Record and brief — Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Melody Wilhite

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DOCKET

PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS DATE: 102285

CASE NBR 84-1-02016 CFX CASE STATUS: DECIDED

SHORT TITLE Greyhound Lines, Ine. DOCKETED: Jun 28 1985

VERSUS Wilhite, Melody, et al.

Entry Date Note Proceedings and Orders

1 Jun 28 1985 D Petition for writ of certiorari filed.

3 1 26 1985 Order extending time to file response to petition until

August 14, 1985.

4 Aug 12 1985 Brief of respondents Melody Wilhite, et al. in opposition

filed.

5 Aug 14 1985 DISTRIBUTED. September 30, 19785

8 Sep 18 1985 X Reply brief of petitioner Greyhound Lines filed.

3 Oet 7 1985 REDISTRIBUTED. October 11, 1985

2 Oct 15 1985 Petition DENIED. Dissenting opinion by Justice White.

(Detached opinion.)

FFP

PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Uuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384,

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM R. Saus, III

STEPHEN M. RUMMAGE *

DAVIS, WRIGHT, TODD,

RIESE & JONES

4200 Seattle-First National

Bank Building

Seattle, Washington 98154

(206) 622-3150

Counsel of Record for

Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Ee — — — — —ů —

WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co.. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the court below properly denied retroactive

effect to this Court’s decisions in United Parcel Service

v. Mitchell and DelCostello v. International Brotherhood

of Teamsters.

A. Whether a federal court of appeals may deny retro-

active effect to a Supreme Court decision when the Su-

preme Court has, without reservation, itself applied the

decision retroactively in the civil litigation before it.

B. Whether a federal court of appeals may deny retro-

active effect to a Supreme Court decision solely because

that decision, which resolves conflict in the federal courts,

prescribes a civil statute of limitations shorter than the

limitations period suggested by lower court precedent.

(i)

LIST OF PARENT COMPANIES,

SUBSIDIARIES, AND AFFILIATES

Greyhound Lines, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of

The Greyhound Corporation. The subsidiaries of Grey-

hound Lines, Inc. (except wholly owned subsidiaries)

are: Greyhound Bus Depot of Atlanta, Inc.; Greyhound

Lines of Canada Ltd.; Greyhound-Taseco Saudi Arabia

Ltd.; Jefferson Lines Holding Company; Kerrville Bus

Company, Inc.; Southeastern Stages, Inc.; Springfield

Bus Terminal Corporation; Union Bus Station of Okla-

homa City, Oklahoma; Wilmington Union Bus Station

Corporation; and Texas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma

Coaches, Inc. The affiliates of Greyhound Lines, Inc. (ex-

cept for wholly owned subsidiaries of its parent, subsid-

iaries, or affiliates) are: Freeport Flight Services Ltd.;

Glacier Park, Inc.; Greyhound Food Management of

Texas, Inc.; Restaura, GmbH; Greyhound Services Saudi

Arabia Ltd.; Armour S.A. E.; Greyhound Computer of

Canada Ltd.; Collins, Collins & Rawlence Ltd.; G. G.

Mor.gagee Corporation; P. T. Gemini Greyhound Leasing

Indonesia; and Tri-State Investment Company. Should

the Court desire disclosure of wholly owned subsidiaries

of these various entities, Greyhound Lines, Inc., will

supplement its list of subsidiaries and affiliates.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF PARENT COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES,

AND AFFILIATES

OPINION BELOW

JURISDICTION

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

——— E G nBß ee ee ee ee 3*“—?5ẽtùꝶ

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I,

II.

BY REFUSING TO APPLY RETROACTIVELY

THE PRINCIPLES OF MITCHELL AND

DELCOSTELLO, THE DECISION BELOW

CONFLICTS WITH THE VIEWS OF OTHER

CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL ..

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF AP-

PEALS MANIFESTS A FUNDAMENTAL

DIVISION OF THE CIRCUITS ON THE

APPLICATION OF RETROACTIVITY PRIN-

CIPLES SET FORTH IN CHEVRON OIL CO.

SEES EE a

A. A Substantial Question Is Presented By the

Conflict Between the Court Below and Other

Circuits as to Whether Chevron Applies to

New Principles That This Court Has Itself

Applied Retrospectively 0.

B. A Substantial Question Is Presented by the

Holding of the Court Below, in Conflict With

Other Circuits, That the Mere Existence of

Contrary Circuit Precedent Necessarily Pre-

cludes Retroactive Application of This

Court’s Decisions to Adversely Affected

Litigants

— — K ERE RE HSH R nE RWK R’ R „„ „„

10

12

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

— —————ůů ů —— — —

APPENDIX

Memorandum Opinion of United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, April 1, 19858

Order of Dismissal and Order of Remand, United

States District Court, Western District of Wash-

ington (Seattle), September 9, 1988

Judgment, United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, April 1, 1985 3

Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726

rr, ee

Welyezko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F. 2d 239 (2d Cir. ),

cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 512 (1983) =

la

4a

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Aarsvold v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 724 F.2d 72

(8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3538

17J/%%/ a a il 10

Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.

| ES T3 en een ee 6, 7

Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726

F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 198(0))0· 5, 8, 15, 16

Bourquin v. Prophet Foods Co., presently Grey-

hound Food Management, Inc., et al., No. 83-1248

- 10

Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064

I ̃⅛ F!!! — 13

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (19717 passim

Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State

Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (194: 18

Christianson v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 681

P2d G77 (Sth Cir. 10GB) ....................-00.....20....... 16

Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) 12

Davidson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 650 F.2d 902

(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 947

r Re ao nk ar 8

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Team-

GEE, Ge Te Te GID cececeneeveccceneveczccsonscencsecend passim

Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 720 F.2d 857

r 9

Edwards v. Teamsters Local No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036

(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599

K 9

Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 717 F.2d 1036

(7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 707

„ r ee ee en ane 9

Glover v. United Grocers, 746 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.

1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3824 (USS.

—— a ee ee ea 15, 16, 18

Graves v. Smith’s Transfer Corp., 736 F.2d 819

I r 8

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554

TL So NT .

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Holmes v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 757 F.2d 1563

D. - erro 10

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 623 F. 2d

786 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 456 U.S. 461 (1982) 16

Lawson v. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers,

698 F.2d 250 (6th Cir.), reh’g denied and veh'g

en banc denied, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 69

. ee ee 7,18

Lincoln v. District 9 of International Association

of Machinists, 723 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1983 9

Liotta v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (19817 6

McNutt v. Airco Industrial Gases Division, 687

r. x

Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) 16, 17

Mitchell v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 624 F.2d

394 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d 451 U.S. 56 (1981)...... 6, 7

Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d

1146 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.

f ee 8,9

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)...... 13

Perez v. Dana Corp., 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1983). 8

Price v. Southern Pacific Transport. Co., 586 F. 2d

I 8

Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co.,

ea 13-14

Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d 1247

(Iich Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 727 F.2d 1116

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 292 (1984).. 9

Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 18 (1964), on

remand, 270 F. Supp. 754 (N. D. Cal. 1967), aff'd

411 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), reversed, 396 U.S. 13

rc 12

Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349

,, e rere eeneene mene oe See 8, 15, 16

Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 372 (6th

D ee een eee 9, 12, 13

Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Dur-

ham, 398 U.S. 268 (1969) ..................................... 10

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56

(1981) ........ C ee SET passim

United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) 14,17

United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103

. .. 10

Vadasz v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 723 F.2d 620 (8th

Cir. 1988) .............. . 10

Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 512 (198) 8, 13

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).......... n 2

r ̃ TTT. 55 3

r 1 3

LR Ee a ee

29 U.S.C. § 185 (a cece. n passim

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04. 1800o 4

Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010, et Se ;œmm 3

OTHER AUTHORITIES

C. Morris, ed., The Developing Labor Law (2d

EE // / / nee en an PS Ae eee 6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

No. 84——

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384,

AMALGAMATED TRANS'T UNION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRI OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner Greyhound Lines, Inc., respectfully requests

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgmeat

and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding on April 1,

1985.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Ninth Circuit is not reported. It is

found in the Appendix at pages la through 3a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit was entered on April 1, 1985. App.

6a-7a. The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been

2

filed within 90 days thereafter. This Court’s jurisdiction

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act

(the “Act”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), provides,

in pertinent part:

. no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair

labor practice occurring more than six months prior

to the filing of the charge with the Board and the

service of a copy thereof upon the person against

whom such charge is made...

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations

Act (the “LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides, in per-

tinent part:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization representing employees in

an industry affecting commerce as defined in this

chapter, . . . may be brought in any district court

of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-

ties

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 15, 1979, Melody Wilhite and a fellow

employee at Greyhound's Seattle facility were observed in

a tavern during their lunch break. Having concluded

that the two were consuming alcohol, local Greyhound

management confronted them and allowed them to choose

between vol intary resignation and termination. Wilhite

chose to resign. Soon thereafter, however, she had second

thoughts concerning her decision and enlisted the aid of

her bargaining representative, Local 1384, Amalgamated

Transit Union (“Local 1384”).

On December 17, 1979, Local 1384’s business agent

filed a grievance and requested a hearing on her behalf.

On December 26, 1979, Greyhound management re-

3

sponded by advising Local 1384 that Wilhite had re-

signed and that her resignation had been accepted. After

receiving Greyhound’s response, the business agent spoke

with Wilhite about the grievance on at least two occa-

sions, explaining that Local 1384 would not pursue the

matter because of his determination that her resignation

had been voluntary. The business agent’s decision was

affirmed by the Executive Board of Local 1384 at its reg-

ular meeting in January of 1980.

Approximately 16 months later, on May 26, 1981, Wil-

hite filed this action in the Superior Court of the State

of Washington in King County, naming as defendants

Greyhound, Local 1384, and the International union affil-

iated with Local 1384. Because Wilhite asserted a cause

of action under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.

§ 185, Greyhound removed the case to the United States

District Court for the Western District of Washington

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 and 1441.

Wilhite’s complaint alleged that Greyhound had

breached its contract with Local 1384 by coercing her

resignation on December 15, 1979. In addition, she

claimed that Local 1384 and its affiliated International

had breached their duty to provide Wilhite with fair

representation subsequent to her resignation. Finally,

Wilhite asserted that Greyhound’s and Local 1384’s ac-

tions discriminated against her on the basis of sex in

violation of the Washington State Law Against Discrim-

ination, Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010, et seg.

On June 29, 1983, the district court dismissed the

International from Wilhite’s lawsuit, reasoning that it

owed no duty of fair representation to Wilhite because

it was not her bargaining representative. On that same

day, the court granted Greyhound’s motion for summary

judgment on the sex discrimination claim. The Section

301 suit against Greyhound, the duty of fair representa-

tion claim against Local 1384, and the state law sex

discrimination claim against Local 1384 remained.

1

On June 8, 1983, after submission of the initial sum-

mary judgment motions in this case, this Court an-

nounced its decision in DelCostello v. International Broth-

erhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), prescribing

a six month statute of limitations for hybrid Section 301/

duty of fair representation cases. Accordingly, in mid-

August of 1983, Local 1384 and Greyhound moved to dis-

miss Wilhite’s federal claims on the ground that her

action had not been timely brought under DelCostello.

In response, Wilhite urged that De/Costello not be ap-

plied retroactively, pointing out that the Ninth Circuit

had refused to apply retroactively this Court’s decision in

United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981),

which had announced the statute of limitations princi-

ples overruled in Del Costello. In reply, Local 1384 argued

that DelCostello was entitled to retroactive effect, not-

ing, among other things, that this Court had itself ap-

plied the six month statute of limitations to bar the

claims of two employees in Del Costello.

On September 9, 1983, the district court granted the

motions and entered an order dismissing Wilhite’s fed-

eral claims and remanding her pendant state law sex

discrimination claim against Local 1384 to the State

Superior Court. App. 4a-5a. Because Wilhite had filed

her action one month after this Court’s decision in

Mitchell, the district court concluded that no question

of retroactivity was presented with respect to the three-

month statute of limitations in effect under that case.

App. 5a. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180 (three-month

statute of limitations for action to vacate arbitration

award). Accordingly, the district court found it un-

necessary to address the retroactivity of DelCostello in

holding that Wilhite’s claims were time barred under

Mitchell. App. 5a.

Wilhite appealed to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed in an unpublished

opinion issued on April 1, 1985. App. la-3a. Relying

5

primarily upon its decision in Barina v. Gulf Trading &

Transportation Co., 726 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1984),

App. 8a-l5a, the court ruled that neither Mitchell nor

DelCostello governed Wilhite’s action. App. 3a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents substantial questions concerning the

circumstances in which principles announced by this

Court should be applied retroactively. The Ninth Circuit,

in conflict with eight courts of appeal, has denied retro-

active effect to this Court’s decisions clarifying the limi-

tations period applicable to hybrid Section 301/duty of

fair representation actions. See United Parcel Service v.

Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) ; DelCostello v. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). This

conflict stems from fundamental differences among the

circuits with respect to the standards to be applied in

determining whether this Court’s decisions apply retro-

spectively. Two courts of appeal have held that this

Court conclusively answers retroactivity questions when

it applies a newly-announced principle to the litigants

before it, as it did in DelCostello. Between these courts

and the Ninth Circuit, there exists clear conflict on the

substantial and fundamental question of the precedential

significance of this Court’s adjudication of cases. In

addition, the Ninth Circuit has parted from other courts

of appeal in denying retroactivity to Mitchell and Del-

Costello solely because those decisions overruled some

lower court precedent in order to resolve conflict and con-

fusion in the circuits. The holding of the court below

creates a per se rule that any new Supreme Court deci-

sion on limitation periods will not be applied retroactively

to adversely affected litigants. This presents a substan-

tial question as to the continued viability of the time-

honored presumption that principles announced by this

Court apply retroactively. Accordingly, review on cer-

tiorari is merited under Rule 17.1 of the Rules of the

Supreme Court.

6

I. BY REFUSING TO APPLY RETROACTIVELY THE

PRINCIPLES OF MITCHELL AND DELCOSTELLO,

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE

VIEWS OF OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL

Until 1981, courts divided sharply over the appropri-

ate statute of limitations to apply in hybrid cases alleg-

ing an employer’s breach of a collective bargaining agree-

ment under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185,

and a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation.

Agreeing only that the limitations period should be bor-

rowed from state law, see Auto Workers v. Hoosier

Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966), federal

courts had applied statutes ranging from 90 days, Liotta

v. National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981), to six years. Mitchell

v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 624 F.2d 394, 398 (2d

Cir. 1980), rev’d 451 U.S. 56 (1981).' These different

approaches resulted from conflicting perceptions of the

nature of these hybrid actions, some courts finding them

to be tort actions, others concluding that they sounded in

contract, and still others finding them to derive from

statutory rights. See 2 C. Morris, ed., The Developing

Labor Law (2d Ed. 1983), pp. 1356-57 (collecting cases).

This Court, however, had foreshadowed a different ap-

proach in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S.

554 (1976), when it noted that a union’s duty of fair

representation implicated the “integrity of the arbitral

process.” 424 U.S. at 567. Recognizing this principle,

the Third Circuit in 1980 concluded that hybrid Section

301/duty of fair representation suits should be governed

by the state statute of limitations applicable to actions

to vacate arbitration awards. Liotta, 629 F.2d at 906

(disimissing Section 301 action against employer).

Truly scores of decisions applied various “appropriate” statutes

of limitation before Mitchell resolved the issue. They are collected

at 2 C. Morris, ed., The Developing Labor Law (2d Ed. 1983), pp.

1355, et seq. 8

7

The distriet court in Mitchell took this approach in

concluding that an employee’s hybrid action was time

barred. See Mitchell, 624 F.2d at 396. The view was

ultimately adopted by this Court in Mitchell, which re-

versed the Second Circuit and reinstated the district

court’s order dismissing the lawsuit against the employer.

451 U.S. at 64. In so doing, this Court broke no new

ground. Rather, it relied upon the then accepted prin-

ciple that the most analogous state statute of limitations

should control. 451 U.S. at 60. See Auto Workers v.

Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 704-05. The Court

rested its choice of limitations in large part upon the

observation that Hines “strongly supports borrowing the

limitations period for actions to vacate arbitration

awards.” 451 U.S. at 61.

The Court in Mitchell declined to address the conten-

tion that a federal statute of limitations should govern

hybrid actions. 451 U.S. at 60 n. 2. That question was,

however, squarely presented in DelCostello v. Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151. Over-

ruling Mitchell, the Court in De Costello determined that

the six month statute of limitations contained in Section

10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), should apply to

actions against both the employer and the union in

Section 301/duty of fair representation lawsuits.

In the brief interval between Mitchell and DelCostello,

few courts had occasion to consider Mitchell’s application

to causes of action accruing prior to that decision. The

Sixth Circuit, however, did apply Mitchell retroactively

based upon its conclusion that this Court’s decision did

not represent a “clean break” with prior decisions, but

merely a clarification of the law on “an issue on which

there is circuit conflict and confusion.” Lawson v. Truck

Drivers, Chauffeurs, and Helpers, 698 F.2d 250, 254 (6th

Cir.), reh’g denied and reh’g en bane denied, cert. denied,

104 S. Ct. 69 (1983). Without undertaking any detailed

retroactivity analysis, other courts of appeal also applied

8

Mitchell to pending cases. See, e.g., McNutt v. Airco

Industrial Gases Division, 687 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1982) ;

Davidson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 650 F.2d 902 (7th

Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 947 (1982). The views

of these courts found express approval in Justice O’Con-

nor’s dissent in DelCostello, in which she observed that it

was “quite appropriate to apply Mitchell retroactively.”

462 U.S. at 175, n.2 O'Connor, J., dissenting) .

The Ninth Circuit, however, took a different approach,

holding in Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d

1349 (9th Cir. 1981), that Mitchell could not apply to

causes of action accruing before this Court’s decision in

that case. Undertaking a cursory analysis purportedly

premised on Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971),

the court of appeals held that previous Ninth Circuit

precedent on the statute of limitations applicable to ac-

tions against unions rendered it unjust to apply Mitchell

to existing causes of action against both unions and em-

ployers. 652 F.2d at 1353, citing Price v. Southern

Pacific Transport. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 752-53 (9th Cir.

1978) (in action against union, limitations period ap-

plicable to actions based upon a statute governs). See

also Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726

F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that Mitchell

applies prospectively only), App. 12a-13a.

The conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the rest of

the nation has continued since this Court decided Del-

Costello. Every circuit court except the Tenth Circuit

and the District of Columbia Circuit has considered retro-

active application of DelCostello. Every court except the

Ninth Circuit has determined that the case does apply

retroactively. Graves v. Smith’s Transfer Corp., 736

F.2d 819 (Ist Cir. 1984); Welyezko v. U.S. Air, Inc.,

733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 512

(1984), App. 16a-20a; Perez v. Dana Corp., 718 F.2d

581 (3d Cir. 1983); Murray v. Branch Motor Express

Co., 723 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105

—

9

S. Ct. 292 (1984); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.,

720 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1983) ; Smith v. General Motors

Corp., 747 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Ernst

v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 717 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 707 (1984); Lincoln v.

District 9 of International Association of Machinists, 723

F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Lockheed Georgia

Co., 720 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 727

F.2d 1116 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 292

(1984). The Ninth Circuit’s view, as expressed in this

case, stands alone on this issue. See Barina v. Gulf Trad-

ing & Transportation Co., 726 F.2d at 564, App. 13a-

15a; Edwards v. Teamsters Local No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036

(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984).

This conflict creates manifest injustice, for it results

in differing treatment for similarly situated litigants. In

this case, Wilhite claims to have suffered damage when

Greyhound allegedly coerced her resignation on Decem-

ber 15, 1979. She then waited until May 26, 1981, after

this Court decided Mitchell, to file her suit. Other liti-

gants allegedly suffering injury and filing suit before

Wilhite have been denied relief under the principles an-

nounced in DelCostello. See, e.g., Murray v. Branch

Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d at 1148 (damages allegedly

suffered on April 22, 1976; suit filed on September 13,

1978) ; Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d at 1250

‘‘n consolidated cases, suits dismissed when litigants’

causes of action accrued in April of 1979, May of 1979,

and October of 1979, respectively; suits filed in March of

1980, June of 1980, and May of 1981, respectively).

This disparate treatment presents an inherently sub-

stantial issue because of its effect on the integrity of the

federal judicial process. Litigants contesting federal is-

sues implicating national labor policy should not find

their rights differing from one circuit to the next. That

is, however, precisely the effect of the decision below.

Three courts of appeal have applied De/Costello retro-

10

actively in cases involving Greyhound or its affiliates.

Holmes v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 757 F.2d 1563 (5th

Cir. 1985); Bourquin v. Prophet Foods Co., presently

Greyhound Food Management, Inc., et al., No. 83-1248

(6th Cir. June 7, 1985) (unpublished; not to be cited as

precedent) ; Vadasz v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 723 F.2d

620 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Aarsvold v. Grey-

hound Lines, Inc., 724 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1983) (per

curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3538 (1984). Only in

the Ninth Circuit has Greyhound been deprived of the

right to repose provided by DelCostello. This Court

should therefore grant the writ to resolve the conflict on

this important issue of federal labor law.

II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

MANIFESTS A FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION OF

THE CIRCUITS ON THE APPLICATION OF

RETROACTIVITY PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN

CHEVRON OIL CO. v. HUSON

A court ordinarily “must apply the law in effect at the

time it renders its decision.” Thorpe v. Housing Author-

ity of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969).

See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110

(1801). Thus, when confronted with a change in law

occasioned by a judicial ruling, a court must apply the

“new” law even to an “old” case. Thorpe, 393 U.S. at

282. This general rule admits of only limited exceptions.

In civil cases, this Court has held that a judicial decision

will have prospective effect if it meets certain criteria:

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively

must establish a new principle of law, either by

overruling clear past precedent on which litigants

may have relied, . . . or by deciding an issue of first

impression whose resolution was not clearly fore-

shadowed . . . Second, it has been stressed that “we

must. . weigh the merits and demerits in each

case by looking to the prior history of the rule in

question, its purpose and effect, and whether retro-

11

spective operation will further or retard its opera-

tion.” . . . Finally, we have weighed the inequity

imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a

decision of this Court could produce substantial in-

equitable results if applied retroactively, there is

ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice

or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”

Chevron Oil Co. „. Huson, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (citations

omitted). Using this test, the Court in Chevron declined

to apply to the parties before it a state statute of limita-

tions adopted in that case. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 109.

The court of appeals in this and other cases has funda-

mentally misperceived the nature and scope of the

Chevron analysis, raising issues of substantial importance

in the future disposition of retroactivity questions. As

the Second and Sixth Circuits have recognized, a court of

appeals should not conduct a Chevron inquiry if this

Court has, without reservation, applied the “new” legal

principle to the parties before it. When that has occurred,

as it did in both Mitchell and DelCostello, the courts of

appeal should apply the same principle in the same fash-

ion as this Court. Because the court below refused to do

so, its decision was in error.

Furthermore, even when Chevron applies, its require-

ment that a decision “establish a new principle of law”

is not satisfied by the mere existence of contrary case law

in the federal courts. This Court, recognizing that deci-

sions are presumed to have retroactive effect, has instead

required a sharp break from a near unanimous view of

lower courts. In finding that DelCostello and Mitchell

should be applied only prospectively, the Ninth Circuit

rejected this principle, in conflict with other courts of

appeal. The decision of the court below has thus raised

a substantial question as to the continued viability of the

fundamental presumption in favor of applying the law

in effect at the time of a court‘s decision.

12

A. A Substantial Question Is Presented By the Con-

flict Between the Court Below and Other Circuits as

to Whether Chevron Applies to New Principles That

This Court Has Itself Applied Retrospectively.

To assure rationality and uniformity in decisions, retro-

activity should not be determined on a case-by-case basis.“

As the Sixth Circuit has observed, a contrary view with

respect to DelCostello would have the “unacceptable” re-

sult of “a separate statute of limitations for every section

301 plaintiff with a case pending when DelCostello came

down .. .” Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d at

375, n.6. With this principle of uniformity in mind, both

the Second and Sixth Circuits have found that this Court

disposed of retroactivity questions when it applied Del-

Costello principles to dismiss the claims of Flowers and

Jones, two of the litigants before the Court in that case.

See 462 U.S. at 172 (holding action of Flowers and Jones

“is governed by the six-month provision of § 10(b)”).

2 This Court has generally analyzed retroactivity questions with

a broad frame of reference. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma,

895 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (discussing consequences of retroactivity

for “cities, bondholders and others connected with municipal utili-

ties”). In one unusual case concerning resale price maintenance

under the Sherman Act, the Court did appear to authorize case-by-

case adjudication of retroactivity. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,

877 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1964), on remand, 270 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal.

1967), aff'd, 411 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), reversed, 396 U.S. 1% (1969).

The Court’s second opinion in that case, however, revealed that it

left the door open for prospective application not to similarly situ-

ated litigants, but to parties whose acts were based “on quite

different considerations” than those that guided the defendant

whose conduct the Court had found unlawful. 396 U.S. at 14.

Cf. 411 F.2d at 901 (explaining Court's rationale in other terms;

reversed, 396 U.S. at 14). When thoroughly analyzed, the Court's

decision in Simpson seems to be little more than a recognition that

differing motivations of defendants might distinguish other cases

as a matter of substantive law. The same is not true here, for

state of mind has no bearing upon the appropriate statute of

limitations.

13

In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit noted

that Chevron has only limited application when a court of

appeals considers new principles announced by the Su-

preme Court. Chevron, the Second Circuit wrote, must

guide a court of appeals in considering “a new rule which

our court [has] pronounced. Welyczko v. U.S. Air,

Inc., 733 F.2d at 241, App. 20a. The same analysis

would apply to a principle as to which this Court has

“given no indication” on the issue of retroactivity. 733

F.2d at 241, App. 20a. However, the Second Circuit ob-

served that the Court in DelCostello had “applied the

time bar retroactively to govern the very claim at issue

in the case before it.” 733 F.2d at 241, App. 20a. Noting

that this Court “is well aware of how to avoid the effects

of applying one of its rulings retroactively to the case at

bar,” id., quoting Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

561 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit

found no reason to refrain from applying a rule of this

Court retrospectively “when [the Supreme] Court itself

has given retrospective application to a newly adopted

principle ...” 733 F.2d at 241, App. 20a. In an en banc

decision, the Sixth Circuit adopted this reasoning. Smith

v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d at 375.

In contrast to the Second and Sixth Circuits, the Ninth

Circuit conducted a Chevron analysis to decide the retro-

activity question, indicating its intent to disregard this

Court’s unconditional disposition of the cases reviewed in

Del Costello. The Ninth Circuit’s approach, however,

bespeaks a fundamental misapprehension of the Court’s

function. This Court decides cases, not abstract princi-

ples. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361

(1911) (the Court’s role is to decide “the rights of liti-

gants in justiciable controversies”). In so doing, the

Court necessarily passes upon the questions essential to

the dispositions it makes.“ See Public Service Commis-

*This Court was aware of the retroactive im

ications

DelCostello, as Justice O’Connor’s dissent, which — 2

14

sion of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952)

(considering appropriateness of declaratory relief, de-

spite lower courts’ failure to consider the issue, because

“that inquiry is one which every grant of this remedy

must survive“

Thus, when the Court found the suit by two employees

in DelCostello to be time-barred, it implicitly held it ap-

propriate to apply the newly announced principle to liti-

gants with cases pending as of that date. To hold other-

wise, as did the court below, verges on a suggestion that

this Court disposes of cases based upon new principles

without regard to the justice of applying those principles.

Such a proposition dramatically understates this Court’s

role in adjudicating the rights of the parties before it.

To paraphrase this Court’s observations in considering

retroactivity of new Fourth Amendment doctrines, “{i]t

would be ironic indeed” if the Ninth Circuit were per-

mitted to reverse judgments applying DelCostello’s rule,

when in DelCostello itself the Court reversed a directly

contrary judgment of the Second Circuit. United States

v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 555 (1982).

The Ninth Circuit’s divergence from the views of the

Second and Sixth Circuits thus reflects a clear division

on a crucial issue: the degree to which the Chevron

criteria may be employed to deny retroactivity to a prin-

ciple that this Court has itself applied retroactively in

civil litigation. This presents a substantial question whose

resolution will determine the precedential value of this

Court’s future dispositions. The Court should grant the

dressed the retroactivity of Mitchell, demonstrates. See 462 U.S.

at 175 n.2. Furthermore, the fact that the parties in DelCostello

did not raise the question fails to diminish the effect of the Court's

retrospective application of its decision to Flowers and Jones.

When the Court perceives an injustice in applying a decision

retroactively, it plainly has authority to dispose of the problem

sua sponte as an incident to deciding a case based upon the new

principle.

15

writ to reaffirm its primacy in deciding the issues nec-

essarily placed before it.

B. A Substantial Question Is Presented by the Holding

of the Court Below, in Conflict With Other Circuits,

That the Mere Existence of Contrary Circuit Prece-

dent Necessarily Precludes Retroactive Application

of This Court’s Decisions to Adversely Affected

Litigants.

Most courts considering Mitchell’s and DelCostello’s

retroactivity have, like the court below, improperly ana-

lyzed the issue under Chevron. Those courts have, how-

ever, reached a conclusion different from that of the

Ninth Circuit. This division among the circuits stems

from a sharply different view of the extent to which the

existence of circuit court precedent at odds with a Su-

preme Court decision fulfills the first Chevron criterion.

Thus, even if Chevron applies when this Court has im-

plicitly decided the retroactivity question, the decision of

the court below raises a substantial issue as to the nature

of the Chevron inquiry.

The Ninth Circuit has not denied that retroactive ap-

plication of Mitchell and DelCostello would further the

purpose of the rules adopted in those cases. See Barina

v. Gulf Trading & Transportation, 726 F.2d at 564, App.

14a (retroactive application of DelCostello would further

purpose of the rule; Singer v. Flying Tiger Lines, 652

F.2d at 1353 (failing to address this criterion in analyz-

ing Mitchell). The disagreement between the court below

and other circuits thus derives from its application of

Chevron’s first criterion, i e., the degree to which the new

principle represents a clear break from prior precedent,

and the third criterion, i. e., the degree to which applica-

tion of the new principle would have inequitable results.

Because it regards these two inquiries as “closely re-

lated,” Glover v. United Grocers, 746 F.2d 1380, 1382

(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3824 (U.S.

16

1985), the court of appeals’ reasoning rests almost ex-

clusively upon its finding that Mitchell and DelCostello

departed from prior precedent. Indeed, that is the thresh-

old question. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381,

n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“An issue of ‘retro-

activity’ of a decision of this Court is not even presented

unless the decision in question marks a sharp break in

the web of the law”); Kremer v. Chemical Construction

Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1980) (“unless the

first [Chevron] factor is satisfied, there is no occasion to

consider the other two”), aff'd, 456 U.S. 461 (1982), and

cases cited therein.

In deciding that Mitchell broke with prior law, the

court of appeals relied upon Ninth Circuit authority sug-

gesting that a longer limitations period applied in suits

against unions and Eighth Circuit authority on suits

against employers.‘ Singer, 652 F.2d at 1353 (discussing

Mitchell) ; see also Barina, 726 F.2d at 562, App. 10a.

The mere existence of this precedent, however, hardly

suggests that this question of federal law was settled

before this Court gave its guidance. To the contrary,

the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that a review of

early authorities on this issue discloses “proliferating

cases in which the various district and circuit courts were

applying a bewildering variety of local statutes of limi-

tations to cases challenging the conduct of employers and

unions with reference to labor grievances.” Glover v.

United Grocers, 746 F.2d at 1382 (describing situation

before DelCostello).

»The Ninth Circuit's confusion on this issue is illustrated by the

fact that it did not announce a pre- Mitchell“ statute of limitations

for actions against employers until after Mitchell was decided.

See App. 2a; Singer, 652 F.2d at 1353 (applying California's four-

year statute in reliance on Eighth Circuit precedent) ; Christianson

v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 681 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 1982)

(applying Washington's three year statute of limitations). In these

circumstances, it is difficult to discern how Mitchell could break

sharply even from precedent within the circuit.

17

This Court should dispel the unfortunate notion that

its resolution of such turmoil can give rise to questions

of retroactivity. The first Chevron criterion can be ful-

filled only when a decision of this Court

explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court,

. . . or disapproves a practice this Court arguably

has sanctioned in prior cases, . . or overturns a

longstanding and widespread practice to which this

Court has not spoken, but which a near-wnanimous

body of lower court authority has expressly ap-

proved.

United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551 (citations

omitted) (emphasis added). Mitchell did none of these

things, as even a cursory analysis of that decision shows.

Given the many approaches to this unsettled issue,

litigants (and the judiciary) could hardly point to any

“near-unanimous” view overruled by Mitchell. Nor could

any litigant claim that Mitchell, in applying state stat-

utes governing efforts to overturn arbitration awards,

relied upon unfamiliar principles. Like the lower court

decisions addressing the issue, Mitchell chose an analo-

gous state statute. See 451 U.S. at 60. And in designat-

ing that statute, it looked not solely to questions of public

policy or legislative history, but to its decision in Hines

five years earlier. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 61. Mitchell

thus did not “mark a sharp break in the web of the law.”

See Milton, 407 U.S. at 381, n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

Rather, Mitchell was but a part of that seamless web,

relying upon established authority.

By the mere fact that Mitchell clarified confusing

lower court precedent, however, the court of appeals

found retroactivity inappropriate. If that were sufficient

grounds for applying a decision prospectively, the very

fact that “new law” is “new” would be enough to deny

it retrospective effect, no matter how unsettled “old”

law might have been. The Ninth Circuit’s approach thus

would grant prospective effect to any litigant adversely

18

affected by a new decision on statutes of limitation, a

per se result at odds with the painstaking analysis this

Court undertook in Chevron. This would turn on its

head the salutary principle “that we should not normally

have one law for old cases and another for new cases.”

Lawson, 698 F. 2d at 254.

Thus, as the district court held, Mitchell should have

governed this case, which was not even filed until after

this Court decided Mitchell. Consequently, DelCostello,

which extended by three months the applicable statute of

limitations under Mitchell, could have applied retroac-

tively as well. See Glover, 746 F.2d at 1382 (Del Costello

applies retroactively in Ninth Circuit when effect is to

lengthen statute of limitations prescribed by Mitchell).

Because Wilhite’s claim was time-barred under either

decision, the court below erred in reversing the district

court’s dismissal.

This error relates not only to the retroactive applica-

tion of Mitchell and DelCostello. Rather, it reflects a dis-

regard of the stabilizing rule that this Court’s decisions,

even if announcing “new” principles, must be presumed

to apply to all pending and future cases, no matter when

the rights asserted accrued.’ The substantial question

presented by the Ninth Circuit’s abandonment of this

presumption will arise each time that court feels it neces-

sary to apply its eccentric version of Chevron. As a

consequence, this Court should grant the writ to address

this important question of Chevron’s application.

5 Petitioner does not suggest that DelCostello should be applied

to permit collateral attacks on judgments that became final when

now-overruled concepts governed. See Chicot County Drainage

District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375 (1940) (decision

will not be applied retroactively to permit collateral attack on

judgment as to which no review was sought).

19

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to

review and reverse the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM R. Squires, III

STEPHEN M. RUMMAGE *

DAVIS, WRIGHT, Topo,

RIESE & JONES

4200 Seattle-First National

Bank Building

Seattle, Washington 98154

(206) 622-3150

* Counsel of Record for

Greyhound Lines, Inc.

June 28, 1985

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-4212

D.C. No. C81-739M

MELODY WILHITE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

GREYHOUND LINES, a corporation; and LocAL 1384,

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, a Labor Union; and

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO, a Labor

Union,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Honorable Walter T. McGovern, Chief Judge

United States District Judge, Presiding

Submitted: December 27, 1984 **

[Filed April 1, 1985]

** The panel is unanimously of the opinion that oral argument

is not required in this case. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Rule 3(f),

Rules of the Ninth Circuit.

2a

Before: GOODWIN, KENNEDY, and FLETCHER, Circuit

Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Melody Wilhite brought suit against both her former

employer, Greyhound Lines, and her union, Local 1384,

Amalgamated Transit Union, alleging breach of contract

by Greyhound and breach of the duty of fair representa-

tion by the union. She filed her complaint in state court

on May 26, 1981, sixteen months after her final day of

work for Greyhound. Defendants removed the action to

the United States District Court for the Western Dis-

trict of Washington and moved to dismiss the action on

the basis of the statute of limitations. The district court,

applying Washington’s three month statute of limitations

for vacating arbitral awards, Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180

(1981), granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and re-

manded plaintiff’s state law claim. From this decision

Wilhite appeals.

When plaintiff’s cause of action accrued, the period of

limitations applicable in Washington to hybrid 301 ac-

tions was three years. Christianson v. Pioneer Sand &

Gravel Co., 681 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 1982) (Wash.

Rev. Code § 4.16.080(3)’s three year statute of limita-

tions applies to suits against employers) ; Washington v.

Northland Marine Co., 681 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir.

1982) (Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2)’s three year stat-

ute of limitations applies to suits against unions).

By the time appellant had initiated this action, the

Supreme Court had issued its decision in United Parcel

Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), and the

applicable period of limitations for section 301 actions

against employers was the three-month period of limita-

tions set forth in section 7.04.180 of the Washington Re-

vised Code. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 64; Buscemi v.

* This disposition is not intended for publication and shall not

be cited as precedent. Rule 21, Rules of the Ninth Circuit.

3a

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir.

1984) ; McNaughton v. Dillingham Corp., 707 F.2d 1042,

1046 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984).

Mitchell does not, however, govern appellant’s suit against

her employer. Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation

Co., 726 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, Wil-

hite’s action against Greyhound is controlled by the three-

year statute of limitations applicable when her cause of

action accrued. Christianson, 681 F.2d at 581; Singer v.

Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir.

1981).

The district court also erred in applying Mitchell to

Wilhite’s suit against her union. Barina, 726 F.2d at

562; McNaughton, 707 F.2d at 1047-48. The relevant

period of limitations at the time suit was commenced was

three years. Northland Marine Co., 681 F.2d at 586.

After the action was filed, the Supreme Court held that

an employee’s action against either the employer or the

union under the LMRA is governed by the six-month lim-

itations period of section 10(b) of that Act. DelCostello

v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,

171-72; see 29 U.S.C. 8 160 (b) (1982). DelCostello does

not, however, control the result here, for this court has

refused to give it retroactive application where its effect

would be to shorten the applicable state statute. Barina,

726 F.2d at 563-64; Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union

No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984); cf. Glover v. United

Grocers, Inc., 746 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (Del-

Costello will be retroactively applied where effect of such

application is to lengthen time in which to file).

Wilhite’s suit, filed sixteen months after the accrual of

her cause of action, is timely as against both defendants.

The order of the district court is accordingly reversed.

Both sides are to bear their own costs on appeal.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

4a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

No. C81-739M

MELODY WILHITE,

Plaintiff,

V.

GREYHOUND LINES, et al.,

Defendants.

[Filed Sept. 9, 1983]

ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND ORDER OF REMAND

This case comes on for consideration before the under-

signed judge of the above-entitled court on the defend-

ants’ motion to dismiss. The ground for the motion is the

failure of the plaintiff to file her action within the ap-

plicable limitations period.

The complaint sets forth claims against plaintiff's em»

ployer under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management

Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1976), and against

her union for its alleged breach of its duty of fair repre-

sentation. Under DelCostello v. Teamsters, 51 U.S.L.W.

4693 (U.S. June 8, 1983), the limitations period applica-

ble to such joint breach-of-contract /duty-of-representation

actions is borrowed from the provisions governing un-

fair-labor-practice claims brought before the National La-

bor Relations Board. This period is six months. 29 U.S.C.

§ 160 (b) (1976). Judged by this standard, the current

plaintiff’s claim was untimely by ten months. The plain-

tiff argues, however, that the standard announced by the

Court in DelCostello in June 1983 should not retroactively

apply to bar her action filed in May 1981.

5a

DelCostello overturned the longstanding rule that joint

breach-of-contract/duty-of-representation claims incorpo-

rate the limitations period of the most analogous state

law cause of action. It does not appear, however, that

either DelCostello or the question of its retroactivity make

any difference in the question of the timeliness of the

current plaintiff’s actior.

In May 1981 when the plaintiff filed this action, the

question of its timeliness was determined under United

Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981). In

Mitchell, decided in April 1981, the Court held as a mat-

ter of federal law that a joint breach-of-contract/duty-

of-representation action was more analogous to a state-

court action to vacate an arbitration award than it was

to other types of state-law actions. Therefore, the limita-

tions period governing such joint federal claims was to

be that limitations period which governed state-law ac-

tions to vacate arbitrations. In Washington this period is

three months. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180 (1981); see

Engelsberg v. Transcon Lines, 530 F. Supp. 628, 632

(W.D. Wash. 1982). Under Mitchell, it was this three-

month period, incorporated into federal law, which gov-

erned the timeliness of plaintiff’s action. Hence the plain-

tiff's action was untimely when filed regardless of the

retroactivity of the recent DelCostello decision. Mitchell

was rendered prior to the filing of the current lawsuit

and no question of retroactivity is presented.

For these reasons, the plaintiff’s federal claims must be

dismissed as untimely. Since no basis remains for juris-

diction over the pendent state-law claim, the state-law

claim is hereby remanded to the King County Superior

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1976).

DATED this 9th day of September, 1983.

s, Walter T. McGovern

WALTER T. MCGOVERN

Chief United States

District Judge

6a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-4212

DC# CV 81-739M

MELODY WILHITE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—

GREYHOUND LINES, a corporation; and LocaL 1384,

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, a Labor Union; and

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO, a Labor

Union,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington (Seattle)

JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Transcript

of the Record from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Washington (Seattle) and was

duly submitted.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here

ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment

7a

of the said District Court in this Cause be, and hereby is

reversed & remanded each side to bear their own costs

on appeal.

A TRUE Copy

ATTEST

Apr. 23, 1985

Clerk of Court

by: /s/ Joseph Williams

Deputy Clerk

Filed and entered: April 1, 1985

8a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-5752

CARMELO REYES BARINA,

Plainti ff-A ppellant,

V.

GuLF TRADING AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, A DIVI-

SION OF GULF Ou. CoRPORATION, a Corporation and

THE NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, an un-

incorporated association,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 7, 1983

Decided Feb. 23, 1984

Before SKOPIL, FERGUSON and CANBY, Circuit

Judges.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:

Barina breught this action against his employer under

§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

$ 185, and against his union for violating its duty of fair

representation. The district court dismissed the entire

action as untimely. In this appeal, we must decide

whether to apply retroactively the statute of limitations

required by either United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,

451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), or

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

—ͤ—ũ— — — — —

—

ga

— US. ——, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1983).

We conclude that neither Mitchell nor Del Costello should

de applied retroactively. We therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

Gulf Trading and Transportation Company Gulf

discharged Barina on October 29, 1979. Barina

to his union, the National Maritime Union (NMU).

NMU obtained a settlement of the grievance which af-

forded Barina reinstatement, but not payment of full

back wages. NMU notified Barina of the settlement by

letter on June 11, 1980. Barina disapproved of the set-

tlement and brought suit on June 24, 1981, against Gulf

under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and against NMU for violation of

its duty of fair representation. Following the pattern in

hybrid § 301/fair representation actions, the complaint

alleged that the union violated its duty of fair represen-

tation during the grievance proceeding and that the

terms of the settlement violated the collective bargaining

agreement.

Barina’s cause of action accrued on July 12, 1980.

Under the then prevailing law, Barina’s action against

The settlement resulted from an informal grievance proceeding.

Although the settlements involved in Mitchell and DelCostello re-

sulted from arbitration, not an informal grievance proceeding,

nothing turns on this distinction. The same limitation periods

apply whether an employee's grievance is resolved with or without

going to arbitration. McNaughton v. Dillingham Corp., 707 F.2d

— 1046 (9th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 722 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir.

).

The district court selected July 12, 1980, as the date of accrual

had been finally resolved. Barina contends that accrual occurred

10a

Gulf and NMU was timely. Because California law

would have been the source of the applicable limitations,’

Barina had four years to file his suit against his em-

ployer, Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349,

1353 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the four-year limitation

for suits on written contracts provided by Cal.Civ.Proc.

Code § 337), and three years to file his suit against the

union, id. (applying the three-year limitation for suits

“upon liability created by statute” provided by Cal.Civ.

Proc. Code § 338(1)); accord Edwards v. Teamsters

Local Union No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.1983). As

Barina filed his action less than a year after it accrued,

his suit féll well within the then prevailing time limita-

tions.

The district court, however, applied United Parcel

Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67

L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), retroactively. It accordingly dis-

missed Barina’s action as time barred. Mitchell held that

the state limitation on challenges to commercial arbitra-

tion applied to suits brought by an employee against his

employer to set aside a labor arbitration decision. The

district court interpreted Mitchell as applying both to

Barina’s claim against Gulf and to his fair representa-

tion claim against NMU. Because California law pro-

vides a 100-day limitation period for challenges to com-

mercial arbitration, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1288.2, the dis-

all are within the limitation period that we apply. We therefore

need not resolve whether accrual occurs when the employee learns,

or should have learned, that his dispute was finally resolved, as the

district court held, or whether accrual occurs when the employee

learns, or should have learned, that the union may have violated

its duty of fair representation. For simplicity, we accept the dis-

trict court’s determination of accrual.

The parties agree that California is the appropriate source

for all relevant state law.

4 Mitchell was decided on April 20, 1981, slightly more than

nine months after Barina’s cause of action accrued.

lla

trict court concluded that Barina’s claims against Gulf

and NMU were time barred.

After the district court’s decision dismissing Barina’s

action, the Supreme Court decided DelCostello v. Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, —— U.S. ——, 103

S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). DelCostello holds

that the applicable statute of limitations in hybrid § 301/

fair representation actions brought against the employer

and the union is the six-month limitation period con-

tained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,

29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Gulf and NMU argue that, if we

decline to uphold the district court’s retroactive applica-

tion of Mitchell, we should nevertheless affirm the district

court by giving retrospective operation to DelCostello.

ANALYSIS

I. Barina’s suit against NMU

The district court erred in applying Mitchell retroac-

tively to Barina’s claim against NMU. We have held

that Mitchell applies only to the employee’s claim against

his employer and that it does not affect the limitation

applicable to the employee’s claim against his union.

McNaughton v. Dillingham Corporation, 707 F.2d 1042,

1047-48 (9th Cir. 1983) (“McNaughton I”), reh’g de-

ved, 722 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1984) (“McNaughton IT”) ;

Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 719 F.2d

— 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1983). Those holdings control

Nor can DelCostello be applied retroactively to bar

Barina’s claim against NMU. We squarely confronted

that question in Edwards v. Teamsters Local No. 36, 719

F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1983). There we decided

that DelCostello was not to be ied retroacti

cord McNaughton II. * 9

We recognize that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and

Eleventh Circuits reached conclusions contrary to Edwards and

12a

Because Mitchell is inapplicable and Del Costello does

not apply retroactively, we reverse the district court’s

dismissal of Barina’s action against NMU.

II. Barina’s claim against Gulf

A. Retroactive application of Mitchell.

In Singer v. Flying Tiger Line Inc., 652 F.2d 1349,

1353 (9th Cir. 1981), we held that Mitchell was not to be

applied retroactively to an action brought by an employee

against his employer to set aside an arbitration decision.

That ruling controls here.“

Gulf argues that Singer should not be followed because

it was effectively overruled by Local 1020 of the United

Brotherhood of Carpenters v. FMC Corporation, 658 F.2d

1285 (9th Cir. 1981), and San Diego County District

Council of Carpenters v. Cory, 685 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir.

1982). In those cases, we did apply the short state limi-

tation applicable to action to set aside commercial

arbitration to claims arising prior to Mitchell. Neither

case, however, discussed the retroactivity issue. More im-

applied DelCostello retroactively. Perez v. Dana Corporation, 718

F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1983); Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co.,

723 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc.,

720 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1983); Lincoln v. District 9 of the Inter-

national Association of Machinists, 723 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1983) ;

Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1983),

The Seventh Circuit has also applied DelCostello retroactively with-

out discussing the issue. Metz v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 715

F.2d 299, 301-803 (7th Cir. 1983). Edwards v. Teamsters Local

Union No. 36 and McNaughton II, however, establish the law of

this circuit and binds us. We also happen to agree with their

i

* Because the plaintiff was an airline employee in Singer, the

action against the employer was brought under the Railway Labor

Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., rather than under § 301 of the Labor

U.S.C. § 185. This distinction, which

court in Singer ignored, is without import and does not pro-

13a

portant, both cases involved a union suing

|

to have an arbitration decision set aside on the ground

that the decision did not draw its essence from the collec-

tive bargaining agreements. That cause of action lacks

a fair representation element and thus differs from the

cause of action here and at issue in Mi United

Brotherhood of Carpenters v. FMC Corporation, 724 F.2d

815, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1984). Therefore, those cases do

not effectively overrule Singer.’

B. Retroactive application of DelCostello

We lack controlling precedent concerning DelCostello’s

,

the district court. Id. at 1047 n. 5.

We reject Gulf's contention that McNaughton I’ reasoning

quires application of California's 100-day limitation apart from ite

reliance on Mitchell. Mitchell is fundamental to McNaughton 18

l4a

from the Supreme Court's prior direction in

Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 US. 696, 704-05,

1107, 1112-13, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), that

cable statute of limitations be drawn from

8 8

:

155

4

7

5

3

S

N

8

:

8

2

8 BE

25

553

=

i

8882

The second Chevron Oil factor does favor retroactivity

in this case. A substantial purpose behind the six-month

limitation developed in DelCostello is to give finality to

labor disputes. 103 S.Ct. at 2294. Affording Barina four

years in which to sue the employer detracts from the

principle of finality. In our view, however, the strength

of the considerations relating to the first and third fac-

tors outweigh that relating to the second factor in this

case. See Singer, 652 F.2d at 1353. We conclude that

Del Costello should not applied retroactively to bar

15a

Singer, Edwards, and McNaughton II confirm our de-

cision not to apply DelCostello retroactively to Barina’s

suit against Gulf. Those cases presented issues analogous

to the one we now decide. In Singer, we confronted the

question whether a 100-day limitation mandated by Mit-

chell should be applied retroactively to an employee’s suit

against his employer; in Edwards and McNaughton II,

the issue was whether De/Costello’s six-month limitation

should be applied retroactively to an employee’s fair rep-

resentation suit against his union. All three cases re-

solved their analogous issues as we do here: they decided

against retroactive application.

Because neither Mitchell nor DelCostello may be ap-

plied retroactively to Barina’s suit against Gulf, the dis-

trict court’s dismissal of Barina’s action against Gulf,

like its dismissal of Barina’s action against NMU, was

erroneous. We reverse and remand for further proceed-

ings.

l6a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 999, Docket 83-7976

ROMAN WELYCZKO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

U.S. AR, INC. and THOMAS POMEROY as Chairman of

the International Association of Machinists and Aero-

space Workers, Local No. 75, Distriet 141,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Argued March 30, 1984

Decided April 25, 1984

Before KAUFMAN, KEARSE and PIERCE, Circuit

Judges.

IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge:

Roman Welyczko appeals from the dismissal of his

hybrid claim against his employer for wrongful dis-

charge, and against his union for breach of its duty of

fair representation. The district judge based his action

upon the Supreme Court’s decision in DelCostello v. In-

ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103

S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), which established a

six-month statute of limitations for claims under § 301 of

the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29

U.S.C. § 185(a). We hold that the DelCostello decision

17a

has both retroactive and prospective application, and

therefore affirm the dismissal of Welyczko’s complaint.

I

We shall briefly review the facts. The parties have

agreed that Welyczko was an employee of U.S. Air, Inc.

(“U.S. Air“) and that the terms and conditions of his

employment were governed by a collective bargaining

agreement between U.S. Air and the International Asso-

ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”).

Welyczko was granted a 90-day medical leave of absence

on May 5, 1975. On or about July 31 of that year, he

wrote to his employer requesting an extension of leave.

He reiterated that request by telegram on August 3. Ap-

proximately three days later, Welyczko received a letter

from a U.S. Air executive, notifying him that his request

for extended leave would be considered only upon receipt

of corroboration from a physician that additional leave

was necessary. Because his doctor was then on vacation,

Welyczko decided to forward to U.S. Air a second copy

of the physician’s note, dated May 5. This document had

accompanied his original application for leave.

U.S. Air refused to accept the copy as adequate sub-

stantiation. Accordingly, when Welyczko did not return

to work, the company terminated his employment on

August 26, 1975. This discharge was made retroactive

to August 5, the day his authorized leave expired.

Welyczko responded by requesting an officer of the IAM

to arrange a special hearing on his discharge, pursuant

to the collective bargaining agreeemnt. The IAM con-

tradicts this by replying that Welyezko was advised that

he himself would have to make a written request for such

a hearing. In any event, the hearing was never held, and

the discharge action became final.

The instant suit was commenced in New York State

Supreme Court on March 5, 1981, and was subsequently

removed to federal court. After DelCostello was decided,

18a

appellees moved for summary judgment asserting that

the statute of limitations adopted in that case should ap-

ply retroactively to Welyczko’s cause of action, which ac-

erued in 1975. On November 1, 1983, in a ruling from

the bench, Chief Judge Munson granted the motion.

Welyczko appeals.

II

In DelCostello, the Supreme Court decided that a uni-

form federal statute of limitations should apply to claims

under § 301 of the LMRA. In the absence of an ex-

pressly applicable federal limitations period, the Court

acknowledged, the “most closely analogous statute of lim-

itations under state law” would normally govern. 103

S.Ct. at 2287. The Court concluded, however, that the

“federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litiga-

tion make [federal law] a significantly more appropriate

vehicle for interstitial lawmaking” in this instance. /d.

at 2294. It therefore held that the six-month time limit

on unfair labor practice complaints under § 10(b) of the

National Labor Relations Act applied to § 301 claims as

well.

Welyezko's claim must be construed as arising under

the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seg., which

governs air carriers in lieu of the LMRA. See 29 U.S.C.

§$§ 142, 152; 45 U.S.C. 8 181. We agree with the Ninth

Circuit, however, that this distinction is “without im-

port.” Barina v. Gulf Trading and Transportation Co.,

726 F.2d 560, 563 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984). The same

policies which led the Supreme Court to apply a federal

statute of limitations to claims under § 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act apply with equal force to sub-

stantively identical claims under the Railway Labor Act.

We have already applied the DelCostello rule retro-

actively, although the issue was not specifically discussed.

Assad v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 703 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),

vacated, —— US. , 104 S.Ct. 54, 78 L.Ed.2d 73

(1983), on remand, 725 F.2d 837 (1984). Our action

—— ͥͤ — ——4——

19a

there was consistent with the “general rule of long stand-

ing” that “judicial precedents normally have retroactive

as well as prospective effect.” National Association of

Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118, 1130 (D.C. Cir.

1976), quoted in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,

623 F.2d 786, 788 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 461,

101 S.Ct. 3107, 69 L.Ed.2d 970 (1982). All but one of

the circuits considering the retroactivity of DelCostello

have reached the same result. Perez v. Dana Corp.,

Parish Frame Division, 718 F.2d 581 (3rd Cir. 1983) ;

Murray v. Branch Motor Exprese Co., 723 F.2d 1146

(4th Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 720

F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1983) ; Curtis v. Int’l Brotherhood of

Teamsters, Local 299, 716 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1983)

(per curiam) (dictum); Storck v. Int’l Brotherhood of

Teamsters, Local Union No. 600, 712 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.

1983) (per curiam); Lincoln v. District 9 of the Int'l

Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 723 F.2d 627

(8th Cir. 1983) ; Hand v. Int'l Chemical Workers Union,

712 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); contra,

Edwards v. Teamsters Local No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036 (9th

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, ——- U.S. ——, 104 S.Ct. 1599,

80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984).

III

Appellant urges us to carve out an exception to the

retroactivity principle so that his claim may proceed, ar-

guing that under the three-factor test articulated by the

Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.

97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the DelCostello

holding should be given only prospective application.

Most of the authorities just cited, however, applied the

Chevron test and found that DelCoste!lo should be ap-

plied retroactively. See Perez v. Dana Corp., Parish

Frame Division, supra, 718 F.2d at 584-85; Mur uy v.

Branch Motor Express Co., supra (adopting reasoning of

Perez); Edwards v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., supra, 720

F.2d at 860-62; Lincoln v. District 9 of the Int’l Ass’n of

20a

Machinists and Aerospace Workers, supra, 723 F.2d at

629-30. Moreover, in our view this case does not present

circumstances in which the use of the Chevron test would

be appropriate.

Were we asked to decide if retrospective effect should

be given to a new rule which our court had pronounced,

the policy factors enumerated in Chevron Oil would in-

deed be determinative. See United States v. Fitzgerald,

545 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1976). Similarly, had the

Supreme Court given no indication whether DelCostello

should apply retroactively, a Chevron Oil analysis would

also be in order. But these factors are not present here.

The Supreme Court not only adopted a new statute of

limitations in DelCostello; it applied that time bar retro-

actively to govern the very claim at issue in the case

before it. We have noted that “the Supreme Court is

well aware of how te avoid the effects of applying one

of its rulings retroactively to the case at bar.” Cates v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir.

1977). Thus, when that Court itself has given retrospec-

tive application to a newly-adopted principle, “no sound

reason exists for not doing so here.” Holzsager v. Valley

Hospital, 646 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir. 1981). A court of

appeals must defer to the Supreme Court’s directive on

this issue, explicit or implicit. See United States v. Fitz-

gerald, supra, at 582. Certainly, its intended application

is clear in this case.

We therefore decline appellant’s invitation to exclude

his suit from the DelCostello holding. Rather, we adopt

for this circuit the rule that in employment termination

cases, a six-month statute of limitations applies both ret-

roactively and prospectively to wrongful discharge failure

to represent claims. Because Welyczko’s complaint was

filed more than five years after his termination, it is

clearly time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

of the district court dismissing Welyczko’s complaint.

OPPOSITION

BRIEF

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

a>

AUG 12 1985

No. 84-2016

JOSEPH F SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384,

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,

Respondents.

>

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Curervi M. Lora“

Attorney at Law

3045 California Avenue S. W.

Seattle, Washington 98116

(206) 938-3475

Attorney for Respondent

Melody Wihite

*Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING co. (800) 835-7427 Ext. 333

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the court below properly denied retroactive

effect to this Court's decisions in United Parcel Service v.

Mitchell and DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of

Teamsters.

A. Whether a federal court of appeals my deny ret-

roactivity to a Supreme Court decision, which adopts a

federal statute of limitations, which significantly shortens

the statute of limitations applicable at the time the case

was filed.

B. Whether Mitchell and DelCostello apply im a case

where there has been no ‘‘final and binding” determina-

tion of a grievance, arrived at through the collectively bar-

gained method of resolving the grievance.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW __ i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

RELIEF REQUESTED __ 2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1

ARGUMENT __ 3

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PROPERLY DETERMINED DELCOSTELLO

SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROAC-

TIVELY. 5

Il DELCOSTELLO SHOULD NOT BE THE

PRECEDENT USED IN DECIDING THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS

— 7

C00 —

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases :

Christianson v. Pioneer Sand and Gravel Co., 1

F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982) — 9

Chevron Oil Co. „ — — Set.

349, 30 L.Ed. 296 (1971) , 4. 3. 6

Cipriane v. City of Houma, 395 US. 701, 89 S.Ct

1897, 23 LEAA 647 (1969) 6

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Team-

sters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) 3, 4,5, 6,7

Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No. 36, 719

88 ä —

1599 (1984) . — 4. 6

Engelsburg v. Transcom — Inc., 530 F. Supp.

628 (W.D. Wash. 1982) _ 7,8

— — —

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 717 F.2d

1036 (7th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 707

(1984) 6

Graves v. Smith’s Transfer Corp., 736 F.2d 819

(Ist Cir., 1984) 6

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554,

96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976) 9

Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d

1146 (4th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 292

(1984) 6

Perez v. Dana Corporation, 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.,

1983) 6

Price v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 586

F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978) FE . 6,7,8

Singer v. Flying — Line, Inc., 652 F. 2d 1349

r ̃èê ² T2 A

Smith v. General Motors ra 747 F.2d 372 (6th

Cir., 1984) (en banc) 6

United Parcel Service v. Mitchel’, 451 U.S. 56

e ‚ ‚ . 4, 6. 7, 8, 9

ö

Srarurks:

e .... ae

29 U.S.C. § 185 1 38

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1254(1) Petitioner Greyhound

Lines, Inc., has submitted a Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to secure review of the judgment and opinion of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in

this proceeding on April 1, 1985.

Initially, this case was filed as a civil action in the

Superior Court for the County of King in the State of

Washington on or about May 26, 1981. The case was re-

moved to the United States District Court for the Western

District of Washington at Seattle upon the petition of

Greyhound Lines, Inc., on or about June 22, 1981. The co-

defendant in the case, Local 1384, Amalgamated Transit

Union, consented to the removal on or about August 3,

1981.

On August 11, 1983, Local 1384 filed a “Motion to Dis-

miss or for Summary Judgment.’’ On August 18, 1983,

Greyhound Lines, Inc., also filed a Motion to Dismiss or

for Summary Judgment.”

On September 2, 1983, Wilhite filed a memorandum

and affidavit in opposition to these motions. Local 1384

filed a reply memorandum on September 7, 1983. An Or-

der of Dismissal and Order of Remand to the King County

Superior Court’’ was entered by the Honorable Walter T.

McGovern, Chief United States District Judge, on Septem-

ber 9, 1983. Wilhite appealed that order and prevailed on

appeal.

2

2

RELIEF REQUESTED

Wilhite opposes the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

and respectfully requests that this court:

1) Deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, or

2) In the alternative, affirm the United States Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals’ judgment entered April 1,

1985.

Wilhite further petitions this Court for an award of

attorney’s fees pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court Rule 49(2).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On December 15, 1979, Wilhite and a male co-worker

walked two blocks from Greyhound’s Seattle, Washington,

shop to get a sandwich and soft drink for lunch, a com-

mon practice for Greyhound employees. They went to a

tavern, called the Press Box Tavern, which serves hot

home-made soups and sandwiches, and they ordered hot

sandwiches and soft drinks to take out.

Upon return to work, Wilhite and her co-worker were

called into the Superintendent’s office. They were told

that they were fired but could avoid a record of an ‘‘ Alco-

hol Termination’’ by resigning immediately.

Wilhite under duress and without Union representa-

tion, signed a resignation and immediately thereafter ap-

pealed to Local 1384, requesting that a grievance be filed

for discharge in violation of the contract.

Wilhite’s male co-worker, confronted with the same

choice said he would not resign. He was terminated and

also appealed to Local 1384.

The Union requested hearings for both Wilhite and

her male co-worker. A hearing was scheduled for the male

co-worker. As a result of this hearing, he was reinstated

as of December 27, 1979. The hearing officer determined

that the penalty of dismissal was too severe for the al-

leged offense. The company reinstated Mr. Hanson with

full retroactive pay and seniority.

In response to Wilhite’s grievance, Greyhound failed

to schedule a hearing, notifying Local 1384 that Ms. Wil-

hite had resigned and was no longer an employee. Local

1384 made no effort to further represent Wilhite and did

not appeal the Company’s rejection of her grievance with-

in the time limits established by the Collective Bargaining

Agreement.

As a resuit of these actions by both the Company and

Union, Wilhite filed suit in King County Superior Court

for the State of Washington.

— *

~~

This Court grants review on writ of certiorari ‘‘only

when there are special and important reasons.’’ Sup. Ct.

R. 17. This case does not present circumstances justifying

a writ.

Prior to DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the question of the timeli-

ness of suits brought pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Man-

agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 4 185, was frequently liti-

gated, but always under the sam. guiding principle—the

application of the most suitable and analogous state stat-

+

ute or rule for timeliness. In adopting a new standard,

DelCostello now establishes a federal statute of limita-

tions for suits against employers and unions, commenced

after an employee has exhausted all internal grievance

procedures and administrative remedies.

Petitioner asserts that the issue of retroactivity re-

quires this Court’s clarification. However, for suits filed

prior to DelCostello, this Court already has set forth a

clear and concise policy regarding nonretroactivity. Chev-

ron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.

296 (1971), enumerated the three factors to be applied to

establish nonretroactivity. The ultimate result in Chevron

Oil was to deny retroactivity where the ‘‘new’’ statute of

limitations to be imposed was significantly shorter than the

previously applied statute of limitations.

This Court has remained consistently sensitive to the

need to provide employees adequate time in which to pre-

pare their cases against their employers and their unions.

Most importantly, this Court has refused to apply retro-

actively cases whereby the plaintiffs would be deprived of

their opportunity to obtain redress for wrongs occasioned

them.

Moreover, in denying certiorari in Edwards v. Team-

sters Local Union No. 36, 719 F.2d 1036 [9th Cir., 1983,

cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1599 (1984) J, this Court determined

that the exact same issue raised by this appeal did not

warrant the Court’s attention. Significantly, the Edwards

case involved a fact pattern consistent with the DelCostello

and Mitchell cases, unlike the case at hand which raises

significant factual differences, as well as serious equitable

concerns.

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PROPERLY DETERMINED DELCOSTELLO |

SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVE.

LY.

In declining retroactive application of a statute of

limitations, this Court in Chevron Oi Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.

97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed. 2d 296 (1971), set forth three

factors to consider:

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively musi

establish a new principle of law, either by overruling

clear past precedent on which litigants may have re-

lied . . or by deciding an issue of first impression

whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed .

Second, it has been stvessed that “we must. . weigh

the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the

rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether

SN ee ee

. Finally, we have weighed the inequity

— by retroactive application, for (here a

decision of this Court could produce substantial in-

equitable results if applied retroactively, there is

ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or

hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”

Prior to DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the lower federal courts

had agreed that the applicable statute of limitations in hy-

brid cases alleging an emplover’s breach of a collective bar

gaining agreement under Section 301 of LMRA, 29 U.S.C.

§ 185, should be the applicable state statute of limitations.

The application of state statutes of limitation was, in fact,

the clear, past precedent. DelCostello effectively adopted

a new, federal six month statute of limitations, applicable

to both employers and unions where the employee’s rights

6

under collective bargaining agreements had been pursued.

The cases cited by the petitioner in support of its position

merely demonstrate the application of the clear rules set

forth in Chevron Oil and DelCostello by each of the appel-

late courts. In almost every single case cited by petitioner,

either shorter state statutes of limitation were extended

by DelCostello (Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 717

F.2d 1036 (7th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 707

(1984); Murray v. Branch Motor Erpress Co., 723 F.2d

1146 (4th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 292 (1984);

Perez v. Dana Corporation, 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir., 1983);

Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.,

1984) (en hang) J, or the action was filed after DelCostello

was decided (Graves v. Smith's Transfer Corp, 736 F.2d

819 (ist Cir., 1984)).

Also following Chevron Oi, and consistent with this

Court’s prior rulings, the 9th Cireuit Court of Appeals in

Edwards, supra, acknowledged what this Court initially

set forth in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89

S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969)—

It would . . . produce the most ‘‘substantial inequitable

reaulis’’.. . to hold that the respondent ‘‘slept on his

rights” at a time when he could not have known the

time limitation that the law imposed on him.

Chevron Ou, supra, at 108.

Likewise, in the present case, Wilhite filed long before

the decision in DelCostello. She had only the precedent

set forth by Price v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,

586 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978), as a model for the limitation

on bringing suit. Even Mitchell, decided only a month

before she filed her suit, provided no clue as to the statute

of limitations applicable in her case. Unlike Mitchell, she

was afforded the opportunity to have her case reviewed

by any fact-finding tribunal, which would have resulted in

an appealable, final and binding decision. Moreover, the

7

applicable state statute of limitations was no less than two

years.

Equity dictates the prospective application of De

Costello, Wilhite's claim was diligently pursued un

der the statutes of limitation applicable at the time her

suit was filed. Wilhite’s Breach of Contract/Duty of

Fair Representation claims were filed May 26, 1981, well

within the two year statute of limitations, established by

Price, supra. If either Mitchell or DelCostello were to be

applied to this case, Wilhite will have lost her opportunity

to have her case regarding breach of contract and duty of

fair representation ever adjudicated.

II. DELCOSTELLO SHOULD NOT BE THE PREC.

EDENT USED IN DECIDING THE STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS CASE.

DelCostello should not be the precedent used in decid-

ing the statute of limitations in this case. First, the Mitch-

ell decision, which was refined by this court in DelCostello,

was made just one month before Wilhite filed her case, and

DelCostello was decided over one year after Wilhite filed

her case. Second, this case does not involve a decision

from an arbitration hearing. Wilhite has never been af-

forded a fact-finding hearing, of any nature, on her breach

of contract/duty of fair representation claims.

The first reason advanced by Wilhite has already

been discussed in Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, lac., 652

F. 2d 1349, at 1353 (9th Cir. 1981) and in Engelsberg v.

Transcom Lines, Inc, 530 F. Supp. 628, at 632, (W. D.

Wash. 1982). The Court in the Singer case refused to ap-

ply the rule decided in Mitchell, even though the Plaintiff

had filed his case in 1978 and the Mitchell case was decided

prior to oral argument in the Singer case. The Court

stated, Although the Price decision is not precisely on

point, we believe Singer might reasonably have relied upon

it to conelude that he had three years to file a claim.” 652

F. 2d at 1353. Engelsberg was a case filed in 1980. In this

ease, the Court held that ‘‘the Court is bound by the hold-

ing in Singer v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 652 F.2d 1349 (9th

Cir. 1981) to apply a two-year statute of limitations for

the present action. In Singer, the Ninth Circuit held that

the Mitchell characterization would not be applied retro-

actively. Singer found the rule of the Mitchell case

is not one which might have been anticipated.’’ 652 F.2d

at 1353. The Court felt that the Plaintiff in Singer might

reasonably have relied on the Ninth Cireuit’s statement in

Price to conclude that he had a longer period than that

expressed in Mitchell in which to file his suit. The Dis

trict Court went on to state, ‘‘The Singer Court held that

to apply the Mitchell rule retroactively in light of Price

would be inequitable.’’ That Court held that the holding

in Mitchell would be given only prospective effect, and

that the Plaintiff in Engelsberg would be governed by the

Washington catchall statute of limitations, R.C.W. § 4.16.

130, a two year statute of limitations for actions for liabil-

ity created by statute if not provided for elsewhere.

As a second objection to the use of the limitation in

Mitchel’, the Appellant points out that there was no griev-

ance procedure involved in this case. The case was never

submitted to an arbitrator from whose opinion Appellant

might have appealed. Instead, a letter was written to the

Company by the Union, a reply was written by the Com-

pany, and the entire situation was dropped. The grievance

was never pursued. The holding in the Mitchell case was

specifically aimed at providing a statute of limitation for

„ hybrid ‘4 301 and breach of duty suit’ brought by an

employee against both his employer and his union in order

to set aside a ‘final and binding’ determination of a griev-

ance, arrived at through the collectively bargained method

of resolving the grievance.’’ 451 U.S. 56, 66.

This concept is also discussed in Christianson v. Pio-

neer Sand and Gravel Co., 681 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982).

The Court diseussed the purpose of arbitration and the

finality of the decision reached by the arbitrator. The

Court went on to say, In the present case, however, the

arbitration process was never reached; in fact, the Union

never even processed appellant's grievances. Therefore,

the concept of finality, which controlled in Hines and

Mitchell, is totally inapposite here.” Hines v. Anchor

Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L. Bd.2d

231 (1976); United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56,

101 8. Ct. 1559, 67 L. Ed.2d 732 (1981).

Appellant was never afforded the grievance procedure

which is such an integral part of the decision in the Del.

Costello and Mitchell cases. She was not entitled to have

an arbitrator hear the circumstances and render a decision

in accordance with the collectively barg ined agreement.

She was bound by the unwillingness of the union to pursne

what she felt was a legitimate grievance. To permit the

employer and the union in this case to join forces and

first, to disregard the collective bargaining agreement and

then, to claim protective cover from the statute of limita-

tions developed in cases where the agreement had been

complied with procedurally would strike down the con-

cepts of equity so fervently protected by this Court.

0

10

For all the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of

certiorari should be denied. In the alternative, the deci-

sion of the lower court should be affirmed in this instance.

Respectfully submitted,

Curry. M. Lerrta*®

Attorney at Law

3045 California Avenue S. W.

Seattle, Washington 98116

(206) 938-3475

Attorney for Respondent

Melody Wihite

; *Counsel of Record

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©

No. 84-2016 YOSEPH F. SPANIOL. 48

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384, AMALGAMATED

TRANSIT UNION,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

WILLIAM R. SQUIRES, III

STEPHEN M. RUMMAGE *

DAVIS, WRIGHT, TODD, RIESE

& JONES

4200 Seattle-First National

Bank Building

Seattle, Washington 98154

(206) 622-3150

*Counsel of Record for

Greyhound Lines, Inc.

—ññ ee a a e.

- 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

WILSON - Eres PRINTING Co. lc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

OPINION BELOW * l

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 2

I. THE ABSENCE OF AN ARBITRATION DE-

CISION IN THIS CASE HAS NO BEARING

ON THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMI-

D 6 2

II. BY REFUSING TO GIVE RETROACTIVE

APPLICATION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF

DELCOSTELLO, THE DECISION BELOW

CONFLICTS WITH THE VIEWS OF OTHER

COURTS OF APPEAL ON ISSUES OF EN-

DURING IMPORTANCE , 5 N 3

~]

CONCLUSION .....................

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Aarsvold v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 545 F. Supp.

622 (D. Minn. 1982), 724 F.2d 72 (8th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3538 (1984)

Badon v. General Motors, Corp., 679 F.2d 93 (6th

/ eee

Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co., 726

F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984)

Byrne v. Buffalo Creek Railroad Co., 765 F.2d 364

LI...

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (19717

Christianson v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 681

F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982)

Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Team-

sters, 510 F. Supp. 716 (D. Md. 1981), on re-

consideration, 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1981),

aff'd mem., 679 F. 2d 879 (4th Cir. 1982), rev'd,

462 U.S. 151 (1983), on remand, 716 F.2d 247

(4th Cir. 1983), on remand, 588 F. Supp. 902

(D. Md. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir.

1 — ——˖ f

Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Team-

sters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)

Ender v. Chrysler Corp., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)

1199 (N.D. III. 1983), aff'd mem., 749 F.2d 34

(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2706

NR

Flores v. Levy Co., 757 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1985)

Flowers v. Local 2602, Steelworkers, 671 F.2d 87

(2d Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. DelCostello v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462

e.. ee

Hall v. Printing & Graphic Arts Union, 696 F.2d

oo | See

Harpp v. General Electric Co., 571 F. Supp. 426

. eh a

McNaughton v. Dillingham Corp., 707 F.2d 1042

(9th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 722 F.2d 1459

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984)

Page

2,3

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Murray v. Branch Motor Express Co., 723 F.2d

1146 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.

292 (1984) SS ee

Perez v. Dana Corp., 545 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. Pa.

1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1983)

Price v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 586

F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978

Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d 1247

(11th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied, 727 F.2d 1116

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 292 (1984)

Scaglione v. Communications Workers of America,

Local 1395, 586 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1983),

aff'd, 759 F.2d 201 (Ist Cir. 1985)...

Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 931 (3d Cir.

r è¾% )

United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56

/ Le

Vallone v. Local Union No. 705, International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520 (7th

/ . A

Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 512 (1984)...

Wilhite v. Greyhound Lines, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)

3091 (W.D. Wash. 1983)...

Zemonick v. Consolidation Coal Co., 762 1 2d 381

eh ——

STATUTE

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180

Page

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 84-2016

GREYHOUND LINEs, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

MELODY WILHITE; LOCAL 1384, AMALGAMATED

TRANSIT UNION,

Respondente

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

Petitioner Greyhound Lines, Inc., submits this reply

brief in support of its petition for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment and opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in this

proceeding on April 1, 1985.

OPINION BELOW

The district court’s opinion is now reported at Wilhite

v. Greyhound Lines, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3091 (W.D.

Wash. 1983). The Ninth Circuit’s opinion remains un-

reported.

2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE ABSENCE OF AN ARBITRATION DECISION

IN THIS CASE HAS NO BEARING ON THE APPRO-

PRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Wilhite urges that this Court consider whether the

limitations periods prescribed by United Parcel Service v.

Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981), and DelCostello v. Inter-

national Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983),

apply to cases in which an employee’s grievance has been

resolved short of arbitration. This issue does not, how-

ever, merit the Court’s attention, for the lower federal

courts have resolved the question with remarkable

unanimity.

Prior to DelCostello, numerous lower courts held that

the statute of limitations ordained by Mitchell applied to

cases in which employee grievances were resolved without

proceeding to arbitration. Perez v. Dana Corp., 545 F.

Supp. 950, 951 (E. D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 581 (3d

Cir. 1983); Badon v. General Motors Corp., 679 F.2d 93,

96 (6th Cir. 1982); Hall v. Printing & Graphic Arts

Union, 696 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1982); Aarsvold v.

Greyhound Lines, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 622, 624 (D. Minn.

1982), aff'd, 724 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,

104 S. Ct. 3538 (1984); McNaughton v. Dillingham

Corp., 707 F.2d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied,

722 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 291

(1984). Recognizing that [a] decision by the union not

to proceed with a grievance is no less final a determina-

tion than an arbitration award,” decisions after Del-

Costello likewise held that the absence of an arbitration

award does not justify application of a different limita-

tions period. Vallone v. Local Union No. 705, Interna-

tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520, 522 (7th

Cir. 1984); Flores v. Levy Co., 757 F.2d 806, 809 (7th

Cir. 1985); Barina v. Gulf Trading & Transportation

Co., 726 F.2d 560, 561 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984).

. 3

Wilhite suggests that some authority supports a con-

trary proposition, citing Christianson v. Pioneer Sand &

Gravel Co., 681 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1982). However, the

Ninth Circuit itself has expressly rejected Wilhite’s read-

ing of Christianson, observing that a longer statute of

limitations for grievances handled without arbitration

“would be inconsistent with the policy of rapid disposi-

tion of labor disputes.” McNaughton, 707 F.2d at 1046.

The Ninth Circuit has subsequently reiterated this princi-

ple, holding that “[t]he same limitation periods apply

whether an employee’s grievance is resolved with or with-

out going to arbitration.” Barina, 726 F.2d at 561 n.1.

The lower federal courts have resolved this question

without hesitation or conflict. Accordingly, there exists

no reason for this Court to exercise its discretion to

review the question presented by Wilhite.

II. BY REFUSING TO GIVE RETROACTIVE APPLI-

CATION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DELCOSTELLO,

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE

VIEWS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL ON

ISSUES OF ENDURING IMPORTANCE

In its petition for a writ of certiorari, Greyhound

urged this Court to consider two issues raised by the

decision below. The first concerned the ability of a lower

federal court to deny retrospective effect to a newly-

announced principle that this Court has itself applied

retroactively. The second related to the propriety of a

retroactivity analysis when this Court resolves wide-

spread confusion in the circuits. Wilhite does not con-

test the importance of these issues. Instead, she attempts

to minimize the circuit conflict over DelCostello’s retro-

activity by suggesting that most cases have applied

DelCostello retrospectively only to extend “shorter state

statutes of limitation... .” Brief in Opposition, p. 6.

Wilhite is incorrect. Many courts have applied Del-

Costello retroactively when the effect was to shorten

4

—

statutes of limitations apparently applicable at the time

of filing. The decision below clearly conflicts with the

views of these courts.’

DelCostello illustrates the route commonly traveled by

cases in which retroactivity has been considered. The dis-

trict court initially ruled that DelCostello’s claim, filed

on March 16, 1978, was timely under a three-year Mary-

land statute of limitations. 510 F. Supp. 716, 720 (D.

Md. 1981). After this court decided Mitchell, the district

court reconsidered and dismissed DelCostello’s claim as

untimely under Maryland’s 30-day limitation governing

actions on arbitration awards. 524 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md.

1981). After the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 679 F.2d 879

(4th Cir. 1982), this Court ruled that a six-month statute

of limitations governed hybrid Section 301/duty of fair

representation cases and remanded the case for con-

sideration of DelCostello’s tolling defense. 462 U.S. 151

(1983). On remand, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Del-

Costello’s claim was barred by retroactive application of

the six-month limitations period established by this Court.

DelCostello v. Teamsters, Local 557, 762 F.2d 1219 (4th

Cir. 1985). Similarly, in the companion case to Del-

Costello, the plaintiffs’ claims had initially been held

subject to limitations periods far longer than six months.

See Flowers v. Local 2602, Steelworkers, 671 F.2d 87, 89

(2d Cir. 1982) (describing history of case), rev’d sub

In responding to this argument, Greyhound does not concede

that Mitchell or DelCostello shortened the statute of limitations

governing Wilhite’s claim, which was filed after the decision in

Mitchell. The period applicable to hybrid suits against an employer

in the Ninth Circuit was not settled prior to Mitchell, despite Wil-

hite’s protestation that Price v. Southern Pacific Transport. Co.,

586 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978), supplied definitive guidance. Price

related only to the statute applicable to an action against a union.

The court of appeals specifically decided to “express no opinion with

respect to the California statute applicable to an employee’s cause

of action against an employer in a duty of fair representation

case... .” 586 F. ad at 753.

5

nom. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Team-

sters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).

This Court’s decision in DelCostello therefore operated

to shorten, not lengthen, the limitations periods previ-

ously applied to the litigants before the Court. A number

of other courts have similarly applied DelCostello’s six-

month limitations period to dismiss claims filed before

this Court decided Mitchell. See, e.g., Scaglione v. Com-

munications Workers of America, Local 1395, 586 F.

Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 759 F.2d 201 (1st

Cir. 1985) (suit filed in 1977 and amended in 1979);

Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 105 S. Ct. 512 (1934) (suit filed on March 5,

1981) ; Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 931, 933-34

(3d Cir. 1985) (applying DelCostello to suit filed in 1980,

despite earlier decision holding six-year statute appli-

cable) ; Murray v. Branch Motor Express, 723 F.2d 1146

(4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 292 (1984) (suit

filed in 1978); Ender v. Chrysler Corp., 119 L.R.R.M.

(BNA) 2299, 2301 (N.D. III. 1983), aff'd mem., 749

F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2706

(1985) (suit filed in 1973); Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia

Co., 720 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105

S. Ct. 292 (1984) (cases filed in 1980); Harpp v. Gen-

eral Electric Co., 571 F. Supp. 426 (N.D.N.Y. 1983)

(summons served in 1977).

In none of these cases did DelCostello lengthen a

statute of limitations applicable at the time the case was

filed.“ Wilhite’s valiant efforts thus cannot alter the fact

that the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to accept the retro-

activity of DelCostello conflicts with the view of every

other court that has considered the issue. In contrast to

? DelCostello did lengthen the statute of limitations applicable

under Mitchell in the vast majority of states, including Washington,

having statutes applicable to actions to vacate arbitraticn awards.

In all of the cases cited, however, plaintiffs filed their claims before

this Court decided Mitchell.

6

the court below, other courts of appeal have denied retro-

activity only in two strictly limited situations. The Sec-

ond Circuit, alluding to perceived delays by the trial

judge, declined to apply DelCostello to a case filed in

1975, in which trial occurred in June of 1979, nearly two

years before Mitchell. Byrne v. Buffalo Creek Railroad

Co., 765 F.2d 364, 367 (2d Cir. 1985) (characterizing

case as “unique” and presenting “extraordinary circum-

stances”). The Fourth Circuit, over vigorous dissent,

has created a limited exception to DelCostello’s retro-

activity in one jurisdiction, West Virginia, in which no

state statute of limitations as short as six months was

ever arguably applicable. Zemonick v. Consolidated Coal

Co., 762 F.2d 281, 387 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Cir-

cuit has refused to extend Zemonick to cases arising in a

jurisdiction, such as Washington, having a shorter “stat-

ute specifically applicable to suits to overturn arbitration

awards.” DelCostello, 762 F.2d at 1222, n.3.

Unlike the decision below, the opinions creating these

two exceptions do not undermine the precedential effect

of DelCostello, for the plaintiffs in Byrne and Zemonick

were not similarly situated to Del Costello and Flowers.“

The facts surrounding Wilhite's claim, on the other hand,

are in all material aspects identical to those present in

the two cases in which this Court applied DelCostello’s

principles retroactively. Consequently, the court below

was not free to ignore this Court’s unambiguous applica-

tion of the six-month limitations period to the claims in

DelCostello.

Unlike Zemonick, the plaintiffs in DelCostello and Flowers sued

in states having arguably applicable statutes of limitations of less

than six months. So did Wilhite. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.180.

Compare Zemonick, 762 F.2d at 384-85 (distinguishing cases in

jurisdictions having statutes pertaining to arbitrations, where liti-

gants “should have known that a much shorter limitations period

might be held applicable”). Further, unlike Byrne, the plaintiffs in

Flowers and DelCostello faced the statute of limitations defense

long before their cases proceeded to trial. So did Wilhite.

7

The Ninth Circuit’s conflict with other circuits is man-

ifest. That disagreement relates to fundamental ques-

tions, not simply to retroactive application of DelCostello.

The court below has misunderstood the scope of Chevron

Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), using that case as

a license to reevaluate considered determinations of this

Court.“ Its misapprehension must be corrected now, be-

fore the court of appeals eviscerates the precedential

value of another decision of this Court.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to

review and reverse the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM R. Squmgs, III

STEPHEN M. RUMMAGE *

DAVIS, WRIGHT, TODD, RIESE

& JONES

4200 Seattle-First National

Bank Building

Seattle, Washington 98154

(206) 622-3150

*Counsel of Record for

Greyhound Lines, Inc.

September 18, 1985

* Wilhite’s Brief in Opposition reflects the Ninth Circuit’s erro-

neous use of Chevron Oil, claiming that retroactivity must be denied

whenever “the ‘new’ statute of limitations to be imposed was sig-

nificantly shorter than the previously applied statute of limitations.”

Br. in Opp., p. 4. This per se approach is unmistakably contrary to

precedent of this Court and must be rejected.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RAYMOND L. SAVILLE, Jr. v. WESTINGHOUSE

ELECTRIC CORPORATION anp UNITED ELEC-

TRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS

OF AMERICA, LOCAL 107

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 84-2034. Decided October 15, 1985

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit held that DelCostello v. International Brother-

hood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (actions brought

under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29

U. S. C. § 185, are governed by the six-month statute of limi-

tations provided in §10(b) of the National Labor Relations

Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160(b)), applies retroactively. In so hold-

ing, the Court of Appeals followed a prior decision in that

court which relied on the factors outlined in Chevron Oil Co.

v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106-107 (1971), in making that retro-

activity determination. See Perez v. Dana Corp., Parish

Frame Div., 718 F. 2d 581 (CA3 1983). For the reasons

stated in my dissent in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Withite,

No. 84-2016, I would grant certiorari in this case.

Jue

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