Record and brief — Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC

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sril 16 1985

ee also:

B4-1999

@5-1085 ‘

#5-172Y

retry Date

1 Aor 16 1985 G

5 May "6 1985

5 May 17 19865

6 May 17 1985

7 May 23 1985

8 May 23 1985

9 Jur 18 1965

10 Jun 18 1985

11 Jut 26 1985

12 Jul 26 1985

13 Jul 22 1985 x

14 Aus 8 1985 X

15 Seo 121985 xX

1¢ Oct 7 1985

7 NOV 11985

18 Nov 17 1985

20 Nov 13 1985

22 Nov ¢€0 1985

23 Nov 27 1985

24 Dec 2 1985

25 Dec 6 1985

26 Dec € 1985

28 Dec 9 1965

29 Dec 12 1965

32 Dec 2€U 1985

tatus:

scketed:

oO. S4-1¢56-CFK xX

GRANTED

Title: Local 28 of the Sheet Metal horkers' International

Association anc Local 28 Jcoirt Accrerticeshic

Comritteers Petitioners

Ve

Eaqcual employment Opporturity Comrissions, et al.

Court: Uunitec States Court of Appeals

tor the Second Circuit

Counsel tor periticner: Golds-Martin PF.

Counsel tor responcert: Solicitor Gererals KaéhrelLawrerce

Steohen,s Schwarz JrercFrecerick AseOes

7

Sherwood,>.°eter

Note Preceecirgs anc Crcers

~“—-<<-e ee ee eo oe oe ee ee ee er er er HO er er ee er ee er er ew eer er er er er eH Fr er Fr er Hr er er er eH er Fr er Hr er er er ee ee

Petiticn for writ of certiorari filec.

vrcer extending time to file response to petitior until

sure 214 1985-6

wrcer extending time to file resconrse to petitior until

may 317 1905-4

Above extension is for the NY St. Human Rights, et al.

vrcer furtner extensins time tc file resconse to

petition until June 2iv 1985.

abcve extension is fer NY State kumar Rights, et al.

urcer turtner extending time tc file resconse to

petition until July 214 1985.

Above extension is for ALL RESPONDENTS.

Brier ct rescondents EEDCse et ale IM Oppcsitior tilec.

LISTRIEUTEY. Seotember 30, 1985

Briet of respondent The City of New York in opocsition

tTilec.

Reoly criet of petitioner Local ¢€38% etcer et al. filed.

Supplerertal trief of ressorcent EECC tilec.

retition GrANTED. The case is set for oral argument in

tander with Ncw B471999s% Local Noo Pdr OCs. Ve

Llevelanc.

REREARAEEEE EKER EARAREEEEEREAREERARAREAREEERARRRREARERRRERRE RRR H DE

mecorc filed.

Certifiec cocy of original recerc & groceecingss 14

coxes,s receivec.

vrcer extending time to file brief of petitioner on the

merits until Decerber 2 1985.

Briet amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Fourcation ftilec.

Urcer furtner extending time to tile trief of petiticrer

cm the merits until Decerder 6 19t5.

Brier amicus curiae cf Local 5424 Internatl. Unicnr of

Loerating encineersvet al tilec. VIDED.

JOINL apcencix filed.

Briet ct setitioners Local 6327 eter OF ale filets.

Brier of rescenderts EFEOCe et ale filec.

atipulation Liniting scoce of issues raisec Cy

petitiorers tir.ec.

Vrcer extending time to file triet of resconcert on the

» B4-105¢-CFx Bb. B4-1¢56-CFK x

try Date Note Proceecings ant Crcers htry Date Note Proceecirgs anc Crecers

Lo OOS OS COSS SC OOS 6 OSS 6 6 OS SSO S OS SS SESSSSSSESS SCS SSSSSZ®SS2e22022ee000" “2 - ee ef = = = -- =

merits until Jenuary 247 19384 SY Jan 26 1984 X Briet amicus curtae cf NOW Legal Defenses et ale filec.

. ‘ 6! - ~~. 6

IDEC.

5 Dec 20 1985 Adocve extension aoplies to all resporcents. ¥ .

6 Dec 19 1985 D pPoticn of the solicitor General for civicec ergurent ang $0 Jan 26 1986 K Erier amicus curtae of NAACP popes geen i Pp a"

tor accitional time tor oral argutent filec 51 Fec 11 1986 moplication tor Leave to file a reoly os cr the

— ' -e ‘ ; ' } } An-é ~~

7? Dec 31 1985 Oopositicn of cetiticners to moticn cf the Sclicitcr Cereral 0 im excess of tne cage Limiteticn jlec ¢ é14)

itior ir f ; ,

aan tee a ee 42 Feo 11 1986 anc orcer granting same Cy Marshalls Jer Or Fearuary les

° . - ee

5 Jan 3 1966 Opposition of respencents City of New Yorn, et al. te motion 19t6. The orvet may mot exceec 55 page

5 Fer 718 1986 K Recly triet cf petitioners Local €38+ etCer Of B@ie Files.

+ Fed 18 1986 K Reply criet of rescondent EEOC filed.

5 Fec 25 1986 APCUEL.

cf tne Solicitcr General for civiced ar*urEent anc for

eccitional time for coral argurert files. -

9 Jar 3 1986 Briet amicus curiae of Natle Conference ct Slack Maycrs, ?

ance filece VILED.

pPoticn of wortn Carolina Associaticn c* Elack Le@ewyers

tor leave to perticigfate in cral argurent @s aricus

curiaes ter civicec ergurent arcs for scsitioral time for

cral argument trilec.

1 Jam 3 1984 Brier amicus curiae of NC Assoc. c* Elack Lawyers filec.

2 Dec 20 1985 LISTFIBUTEVe Jone 107 1986. (Sticulation Limitins scope

cf issues raises Dy petitioners).

3 Jan 7 1984 SET FCR ARGUPENT? TueScays Fetruery 254 1954. (ire case)

~ Jan 13 1968¢ motion of the solicitor Ceneral for civicec argurent anc

tor accitional time tor oral argument DENTEC.

5 Jan 13 1986 motion ef wortn Carolira Asscciation cf Elack Lanyers

tor leave to perticicate in cral argurent as aricus

curieaes tor civicec arcurent anc tor acczitioral time for

Crek argurent VENTED. Motion c* North Carolira

association of Slack Lawyers fer leave tc particicate in

cral argument es amicus curiaes for civisec argurent anc

tor accitiunsl tine tor oral arcgurents or iF tre

elternative motion for erocinrtrert of counsel to trief

ofc argue iM Suprort ct jucgrent celcer as amicus curiae

1s DENIED.

6 Jar 11 198¢ agetlicaticn of resporderts NY State Cive cf Purar RIGhts

tor leave to file responcent’s prief cr the merits in

7 Jan 117 1986 excess of the case Limitation filec (A542), arco orcer

granting same oy Marshalls Jer on Jaruary 147 1986.

8 Jan 11 19b6¢ ihe Oriet may not exceec 65 Cages.

9 Jan 23 1986 Locaing receiveds 2 volumes, titled "Employrent Fatterns

uf MINOTITIESsees’ «

9 Jar 26 1986 LIRCULATED.

7 Jan 26 1986 X Briet amicus curtae of Detroit, et al. filec. VIDED.

2 Jan 23 1986 XK Briet amicus curiae of National Associaticn cf “anufacturers

tilec,.

3 Jan 26 19686 Brier amicus curise of Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights

wncer Laws et ol. filed. VIDEC.

4 Jan 25 1986 K Briet of respondent The City of Rew York filec.

5 Jan 26 1986 © Eriet amicus curiae of Ecusal Eroloynent Acvisery Courcil

tilec.

+) Jan 26 1986 K Briet eticus curtae of Bremirgshars AL filec. VIDED.»

57 Jan 26 196e¢ X Briet amicus curiae cf Californias et al. filet. VICED.

g Jar 27 1956 KX Brier of rFesconsent AY Ste Dive Cf Human Rights tilec.

2) Jar 31984

©

10 11

PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

Supreme Court, U.S.

(1 | } | a bk 1)

84-1656 | APR ig i985

No.

halite STEV AS

CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1984

LOCAL 638 ..., LOCAL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL

WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE,

Petitioners,

— against —

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and NEW

YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RICHTS,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

WILLIAM RoTHBERG Martin R. Gotp

PoPKIN & ROTHBERG (Counsel of Record)

16 Court Street

Rosert P. Mutvey

a New York 11241 Howarp Lioyp WIEDER

(718) 624-2200 Gop, FARRELL & MARKS

Co-Counsel for Local 28 595 Madison Avenue

JAC New York, New York 10022

EpMUND P. D’E IA (212) 935-9200

655 Third Avenue Attorneys for Petitioners

New York, New York 10017

(212) 697-9895

Co-Counsel for Local 28

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit affirmed orders of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York which held Peti-

tioners in contempt for violating a Revised Affirmative Action

Program and Order (RAAPO) and an Order and Judgment

(O&j); imposed substantial monetary fines on Petitioners to

establish, as part of the contempt remedy, an Emiployment,

Training, Education and Recruitment Fund to be financed by

Petitioners and to be employed solely to benefit nonwhite ap-

prentices and journeymen; adopted an Amended Affirmative

Action Plan and Order (AAAPO), which included a race-

conscious quota of 29.23% for nonwhite membership in Local

28; and continued the office of the Administrator, which has

placed Loca) 28 and the Joint Apprenticeship Committee

(“JAC”) under a judicially-imposed receivership.

The questions presented are:

1. After a general finding of discrimination against uniden-

tified persons, may a district court order a race-conscious af-

firmative action program under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act to benefit nonwhites?

2. May such an affirmative action program include a percen-

tage “goal” for nonwhite membership and a judicial threat that

the goal must be met by a specified date?

3. Does the Constitution prohibit such reverse discrimination

as a violation of the Equal Protection clause?

4. Does the Constitutional prohibition against Corruption of

Blood invalidate such reverse discrimination?

5. Should civil contempt remedies be declared to be illegal

criminal contempt remedies imposed without Due Process of

law when they include (a) a compensatory component without

proof ot damage and (b) a coercive component unrelated to the

contempt and without an opportunity to purge the contempt?

6. Do findings of discrimination, premised upon improper

standards and statistics, followed by findings of contempt of

the resulting orders also based upon improper standards and

statistics, deprive Petitioners of Due Process of law?

7. Does a district court order appointing an Administrator

with day-to-day supervisory powers over the internal affairs of

a labor union violate the union’s right to self-governance, or

exceed the court’s power to appoint special masters.

PARTIES

With the exception of the Sheet Metal and Air-Conditioning

Contractors’ Association of New York City (“Association”), the

caption of this petition contains the names of all parties in the

Court of Appeals. * The Association is composed of building con-

tractors in New York City who are engaged in sheet metal con-

struction work. Although no claim was made that it engaged

tempt sanctions against the Association were reversed by the

Court of Appeals, and it does not join in this petition.

* The contempt proceeding in the district court was also brought against

121 individual contractors. Although the district court found that all of them

were guilty of contempt, it imposed no sanctions against them. They therefore

did not pursue appeals.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

a sc ves. cccccceces

ES

Se

Facts and Prior Proceedings .................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.......

I. THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE

THE LEGALITY OF COURT-IMPOSED

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

UNDER TITLE VII .........

Il. THE FUND ORDER AND

ii

iv

2

4

4

5

10

A. Equal Protection of the Law ........ =

B. Corruption of Blood..... —-

III. THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED

EMASCULATE THE DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT AND DENY DUE PROCESS

5O PESEOOeene ....... 2.055

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S USE OF

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE VIOLATED

TITLE VII AND DUE PROCESS........

V. THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATOR

CONSTITUTES UNJUSTIFIED

INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT

OF SELF-GOVERNMENT .............

a hb Cos esis cs cess cccccauun

16

19

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital & Training,

Inc., 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980) ..........

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 494 (1954)..........

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 seas es cuwen

Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) ....

Chisholm v. United States Postal Service, 665

F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1981) ..........-.-.-e ees

County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of

New York, 53 U.S.L.W. 4225 (U.S. Mar. 5,

Pee er ret tree

RBA a neNe SY ES

Diaz v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 752

F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1984) ..............----.

Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104

§; Ct: BB7B-(10B4) 6. e ccc c cece cee eneees

Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S.

ft Ferrrrrererier rr tr errr tree

Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433

tS 7) ore errr rr eorr

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United

States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) ...........- 2-0

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 2i4 (1944) .

Kromnick v. School District of Philadelphia, 739

F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.

Ct. TBD (1GBB) 2. cece ccc cece cece ee eeeens

Page

12 n.7

14

14 n.9

16

13

iS

12

Cases Page

La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249

RR RS Rad i hele «res eee 20

Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of

America, 545 F. 2d 1336 (3rd Cir. 1976) ...... 12 n.7

Local No. 82, Furniture ¢> Piano Moving, etc. v.

Crowley, 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984) ............. 19-20

Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) ........ 20

McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187

SU 261 SabuaGinater tl ron wei es eo 16

National Black Police Association, Inc. v. Velde,

712 F.2d 569 (D.C. Cir. 1983)............... 14

National Maritime Union v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive

Corp., 737 F.2d 1395 (5th Cir. 1984)......... 12 n.7

Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) ........ 16

Penfield Co. of California v. S.E.C., 330 U.S.

| i scart et adied aera aR A 16

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,

Se ee I ab bi. voted ei unk peeee eas 20 n.14

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,

Be We i ID oi o's doc cans dubecccesvan 20 n.14

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,

ee I ea Wu cawhu oes oce sft 15

Rios v. Enterprise Association of Steamfitters

Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) ....... 14

Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) ...... 14

vi

Cases

United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).....

United States v. City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643 (2d

i Snr rer. ere

United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).....

United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.

RE GI 0 ic V ieee dihencescebucssssaencsns

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443

cols seen endaued oss |

Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, No.

83-3091 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1985) .............

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).......

Constitutional Provisions

WD. Goomt. wet. T, GR, Ge. BD wn cc ccccc cr ecseces

U.S. Comet. ast. TT, §3, cl. B... 2... eee eeeee.

6 vids cseccvccsedcseccuce

rr ee, Oe cc ck kt ace peu eanaes

Statutes

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

§703(j), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) ..........----.

§706(g), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) ...........--.

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959, §401(a), 29 U.S.C. §40](a) ..........

Rules

ees 2 eeerrererrrrr rere er reer re

ee. @ Se Serre rrrererr rer rere

ll

19

16

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToser TerM, 1984

LOCAL 638... ., LOCAL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL

WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE,

Petitioners,

— against —

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioners, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International

Association and its Joint Apprenticeship Committee (“JAC”),

respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-

ment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit entered in this proceeding on January 16, 1985.

CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (A-1-52)! is officially

reported at 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985) and is unofficially

' References as to the Appendix to this petition are referred to herein as (A- ).

reported at 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1466 (2d Cir. 1985).

Other reported decisions in this case, also included in the Ap-

pendix, are as follows: United States v. Local 638 et al., 337

F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Local 638 et

al., 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Local

638 et al., 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission v. Local 638 et al., 401 F. Supp.

467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd as modified, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.

1976) (Feinberg, J., concurring); Equal Employment Oppor-

tunity Commission v. Local 638 et al., 421 F. Supp. 603

(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

v. Local 638 et al., 565 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J.,

dissenting) .’

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit was entered on January 16, 1985. The jurisdic-

tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Article I, §9, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution provides:

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be

passed.

Article III, §3, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides:

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punish-

ment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall

* Earlier proceedings in the state courts are reported as follows: State Com-

mission For Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup.

Ct. N.Y. County 1964); State Commission For Human Rights vo. Farrell, 47

Misc. 2d 244, 262 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); State Com-

mission For Human Rights v. Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 799, 263 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup.

Ct. N.Y. County 1965); State Commission For Human Rights v. Farrell, 52

Misc. 2d 936, 277 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affd, 27 A.D.2d

327, 278 N.Y.S.2d 982 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 974, 228 N.E.2d 691,

281 N.Y.S. 2d 521 (1967).

work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except dur-

ing the Life of the Person attainted.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-

vides in pertinent part:

No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law... .

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution provides in pertinent part:

No state shall . . . deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the !aws.

Section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. §2000e-5(g), provides in pertinent part:

If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally

engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful

employment practice charged in the complaint, the

court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in

such unlawful employment practice, and order such

affirmative action as :nay be appropriate, which may

include, but is not lirnited to, reinstatement or hir-

ing of employees, with or without back pay (payable

by the employer, employment agency, or labor

organization, as the case may be, responsible for the

unlawful employment practice), or anv other

equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

Section 703(j) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. §2000e-2(j), provides:

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be inter-

preted to require any employer, employment agen-

cy, labor organization, or joint labor-management

committee subject to this subchapter to grant

preferential treatment to any individual or to any

group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or na-

tional origin of such individual or group on account

of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the

total number or percentage of persons of any race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by

any employer, referred or classified for employment

by any employment agency or labor organization, ad-

mitted to membership or classified by any labor

organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any ap-

prenticeship or other training program, in comparison

with the total number or percentage of persons of such

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any

community, State, section, or other area, or in the

available work force in any community, State, sec-

tion, or other area.

Section 401(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §401(a) provides in pertinent part:

The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it con-

tinues to be the responsibility of the Federal Govern-

ment to protect employees’ rights to organize, choose

their own representatives, bargain collectively, and

otherwise engage in concerted activities for their

mutual aid or protection.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Summary

Since 1975, Petitioners, a labor union and its joint appren-

ticeship committee, have been living under an elaborate race-

conscious affirmative action program designed to integrate the

sheet metal industry in New York. The centerpieces ot the pro-

gram are (1) a nonwhite membership quota of 29%,

denominated a “goal”, and (2) a court-appointed Administrator

(i.e. a special master) who governs Petitioners with respect to

the program on a daily basis, at their expense. As a result of

their failure to meet the goal, Petitioners have row been held

in contempt, largely for failing to comply with ministerial pro-

visions of the program. An expanded race-conscious affirmative

action program has now been ordered in which fines and

penalties will fund education, training, counselling and financial

to govern. Petitioners have been warned by the district court that

if the nonwhite membership “goal” is not met by August 31, 1987,

they “will face fines that will threaten their very existence.”

(A-123). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals distinguished

and limited this Court's recent decision in Firefighters Local Union

No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), and affirmed, but

stayed its mandate pending this petition.

Facts and Prior Proceedings

Sheet metal workers are skilled artisans who fabricate sheet

metal into ducts and conduits to convey heating and air-

conditioning through offices and homes. Local 28 is a union af-

filiated with the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association.

The JAC is an apprenticeship committee composed of labor and

are sons or sons-in-law of present or deceased members of the

Union.” (A-421). In 1971, the United States brought suit against

Oe pe tr ag lgeermee ty or Sai

violated engaging in discriminatory hiring prac-

tices regarding the employment of nonwhites.‘

* The case was severed as to each of the defendant unions to

ne aa prior to trial and

* The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was substituted as nam-

ed plaintiff for the federal government. 532 F.2d at 824 n.2 (A-210). The

New York City Commission on Human Rights was granted leave to intervene

in the action against Local 28. 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). (A-394-401).

The New York State Division of Human Rights, initially named as a third-

party defendant, realigned itself as a plaintiff. 753 F.2d at 1175. (A-6).

The district court found that Local 28 and the JAC had

discriminated against nonwhites in violation of Title VII, largely

by following long-established practices of filling positions in the

industry with friends and relatives. 401 F. Supp. at 476. (A-330).

On August 28, 1975, the court entered an Order and Judgment

(the “O & J”) (A-300-316), which required Local 28 and the JAC

to refrain from discriminatory practices in the future and (a)

established a nonwhite membership goal of 29% to be reached

by July 1, 1981; (b) appointed a special master, called an Ad-

ministrator, with broad supervisory powers, who was to propose

and implement an affirmative action plan to govern Petitioners’

employment practices; (c) required Petitioners to administer

“hands-on” nondiscriminatory tests for journeymen; (d) ordered

Petitioners to keep extensive records of applicants to the union

or apprenticeship program; (e) directed Petitioners to issue tem-

porary work permits on a nondiscriminatory basis; and (f) ordered

Petitioners to conduct a publicity campaign to increase nonwhite

awareness “f employment opportunities within the union.

The Administrator submitted an Affirmative Action Program

and Order (AAPO) which established interim annual goals for

nonwhite membership in Local 28, detailed the mechanics for

the conduct of the testing and apprenticeship programs and set

forth elaborate record-keeping requirements for Local 28 and the

JAC. AAPO was approved by the district court and substantially

affirmed by the Court of Appeals.’ 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976)

(Feinberg, C.J., concurring). (A-207-229).

Thereafter, a Revised Affirmative Action Plan and Order

(RAAPO) was entered in 1977. (A-182-206). RAAPO preserved

the interim membership goals in AAPO, the detailed testing,

* The Court of Appeals modified the district court's order to the extent it had

required that one of the three union representatives to the JAC be replaced by

a representative of minority descent and that three nonwhites be admitted to

the apprenticeship program for every two whites admitted. The Court held that

these remedies constituted quotas of a nature forbidden by Title VII. Judge

Feinberg concurred in the result and the disapproval of the racial quotas. He

wrote separately to stress the difference between racial quotas and goals, and

to note his approval of the 29% figure in the district court order because it was

a goal. (A-227-229).

“4

record-keeping and reporting requirements and the mandated

publicity campaign program to attract nonwhite applicants. A

divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed RAAPO. 565 F.2d

31 (2d Cir. 1977). (A-160-181).

Judge Meskill dissented (A-169-181) on the ground that the

findings of discrimination, which had been approved by the

earlier Court of Appeals decision, had been improperly deriv-

ed from employment statistics which violated this Court's in-

tervening ruling in Hazelwood School District v. United States,

433 U.S. 299 (1977). These statistics utilized a population base

restricted to New York City as opposed to the wider geographical

area from which the union actually attracted applicants, and

the findings were in part based upon discriminatory practices

which occurred prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII

does not apply to acts or practices which occurred prior to its

effective date. Judge Meskill concluded that the failure to app-

ly the Hazelwood criteria “cast substantial doubt on the existence

of illegal discrimination by these unions. . . .” (A-169).

For the next several years, Local 28 and the JAC were govern-

ed by the O & J, RAAPO and the day-to-day dictates of the

Administrator. The Administrator approved the size of each of

more than 60 classes of apprentices, the major entry point into

the industry. (A-42). These classes consisted of approximately

45% persons of minority extraction. (A-43). From April 1977

to April 1982, a period of extreme economic distress for the New

York Sheet Metal Industry (A-23-24, 46), total nonwhite

membership in Local 28 increased from 6.1% to 14.9% , while

total membership declined. (A-480).

Despite the substantial increase in nonwhite membership, in

April 1982, as the extended July 1982 deadline for reaching the

nonwhite membership goal approached, the City and State in-

itiated contempt proceedings against the Petitioners, claiming

they had failed to achieve the requisite 29% “goal”. (A-441-477).

The contempt proceeding was clearly premised on the failure

to meet the requisite percentage of minority membership, which

was treated as a quota. Nevertheless, the district court purported

to hold Petitioners in civil contempt for (1) underutilization of

the apprenticeship program; (2) failure to conduct the general

publicity campaign ordered in RAAPO; (3) adoption of a job

protection provision in the collective bargaining agreement that

favored older workers during periods of unemployment (older

workers’ provision); (4) issuance of unauthorized work permits

to white workers from sister locals; and (5) failure to maintain

and submit certain records and reports. The district court im-

posed a fine of $150,000 and assessed costs and attorneys’ fees.

(A-149-159).

In holding Petitioners in civil contempt, the district court

observed that it was not placing primary emphasis on any one

of the above violations but “that the collective effect of these

violations has been to thwart the achievement of the 29% goal

of non-white membership. . . .” (A-155-156).

In April 1983, the City commenced a second contempt pro-

ceeding before the Administrator, charging Local 28 and the

JAC with violating certain ministerial provisions of the O &

J] and RAAPO: (1) Local 28’s tardy submission of various records;

(2) submission of certain inaccurate data by Local 28 and the

JAC,* and (3) Local 28’s failure to serve the O & J and RAAPO

on certain contractors. (A-127-148). No act of racial discrimina-

tion was alleged in the second contempt proceeding.

The district court adopted the Administrator's recommenda-

tion that Local 28 and the JAC be held in contempt and assess-

ed additional penalties. (A-125-126). On September 1, 1983,

the district court issued an order establishing an Employment,

Training, Education and Recruitment Fund (the “Fund”)

(A-113-118), which was “for the purpose of promotion, employ-

ment, training, education and recruitment, and shall be used

solely for the benefit of nonwhites.” (A-114). The Fund was to

be financed in part by the $150,000 levied against Petitioners

in the first contempt proceeding, plus additional administrative

* The sum total of the “inaccurate data” enumerated by the Administrator

consisted of describing “Kaplan” as a Spanish surname and “Marquez” as a

“white” surname. (A-132-133).

ee

expenses and a further fine of $.02 per hour for each journeyman

and apprenticeship hour worked. Its stated purpose is to create

a tutorial program summer jobs, counselling and support ser-

vices, and financial support solely for nonwhite apprentices and

journeymen.

By separate order (A-111-112), the district court adopted an

Amended Affirmative Plan and Order (AAAPO) (A-53-107)

which altered RAAPO in various ways, including: (1) com-

puterization of records to be monitored by an independent ad-

visor to the Administrator; (2) extension of the Plan’s coverage

to include merged locals and their JACs; (3) a requirement that

one nonwhite apprentice be indentured for each white appren-

tice; (4) a requirement that contractors employ one apprentice

for every four journeymen; and (5) replacement of the appren-

ticeship testing program by a three-member selection board,

with one representative selected each by the court, JAC and

the respondents. AAAPO continues the office of the Ad-

ministrator. The expenses of the entire affirmative action pro-

gram, including the fees of the Administrator (at $150 per hour),

his office and administrative expenses, and expenses of the selec-

tion board are all to be borne by Petitioners.

AAAPO also adopted a 29.23% nonwhite membership “goal”;

the slight change from 29% resulted from the merger of several

unions into Local 28. In a memorandum and order

adopting the 29.23% “goal” (A-119-124), the district court stated

that if the Petitioners fail to achieve the percentage by August

31, 1987, they “will face fines that will threaten their very ex-

istence.” (A-123).

The Court of Appeals affirmed all findings of contempt

against Local 28 and the JAC, save one. The exception was the

inclusion of the older workers’ provision in the collective

bargaining agreement, which the court held could not form the

basis for contempt because it had never been implemented. In-

asmuch as the only contempt finding against the Association

was occasioned by its agreement to the older workers’ provi-

sion, all findings and sanctions entered against it were revers-

ed. The Court affirmed all contempt remedies against Local 28

10

and the JAC, including the Fund created only to benefit non-

whites. The adoption of AAAPO was similarly affirmed with

two modifications. First, AAAPO’s requirement that the JAC

indenture whites and nonwhites on a 1:1 ratio was reversed.

Second, the court clarified selection board procedures to avoid

possible confusion as to whether such procedures can be utiliz-

ed before the 29.23% nonwhite membership goal is reached.

Judge Winter dissented and voted to reverse AAAPO and all

findings and remedies. He found “that Local 28 had the ap-

proval of the administrator for every act it took that affected

the number of minority workers entering the sheet metal in-

dustry” (A-38); that the 29% “goal” was, in fact, “an inflexible

racial quota” which is illegal and unconstitutional (A-38-39);

that the only allegation even remotely justifying “the extraor-

dinary sanctions imposed” was the allegation of underutiliza-

tion of the apprenticeship program over which the Ad-

ministrator had total control (A-39); that the finding of

underutilization was based on a statistical analysis which the

entire panel and all parties agreed was erroneous (A-43); that

Local 28 has improperly been effectively placed in receivership

and denied its right of self-government (A-38, 45); and that the

race-conscious contempt remedies are inconsistent with this

Court's decision in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,

104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), and are of “questionable constitutional

validity.” (A-44, 48).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Judge Winter, in the opening lines of his dissent, outlined

the reasons for this Court to grant certiorari:

This case, which raises sensitive constitutional issues

regarding the judicial imposition of racial quotas, con-

troversial questions of statutory interpretation con-

cerning so-called reverse discrimination as a remedy

under Title VII, and more mundane yet important

legal issues as to the use of the contempt power,

divides this court for a third time. EEOC wv. Local

638, 565 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill J.,

11

dissenting); EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 833

(2d Cir. 1976) (Feinberg, C. J., concurring).

(A-38).

I

THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THE

LEGALITY OF COURT-IMPOSED AFFIRMATIVE

ACTION PROGRAMS UNDER TITLE VII

In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,

200 (1979) the Court reserved the issue of “what Title VII re-

quires or . . . what a court might order to remedy a past viola-

tion of the Act.” It appeared that the issue was resolved in

Firefighters Local Union No.1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576

(1984). The Court’s opinion, written by Justice White, in which

Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell join-

ed, exhaustively considered section 706(g) of Title VII and its

legislaive history and held that courts could not order race-

conscious quotas or remedies except to make whole actual vic-

tims of discrimination. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90. In a concurring

opinion, Justice O’Connor expressed her agreement with this

holding. She concluded that judicial remedies for Title VII viola-

tions were to be employed “only to prevent future violations

and to compensate identified victims of unlawful discrimina-

tion,” (as was done in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc.,

424 U.S. 747 (1976) and International Brotherhood of Teamsters

v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371-74 (1977)) and that the

“District Court had no authority to order the Department to

maintain its current racial balance or to provide preferential

treatment to blacks.” 104 S. Ct. at 2593-94.

Justice Blackmun’s dissent, in which Justice Brennan and

Justice Marshall joined, also considered the issue fully. Clear-

ly, the Court intended to resolve the issue, but the Courts of

Appeals and District Courts which have considered the issue

since Stotts, including the Court of Appeals in the present case,

12

have refused to read Stotts as precluding race-conscious affir-

mative action as a judicial remedy under Title VII. Vanguards

of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, No. 83-3091 (6th Cir. Jan.

23, 1985) (cf. dissent of Kennedy, C.J.); Kromnick v. School

District of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert.

denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Diaz v. American Telephone &

Telegraph, 752 F.2d 1356, 1360 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1984). Deveraux

v. Geary, 596 F. Supp. 1481 (D. Mass. 1984). These cases restrict

Stotts to situations involving bona fide seniority plans.

The majority opinion below limits Stotts even more severe-

ly. The blatantly race-conscious program judicially imposed

since 1975, the Fund order providing benefits solely to non-

whites, and the nonwhite membership “goal” compelling Peti-

tioners to discriminate against whites or “face fines that will

threaten their very existence” cannot be justified under Justice

White's analysis. Nor can Judge Pratt’s three-pronged attempt

to distinguish Stotts withstand scrutiny. It is an unfair reading

of Stotts to limit it to bona fide seniority plans, “make whole”

as opposed to prospective relief, and cases where there has been

no finding of intent to discriminate. (A-30-31).

This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the issue of

whether Stotts is limited as the Court of Appeals held below.

The present case squarely raises the issue. The legality of the

O & J and RAAPO are before the Court because Petitioners have

now been held in contempt for alleged noncompliance with

these decrees.’

AAAPO and the Fund Order raise the issue directly. These

decrees cannot be justified as civil contempt remedies, the per-

missible breadth of which they vastly exceed. (See Point III,

’ A contempt proceeding requires consideration of the legality of the underlying

order. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); National

Maritime Union v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp. , 737 F.2d 1395 (5th Cir. 1984);

Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital & Training, Inc. , 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir.

1980); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d 1336

(3rd Cir. 1976).

tenet “—_

13

infra). As the entire panel of the Court of Appeals recognized,

they can be justified, if at all, only as Title VII remedies.

This case is of great national importance because the deter-

mination of this issue will have enormous impact on the

numerous court-imposed plans presently in effect. See, e.g.,

Chisholm v. United States Postal Service, 665 F. 2d 482 (4th

Cir. 1981); United States v. City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643 (2d

Cir. 1980).

Regardless of whether this Court intended the limited reading

of Stotts which the majority in the Court below adopted, this

petition for certiorari should be granted. If the important issue

of whether district courts may impose race-conscious plans under

Title VII was not decided by Stotts, it should be decided in this

case. If the Court were to determine that such remedies may

be imposed, the guidelines for such orders should be address-

ed. In the present case the decrees far exceed the bounds which

this Court has fixed for voluntarily-adopted affirmative action

programs,* and vioiate the Congressional prohibition against

employers granting preferential treatment to any group on the

basis of a racial imbalance. Title VII, Section 703(j), 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-2(j).

I

THE FUND ORDER AND AAAPO

VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION

A. Equal Protection of the Law

The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes the

equal protection limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment on

actions of the federal governinent and its agencies, including

judicial orders, and prohibits the federal government from

* United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) adopted

a three-pronged test for voluntarily-adopted plans. (1) They must be

“specifically designed to break down patterns of racial discrimination”; (2)

they must not “unnecessarily trammel” the rights of whites; and (3) they must

be temporary.

14

discriminating between individuals or groups. Washington v.

Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Schlesinger v. Bullard, 419 U.S.

498, 500 n. 3 (1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);

National Black Police Association, Inc. v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569

(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984).°

The race-conscious quota in AAAPO and the race-conscious

Fund order deny equal protection of the law to present and

future white members of the union and white applicants to the

apprenticeship program by mandating benefits solely to non-

whites. The nonwhites benefiting from the program are not

identifiable victims of past discrimination, and the whites

discriminated against by the program are not persons who prac-

ticed discrimination."

AAAPO requires the Petitioners to achieve a racial balance

of 29.23% nonwhite members by 1987, and the court has

threatened them with dire consequences if the percentage is not

realized. (A-123). In affirming the O & J in 1976, the majority

opinion of the Court of Appeals acknowledged that in practice

the mathematical membership goal would require Petitioners

to exclude whites from membership solely on the basis of race.

532 F.2d at 827. (A-216). The Court of Appeals held that such

reverse discrimination was permissible.

In the Court of Appeals decision to which this petition is ad-

dressed, the majority simply states its conclusion that the race-

conscious program does not violate the Constitution. (A-29). Its

only authority is its own decision in Rios v. Enterprise Associa-

tion of Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629-31 (2d Cir.

1974), which itself contains no reasoned discussion of the issue.

The majority ignores the fact that Petitioners will obviously be

* Equal protection analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1, 93 (1976).

” Judge Winter observed in his dissent that the Fund order has the effect of

holding “Local 28 responsible for improving the quality of public education

in New York.” 753 F.2d at 1195. (A-50).

15

required to engage in overt reverse discrimination to meet the

nonwhite membership “goal” mandated by the district court.

As Judge Winter states in dissent, the orders of the district

court are of “questionable constitutional validity. See Regents

of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-320

(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).” (A-48). In Bakke, Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court for less than a majority. In

his learned discussion of the application of the equal protec-

tion clause to affirmative action programs, he concludes that

strict racial quotas and other broad racial benefits constitute

unconstitutional reverse discrimination unless tailored to make

whole identified victims of past discrimination, in a manner

which has clearly not occurred here.

The Court should grant certiorari to address the application

of the equal protection clause to the orders of the district court.

B. Corruption of Blood

The construction of Title VII adopted by the Court of Ap-

peals has the effect of making the Civil Rights Act an unconstitu-

tional bill of attainder. The reverse discriminatory impact on

innocent white workers occasioned by AAAPO and the Fund

order visits upon them the sins of past discrimination by others.

This construction of Title VII is contrary to basic principles of

individual accountability, and is specifically outlawed by the

prohibition against bills of attainder and corruption of blood

contained in art. I, §9, cl. 3 of the Constitution.

Bills of attainder punish either named individuals or classes

of persons, without judicial proceedings. The practice of “cor-

ruption of blood,” abolished by art. III, §3, cl. 2, continued

the punishment to the heirs of the person attainted. This Court

has repeatedly voiced its objection to such discriminatory legisla-

tion. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,

53 U.S.L.W. 4225, 4238 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1985) (Stevens, J. dissen-

ting) (“The Framers that no one ought to be con-

demned for his forefathers misdeeds . . . . ”); Korematsu v.

United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting)

16

(“ . . . if any fundamental assumption underlies our system,

it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable.”) Guided by these

fundamentals of our jurisprudence, the Court has declared un-

constitutional legislation that abridged the rights of identifiable

classes of individuals to employment. United States v. Brown,

381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303

(1946).

The Court should grant certiorari to address the dimensions

of these constitutional rights and their application to the Civil

Rights Act.

Il

THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED EMASCULATE THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

CONTEMPT AND DENY DUF PROCESS TO

PETITIONERS

Judicial sanctions for civil contempt are wholly remedial and

may be imposed only to compel compliance with prior orders

of the court or to compensate the complaining party for actual

losses proved to have been suffered by him. McComb v. Jackson-

ville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); United States v. United

Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-304 (1947); Penfield Co. of

California v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585 (1947). Contempt remedies

which are punitive in nature may be imposed only in a criminal

contempt proceeding, Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941),

brought under Rule 42, Fed. R. Crim. P., in which the defen-

dant is afforded the protections of Due Process applicable to

a proceedings. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373

( ).

The entire panel in the Court of Appeals agreed, and all par-

ties concede, that such procedures were not followed in this case.

(A-25). The remedies must thus be justified as sanctions for civil

contempt, or they cannot be upheld."

'' Alternatively, Respondents may argue, certain provisions could be justified

as remedies under Title VII. See Point I, supra.

17

In upholding the remedies imposed here, the majority paid

lip service to the standards enumerated above, but so departed

from their application as to emasculate ‘he differences between

civil and criminal contempt and sustain criminea] sanctions

against the Petitioners without Due Process. In addition, the

Court of Appeals has created a precedent with potential broad

applicability which departs from well-settled principles.

The Court of Appeals misconstrued the nature of compen-

satory civil contempt remedies, and then clearly implied that

if the sanctions imposed can be said to have compensatory or

coercive “components”, then the inquiry ends without even ex-

amining other aspects of the penalty which have neither feature.

The fines imposed here are to be used to provide tutorial,

counselling and financial supp«rt for nonwhites. The majority

approved these fines as a compensatory civil contempt remedy

despite the fact that no proof was presented that any identifiable

person was damaged. Indeed, ao proof of damage of any kind

was

The “coercive component” found by the Court of Appeals suf-

fers from a similar infirmity. The orders continue until the

29.23% nonwhite membership “goal” is reached, which the

Court of Appeals found provided Petitioners with the requisite

opportunity to purge themselves of the contempt. But the con-

tempt was purportedly not based on Petitioners’ failure to meet

the “goal”. Thus a civil contempt remedy which coerces them

to reach the “goal” is a gross departure from settled principles

of civil contempt remedies.

In actuality, Petitioners have been punished criminally

without the procedural requirements of such a proceeding, and

thus without Due Process. This Court should grant certiorari

to restate the principles of civil contempt.

2 In his dissent, Judge Wiater reasons with compelling logic that petitioners

were in reality held in contempt solely for their failure to meet the 29% racial

quota. (A-38-48).

IV

THE DISTRICT COURT'S USE OF STATISTICAL

EVIDENCE VIOLATED TITLE VII AND DUE

PROCESS

The district court's 1975 finding that petitioners violated the

Civil Rights Law is the underpinning for all the proceedings which

have followed. Two years later this Court decided Hazelwood

School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) and held:

(1) events which predated the Civil Rights Act could not be used

as evidence of the Act's violation; and (2) proof of a pattern of

discrimination by statistical evidence must be logically consistent

and must be drawn from relevant geographical locations. The

original district court decision in the present case violated both

of these requirements. This departure was the basis for Judge

Meskill’s dissent from the court's affirmance of RAAPO. Inasmuch

as Petitioners have now been held in contempt for violating the

O & J and RAAPO, the propriety of the evidence upon which

they were based is ripe for review by this Court.

The misuse of statistics was repeated, and thus compounded,

in the 1982 contempt finding. Proof of the only charge which could

be construed as a discriminatcry practice, the underutilization of

the apprentice program, was based upon statistics which all par-

ties and the entire panel of the Court of Appeals agree were

misunderstood by the district court. (A-15-16). The majority below

overlooked this failure by stating that other facts substantiated

the finding, which they do not.”

The facts are logically analyzed in Judge Winter's dissent.

(A-38-52). As he demonstrates, the proof concerning underutiliza-

tion of the apprentice program is additionally deficient. It

overlooks the role of the Administrator who has final authority

with respect to the utilization of the apprentice program, and who

approved each new class of apprentices.

“ Thus, for example, the percentage of unemployed apprentices had drop-

ped to 0% by 1981, the time when it is claimed they were not being utilized.

Clearly, they were utilized fully.

This Court should review the procedures followed by the

district court in drawing conclusions from statistics without

carefully considering“. . . all of the surrounding facts and cir-

cumstances.” International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United

States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977), including whether acts ap-

proved by the Administrator can be contemptuous.

Vv

THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATOR CON.

STITUTES UNJUSTIFIED INTERFERENCE WITH

THE RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

AAAPO continues the office of the special master, called an

Administrator, originally appointed in the O & J, with broad

supervisory powers over Petitioners’ compiiance with the affir-

mative action plan. Thus, with respect to key elements of its

internal affairs — hiring and employment — Petitioners have

been placed under what Judge Winter characterized as a

receivership. (A-38, 45). This infringement of the union's

statutory right of self-government began in 1975 and will con-

tinue until August 1987.

The Court should grant certiorari to consider the extent of

judicial power to interfere with the internal management of a

union as a part of the remedial action ordered under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act. The issue was addressed by the Court

of Appeals in 1976 on appeal from the O & J (532 F.2d at 829).

(A-220). It then approved the suspension of self-government as

“necessary”, with little discussion and without citation of

authority. In its decision to which this petition is addressed, the

Court of Appeals again considered the issue and adhered to its

earlier position.

The appointment and continuation of the Administrator

possessed with broad powers “to exercise day-to-day oversight

of the union’s affairs” (A-220) constitutes an unwarranted denial

aa ne

by Section 401(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §401(a). Cf. Local No. 82,

20

Furniture & Piano Moving, etc. v. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. 2557

(1984). Before approving an order which abridges this right,

a court should be required to find that erforcement of its orders

by use of traditional remedies is unavailing.

Rule 53, Fed. R. Civ. P., empowers the court, in exceptional

circumstances, to appoint a special master to ensure compliance

with its orders. The text of Rule 53(b), however, counsels

restraint in the use of a special master: “A reference to a master

shall be the exception and not the rule”, accord, Mathews v.

Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 272 (1976), and this Court has employed

the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to vacate improvident

references to a special master. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,

352 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1957).

The Court should grant certiorari to review this judicial in-

trusion in the internal affairs of a union.

CONCLUSION

A decade ago, petitioners were found to have violated Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act, largely on the basis of statistical

evidence of a kind which has since been disallowed. A well-

intentioned but ill-conceived series of orders and judgments are

all hinged upon this questionable finding. Petitioners have been

ordered to comply with racial quotas under penalty of extinc-

tion; ordered to fund and administer a blatantly race-conscious

affirmative action program; been adjudicated in contempt on

the basis of evidence which does not withstand scrutiny; been

subjected to civil contempt penalties which deny Due Process

because they are in reality criminal penalties; have endured an

unjustifiable denial of self-government; and have been subjected

to the daily interference of a court-appointed Administrator.

“ See also Pennhurst State School & Hospital o. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 54

(1981) (White, J. dissenting in part) (“In any event, however, the court should

not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst or deciding in the first in-

stance which patients should remain and which should be removed”). In its

subsequent opinion in Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. 900, 906 (1964), this Court reserv-

ed decision on the propriety of the order appointing the special master as it

may have violated principles of comity.

are “ee ee

21

Throughout this decade, it has never been shown that Petitioners

have discriminated against even one identifiable person, or that

the purposes of the Civil Rights Act could not have been achieved

by a simple injunction.

Moreover, the end is not in sight. There is no apparent course

of action which Petitioners could follow which would end the

— interference, the endless litigation and the great finan-

ci ain.

e

This Court should grant certiorari, vindicate Petiticners’

rights, and fix the rules so that the numerous civil rights pro-

ceedings brought throughout the nation do not result in similar

departures from the law and the Constitution, and cause many

others the loss of basic freedoms.

Dated: New York, New York

April 16, 1985

Respectfully submitted,

WiLuiaM RorTHBERG Martin R. Gotp

—_ & ROTHBERG (Counsel of Record)

Brooklyn, New York 11241 a eng =

(718) 624-2200 Gowp, FARRELL & Marks

New York, New York 10017

(212) 697-9895

Co-Counsel for Local 28

595 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10022

(212) 935-9200

Attorneys for Petitioners

APPENDIX

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit Dated January 16, 1985..............

Amended Affirmative Action Program and Order

Entered November 4, 1983 ..................

Order Entered October 13, 1983 Setting Forth

Procedures for Implementing Order

Establishing Employment, Training, Education

and Recruitment Fund......................

Order Entered September 1, 1983 Adopting

Amended Affirmative Action Program and

Order Entered September 1, 1983 Establishing

Employment, Training, Education and

Ee

Memorandum and Order Entered September 1,

1983 Imposing 29.23% Nonwhite Membership

Order Entered August 24, 1983 Holding Local 28

and the JAC In Contempt and Imposing

Administrator's Memorandum Decision Entered

June 9, 1983, Finding Local 28 And the JAC

Violated O & J and RAAPO.................

Decision of the District Court for the Southern

District of New York Entered August 19, 1982

Holding Petitioners In Contempt .............

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit Dated October 18, 1977..............

Page

Revised Affirmative Action Plan and Order Dated

NS oc oie kee 68 ata ees

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit Dated March 8, 1976 ................

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern

District of New York Dated November 25, 1975

Order and Judgment Entered August 25, 1975 ...

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern

District of New York Dated July 18, 1975 .....

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern

District of New York Dated July 7, 1972 ......

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern

District of New York Dated June 14, 1972.....

Opinion of the District Court for the Southern

District of New York Dated January 3, 1972...

Opinion of the Supreme Court of the County of

New York Dated August 24, 1964 ............

Notice of Motion Dated April 16, 1982..........

Affidavit of Charles R. Foy in Support of Motion

ir Rs cn ecb de nccscahudsacenseyes ss

Affidavit of Sheila Abdus-Salaam in Support of

Motion for Comtempt ........ ccc ccccceees

Page 22 of Defendants’ (Petitioners’) Reply

es os ee deena ene ee

Page 19 of Plaintiffs’ (Respondents’) Reply

SE cectucaweenseuasdsekaebhaudes

Page

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Nos. 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111 — Aug. Term 1983

(Argued: April 13, 1984 Decided: January 16, 1985)

Docket Nos. 82-6241, 82-6243, 83-6353, 83-6357,

83-6295, 83-6299

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plainti ff-A ppellee,

and THE CITY oF NEW YorRK,

Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-A ppellant,

—against—

LOCAL 638 .. . LOCAL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL WORKERS’

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 28 JoINT AP-

PRENTICESHIP . . . , SHEET METAL AND AIR-CONDI-

TIONING CONTRACTORS’ ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

City, INc.,

Defendants-A ppellants-Cross-A ppellees.

i

LOCAL 28,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

—against—

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION oF HUMAN RIGHTs,

Third-Party Defendant-Plaintiff-A ppellee.

A-2

LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE,

Fourth-Party Plaintiff,

—against—

New YorK STATE DIVISION oF HUMAN RIGHTS,

Fourth-Party Defendant.

Before:

MANSFIELD, WINTER, and PRaTT, Circuit Judges.

Appeal from several orders of the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Southern District of New York,

granted by the late Judge Henry F. Werker, finding de-

fendants in contempt of court, imposing both compensa-

tory and coercive fines, and adopting an amended affirma-

tive action plan to govern defendants’ employment

practices. Cross-appeal by plaintiff City of New York

from an order establishing for defendant union a non-

white membership goal of 29.23%.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for

proceedings consistent with the opinion. Judge Winter

dissents in a separate opinion.

Otto V. OBERMAIER, New York, NY (Ron-

ald C. Minkoff, Obermaier, Morvillo &

Abramowitz, Edmund P. D’Elia, NY,

NY; William Rothberg, Brooklyn, NY,

of Counsel), for Defendants-Appellants-

Cross-Appellees Local 28 and Local 28

Joint Apprenticeship Committee.

A-3

MARTIN R. GoLD, New York, NY (Jane G.

Stevens, Deborah Sherman, Gold, Farrell,

& Marks, NY, NY; William Rothberg,

Brooklyn, NY, of Counsel), for Defen-

dant-Appellant Sheet Metal and Air Con-

ditioning Contractors’ Association of New

York City, Ine.

SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM, New York, NY, Assis-

tant Attorney General of the State of

New York (Robert Abrams, Attorney

General of the State of New York, Rose-

marie Rhodes, Allen D. Aviles, Assistant

Attorneys General, NY, NY, of Counsel),

for Plaintiff-Appellee State Division of

Human Rights.

CHARLES R. Foy, New York, NY (Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Corporation Counsel,

Francis Caputo, NY, NY, of Counsel),

for Plainti ff-A ppellee-Cross-A ppellant City

of New York.

WARREN Bo DUPLINSKY, Attorney, Equal Em-

ployment Opportunity Commission, Wash-

ington, DC (David L. Slate, General

Counsel, Philip B. Sklover, Associate

General Counsel, Barbara Lipsky, Acting

Assistant General Counsel, Equal Em-

ployment Opportunity Commission, Wash-

ington, DC, of Counsel), for Plaintiff-

Appellee Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission.

PRATT, Circuit Judge:

Defendants, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’

International Association (Local 28), the Local 28 Joint

A-+

Apprenticeship Committee (JAC), and the Sheet Metal

and Air Conditioning Contractors’ Association of New

York City (contractors’ association) appeal from several

orders of the United States District Court for the South-

ern District of New York, granted by the late Henry F.

Werker, Judge, which (1) held all defendants in contempt

of court for violating numerous provisions of the Revised

Affirmative Action Program and Order (RAAPO) gov-

erning defendants’ employment practices relating to non-

whites (black and Spanish-surnamed workers); (2) im-

posed both compensatory and coercive contempt fines to

be used to fund supplemental training for nonwhite ap-

prentices; and (3) adopted a new Amended Affirmative

Action Plan and Order (AAAPO) proposed by plaintiffs.

The City of New York (city) cross-appeals from an order,

incorporated in AAAPO, establishing a temporary non-

white membership goal for Local 28 of 29.23%. As to

Local 28 and the JAC, we affirm all but one of the con-

tempt findings and all of the sanctions ordered below; as

to the contractors’ association, we reverse the only con-

tempt finding attributable to it, and reverse the award of

administrative expenses, costs, and attorneys fees against

it. We also affirm, with two modifications, the AAAPO

entered by the district court. Because Judge Werker’s

findings with regard to the membership goal contained in

AAAPO were not clearly erroneous, we affirm the cross-

appeal.

These appeals and cross-appeal! arise from yet another

attempt to force Local 28 and its JAC to correct the dis-

criminatory practices they have used to keep nonwhites

out of Local 28. As we have stated before, “Local 28

and the JAC are no strangers to the courts”, EEOC v.

Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1976), and for a

more complete history of this protracted struggle we refer

the uninitiated reader to the many earlier opinions deal-

ing with these defendants. £.g., State Commission for

Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Mise. 2d 958 (New York

Cty. 1964) ; State Commission of Human Rights v. Far-

rell, 47 Misc. 2d 244 (New York Cty. 1965) ; State Com-

mission of Human Rights v. Farrell, 52 Misc. 2d 936

(New York Cty. 1967), affd, 27 A.D.2d 327 (1st Dep’t),

affd, 19 N.Y.2d 974 (1967); United States v. Local 638,

Enterprise Association, etc., 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y.

1972); EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. -

1975), affd as modified, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976);

EEOC v. Local 638, 421 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);

EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977).

I. BACKGROUND

Local 28 is a union composed of workers who per-

form sheet metal work in the New York metropolitan

area. At the time this litigation was instituted Local 28

represented sheet metal workers only in New York City;

but in 1981 it merged with several of its sister locals and

now represents sheet metal workers in New York City,

in Nassau and Suffolk counties in New York State, and

in Essex, Passaic, Hudson, and Bergen counties in New

Jersey.

The JAC is a management-labor committee respon-

sible for operating the Sheet Metal Work Apprenticeship

Training Program (apprenticeship program), a four-year

program designed to teach sheet metal skills. A student

entering the apprenticeship program is indentured, and

upon graduation becomes a journeyman.

The contractors’ association, as its name implies, is

a trade association of building contractors who perform

sheet metal work in New York City. Although not named

in the original complaint, the contractors’ association was

joined by the court to permit complete relief. EEOC v.

Local 638, 532 F.2d at 824 n.3.

A. Prior Proceedings.

This action was instituted in 1971 by the United

States Department of Justice under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. (1982),

against Local 28 and the JAC to enjoin a pattern and

practice of discrimination i nonwhites. Shortly

thereafter, the Equal t Opportunity Commis-

sion (EEOC) was substituted as plaintiff, the city inter-

vened as a plaintiff, and the New York State Division

of Human Rights (state), initially named as a third-

party defendant, realigned itself with the EEOC and the

city. After a three-week trial in 1975, Judge Werker

found that Local 28 and the JAC had purposefully dis-

criminated against nonwhites in violation of Title VII.

EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. at 486.

The district court found that the discriminatory

methods used by Lucal 28 and the JAC effectively ob-

structed every route that nonwhites might use to gain

|

:

:

i

:

:

neyman’s examination; (3) transfer from a sister local;

and (4) organization of nonunion shops coupled with

certification of both employer need and worker ability.

Judge Werker found that a majority of Local 28’s

members were admitted through the apprenticeship pro-

gram. He further found that entry of nonwhites into

—. we ae ae

that program had been blocked by the JAC and Local 28

by using invalid entrance exams, by requiring that appli-

cants possess a high school diploma, and by inquiring into

applicants’ arrest records. Significantly, Judge Werker

also noted that proof of the plaintiffs’ case was made

extremely difficult because the union refused to keep re-

cords showing each applicant’s race and national origin

as required by EEOC regulations.

Judge Werker further found that the local had im-

peded the other avenues of entry into the union by using

invalid journeymen’s examinations, by refusing to accept

nonwhite transfers from sister locals while issuing tem-

porary work permits primarily to white workers, and by

selectively organizing only those shops having a high

percentage of white employees. /d. at 476-87. In July

1975 Judge Werker entered an order and judgment

(O&J) which not only prohibited the defendants from

discriminating against nonwhites seeking union member-

ship, but also ‘a) appointed a special master, called an

“administrator”, to propose and implement an affirmative

action plan to govern defendants’ employment practices;

(b) established a nonwhite union membership goal of

29% to be reached by July 1, 1981; (c) directed defend-

ants to administer a nondiscriminatory “hands-on”

journeymen’s examination at least once a year; (d) di-

rected defendants to issue temporary work permits on

a nondiscriminatory basis; and (e) ordered defendants to

conduct a publicity campaign designed to increase non-

white awareness of employment opportunities in the

union. Jd. at 489-90.

On appeal, we affirmed Judge Werker’s finding that

Local 28 and the JAC had intentionally violated Title VII,

but reversed two provisions of the relief ordered in the

A-8

O&J and in the Affirmative Action Plan and Order

(AAPO), which was adopted by the district court during

the pendency of the appeal from the O&J. EEOC V. Local

638, 532 F.2d at 833. After remand, Judge Werker

adopted a Revised Affirmative Action Plan and Order

(RAAPO) to reflect the modifications this court made to

the O&J and AAPO. We subsequently approved RAAPO.

EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at 36.

Generally, RAAPO incorporated the provisions of the

O&J. It also established intermediate nonwhite member-

ship goals in order to accomplish the ultimate 29% goal,

and ordered defendants to develop the apprenticeship pro-

gram, to increase and maintain nonwhite enrollment, to

maintain detailed records regarding union employment

practices, and to submit

en periodic reports summarizing

B. The Contempt Proceedings and AAAPO.

On April 16, 1982, the city and state moved in the

district court for an order holding Local 28, the JAC, the

contractors’ association, and 121 contractors in contempt

for failing to comply with the O&J, RAAPO, and two

orders of the administrator. Specifically, plaintiffs al-

leged that defendants had violated the O&J and RAAPO

by not achieving the 29% nonwhite membership goal by

July 1, 1982, and that the failure was due to defendants’

numerous violations of the district court’s orders. De-

fendants cross-moved to terminate both the O&J and

RAAPO. A hearing was held on June 10, 1982, at which

both sides submitted voluminous exhibits and live testi-

mony to detail how the O&J and RAAPO had operated

over the previous six years.

A-9

In August 1982 Judge Werker held defendants in

civil contempt. Although nonwhite membership in Local

28 was only 10.8% at the time of the hearing, he did not

rest his contempt finding on failure to meet the 29%

membership goal by the date ordered in RAAPO. In-

stead, he found that defendants had “failed to comply

with RAAPO * * * almost from its date of entry”. Spe-

cifically, Judge Werker found that “(five) separate

actions or omissions on the part of the defendants have

impeded the entry of non-whites into Local 28 in contra-

vention of the prior orders of this court.” Those five

were (1) adoption of a policy of underutilizing the ap-

prenticeship program to the detriment of nonwhites; (2)

refusal to conduct the general publicity campaign ordered

in RAAPO; (3) adoption of a job protection provision

in their collective bargaining agreement that favored

ole*r workers and discriminated against nonwhites (old-

e: workers’ provision); (4) issuance of unauthorized

work permits to white workers from sister locals; and

(5) failure to maintain and submit the records and re-

ports required by RAAPO, the O&J, and the adminis-

trator. After discussing these points Judge Werker

concluded: “Based on the foregoing violations of the

orders of the court and the Administrator, I have no

other recourse but to hold the defendants in civil con-

tempt of court.” He did so “without placing primary

emphasis on any one of the violations of the RAAPO and

O&J”, and he noted, “I am convinced that the collective

effect of these violations has been to thwart the achieve-

ment of the 29 percent goal of non-white membership in

Local 28 established by the court in 1975.”

“(Tlo remedy the past noncompliance of the defen-

dants”, Judge Werker imposed a fine of $150,000 to be

A-10

placed in a training fund to be used to increase nonwhite

membership in the apprentivestip program and, ultimate-

ly, in Local 28. The court directed administrator to

On April 11, 1983, the city brought a second contempt

proceeding, this time before the administrator, charging

Local 28 and the JAC with additional violations of the

O&J and RAAPO, as well as orders of the administrator.

By the conclusion of the hearing these charges were dis-

tilled into three categories: (1) Local 28’s failure to

provide the records required by the O&J and RAAPO in

a timely fashion; (2) failure by both Local 28 and JAC

to provide data that was accurate, and (3) Local 28’s

puterized recordkeeping system to be maintained by out-

side consultants and that they should make further con-

tributions to the training fund whose details were stil!

under consideration.

After reviewing the arguments of the parties, the

record of the hearing held before the administrator, and

the objections to the findings of the administrator, Judge

Werker adopted the recommendation that Local 28 and the

JAC be held in civil contempt for the additional viola-

tions. He deferred ruling on the amount of fines to be

imposed unti] the administrator could submit his recom-

A-1l

mendations regarding the training fund, but he immedi-

ately ordered the JAC and Local 28 to pay the cost of

outside consultants to monitor computerization of the

local’s records.

In September 1983 Judge Werker entered two more

orders. One adopted the administrator’s propasal to

establish an Employment, Training, Education and Rez

cruitment Fund (the fund). The other adopted the Amend-

ed Affirmative Action Plan and Order (AAAPO) pro-

posed by the plaintiffs and the administrator.

The training fund was to consist of the $150,000 fine

required the contractors’ association and the JAC, jointly,

to pay the fund’s administrative expenses. The general

purpose of the fund was to compensate for defendants’

underutilization of the apprenticeship program by en-

couraging the participation of nonwhites.

them to stay in the trade and to upgrade their skills; (4)

to provide financial support to any employer who cannot

afford to hire additional apprentices to meet the “~

of one apprentice to every four journeymen required

the court; and (5) to provide incentive or matching funds

to attract additional governmental or private job training

a Fate eee « . oe

A-13

II. DISCUSSION

A. Liability for Contempt.

It is well settled in this circuit that a party may be

held in civil contempt for failure to comply with an order

of the court if the order being enforced is “clear and un-

ambiguous, the proof of noncompliance is ‘clear and con-

vincing,’” and the defendants have not “been reasonably

diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what

was ordered.” Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924, 931 (2d

Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832

(1981). It is not necessary to show that defendants dis-

obeyed the district court’s orders willfully. McComb v.

Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) ; Dono-

van V. Sovereign Security Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 59 (2d Cir.

1984).

When we previously reviewed the district court’s

1975 O&J and RAAPO, we affirmed the general provisions

of each. EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at 31. After re-

examining the specific provisions of those orders that de

fendants are now charged with violating, we are satisfied

that they are clear and unambiguous. Indeed, defendants

do not even claim that the burdens imposed by the O&J

and RAAPO were unclear; instead they offer other de-

fenses to excuse their admitted noncompliance.

1. Challenges to the First Contempt Proceeding.

As to those findings in the first contempt proceeding

that relate to the issuance of unauthorized work permits,

failure to propose and conduct a general publicity cam-

paign, adoption of the older workers’ provision, and the

record keeping violations, Local 28 and the JAC virtually

concede the facts showing those violations, but offer three

A-14

arguments to excuse their noncompliance. They first

argue that, under 7 41(a) of RAAPO, the disputes about

unauthorized work permits and failure to conduct the

general publicity campaign have been resolved before the

administrator and thus are moot. Next, again relying

on 7 41(a), they argue that plaintiffs failed to complain to

the administrator about the older workers’ provision and

the recordkeeping violations, and were thus barred from

doing so after 30 days. Finally, as an alternative, they

argue that laches should bar plaintiffs from complaining

about any of these four violations. Not one of these

arguments has merit.

Our examination of the record convinces us that de-

fendants’ disputes with plaintiffs and the administrator,

with regard to the general publicity campaign and the

unauthorized work permits, were never resolved. Judge

Werker correctly rejected defendants’ second argument

when he pointed out that 1 41(b) provides that “the par-

ties may make a complaint to the administrator”, thus

showing that while 1 41(a) provided one means to resolve

disputes, it was not the only means, and its 30 day limita-

tion period could not bar plaintiffs from complaining to

the district court about the older workers’ provision and

recordkeeping violations.

On their alternative laches defense Local 28 and the

JAC argue that plaintiffs unreasonably delayed in assert-

ing the contempt claims, that the delay was inexcusable,

and that their failure to act quickly prejudiced defen-

dants. Environmental Defense Fund v. Alexander, 614

F.2d 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).

Initially, although plaintiffs may have been in the best

position to bring defendants’ violations to the attention

of the district court, it was the defendants who were

A-15

charged with reasonable diligence and making energetic

efforts to comply with the orders of the court. Their

attempt to shift the onus of inactivity to plaintiffs is mis-

guided.

Even if we were to entertain the laches defense, how-

ever, it would fail, for plaintiffs did not sit quietly by

while defendants refused to comply with the district

court’s orders. Instead, they complained, albeit infor-

mally, to defendants and to the administrator on many

occasions. Defendants had ample notice that plaintiffs

were dissatisfied with their efforts, and they cannot

credibly claim they relied on plaintiffs’ “inaction”. De-

spite repeated urgings by plaintiffs and the administrator,

defendants ignored, or at best made only minimal efforts

to comply with, the district court’s orders. Moreover,

plaintiffs initially pursued measures less drastic than

contempt in their attempt to urge defendants toward

compliance. See United States v. United Shoe Corp., 391

U.S. 244, 249 (1968). Defendants’ laches defense there-

fore fails, and the district court’s findings of contempt

with regard to the issuance of unauthorized work permits,

failure to propose the general publicity campaign, and

record keeping violations are affirmed. For other reasons

discussed below, however, we reverse the finding with

respect to the older workers’ provision.

Local 28 and the JAC raise a more credible challenge

to the district court’s finding that the apprenticeship

program was underutilized. To show that the apprentice-

ship program was underutilized after the O&J was entered

in 1975, Judge Werker sought to compare the number of

apprentices indentured between 1971 and 1975 with the

number indentured between 1976 and 1981. In so doing,

however, he mistakenly compared the total number en-

A-16

rolled in all four years of the program during the period

before the O&J, 1971-75 (2,164) with the number inden-

tured, that is the new enrollees, during the period after

the O&J, 1976-81 (334). Defendants seize upon this

error to argue that the district court’s entire finding of

underutilization was clearly erroneous, and that the con-

tempt order must therefore be reversed. We disagree

with defendants’ conclusions.

Contrary to the argument advanced by Local 28 and

the JAC, Judge Werker’s finding of underutilization does

not hinge entirely on his mistaken statistical comparison

of the pre- and post-judgment figures. That factor was

only a small part of the overall evidence showing under-

utilization of the apprenticeship program. Other evidence

showed that after the O&J was entered:

@ There was a sharp increase in the ratio of

journeymen to apprentices employed by contractors. It

rose from 7:1 before the O&J to 18:1 by 1981. The ratio

generally recognized by the industry was 4:1, a ratio that

Local 28 indicated it would follow when it registered its

apprenticeship program with the New York State Depart-

ment of Labor.

(2) The average number of hours worked annually

by Local 28’s journeymen increased dramatically from

1,066 in 1975 to 1,666 in 1981.

(3) The percentage of unemployed apprentices de-

creased from 6.7% in 1977 to 0% by 1981.

(4) Between July 1981 and March 1982 the union

issued more than 200 temporary work permits, predomi-

antly to white journeymen.

(5) Defendants refused to conduct the general pub-

licity campaign that was designed to attract nonwhites to

the apprenticeship program.

A-17

In short, despite a need for more apprentices demon-

strated by items (1) through (4) above, defendants

refused to advertise the apprenticeship program and

thereby help fill the need. This evidence solidly supports

Judge Werker’s conclusion that defendants underutilized

the apprenticeship program. Moreover, any lack of more

specific figures with respect to utilization of the appren-

ticeship program is attributable to defendants’ failure to

comply with the reporting requirements of the court's

order, Defendants may not benefit from this non-compli-

Defendants’ final challenge to the first contempt pro-

ceeding focuses on the older workers’ provision. They

contend that the district court clearly erred in finding

that provision violated the paragraphs of the O&J which

enjoined defendants from doing any act with the purpose

or effect of discriminating against nonwhites. Defen-

dants contend that the older workers’ provision was never

implemented, and therefore did not have any effect—dis-

criminatory or otherwise—on nonwhites. We agree.

Paragraphs 1, 7, and 21(g) of the O&J enjoin

Local 28, the JAC, and the contractors’ association from

engaging in any act “which has the purpose or effect of

discriminating [against nonwhites]”. During negotia-

tions on their collective bargaining agreement, Local 28,

the contractors’ association, and individual employers

agreed to amend their labor agreement to provide pro-

tection for Local 28 members who were over 52 years of

age. They entered into a memorandum of agreement

which included the following provision:

During periods of unemployment, there shall be

a ratio of one man to every four men (1:4) to be

fifty-two (52) years and older in the shop and field.

—_ Cet «44.

A-18

The essence of this provision was to ensure that one

older worker over 52 would be employed for every four

workers employed. There is no claim that its purpose

was to discriminate against nonwhites. Instead, plaintiffs

claim that this older workers’ provision was merely dis-

criminatory in effect, because the percentage of nonwhites

in the protected age group was very small as a result of

defendants’ past discriminatory practices. However. de-

fendants introduced evidence, not contested by plaintiffs,

showing that the provision had never been applied in

practice. Thus, although plaintiffs proved through the

testimony of Dr. Harriet Zollner that, if implemented, the

provision would have had a disparate impact, defendants

established that no such impact had ever occurred.

Plaintiffs, therefore, failed to prove that the older

workers’ provision had either a discriminatory purpose or

present discriminatory effect, and Judge Werker erred in

holding Local 28, the JAC, and the contractors’ associa-

tion in contempt for merely agreeing to the older work-

ers’ provision. “{A] district court, in exercising the

awesome power of contempt, must turn square corners”.

United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 915 (2d Cir.

1984). We therefore reverse the contempt finding against

all defendants with regard to the older workers’ provision.

If the district court concludes that the provision will have

a potentially discriminatory effect, it may strike the provi-

sion from the collective bargaining agreement and thereby

insure that its discriminatory impact will never be felt.

However, on this record even such a mild injunctive

remedy may be unnecessary in the absence of more facts

with respect to the older workers’ provision. On oral

argument we were told that the provision had been, or

was about to be, removed from the collective bargaining

A-19

agreement entirely. Moreover, in a motion made shortly

before oral argument, defendants asserted that the versicn

of the older workers’ provision that was actually incor-

porated into the collective bargaining agreement had ap-

plied only to journeymen and not to apprentices. If the

provision no longer exists, or alternatively, if it applies

only to journeymen and if there is no evidence to suggest

that the provision will have a discriminatory effect on

then there is no reason in this action to grant

criminate against nonwhites. If the adopted provision

older workers’ provision was the only alleged contemptu-

ous conduct attributed to the contractors’ association.

Because of it Judge Werker ordered the contractors’ asso-

ciation and the JAC to pay jointly for the administrative

costs of the training fund. Since there was no contempt

in this regard, however, there is no basis for any relief

against the contractors’ association. We leave it to the

discretion of the district judge to determine how the con-

tractors’ association's share of those costs should be re-

allocated between Local 28 and the JAC.

Similarly, we reverse the court’s award of attor-

neys’ fees and costs to plaintiffs as against the contrac-

A-20

tors’ association. As will be discussed in II.B., infra,

To sum up on the first contempt proceeding, we

affirm the district court’s findings with regard to four of

the five bases for its decision. We reverse insofar as a

contempt finding was based on the older workers’ provi-

sion, and we remand to the district court to determine the

status and effect of that provision. We also reverse all

relief granted against the contractors’ association. We

now turn to the second contempt proceeding.

2. Challenges to the Second Contempt Proceeding.

Local 28 and the JAC raise various challenges to the

second contempt proceeding conducted before the adminis-

RAAPO, (c) that the administrator waived any reporting

requirements as to the merged locals, and (d) that the

plaintiffs complaint about inaccurate man-hour reports

was barred by laches.

(a) Local 28 was charged with violating an order of

the administrator requiring it to serve the O&J and

RAAPO on each employer by mail that was “certified,

return receipt requested. Copies of the certification cards

are to be provided to the parties upon their receipt by

Local 28.” At the second contempt hearing, piaintiffs

+

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it

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{c) Defendants also argue that the administrator

waived the reporting requirements as to merged locals.

We find no evidence in the record to support a waiver.

A-22

On the contrary, the administrator urged Local 28 to

have its records include data on the merged locals, bu

defendants ignored him.

(d) Finally, defendants urge laches as a bar to

plaintiffs’ complaints about inaccurate man-hour reports

because “the city should have been aware that the JAC’s

apprentice manhour reports were inaccurate’. Again

defendants misconstrue the obligations of the parties: it

is defendants who are charged with the duty to comply

with the court’s orders, not plaintiffs. Defendants can-

not complain simply because plaintiffs did not discover

defendants’ errors sooner, for they disregarded the court’s

orders at their own peril. See McComb v. Jacksonville

Paper Co., 336 U.S. at 192. Defendants’ laches defense

also fails because they have pointed to no evidence show-

ing either reliance on plaintiff's inactivity, or prejudice

resulting therefrom.

In sum, on the second contempt proceeding, the dis-

trict court’s determination that defendants had violated

several provisions of the O&J, RAAPO, and the admin-

istrator’s orders was supported by clear and convincing

evidence which showed that defendants had not been

reasonably diligent in attempting to comply with the

orders of the court and the administrator.

In his dissenting opinion, our colleague, J

Wises, alpen the view Get Sate Wate

co

lutely no basis for the claim of apprenticeship under-

A-23

utilization once the economic circumstances are taken

into account”. We think such a view treats Judge

Werker’s approach to the contempt issue too narrowly.

For over 15 years both the federal and state courts have

sought to require Local 28 to end its unlawful diserim-

ination against minorities. While the factor of under-

utilizing apprentices may in one sense be viewed, as

Judge Winter describes it, as “the centerpiece of the con-

tempt finding”, it assumes that position only because it

is not only a partial cause of the lack of sufficient pro-

gress in integrating the union but also a point at which

the success or failure of the program can be readily

measured. In other words, failure to have the appren-

tices employed is both an independent cround for con-

tempt and a symptom of the effects of defendants’ other

kinds f contemptuous conduct. @ -“

Many of the uncertainties about underutilization

that are urged by defendants are due in large part to

the union’s noncompliance with the reporting provisions

of RAAPO. Had the union complied promptly and accu-

rately with the recordkeeping and reporting require

ments the picture as to underutilization would be clearer.

Nor are the difficult economic circumstances of the

sheet metal workers an adequate justification for the

union’s continued discrimination. Even if it were true,

as Judge Winter states, that the union “faced an excruci-

ating reduction in demand for its services in the years

in question”, that circumstance would not justify the

union’s discriminatory favoring of journeymen over ap-

prentices, a fact that is crystal clear from (1) the tre-

mendous increase during the relevant period in the ap-

prentice :journeymen ratio from 1:7 to 1:18 and (2) from

A-24

the decline in percentage of unemployed apprentices dur-

ing the period 1977-1981 from 6.7% to 0%. One of the

principal reasons for revising the original AAPO into

RAAPO was to adjust for the “changed working and

employment conditions in the sheetmeta! industry. in New

York City, including the present severe and widespread

unemployment in the industry”. RAAPO % 1.

to integrate its membership, we think the combination

of violations found by Judge Werker below amply demon-

strates the union’s foot-dragging egregious noncompli-

ance with the O&J and RAAPO and adequately supports

a

A

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A-25

B. Contempt Remedies: The Fund and the Order to

Computerize Records.

“Generally, the sanctions imposed after a finding of

civil contempt serve two functions: to coerce future

compliance and to remedy part noncompliance.” Vuitton

et Fils v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir.

1979): see United States v. United Mine Workers of

America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947). “The measure of

the court’s power in civil] contempt proceedings is deter-

mined by the requirements of full remedial relief.” Me-

Comb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. at 193-94. With

these principles in mind, consider Local 28's and the

JAC’s challenges to the relief imposed by the district

court to remedy defendants’ contemptuous conduct. This

convincingly numerous violations of the O&J, RAAPO,

and orders of the administrator, Judge Werker was faced

the prior orders of [the district) court.”

that it will remain in existence “until the [29%

ship goal) ° * ° is achieved”. Paragraph 5 further pro-

finding underlying the two contempt proceedings is re-

versed, the entire remedy must be vacated) While this

might be a tenable argument if the fines had been im-

posed for multiple findings of criminal contempt, see

A-27

In the first contempt decision the district court found

that the defendants had committed five violations of prior

court orders: underutilization of the apprenticeship pro-

gram, reporting violations, failure to conduct the general

publicity campaign, unauthorized issuance of work per-

mits, and adoption of the discriminatory older workers’

provision. We have reversed the last finding because the

conduct proved does not violate a clear order of the court.

However, the older workers’ provision presents a problem

separate from the other violations. Since that provision

was not implemented, it had no past impact on the appren-

ticeship program, and since it will not be applied in the

future no purpose would be served by permitting its

reversal to undermine the fund order. Indeed, defendants

virtually concede in their brief that the fund order was

aimed primarily at the finding that the apprenticeship

program was underutilized. Thus, we conclude that re-

versal on the older workers’ provision is not fatal to the

fund order because the remedies ordered are amply war-

ranted by the other findings of contempt, and we affirm

them on the basis of those findings.

Finally, the JAC and Local 28 have not challenged

the order which requires them to pay the cost of monitor-

ing the computerized recordkeeping system. We there-

fore affirm that order. We turn now to the parties’

various challenges to certain provisions of AAAPO.

C. Challenges to AAAPO.

In November 1983 Judge Werker approved the third

version of the affirmative action plan (AAAPO), which

affects Loca] 28, its JAC, the locals that had been merged

into Local 28, their JACs, and all contractors who use the

union’s sheet metal workers. AAAPO modified RAAPO

A-28

in six significant ways. It (1) increased the nonwhite

membership goal from 29% to 29.23% to reflect the addi-

tion of the merged locals; (2) established an apprentice

to journeymen ratio of 1:4; (3) created a three-member

apprentice selection board; (4) imposed an indenture

ratio of one nonwhite for every white admitted to the

apprenticeship program; (5) permitted work to continue

on developing new selection procedures, but barred their

use until the membership goal could be accomplished; and

(6) incorporated the order requiring defendants to bear

the cost of an advisor to monitor the computerization of

Local 28’s records.

AAAPO was a response by the district court to three

developments in this case: first, Local 28’s failure to meet

the 29% nonwhite membership goal by July 1, 1982;

second, Local 28’s contemptuous refusal to comply with

many provisions of RAAPO; and third, the merger of

several largely white locals outside New York City into

Local 28.

Local 28 and the JAC challenge the district court’s

adoption of AAAPO, however, contending that: (1)

AAAPO contravenes Title VII and the equal protection

component of the fifth amendment; (2) AAAPO unduly

interferes with union government; and (3) the district

court abused its discretion by adopting five of the six

provisions of AAAPO described above. On its cross-

appeal the city contends that the findings underlying the

district court’s adoption of the 29.23% interim nonwhite

membership goal were clearly erroneous, and that the

figures should have been higher.

Since entry of the O&J in 1975, the district court has

retained jurisdiction “to enter such orders as may be

“o

A-29

necessary to effectuate the equal employment opportufi-

ties for non-whites and other appropriate relief’; conse-

quently, additional violations of Title VII were not needed

to trigger modifications of the remedies that were orig-

inally ordered. See United States v. Local Union No. 212,

472 F.2d 634, 635-36 (6th Cir. 1973). Any changes

made by the district judge were to be guided by the

sound exercise of his equitable discretion, see Rios Vv.

Enterprise Association of Steamfitters Local 638, 501

F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974), and our task is not to exer-

cise our own discretion, but to determine whether the dis-

trict judge has abused his. Association Against Discrim-

ination V. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 279 (2d Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. $988 (1982).

Defendants’ first challenge to AAAPO need not de-

tain us long. Defendants contend that the core provisions,

which constitute the affirmative action program, violate

Title VII and equal protection. We disagree. This court

has consistently held that appropriate affirmative action

measures are not proscribed by Title VII, see Association

Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d at

280; EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d at 827; Rios v. Enter-

prise Association of Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d at

629-31, or by the constitution. /d. at 628 (citations

omitted). Moreover, this court has twice upheid the

affirmative action provisions of RAAPO, EEOC v. Local

638, 582 F.2d at 829-33; EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at

33-36, and we therefore reject any challenge to the parallel

provisions contained in AAAPO.

Finally, we believe that defendants’ attempt to rely

on Firefighters Local Union No, 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S.Ct.

2576 (1984), is misplaced. Defendants argue that Stotts

eliminates all race-conscious relief except that benefitting

specifically identified victims of past discrimination. We

A-30

do not accept defendants’ expansive interpretation of that

opinion.

In Stotts, a federal district court enjoined the city

of Memphis from laying off black fire department em-

ployees in accordance with the seniority system contained

in the collective bargaining agreement governing rela-

tions between the city and its employees. The black

workers had been hired pursuant to a year-old consent

decree settling prior charges of employer discrimination.

The consent decree did not find that Memphis had vio-

lated Title VII, and did not identify any particular em-

ployee who had suffered from the alleged discrimination.

In granting the injunction, the district judge found that

although the seniority provision was not adopted with

discriminatory intent, it nevertheless had to give way to

the consent decree because of the discriminatory effect that

would result from the city’s use of the seniority system.

Id, at 2581-82. The district court’s injunction was

affirmed on appeal to the sixth circuit, 679 F.2d 541 (6th

Cir. 1982), and the Supreme Court reversed. 104 S.Ct

at 2590. |

Stotts can be distinguished from the present case in

at least three ways. First, the ancien atten ordered

by the district court in that case was in direct conflict

with a bona fide seniority plan that was protected by

, 703(h) of Title VII. Jd. at 2587. In our case § 703(h)

is not involved because there is no seniority plan in con-

flict with the remedies imposed by AAAPO or the fund

order. Second, the court’s discussion of $ 706(g), par-

ticularly relied on by the defendants here, related only

to the “make whole” relief ordered in the district court,

id. at 2589, and did not address prospective relief like

that ordered in AAAPO and the fund order. Third, in

A-31

Stotts there was no finding of any intent to discriminate,

id. at 2581, whereas in this case we have affirmed the

district court’s finding that defendants have intentionally

discriminated against nonwhites. These three factors

significantly distinguish Stotts from the case at bar and

undercut defendants’ reliance on that case. Thus, de-

fendants first challenge to AAAPO fails.

Local 28’s complaint that the obligations imposed by

AAAPO will interfere with its right to self-government

need not detain us either. We have rejected this conten-

tion on previous appeals, e.g., EEOC v. Local 638, 532

F.2d at 829, and we reiterate that the government of

Local 28 will be returned to its members as soon as it

ends it unlawful discrimination against nonwhites. Until

that time the government of Local 28 must remain sub-

ject to the supervision of the district court and the ad-

ministrator.

There being no merit to defendants’ first two con-

tentions, we turn to defendants’ challenges to the specific

remedial provisions added by AAAPO.

1. The 29.22% Nonwhite Membership Goal.

We reject defendants’ attempt to characterize the

membership goal as a permanent quota, because the pro-

vision at issue is clearly not a quota, but a permissible

goal. See Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters

Local 638, 501 F.2d at 628 n.3.

This circuit has a well-established two-pronged test

for the validity of a temporary, race-conscious affirmative

action remedy such as a membership goal:

There must first be a “clear cut pattern of long-

continued and egregious racial discrimination”. Sec-

ond, the effect of reverse discrimination must not be

A-32

“identifiable”, that is to say, concentrated upon a

relatively small, ascertainable group of non-minority

persons.

EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d at 828 (quoting Kirkland v.

New York State Dep't of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d

420, 427 (2d Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 531 F.2d

5 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 :1976)).

A race-conscious goal in AAAPO passes this test as

it did in RAAPO in 1976. This court has twice recog-

nized Local 28’s long continued and egregious racial dis-

crimination, EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d at 825; EEOC

v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at 36 n.8, and Local 28 has pre-

sented no facts to indicate that our earlier observations

are no longer apposite. Certainly, the effects of the

union’s discriminatory conduct have not been eliminated,

for its nonwhite membership is still only 10.8%. There-

fore, Kirkland’s first prong has been satisfied.

We think the second prong has been satisfied as well,

because the effects of the affirmative action remedies in-

—_—— EEE

A-33

dies will be in place only uncil the effects of the past

discrimination have been eliminated, see United Steel

Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09

(1979), and because AAAPO will cease when those effects

On cross-appeal, the City of New York has also chal-

lenged AAAPO’s goal, but for a different reason. It

contends that the district court’s adoption of the 29.23%

posed, we would have to affirm the 1:4 apprer.tice :journey-

men ratio because we are not reversing, but affirming, the

underutilization findings by the district court.

A-34

Going further, however, the 1:4 ratio is a critical

element in AAAPO because it helps insure that defendants

will not underutilize the apprenticeship program in the

future. Because of the ratio employers will be motivated

to hire more apprentices and they will have the court’s

assistance in overcoming union opposition; the union faces

further contempt penalties if it does not cooperate in

meeting the ratio; and the JAC will have to admit more

apprentices to its program in order to meet the increased

demand for apprentice labor. Moreover, additional jobs

available to apprentices will, in time, help to attract

larger apprentice classes.

Finally, we think the 1:4 ratio requirement is reason-

able and flexible—reasonable, because it reflects a ratio

that the industry has historically followed: flexible, be-

cause exemption from the ratio in particular cases may

be obtained upon a proper showing. Thus, we affirm the

1:4 ratio provision of AAAPO.

3. Apprentice Selection Board.

It is charged with selecting both nonwhite and white

apprentices to enter the apprenticeship program.

Defendants claim that the selection board provision

will have an adverse impact on the union’s freedom to

govern its own affairs. We have rejected this argument

when raised in prior challenges to similar provisions,

EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d at 33-34, and we find it

no more pe.uasive here. Since it is an interim measure,

A-35

the board can be disbanded as soon as the nonwhite mem-

bership goal is reached. Unlike a provision rejected by

us in the 1976 appeal to this court, EEOC v. Local 638,

532 F.2d at 830, the racial makeup of the board under

AAAPO is not prescribed. This selection board is more

analogous to the board of examiners approved in RAAPO.

4. Elimination of the Apprentice Examination.

Paragraphs 25-28 of RAAPO ordered defendants to

develop and administer apprentice entrance examinations

validated by the EEOC, and in the amended affirmative

action plan proposed by plaintiffs these requirements were

carried forward. However, in his order adopting AAAPO,

entered on September 1, 1983, Judge Werker eliminated

the provisions in plaintiffs’ proposal that called for ad-

ministration of apprenticeship examinations. He found

that many had complained of the tests’ adverse impact on

nonwhites, that agreement on the tests’ validity was vir-

tually impossible, and that the tests were costly to admin-

ister. AAAPO takes a new approach to the apprentice

selection procedure. It substitutes the selection board

discussed above, and also orders defendants to work with

industrial psychologists to develop objective, nondiscrim-

inatory selection procedures.

On appeal, the EEOC contends that paragraph 15 of

AAAPO prohibits the use of the new selection procedures

to be developed, even if proven nondiscriminatory, until

the 29.23% membership goal is reached. Although we do

not necessarily agree with the EEOC’s narrow reading

of AAAPO, in order to eliminate any possible confusion,

we direct that paragraph 15 of AAAPO be amended to

state:

A-36

15. Upon termination by court order of this AAAPO,

or at such earlier time as the court may order, the

in italics).

With this provision the defendants may use new selection

procedures at any time after they prove to the district

court that they are nondiscriminatory.

5. The Nonwhite to White Indenture Ratio.

In order to insure that adequate numbers of non-

whites are taken into the apprenticeship program, the

district court provided in AAAPO that the JAC must

indenture one nonwhite apprentice for every white appren-

tice. Local 28 and the JAC, joined by the EEOC, chal-

lenge this 1:1 indenture ratio as an abuse of the district

court’s discretion. We agree.

We have recognized that temporary hiring ratios may

be necessary in order to achieve integration of a work

force from which minorities have been unlawfully barred.

Association Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport,

647 F.2d at 283; United States v. City of Buffalo, 633

F.2d 643, 646-47 (2d Cir. 1980). However, such race-

conscious ratios are extreme remedies that must be used

sparingly and “carefully tailored to fit the violations

found”, Association Against Discrimination Vv. City of

Bridgeport, 647 F.2d at 281, and we will approve such

ratios only where “no other method was available for

affording appropriate relief”. Vulcan Society of the New

York City Fire Department, Inc. v. Civil Service Com

A-37

mission, 490 F.2d 387, 398 (2d Cir. 1973); Bridgeport

Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 482 F.2d 1333,

1341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).

Here, other methods do seem to be available. To be-

with, defendants have voluntarily indentured 45%

S p classes since January

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Ill. CONCLUSION

We affirm all but one of Judge Werker’s findings of

contempt against the defendants. We reverse and re-

mand for further proceedings Judge Werker’s finding that

agreement to the older workers’ provision violated the

O&J and RAAPO. Because that is the sole finding of

contempt against the contractors’ association, we reverse

the contempt relief and the awards of administrative ex-

penses, attorneys’ fees and costs ordered against it. We

affirm, however, all of the contempt relief ordered against

Local 28 and the JAC. We also affirm, with two modifi-

cations, the AAAPO adopted by Judge Werker. Finally,

we affirm the order, incorporated in AAAPO, establishing

a temporary, nonwhite membership goal of 29.23%.

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economic conditions into account. The RAAPO replaced

the first affirmative action plan and order (“AAPO”),

which dictated fixed numbers of apprentices to be in-

dentured periodically, but which the administrator found

to be unrealistic in view of the sheet metal industry's

depressed economic conditions.’ After the district court

approved the O & J and RAAPO, Local 28 appealed and

challenged the provisions relating to the apprenticeship

program as unduly intrusive on the union’s self-govern-

ment. This court rejected that argument and Judge

Smith’s opinion expressly stated that the “{i]ndenture of

apprentices . . . is appropriately subject to administrator

oversight. The balancing of the need for training workers

against existing economic conditions is appropriately left

: The AAPO, which was superseded by the RAAPO, called for:

(1) the indenture of 100 apprentices in February, 1976, 200 in

July, 1976, and 200 each year thereafter; (2) the rotation of

apprentices through jobsites in order to equalize employment

among apprentices; and (3) a ratio of one apprentice for every

four journeymen.

None of these requirements were met because of an egregiously

JAC indentured only 53 apprentices in February, 1976, none in

July, 1976, and 36 in all of 1977. In addition, the JAC stopped

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A-42

to his informed discretion.” 565 F.2d at 35 (emphasis

added).

The union’s obligation under RAAPO, therefore, is

to report on the number of apprentices indentured and

to obey any decision by the administrator altering that

number on his own initiative or upon objection by the

plaintiffs. After final entry of the O & J and RAAPO,

the union informed the administrator and the plaintiffs

virtually every month of the number of apprentices in

the program.’ Those reports are in the record. On no

occasion did the administrator order the union to increase

the number of apprentices indentured. Nor did the

plaintiffs object to the numbers submitted, as the pro-

vision for notice to them contemplated and as they had

the clear power to do under Paragraph 15 of the O & J."

For all that appears in the record, the level of

utilization of the apprenticeship program, the centerpiece

of Judge Werker’s contempt finding, was never a serious

issue between the parties before the district judge’s

: Apprentice class sizes were reported by the JAC to the Ad-

ministrator and the plaintiffs on April 6, June 2, June 18, 1976;

March 4, April 4, May 9, June 8, July 13, August 3, September 7,

November 7, December 7, 1977; January 6, February 27, April 11,

May 15, June 6, July 6, August 4, September 12, October 4,

November 3, December 4, 1978; January 10, February 13, March

14, April 4, May 9, June 14, August 16, September 18, October

i9, November 21, December 14, 1979; January 21, February 22,

March 17, April 23, May 23, June 17, July 23, August 7, Sep-

tember 10, October 9, Nowember 12, December 16, 1980; January

21, February 18, March 10, May 5, June 9, August 3, August 4,

September 17, October 13, November 13, December 9, 1981; Jan-

wary 11, February 8, March 22, April 7, May 10, 1982.

A-43

decision. The claim of underutilization was not even

raised by the plaintiffs in their motion for contempt. The

issue literally crept into the case only when Local 28

attempted to show its good faith by relying in its brief

in response to the contempt motion on its efforts to recruit

minorities into the apprenticeship program and on the

fact that every apprenticeship class after entry of the

O & J began with 45% minority members. The plaintiffs

addressed the apprenticeship issue for the first time in

their reply brief and only then asserted underutilization

as a ground for contempt. In the hearing before the

district judge, the size of the apprenticeship program was

mentioned only by the union, again to demonstrate its

good faith efforts.

With the issue thus in the posture of an afterthought,

the district judge seized upon certain statistics relating to

total apprenticeship enrollment and found as a fact that

the union deliberately reduced enrollment in the program

after final entry of the O & J following our decision in

October, 1977. Everyone, including the plaintiffs and the

majority, concedes that these statistics were misunder-

stood by the district court and do not support the con-

clusion reached. Moreover, in drawing that conclusion,

the district judge made no reference whatsoever to the

elaborate procedures established in the O & J and RAAPO

to determine the size of the apprenticeship program, to

the administrator’s plenary authority in that regard, to

the fact that Local 28 was never ordered by the adminis-

trator to increase the number indentured, or to the plain-

tiffs’ opportunity to object as contemplated by the

RAAPO.

The majority now affirms the district court on the

grounds that its finding is not clearly erroneous. How-

A-44

ever, it treats the finding not as one of a deliberate

evasion of the O & J and RAAPO by reducing the

number of apprentices enrolled after their entry but

rather as a more general finding of underutilization not

involving an actual reduction of apprentice enrollment.

This alteration of the district court’s finding is necessary

because the number of apprentices enrolled after final

entry of the O & J did not generally decline.’ The majority

also does not discuss the relationship of the O & J and

RAAPO to the union’s obligations with regard to the ap-

prenticeship program. Since it also does not state what

by the operation of the apprenticeship program, one can

infer only that the contempt in its view lies not in any

failure to comply with the elaborate provisions of the

O & J and RAAPO but solely in the failure to reach

the 29% racial goal.

Respectfully, I believe the majority is in error in so

concluding because the union’s obligation with regard to

the apprenticeship program is clearly limited to compli-

ance with the specific provisions of the O & J and RAAPO.

Indeed, rigid enforcement of the 29% goal without regard

to economic or other circumstances is not consistent with

the O & J and RAAPO, with our prior decisions in this

very case, with Title VII, or probably with the Constitu-

tion.

5 Enrollment after entry of the orders was as follows:

1977 36

1978 49

1979 30

1980 77

1981 143

Our decision affirming the RAAPO was rendered on October 18,

1977. The enrollment of 36 apprentices in 1977 was specified in

the RAAPO itself.

A-45

Since the O & J and RAAPO became effective, Local

28 has essentially been in a receivership so far as admis-

sions to membership or job referral are concerned. In

the words of Judge Smith, the administrator has the

power “to exercise day-to-day oversight of the union's

affairs.” 532 F.2d at 829. The practical function of the

29% goal is not to impose some overweening obligation

on the union but to guide the administrator in determin-

ing what Local 28 is to do under the 0 & J and RAAPO.

There is simply no reason whatsoever for a court to de-

prive a union of its self-governance and impose on it

the costs of judicial administration of its affairs only to

deny that compliance with the decisions of the court-

appointed administrator fulfills the union’s obligations.

The majority’s use of rhetorical assaults and punitive

sanctions against Local 28 simply cannot be reconciled

with its failure to utter even muted criticism of the ad-

ministrator who repeatedly authorized the supposedly

contumacious acts and continues in office to this day.

Judge Smith’s second opinion also explicitly recog-

nized that the number of apprentices indentured must be

determined by the administrator in light of “existing

economic conditions,” 565 F.2d at 35. The majority “re-

jects” the so-called “tacit premise” of this dissent that

difficult economic circumstances may justify reducing the

number of new apprentices and thus the number of new

minority members. In doing so, of course, it is rejecting

Judge Smith’s prior ruling in this very case.

As the record amply demonstrates, Local 28 faced

an excruciating reduction in demand for its services in

the years in question. In fact, the reason for the adminis-

trator’s revision of the fixed enrollment requirements of

the AAPO, see note 2, supra, was “the present changed

A-46

The record also demonstrates that the level of utiliza-

tion of the apprenticeship program was consistent with

existing economic circumstances. Although the majority

notes a “dramatic” increase in average hours worked

annually by a journeyman from 1975 to 1981, the number

of journeymen in fact fell from 3,670 to 2,163 in roughly

the same period. Even with this enormous decline in

journeymen, the average number of forty-hour weeks

worked by a journeyman in a calendar year was as fol-

lows:

1970 — 52

1971 — 51

1972 — 35

1973 — 31

1974 — 28

1975 — 26

1976 — 25

1977 — 26

1978 — 31

1979 — 37

1980 — 42

Emphasis has also been placed upon the fact that the

unemployment rate among apprentices has declined. How-

ever, during 1974 and 1975, when that unemployment

A-4+8

in a growing industry. Its use is thus also subject to

prevailing economic conditions.

For these reasons, there has not been a “clear and

unambiguous” order of which there is “clear and con-

vineing’” evidence of non-compliance, prerequisites to a

contempt judgment. Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924. 93]

(2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied, 454 US. 330

(1981). The frustration of the plaintiffs, the district

court, and the majority at the union’s failure to reach

the judicially mandated racial balance even while comply-

ing with the O&J and RAAPO is perhaps understandable.

However, in light of the facts that large numbers of

journeymen did not work during the period in question

or worked only meager hours, reactive finger pointing at

Local 28 is a faintly camouflaged holding that journey-

men should have been replaced by minority apprentices

on a strictly racial basic. This is at odds with Fire-

fighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576

(1984), which rejected such a use of racial preference as

a remedy under Title VII. Resort by a federal court to

such a strict racial quota in circumstances such as this

seems to me also to be of questionable constitutional valid-

ity. See Regents of the University of California v.

Ti 438 U.S. 265, 287-320 (1978) ( opinion of Powell,

I alse disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the

establishment of the “education fund.” The district court

ordered the union to finance the fund as part of the con-

tempt sanction without making factual findings as to the

need for the fund. As stated by the court, the fund will

be used to provide tutorials and counseling for first year

minority apprentices, to finance various methods of re-

ducing dropouts among minority apprentices, and to im-

A-49

prove the curriculum at vocational and technical schools.’

The district judge’s order reads in part:

6. The Fund shall be used for the following purposes:

a. Establishing a tutorial program of up to 20 weeks

duration for nonwhite first-year apprentices.

b. Creating part-time and summer sheet metal jobs for

nonwhite youths between the ages of 16 through 19 who are

currently enrolled in or have successfully completed, within

the past year, a sheet metal vocational or technical education

program or a program in an allied trade requiring the use

of tools, math or drafting, such as carpentry.

c. Paying the expenses, including any lost wages, of non-

white members and apprentices of Local 28 for their services

as liaisons to vocational and technical schools having sheet

metal programs. The duties of the liaisons shall include, but

not be limited to, the following: working with the schools to

upgrade the sheet metal program, arranging trips to sheet

metal shops and field sites, counseling the students on methods

of entry into Local 28 and working with participants in the

program set forth in paragraph 6(b) above. The JAC train-

ing coordinators and union officials shall cooperate fully with

the liaisons in the effort to carry out this program.

d. Appointing a counselor or counselors, whose duties shall

include, but not be limited to, the following: monitoring the

progress of nonwhite apprentices at each JAC school and on

the job, providing nonwhite apprentices with personal and job-

related counseling and assisting nonwhite apprentices in adjust-

ing to their school and work environments to help ensure their

successful completion of the Apprenticeship Program. The coun-

selor(s) shall be selected and supervised by the Administrator

subject to approval by plaintiffs and the Court. Defendants

and all Local 28 contractors shall cooperate fully with the

counselor(s). Every two months, and at the end of each ap-

prenticeship term, the counselor(s) shall submit to the parties,

the Administrator and the Court a report detailing the progress

of nonwhite apprentices and setting forth recommendations to

resolve any problems nonwhite apprentices may be encountering.

e. Providing stipends to unemployed nonwhite apprentices

while they attend their regular apprentice class and any addi-

tional classes that will be offered to such apprentices pursuant

to the AAAPO.

f. Establishing a low-interest loan fund for nonwhite first-

term apprentices who demonstrate financial need.

g. Providing stipends to unemployed nonwhite journeymen

while they take advanced courses to upgrade their skills.

[Footnote continued on following page]

A-50

I do not quarrel with the potential usefulness of such a

fund as social policy. However, its central factual premise

seems to be the lack of qualified minority applicants able

to enroll in and complete the apprenticeship program, an

implicit finding by the district court that Local 28 has

done all it reasonably could with regard to the training

of minority apprentices. If a lack of qualified applicants

exists—and if it does not, it is difficult to understand the

purpose of the fund—the remedy is not to hold a private

organization such as Local 28 responsible for improving

the quality of public education in New York.

Many of the other claims of contempt also rest on a

shaky foundation. For example, with regard to many of

the alleged failures to comply with reporting requirements,

Local 28 argued that the administrator had determined

that it was not required or able to make such reports. The

district judge rejected this argument on the grounds that

the administrator had no power to grant such relief, a

[Footnote continued from previous page]

h. Providing financial reimbursement to any employer who

has demonstrated to plaintiffs’ satisfaction that it cannot afford

to hire an additional apprentice to meet the one-apprentice-to-

every-four journeymen requirement of the AAAPO.

i. Providing incentive or matching funds to attract addi-

tional funding from governmental or private job training pro-

grams, such as the Dislocated Worker Program established

pursuant to Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1658.

j. Additional expenditures may be made from the Fund

upon a showing by any party that such an expenditure would

serve to increase the nonwhite membership of the union and

the Apprentice Program, or to provide support services to non-

whites. The party submitting authorization for withdrawal of

monies from the Fund must first circulate a written proposal

to all other parties and the Administrator detailing the amount

requested and how the money would be expended. If all parties

agree to such a proposal or, if the parties cannot agree, and

the Administrator determines that the proposal should be

funded, the Administrator shall authorize the withdrawal of

an appropriate amount from the Fund.

|

questionable ruling in light of RAAPO § 15. Other claims

of contempt are based on firmer grounds but do not war-

rant the extraordinary remedies invoked here. Only so

much can be made, for example, of a use of first class

rather than certified mail or an isolated issuance of work

permits. (The majority surely makes the most of it in

implying that 200 unauthorized permits were issued. The

district court’s finding was that 13 such permits violated

the RAAPO.) The failure to undertake the publicity

campaign followed the administrator’s failure to respond

to Local 28’s request for advice on the content of the

campaign in light of the limited apprenticeship ‘Spaces

available. Since the administrator was to supervise the

campaign under the terms of the RAAPO, the union’s

failure to go forward is rather less blameworthy than it

seems to the majority. In any event, since each appren-

tice class had 45% minority membership, the lack of a

publicity campaign seems inconsequential.

I would remand the case to the district court for a

full reexamination of the contempt charges as well as of

the newly revised affirmative action program. Regrettably

the district judge failed to give careful scrutiny to the

record or to the prior history of this case before reaching

his conclusions. His legal and factual determinations with

regard to the apprenticeship program were taken literally

from the air and showed little understanding of what the

O & J and RAAPO actually provide. This is evident in

his disregard of the administrator’s final authority as to

the size of the apprenticeship program, and also in his

failure to examine the administrator’s rulings with re-

gard to reporting requirements. The newly revised pro-

gram approved by the majority imposes the same kind

of hard and fixed numerical requirements as were found

unrealistic in the AAPO, without any serious explana-

A-52

tion of why they did not work before. Affirmance requires

us to enforce the 29% goal as a fixed quota requiring the

replacement of journeymen by apprentices on a strictly

racia! basis. Believing this to be inconsistent with our

prior decisions in this matter and with Title VII itself I

dissent.

A-53

71 Civ. 2877 (HFW)

AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE

ACTION PROGRAM AND

ORDER

Vnited States Bistrict Court

Southern Bistrict of New York

EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, and

THE City OF NEw YorK,

Plaintiffs,

— against -

Loca. 638 ... LocaL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL WORKERS

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP

COMMITTEE ... SHEET METAL AND AIR-CONDITIONING

CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF NEW York City, INC., ETC..

Defendants.

Introduction

1. The parties in this case are the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (““EEOC’’), the City of New York

(“City”), the New York State Division of Human Rights

(““State’’ ) (collectively “Plaintiffs” ), Local 28 of the Sheet Metal

Workers International Association (“Local 28°’), Joint

Apprenticeship Committee New York City, the Joint

Apprenticeship Committee Essex-Passaic Counties, New Jersey,

the Sheet Metal and Air-Conditioning Contractors Association of

New York City, Inc. (“Contractors Association” ), (collectively

A-54

~ Defendants”), all those contractors who were named as

Respondents in the civi! contempt motion that was decided on

August 16, 1982 and who are listed in Appendix “A” and marked

with an asterisk (collectively “Respondents’). the Joint

Apprenticeship Committee Nassau-Suffolk Counties, New York.

the Joint Apprenticeship Committee Hudson-Bergen Counties.

New Jersey, Association of Sheet Metal Contractors of Northern

New Jersey (“ASMCNN”), SMACNA of Long Island, Inc.

( SMACNA”), and all individual contractors listed in Appendix

“A” who are currently in contractual relationship with Local 28

or who subsequently enter into such a relationship. This

Amended Affirmative Action Program and Order (“AAAPO” or

“Amended Program” ) supersedes the Revised Affirmative

Action Program and Order (“RAAPO”) entered on January 19,

i977.

2. This Amended Program encompasses Local 28, former

Locals 10, 13, and 55 (“former locals” ) which merged into Local

28, the Apprentice Program and Contractors’ Associations in

agreement with Local 28, as stated in the Stipulation and Order

dated May 17, 1983, annexed hereto as Appendix “B”. Local 28's

territorial jurisdiction includes New York City, Nassau and

Suffolk Counties, New York, and Hudson, Bergen, Essex and

Passaic Counties, New Jersey.

3. The goal of this Amended Program is to assure that Local

28's non-white’ membership reaches at least 29.23%, that

substantial and regular progress is made toward this goal and that

all members and apprentices of Local 28 share equitably in all

available employment opportunities in the industry.

4. The goal shall be measured against the total membership

of Local 28, including that of the former locals. For the purpose

of measurement, total membership shall include: (a) all

journeymen members; (b) all pensioners, reduced or limited

members who, while receiving any retirement benefit from Local

28, the Sheetmetal Workers’ International Association or any

“Apprentice Program” shall refer to the JACs collectively

*“Non-white” as used in this AAAPO means black and Spanish-surnamed

individuals.

A-55

former local’s pension program have been employed as om

metal workers by a Local 28 contractor within three (3) —_

prior to the date of the most recent membership census; ( 4 -

members or participants in the Apprentice Program; and (d) .

individuals who (i) have been offered admission to an

membership in Local 28 but have exercised their option,

pursuant to Paragraph 41 of this Amended Program or pursuant

to a parallel policy adopted by Local 28, to defer such eget

and membership, and (ii) at the time of measurement : e

aforesaid deferment option has not been exercised for more than

two (2) years.

5. Defendants are to implement this Amended Program so

that the goal shall be attained at the earliest possible date, but no

later than August 31, 1987.

6. The Amended Program shall remain in effect until such

time as the membership of Local 28, including the former locals,

has reached 29.23 percent and the Court, upon motion of the

defendants issues an order terminating AAAPO.

i i 28 reaches

7. Until the non-white membership of Local .

29.23%. admission to membership in Local 28 shall be attained

only through:

a) successful completion of a hands-on journeyman test

administered pursuant to Paragraphs 33 through 40;

or

b) completion of the Apprentice Program pursuant to

Paragraphs 8 through 27; or

c) transfer in accordance with the International Union

Constitution and Ritual; or

d) organization of non-union shops; or

i ithdrawal card

) the deposit of a previously obtained wi

‘ with the I Executive Board of Local 28 and compliance

with the relevant provisions of the International Union

Constitution and Ritual.

Apprentice Programs

8. No JAC shall maintain an apprentice program longer than

four years. Each JAC shall maintain an apprentice program

which shall be equivalent to the program conducted by JAC-

New York City. The terms and conditions of such apprentice

program shall be as set forth in the Collective Bargaining

Agreement (‘Standard Form of Union Agreement ... between

Local 28 .. . and Sheet Metal Contractors”), and the Sheet Metal

Workers Joint Apprenticeship Committee Essex-Passaic

Counties Trust and Indenture, the Sheet Metal Workers Joint

Apprenticeship Committee Hudson-Bergen Counties Trust and

Indenture, the Local 28 Joint Apprenticeship Committee Trust

and Indenture, the Sheet Metal Workers’ Local 28 Joint

Apprenticeship Committee Nassau-Suffolk Counties Trust and

Indenture, and the rules and regulations thereunder except as

modified by the Order and Judgement (“O&J”’), the provisions

of this Amended Program, or orders of the Administrator

pursuant to his powers under the O&J and this Amended

Program.

9. a) The JACs shall utilize the standardized application

form, a copy of which is annexed hereto as Appendix C.

Applications for each apprentice program shall be made

available to all interested persons and accepted from any

qualified candidate. A qualified candidate is defined as: any

person who is physically fit for sheet metal work and who has or

will have attained the age of 17 by the date of indenture of the

next scheduled apprentice class, is not older than 35 years of age,

and is a citizen or permanent resident alien.

b) Consecutively numbered application forms for each

Apprentice Program shall be available at the offices of each JAC

and any union office during normal business hours and at the

offices of the organizations and institutions listed in Appendix D.

Application forms shall be provided automatically to the groups

in Appendix D at least 30 days before the opening date for

applications for each apprentice class. Defendants shall update

Appendix D yearly by adding groups, including those suggested

by the plaintiffs, and correcting addresses if new addresses are

known. An updated Appendix D shall be submitted by the

EE ——--

A-57

defendants to the plaintiffs and the Administrator by September

15th of each year. Application forms shall also be made available

upon request to any government employment office or minority

community organization. Application forms also shall be

available by mail upon written request. Completed applications

shall be accepted in person or by mail at the offices of each JAC

or any union office. The time for filing applications for a

particular apprentice class may be closed by the Apprentice

Selection Board at a reasonable time; the closing date for filing of

applications shall be ciéarly stated on the application form and

shall be uniform for all JACs. There shall be no filing fee.

10. a) Each JAC shall indenture a minimum of two classes of

apprentices each year until such time as the non-white

membership of Local 28 reaches 29.23%. The classes shall be

indentured in February and August of each year. Each JAC shall

indenture no fewer than the number of apprentices necessary to

ensure that Local 28 contractors working in the respective

geographical jurisdications of the former locals and in New York

City maintain a rate of one (1) apprentice for every four (4)

journeymen employed in those respective territorial areas.

subject to the procedures set forth in Paragraph 22.

(b) Until such time as the 29.23% non-white goal is met.

selection of apprentices pursuant to Paragraph 12 shall be on the

basis of one non-white apprentice for each white apprentice so

indentured. Each apprentice who drops out or is terminated

during the first term shall be replaced by another apprentice of

the same race/national origin or, if this not possible, an

additional apprentice of the same race/national origin shall be

indentured in the next apprentice class.

11. Until such time as the non-white membership of Local 28

reaches 29.23%, each JAC shall maintain separate white and.

non-white lists of apprentices and shall indenture apprentices on

the basis of one non-white for each white.

12. Until such time as the non-white member of Local 28

reaches 29.23%, selection of apprentices shall be made by a

Selection Board composed of one designee each from plaintiffs,

the JACs and the Court. The Selection Board shall be chaired by

A-58

the Court's designee, act by majority vote and be compensated

by the JACs at an hourly rate plus expenses as determined bv the

Administrator and approved by the Court.

13. The Selection Board shall establish standards and

procedures for selection of apprentices and shall submit such

standards and procedures to the plaintiffs, Local 28, all JACs and

the Contractors’ Associations for their comment. Any disputes or

differences regarding the standards and procedures shall be

brought before the Administrator by the parties and/or any

member of the Selection Board within 5 days of such dispute or

difference.

14. The standards and procedures established by the

Selection Board shall include, but not be limited to, review and

verification of a candidate's work experience and/or

technical/trade education. These standards and procedures for

the selection of non-white and white apprentices shall be

uniformly applied to all candidates for membership in each JAC

apprentice program.

Development of Permanent Selection Procedures

15. Upon termination by court order of this AAAPO, the

defendants and the JACs shall use selection procedures for

aclmission to the Apprentice Program as developed ‘pursuant to

Faragraphs 16 through 20. Such selection procedures shall be

designed to have the least adverse impact on non-whites.

16. The JACs shall consult with an industrial pschologist

designated by plaintiffs on the development of the new selection

procedures. Plaintiffs’ designated industrial psychologist will

provide input in the development, review of the results, and

implementation of the new selection procedures.

17. Plaintiffs’ designated industrial psychologist’s comments,

shall be advisory only and in no way binding on defendants, their

officers, employees and agents or their successors. The JACs’ and

plaintiffs’ designated industrial psychologist shall cooperate in

order to effectuate development and implementation of the new

selection procedures in an efficient manner. Defendants shall

furnish plaintiffs’ designated industrial psychologist with

A-59

appropriate materials in a timely fashion and shall provide the

industria! psychologist with a reasonable amount of time to

provide his/her input.

18. Plaintiffs’ designated industrial psychologist shall be paid

jointly by JAC-New York City, JAC-Essex/Passaic Counties,

New Jersey, JAC-Hudson/Bergen Counties, N.J. and JAC-

Nassau/Suffolk, Counties, N.Y., at an hourly rate, plus expenses,

as determined by the Administrator and approved by the Court.

19. The new selection procedures to be developed pursuant

to Paragraphs 15 through 18 above, shall be designed to obtain

quality apprentice applicants and to assure that the selection

system has the least adverse impact on non-whites. The specific

measures outlined below are intended to achieve this goal:

a) The selection procedures shall be as content valid as

feasible.

b) The selection procedures shall, consistent with

selection standards such as those of the American

Psychological Association and the EEOC guidelines,

eliminate or minimize adverse impact on non-white

candidates.

c) In developing the new selection procedures, the JACs

shall consider the possibility of alternatives or

supplements to written examinations, including use of

oral examination or assessment center techniques.

d) In the event that a written examination is used as part

of the new selection procedures, the JACs shall

consider application of one or more of the iollowing

techniques to minimize or eliminate adverse impact

on non-white candidates should such adverse impact

result:

i. Separate frequency distribution for non-white and

white candidates;

ii. Elimination of particular items that result in

statistically significant adverse racial/national

origin impact among candidates of substantially

equivalent ability.

A-60

iii. Addition of items to off-set the adverse impact of

other items.

e) Any selection procedure that is adopted, including the

setting of cut-off scores or rank ordering feaiures, shall

be used in a manner that, consistent with validity and

utility, reduces or eliminates adverse racial /national

origin impact.

20. During the temporary period that the ratio in paragraph

11 is in effect, the JACs shall conduct trial runs of various

selection techniques to obtain empirical data as to which valid

selection method has the least adverse impact. This provision is

intended to assure that when the goal is reached, there will be a

valid selection method available which has, by actual usage, been

shown to have the least adverse impact upon non-whites.

Apprentice Indenture

21. Prior to indenturing an apprentice class each JAC shall

hold a one-day orientation for all new apprentices. Such

orientation shall include discussion of the need for punctuality

and reliability on the job, safety, job readiness skills and a general

description of the tasks and duties apprentices wili be expected to

perform.

22. To ensure that it indentures the largest possible

apprentice class each JAC shall assign apprentices for

employment in a ratio of not less than one apprentice for every

four journeymen working of the aggregate journeymen

employed by Local 28 contractors in each respective JAC’s

territorial jurisdiction. Towards that end, each JAC shall take the

following steps prior to indenturing an apprentice class:

a) notify each employer who maintains a ratio of

apprentice to journeymen of greater than one to four

that it will be assigned a sufficient number of

apprentices to reduce its apprentice to journeymen

ratio to one to four, unless the employer, pursuant to

Paragraph 43(b), obtains an exemption from the 1:4

ratio; and

A-61

b) mail notice of apprentice assignment to contractors 45

days before a class is to be indentured; and

c) within 5 days of the mailing of apprentice assignment

notices, subsnit to plaintiffs and the Administrator

copies of such notices; and

d) within 15 days after the notices are mailed any

employer requesting an exemption from the 1:4 ratio

must do so pursuant to Paragraph 43(b).

These procedures are a minimum: the JACs shall take any

additional steps necessary to ensure that the largest possible

apprentice class is indentured.

24. Persons selected for an apprentice program may be

required to appear for a physical examination prior to being

indentured. The cost of physical examinations are to be borne

one-half by successful applicants and one-half by the particular

JAC. Persons selected in accordance with the above procedures

shall be indentured as apprentices unless such indenturing is

declined by them, or they are certified physically unable to

perform sheet metal work by a medical practitioner licensed in

New York or New Jersey.

25. Each JAC shall take all reasonable steps to insure that all

apprentices indentured receive adequate employment and

training opportunities. Such steps shall include, but not be

limited to, providing apprentices with ciassroom instruction,

including evenings and Saturdays where necessary, during

periods of unemployment, and shall credit such hours toward

fulfillment of apprenticeship requirements. Each JAC shall

_ provide to plaintiffs, on a weekly basis, the names and attendance

records of all unemployed apprentices enrolled in these classes.

Advanced placement, accelerated advancement or graduation of

A-62

\

any apprentice may be authorized by any JAC, as it deems

proper.

26. a) Each JAC shall establish an employment referral

system which shall incorporate the following elements:

(i) A list of all apprentices shall be established in three

groupings. Group one shall contain apprentices in terms 1, 2,

3, Group two shall contain apprentices in terms 4, 5, 6; and

Group three shall contain apprentices in terms 7 and 8.

(ii) A record shall be kept for each apprentice of the

actual number of hours worked’ within each group and each

JAC shall refer out apprentices in inverse order to the

number of hours worked (so that apprentices with the

lowest number of hours shall receive referrals first).

(iii) To the extent feasible, each JAC shall rotate the

groupings to insure that no one grouping or persons therein

receive a disproportionate amount of work.

(iv) Each JAC shall provide counsel for the parties and

the Administrator with monthly reports. Such reports shall

include but not be limited to: A) all apprentices by name,

race/national origin, term, grouping, actual number of

hours worked, and name of contractor(s) to which the

apprentice is assigned; and B) summary of manpower

reports showing the number of journeymen and apprentices

working for all employers.

b) Seniority among apprentices shall not be a criterion for

employment.

27. Upon successful completion of an apprentice program,

apprentices shall be promptly admitted to full journeyman

membership upon payment of any balance due of the initation

fee. Upon application to the Executive Board of Local 28, the

initation fee may be paid on an installment basis tor good cause

’ The listing of the hours worked shall be derived from the weekly reports that

each employer must file pursuart to Paragraph 52.

A-63

shown and suoject to the procedures contained in Paragraph

42(b).

28. Each JAC shall designate a Training Coordinator who

shall be responsible for the conduct of the particular JAC’s

apprentice program and for all reports required to be maintained

and/or filed by the O&J, this AAAPO or such further orders of

the Court or the Administrator.

29. Defendants shall appoint a person to serve as the

Training Director. The Training Director shall be responsible for

insuring that all training programs are equivalent to JAC-New

York City’s program and that the Training Coordinators meet

their obligations as set forth in this Amended Program.

Advanced Apprentices

30. Those non-whites who scored above 55 on the July, 1982

journeyman hands-on test but who were unsuccessful in attaining

journeyman membership shall be immediately offered advanced

standing in the JAC-New York City’s next apprentice class.

31. Those individuals who have successfully completed a

sheet metal program in a vocational high school or have two

years verifiable trade experience shall be considered for

advanced standing in the Apprentice Program.

32. The Training Coordinator of each JAC shall evaluate the

experience of all individuals who apply for advanced standing in

his/her apprentice program pursuant to Paragraphs 30 and 31

and shall make placement at the appropriate grade level. The

grade level assigned shall be conditional for a period to be

determined by the Coordinator, not exceeding three months,

based upon classroom work and on-the-job performance. If any

individual cannot succeed at the advanced level, s/ he shall have

the option to remain in the program at a lower term. Eligible

individuals who challenge the grade level assigned shall be

advised in writing of their right to appeal to the Administrator.

Journeyman Test

33. Local 28 shall administer a _ validated,

non-discriminatory, hands-on journeyman’s test on the third

A-64

Saturday in October of each year for applicants residing in New

_ York State and on the fourth Saturda: in October of = -

for applicants residing in New Jersey. serge wit _

requirements of the O&J and Paragraph 3 above,

Administrator or any party may apply to the Court to increase or

decrease the frequency of the tests to be administered pursuant to

this paragraph.

34 The ‘hands-on’ journeyman’s test shall be graded by a

Board of Examiners consisting of three members knowledgable in

sheet metal. The Board shall be comprised of a egar i

chosen by Local 28, a representative chosen by the Court, an -

representative chosen by the plaintiffs. The Board _, act “sd

majority vote and shall employ a passing grade leve -

developed pursuant to the validation procedures. All app —

shall be advised of their status by first class mail within 30 7

the test. Applicants who fail the test shall be advised of t

methods of application for the Apprentice Program.

fendants at an

35. The Board shall be compensated by the de int

hourly rate, plus expenses as determined by the Administrator

and approved by the Court.

i nd are

_ All qualified applicants who pass the test ar

Pa fit to perform sheet metal work shall be admitted to

journeyman status in Local 28 within 60 days of the test.

«Ve . . . form a

37. Local 28 shall utilize the standardized application form,

copy of which is annexed hereto as Appendix E. Applications for

each hands-on test shall be made available to all interested

parties and accepted from any qualified candidate. A qualified

candidate is defined as follows: any person who

a) has or will have attained the age of 18 by the date of

the test, and

b) is a citizen or lawful permanent resident alien legally

entitled to work in the United States; and

c) has one year of sheet metal work experience as defined

by the Board. Such experience shall include but be not

limited to sheet metal experience in the Armed

Forces, or vocational education or training related to

A-65

the skills of a journeyman sheet metal worker. Persons

presently registered in the Local 28 Apprentice

Program or any other recognized apprentice program

affiliated with the Sheet Metal Workers’ International

Association are not eligible.

38. Application forms for each hands-on test shall be

available at any office of Local 28 during normal business hours

and at the offices of the organizations and institutions listed in

Appendix D. Application forms shall be provided automatically

to the groups listed in Appendix D at least 30 days before the

opening date for applications for each journeyman’s test.

Application forms shall also be made freely available upon

request to any government employment office or minority

community organization. Application forms also shall be

available by mail upon request. Completed applications shall be

accepted in person or by mail at any office of Local 28. Local 28

shall establish a ressonable cut-off date for filing applications for

the hands-on test. The closing date shall be clearly stated on the

application form.

39. Within 30 days of the journeyman’s test Local 28 shall

submit to the plaintiffs and the Administrator the name,

race/national origin, address and social security number of each

individual who took the test, their score and list of the individuals

who passed the test.

40. The fee for taking a hands-on journeyman’s test shall be

$25.00. Local 28 may apply to the Administrator for an increase

in this fee, which will be granted only upon a showing of good

cause. Applicants shall be informed, in writing, as to the place of

examination with instructions as to how to reach the place

and/or a map indicating its location.

41. A person eligible for admission pursuant to passing a

hands-on test shall be permitted to defer such admission for a

reasonable time, not to exceed two (2) years. The name and

race/national origin of each person who a) applies for deferral

status and b) the date each deferral status is granted shall be

provided the plaintiffs within ten days of the application.

A-66

Admission Fees

42. a) Upon written application, a non-white eligible for

admission to journeyman membership in Loca! 28 pursuant to

Paragraph 7 of this Amended Program may request of the

Executive Board of Local 28 (“Executive Board”) that the Local

28 initiation fee be paid pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph

22(d) of the O&J. Within 5 days of receipt of such application,

the Executive Board shall render a decision on the application in

writing and notify the applicant, and the parties of the

disposition of the application. If such application is denied in

whole or in part, or is not acted upon within five days of its

receipt by the Executive Board, an application may be made to

the Administrator who shall either grant or deny the request in

writing after duly considering all the factors set forth in

Paragraph 22(d) of the O&J and such additional information,

documents, or other data from either Local 28 or the applicant as

they wish to submit.

b) Upon written application a non-white eligible for

admission to journeyman membership in Local 28 pursuant to

passing a hands-on test may request of the Executive Board that

payment of the Local 28 initiation fee commence with

employment and be payable on a pro rated basis, each payment

not exceeding 10% of the net pay check, and payable only

during periods of employment until the fee is paid. Within 5 days

of the receipt of such application the Executive Board shall

render a decision on the application in writing and notify the

applicant, and all parties of the disposition of the application. If

such application is denied in whole or in part or not acted upon

within 5 days of its receipt by the Executive Board an application

may be made to the Administrator who shall either grant or deny

the application in writing.

Apprentice /Journeymen Ratio

43. a) In order to reach the 29.23% non-white membership

goal as soon as practicable, each Local 28 employer shall be

required to maintain a ratio of one apprentice for every four

journeymen. Pursuant to this ratio, an employer would not be

A-67

required to employ a second apprentice until the employer

_ employs an eighth journeyman.

b) An employer may be relieved of its obligati

Paragraph 43(a), if the employer submits to the oe pee

the Administrator a sworn affidavit detailing the reasons for

being unable to comply with Paragraph 43(a) and the plaintiffs

consent in writing to a different ratio. If plaintifis refuse to

consent, they must state their reasons in writing. Any party

aggrieved by actions taken under the provisio :

Administrator for relief. , ns may apply to the

c) Each JAC shall immediately notify in writin

employer in its territorial jurisdiction maintaining a ui of

apprentice to journeymen greater than one to four for six

consecutive weeks, that unless it files for and receives an

—— pursuant to Paragraph 43(b) that the employer will

, assigned additional apprentices in order to bring its ratio

lown to one to four. Copies of the notices shall be mailed

simultaneously to plaintiffs and the Administrator.

Permits

ed | Local 28 may not issue “permits” or “identification slips”

a) a written request, Appendix “F’’, has been made t

the plaintiffs justifying the issuance. Such request he

be certified and affirmed by a union officer and the

contractor subject to penalty for perjury;

b) plaintiffs have consented in writing to the issuance,

and have submitted a copy of the written request and

written consent to the Administrator:

c) if plaintiffs refuse to consent, they must state thei

reasons for doing so in writing; and .

d) any party aggrieved by actions taken under this

provision may apply to the Admini

— inistrator for

A-65

Publicity-Recruitment

45. Local 28 and the JACs shall hire an_ individual,

individuals, or agency approved by the plaintiffs to serve as an

out-reach worker(s) to the non-white community and to assist

defendants in developing out-reach and recruitment programs.

46. By October 1, 1983, Local 28 and the Training Director

shall provide to plaintiffs and the Administrator a written plan

for an effective general publicity and recruitment campaign to

inform the non-white community in Local 28's geographical

jurisdiction of nondiscriminatory opportunities in Local 28 and

the Apprentice Program and to ensure an available pool of

non-white applicants for journeyman and apprentice

membership in Local 28. This plan, which shall be in addition to

the recruitment and publicity campaign defendants are required

to conduct before each hands-on test and the indenturing of each

apprentice class, shall include but not be limited to the following

steps:

a) during the third and fourth week of each September

send a representative, and a non-white apprentice or

journeyman, to all vocational and technical schools in

Local 28's jurisdiction and to the organizations listed

in Appendix D which in the past have provided

non-white applicants to discuss what sheet metal work

involves and all the procedures for admission to Local

28 and to distribute copies of the brochure/flyer

developed pursuant to Paragraph 47(e); and

b) at least once a year, hold an Apprentice Program open

house at the JAC schools in New York City and

Nassau-Suffolk Counties, and the union's branch

offices or JAC Schools in New Jersey;

c) at least once a year, prior to the Apprentice Program's

Open House, place advertisements in the media listed

in Appendix G announcing the Open House and

describing sheet metal work and all the procedures for

admission to Local 28 and the JACs, including the

schedule for indenturing apprentice classes and the

hand-on test; and

A-69

d) on an on-going basis, advise non-whites working in

non-union shops within Local 28's jurisdiction of the

procedures for admission to Local 28.

Plaintiffs shall have 30 days to comment upon the written plan

and to develop reporting requirements for monitoring it. The

Administrator shall consider all submissions, shall revise the plan

if he deems it necessary and shall order it into effect by

December 1, 1983. Thereafer, the plan may be changed upon

application by any party and approval thereof by the

Administrator.

47. Prior to the application cutoff date for apprentice

selection and the journeyman hands-on test, Local 28 and the

Apprentice Program shall undertake an eight week recruitment

campaign informing the non-white community of the date,

location and nature of such selection methods, and the

qualifications therefor. Such a recruitment campaign shall

include but not be limited to:

a) advising non-whites working in non-union shops

within Local 28's jurisdiction of the procedures for

admission into Local 28;

b) visits by a repvesentative of the Apprentice Program

and a non-white Local 28 journeyman or apprentice

to each of the vocational or technical schools listed in

Appendix D;

c) advertisements in the print media listed in Appendix

G;

d) requests for weekly Public Services Announcements

(“PSAs”) on each of the radio stations listed in

Appendix G; and

e) developing, with the approval of the plaintiffs and the

Administrator, a brochure/flyer describing in some

detail what sheet metal work involves and all

procedures for admission into Local 28 and the JACs.

During each publicity campaign the defendants shall

distribute this brochure to the organizations listed in

A-70

Appendix D, and upon request to all other interested

individuals and organizations.

48. Six weeks prior to the start of a recruitment ——

under Paragraph 47 defendants, with the assistal. ce 0 ”

out-reach worker(s), shall submit to the plaintiffs for pveotseatr

written plan detailing the particulars of defendants’ propo

recruitment campaign.

49. The defendants shall submit to the plaintiffs —

Administrator weekly progress reports detailing ¢ os

recruitment efforts. These reports shall include, but not

limited to:

a) the number of non-white and white applicants for the

journeyman hands-on test and for each apprentice

class;

b) the name of each non-white and white applicant who

claims to have completed a sheet metal program in a

vocational or technical high school,

c) the name of each non-white and white applicant who

claims to have two or more years trade experience;

and

isti i licants for the

d) a listing of the sources by, which app 7

| various entry methods have heard of Local 28.

Record Keeping/ Reports

independent statistical expert (“Advisor”) may be

Pc ie Rag pr ean Such advisor shall assist —- -

devising a computerizered record keeping system w n be

generate all reports and records required pursuant to the o

and this Amended Program. The advisor shall also, on a — y

basis, check the integrity of the data base, verify — =

program, and authenticate proper entry of the Taw ta. The

advisor shall report to plaintiffs and the Administrator on a

monthly basis if that is found to be necessary for the ee

of the system and for compliance with the O&) and the ese :

The compensation and expenses of the advisor shall be paid by

defendants.

A-71

51. On March 15th and September 15th of each year, Local

28 shall submit to the plaintiffs and the Administrator both a

geographical census, b

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Record and brief — Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC · 478 U.S. 421 | Frix