition

of ex post facto laws, the law must

affect a substantial right, see

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29-32

(1981), rather than merely aiter

"'modes of procedure which do not

affect matters of substance.'‘'"

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293

(1977) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269

U.S. 167, 171 (1925)). Further, “two

critical elements must be present for

a criminal law to be ex post facto:

it must be retrospective, that is, it

must apply to events occurring before

its enactment, and it must disadvan-

tage the offender by it.” Weaver,

450 U.S. at 29; see Dobbert, 432 U.S.

at 294 ("(ijt is axiomatic that for a

law to be ex post facto it must be

more onerous than the prior law.").

Application of the Amended Guide-

lines, which were enacted expressly

to lengthen the prison terms of

sexual offenders, to defendants --

like Mr. Miller -- who committed

their crimes prior to the enactment

of the Amended Guidelines manifestly

violates the bar on ex post facto

laws.

A. The Amended Guidelines

Substantively Change the

Punishment an Offender

Can Expect To Receive __

In ruling that sentencing

Mr. Miller under the Amended Guide-

lines was constitutionally permis-

sible, the Florida Supreme Court held

that changing the number of points

assigned to a criminal act by amend-

ing the sentencing guidelines is

merely a “procedural” change not

subject to the ex post facto prohibi-

tion. State v. Miller, 488 So. 2d

820 (Fla. 1986) (expressly relying on

State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054,

1056 (Filia. 1985)). Nothing could be

further from the truth. Since the

Amended Guidelines effectively

;

increase the “quantum of punishment

they are, and must be treated as,

affecting matters of substance.

Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 294 (1977).”

What qualifies as a “pro-

cedural rule” is strictly limited.

As this Court has stated, the “proce-

dure" exception to the ex post facto

prohibition applies only where

ftjhe crime for which the

present defendant was indicted,

the punishment prescribed

therefor, and the quantity or

the degree of proof necessary to

establish his guilt, all remain

€ The determination of whether a

change in law falls within the

“procedure” exception to the ex

post facto doctrine is a matter

of federal law. See Dobbert,

432 U.S. at 292-294; Beazeli v.

Ohio, 269 U.S. 163 (1925).

unaffected by the subsequent

statute.

Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 294 (quoting

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90

(1884)). None of these criteria

apply here, for a cursory examination

of Florida's sentencing suidelines

System shows that the guidelines are

the basis upon which criminal sanc-

tions are imposed in Florida.

The operation of Florida's

guideline system demonstrates that

the guidelines are meant to fix a

precise and narrow range of punish-

ment for a given offender. The

guidelines do not guide discretion.

Rather, they operate much like a

computer. The court inputs various

Gata about the offender and the crime

and the sentence, within narrowly

fixed limits, is mechanically deter-

mined. Moreover, the rules adopted

in conjunction with the Original

Guidelines and the practice in the

Florida courts make clear that the

court's authority to sentence outside

the guidelines is meant to be

extremely limited. See Fla. R. Crin.

P. 3.701(d) (11) ("departures from the

guideline range should be avoided."),

and pp. 2-3, Supra.

The State of Florida has

explicitly recognized that the

guidelines affect substantial rights.

In creating the Sentencing Conm-

mission, which initially developed

the Original Guidelines, the Florida

Legislature recognized that develop-

ing sentencing criteria was primarily

a matter of substantive iaw.

The provision of criminal

penalties and of limitations

upon the application of such

penalties is a matter of pre-

dominantly substantive law and,

as such, is a matter properly

addressed by the Legislature.

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.001 (West 1985)

(emphasis added). The substantive

effect of the Amended Guidelines was

also recognized by the Florida

Supreme Court when the Original

Guidelines were amended in 1984.

The essential changes and

reasons therefor are... to

increase the primary offense

points in category 2 sexual

offenses ... the revision

increases the primary offense

points by 20% and will result in

in re Amendments to Rules of Crimina)

Procedure, 451 So. 2d 824 (1984)

(emphasis added).

Because sentencing guide-

lines determine the quantum of

punishment an offender will receive,

changes in the guidelines, such as

those embodied in the Amended Guide-

lines, substantively change punish-

ment. For this reason, the changes

embodied in the Amended Guidelines

are unlike any that have been con-

strued by this Court as merely

"procedural."

In Dobbert, for example,

the Court considered whether a change

in the allocation of authority,

between judge and jury, for the

imposition of a death sentence,

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause

when applied retroactively. Finding

that the change did not add to the

“quantum of punishment," the Court

held there was no ex post facto

violation. 432 U.S. at 293-94; see

also Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 163

(1925) (change in rules for severance

of trials); Malloy v. South Carolina,

237 U.S. 180 (1915) (change in method

of execution of death sentence) ;

Mallet v. North Carolina, 181 U.S.

589 (1901) (change in rules governing

appeals by the state); Gibson v.

Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896)

(change in method of selection of

jury venire); Duncan v. Missouri, 152

U.S. 377 (1894) (change in structure

of the courts).

None of the changes dis-

cussed in the above cases determined

the length of sentence to be imposed

upon a criminal defendant, as do the

Amended Guidelines. Thus, the

EE "

Florida Supreme Court erred in

finding the guidelines to be merely

procedural.

B. The Operation of the

Amended Guidelines Works

to Mr. Miller's Detriment

The use of the Amended

Guidelines substantively affected the

sentence that Mr. Miller received, to

his indisputable detriment. Rather

than receiving a sentence of four and

one-half years, Mr. Miller is now

serving a seven-year sentence. If

the effect of the change in the

sentencing law is to lengthen the

period that the defendant is incar-

cerated or otherwise in the state's

custody -- as it plainly is here --

the law is detrimental within the

meaning of the Constitution's

prohibition of ex post facto laws.

See Weaver, 450 U.S. 24 (reduction

in the availability of automatic

gain-time); Lindsey v. Washington,

301 U.S. 397 (1937) (abolition of

minimum sentencing).

In short, since Mr. Mil-

ler's sentence as determined by the

Amended Guidelines <-- and hence the

sentence he received -- is nearly

double the sentence that would have

been imposed under the Original

Guidelines, the Amended Guidelines

indisputably operate to his detri-

ment.

Nor is it significant to

the issue presented here that the

Amended Guidelines do not change the

statutory maximum penalty for second

degree felonies which remains fifteen

years. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.082(c)

(West 1985). In Lindsey, the Court

held that retroactive application of

a new sentencing scheme detrimentally

affected an offender, even though the

new scheme left unchanged the maximum

statutory penalty.

In Lindsey, when the

petitioner committed his crime, the

State of Washington used a system of

indeterminate sentencing. 302 U.S.

at 398. The maximum penalty for the

crime was 15 years, and the minimum

could range between 6 months and 5

years, in the discretion of the

court. Id. The defendant would be

eligible for parole after serving the

minimum. Id. By the time of the

petitioner's sentencing, indetermi-

nate sentences had been abolished.

iad. Although the maximum punishment

was left unchanged, the court no

longer had discretion to sentence an

offender to less than the maximum

prison term. Jd. The actual length

of incarceration was to be set later

by the parole board. Id. at 399.

In holding that retroactive

application of the new sentencing law

violated the ex post facto prohibi-

tion, the Court expressly rejected

the argument that since no change in

the maximum statu.tory penalty had

been enacted, there was no detriment

to the petitioner. Id. at 400. The

Court noted "that an increase in the

possible penalty is ex post facto --

regardless of the length of the

sentence actually imposed, since the

measure of punishment prescribed by

a |

the later statute is more severe than

that of the earlier.” Id. at 401.

So it is here. Like the

change in Lindsey, Florida's Amended

Guidelines prescribe a “more severe"

"measure of punishment” than the

Original Guidelines. For this

reason, the Amended Guidelines

materially “alter[{] the situation of

the accused to his disadvantage.” in

re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890);

accord, Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32.

Thus, the Amended Guidelines cannot

constitutionally be applied retroac~-

tively.

c. The Guidelines Are Retrospective

The best evidence that the

Amended Guidelines are retrospective

is that they have been applied to Mr.

Miller, and others, retroactively.

This is in accord with State v.

Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. i985),

in which the Supreme Court of Florida

held that a trial court may properly

sentence a defendant according to the

guidelines in effect at the time of

sentencing -- regardless of when the

crime was committed. It cannot be

seriously maintained that such a law

is anything other than retrospective.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing discussion

amply demonstrates, Florida's Amended

Guidelines increase the punishment

for sex offenders. Thus, the Amended

Guidelines cannot constitutionally be

retroactively applied, as they were

in this case. For these reasons, the

decision of the Florida Supreme Court

should be reversed and the case

remanded for resentencing in

accordance with the guidelines in

effect when Mr. Miller committed his

crime.

Dated: January 13, 1987

Respectfully submitted,

GERALD D. STERN

(Counsel of Record) '

Steven E. Landers

Ann J. Holtwick

Philip R. White

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind '

Wharton & Garrison |

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10019

(212) 373-3000

Alvin Bronstein

David Goldstein

American Civil Liberties

Union

132 West 43rd Street

New York, New York 1003¢€

(212) 944-9800

Michelle Ivy

American Civil Liberties

Union of Florida

225 Northeast 34th Street

Suite 208

Miami, Florida 3137

(305) 576-2336

Counsel for Amici Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.