Jurisdictional Statement — Bowen v. Owens
Supreme Court brief1986
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84-1905 | pre cut us
No... 84. 3905 -
> 1985 |
ALEXANDER | TEVAS
CLERK
In the Supreme Court of the a en — J
OCTOBER TERM, 1984
SECRETARY
ARET M
AND HUMAN
MARG HECKLER OF HEALTH
SERVICES, APPELLANT
ENTA M. OWENS, @T AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT (
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
CHARLES FRIED
Acting SOotLk
RICHARD K. WILI
Acting Assistant Att
KENNETH 8S. GELLEI
Deputy Solicitor Ger
EDWIN S. KNEEDLE!
Ass sfan}w fe) ths
WILLIAM KANTER
CARLENE McINTYRI
\ftorneys
Depart nev} 7 EY
Wasi noto? De
i)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
“i
I]
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The appellant is Margaret M. Heckler, the Secretary
Health and Human Services
~ } 1} 4
ne named appellees are Buenta M. Owens and Kennet}
R. Owens. The district court certified a class represented
by those named appellees, consisting of (App nfra, 3la
Ajli persons who (1) were divorced from an individual
who was covered under the Social Security Act and who
predeceased the claimant; (2) remarried at age 60 or
thereafter; and (3) have filed an application in accord
ance with the time frames described in Pub. L. N:
95-216, § 336(c)(1) and (2); and (4) have been or will be
denied survivor's benefits, as surviving divorced
spouses, for any month after December, 1978, provided
that such persons (A) applied for such benefits on or af
er August 20, 1982, or (B) applied for such benefits
prior to that date and either had not received an ini-
tial decision denying those benefits prior to that date or
ll) had received an initial decision denying those bene
fits prior to that date and their right to seek adminis
trative or judicial review of the denial of their benefits
had not expired as of August 20. 1982
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below l
Jurisdiction l
Constitutional and statutory provisions involved 2
Statement 2
\. The statutory and regulatory framework 2
1. Substantive provisions 2
2. Procedural provisions 5
B. The proceedings in this case 7
The questions are substantial 11
Tonciusion 27
Appendix A la
Appendix B 13a
Appenaix C 29a
Appendix D 30a
Appendix E dda
Appendix F 47a
Appendix G 48a
Appendix H 19a
Appendix | 50a
Appendix J 52:
Appendix K d4a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ases
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 2
imbrose v. Califano, [1980] Unempl. Ins. Rep.
© 17702 ) 5
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 9g
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 4, 14, 17
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 3
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 passim
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 22, 25
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 18
(III)
Continues
Zs ty of Ne /
fr ywev. [))
( asets
}
]
j
York ¥< Heck CT.
123 U.S. 22
'.2d 729
fed State S.
Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
Heckler v. Day, No. 82-1371 (May 22, 1984
Heckler v. Lopez
No. 84-115 (Dee. 10. 1984
No. A-707 (Apr. 30, 1984
125 2 2d LSU
Mar
LOD50
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
Hunt v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 121
Hyatt v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1455
Le hma Vv. Naksh an, 153 ULS
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S.
Mathews v. Kldrida 424 U.S. 319
Mental Health Ass'n v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965
Munro v. United States. 303 U.S. 36
Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 22)
Sorano Vv. lL nate d State &-
156
35? U.S
No. 83-1266
l’nited States Vv. Bo sle,
1985)
[)
Un
1985)
l’nited States v. She rwood. :
l’nited States v. Testan. 424 U.S. 392
l’nited States Railroad Retirement Board \
ited States v. Kubrick. 444 U.S.
ited States Vv.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 15,
Bradli u. 14() L)_S. 4S
Salfi. 122 |
Vance \
We
» ni be rgerv.
Zahlocki Vv. Redhail. 134 U.S. 374
Constitution, statutes and regulations:
U.S.
Const. Amend. V (Due Process Clause)
(Jan. 9,
lS. 749 G 1,
16,
—— et
~~ _
~ fo fo
ws
—"
i
— bo bo to ly
ites and regulatior _ontinued Page
> | ‘ | |
i! Rights Act of 1964, 1 Il, 42 Ss.
+) / ‘yey
2000e et seq Le
.~
IN
j
SOClal Set
202. 42 U.S ¢ 1()? 2
y 202(b), 42 U.S.C. 402(b
y 202(e), 42 U.S.C. 402(e)(3 », 54a
> 2ZU2Z(e)(1)( A), 42 U.S.C. 402 (e)(1(A Z, 4
2072(e (3). 42 US. s;O2Z(eK3 '
y ZUZ(e (3) A). 42 U.S.C. 402(e VBA :
202(e)(4), 42 U.S.C. 42(e)(4 2,4
y 202(e)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. 402(e 4A
§ 202(f), 42 U.S.C. 402(f », 5Dda
» 202(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. 402(H01 ‘
202(f)(1)( A), 42 U.S.C. 402(f) 1) A 2a
s 202(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. 402(f)(4 3, 5
202(f)(5), 42 U.S.C. 402(f)(5 5 4
203(a V3 VC), 42 U.S.C. 408(a V3 16
» 2POD(a). 42 U.S.C. 405(a » 7
205(b). 42 U.S.C. 405(b >
205(2), 42 U.S.C. 405( 9
216(b), 42 U.S.C. 416(b Ld
216(c), 42 U.S.C. 416(e)(5 15
§ 216(d), 42 U.S.C. 416(d
Zlb(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. 416(d)(2 i
> 216(f), 42 U.S.C. 416(f 5
> 216(¢)(5), 42 U.S.C. 416(2)(5 L5
social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 ef
seq 24
| 3 | 28 ZO01 et seq os sta 620 ‘ -
Ch. 666, 55 Stat. 1360 eq
y Z0Z, 55 Stat. 1363 Ya
> 202(¢)(1 > Stat. 1364
» 202(e)(1)( A). 53 Stat. 1365
S 2OZ(T)(1). 53 Stat. 13266 )
Ch. S09, & 101(a). 64 Stat. 482
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
Pub L. No. 85-840, 72 Stat. 1013 et seq.:
Pub.
Pub.
20 C.
Section 403.
section 404.
Section 404.
Vi
§ 307(b), 72 Stat. 1031
§ 307(c), 72
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 et seq.:
Stat. 1031
§ 308(a), 79 Stat. 375-376
§ 308(b)<(1),
§ 308(b){2),
§ 308(c), 79
§ 333(a)(1),
§ 333(b)(1),
Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 et seq.:
79 Stat. 376-377
79 Stat. 377
Stat. 377-378 .
79 Stat. 403
79 Stat. 404
§ 107(a)(3), 86 Stat. 1343
§ 114(b)(1),
L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 ef seq.:
§ 334(d)(1),
86 Stat. 1348
91 Stat. 1545
§ 336(a)(3), 91 Stat. 1547
§ 336(b)(3),
91 Stat. 1547
336(c)(1), 91 Stat. 1547
§
§ 337(a), 91
L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 ef seq.:
Stat. 1548
> 131(a)(2), 97 Stat. 92 .
> 131(aX(3\ A), 97 Stat. 92
> 131(b)(2),
97 Stat. 93
} 131(d)(1), 97 Stat. 93
§ 301(b)(1), 97 Stat. 111
§ 301(b)(4), 97 Stat. 111
F ibe:
3
§
3
§ 131(b)(3)(A), 97 Stat. 93
3
3
336
900(a)(5)
900(b)
Sections 404.902-404.904
Section 404.
Section 404.
Section 404.
902(k) .
905
909(a)(1)
Page
3
3
4
3
4
om
. : .
Vij
Statutes and reguiations—Continued Page
Sections 404.907-404.92)] 6
seciion 404.91] 29
Section 464.920 6
Sections 404,.923-404.926 7
Sections 404.944-404.965 6
Section 404.927 7
Section 404.9233(b)\(1) 6
Section 404.955(a) h
Section 404.955(b) a
Sections 404.967-404.983 4)
section 404.968(a)(1) 6
Section 404.98] 6
Section 404.982 29
Sections 404.987-404.995 25
section 404.987(a) 25
Miscellaneous:
10 Fed. Reg. 53385 (1975) 20
10 Fed. Reg. 12161 (1982) 5
H.R. Rep. 213, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) ,
H.R. Rep. 728, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939) 2
H.R. Rep. 95-702, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977)
H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-837, 95th Cong., 2¢
sess. (1977) 17
S. Rep. 734, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939) 2
S Rep. 98-466, 98th Cong., 2d Sess
\ 1984 } 24
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OcTOBFR TERM, 1984
No
MARGARET M. HECKLER. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES. APPELLANT
BUENTA M. OWENS, @T Aw.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
OPINIONS BELOW
The December 23, 1983 order of the district court granting
the Secretary's motion for summary judgment (App., infra,
la-12a) and the August 28, 1984 order of the district court
certifying the class (App., infra, 13a-28:) are unreported
The order of the district court holding the relevant provi-
sions of the Social Security Act unconstitutional (App.,
infra, 30a-43a) also is unreported
JURISMCTION
The judgment of the district court (App., infra, 44a-46a)
was entered on December 20, 1984, and the order ot the dis-
trict court denying the Secretary’s motion to alter or amend
the judgment was entered on February 6, 1984 (App., infra,
47a). A notice of direct appeal to this Court was filed on
March 7, 1985 (App., infra, 48a), and an amended notice of
appeal was filed on March 9 1985 (App., infra, 49a). By or-
der dated April 30, 1985, Justice Rehnquist extended the
time within which to docket the appeai to and including June
5, 1985. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1252
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Se
202(e 1A). (e4). and (f(1)(A) and (5), and 205(g) of
the Social Security Act are reproduced at App nfra
STATEMENT
The Social Security Act was amended, effective January
1979, to permit a surviving widowed spouse who remarries
I
4% y
afte 60 to receive monthly survivor’s benefits based on
age
the deceased spouse’s earnings account. However, until Jan-
ry 1984, a surviving divorced spouse who remarries was
not entitled to receive survivor's benefits based on the
former spouse’s account. The district court held that this dis
tinction ia effect from 1979 through 1983 was irrational and
therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. and it ordered relief in this action under 42
[1.S.C. 405(¢) to a nationwide class that includes individuals
who did not exhaust their administrative remedies or seek
judicial review within 60 days of receiving the final decision
if the Secretar,
4. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
!. Substantive Provisions
The statutory provisions at issue in this action were the
product of a step-by-step evolution of provisions for survi
vor’s benefits for spouses and former spouses under the 5o
cial Security Act
a. The Social Security Act, as enacted in 1935, provided
only primary benefits for qualified wage earners. Ch. 531,
$§ 201 et seq., 49 Stat. 622 et seq In 1939. Section 202 of the
Act was amended to provide secondary benefits for wives,
dependent children, widows and surviving dependent par
ents. Ch. 666. § 202. 53 Stat. 1363. The purpose of these
mendments was to afford more adequate protection to the
wage earner’s family as a unit by furnishing benefits to fam
members who may have been dependent upon him. H.R
Rep. 728, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1939); 5 Rep. 734, 76th
f no let Secs {9 1] 14349 See (alifano Vv Jobst.
434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977): Califano v Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199.
208-209, 213 (1977) (opinion of Brennan, J.). The Act as so
amended provided that widows and other secondary benefi-
claries would lose their entitlement to monthly benefits if
they remarried. § 202(e)(1)(A), 53 Stat. 1365; see also
> 202(c)(1) and (f)(1), 53 Stat. 1364, 1366. In 1950. Congress
added Section 202(f) to the Act to provide survivor’s benefits
for widowers. Ch. 809, § 101(a), 64 Stat. 482.' As in the case
of widows, widowers lost their entitlement to benefits upon
remarriage. 64 Stat. 485 (§ 202(f\1)(A). In 1958, however,
Congress enacted an exception to this remarriage rule, pro-
viding that if a widow or widower married an individual who
also was entitled to receive secondary benefits under the
Act, he or she would not lose the entitlement to survivor's
benefits. § 202(e)(4)(A) and (f)(4) of the Act, as added by
Pub. L. No. 85-840, § 307(b) and (c), 72 Stat. 1031. Compare
(‘alifano v. Jobst. 4134 U.S. $7, 51 (1977).
b. In 1965, Congress amended Section 202(b) and (e) to
ermit a surviving divorced wife aged 60 or over to receive
widow's benefits. However, unlike in the case of a widow, a
surviving divorced wife could receive widow’s benefits only
if she had received support from the deceased wage earner
and had been married to him for at least 20 years. Pub. L.
No. 89-97, § 308(b)(1), 79 Stat. 376-377. See also § 216(d) of
the Act, as added by Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308(c), 79 Stat.
377-378.° As under the preexisting rule affecting widows
Congress provided that a surviving divorced wife could not
receive widow's benefits if she remarried, unless she mar-
rieu a man receiving secondary benefits as a dependent wid-
ower or parent or as a disabled child aged 18 or over
> 202(e)(3)(A), as amended and renumbered by Pub. L. No
A widower was entitled to receive benefits only if he had previously
received one-half of his support from his wife. In Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199 (1977), this Court held that the requirement that widowers,
but now widows, show such support unconstitutionally discriminated on
¢
the basis of sex. Congress thereafter repealed the dependency require
ment for widowers. Pub. L. No. 95-216. § 334(d\(1). 91 Stat. 1545: 42
U.S.C. 402(11(1). See Heckler v. Mathews. No. 82 1050 (Mar. 5, 1984). slip
op. 2
Congress similarly amended Section 202(b) of the Act to make a di
vorced wife eligible for wife’s benefits, subject to the same durational and
support limitations. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 308(a), 79 Stat. 375-376
~U4 fix t Z i4 Stal ii it at tne ime time on
¥¢ _ ed the remarriage rule as it applied to widows
ind widowers. Congress provided that lf a widow or wid
ower. after reaching age 60, married an individual who wa
not entitled to benefits under the Act. he or she would not
ose the entitiemel to Oe it ilthough the benefits vould
ne reduced To ov i tne primal Vayve earnel s penefit
02(e\(4) and (f\(5) of the Act, as added by Pub. L. N
~~ ; i ] mn / j 4% Strat hs and 14° ine re
iuirement that re 1} or reed wife establish that
ar va ipported Tne aecet sec Wave earner lI order to
‘_ ‘ ‘ i‘ ov henefit in equent was elimi! ited I
1972. Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 114(b)(1), 86 Stat. 1348. See
Calif Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 291-293 (1979
ly My f neres agall amended the relevant pro\
if the Social Security Act. it revised Section 202(: :
mn yh iy tne \ect to nrovide tnat la Widow or widow
remarri¢ ifter attaining age 60 the marriage wWili De
deemed not to nave ecurred [Ol purposes of entitlement
Ti i’ ai Herne fits Pub | NO 95-216. > ool als ind
b 4G] Stat 154 ¥ hy amenament wa effective ror
nontn penetit | yVabie beginning In lanuary 1979
entitled to unreduced survivor's benefit if
he or she remarries after age 60. Congress also amended
section 216014 .) ot tine \et to reduce from ZU to 1() vears the
period during whicn a sur\ ving divorced wife must have
neen marred to tne primary wage earner in rder to he ¢ ly
nie Tor witow benefits Pub Ni 95-216 . 337 a 9]
. ;
Stal 154s Dut il retained the provision inf Sectiol
ZUZ( 1A) that weneraliv barred a irviving divoreed wilt
1? wri rece iVilt {? ry rie fits pon re marriave
\ithough Congress had permitted surviving divorced
"1 o . . ;
wives to receive Widow 8s DeneTits In certain circumstances, |
‘ } y +} 1? , henefit ‘ : ir ng ay reed wits " iid
nate ‘ he marred a pe! n recs ng id-age henefits ne would
me ¢ pipie tor Vv Té nenetit mm hner new nusband 8 account
\ riginally enacted, the relevant age for widowers was 62 That age
aq; not t I I re
read } hand ‘ 4 , : }
1O80) [nem ° 5? (“(*}
tor (7,ene? leter ec th
this Court in A
efended under t rt
raing ne secretal pro!
enefits t 1) od reed |
ne vere pl ied Latute
see ibid 2) CFR 1 kb
nation of gender-based d
section ZOA(T)(] t ting ‘To,
voreed husbands eligible for
x. | Hip MI if tal |
il. Fina n 1s mere
tnat if rit I re ‘
oy we HUT } rece Henefii
vA ind widowel e sect
Act, as amended and redesig
: LSlia Z a \ [ .
Yi Sta Je. 9 ind | \ i!
De! I the appe f a i
ry ryt i Vici ? i } Ve)
2. Procedural Provisions
‘ aif tol if rT amici
tne SOCla SeCCU | \ afr }
lant lo special procedurt
secretal he pri pa la
1.dmini tratl e Tt lew Sec
LOD H mae? wt cn tne se rs
v of fact. and dec! I
appiyineg tor a paymen' na
rrer pr Vide tnat if the na
yecretar preliminat ci
ford him a rignt to a hearing
Pursuant to he horit
‘LO make lit ind regulal
6
(42 U.S.C. 405(a)), the Secretary has fleshed out these gen
eral statutory directives by establishing a four-step
administrative procedure for review by the Social Security
Administration (SSA) of claims for benefits: the initial deter
mination (20 C.F.R. 404.902-404.904); de novo reconsidera
tion (20 C.F.R. 404.907-404.921); an evidentiary hearing be
fore an administrative law judge (ALJ) (20 C.F.R
404.944-404.965); and discretionary review by the Appeals
Council (20 C.F.R. 404.967-404.983). The Secretary’s deci
sion rendered at the initial determination, reconsideration,
or ALJ hearing stage is expressly made “binding” on the
claimant unless he seeks further administrative review
within 60 days. 20 C.F.R. 404.905, 404.909(a)(1), 404.920,
404.933(b)(1), 404.955(a), 404. 968(a)(1)
“These four steps exhaust the claimant’s administrative
remedies. Thereafter, he may seek judicial review in federal
district court.” Heckler v. Day, No. 82-1371 (May 22. 1984).
slip op. 3. Under Section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(g),
the claimant, after the “final decision” of the Secretary made
“after a hearing,” may obtain judicial review of the final de
cision “by a civil action commenced within sixty days after
the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such
further time as the Secretary may allow.” If the claimant
does not seek judicial review within 60 days of the Appeals
Council’s decision, the adverse Appeals Council’s decision (01
the ALJ’s decision if the Appeals Council denied review) is
expressly made “binding” on the claimant. 20 C.F.R
404.955(b), 404.981
The Secretary has carved out only “one exception” to the
exhaustion requirement. Heckler v. Ringer, No. 82-1772
(May 14, 1984), slip op. 2 & n.2. This exception is in the form
of an expedited administrative appeals procedure, under
which the Secretary will formally waive the requirement
that the individual claimant fully exhaust his administrative
remedies through the Appeals Council stage if the individu-
al’s claim for benefits has been denied at the reconsideration
level, if he does not dispute the Secretary’s findings of fact
or interpretation or application of controlling law, and if the
claimant alleges (and the Secretary agrees) that the only fac
tor precluding an allowance of the claim is a statutory provi
sion that the claimant contends is unconstitutional. In such a
LUALIOI i represental f I e -ecretal ! entel ’
rmMmai agreement vitr tT hie rel qua lImant iaemir . 4
reconsideration decision to be the Secretal s “Tinal ae
ior 1 irpose ~ | SC@KING te aire PW DHNDUrsuUual yy.
US. 15g). 20 C.F. R. 404.923-404.926. The ulmant ther
ha HU) da fini a"? nh ft 2e } i r"¢ eV Jt) { ; :
14 47
8B. THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASI
I i. Appellee Buenta Ow: Vas marr 1 MuUuSSé da
n YS al divorced from |! ! 468. in LOTS il ©€ at I
Hi. she marned appellee Ke etn Uwe ludd ned n une
14 LYS? (py lu sf) LOS? Ruenta Owe ippile | TO) i?
ne divorced wite s Dene;nts mn tne Das f Judd’s ear ne
account He} cCialm Was cel i (on UOetonber 14. |OUR? RR enta
wens requested ami! tral e re ! eral ’ That 1
nia ontending that ne Statutol Drovision adenvyinege dene
its De iuse oI her remarriage wa l] nstitut na He}
alm avail was aenied | reconsideratiol letern I
dated December 7 LYSZ Ap! / la, loa-li4a
B.R. 2, 6-7, 9-10
Ruenta Owens requested tna ner Clall ™ } eT’
ler the expedited administrative appeals p edure | ed
by the Secretary's regulations, discussed above ee pag
6-7. supr 3.R. 9. The designate representative L Une
Secretary determined that it would be appropriate t Ist
Lnis procedure, and he entered nto an agreement with he
to that effect dated Marc} LYSS Ay } nira Wla-ola
he agreement states that Buenta Owens accepts tne fa
jal determinations of the Secretary as contained in the re
consideration determination of December 7. 1982. on the
wage record of Russell B ludd ’ That sne ais accepts tne
secretary s interpretation and application of the Social Secu
rity Act contained i t he above-referenced reconsiderat
dgeterminatior and that except for the statutory provisiol
B.1 eter re ra rij ' :
ul! appellee Buenta Owe it wa |
-
wr S¢ nstitut naiit She naiienves ths rignt f ths
laimant to benefits has been established by the laimant
L. al 20a Un tnis ‘ isis. the agreement pro\ des tna
tine al e-referenced reconsideration determination re]
resents the final decision of the secretary that the agret
i nt “constitutes a waiver t tne almal ana’ tne Secre
tar t the necessit | pursue the remainil stens of the
Adan ’ strativée Appe ; CERsse mn ti at ans r AS 60 da\
within which to file a action to raise Une nstitutiona
Ssue d. at 50a-5la). Buenta Owens the! filed the mnten
piated \i' actiol nthe U1 ted States L) Strict ' irt tor tne
Central District of Califorma on Apmi 19, [YS56, seeking t
represent a nationw 1¢ ass surviving divorced spouses
(_ompialnt © 6
Appellee Kenneth Uwens was marned | Dorothy |
Owens in 1934 and was divorced from her in 1978. He the
married appellee Buenta Owens in 1978, when he was 60
vears old. On July 15, 1982, Kenneth Owens apphed for sur
vivor’s benefits based on the earnings account of his first
wife. who had since died. His claim was denied at the initia!
determination stage and in a reconsicderatl
May 12. 1983S He hkewise requested to use the expedited
Le
administrative appeais procedure ind oO! November 23
1985, a representative of the secretary entered into an
wreement with him under that procedure. App., m/fra, i4a
Do 59a.53a- K.R. 1-2. 14-18, 31, 34. On January 6, 1984
Kenneth Owens then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Centra! District of California, challenging the
constitutionality of the statutory provisions. His class action
subsequently was consolidated with that filed by his wife
App., wfra, l3a, loa
2? a In the action brought by Buenta Owens, the district
eourt at first rejected appe ees onstitutional challenge to
the statutory provisions in an opinion dated December 25
,
1983—before Kenneth Owens filed suit (App., mm/fra, la-l2a
The court rejected the contention that strict scrutiny of tI
challenged provisions was required pecause they created a
‘disincentive” to marry (id. at 5a-7a). The court explained
that this Court has applied strict scrutiny oniv when the
government “created substantia! legal obstacles to entry into
9
or exit from the marital state” (id. at 6a, citing Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Boddie v. Connecticut.
401 U.S. 371 (1971)). By contrast, the district court ob-
served, this Court has applied the rational basis standard in
reviewing provisions of the Social Security Act that deny
benefits to some persons, but not others, based upon their
marital status (App., infra, 6a, citing Mathews v. De Castro,
429 U.S. 181 (1976), and Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
\977)). Applying the rational basis test, the court sustained
the statutory distinction (App., infra, 7a-12a). It reasoned
that, as in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 57-58, Congress
reasonably could decide to take one step at a time in
removing the perceived hardship of the remarriage
rule—iifting it as to widowed spouses effective January 1979
and as to surviving divorced spouses effective January 1984
App., ifra, 10a-11a).
b. Buenta Owens then filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment. While that motion was pending, the court, by or-
der dated August 28, 1984, certified a nationwide class of
surviving divorced spouses who remarried after age 60 and
who were denied monthly benefits for any month after De-
cember 1978, provided that the claimant’s application was
filed on or after August 20, 192 or the time within which to
seek review of a decision denying his claim had not expired
on that date (App., infra, 13a-28a; see id. at 28a, 44a). The
district court acknowledged that 42 U.S.C. 405(g) was the
exclusive source of jurisdiction over the suit and that, under
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975), a class may be
certified only if all of the members satisfy all of the require-
ments for judicial review set out in Section 405(g). Never-
theless, the court included in the class individuals who had
not exhausted their administrative remedies or who had not
sought judicial review within 60 days of the final decision
denying their claims for benefits.
Citing the Secretary’s regulations under which appellees
Buenta and Kenneth Owens had entered into an agreement
with the Secretary waiving exhaustion with regard to their
claims for benefits, the court held that the Secretary had
waived exhaustion for all class members, without regard to
whether the Secretary had entered into a comparable agree-
10
ment with them (App., infra, 17a-18a). The court further
held that a court in any event may excuse compliance with
the exhaustion requirement on a class-wide basis where the
constitutionality of a statutory provision is at issue (id. at
lSa-19a).
Similarly, the court treated the 60-day requirement as an
ordinary statute of limitations and held that running of the
60-day period should be tolled retroactively as to all class
members on a nationwide basis as of October 19, 1982, the
date on which appellee Buenta Owens sought administrative
reconsideration of the initial determination denying her
claim for benefits (App., infra, 20a-21a). In the court’s view,
the filing of this “single administrative complaint” by Buenta
Owens gave the Secretary adequate notice of the constitu-
tional contention and an opportunity to evaluate its effects
on similarly situated persons (id. at 21a). Accordingly, tne
court included in the class any individual! who had a live
claim for benefits pending administratively on or after Au-
gust 20, 1982, which was 60 days before Buenta Owens re-
quested reconsideration (id. at 22a) but more than eight
months before she filed suit.
ec, After it certified a nationwide class, the court, by opin-
ion and order dated October 5, 1984, reversed its prior rul-
ing on the merits and held unconstitutional the challenged
distinction between surviving widowed and divorced spouses
(App., infra, 29a, 30a-43a). The court again acknowledged
that “[t]he one step at a time argument has considerable al-
lure in this instance because it literally describes Congress’
actions here” (id. at 39a). But this time the court found that
justification insufficient. The court explained that “Congress
must have a rational basis for each step it takes” and that
the statutory distinction “must stand or fall on whether Con
gress rationally might have assumed that widowed spouses
are generally more dependent on income from the deceased
wage earner than are surviving divorced spouses” (id. at
10a). The court expressly agreed with the Secretary that
Congress rationally could so assume (id. at 42a). But the
eourt nevertheless held that the challenged distinction was
irrational because Congress chose to treat surviving wid-
owed spouses and surviving divorced spouses the same upon
1]
the death of the primary wage earner, and there was. in the
court’s view, no “logical basis” to distinguish between them
upon their subsequent remarriage (ibid.). The court there-
fore enjoined the Secretary from applying the challenged
provisions to appellees Buenta and Kenneth Owens and
other eligible class members, to pay retroactive benefits to
them, and to determine and assure payment of survivor’s
benefits to other class members within 120 days (id. at
+4a-46a).
THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
The district court has held several provisions of an Act of
Congress unconstitutional. That holding is plainly wrong.
This Court has made clear that Congress rationally could de-
termine that divorced husbands and wives depend less on
each other than do couples whe remain married. Mathews v.
De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 188 (1976). As the district court in
this case expressly acknowledged, Congress also rationally
could determine that this difference continues after the
death of the primary wage earner (App., infra, 42a). If this
much is conceded, Congress surely can draw this same dis-
tinction in determining whether surviving spouses and
former spouses should be entitled to benefits even after they
remarry. Contrary to the district court’s apparent belief, the
fact that Congress, in its discretion, has chosen to treat wid-
owed and certain divorced spouses in a similar manner for
one purpose (their entitlement to survivor’s benefits upon
the death of the primary wage earner) does not mean that
the two categories are constitutionally indistinguishable for
all purposes or that Congress is somehow estopped from
treating them differently as regards their entitlement to sur-
vivor’s benefits upon remarriage.
The particular statutory distinction appellees challenge
existed only during one relatively brief portion of the ex-
tended period over which Congress has adjusted and ex-
panded the respective eligibilities of spouses and former
spouses to receive Social Security benefits. If the district
court had limited the impact of its decision in this case by
awarding benefits only to the two named appellees, it might
have been appropriate for the Secretary to forgo an appeal,
12
because Congress now has eliminated the particular distinc
tion the court invalidated. But rather than limiting its hold-
ing. the district court compounded its error by ordering re-
lief to a nationwide class that includes numerous individuals
who did not exhaust their administrative remedies or seek
judicial review within 60 days, and who thereby effectively
abandoned their individual claims for benefits. This holding
is flatly inconsistent with the plain language of 42 U.S.C
405(g), implementing regulations, and this Court’s decisions
The district court’s cavalier disregard of these explicit juris-
dictional prerequisites unfortunately is typical of the ap-
proach by a number of lower courts in the face of this
Court’s clear pronouncements, most recently in Heckler v.
Ringer, No. 82-1772 (May 14, 1984). The result has been
substantial disruption of the orderly administrative review
of claims for benefits under the vast Social Security pro-
gram. These issues therefore independently warrant review.
1. The district court clearly erred in holding that the stat-
utory distinction between surviving widowed spouses and
surviving divorced spouses who remarry is unconstitutional.
Indeed, that holding is foreclosed by this Court’s decisions in
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976), and Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
a. The legal principles governing the resolution of this
case are firmly settled. Where, as here, a statutory classifi-
cation does not impinge on a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution,” the classification is unconstitutional only if
“the varying treatment of different groups or persons IS SO
unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legiti-
mate purposes that [the Court] can only conclude that the
®° ‘The district court correctly held that the statutory provisions denying
survivor’s benefits to divorced spouses who remarry do not impermissibl)
impinge on the exercise of a fundamental right to marry merely because
they create a distinction on the basis of marital status (App., infra, 5a-7a,
26a-38a). In fact, this Court, applying the rational basis test, already has
sustained the constitutionality of the general rule terminating entitlement
to secondary Social Security benefits upon marriage, even though such
provisions “may have an impact on a * * * beneficiary's desire to marry,
and may make some suitors less welcome than others.” Califano v. Jobst,
134 U.S. at 58. See also id. at 54
legislature’s actions were irrational.” Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 97 (1979). See. e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson. 450 U.S.
221, 230 (1981): United States Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980). This conclusion has particu
lar force in the distribution of Social Security benefits, be
cause “|glovernmental decisions to spend money to improve
the general public welfare in one way and not another are
‘not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Con
gress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbi
trary power, not an exercise of judgment.” Mathews v. Dy
Castro, 429 U.S. at 185, quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
b. In this case, the statutory classification plainly is the
product of a careful “exercise of judgment” by Congress, not
a “display of arbitrary power.” Each of the factors on which
the denial of benefits to appellees was based—their divorce
and their subsequent remarriage-—long has been utilized in
determining eligibility for secondary benefits under the So-
clal Security Act, and each has already been sustained by
this Court as an independently sufficient basis for distin
guishing between classes of potential beneficiaries.
In Califano v. Jobst, supra, the Court held that the uni
form rule prior to 1958, under which Social Security benefits
payable to all secondary beneficiaries were terminated upon
remarriage, was “unquestionably valid.” 434 U.S. at 54. The
Court in Jobst considered that rule in the context of the eli
gibility of a disabled person to receive child’s benefits after
remarriage, but the Court’s observations are equally appli
cable here (id. at 53):
Both tradition and common experience support the
conclusion that marriage is an event which normally
marks an important change in economic status.
Traditionally, the event not only creates a new family
with attendant new responsibilities, but also modifies
the pre-existing relationships between the bride and
groom and their respective families. Frequently, of
course, financial independence and marriage do not go
hand in hand. Nevertheless, there can be no question
about the validity of the assumption that a married per-
son is less likely to be dependent on his parents for sup-
port than one who is unmarried.
14
Similarly, in the present context, Congress rationally could
conclude that a surviving divorced spouse who remarries is
less likely to be dependent on the resources of the former
spouse than one who does not remarry. For this reason,
Congress’s decision to terminate a surviving divorced
spouse’s entitlement to benefits upon remarriage is, in itself,
plainly rational.
The district court did not dispute that Congress constitu
tionally may terminate a person’s entitlement to secondary
benefits upon remarriage. But the court held that Congress
was foreclosed from doing so after 1979 with regard to sur
viving divorced spouses who remarry after reaching age 60
because Congress in 1979 permitted widowed spouses who
remarry at that age to receive survivor's benefits. The court
concluded that Congress could not rationally distinguish be
tween widowed and surviving divorced spouses in this man
ner (App., infra, 42a). This holding ignores both the signifi
eance Congress long has placed on divorce as it affects
eligibility for Social Security benefits and this Court’s con
clusion that it is constitutional for Congress to do so.
In Mathews v. De Castro, supra, the Court unanimously
sustained the constitutionality of provisions of the Social Se
curity Act that provided for the payment of benefits to a
married woman under age 62 whose husband retires or be
comes disabled if she has a minor or other dependent child in
her care, but not to a divorced woman. The Court explained
(429 U.S. at 188):
Divorce by its nature works a drastic change in the eco-
nomic and personal relationship between a husband and
wife. Ordinarily it means they will go their separate
ways. Congress could have rationally assumed that di-
vorced husbands and wives depend less en each other
for financia! and other support than do couples who stay
married.
See also Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 289-293 (1979)
This same rationale applies to the survivor's benefits at is
sue here. Congress rationally could determine that a di
vorceed spouse in general would be less dependent upon the
primary wage earner at the time of the latter’s death than
would a spouse who remained married to the wage earner
DOS€
’
acking In ! ul justificatior Pile Nestor, 363
~ ‘ 1960). Compare Frnt 444 S. at 178 & n. ll
e aIstrict rt i wt express iwreed with the Sex
i nat oress rationa 11d assun tnat surviving
~ “4 ire venera ess epel ent po! the re
~ ‘ re | eased primal wage earner than are V1G
\ 2a). But the irt held that be
: e { oTes na nosen | treat tne tw itegories tne
’ a eat! ne primal Wage earnel t ild
_ wes hem upon their subsequent remat
R his reasoning is seriously flawed
. i atter, the dist irt was mistaken in its
¢ premise that Congress in 1979 treated divorced
~t f al is SI ises WI remained marned to tne
vage earner [tor purposes letermining eligibd
1 re henefits mon tre i@all I the wage earner \
ae Vile 1 rece ‘ survivors benefits muy il sme
e¢ irrieda the wage earne! for LU vears: the
i] requirement for a widow or widower Was a yeal
ripss {jf 1s ( neTress id not view the two categories
e equa entitied | rece e secondary Den fits
In any event, the fact that Congress, in its discretion
‘ edt treat tnis narrow 2roup of divorced wives in a
manner similar to widows and widowers by making them ell
gible for survivor’s benefits does not mean that Congress ac
illy found them to be indentically situated even in that set
ng. Far less does it render the two groups constitutionally
ndistinguishable or estop Congress from treating them dif
ferently for other purposes. In the present context, for ex
ample, Congress might well have believed that there were
sufficient similarities between the two groups to warrant
similar treatment upon the death of the primary wage
earner. notwithstanding the existence of substantial differ
ences as well, or that considerations of uniformity or ease of
administration warranted similar treatment for that pur
it
Such a judgment cannot constitutionally disable Con
gress from responding to the residual differences between
the two groups in determining their continued entitlement to
rvivor’s benefits remarniage
Ipor
—— ee eee ee —ee ee - eee *
this conclusion is especially compelling when it is consid
ered that Congress often must proceed one step at a time
wnen ¢ xpanding or adjusting benefits and entitlements un
ler this “complex statutory scheme ftano v. Jobst. 434
; ) ( OnvTess
IAS done S00 1 several! respects that
bear directiv on this case. F irs Congress often has delayed
before conforming the entitlement of divorced spouses and
irviving divorced spouses to that of wives, husbands, wid
ws, and widowers. That delay may be explained by a belief
tnat the tatter nave a stronger eq litabie claim to receive
iat were originally intended for members of the
wage earners family than do persons for whom those family
ties have been broken. Cf. United States Railroad Retir
nent Board v. Frnt 149 U.S. at 178
second, Congress has moved cautiously and incrementally
n modifying the remarriage rule under the Social Securit
Act. See ( alifay v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 54-57. As the district
urt acknowledged, the House version of the bill enacted in
ivi i contained an “across-the-bDoaru elimination of the ger
al remarriage rule, covering all secondary beneficiaries
ncluding but not limited to widows and surviving divorced
pouses nis was a “broad change that in its first vear of
nave created “an estimated 670.000
yperation alone would
new pene ficianes at a cost of 31.3 Dillion in additional! bens
tits App nira fa-4a. citing H.R Rep 95-702, 95th
Cong., lst Sess. Pt. I at 47-48 (1977). id. Pt. II. at 73). No
simiiar provision was contained in the Senate bill. and it is
not surprising that it was deleted in Conference in favor of a
more modest provision to repeal the remarriage rule only for
widows and widowers. See H.R. Conf Rep. 95-837, 95th
cs
(Long 2d Sess i¥7 7). Congress pre sumably belheved that
widows and widowers had the strongest claim to receive
benefits after remarriage, and it chose to “concentrate lim
ited funds where the need is likely to be greatest” (Califano
v. Boles, 443 U.S. at 296
jurt observed in a nearly identical context
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 57-58
” a
Jf
-
~~
f
_
Congress could reasonably take one firm step toward
the goal of eliminating the hardship caused by the gen
eral marriage rule without accomplishing its entire ob
ect ‘ rm Le “ame piece I legisiatiol V
pe Cini ri 4x |S. 4585. 489 You) ke ven if it
mignt have been wiser to take a larger step the ep
(_ongre did take was in the right direction and had no
ve rse mpact on persons ke the appre lle«
(‘ongress might well be deterred from taking measures lO al
eviate what it believes to be the greatest hardships or ineq
nfties in the Somali Security ct and similar iegisiation it it
adecisions ti proceed n this iLIoOUus fas! ion are invalidate d
hecause thev d not go tar enougn The Constitutior pre
imes that sent some reason to intel antipathy even im
DY? vident decisions W eventually De re tified nv tine wmMo
ratic process ind that idicia ntervention 18 generalil\
inwarranted natter how unwisely [the Court] may think
i pO ial Drancn Nas acted Vance v. Bradley 40 US. at
7 his fait! nthe democratic process was vindicated nm the
present case, because Congre enacted legisiation to elin
nate tne ustinction appelet cnalenge most | mont!
j ; , thy . trict int ler red rye qaistinet ]
mconstitutlons
ta hye mistrict court a , eariv erred i ts tn shold cer
tif ition Oot a is \ the district ¢ irt itsell recoenized
App nr lLba-lba i] roder tor a ciass to De certined
each member of the proposed class must individual salisiy
ne requirement tO? miicial re ew f ut 2 | s,{
LOD. go see | I nasark 142 US. 68 701 A979
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975). Yet the court
roceeded to certify a class in utter disre gard of the ¢ xpiicit
requirement n 47 LS libig) that each class membel
must have received a “Tin aecisio! of the Secretary on nis
wn individual claim for benefits and may obtain idicial re
ew ony y filing a civil action within 6V days ol that fina
1. The Court held in S fi that the meaning of the tern
al decision in 42 US. Wo(g is left to the Secretar
to flesh out by regulation” and that she may “specify such re
suirements for exhaustion as |s|he deems serve |her| own
terests in effective and efficient administration (422 U.S. at
66 & n.9). As the Court recognized, governing regulations
final! required for judicial review is
ly
achieved only after the ALJ hearing and Appeals Council
vages are completed id. at 765) see 20 C.F.R
104.900(a)(5). See also Heckler v. Ringer, slip op. 2. There is
no allegation in the complaint in this case that the unnamed
class members actually pursued their administrative remé
dies through the Appeals Council stage to obtain the requl
site “final decision.” The district court therefore “was with
ut Jurisdiction over so much of the complaint{s] as concern
the class, and it should have entered an appropriate order of
dismissal.” Salfi, 422 U.S. at 764
Instead of ordering dismissal of the class claims, however,
the court excused all of the unnamed class members from
the exhaustion required by tine Secretary s regulations based
n the court’s own view that exhaustion would be futile
App., mfra, 18a-19a). The district court’s action was flatly
inconsistent with Salf here, the Court held that the re
quirement that the Secretary have made a “final decision” on
the individuai’s claim for benefits is a “statutorily specified
jurisdictional prerequisite” that “may not be dispensed with
merely by a judicial conclusion of futility such as that made
by the District Court here” (422 U.S at 766 (emphasis
added ))
The Court did observe in Salfi that ‘‘wihile a court may
not substitute its conclusion as to futility for the contrary
onciusion of the Secretary, * * * it would be inconsistent
with the congressional scheme to bar the Secretary from de
termining in particular cases that full exhaustion of internal
review procedures is not necessary for a decision to be ‘final’
within the language of § 405(g).” 422 U.S. at 766-767 (em
phasis added). The Court concluded that the Secretary prop
erly could make such a determination where she has satisfied
herself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statu
tory provision that bars payment (id. at 765, 767), that “th
claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a dif
lerent section of the Act” (id. at 765), and that all other is
sues have been resolved in favor of the claimant without the
need for a hearing (id. at 767). See also Heckler v. Ringer,
slip op. 14-16 & nn.11 & 12. Contrary to the district court’s
conclusion (App., infra, 17a-18a), however, the Secretary i:
this case clearly did not make such a determination and ac
cordingiv did not walve the exhaustion requirement for ¢ |
of the unnamed membpe! i the clas
Following the decision in Sa/fi, the Secretary promuigated
the regulatk : discussed above that establish a pl cedure
‘
or walving t} exhaustion requirement in the circumstance
{
identified in Saif e., where the Secretary has determined
that all other issues bearing on the individual's claim for ben
efits have been resolved and that the n issue Darring pay
ment is a statutory provision that the claimant contends
l! mnstitutional. Pursuant to this procedure the Secretar
entered into a formal agreement wit! appe llees |
suenta and
Kenneth Owen tipulating to the existence of these cond
tior is regards their particular claims for benefit nd
lesignating the respective reconsideration decisiol le! ng
those claims as the Secretar inal Gecisio! ior purpose
of judicial revi minder 42 U.S.f 1>( g But there !
egation if L? Con | ialnt TMAL Lire Secreta} na entered
nto a con paral i¢ iwreement wit! i! r tre l! immed ;
mem !
| promu ting the regulat estan ning the expe
tec ippea procedure +} Secretar explained that where
tl Spe hed maivior nave Deel il hed ne 11a tf
nfident that the particular claim [for benefits had beet pre
sented at a suffiment nen i to afford the agen an OF
oritunit rres erro?) | Nave ; mpiet« rey re
thn respect tne tact iw. and Dp ipie alternative Das¢
entitlement ind ts ! ire nationa iniiormit 1) Fed
Reg eld, 14 ; . TT Dare Sally $22 | ~ il 4 ly ic!
rceumstance Tre serretary ceterminedt irtner! adm |
trative review would te e/a?’ muti ji (I The ©® proce
dures thus a ire that the question of exhaustion of admu
‘ra e remedtie Tselil wi ay nresented to al | exnre
! lled 1p I ne oec;re iT and nat te 11 re ta i ry
: | : re ' uiT | : ; ir’ :
‘ : ror ' nifa ;
etal ¥. it 76 he Secreta! is specifi hat the ds il of
: ar que rsue ne ¢ ec) ippea edaure
‘ OL t he mgnt Te rative or jud ul review MT Keg
bebe iY ee 2) CLF .! M4 SOS
24
thority to proceed where that 60-day requirement has not
been met. Hyatt v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1455, 1460-1461 (4th
Cir. 1985); Hunt v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 121 (4th Cir
1982).'° Compare United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,
117-118 (1979): Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41
(1988): Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232-233 (1887)
Other courts, however, have reached a contrary conclusion,
See, e.g., City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729,
737-738 (2d Cir. 1984) (question “not free from doubt,” but
holding that 60-day requirement is not jurisdictional); Men
tal Health Ass'n v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965, 973 n.19 (8th Cir
1983). That conflict warrants resolution by this Court.
Even if the 60-day requirement in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) were
not regarded as a jurisdictional prerequisite in the strictest
sense,'' that consequence would furnish no support for the
district court’s novel “tolling” rule in this case. Statutorily
mandated limitations on the time within which a person may
bring a suit against the government must be strictly con
strued, and the courts are not at liberty to fashion toiling
The holding in Hunt v. Schweiker,supra, tnat the 60-day requirement
in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) is jurisdictional in nature was cited with approval in
the extensive discussion of the requirements ol 2 US. 10512) in the
Senate Report on the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 ef seg. See S. Rep. 98-466, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1984)
' In Salfi, 422 U.S. at 763-764, and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
328 n.9 (1976), the Court described the 60-day requirement as a “statute
of limitations” that was waived by the Secretary because it was not raised
in district court. However, these statements were dicta, because in each
instance the claimant had sought judicial review within 60 days. App. (at
1. 9. 17-20), Weinberger v. Saifi, No. 74-214 (Oct. Term 1974); App at
l 3, 14), Mathews \ Eldndae No 74 204 (Oct Term 1975) Moreover in
other circumstances, the Court has held that the congressionally imposed
condition that a suit against the government be filed within a specified
time period is not subject to waiver under the usual rules affecting the
waiver of a statute of limitations defense. Munro v. United States, supra
Finn v. United States, supra. In any event, even if the 60-day require
ment in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) is not “jurisdictional” in the sense that it Is not
waived even where it is not raised as a defense, a court is not free to ex
cuse compliance with that requirement where, as here, it 1s invoked by
the government in the tnal court
——— ee
-
:
rules that Congress has not prescribed Soriano v. United
States, 352 U.S. 270, 275-276 (1957). Indeed, in this case. the
fact that Congress expressly vested in the Secretary, but
not the courts, the authority to extend the 60-day filing pe
riod where circumstances warrant strongly indicates that
(Congress intended to foreclose the duplicative fashioning of
tolling rules by the courts. Cf. United States v. Locke, slip
op. 9 n.10. Governing regulations reinforce this conclusion,
for they expressly provide that an individual forfeits his
right to judicial review if he does not file within the 60-day
period, unless he establishes “good cause” for the Sec retary
to extend that period. 20 C.F.R. 404.900(b), 404.987(a)
The district court’s holding on the 60-day issue also is di
rectly contrary to this Court’s ruling in Califano v. Sanders,
supra. After the 60-day period has expired, the claimant
may obtain further consideration of his claim only by re
questing the Secretary to reopen the adverse administrative
decision. See 20 C.F.R. 404.987-404.995. This Court held in
Sanders that the Secretary’s determination not to reopen an
adverse decision that the claimant had allowed to become fi-
nal and binding is not subject to judicial review. The Court
explained that a contrary holding would “frustrate the con
gressional purpose, plainly evidenced in § 205(g), to impose a
60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary’s final
decision on the initial claim for benefits”—a limitation that
the Court regarded as an aspect of a “policy choice obviously
designed to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale
eligibility claims.” 430 U.S. at 108. The nationwide tolling
rule fashioned by the district court in this case would frus-
trate that congressional policy choice far more severely than
would judicial review of the denial of an individual request to
reopen, which the Court foreclosed in Sanders
c. The ruling by the district court on the exhaustion and
60-day requirements in 42 U.S.C. 405(g) has the effect in
this case of requiring the Secretary to reopen numerous
administrative decisions that the individual claimants in-
volved allowed to becoine final and binding against them
when they failed to seek further review in accordance with
the requirements of the Act and implementing regulations.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates
4
na nere are approximately 1,UUv ich individuals. Other
ivts have ordered a similarly sweeping intrusion 1.to the
viministration of the Social Security Act In class actions
Uf isand tT ind lua who had abandoned then
wn ; " henefit ~~ os 4 f iy ( New Yori \ Heckler
p Heckle (51 F.2d 943 (Sth Cir. 1984
These jurisdictiona ies are of broad importance in the ad
: tral " rTTng “wy } ~ 4 init Act and independent
’ ’ rs A ’ ‘ ' int
»
CONCLUSION
rrobadt il chic I | j e 7 rey
: ‘ }
re pe ar idl . ‘
[
‘
| ;
,
. 7
: : i
kK
sé + '
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CV 83-2436-WMB
BUENTA M. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIF!
MARGARET M. HECKLER. ETC... DEFENDANTS
[FILED DEC. 23, 1983}
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
in this action, plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of
that portion of Title II of the Social security Act which pro
vides that widows aged 60 and over may remarry and retain
their social security benefits while surviving divorced
spouses of that age lose their benefits if they remarry. Both
parties have stipulated to the facts as set out in earlier
administrative proceedings. Each side now moves for sum
mary judgment
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Buenta M. Owens, was divorced from her hus
band of more than 30 years, Russell B. Judd, in 1968. In
1978, at the age of 61, plaintiff married Kenneth R. Owens
her present husband. Her former husband, Mr. Judd, died
on June 19, 1982. Thereafter, the plaintiff applied for social
security benefits on Mr. Judd’s account
The Department of Health and Human Services denied
plaintiffs application on the ground that plaintiff was mar
ried at the time of her .pplication. Plaintiff sought reconsid
eration but the Department again denied plaintiffs applica
tion on the same grounds
ine part tnen pul ied an eX! gj appea
I'he iwreed tnat Lire ‘Jit it ! (il } ite Line i}
if section Z0c \ ind (¢ } i tne Socia
\ | Vi} (wet mnrend rmhart tne pro 7
tutional tnat permit i widow to remar»r! il
nereatter without atiecting elgipiill DULL a l?
reed Vile Wart remarries iT ive rh or Tnerealtlet
‘ pipie ior Sul yy penetit ral ript | Adi I
Proceedings at 2 © (
r untill Oring lit unaer Une Der irat ludgt
Ds ' 4 . »H()] yp 1976 ee King , ole ara
ne nalienged statutol scneme nmconstitutiona
plaintiff remains entitled to benefits despite her ren
Piaintiff further seek in injunct n preventing Cc
from denving benefits t 7 ng d reed spoust
marry at age ov or olde! and al raer mandating
endant pay piaintill ti e peneiits pre UsiVwenle
ntiinue Those henefit nto tne Tuture
li. DISCUSSION
\. The Legislative Scheme and History
Congress passed the Social Security Act in 1935
providing benefits for qualified wage earners. Pul
1-271, 49 Stat. 620, 622-24 (1935). Secondary benet
‘ , " ‘ ’ cre : th i! i | rent De} ;
¢ eDpe!l ent por eal. rimna? Vayve-earnel
\ 76-279. 52 Stat. 1360. 1264-66 (1939). Unde
it that time econdal neneticiaries iost their pen
chang n tneir marita tatu i Dp! son na
KNOW is The ypenera marriavt rilié | orig
rorry The rilie rie ied i pre nm i at entities
Vou se Their penefits iIpon remarriayvt > ost it
Ur pl : : iter amended, whic! naleng
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len” of providing benefits to the institutionalized
it could rationally limit the provision to those for wi
federal government was already paying out funds
at 238. The Court noted that, “lalwarding this type
‘fits inevitably involves the kind of line-drawing that
some comparably needy person 0 itside the favored
ld
he Court took a similar approach in Califa
regard to the general marrage rule enacted as var
Social Security Act. The Court held
Congress could reasonably take one firm ste}
the goal of eliminating the hardship caused by t! e
eral marriage rule without accompusning its entire
ePctive |} tne same piece OT egvisiat Citat
mitted! Even if it mght have been wiser t Lak
arger step, the step Congress did take was in the r
rection and nad no adverse mpact on persons ‘
lobsts
| »S. al yf >> Se : a ») } ())
thoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955 tne refiorm may t
step at a time, addressing itsell to the phase of the p
which seems most acute to the legisiative mind
he remarriage rule may be similariy justified. Cong
In tact, taken a one sls it a time approacn Lo f
on, removing It aS tO WIGOWS OU and Ver il O77 al
irviving divorced spouses 60 and over in 1983. Altho
he interim the different treatment between the t
ips May seem unwarranted, even uniair, Unis is the s
leVitabDie line drawing whnicen a court inder rational!
must tolerate. The Court finds that the distinctior
n widows and surviving divorced spouses drawn b
C. § 402(e 1) A), and 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4) Is const
al aS a rational step Dy step approac! ») remed (
em or the remarriage rule
H emp. li Rptr. (CCH) © 14,296 (D uh 19%
rt found S il Secur \ r }
enefit rrat | e! ne | ! rhe
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lil. CONCLUSION
The statutory distinction between widows and surviving
divorced spouses of which plaintiff complains does not in
volve invidious discrimination nor does it so impinge upon
the fundamental right of marriage as to warrant strict scru
tiny. Thus the distinction need only be supported by a ra
tional basis. This may be supplied by a one step at a time
congressional approach to eliminating the hardships of the
remarriage rule
Based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD
JUDGED, AND DECREED that
(1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED, and
2) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is DENIED
DATED: DEc. 23. 1983
S/ Wm Matthe “ Ryrne Jr
WM. MATTHEW BYRNE. J]
United States District Judge
court ated that the governme had offered explanation for the dis
tinction between these groups ol women and found that the listinctior
served neither to encourage valid marriages nor discourage divorce. The
ourt found the statutory distinction irrational and lative of the equal
protection component if due process
Evans is distinguishable because there the ourt apparent was no
presented and did not consider the one step at a time rationale considered
and relied pon Dy the (Court in this actior
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COUR]
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ¢
ALIFORNIA
No. CV &83-2436-WMB
FILED AUG. 28, 1984
ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS
In these consolidated class
actions, plaintifi
constitutionality ol
certain provisions ol
Act of 1977 which provide that
hallenge the
Lhe social Securit\
on remarriage, widowed
spouses may receive survivors benefits but divorced survi\
ing spouses may not.’ The parties have stipulated to the
facts as set out in earlier administrative proceedings and the
oniv issue In the ca
se is the const
lenged provisions. Plaintiffs now
inder Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(¢)(1
itutionality of the chai
move fol
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Buenta M. Owens was divorced trom Russe!
Judd. her husband of more than 30 vears. in 1968. In 1978
plaintiff married Kenneth R
(ywens,. ner
present husband. Her former husband. Mr. Judd. died
at the age of 61.
— ee oe —_—_ —-_
l4da
June 19, 1982. Thereafter, plaintiff applied for social security
benefits on Mr Judd’s account
The Department of Health and Human Services denied
plaintiffs application on the ground that plaintiff was mar
ried at the time of her application. Plaintiff sought reconsid
eration but the Department again denied plaintiffs applica
tion on the same grounds
The parties then purs led an expedited appeal process
They agreed that the sole issue in di pute is “che application
of section 202(e) 1) A) and (e)(4) of the Social security) Act
Mrs. Owens contends that the provision is unconstitu
tional in that it permits a widow to remarry at age 60 or
thereafter without affecting eligibility, but a surviving di
vorced wife who remarries at age 60 or thereafter is then in
eligible for survivors benefits.” Transcript of Administrative
Proceedings at 2. © (
Plaintiff, Kenneth R. Owens, was divorced from Dorot}
L.. Owens, his wife of more than 34 years, in 1978. He ma
ried pl untiff, Buenta Owens (then Buenta Judd) in 197%
when he was 60 years old. On July 15, 1982. he applied ior
survivors benefits on the account of his first wife. who had
ince died. His claim was denied on the ground that plaintiff
was married at the time of his application
Mr. Owens requested reconsideration of the decisior
which was denied on May 12, 1983. The Secretary and Mr
Owens thereafter entered into an agreement on Novembe!
23, 1983 stating that except for the provisions of sections
202(f)(1 A) and 202(f)(5) of the Social Security Act, the pro
visions which are challenged by Mr. Owens in this actior
Mr. Owens had established his right to survivors’ benefit
The agreement also waived further administrative appeals
Plaintiffs brought separate Class actions under the Declar
atorv Judgment Act ® US. 28 2201, 2202 (1976 Mrs
Owens seeks a deciaration that former sections Z0Z( }) and
202(e)(1)(A) of the Act, the sections that distinguish betwee!
widows and surviving divorced wives on remarriage. are un
constitutional and that she remains entitled to benefits de
spite her remarriage.“ Mr. Owens seeks a declaration that
——
;
’
ivmryvy and Decause there 1s no ral
tion Detween divorced i! ny
pouses On remarriayve p untill se"
Irom den nv penetrits to 1?
: } mt
iormer sections 2Ucz\1
imilar distinction betw
i
isbands on remarriag’
Ul]
tled to benefits. Pla
ms violate the Fift!
are unconstl
mcits Ait
Amendment
vt
| 7 penet;it pre wou aqenied al
fits into the fut re. The cases |!
untilfs now move tor certificatior
,
All persons who (1) were ad
Vr Was ered Inder tne Soca
ry)? ie } +} , nit )
predeceased © Clalilia hs re
. , ,
nereaiter; and ») Up an ap]
ince With tne time tIrame i¢
; >
95-216. 2% 336 l) and (2 nave
il ! enetit : il rit
i] ry nT iTT ey? 1 ‘ ryey 1) &
DISCUSSION
Section 405(¢
Z ynre
ii)
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re ~
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fies three prered
rirst, there must
after a hearing. S
: TWO ¢€ ements
: resent at cy? 1
1 nearing exna
14 2] iY fH . -.
anthin 60) davs aft
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ff < rs dence
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iia
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aay hy} ia rule : : AN are ’ av : iT a
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Ad
ary
ropriate fina! injunctive or corres] nding declaratory re
with respect to the class as a whole.’
‘laintiffs have requested a declaration that tne challenged
yvisions are unconstitutional! and seek an injunction
gainst their application. The Secretary contends that
etheless, this action is essentially a suit for damages
yment of lost benefits—and therefore certification under
(2) is inappropriate. The Secretary argues that the rs
st for a declaratory judgment in this case does not itself
ke (b)(2) certification proper: the declaratory relief must
respond to injunctive relief, not merely be a substituts
damages. See Pension v. Terminal Transport ¢ 634
2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1981); Sarafin v. Sears, Roebuc!
1446 FF. Supp. 611, 615 (N.D. Ul. 197%
However, an injunction against application of the cha
ged sections 1s necessary to afford the rehef requested
uintiffs may receive Social Security
terms of the Social Security Act. If the remarr age rule
not declared unconstitutional, the Secretary is obligated
der the statute to deny any application for bene fits. Thu
injunction and declaratory judgment is required to e1
operation of statutory scheme which in the absences I
‘+h an injunction would require a finding of ellgit I
Plaintiffs’ position is supported by mar ases I
rts have enjoined provisions of the Social Security A
efore ordering the payment of benefits. See e.¢., Bol:
lifano, 464 F. Supp. 408, 417-18 (W.D. Tex. 1978),
Orie r grounds euh pido fs rey wie ' Is j 145 ' ~ 287
179 D az \ Wernhe roe 1 SUDD if ~ | ) Fla
wy) ; : — 4 j
io) »>-ludge coul re (] ) The 0 syne
ratheu v. Thaz. 426 U.S. 67 (1976
Plaintiffs’ position is further supported by the decis
fano v. Yamasaki. There, the plaintiffs sought an nu
ction ordering the Secretary to hold a hearing p! !
\ attempt Lo recoup henefits alleged Yy erronre ih. Da
t. The Secretary ary ied that an injunction was unnec
ry because the Court could simply reverse the Secreta!
’
cision to not hold such a hearing. The Court disagreed and
id that the district wrt nad the power to issue an injun
" noting +} at aT ’ inct ¥ A 4S nec “—* ’ , DY! ‘ , ryé
oo
Se ee
Zha
rights of class members and prevent repetitive litigation
142 U.S. at 705-06. Such concerns are clearly present in this
Cane
Finally, plaintiff has shown another basis for the issuanc
of injunctive relief: plaintiffs’ mght
the iaWSs In He Kier \ Mathe Os,
plaintiff challenged certain provisions of the Social Securit
to equal treatment under
104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984
Act as being based on an unconstitutional gender-base 1 clas
The Secretary argued that plaintiff had no stand
ing to request an injunction against the statute because he
'
no benefits. The Court disagreed, noting that
sification
could receive
even if no benefits could be paid out, plaintiff was entitled to
recelve mandate of equal treatment under the laws. /d. at
1395. Thus, he had standing to seek an injunction against op
f the allegedly discriminatory statute
eration of
This action similarly claims that the Social Security Act
inconstitutional provides for unequal treatment
VM athe us miy imjunctive
iffs with the mandate of equa!
Thus, both because plaintiffs would
or deciaratory reliel can provide
treatment to which the
claim they are entitied
be entitled to such relhef if the prevall and because an ll
inctior ; necessary to provide tor the payment ol benefit
the proposed propel! ertifiable under Rul
2h Wo
( Section 1505
he Secretary finally argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1303 pronib
ts class certification. This section provides that “|1i|/f any pro
10n of this chapter, or the application tnereol to any per
on or circumstance, 1s held invalid, the remainder oi the
napter, and the application of such provision to other per
ons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby) he
rues that absent ciass members constitute
secretary arg
other persons inder section 1505 and therefore anv dec!
n by this court cannot apply to them. The Secretary cits
1O
rm ase support tor this proposition
(Jn its tact section 1303 does not bar class actions: indeed
: lent about class certificatior he statute simp pro
cle hat a court may only hold certain provision f Tith
' tat t oce : 1 AS Lo Line parti netore
uHtia
the court. In a properly certified class action, all class mem
bers should be considered before the court. Therefore, they
are not “other persons’ under the statute and section 1303
does not prevent the judgment in a class action to apply
tnem
Further, the Secretary’s interpretation of section 1303 is
inconsistent with Congressional intent. The Supreme Court
has described section 1303 as a “strong severability clause
which “evidences a congressional intent to minimize the bur
dens Impose d DY a declaration of unconstitutionality upon in
nocent recipiencs of yovernment largess " Califano \
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76. 90 (1979). The intent of the section is
to prevent the denial of benefits to absent parties, not to
prevent class actions seeking extensicn of benefits to mem
pers ol a class allegedly unconstitutionally excluded from
receiving such benefits. See Cimaglia v. Schweiker. 555 |
Supp. 710, 713 (S.D. Fla. 1983)
nally, It is necessary to co! sider the consequences of the
Secretary s interpretation of section 1303. Section 1303
applies to all of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United States
Code which includes not only the Social Security Old Age
and Disability Program, but also Medicaid, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income
and other federal! benefit program If the See retary s inter
pretation is correct the Supreme Court and lower courts
have over the years incorrectly certified classes in the mar
actions brought in these areas. Given the lack of support for
the Secretary's interpretation of both tin language and in
tent of the statute, the Court declines to make such a drasti
holding
LD). Scope of the Class
he Court must finally decide if the proposed class should
be certified on a nationwide basis. This decision is committed
to the discretion of the Court. Yamasak 142 U.S. at 7038. li
exercising its discretion. the court should consider whether
there is ongoing litigation in other districts and whether the
issues pre ented are such that it would be pre ferable to have
them aliudicated by different courts in different factual con
,
Lea
Considering these factors, the Court finds that nationwids
certificai.on is appropriate in this case. The Court is not
aware of any ongoing litigation in other districts involving
the same issue. Further, the only issue presented In the cas¢
the facial constitutionality of the challenged provisions of
the Social Security Act. Thus, there is no possibility of dit
ferent factual contexts arising which might affect the out
come of the questions presented Finally, a nationwide class
would provide the most efficient means of reaching a final
resolution of the application of the remarriage rule to all per
sons affected by the rule. See McClure v. Harms, 503 |!
Supp. 409, 413 N.D. Cal. 1980). rev'd on other grounds. 102
S. Ct. 1665 (1982). For these reasons, the Court finds that
the class should be certified on a nationwide basis
CONCLUSION
or the foregoing reasons, [IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs’ motion fo
class certification is GRANTED and the named plaintill
Ruenta Owens and Kenneth Owens shall represent the fo
Ail persons who (1) were divorced from an individua
who was covered under the Social Se rity Act and wh
predeceased the claimant 2) remarried at age 60 o7
thereafter: and (3) have filed a application in accord
ince with the time frames described in Pub. L.N
95-Z16, 2 336(0)(1 ind (2): and (4) have been or wi m™
denied survivors benefits, as surviving divorced
spouses, for any month after December, 1978, provided
fnhat such persons applied for such benefits on or afte
August 20. 1982 o1 compieted the administrative appea
process following a denial of such application on or after
? ¢ ;
\ugu t Zu iva
APPENDIX ¢
UNITED STATES DISTRI
ENTRAL DISTRICT OF ¢
MARGARET HECKLER. }
: ‘ { be? a |
ORDER
y neard and I ered (Une
Court now GRANTS plaintiff
f the 1) ember ? IU fing
it finds that plaintiff is corre:
on petween Widow ind i!
y former section 2ZUZ(e4 t Une
1509, 1547 (1977), must be
rational Dasi he statute ma
That . ongrTress lid inKet
ting the hardships of the remar
2(e)(1)(A) of the Act, 79 Stat
Tne irl must Alsi f' larat
step Congress e | Lake Re
ecem De 25, 1YS5 was Dass !
IS HEREBY VACATED. 7
roler
ET): Se ‘ , 4
"s Matthew
A
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rYy\é
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7«
ty.)
: i]
’ ’
APPENDIN
ORDER
= —_ — — — —_ —
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39a
onstitutionality. de Castro, 429 U.S. at 185. In applying the
rational basis test, the Court need not ascertain the actual
wpose of the statute. The Ninth Circuit has held
[A] court may hypothesize legislative purposes: “where
there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our in
quiry is at an end. It is, of course, ‘constitutionally ir
relevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the
legislative decision,’ [citation omitted] because [the Si
preme Court} has never insisted that a legislative body
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.” l/nited
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S
166, 179, 101 S. Ct. 453, 461, 66 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1980
Rrandwein v. California Board of Osteopathic Examiners
= F.2d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to find a statute
nstitutional under the rationa! basis test, a court need only
etermine that there is a “conceivable legitimate purpose
which would justify the distinctions made in the state’s regu
wtory schen 2.” /d. at 1471
4s noted above, the legislative history of the challenged
visions is silent on the reason for the disparate treatment
widowed and surviving divorced spouses with regard to
emarriage after attaining the age of 60. Plaintiffs urge that
he failure to extend the remarriage rule exemptions to sur
ing divorced spouses was not only unexplained at the
e of passage but remains rationally inexplicable today
Defendant argues ‘hat Congress rationally could have distin
guished between widowed spouses and surviving divorced
spouses on the basis of their differing dependence on the pri
wry wage earner. Defendant further urges that Congress
betinction represents the sort of “one step at a time” ap
ach to problem-solving that the Supreme Court has often
wproved under rational basis analysis. -.g., Schweiker
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 (1981
1. One Step At A Time
he one step at a time argument has considerable allure in
s instance because it literally describes Congress’ actions
re. In 1977, Congress considered exempting both widowed
wel surviving divorced spouses from the remarriage rule but
resolved only to exempt widows and widowers. Then in
a — : . - — —_ . 7
Ha
ivs, Congress decided to extend the relief to surviving d
yvorced spouses
As piaintifis note, howe rr, the tact that Tongress moved
me Lep al a time in Its efforts to alleviate the hardship )
tne remarriage rule does not in and ol itsell provide a ra
tional basis for the statutory distinction here. Congres must
nave a rational Dasis tor each step it take ina ast
where the Supreme Court has used the phrase “one step at a
time it has found ar ndepe nadent rational Dasis tor initial
egisia ¢ te} Schweike? VW or ib0 U.S. 221. 238
LYS] rational tor Tonegre LO De f e those alread
receiving primary federal! aid in Institutions are most need
and limit supplemental! relief to them); C alifan Jobst, 434
| “ 1'7 ¥ » 1977 rational ts neneve recipient 7 i¢
pendent child henefits who marry other re pient ire more
need tnan recipient wno mar? pe! ] not entitied t
benefit Vv an Lee Optu if Oklahoma. 348 |
> 1s /-Y1 (health col aeratior provide rational ba it)
tate Trestlrictiol 1 vyno ma fit ‘ evia ‘ ang) ieTrsé
hu tne tatutor listinection between widowed spouss
and irvi ng divorced W f erected ov tormer sect !
AZ 1) and (f)(5) must stand or fal m whnetner Conere
rationa mignt nave i imed that widowed DOUSK art
general more depende! ym income from the deceased
Wage earner tnal ars ir’ ne a orceqd pous¢
‘he Supreme Court has recognized that the pr Ol
econdal penefnit inder the ocial Securit Act not pari
ti a general welilaré cneme pdased o1 ndividualized need
Nut an attempt to alle ate general probie! of economic ce
penden r dist? pNuting we efit Lo Lnose perso! pre med
I rT lependent Instead of requir ng individualized pr |
n case-DV-case Dasi (__ongre nas elected to use Imp :
teria ich a we and maritai statu to determine probdabi
adependemn Jobst, 434 U.S. at 53. Thu i cnalienged |
on must be examined with reference to the general !
tionaie ior tn LaLuLory criteria, not whether the ind
jatior I the plaintil!i under tne itute al
ele! inpi¢
Defendant points to the gislative hi , e Tith
irgue tnat ners as traditiona x onived a dep
Za
that unmarned mother
Act, could rationally have assumed
would be less dependent pon their husbands than marned
mother 143 U.S. at 292
Defendant urges that the above authority establishes that
‘ or uid rationaliv fave a imé that a ‘
pouse ire it lependent upon primary wage earners thal
t} e st married. Defendant further mtends ¢ yr
nt rational peneve tl distinctior tinue alter Ut!
leat é Vay irne}! Lnat i? ya rceuw WV
| hy pre iImeqd ‘ ~ } pende nt thal Lf ‘ VT rt A
W ¢ hye ‘ ur? ivrTrees Howe Vey Sat na v¢ |
10 not comport with these assumptior nder fort
ect " sivas | an ’ ' | ’ viel we } : 7 ng
' Ise nitially rece i! ' enefit iy
™
nervy ti reTtiect i? is j pi ' ependel
rere! ePrwersr Tne Tw oy Ip ‘ ng T lexi | —
re : “ aent uly Upol eat! 1 Ure rial Vas
earner. 0 Ip marriage does the groups treatmer
erg \ : a | mes retain (ther re efit Dui il
livorced spoust e their hu n order
hallenged pi nm the ground of an assumed dep
} ; , oT would have have ha
: rea ’ 1 " ‘ nat wid 4 ind | |
Ouse : e Lhe rrve leyvrTe ' ein ‘ | |
‘ rimat} Vave ¢ rnet le] ‘ ' '
’ ‘ ’ ec ‘ rye ‘
" : .
ere! lA ' et ' il ' rt | : b :
mn are ri ipparani rm i}
‘ ‘ oy ¢ ' ia rat nai distil nwa
’ : ' iv . | ’ , lid} yw a Tet : eat
ip | we earner, Not Ol ul
, riage. Vi r der nees mig! '
‘ Vee! Vidow ’ ia il : | reed Ou
i¢ itt Li 7 Ca ' erence
e erased | rria i e bel
‘ ris Ai Thiarriaye : : rT ' : :
' ; ‘ ; init \ . Vs
>? ; : ’ 1) ; ' ’ | b | ‘
: | : rat : : ' '
met La
ving divorces
‘ ' vid
fundame!
Ih trv
as ‘ hye
: ’ wa’ »*
\ ? ry ’
MLS il '
ec] }S¢
| :
™~s if
7
:
" .
7
oy
CONCLUSION
tory distinction bet
pouses ol whic piall
s discriminatiol or
al mght of marnags
istinction need on
ynstitutional. The
’ | ( ongrTres i
ef} for both widows
tne! remarriage
ry ’ y pene
rimer ‘ Alvar
Act are unconstitult
e, IT IS HERE!
ECREED tha
APPENDIX |
loa
6) Defendant, her agents, and employees shall take all
reasonable steps, within 120 days of the entry of this Judg
ment, to determine the entitlements to survivors’ benefits,
to calculate the amounts thereof, and to assure payment of
said amounts to class members who applied prior to the date
of the entry of this Judgment, retroactive from the respec
tive dates on which their eligibilities should have been estab
lished had defendant not applied the invalid classificatory
scheme (including benefits for al! months of eligibility
through the month prior to the month in which prospective
benefits are paid, pursuant to paragraph 7 below).
(7) Consistent with this Judgment, for those class mem
bers whose entitlements have been determined pursuant to
paragraph 6 above, defendant, her agents, and employee
shall begin paying said class members the prospective bene
fits to which they are entitled beginning with the calendar
ith following the calendar month in which full retroactive
benefits have been paid.
Dated: This 20th day of Dec, 1984
s/ Wm. Matthew By rne. Jr
WILLIAM MATTHEW BYRNE. JR
nited States District Judges
Approved As To Form
NATIONAL SENIOR C'riZENS LAW CENTER
s Gill Deford’
GILL DEFORD
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
*As per telephonic authorization
given 12/19/84
ROBERT C. BONNER
United States Attorney
FREDERICK M. Brosto, JR
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
S George H Wu
GEORGE H. Wt
Assistant United States Attorney
Att rneys for Defendant
a _
7a
APPENDIX F
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAI
Case No. CV &83-2436-WMB
CV 84-154-WMB
BUENTA OWENS. ET AI
SEC. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVIC!
Present
Hon. Wm Matthew Bryne Jr, (Judg:
D. Hostith (Deputy Clerk)
Rosa Treibach (Court Reporter
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Gill Deford
Neal Dudovitz
Attorne\ ; Present For Defendants
(,eorge Wu, AUSA
Proceedings. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions
Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment
( ounsel are present and the motions are art ué dd to the
Court. Both the motion for sanctions and the motion to alter
or amend the judgment are denied
sa
APPENDIX G
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV &83-2436-WMB
BUENTA M. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIF!}
MARGARET HECKLER. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES. DEFENDANT
KENNETH R. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIFFS
MARGARET HECKLER. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES. DEFENDANT
FILED MAR. 7, 1985]
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the defendant
Margaret Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Serv
ices, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the United
States from the final Order entered in this action on Febru
ary 6, 1985.
The appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252
DATED: This 7th day of March, 1985.
KOBERT C. BONNER
United States Attorney
FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR
Assistant l/nited States Attorney
("hiet Cian] Division
~ George H. Wu
GEORGE H. Wi
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant
a
APPENDIX H
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV &83-2436-WMB
BUENTA M. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIFI
MARGARET HECKLER. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, DEFENDANT
No. CV 84-0154-WMB
KENNETH R. OWENS. ET AL.. PLAINTIFFS
MARGARET HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES. DEFENDANT
[FILED MAR. 9, 1985]
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the defendant
Margaret Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Serv
ices, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the United
States from the final Order entered in this consolidated ac
tion on February 6, 1985.
The appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 125:
DATED: This 8th day of March, 1985.
ROBERT C. BONNER
United States Attorney
FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
~ George H. Wu
GEORGE H. Wt
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant
. i
APPENDIX I
AGREEMENT
The Secretary of Health and Human Services, hereinafter
called the Se retary, and Buenta M. Owens, hereinafte1
called the claimant, hereby agree in accordance with the pro
visions of chapter III of title 20 of the Code of Federal Regu
lations, part 404, section 404.923 through 404.928 to all of
the following
A. The claimant accepts the factual determinations of
the secretary as contained in the reconsideration deter
miuation of December 7, 1982, on the wage record of
Russell B. Judd, social security number 490-10-018
copy attached)
B. The claimant accepts the Se retary s interpreta
tion and application of the Social Security Act contained
in the above-referenced reconsideration determination
except as indicated in paragraph C below.
C. The sole issue in dispute is the application of sec
tion 202(e)(1)(A) and (e)(4) of the Social Security Act
Section 202(e)(1)(A) provides that the widow and every
surviving divorced wife may receive survivors benefits
if along with other requirements they are not married
Section 202(e)(4) modifies the non-marriage require
ment in 202(e)(1)(A) it states that, “If a widow, after at
taining age 60, marries, such marriage shall, for the
purposes of paragraph (1), be deemed not to have
occurred.” Mrs. Owens contends that the provision is
unconstitutional in that it permits a widow to remarry
at age 60 or thereafter without affecting eligibility, but
a surviving divorced wife who remarries at age 60 or
thereafter is then ineligible for survivors benefits. This
provision denies Mrs. Owens the right to receive sur
viving divorced wife’s benefits because she remarried,
even though such marriage occurred after she had at
tained age 60.
D. Except for the provisions of section 202(e)(1)(A)
and (e)(4) of the Social Security Act, which have been
challenged by the claimant as indicated in paragraph C
of this agreement, the night of the claimant to benefits
has been established by the claimant
Kk}. The above-referenced reconsideration determina
tion represents the final decision of the Secretary with
Dla
respect to the claimant in accordance with section
2U2(g) of the Social Security Act
F. This agreement constitutes a waiver by the claim
ant and the Secretary of the necessity to pursue the re
maining steps of the administrative appeals process
G. The claimant has 60 days following the date the
agreement is signed Dy or on behalf of, the Secretary
within which to file a civil action in a U.S. District
Court pursuant to section 203(g) of the Social Security
Act on the issue stated in paragraph C of thi
agreement
Signed Buenta M. Owens
BUENTA M. OWE)
f {7 mant
Date: February 11, 1983
Secretary of Health and Human Serv
Signed William F’. Cooper
De puty Diree fo
‘Bia
Date: March 3, 1983
APPENDIX J
AGREEMENT
The Secretary of Health, and Human Services, hereinafter
called the Secretary and Kenneth R. Owens, hereinafter
eallled| the claimant, hereby agree in accordance with the
provisions of ( hapter Ill of Title 20 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. Part 404. sections 404.923 through 404.928 to
all of the following
\. The claimant accepts the factual determinations of
the Secretary as contained in the reconsideration deter
mination of May 12, 1983, on the wage record of
Dorothy L. Owens, Social Security Number 568-20-9248
opv attached
B. The claimant accepts the Secretary s interpreta
tion and application of the Social Security Act contained
in the above-referenced reconsideration determination,
except as indicated in paragraph CU below
C. The sole issue in dispute is the application of se
, ; | Dc) it y+] : ,
tions 202(f)(1)A) and 202(f)(5) of the Social Security
D. Except for the provisions of sections 202(f)(1)(A)
and 202(f)(5) of the Social Security Act which have been
challenged by the claimant as indicated in paragraph CU
of this agreement, the nght of the claimant to surviving
livorced husband’s benefits has been established by the
‘laimant
Ek. The above-referenced reconsideration determina-
tion represents the final decision of the Secretary with
respect to the claimant in accordance with section
205(¢} of the Social Security Act
fF. This agreement constitutes a waiver by the claim
ant and the Secretary of the necessity to pursue the re
maining scope of the administrative appeals process
_
ooa
G. The claimant has 60 full days following the date
the agreement is signed by, or on behalf of, the Secre
tary within which to file a civil action in a U.S. District
Court pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security
Act on the issue stated in. paragraph C of this
agreement.
Signed Kenneth R. Owens
KENNETH R. OWENS
Claimant
Date October 27, 1983
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Signed James E. Forbus
Acting Deputy Associate Commissioner
for Re fire rie ni and Nu rmvnpVores Insuran 4
Date: November 23. 1983
o4a
APPENDIX K
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
1. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides:
No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;
2. Section 202(e) of the Social Security Act, as in effect
when this action was filed and as codified at 42 U.S.C.
402(e), provided in relevant part:
Widow’s insurance benefits
(1) The widow (as defined in section 416(c) of this ti-
tle) and every surviving divorced wife (as defined in
section 416(d) of this title) of an individual who died a
fully insured individual, if such widow or such surviving
divorced wife—
(A) is not married,
(3)) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age
50 but has not attained age 60 and is under a disabil-
ity (as defined in section 423(d) of this title) which be-
gan before the enc of the period specified in para-
graph (5),
(C)(i) has filed application for widew’s insurance
benefits, or was entitled to wife’s insurance benefits,
on the basis of the wages and self-employment in-
come of such individual, for the month preceding the
month in which he died, and (I) has attained age 65 or
(II) is not entitled to benefits under subsection (a) of
this section or section 423 of this title, or
(ii) was entitled, on the basis of such wages and
self-employment income, to mother’s insurance bene-
fits for the month preceding the month in which she
attained age 65, and
(D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or
is entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which
is less than the primary insurance amount of such de-
ceased individual,
shall be entitled to a widow’s insurance benefit for each
month,* * *.
oa
(4) If a widow, after attaining age 60, marries, such
marriage shall, for purposes of paragraph (1), be
deemed not to have occurred.
» - .
3. Section 202(f) of the Social Security Act, as in effect
when this action and as codified at 42 U.S.C. 402(f), pro
vided in relevant part:
Widower’s insurance benefits
(1) The widower (as defined in section 416(g) of this
title) of an individual who died a fully insured individ
ual, if such widower—
(A) has not remarried,
(B)(i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age
50 but has not attained age 60 and is under a disabil-
ity (as defined in section 423(d) of the title) which be-
gar before the end of the period specified in para-
graph (6),
(C) has filed application for widower’s insurance
benefits or was entitled to husband’s insurance bene-
fits, on the basis of the wages and self-employment
income of such individual, for the month preceding
the month in which she died, and (1) has attained age
65 or (II) is not entitled to benefits under subsection
(a) of this section or section 423 of this title,
(D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or
is entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which
is less than the primary insurance amount of his de-
ceased wife,
shall be entitled to a widower’s insurance benefit for
each month, * * *
(5) If a widower. after attaining age 60, marries,
such marriage shall, for purposes of paragraph (1), be
deemed not to have occurred.
1. Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as codified at
42 U.S.C. 405(g), provides:
Judicial review
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secre-
tary made after a hearing to which he was a party,
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a
56a
review of such decision by a civil action commenced
within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of
such decision or within such further time as the Secre-
tary may allow. Svch action shall be brought in the dis-
trict court of the United States for the judicial district
in which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place
of business, or, if he does not reside or have his princi-
pal place of business within any such judicial district, in
the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia. As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a
certified copy of the transcript of the record including
the evidence upon which the findings and decision com-
plained of are based. The court shall have power to en-
ter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the deci-
sion of the Secretary, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as
to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the
Secretary or a decision is rendered under subsection (b)
of this section which is adverse to an individual who
was a party to the hearing before the Secretary, be-
cause of failure of the claimant or such individual to
submit proof in conformity with any reguiation pre-
scribed under subsection (a) of this section, the court
shall review only the question of conformity with such
regulations and the validity of such regulations. The
court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good
cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case
to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary,
and it may at any time orde. additional evidence to be
taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing
that there is new evidence which is material and that
there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such
evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the
Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after
hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify
or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and
shall file with the court any such additional and
modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript
of the additional record and testimony upon which his
action in modifying or affirming was based. Such addi-
tional or modified findings of fact and decision shall be
reviewable only to the extent provided for review of the
).
Jia
original findings of fact and decision. The judgment of
the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to
review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil
actions. Any action instituted in accordance with this
subsection shali survive notwithstanding any change in
the person occupying the office of Secretary or any va-
cancy in such office.
Section 216(d) of the Social Security Act, as in effect
when the action was filed and as codified at 42 U.S.C.
416(d), provided in relevant part:
Divorced wives; divorce
(1) The term “divorced wife” means a woman di-
vorced from an individual, but only if she had been mar-
ried to such individual for a period of 10 years immedi-
ately before the date the divorce became effective
(2) The term “surviving divorced wife” means woman
divorced from an individual who has died, but only if
she had been married to the individual for a period of 10
years immediately before the date the divorce became
effective.
(4) The terms “divorce” and “divorced” refer to a di-
vorce a vinculo matrimonil.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.