Record and brief — Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America
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IF AND WHEN A
Oe 85-289-CFX Title: United States Department cf Transportations et al.,s
tatus: GRANTED Petitioners
' Ve
Paralyzed Veterans of Americas et al.
ocketed:
ugust 20 1985 Court: United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit
Counsel for petitioner: Solicitor General
Counsel tor responcent: ParkersDouglas Les Davison-Calvin
ntry Date Note
Proceedings and Orders
1 Jul 11 1985 Application tor extension of time to file petition arc
orcer granting same until August 26 1985 (Whites July
137 1965).
; 2 Aug 20 1985 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.
6 Seo 11 1985 urcer extending time to file response to petition until
September <c6s 1985.
5 Sep 26 1985 Briet of respondents Paralyzed Veterans of America, et al.
In opposition tiled.
6 Sep 26 1985 Locging received.
7 Oct 2 1985 DISTRIBUTEV. October 18, 1985
8 Oct 3 1985 X Reply triet of petitioners U.S. DOTs et al. filed.
9 Oct 21 1985 retition GrANTcD.
REE EERE ERE EREEERERRREERESE
10 Nov 1 1985 G potion of the solicitor General to dispense with
printing tne joint appendix filec.
motion of the solicitor General to dispense with
printing tne joint apoendix GRANTED.
Urocer extending time to file brief of petitioner on the
merits untrl December 19, 1985.
14 Dec 19 1985 Sriet amicus curiae of Equal Employment Acvisory Counsel
11 Nov 18 1985
13 Nov 25 1985
tilec.
15 Dec 19 1985 Brier amicus curiae of International Air Transport Assn.
tiled.
16 Dec 19 1985 Brier of petitioners U.S. DOT» et al. filed.
17 Dec 19 1985 Briet amicus curiae of Air Transport Assn. of America filec.
18 Jan 13 1986 kecord filed.
19 Jan 18 1986 Briet of respondent Paralyzed Veterans of America, et al.
tilec.
20 Jan 18 1986 Briet amicus curiae of National Federation of the Blind
tiled.
21 Feb 4 1986 SET FOR ARGUMENTs Wednesdays March 267 1986. (2nc case)
22 Fed 4 1986 CIRCULATED.
23 Mar 19 1986 X Reply briet of petitioners U.S. DOTr et al. tiled.
24 Mar 26 1986 ARGUED.
14
PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
~ CERTIORARI
oupreme VUOUTL, U.o-
85-289 a FILED
AUG 20 1985
No.
1 =
Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
VU.
PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ET AL.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
CHARLES FRIED
Acting Solicitor General
WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Assistant Attorney General
CHARLES J. COOPER
MARK R. DISLER
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
KATHRYN A. OBERLY
Assistant to the Solicitor General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
MIRIAM R. EISENSTEIN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether federal financial assistance to airport
operators renders Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, applicable to the on-board
activities of airlines using federally-assisted airports.
2. Whether the federally-operated air traffic con-
trol system constitutes a form of federal financial as-
sistance to airlines.
(I)
II
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
In addition to the United States Department of
Transportation, the respondents in the court of ap-
peals included the Civil Aeronautics Board and the
Federal Aviation Administration. The CAB ceased
operations on December 31, 1984, pursuant to the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
504, 92 Stat. 1705 et seqg., and the Civil Aeronautics
Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98
Stat. 1703 et seq. See note 1, infra. The Department
of Transportation assumed the CAB’s functions under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and it is the petitioner
in this Court, along with its constituent agency, the
Federal Aviation Administration.
In addition to Paralyzed Veterans of America, the
petitioners in the court of appeals included the Amer-
ican Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, Inc. and
the American Council of the Blind. All three organi-
zations are respondents in this Court.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .........................0..-c--cce-eeesecesecerecsennsecnsenssenes 1
ip pesnenenooanesannces 1
Statute and regulations involved .......................-.-----------+ 2
a _..___.cessnsnneounnenpanonnaesces 2
A. The history of the CAB’s regulations ................... 4
B. The court of appeals’ decision ............................---- 14
Reasons for granting the petition .................................... 18
io ceeernnnenOnNDSUROOSDONS 30
I i cicincsiviocetschithiniteneniesnenemerengnonsuscesovervotenseecceneeneses la
ic ainceaninetnenmapatnerescevenemscsecoceneocers 77a
ar nesigesaneonernemanosnesennnneoreeeerenecerns 78a
a eeesnaeteptbaetenneetnnneesccenececcoosees 84a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. CAB, 667 F.2d 181 -........... 4
Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597,
a 19-20
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, No. 82-1005 (June
EEE EEE ee 24
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, No. 82-862
tail nciaarninsennctonccereineanees 11, 18, 21, 27
Fitzgerald vy. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
EE EEE ES Se 9
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555... 24
Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 ...................-..----....... 15
Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792 (Feb. 28,
IE Ee 5-6, 16, 18, 27, 28, 29
Jacobson V. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202..18, 24, 25,
26, 27
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 .... 11, 18,
21, 27
United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp.
i cuesngunsananecesasos 9
IV
Statutes and regulations: Page
Act of Oct. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-276, § 130, 96
| RITE ETE apes eran es Sen SOE eS 5
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
ee ee —cassemmesemtaidaguaindsaaues 3
aaa 5
I eicainheudions 5
§ 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744 (to be codified at 49
Co ones 12
Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 et seq. _....022...e cee... 4
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, Tit. V, 96 Stat. 671 et seq. (to
be codified at 49 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.) 0.00... 4, 20
Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 et seq. ...20000.002 eee. 3
a ts TIE sccnicccicennieninsnpnsneninanssissinsastiineasnies 3
I ne 4
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d.... 5,19
Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-670, § 3(e) (1), 80 Stat. 982 00. 4
Department of Transportation and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-
369, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 1778-1779 ............................ 5
Education Amendments of 1972, Tit. IX, 20 U.S.C.
Fe TET aT we RE Soe 11, 19, 21
Federal Airport Act, ch. 251, 60 Stat. 170 et seq..... 4
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.
BS ee I ciate berermitcrtaiccnncs,. 4
§ 404, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1374...... 11, 12
§ 404(a), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V)
EEE Ie La OE OG eee 12, 13, 14
§ 404(a) (1), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)
RE ee ne ener era 12
§ 404(b), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1374(b) _........ 9, 12, 25,
29, 30
§ 406, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1376....3, 5, 14
§ 406(b), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)
SPITE .ixcisittirnssenieiiaiashinielenaniniteiaiiadansbetaaell 3, 4, 5
Vv
Statutes ar regulations—Continued: Page
§ 406(c), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)
RE, IEE a es 5
§ 419, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V) 1389 .......... 3,14
§ 419(a) (4), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)
I i ae 3,4
§ 419(b) (5), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)
I a nel 3, 4,14
§ 1006, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1486 —..000000.. 2-3
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. 794....passim
RRR CrereR eomnee Orne Wer AROnT RFE RAE 19
nN 4
Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117-118 (1977)... 13
Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981) ........... 13
14C.F.R.:
Pt. 15:
Section 15.5(c) (1965) ............................... 7
Section 15.28(8) (1966) .............................. 23
Pt. 379:
i 7
ao 6
ES ET ne ec 7
Section 879.8(b) (1965) .................................. 6
I 7
eae 7
Section $379.12 (1965) .................................. 6
Rg LTS Se CA ee 2,13
REITER es er ne rn 14
TEESE aa See MO ea 14
SEE A A See easel 14
Ee een OR a 24
49 C.F.R.:
Pt. 21:
BS a ee 23
FG, | ARR ae nese een 8
App. C (a) (1) (iii) (1971) —2000 9
VI
Statutes and regulations—Continued : Page
App. C(a) (1) (vi) (1971) ......................---. 9
App. C(a) (1) (vii) (1971) ~....................... 9
(la MATIN ch et AA Bieter 28
29 Fed. Reg. (1964)
AE a ew oT ee oe en 7
I ai lta iilaae aabaltindiaiadaianbi 23
Ee ne On Re nC 6
p. 192889 .............. i a aa aa tid 6
35 Fed. Reg. (1970) :
III si cstnncsidciitencgnecngindensiphudpnathdeniibonededionds 7
FNS a eee ea ae a ane eee 8
43 Fed. Reg. (1978)
ES ee eT 23
inertia siaclciatahintenbdiiisnets 23
44 Fed. Reg. (1979):
I i nisnuss tetcccsiniecatinadiitesncntsiantiiliieiataellinnes 28
Ee nae 11
ao etnanioioaneanil 10
St ns 11
EEE Ce OE TO CL 10
NEE A A A a 7
47 Fed. Reg. (1982) :
Pe Fe I on enccccnnevenccccecenccseeneresensennseseoneneresren 2
I 105-0 cicnrnnsrenancsinienseesinnidininiiamniiiiuns 2
ec a ee 13
SR A Ae AR ON 13
SEE Ec ee ee Se. Aa 14
EE NS a SO Fc a 13-14
ITI sensi cirectsninpiinsiiicninnateniaiceitaichienitinabianns 2
Miscellaneous:
110 Cong. Rec. 18880 (1964) ...................................... 22
Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
ET AL., PETITYONERS
Vv.
PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ET AL.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
The Acting Solicitor General, on behalf of the
United States Department of Transportation and the
Federal Aviation Administration, petitions for a writ
of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,
la-76a) is reported at 752 F.2d 694. The opinion dis-
senting from the denial of rehearing en banc (App.,
infra, 80a-83a) is not reported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on January 18, 1985. A petition for rehearing was
denied on April 26, 1985 (App., infra, 77a). On
(1)
2
July 13, 1985, Justice White extended the time for
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and in-
cluding August 26, 1985. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. 794, provides in pertinent part as follows:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual
in the United States, as defined in section 706
(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason o- his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Exec-
utive agency or by the United States Postal Ser-
vice.
2. Regulations promulgated by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board to implement Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 were published at 47 Fed.
Reg. 25936 et seg. (1982), as amended by 47 Fed.
Reg. 51857 et seg. (1982), and codified at 14 C.F.R.
Pt. 382. Because the issues in this case are limited
to the question of the proper jurisdictional reach of
the regulations and do not involve the details of the
regulations themselves, only the preamble to the reg-
ulations (47 Fed. Reg. 25936-25939 (1982) ), setting
forth the Board’s legal rationale for the scope of the
regulations, is reproduced in the appendix to this pe-
tition (App., infra, 84a-95a).
STATEMENT
Respondents, the Paralyzed Veterans of America
and two other organizations representing handicapped
individuals brought this action under Section 1006 of
3
the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1486,
seeking review of regulations issued by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board to implement Section 504 of the Re
habilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. Section 504
prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in
“any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” In its final rulemaking, the Board de-
termined, with the approval of the Department of
Justice, that only those airlines receiving a subsidy
from the Board under Section 406(b) or Section
419(a)(4) and (b)(5) of the Federal Aviation
Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V) 1376(b) and
1389(a)(4) and (b)(5), were federally assisted
within the meaning of Section 504.
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the
commercial aviation activities of all certificated air-
lines constitute federally assisted programs or ac-
tivities because the airlines have the use of federally
assisted airports. In addition, the court of appeals
was of the view that the federally-operated air traffic
control system constitutes federal financial assistance
- to the commercial aviation activities of all airlines.
Accordingly, the court vacated the Board’s regula-
tions insofar as they were limited in their application
to carriers receiving subsidies under Section 406 or
419 of the Federal Aviation Act and instructed the
CAB’s successor agency, the Department of Trans-
portation, to promulgate new regulations applicable
to all commercial airlines.’
The CAB ceased operations on December 31, 1984. See
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat.
1705 et seg.; Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 et seq. Section 3(e) of the
Sunset Act (98 Stat. 1704) devolved all remaining authority of
the CAB on the Department of Transportation, unless other-
4
A. The History Of The CAB’s Regulations
1. Prior to the “sunset” of the CAB, federal regu-
lation of aviation was divided between the CAB and
the Federal Aviation Administration? The FAA
was and is responsible for operating the air traffic
control system and ensuring the safety of airline
operations. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. CAB, 667
F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In addition, the FAA
has, since 1946, granted federal financial assistance
to airport operators (typically, municipalities or
other units of local government) for the construction
and improvement of terminals, runways, and airport
safety equipment.*
The CAB, on the other hand, was responsible for
the economic regulation of the airline industry. In
that capacity, the Board regulated airline routes,
fares, and service under the authority of the Federal
Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1301
et seq. Of particular relevance to this case was the
Board’s administration of subsidies to a few airlines
pursuant to Sections 406(b) and 419(a) (4) and (b)
(5) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976
ed. Supp. V) 1376(b) and 1389(a) (4) and (b) (5).
wise provided. Section 12(a) of the Sunset Act (98 Stat. 1710)
preserved all CAB rules and regulations in effect at the time
of transfer.
2 The FAA became a component of the Department of Trans-
portation by virtue of Section 3(e) (1) of the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 932,
recodified at 49 U.S.C. 106.
3 See the Federal Airport Act, ch. 251, 60 Stat. 170 et seq.;
the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 et seq.; and the Airport and Airway
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, Tit. V, 96
Stat. 671 et seg. (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.).
a a a eee
5
Until 1978, Section 406 was the Board’s only subsidy
program. Designed to guarantee air service neces-
sary to transport the mail to small communities, the
original statutory scheme provided that the Post-
master General was to pay the airlines for the basic
cost of transporting mail, while the Board was to
pay the airlines additional amounts as subsidies if
necessary to ensure the carriage of mail. See Section
406(b) and (c), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V) 1376
(b) and (c). The Section 406 program was sharply
curtailed in 1978, and it was terminated entirely at
the end of fiscal year 1982. See Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 24, 92 Stat. 1725;
Act of Oct. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-276, § 130, 96
Stat. 1196-1197; Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L.
No. 97-369, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 1778-1779.
Also in 1978, the CAB began operating the “Sec-
tion 419 prezram,” in order to subsidize “small com-
munity” and other essential air service that would
not otherwise be provided. See Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No, 95-504, § 33, 92 Stat. 1732.
This program, which is to operate through 1988, is
unrelated to the provision of mail service under Sec-
tion 406.
2. In 1964, Congress passed Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin in federally assisted programs and activities.*
* Title VI is widely recognized as the congressional model
for subsequently-enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination
in federally assisted programs or activities, and case law
interpreting Title VI is generally applicable to issues arising
under the later-enacted statutes, including the Rehabilitation
Act. See Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792 (Feb. 28,
6
Both aviation agencies, the CAB and the FAA, pub-
lished regulations implementing Title VI on Decem-
ber 31, 1964. The only federally-assisted grant pro-
gram administered by the Board at that time was
the Section 406 mail subsidy program, and the
Board’s initial Title VI regulations, while leaving
open the possibility of Title VI coverage for unspeci-
fied, future programs, expressly applied only to the
activities of airlines receiving payments under the
Section 406 program (14 C.F.R. 379.2 (1965), 29
Fed. Reg. 19287 (1964) ):
This part applies to any program for which
Federal financial assistance is authorized under
a law administered by the Board, including the
payment of compensation by the Board under
section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(49 U.S.C. 13769."
After 1978, the Board modified its Title VI regula-
tions to include its only other subsidy program, the
1984), slip op. 10; App., infra, 29a-30a & nn. 86-88. Accord-
ingly, regulations issued by the FAA and the CAB to imple-
ment Title VI form the critical backdrop for consideration of
the Board’s Section 504 regulations at issue in this case.
5 See also 14 C.F.R. 379.3(b) (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19287
(1964) :
Specific discriminatory actions prohibited. No air car-
rier shall subject any person to discrimination on the
ground of race, color, or national origin in connection
with any air transportation for which such carrier is
receiving or has claimed compensation payable by the
Board under section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.
Similarly, the only definition the Board specified for the term
“Federal financial assistance” was “grants of Federal funds
under section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.” 14
C.F.R. 379.12 (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19289 (1964).
ne ee See ee er ee | ee
a ar nt st
T
newly-enacted Section 419 program. 14 C.F.R. 379.2,
379.3, 379.4, and 379.12, 44 Fed. Reg. 42175-42176
(1979).
Meanwhile, the FAA, based on its administration
of grants to airport operators, proscribed discrim-
inatory treatment by airport operators and by lessees
of airport operators who furnished services at the
airport; the illustrative examples given in the FAA’s
Title VI regulations make it clear that its regulatory
authority extended to the threshold of the planes but
no farther.’ After the FAA became a part of the
Department of Transportation (see note 2, supra),
its Title VI regulations were subsumed within DOT’s
own Title VI regulations (35 Fed. Reg. 10080 et seq.
(1970) ). DOT’s regulations contained equivalent il-
lustrative examples that, if anything, made it even
clearer that the regulatory jurisdiction conferred by
virtue of federal financial assistance to airport oper-
*The FAA’s original Title VI regulations provided (14
C.F.R. 15.5(c) (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19283 (1964)):
Examples. The following examples illustrate the ap-
plication of the non-discrimination provisions of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act and this part:
(1) The operator of an airport who is the recipient of
Federal financial assistance must give assurance that an
entrepreneur who rents space at the airport and there
operates a restaurant will not in any manner discriminate
between patrons for reasons of race, color, or national
origin.
(2) The operator of an airport who is the recipient of
Federal financial assistance is bound by the conditions and
covenants in the conveyance that prohibit, among other
thinys, discrimination for reason of color, race, or na-
tional origin in admission of the public to waiting rooms,
sightseeing areas, sanitary facilities, and any other facili-
ties under the control of the airport operator himself.
8
ators extended to services provided at the airport,
but not to the interior of aircraft.’ Indeed, DOT’s
7 Appendix C to DOT’s Title VI regulations gave the follow-
ing pertinent examples of FAA programs subject to regulation
(49 C.F.R. Pt. 21, App. C(a) (1) (1971), 35 Fed. Reg. 10085
(1970) ):
Federal Aviation Administration. (i) The airport spon-
sor or any of his lessees, concessionaires, or contractors
may not differentiate between members of the public be-
cause of race, color, or national origin in furnishing, or
admitting to, waiting rooms, passenger holding areas,
aircraft tiedown areas, restaurant facilities, restrooms,
or facilities operated under the compatible land use con-
cept.
(ii) The airport sponsor and any of his lessees, con-
cessionaires, or contractors must offer to all members of
the public the same degree and type of service without
regard to race, color, or national origin. This rule applies
to fixed base operators, restaurants, snack bars, gift shops,
ticket counters, baggage handlers, car rental agencies,
limousines, and taxis franchised by the airport sponsor,
insurance underwriters, and other businesses catering to
the public at the airport.
(iii) An aircraft operator may not be required to park
his aircraft at a location that is less protected, or less
accessible from the terminal facilities, than locations of-
fered to others, because of his race, color, or national
origin.
(iv) The pilot of an aircraft may not be required to
help more extensively in fueling operations, and may not
be offered less incidental service (such as windshield
wiping), than other pilots, because of his race, color, or
national origin.
(v) No pilot or crewmember eligible for access to a
pilot’s lounge or to unofficial communication facilities
such as a UNICOM frequency may be restricted in that
access because of his race, color, or national origin.
(vi) Access to facilities maintained at the airport by
air carriers or commercial operators for holders of first-
9
regulations prohibited airport administrators from
discriminating against aircraft operators because of
the race of the pilot (49 C.F.R. Pt. 21, App. C(a)
(1) (iii) (1971), set forth at note 7, supra). Sig-
nificantly, however, the exhaustive list of examples
made no mention of passengers in airplanes; the
only provisions for passengers related to the use of
facilities at the airport and the use of grownd trans-
portation to leave the airport. 49 C.F.R. Pt. 21, App.
C(a)(1)(vi) and (vii) (1971), set forth at note 7,
supra).
In sum, the regulatory agencies recognized from
the very outset that Title VI did not reach the on-
board activities of commercial airlines, except for
those few airlines that received subsidies from the
CAB.°
class transportation tickets or frequent users of the car-
rier’s or operator’s services may not be restricted on the
basis of race, color, or national origin.
(vii) Passengers and crewmembers seeking ground
transportation from the airport may not be assigned to
different vehicles, or delayed or embarrassed in assign-
ment to vehicles, by the airport sponsor or his lessees,
eencessionaires, or contractors, because of race, color, or
national origin.
§ Although Title VI was never construed to reach the on-
board activities of nonsubsidized air carriers, courts had early
interpreted the general “antidiscrimination” clause of Section
404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.)
1374(b), to prohibit racial discrimination by all air carriers.
See Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229
F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) ; United States v. City of Montgomery,
201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962). As described at pages
12-13, infra, however, Section 404(b) “lapsed” as part of the
phase-out of the CAB.
10
8. Using their Title VI regulations as a model,
DOT and the Board divided regulatory jurisdiction
under Section 504 in the same fashion, with DOT tak-
ing responsibility for regulations covering activities
at airports and the Board ultimately assuming re-
sponsibility only for the on-board activities of subsi-
dized carriers. Initially, however, both agencies ex-
pected the CAB to be able to promulgate regulations
governing the on-board activities of all certificated air-
lines, using authority derived from the Federal Avia-
tion Act to supplement its more limited authority un-
der Section 504. Thus, on June 6, 1979, the CAB
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in which
it announced its intention to promulgate regulations
“to prohibit unlawful discrimination against disabled
travelers and to implement section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973.” 44 Fed. Reg. 32401 (em-
phasis added). The Board’s notice made clear its
position that its jurisdiction under Section 504 was
limited to those few carriers to which the Board ex-
tended federal subsidies. 44 Fed. Reg. 32402 (1979).°
® That this was the Board’s view is demonstrated by its
explanation for deciding not to regulate employment practices
of the airlines (44 Fed. Reg. 32402 (1979) (emphasis added) ) :
In accordance with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
the Board will be phasing out its operations over the next
6 years. * * * Under the circumstances, it would be very
difficult to develop a new program in an area where we
have little experience or background, and then to allocate
and train staff to implement it. This use of resources
would be particularly unwise because the benefits that
would flow from Board regulation of employment would
be small. The Board extends direct Federal subsidies only
to a small number of air carriers, so that the reach of our
section 504 jurisdiction would not have a significant effect
11
For that reason, the Board proposed to prohibit all
carriers from discriminating against handicapped air
travellers not in reliance on Section 504, but instead
based on its authority under Section 404 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V)
1374. As the Board explained (44 Fed. Reg. 32401-
32402 (1979) (emphasis added) ):
[The proposed rules] would implement section
504 * * *, which prohibits discrimination against
the handicapped in any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance. In addition,
the proposed rules would emphasize that the
on industry employment. While we can prevent discrimi-
nation in air transportation under section 404 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act without clear section 504 jurisdiction,
the same is not true of employment. The Board would
have no authority to regulate employment practices of
unsubsidized carriers unless those practices somehow
caused discrimination in transportation.
Of course, the Board’s statement was issued prior to this
Court’s decisions in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512 (1982), and -onsolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, No. 82-
862 (Feb. 28, 1984). But those decisions, holding that Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.,
and Section 504 encompass employment discrimination, are not
pertinent to the issue here, which is whether nonsubsidized
carriers receive “Federal financial assistance” that would
render their “program or activity” of transporting passengers
from one place to another subject to Section 504 at all.
Contrary to the view of the court of appeals (see App., infra,
48a), it is also clear that DOT understood the Board’s position
with respect to its Section 504 jurisdiction. In the preamble
to DOT’s final Section 504 regulations, the Department noted
that “the CAB determined that it had statutory authority to
issue regulations governing air transportation of handicapped
persons, both under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
under sections 404 and 411 of the Federal Aviation Act.”
44 Fed. Reg. 31451 (1979) (emphasis added).
12
handicapped are protected by the adequacy of
service and antidiscrimination provisions of sec-
tion 404 of the Federal Aviation Act * * *, which
are applicable to all air carriers, whether or not
receiving Federal financial assistance.
Section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
(1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1374, as it existed at the
time of the Board’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
contained two provisions relevant to this case. Sec-
tion 404(a) (1), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V) 13874
(a) (1), contained a “safe and adequate service” re-
quirement, obligating all air carriers to “provide safe
and adequate service, equipment, and facilities in
connection with [interstate and overseas air] trans-
portation.” Section 404(b), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.)
1374(b), contained a general “antidiscrimination”
clause, prohibiting any carrier from “subject[ing]
any particular person, port, locality, or description of
traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimina-
tion or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-
advantage in any respect whatsoever.”
As set forth above, the Board was of the view that
the “safe and adequate service” and “antidiscrimina-
tion” provisions of Section 404, taken together, gave
the Board sufficient authority to require all carriers
to comply with regulations prohibiting discrimination
against handicapped air travellers, whether or not a
particular carrier was receiving federal financial as-
sistance. Pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744
(to be codified at 49 U.S.C. 1551(a) (2) (B)), how-
ever, the “antidiscrimination” clause of Section 404(b)
lapsed as of January 1, 1983; only the “safe and
adequate service” requirement of Section 404(a), 49
U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1374(a), remains in
effect.
13
This contraction of the Board’s statutory authority
required it to reevaluate its jurisdiction to impose the
proposed regulations on all carriers. After studying
the numerous comments received and consulting with
the Department of Justice,”° the Board concluded that
the “safe and adequate service” clause of Section
404(a) might support a general prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of handicap applicable to
all carriers, but that it was too slender a reed to
justify the imposition of more specific regulations ap-
plicable to the on-board activities of nonsubsidized
carriers. 47 Fed. Reg. 25937-25938 (1982) (App.,
infra, 85a-91a). In reaching this conclusion, the
Board carefully considered, but ultimately rejected,
the contention that all certificated carriers receive
federal financial assistance within the meaning of
Section 504 by virtue of their use of the federally-
operated air traffic control system and federally-
assisted airports. 47 Fed. Reg. 25937 (1982) (App.,
infra, 88a). Accordingly, the Board concluded that
the on-board activities of only those airlines receiving
subsidies from the Board could be regulated under
Section 504. 47 Fed. Reg. 25937-25938 (1982) (App.,
infra, 85a-91a).
The final regulations promulgated by the Board
(14 C.F.R. Pt. 382, 47 Fed. Reg. 25948 et seq.
1° Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298
(1981), the Attorney General was directed to coordinate the
implementation and enforcement by Executive agencies of the
nondiscrimination provisions contained in a number of civil
rights statutes, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. Previously, this coordinating function had been exercised
by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (see Execu-
tive Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117-118 (1977)) and, later,
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
14
(1982) ) contain three subparts. Subpart A is a gen-
eral prohibition against discrimination in air trans-
portation against qualified handicapped persons. Sub-
part B of the Board’s final rules sets forth specific
requirements to be followed by each regulated carrier
in providing air transport service to the handi-
capped.’ Subpart C establishes compliance and en-
forcement mechanisms. By virtue of the “safe and
adequate service” provision of Section 404(a) of the
Federal Aviation Act, the Subpart A prohibition ap-
plies to all certificated carriers, whether or not they
receive federal financial assistance. In recognition of
the limited jurisdictional reach of Section 504, how-
ever, Subparts B and C of the final regulations apply
only to those carriers receiving federal subsidies un-
der Section 406 or 419 of the Federal Aviation Act.”
The Attorney General approved the CAB’s final regu-
lations (see note 10, supra).
B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision
After setting forth the history of the rulemaking,
the court of appeals turned to respondents’ contention
that all commercial airlines are subject to Section
504. The court first rejected respondents’ arguments
that operating certificates and preferential tax treat-
ment for airlines constitute “Federal financial as-
11 Subpart B deals with such matters as the availability of
information for deaf persons, guide dogs, wheelchairs, special
lifts to help handicapped passengers board and deplane, and
the carrying of medically-needed oxygen on board the aircraft.
22 The Board did, however, urge nonsubsidized carriers to
look to Subpart B of the Section 504 regulations for guidance
in complying with the general antidiscrimination provision of
Subpart A applicable by virtue of Section 404(a) alone. 47
Fed. Reg. 25938 (1982) (App., infra, 90a-9la).
15
sistance” to airlines within the meaning of Section
504.° The court next considered respondents’ con-
tention that the federally-operated air traffic control
system constitutes federal financial assistance to air-
lines and concluded that it does (App., infra, 39a-
40a, 48a (footnotes omitted) ) :
It cannot be seriously disputed that the safe
and efficient operation of commercial] air trans-
portation depends in great measure (if not, as
[respondents] assert, “entirely”) upon “the
proper functioning of the national air traffic
control system.” * * * Moreover, this crucial
assistance may reasonably be considered “finan-
cial.” * * * Consequently, [respondents’] argu-
ment that the federal air traffic control system
is an “arrangement” that “provides or other-
wise makes available assistance in the form of
. . . Services of Federal personnel’ leads reason-
ably to the conclusion that the system does in-
deed constitute federal financial assistance to
all commercial air carriers. It follows, therefore,
that any and all carriers making use of the fed-
18 With respect to operating certificates, the court endorsed
the CAB’s reliance (App., infra, 88a) on Gottfried v. FCC, 655
F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in which the court had held that
broadcast licenses issued by the FCC do not constitute federal
financial assistance for purposes of Section 504 (App., infra,
34a). With respect to tax credits, the court of appeals doubted
that “Congress * * * intend[ed], by granting a limited tax
incentive to a particular industry or group, to thereby encom-
pass every such individual or group, or, for that matter, indi-
vidual within some ever-widening and potentially almost limit-
less definition of ‘federal financial assistance.’” Jd. at 37a.
The court also noted the anomaly that would result from
allowing the airlines themselves to determine whether they
wished to comply with Section 504 simply by deciding whether
or not to take advantage of tax credits (App., infra, 37a-38a).
16
eral air traffic control system should be subject
to any regulations promulgated under section
504.
* * * * *
The fact is that the air traffic control system is
indispensable to the very existence of modern
commercial aviation, and that if it were not pro-
vided by the federal program now in place, it
would have to be provided, and paid for, by the
airlines themselves.
Despite the court’s conclusion that the air traffic
control system constitutes federal financial assistance
to all commercial airlines, the court declined to in-
validate the Board’s rules on that basis, apparently
because it found itself unable to define the “program
or activity” that is federally assisted by the air
traffic control system. Taking note of this Court’s
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792
(Feb. 28, 1984), the court observed that if the assisted
“program or activity” were deemed to be the federal
air traffic control system, then “only that particular
system—its personnel practices and physical facili-
ties, for example—could be regulated under section
504” (App., infra, 45a). On the other hand, the court
reasoned that, if the assisted “program or activity”
were deemed to be that of “commercial air trans-
portation as engaged in by- the ai carriers,” then
Grove City’s program-specific mandate would not be
violated by applying Section 504 to the on-board ac-
tivities of all commercial airlines (App., infra, 45a).
The court then concluded that it need not resolve
the “program or activity” question in the context of
the air traffic control system. Instead, the court rea-
soned that the CAB “erred as a matter of law in fail-
ing to apply its section 504 regulations to all com-
17
mercial air carriers” because of the federal govern-
ment’s funding of airports and airways used by those
carriers. App., infra, 45a. The court stated (id. at
50a-51a (footnotes omitted) ) :
Airports and airlines are inextricably inter-
twined. The indissoluble nexus between them is
the provision of commercial air transportation.
Although airports may lease space to gift shops
and airlines may publish in-flight magazines or
own a chain of resort hotels, when it comes to
the “program or activity” of providing air
transportation to the traveling public, the two
entities are so functionally integrated that they
become one. While it may be the case * * * that
the airline as a corporate entity does not become
a federally-assisted “program’’ by virtue of its
use of federally-assisted airports, its “program
or activity” of providing commercial air trans-
portation certainly does.
Accordingly, the court vacated the CAB’s regula-
tions insofar as they failed te apply to all commercial
airlines and remanded the regulations to the Depart-
ment of Transportation (the CAB’s successor) for re-
promulgation in accordance with its opinion.”
The government’s petition for rehearing and sug-
gestion that rehearing be en banc were denied. Judges
Bork, Scalia, and Starr dissented from the denial] of
rehearing en banc. In an opinion written by Judge
Bork, the dissenters expressed the view that the panel’s
14 Respondents also challenged two specific aspects of the
Board’s final regulations—the Board’s definition of “qualified
handicapped person” and a requirement that handicapped
persons who require “extensive special assistance” notify the
airlines 48 hours in advance of flight. These challenges
were resolved in the Board’s favor (App., infra, 62a-72a), and
they are not pertinent to the issues before this Court.
18
decision could not be squared with this Court’s de-
cisions in Grove City and North Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (App., infra, 82a-83a
(footnote omitted) ) :
Under Grove City, the airlines here are clearly
not “recipients” of federal funds. The airports
are, and the ground activities of the airlines in-
tegral to the operation of the airport may be,
subject to section 504. However, the non-airport
activities of the airlines, such as in-flight pro-
cedures, are outside the scope of that section.
The panel’s attempts to distinguish this case
from Grove City are wholly unpersuasive. It
would unduly extend this dissent, however, to
deal with those contentions in detail. The Su-
preme Court has been over this ground, and we
ought to accept, rather than evade, its conclu-
sion.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The court of appeals’ decision that all commercial
airlines, by virtue of their use of federally assisted
airports, are thereby subject to regulation under Sec-
tion 504 in their “program or activity” of “providing
commercial air transportation” completely ignores the
distinction between a “recipient” operating a fed-
erally assisted “program or activity” and a “bene-
ficiary” of that assistance; disregards the “program
specific” limitation on Section 504’s coverage required
by this Court’s decisions in Grove City College v.
Bell, No. 82-792 (Feb. 28, 1984); Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, No. 82-862 (Feb. 28, 1984), slip
op. 11-12; and North Haven Bd. of Educ. vy. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 540 (1982); and conflicts with the decision
of the Ninth Circuit in Jacobson v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 742 F.2d 1202 (1984). Maintenance of the dis-
tinction between a “recipient” operating a federally
19
assisted “program or activity” and a “beneficiary” of
that assistance, as well as the “program specific”
mandate contained in the language of Section 504, is
essential if Congress’s expressed intent to impose
some limits on the reach of the statute is to be re-
spected. The court of appeals’ decision, which dis-
torts longstanding administrative interpretations of
the key concepts at issue, requires the regulation of
activities that the administering agencies have con-
sistently regarded as beyond the purview of Section
504. Moreover, the recipient/beneficiary dichotomy
and the program-specific limitation at issue in this
case apply not only to Section 504, but also to Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d,
Title [IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. 1681, and to a host of other general and spe-
cific revenue sharing statutes. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C.
6716. Accordingly, the court of appeals’ decision may
well have substantial impacts beyond this case. Fi-
naily, the conflict within the circuits means that nei-
ther the Department of Transportation nor the air-
lines can be certain of their obligations under Section
504. In these circumstances, review by this Court is
appropriate.
1. a. The court of appeals’ conclusion that com-
mercial airlines are “recipients” of federal financial
assistance by virtue of their use of federally assisted
airports totally obliterates any distinction between a
“recipient” operating a federally assisted “program
or activity” and a “beneficiary.” The two are not the
same. Section 504 prohibits those who receive federal
financial assistance—i.e., recipients—from discrimi-
nating in the conduct of assisted programs against
the intended beneficiaries of that assistance. Impor-
tantly, however, the intended beneficiaries of the fed-
eral funding are not themselves regulated by the stat-
ute. See Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F.
20
Supp. 597, 601 n.15 (D. S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d
514 (4th Cir. 1975) (Table).
In this case, airport operators clearly are “re-
cipients” of funds extended under the Airport and
Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, Tit. V, 96 Stat. 671 et seqg., and its predecessor
statutes (see note 3, supra). Members of the travel-
ling public, on the other hand, are “beneficiaries” of
federal grants to airport operators, because the pur-
pose of the federal grants is to benefit those who use
airports. For the same reason, airlines using fed-
erally assisted airports are beneficiaries of grants to
airport operators, but they are not, by virtue of use
alone, “recipients” of federal financial assistance.
As Judge Bork recognized in his opinion dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc, the court of
appeals’ approach to the “recipient” issue is bound-
lessly latitudinal (App., infra, 80a-81a) :
[The panel’s] reading of section 504’s statu-
tory language would make every commercial en-
terprise a “recipient” of federal aid when it
merely makes use of a service or facility that
receives any federal assistance. That idea has
great potential. Trucking and bus companies use
federally constructed and maintained highways,
and their businesses are thus inextricably inter-
twined with a federally assisted program. Many
electric companies rely on dams constructed and
maintained with federal funds. Without the
National Weather Service farmers would be un-
able to plan, protect, and cultivate their crops
in an effective manner. It ought surely to be
true that federal funding of federal courts re-
sults in the regulation of law firms since courts
are inextricably intertwined with and indispen-
sable to lawyering.
There is no merit, therefore, to the court of ap-
peals’ rationale that an “indissoluble nexus” (App.,
21
infra, 50a) between airports and airlines transforms
the airlines into “recipients” of grants to airport
operators. Virtually the same argument would apply
with equai force to all businesses that rely on air
travel to sell goods and services in a nationwide mar-
ket. Most if not all of the Nation’s major corpora-
tions require extensive air travel by their personnel.
Under the court of: appeals’ reasoning, \hose busi-
nesses, like the airlines, all would have to be treated
as “recipients” of federal financial assistance. Yet
Congress clearly did not intend that all those who
rely on air travel be deemed “recipients” of federal
financial assistance to airports.
b. The court of appeals also erred in holding that
the services of federal air traffic controllers consti-
tute federal financial assistance to airlines.” The
% As previously noted (see page 16, supra), the court of
appeals did not base its ultimate holding on this conclusion.
Nevertheless, we believe that the issue is properly before the
Court. The situation is comparable to that presented by North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), in which the
Court held that Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seg., encompasses employment discrim-
ination on the basis of gender, but declined to define the
federally-funded program at issue (456 U.S. at 540). See also
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, No. 82-862 (Feb. 28,
1984), slip op. 11-12. Here, too, the court of appeals held that
the air traffic control system constitutes federal financial assist-
ance to all airlines within the meaning of Section 504, but de-
clined to define the program or activity covered by that assist-
ance. Thus, if this Court were to grant review and reverse only
that part of the decision holding that federal assistance to air-
ports requires airlines to comply with Section 504 in their
“program or activity” of “providing commercial air transpor-
tation” (App., infra, 50a), the Department of Transportation
still would be left with a holding that all airlines receive federal
financial assistance within the meaning of Section 504 by
virtue of their use of the air traffic control system. Although
it would be open to the Department to define the relevant “pro-
22
legislative history of Title VI makes it clear that fed-
erally conducted programs—that is, programs funded
solely by federal money—such as dams, harbors, or
the air traffic control system—have only “beneficiar-
ies’; there are no intermediate “recipients.” As
then-Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach explained
(110 Cong. Reg. 13380 (1964) (footnote omitted) ) :
Activities wholly carried out by the United
States with Federal funds, such as river and
harbor improvements and other public works,
defense installations, veterans’ hospitals, mail
service, etc., are not included in the list [of fed-
erally assisted programs]. Such activities, being
wholly owned by, and operated by or for, the
United States, cannot fairly be described as re-
ceiving Federal “assistance.” While they may
result in general economic benefit to neighbor-
ing communities, such benefit is not considered
to be financial assistance to a program or activ-
ity within the meaning of title VI.
Stated differently, programs like the air traffic
control system fall in the general category of “public
goods”—goods and services from which all citizens
and businesses benefit. The air traffic control system
helps to ensure “safe skies.” Arguably, this public
benefit may “assist” airlines more directly than it as-
sists other enterprises, yet it also assists all enter-
prises that use the airlines or fly private planes in the
course of their business. It also protects those on the
gram or activity” in the first instance, it still would presum-
ably be required to repromulgate the challenged regulations in
some fashion. On the other hand, a decision by this Court
that the air traffic control system is not federal financial assist-
ance at all would obviate the need for further administrative
and judicial proceedings regarding the scope of the “program
or activity.”
23
ground from plane crashes. It does not, however, con-
stitute ‘Federal financial assistance” to anyone.
The court of appeals was able to reach a contrary
conclusion only by distorting a consistent adminis-
trative interpretation of “Federal financial assist-
ance” that dates back to 1964. The FAA’s original
Title VI regulations included the “detail of Federal
personnel” as an example of “Federal financial assist-
ance.” 14 C.F.R. 15.238(3) (1965), 29 Fed. Reg.
19286 (1964) (emphasis added). DOT’s current
Title VI regulations continue the use of that phrase.
49 C.F.R. 21.23(c) (3). Clearly, the operation of the
air traffic control system does not involve the “de-
tail” of any federal personnel to the airlines. In-
deed, as earlier noted (see page 22, supra), the air
traffic control system is far more aptly described as a
self-contained federally conducted program.
In 1978, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare published guidelines for other agencies to
follow in promulgating regulations under Section 504
(see note 10, swpra). HEW’s guidelines substituted
the word “services” for “detail,” so that “Federal
financial assistance” under Section 504 included the
“Ts]lervices of Federal personnel.” 43 Fed. Reg. 2137
(1978) (emphasis added). It is clear, however, that
HEW did not intend by this change to work any sub-
stantive alteration in the definition of ‘Federal fi-
nancial assistance” (43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1978)):
Despite some difference in the wording of the
definitions of federal] financial assistance in the
regulations implementing section 504 and title
VI, the substance of the two definitions does not
differ.
When the Department of Justice assumed over-
sight responsibility for Section 504 (see note 10, sw-
pra), it retained HEW’s definition of “Federal finan-
24
cial assistance,” including the “[s]ervices of Federal
personnel.” 28 C.F.R. 41.3(e). Again, however, there
is nothing to indicate that the term “services” of Fed-
eral personnel was to be construed any differently than
the “detail” of Federal personnel. But only by conclud-
ing that the “services” of Federal personnel means
something entirely different than the “detail” of Fed-
eral personnel was the court of appeals able to hold
that the federally-operated air traffic control system
constitutes federal financial assistance to airlines
(App., infra, 39a-40a). The court clearly erred in
disregarding the longstanding and consistent admin-
istrative interpretation of the agencies charged with
administering Title VI and Section 504. See, e.g.,
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, No. 82-1005 (June 25,
1984), slip op. 5-7; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mil-
hollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980).
e. In Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1984), the court of appeals held that neither
the use of federally-assisted airports nor the air traffic
control system constitutes federal financial assistance
to airlines within the meaning of Section 504. The
court below did not discuss Jacobson, but it is clear
that the two decisions cannot be reconciled. The
result of the conflict is that neither the airlines nor
the Department of Transportation can be certain of
their obligations under Section 504. Consistency in
the administration of this nationwide program re-
quires resolution of the conflict.
The plaintiff in Jacobson, who was confined to a
wheelchair because of cerebral palsy, challenged the
airline’s requirement that he sign a statement, in
advance of flight, acknowledging the airline’s right to
refuse him passage or to remove him at any stop “if
it becomes necessary for the comfort and safety of
other passengers” (742 F.2d at 1204). The court of
25
appeals agreed that the airline had subjected him to
unlawful discrimination, reasoning that the “anti-
discrimination” clause of the Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1374(b), incorporated Section
504’s basic prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of handicap (742 F.2d at 1205).”°
Having prevailed on his basic claim, plaintiff then
sought attorney’s fees. The request for fees required
the court of appeals to determine whether plaintiff had
stated a claim under Section 504 itself, because the Fed-
eral Aviation Act contains no fee-shifting provision.
Considering arguments remarkably similar to those
advanced by respondents in this case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that plaintiff had not stated a claim under
Section 504 because the airline did not receive federal
financial assistance (742 F.2d at 1208).
Although he apparently recognized that, in general,
airlines, like other corporations and persons, are
simply beneficiaries of government-supported services,
the plaintiff in Jacobson argued that airlines benefit
so much more than others from the use of federally
assisted airports and the air traffic contro] system
that they should be treated as recipients of federal
financial assistance (742 F.2d at 1213). The court of
appeals found it unnecessary to decide “whether a
person can become subject to the Rehabilitation Act
by benefiting to a substantially greater degree than
the general public from services provided primarily
for the general public” (ibid.). Instead, the court
concluded that “even though air carriers benefit from
16 There is no indication that either the Ninth Circuit or
the parties were aware of the fact that Section 404(b) of the
Federal Aviation Act expired on January 1, 1983. See page
12, supra. In any event, the discrimination of which plaintiff
complained occurred in 1980 (see 742 F.2d at 1204).
26
federal airport grants and federal air traffic control
* * * to a greater degree than the general public,
they also pay for those services, as Congress intended
them to, to a greater degree than the general public
does” (ibid.). This was so, the court concludea, be-
cause the trust fund from which grants to airport op-
erators are made is supported in large part by taxes
on aviation fuel, airplane tires and tubes, and other
products used by the airlines (id. at 1213-1214).
Because Congress established a user fee system under
which the airlines were to pay for services rendered,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress could not
simultaneously have intended that the airlines’ use of
federally assisted airports and the air traffic control
system would constitute federal financial “assistance”
(id. at 1215). Accordingly, the court held that
17 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the airport trust fund
is supplemented as necessary with general tax revenues and
that an FAA study prepared in 1978 reported that the air-
lines were not contributing to the trust fund to the same
extent that they were benefitting from federal services (742
F.2d at 1214). For two reasons, these facts did not alter the
court of appeals’ conclusion that the airlines are not “recipi-
ents” of federal financial assistance. First, the court observed
that “Congress might reasonably have concluded that the serv-
ices provided by the FAA confer benefits on the general public
over and above the benefits they confer on the users of the sys-
tem,” thus making it reasonable for the general public to bear
some of the costs (ibid.). Second, the court deemed it irrelevant
that, at any given point in time, airlines might be paying less
than their “fair share” as calculated under a strict user fee
system. Any temporary distortions meant only that the user
fee system required fine-tuning to implement congressional
intent; they did not suggest that Congress ever conceived of
the airlines as “recipients” of federal financial assistance
(id. at 1214-1215). Moreover, the court thought it would be
anomalous for the determination of “recipient” status under
Section 504 to vary from day to day, depending on “whether
the congressionally mandated system is operating flawlessly or
27
plaintiff had not stated a claim under the Rehabilita-
tion Act and that he could not recover attorney’s fees
under that Act (ibid.)."*
2.a. In deciding that the “program or activity”
that is federally assisted in this case is the “pro-
vi{sion of] commercial air transportation” by all
certificated carriers (App., infra, 50a), the court of
appeals seriously misapplied this Court’s decision in
Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792 (Feb. 28,
1984). In Grove City, the Court reaffirmed the doc-
trine that where a statute prohibits discrimination in
a “program or activity” receiving “Federal financial
assistance,” the reach of the statute is “program
specific.” See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Dar-
roné, No. 82-862 (Feb. 28, 1984), slip op. 11-12;
and North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
539-540 (1982). Applying “program specific” reason-
ing to tuition grants, the Court held in Grove City
that Congress did not intend the Department of Edu-
whether accountants’ studies demonstrate that changes in allo-
cation formulas are required” (742 F.2d at 1215 (footnote
omitted) ).
18 We note that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Jacobson
is by no means the only route to a conclusion that a “bene-
ficiary” of federal services is not a “recipient” of federal
financial assistance. Indeed, most beneficiaries of federal
financial assistance are in quite a different position than the
airlines—like the students receiving tuition grants in Grove
City, beneficiaries generally pay little or nothing for the bene-
fits they receive. It does not follow, however, that they should
be treated as “recipients” of federal financial assistance. Stated
simply, “beneficiaries” of federal financial assistance are those
that Congress intended to benefit; they are not, however, those
that Congress intended to regulate. “Recipients,” on the other
hand, are the entities that are carrying on an assisted “pro-
gram or activity” with the help of federal aid, and it is the
receipt of that federal aid that subjects them to regulation
in the conduct of such a “program or activity.”
28
cation (or the courts) to attempt to trace federal
money “from classroom to classroom, building to
building, or activity to activity.” Grove City, slip op.
17. The obvious purpose of tuition grants, the Court
found, was to assist a school’s financial aid program.
Ibid. Accordingly, receipt by the school (or its stu-
dents) of tuition grants meant that only the school’s
financial aid program was subject to regulation under
Title IX. Ibid.
Thus, the clear teaching of Grove City is that the
boundaries of a federally assisted program or activity
are defined by the underlying grant statute. Grants
under the Airport and Airway Improvement Act
(and its predecessor statutes) are made to airport
operators to support “program[s] or activit[ies]”’
involved in running an airport.” The grant statute
provides, in general terms, for the construction and
improvement of airports and associated ground facili-
ties; it furnishes no funds whatever for the purpose
of transporting people from one place to another. (It
is undisputed in this case that not one penny of
federal funds is given to airlines under the Airport
and Airway Improvement Act or its predecessor stat-
utes.) Accordingly, it is clear that all federally as-
sisted activities at airports, including the ground
operations (e.g., ticketing and baggage handling) of
all airlines using such airports, are indeed subject to
Section 504. See 49 C.F.R. Pt. 27, 44 Fed. Reg.
31442 et seg. (1979) (DOT’s Section 504 regula-
tions). But it is equally clear that Section 504’s
1® As the court of appeals recognized (App., infra, 46a (foot-
note omitted) ), the grants are used for such purposes as “air-
port land acquisition, runway construction, passenger termi-
nals, airport lighting, airport access and service roads, elec-
tronic and visual approach aids, taxiway construction, ob-
struction removal, and fire/rescue equipment and buildings.”
29
coverage cannot extend beyond the program or ac-
tivity conducted by or under the auspices of the
grant recipient. Neither the agency granting funds
to airport operators nor the airport operators them-
selves have the authority under Section 504 to regu-
late an airline’s practices on board its planes, because
air transport is simply not within the scope of the
grant program. Contrary to the court of appeals’
view that it would be “nonsensical” to distinguish
between an airline’s activities at the airport and its
activities on board its planes (App., infra, 47a), we
submit that such a distinction is the only interpreta-
tion consistent with the program-specific Jimitation on
coverage mandated by this Court’s decision in Grove
City. Simply stated, Section 504 is inapplicable to
the “program or activity” of “providing commercial
air transportation” (App., infra, 50a) unless and
until Congress furnishes the airlines with federal
financial assistance for flying.
b. As was the case with its analysis of the air
traffic control system (see pages 23-24, supra), the
court of appeals was able to conclude that the on-
board activities of commercial airlines are a federally
assisted “program or activity” only by distorting two
decades of consistent administrative interpretation.
The history of the Section 504 regulations, set forth
at pages 4-13, supra, demonstrates that the regula-
tory agencies never understood Title VI to reach the
on-board activities of airlines not receiving subsidies
from the CAB. Regulation of such activities was to
be accomplished, however, under Section 404(b) of
the Federal Aviation Act, which had been judicially
interpreted to prohibit racial discrimination in air
travel. See note 8, supra. It is true that both
DOT and the Board initially expected the Board to
promulgate regulations prohibiting all certificated
30
carriers from discriminating against handicapped air
travellers; this was to be accomplished, however,
through renewed reliance on Section 404(b), and not
Section 504 alone. But the congressionally mandated
“sunset” of Section 404(b) made it impossible for
the Board to carry out its original intent to write
regulations that would cover both subsidized and non-
subsidized carriers. The court of appeals erred in
failing to acknowledge that, with the expiration of
Section 404(b), the Board lost the authority it in-
tended to invoke to issue the all-encompassing regula-
tions mandated by the court. Neither DOT nor the
Board ever expressed the view that Section 504 alone
provided the Board with such sweeping authority, and
the court of appeals should have respected the agen-
cies’ determination of their own jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Acting Solicitor General
WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS
Assistant Attorney General
CHARLES J. COOPER
MARK R. DISLER
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
KATHRYN A. OBERLY
Assistant to the Solicitor General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
MIRIAM R. EISENSTEIN
Attorneys
AUGUST 1985
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 83-1055
PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA,
AMERICAN COALITION OF CITIZENS WITH DISABILITES,
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE BLIND, PETITIONERS
Vv.
CriviL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
RESPONDENTS
REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION, INTERVENOR
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Civil Aeronautics Board
Argued October 31, 1983
Decided January 18, 1985
Before: WALD and MIKvVA, Circuit Judges, and
BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
BAZELON.
‘ (la)
2a
BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge: Petitioners Para-
lyzed Veterans of America (PVA) and other organi-
zations representing disabled citizens ' challenge final
regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB or
Board) implementing section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 (the Act) with respect to commercial
airlines. The regulations were designed to prevent
discrimination against handicapped persons in air
transportation. The most important issue presented
by this case concerns the scope of the CAB’s Amended
Final Rule, which the Board has applied only to cer-
tain small airlines receiving direct federal subsidies.
Petitioners maintain that te Board is required by
law to apply its regulations to all commercial air car-
riers. We agree. As to the substance of those regula-
tions, however, which petitioners challenge on account
of the CAB’s definition of “qualified handicapped in-
dividual” and aspects of its 48-hour advance notice
1 Joining PVA as petitioners in this case are the American
Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, Inc., a nationwide coali-
tion of 127 organizations representing all major disability
groups, and the American Council of the Blind. PVA is com-
prised of veterans of the United States Armed Forces who
have suffered spinal cord injury or disease.
? Joining respondent CAB in this case are the Federal Avia-
tion Administration and the United States Department of
Transportation. Intervenor in this case on behalf of respon-
dents is the Regional Airline Association, the trade association
of the regional/commuter air carrier industry, representing
approximately 130 airline members. Because the CAB ceased
operations on December 31, 1984, pursuant to the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 and the Civil Aeronautics Board
Sunset Act of 1984, see infra notes 212-214 and accompanying
text, references in this opinion to the CAB or Board should
be construed, where appropriate, to include the CAB’s succes-
sor agency, the Department of Transportation.
3a
provision, we find respondents’ position more per-
suasive. Accordingly, we vacate the regulations in
part and remand them in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. From Statute to Rulemaking
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (sec-
tion 504) provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual
. . . Shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.*
As enacted, the statute did not provide for adminis-
trative implementation of section 504’s mandate; it
was silent as to the exercise of regulatory authority.*
In 1976, however, the President issued Executive Or-
8 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87
Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp.
V 1981)). Title V of the Act also required federal agencies
and federal contractors undertaking contracts in excess of
$2,500 to take affirmative action to employ handicapped in-
dividuals. Sections 501, 503, 29 U.S.C. § 791. In addition,
and of considerable relevance to the case before us, see infra
notes 150, 154, 174 and accompanying text, section 502 estab-
lished the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Com-
pliance Board in an effort to lower the “architectural, trans-
portation and attitudinal barriers” confronting handicapped
citizens. 29 U.S. c. § 792 (emphasis added).
4 See Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered:
Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap
Urjer Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 411-12 (1984).
4a
der 11,914, requiring the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) to coordinate the imple-
mentation and enforcement of section 504 by all fed-
eral agencies.° In 1977, prodded by an order of our
district court,° HEW did adopt regulations implement-
ing section 504 as it applied to those programs and
activities for which HEW was itself a source of fed-
eral financial assistance.” Finally, on January 13,
1978, the Secretary of HEW issued guidelines direct-
ing other federal agencies to begin their own rule-
making proceedings within ninety days and to issue
final regulations no later than one hundred thirty-
five days following the close of the comment periods
for the proposed rules.*
5 Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
® Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). The
court found “that Congress contemplated swift implementa-
tion of § 504 through a comprehensive set of regulations.” Jd.
at 927.
7 See 42 Fed. Reg. 22, 676 (1977); see also Note, Ending
Discrimination Against the Handicapped or Creating New
Problems? The HEW Rules and Regulations Implementing
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 6 FORDHAM
Urs. L. J. 399 (1978); Note, Administrative Action to End
Discrimination Based on Handicap: HEW’s Section 504 Reg-
ulations, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59 (1979).
8 Implementation of Executive Order 11,914, Nondiscrimi-
nation on the Basis of Handicap in Federally Assisted Pro-
grams, 43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2137 (1978) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 85 (1982)). When Congress divided HEW into two new
agencies in 1979, both the Department of Education and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) repub-
lished regulations implementing section 504 within the agen-
cies themselves. Authority for coordinating the implementa-
tion and enforcement of section 504 throughout the executive
branch was transferred first to HHS, then to the Department
5a
The Civil Aeronautics Board commenced its rule
making proceedings on June 6, 1979.° Because of the
complexities of the issues in this case, both jurisdic-
tional and substantive, it will be helpful to summa-
rize those proceedings in considerable detail.
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the Board
proposed “new rules to prohibit unlawful discrim-
ination against disabled travelers and to implement
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” *°
Although the CAB noted that “[t]his proceeding be-
gan at the Board’s initiative and with a petition for
rulemaking filed by the National Federation of the
Blind,” petitioners observe, and respondents do
not dispute, that “the Board’s initiative’ was
prompted at least in part by pressure from HEW
Secretary Joseph Califano.” In its discussion of the
of Justice, were it currently resides. See C.F.R. § 41 (1982)
(guidelines . ublished by Department of Justice pursuant to
Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981)). The original
guidelines promulgated by HEW to assist other agencies in
implementing section 504 are now deemed to have been issued
by the Attorney General and it is clear, as one commentator
has noted, that “[i]n the future the Department of Justice
will play a leading role in the interpretation of § 504.”
Wegner, supra note 4, at 417 n.42.
® Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 382, Nondiscrimina
tion on the Basis of Handicap, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,401 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule].
10 Id.
1 Jd,
12 As the proceedings continued, further prompting was ap-
parently necessary before the Board would adopt final rules.
In addition to Secretary Califano’s letter of January 29, 1979
urging the CAB to give the matter a high priority, the Board’s
slow pace elicited a formal request from the White House in
6a
proposed new rules’ “Introduction and Background,”
however, the Board’s position was a strong one:
A review of the problems that have been pre-
sented to the Board regarding difficulties en-
countered by handicapped persons in air trans-
portation demonstrates not only a need for reg-
ulations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, but also a significant need for the handi-
capped to receive adequate, nondiscriminatory
service in air transportation in general... .
Therefore, we have decided that the scope of
this rulemaking should include any discrimina-
tion against passengers and prospective passen-
gers on the basis of a handicapping condition,
and the availability of adequate, reasonable serv-
ice to handicapped persons. We believe that the
burden of showing that airline service to handi-
capped persons cannot be provided should be on
the air carrier.”
Also included in the Board’s “Introduction and
Background” discussion were several important ref-
erences to the agency’s statutory authority. First,
the CAB wished to “emphasize that the handicapped
are protected by the adequacy of service and anti-
November, 1980 that the CAB’s section 504 obligations be ful-
filled. “When the CAB still had not issued final rules by July
2, 1981, a district court ordered the agency to inform all of its
subsidized carriers of their obligation to comply with the re-
quirements of Section 504. Paralyzed Veterans of America,
et al. v. William French Smith, et al., No. 79-1979 (C.D. Cal.
July 2, 1981). The CAB complied with this order by sending
a letter on June 12, 1981 to all carriers receiving federal pay-
ments under Section 419 of the Federal Aviation Act.” Peti-
tioner’s Brief at 7 n.4 [hereinafter cited as PVA Brief].
18 Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,401 at 32,402.
ee
7a
discrimination provisions of section 404 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act [49 U.S.C. § 1374], which are
applicable to all air carriers, whether or not receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance.”** It relied upon
this fact as a partial justification for declining to
propose any regulation of airline employment prac-
tices, noting that other agencies, such as the Depart-
ment of Labor or the Justice Department, would have
“the experience and skill necessary to do the job ef-
fectively.” ” Moreover, the CAB reasoned:
The Board. extends direct Federal subsidies only
to a small number of air carriers, so that the
reach of our section 504 jurisdiction would not
have a significant effect on industry employment.
While we can prevent discrimination in air
transportation under section 404 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act without clear section 504 juris-
diction, the same is not true of employment. The
Board would have no authority to regulate em-
ployment practices of unsubsidized carriers un-
less those practices somehow caused discrimina-
tion in transportation.”
The CAB’s initial efforts to implement section 504
were further constrained by its decision “not to pro-
pose to require structural modifications of aircraft
at this time” on the ground of its having insufficient
information regarding alternatives, costs, and ben-
efits.” Nevertheless, the Board proposed, and in-
14 Id. at 32,401-02.
6 Id. at 32,402.
16 Td.
17 Id. Some implications of this limitation pertaining to
recent case law in this area are discussed infra at note 155.
8a
vited public comment upon, regulations that would
apply “to all certificated carriers and air taxis [com-
muter carriers] in their operations with aircraft of
more than 30-seat passenger capacity.” * Conceding
tha. “some aspects of the rules would merely make
exp icit what is already implicitly required by sec-
tion 404,” ” and that they might prove too burden-
some or impractical for certain small carriers, the
Board went on to suggest regulations that it believed
strike a reasonable balance among the interest
of handicapped persons in the greatest possible
convenience and freedom of choice in their use
of air transportation services, the legitimate re-
quirements of air safety, and the economic real-
ity that costs incurred by carriers will be passed
on to consumers in the form of higher air fares,
or to the handicapped in the form of special
charges.”
B. The Proposed Rules: Substance and Scope
The regulations developed by the CAB were tri-
partite. Subpart A—‘General Provisions”—prohib-
ited “discrimination in air transportation against
qualified handicapped persons.” * It stated that the
CAB’s purpose in adding a new Part 382—“Non-
discrimination on the Basis of Handicap”—to Chap-
ter II of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations was
to ensure: (a) That handicapped persons re-
ceive reasonable access to commercial air trans-
8 Id.
19 Td.
2% Id. at 32,402-03.
21 Id. at 32,405.
9a
portation, (b) that certain specific practices are
prohibited, and (c) that certain specific changes
in service are made. The part is designed to
ensure that transportation of handicapped per-
sons is integrated into the overall air transpor-
tation system as much as possible.”
Section 382.4 of Subpart A—a single sentence titled
“Prohibition against discrimination”—provided:
A carrier shall not, on the basis of handicap, ex-
clude any qualified handicapped persons from
participation in, deny them the benefits of, or
otherwise subject them to discrimination in the
provision of air transportation or related serv-
ices.”
Section 382.5 of Subpart A prohibited air carriers
from providing “different or separate” transporta-
tion services to qualified handicapped persons, or
from denying any services available to other passen-
gers, unless such actions were “reasonably neces-
sary.” ** Subpart A left the specific words ‘‘reason-
ably necessary” undefined, but did, in section 382.3,
define the terms “Carrier,”* “Conditions for air
2 Id.
23 Id. at 32,406.
*4 Id. Section 382.5(a) permits different or separate service
if “reasonably necessary to provide a qualified handicapped
person with access to air transportation or related services or
if requested by such a person.” Section 382.5(b) permits
carriers to deny transportation or services available to other
passengers if “such action is reasonably necessary to accom-
modate the handicapped passenger in order to comply with
the conditions for air transportation.” Id.
25 In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the CAB defined
“carrier” as including “(1) any holder of a certificate of pub-
10a
transportation,” * ‘Facility,’ ** “Handicapped per-
son,” * and “Qualified handicapped person,” *” each
of which assumes considerable significance in the
controversy before us.
lic convenience and necessity issued by the Board authorizing
the transportation of passengers, and (2) any air taxi opera-
tor” using aircraft seating more than thirty passengers. Al-
though the Notice was explicit about its applicability “to all
certificated carriers,” i.e., major commercial airlines, it spe-
cifically invited comment on the subject of commuter carriers;
indeed, it included language for an alternative regulation that
would not routinely exempt aircraft with fewer than thirty
seats. Id. at 32,405.
26'To be “qualified,” a handicapped person was required to
satisfy these conditions, defined as:
the tender of payment for air transportation, the absence
of any indication that air transportation of the passenger
will jeopardize flight safety, and the absence of any indi-
cation that the passenger is unwilling or unable to comply
with reasonable requests of airline personnel. Any re-
quest of airline personnel that is inconsistent with this
part will not be considered reasonable for the purposes of
this definition.
Id.
27 “ ‘Facility’ means all or any portion of a carrier’s air-
craft, buildings, structures, equipment, roads, walks, parking
lots, and other real or personal property, normally used by
passengers or prospective passengers, or interest in such
property.” Id.
28“ *Handicapped person’ means a person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an im-
pairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.”
Id.
29“ ‘Qualified handicapped person’ means a handicapped
person who has satisfied all the conditions for receiving air
transportation services (‘conditions for air transportation’)
that are required for the non-handicapped.” Jd. at 32,405-06.
lla
Subpart B—“Specific Requirements’—provided de-
tailed guidelines to be followed by each carrier with
regard to accessibility of facilities and services,” the
availability of information,” refusal of service,”
%® As to accessibility, § 382.10 did not require “that every
facility or every part of the facilities for each flight be made
accessible to or usable by handicapped persons,” but did man-
date that “[eJach carrier’s facilities and services, when
viewed in their entirety, shall be reasonably accessible to and
usable by handicapped persons.” Jd. at 32,406.
31 Paragraph (a) of § 382.11 required that carriers “‘estab-
lish a method for ensuring that deaf passengers receive
necessary information in emergencies” and that necessary
information be provided “in a timely manner .. . by use of
written material, signs, placards, flashing signal lights, or
other means.” Jd. Paragraph (b) provided that any informa-
tion available to passengers on printed emergency cards must
also be made available to blind passengers in Braille. /d.
32 Appropriately, the “refusal of service” regulations of
§ 382.12 were the most lengthy and detailed of any in the
Notice. Although they explicitly granted carriers the right
to refuse transportation to “handicapped persons who are
intoxicated by alcohol or drugs, who are seriously ill with a
condition that may require immediate treatment, who have
a contagious disease, who would endanger flight safety, or
whose condition results in disruptive behavior by the handi-
capped person,” § 382.12(a), they equally explicitly estab-
lished the following presumption and elaborated upon its
proper application in practice:
Handicapped persons shall be presumed to meet all condi-
tions for the provision of air transportation. A carrier
shall not refuse transportation to a handicapped person in
accordance with this paragraph unless it reasonably
believes that the person does not meet those conditions.
If the handicapped person presents a medical certificate
from a licensed physician that the person is eligible for
12a
guide dogs,” the use of Braille,** and service to be
provided to incontinent passengers and to passengers
unable to feed themselves.” Subpart B also specif-
air transportation, a carrier shall not refuse transporta-
tion without compelling evidence to the contrary.
Id.
Paragraph (b) of § 382.12 permitted carriers to require
that a personal nurse or attendant accompany “a handicapped
person who needs extraordinary care during flight” or who
“would need substantial assistance to deplane in an emer-
gency” or who would necessarily, because of the ai’ raft’s
structure, “obstruct the emergency deplaning of other pas-
sengers.” The paragraph pointedly provided, however, that a
carrier “shall not require persons who are blind or deaf but
not both, or persons who are unable to walk but who can
deplane reasonably expeditiously in an emergency by using
their arms, to have attendants for that reason.” Id.
%3 Blind and deaf passengers were permitted by § 382.13,
“Guide dogs and personal equipment,” to be accompanied
on aircraft by guide dogs, and to use canes or crutches and
“to keep those aides near them at all times.” Paragraph (c)
of § 382.13 further required carriers to permit handicapped
persons to take folding wheelchairs aboard and to stow the
wheelchairs in the passenger compartment, and paragraph
(d) required carriers to “accept as baggage battery-powered
wheelchairs and personal oxygen supplies of handicapped
passengers” to the extent that such storage and baggage-
carrying did not violate Federal Aviation Regulations or De-
partment of Transportation regulations for the transportation
of hazardous materials (49 C.F.R. Parts 172, 173, and 175).
Id.
% See supra note 31.
% According to § 382.12(c) :
A carrier shall not refuse transportation to, or require
attendants for, persons because they are unable to feed
themselves, if they elect not to eat during the flight. A
carrier shall not refuse transportation to or require
attendants for, persons because they are incontinent or
13a
ically prohibited carriers from conditioning the car-
riage of handicapped passengers or their baggage,
including wheelchairs, on any waiver of liability for
personal injury or property damage and forbade “any
limitation of liability that is stricter than the limita-
tions applied to all passengers and baggage.” ** That
section of Subpart B with which the instant case is
most concerned, however, and which serves as an
important illustration of the specificity and detail
of the regulations at issue, was section 382.14,
“Availability of services and equipment,” providing
in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Carriers shall ensure the availability of:
(1) Necessary life-support systems, such as
oxygen, for on-board use; and
(2) Personnel and equipment to assist in
boarding, moving to restrooms, deplaning, bag-
gage handling, and making ground connections,
including ground wheelchairs, aisle chairs and,
if necessary, mechanical boarding lifts.
(b) Carriers shall not establish advance no-
tice requirements for the provision of special as-
sistance unless that assistance is extensive. Car-
riers may establish reasonable advance notice
persons who are unable to use the restrooms without
assistance, if they have made adequate alternative ar-
rangements for waste disposal.
Id.
36 Exceptions to these prohibitions were contained in
§ 382.15(b), which permitted carriers to “insist upon a waiver
of liability for injury that: (1) Results from a handicap
traveling with which presents an extraordinary hazard, and
(2) Occurs despite the exercise of due care by the carrier.”
Id. at 32,407.
l4a
requirements of up to 48 hours for the provision
of extensive special assistance. For the purposes
of this paragraph, carrier-provided wheelchairs,
oxygen for on-board use, and mechanical board-
ing lifts will be considered extensive special
assistance.”
Subpart C of the regulations initially proposed by
the Board—‘“Compliance”—mandated that each car-
rier provide formal assurances to the CAB “that it
wiil comply with this part” * and specified the means
for so doing. Each carrier, for example, was re-
quired to “maintain an employees’ manual contain-
ing company rules for accommodating handicapped
passengers,” * to formally designate “at least one
person . . . to coordinate its efforts to comply with
37 Id. at 32,406. Additional paragraphs of § 382.14 per-
mitted carriers to charge handicapped passengers “the costs
of the assistance including a reasonable profit,” § 382.14(c),
and enjoined carriers from forcing special assistance upon a
handicapped person “who does not request it, unless the
assistance is reasonably necessary to physically accommodate
the passenger or to enable the passenger to meet the condi-
tions for air transportation,” § 382.14(d). Jd. Supplementing
'§ 382.14’s definition of “extensive special assistance,” the
Subpart B guidelines on “refusal of service” provided in
§ 382.12(d) as follows:
A carrier may refuse transportation to a person who
will need extensive special assistance from the carrier,
such as the provision of wheelchairs, oxygen, or mechan-
ical boarding lifts, if the person fails to comply with ad-
vance notice requirements established by the carrier in
accordance with § 382.14(b).
Id.
88 Id. at 32,407 (§ 382.20).
8° Td. (§ 382.21).
15a
this part,” “® and not only to “[e]valuate its current
policies and practices and effects for compliance” but
also to “[e]stablish a system for periodically review-
ing and updating the evaluation.” ** The requisite
“evaluation and modification of practices” was to in-
clude “a reasonable effort to consult with and obtain
the views of handicapped persons and experts on
handicapping conditions.” *
In addition, under Subpart C, every carrier was
required, within 180 days after the effective date of
the proposed regulations, to “adopt a plan that pro-
vides for the prompt and equitable resolution of com-
plaints alleging any action prohibited by this part
...’* Such a complaint might be filed by any
person who believed “that he or she has been a vic-
tim of discriminatory action” by a carrier.“ Finally,
section 382.26 of Subpart C, Procedures for noncom-
pliance,” authorized the Director of the Bureau of
Consumer Protection to institute enforcement pro-
ceedings. If, after notice and opportunity for a hear-
ing, such proceedings “[f]ound a failure by the car-
rier to comply with a requirement of this part,” the
Board was empowered to “order suspension or ter-
mination of, or refuse to grant or continue Federal
financial assistance” to the offending carrier, or to
“use any other means authorized by law to ensure
compliance.” *
Id. (§ 382.23).
“1 Id. (§ 382.22).
“2 Td.
* Id. (§ 382.24).
** Id. (§ 382.25).
* Id. (§ 382.26).
l6a
In response to its request for comments on its pro-
posed regulations, the CAB received a large number
of suggestions and criticisms from airlines, airline
trade associations, flight crew unions, government
agencies, disabled individuals and organizations rep-
resenting handicapped persons, including petition-
ers.**
C. The Final Rules: Comment, Compromise, and
Constriction
In general, the airlines objected to the adoption of
the proposed regulations, arguing that such rules
were inconsistent with recent congressional initia-
tives aimed at reducing regulation of the air trans-
port industry and that they were unduly burdensome
and duplicative.’ At least one commenting airline
contended “that unjust discrimination on the basis
of handicap does not exist” and that the proposed
rulemaking of the Board was not only “unnecessary”
but “would cause confusion and ambiguous interpre-
tation with the undesired result of diminished spe-
#6 Additional groups included the National Association of
the Deaf, the National Capital Chapter of the National Multi-
ple Sclerosis Society, the Disability Rights Center, the Na-
tional Center for Law and the Deaf, and the National Associ-
ation for Retarded Citizens.
47 American Airlines argued, for example, that “[t]he FAA
currently enforces its own regulations regarding accommoda-
ting handicapped travelers. These regulations are both com-
prehensive and reasonable. There is no need, therefore, for
the Board to involve itself in duplicating the efforts of the
FAA, particularly when it lacks the FAA’s technical exper-
tise.” Comments of American Airlines, Inc. before the Civil
Aeronautics Board, Aug. 31, 1971, J.A. at 154, 156; see also
Respondents’ Brief at 10.
17a
cial service to handicapped persons.” ** While repre-
sentatives of commuter airlines could see some merit
in the proposed regulations as they applied to the
large certificated carriers, they concluded that “if
applied to commuter air carriers, [the rules] would
result in a substantial burden on such carriers. The
mere recitation of the detail and scope of the pro-
posed requirements ‘is staggering.” ** The larger air-
lines, through the comments of the Air Transport
Association and several individual companies, con-
tended not only that the proposed regulations were
“redundant, confusing, and, in some cases, conflict-
ing,” but that the CAB was without jurisdiction to
apply them to any airlines but those few (generally
smaller ones) that received direct money subsidies
from the Board.”
This jurisdictional contention was vigorously op-
posed by groups representing handicapped citizens,
all of which supported the CAB’s initial assertion of
rulemaking authority over every certificated carrier.
As to the scope of rulemaking, these groups criticized
the agency, if at all, for its tentative proposal to
exempt from its regulations those small commuter or
air taxi operators using aircraft of fewer than thirty
seats.” Although the substantial submission of the
*8 Comments of Pacific Southwest Airlines before the Civil
Aeronautics Board, Sept. 4, 1979, J.A. at 137, 139.
*? Comments of Commuter Airline Association of America,
Inc. before the Civil Aeronautics Board, Sept. 4, 1979, J.A. at
98, 102.
5° Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Final Rule,
47 Fed. Reg. 25,936 (1982) (codified at 14 C.F.R. Part 382)
[hereinafter cited as Final Rule].
51 See, e.g., Comments of PVA before the Civil Aeronautics
Board, Sept. 5, 1979, J.A. at 83, 85 (citing the increasing
18a
Disability Rights Center and eight other groups”
did address the legal issue of the proper reach of
section 504—arguing that all airlines, whether sub-
sidized or not, received “federal financial assistance”
in the form of development grants to airports, the
federal air traffic control system, exclusive operating
certificates, and special investment tax credits—the
vast majority of comments were directed to the sub-
stance of the rules themselves.”
In this regard the rulemaking proceeding below
appears to have been an exemplary one. The record
contains many examples of difficult and sensitive is-
sues being painstakingly resolved, of diverse view-
points being conscientiously considered. For example,
the Board redrafted its rules to eliminate any refer-
ence to medical certificates,* agreeing with commen-
ters representing the disabled who argued that terms
like “reasonable belief” and “compelling evidence”
were too vague, that travelers were the best judges
of their own medical status and ability to fly as far
as their own risk was concerned, and that the re-
quirement might discriminate in practice between
those in whom a handicap was apparent and those
in whom it was not.” In cases where risks to other
frequency of such flights, noting their importance in making
mid-route connections, and arguing that “[a]t most, these
carriers should be individually and temporarily exempted’’) ;
regarding the CAB’s concern on this score see note 25, supra.
52 These included the three petitioners in this case and the
groups enumerated in note 46 supra.
53 See J.A. at 111; Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.
54 See supra note 32.
55 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,942 (discussing proposed
§ 382.12 (now § 382.13) ).
19a
passengers are potentially involved, however, such as
where “the likelihood that aggravation of the pas-
senger’s condition will cause an in-flight emergency
or unscheduled landing,” the Board concluded “that
airlines must make determinations of flight worthi-
ness.” ** This was to be accomplished not on the basis
of a required medical certificate from “passengers’
doctors [who, the airlines contended] are generally
inexpert in aerospace medicine, and, therefore, un-
qualified to determine whether the passenger can fly”
but rather “on the basis of standards clearly related
to flight safety, applied in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner by personnel who are assigned specific respon-
sibility for this task.” ™
In general the Board’s response to the comments it
received upon specific provisions of the proposed rules
resulted in its granting enhanced discretion to the
regulated carriers. For example, a proposed rule re-
quiring Braille information cards" was dropped in
favor of a section that, according to the Board, “now
clearly states the airlines’ obligation to provide both
emergency and important non-emergency information
to blind or deaf passengers, but allows more flexi-
bility in choosing methods for providing it.” ° Simi-
larly, in dismissing the objection of several commen-
tators to the use of the phrase “reasonably accessi-
ble” in sections 382.1 and 382.11 of the proposed rules
rather than of the words “readily accessible” (the
standard of the HHS guidelines in 14 C.F.R. § 85.57
(a)), the Board concluded that its original language
56 Jd.
57 Td,
58 See supra note 31.
5° Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,941.
20a
reflected “the accessibility standard most appropriate
to the airline industry.” ” In such areas of evident
concern to handicapped persons as the storage of
blind travelers’ canes“ and in-flight wheelchair
policy,” the Board’s decisionmaking resulted in Final
% Jd. at 25,940.
61“The question of whether a blind person may have his
cane during flight,” according to a “‘Fact Sheet” submitted to
the Board by the National Federation of the Blind, s no
exception to th[e] chaotic configuration of procedur.3 and
practices by the airlines.” Noting that many airlines treated
canes as any other carry-on baggage to be stowed at the dis-
cretion of the carrier, the Federation noted that “[t]he white
cane is of functional necessity to its owners just as the guide-
dog is inextricably bound to its master,” placing it “entirely
out of the category of portable hardware when it comes to the
importance that the white cane holds for blind persons. The
white cane represents one of two full-proof methods of inde-
pendent travel for the blind, and is therefore symbolic of the
mobility and self-sufficiency which blind people strive for.
Stowing a blind person’s cane in some far-off closet is not like
doing so to another person’s extra clothes bag.” J.A. at 174.
On this subject, the Board, in explaining its Final Rule,
noted that the “primary authority” on the matter was the
Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], which “has consid-
ered the air safety implications” [45 Fed. Reg. 75,138 (1980) ]
and “determined that the stowage of travel canes under pas-
senger seats is consistent with its safety mandate provided
that the cane is placed flat on the floor and does not protrude
into an aisle or exit row.” The Board therefore amended its
Final Rule § 382.14[b] to require carriers to permit stowage
of travel canes whenever the FAA’s conditions can be met.
Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,943-44.
®2 The proposed rules would have required airlines to carry
folding wheelchairs in the passenger compartment if permis-
sible under FAA and Department of Transportation [DOT]
regulations—a proposal that was warmly embraced by com-
menters representing the handicapped and strongly criticized
2la
Rules that appear to have successfully balanced the
felt necessities of the handicapped with the require-
ments of the airlines for flexibility and the need for
deference to the expertise of agencies that are
charged more directly with ensuring the safety of air
transportation.®
by the airlines, flight attendants’ unions, and the Aerospace
Industries Association. The critics contended that passenger-
area storage space was too limited and that folding wheel-
chairs could be “doortagged” (taken from the passenger and
stored in the plane’s belly just before boarding and returned
just after deplaning). Advocates of the proposed rule, how-
ever, argued that chairs were more likely to be damaged by
such a procedure and that passenger-compartment stowage
was much less uncomfortable because it permitted use of a
personal chair for the longest possible time. Jd. at 25,944.
In its Final Rule, the CAB decided “that airlines need more
flexibility” and modified its proposed rule “to require carriers
to make reasonable efforts to provide passenger-area storage,
and otherwise to doortag,” stating its expectation that airlines
would make “good faith efforts to accommodate folding wheel-
chairs in the passenger compartment when possible.” Jd. On
the other hand, the Board refused to cede to the airlines’
request that it further relax its proposed § 382.13(d), which
required airlines to carry battery-operated wheelchairs in the
baggage compartment to the extent permitted by DOT rules
on the carriage of hazardous materials. It noted that any
need for more flexibility here was offset by the “strong coun-
tervailing interest” of the handicapped traveler’s access to
such “extremely important belongings.” Jd.
*8 A final illustration involves paragraphs (b) and (c) of
proposed § 382.12 (now § 382.13), which permitted airlines
to require handicapped passengers to travel with attendants
when nursing or other extensive personal care would be
necessary during flight and when a passenger would require
assistance to exit during an emergency. Responding to com-
ments seeking greater specificity in the rules, the Board in
its Final Rule sought to “make clear that minor assistance
with meals, such as opening silverware packages or telling a
22a
Nevertheless, the Board’s determinations regarding
two specific aspects of the Final Rules have been
challenged by petitioners in this case. The first in-
volves the CAB’s definition, in its Amended Final
Rule, of “Qualified Handicapped Person,” to which
blind passenger what is being served and where each item is
located on the tray, should not be considered feeding assistance
requiring a passenger to travel attended or forego food.” Id.
at 25,942. Otherwise the Board relied on what it in another
context termed the airlines’ “courtesy and common sense.” /d.
at 25,941. Thus:
The normal range of flight attendant services, including
the occasional modest extra efforts provided for some
passengers—escorting them to seats, providing games to
restless children, soothing first-flight anxieties—can be
easily distinguished from the kind of time-consuming
attention or specialized services (such as administering
injections or assisting a passenger in the lavatory) that
passengers would not expect as a matter of course.
Id. at 25,942.
As to the requirement of an attendant when necessary for
emergency deplaning, the Board concluded that airlines should
be permitted to require this “substantial logistical and finan-
cial barrier to travel,” id., only “when reasonably necessary
for the safety of other passengers, in accordance with the
regulations and policies of the FAA.” Id. at 25,943. Noting
that the FAA had still not resolved the question to its own
satisfaction, but had found in a preliminary study that “ ‘the
potential for handicapped passengers delaying aircraft evacu-
ations would appear minimal,’ ” the Board concluded that
[a]s with decisions on refusing service, decisions re-
quiring attendants must be made by designated personnel.
The name of the designated person must be made known
to any person that requests it. Additionally, we will ex-
pect airlines to be able to provide specific justifications
for their determinations that safety requires a passenger
to be attended.
Id.
23a
petitioners object on two grounds: that it “unlaw-
fully allow[s] airlines to selectively impose require-
ments on disabled passengers which are not required
of all other passengers” and that it lacks “objective
guidelines and criteria to ensure that airlines do not
arbitrarily impose unnecessary conditions on dis-
abled passengers,” thus rendering the definition
“vague and confusing for both airline personnel and
disabled travelers.” “* Petitioners’ second specific ob-
jection is‘ to section 382.15(c) of the Final Rule,
which allows airlines to require all passengers who
will need “extensive special assistance” to notify the
airline 48 hours in advance of their flight.“ This
provision, petitioners contend, is “especially arbi-
trary” and “overly broad” and “inconsistent with
Section 504” because it would permit airlines “to
circumvent their Section 504 responsibilities.” *
A discussion of the administrative background of
these disputed sections of the Final Rule, and of the
arguments advanced for and against their validity
by the parties to this case, is best deferred until a
* PVA Brief at 51. When its Final Rule was published,
the Board noted that “[i]n order to aid in any revisions or
analysis that may be necessary, we are leaving this rulemaking
docket open for further comments on possible changes... .
42 Fed. Reg. at 25,948. Such comments were in fact received
from the Department of Justice and several groups represent-
ing the handicapped, resulting in some minor changes dis-
cussed infra at note 179. The amendments, characterized by
the CAB as “interpretative” and promulgated without notice
or public comment, were published on November 18, 1982.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Amendment
No. 1 to Part 382, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,857 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Amended Final Rule].
* PVA Brief at 60; see Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,949.
* PVA Brief at 61-62.
24a
related and more fundamental question has been re-
solved: What airlines, in fact, have section 504 “re-
sponsibilities”? The question arises because the CAB,
having engaged in the extensive and apparently
scrupulous rulemaking procedure only partially sum-
marized in the foregoing paragraphs and notes, de-
cided that the rules it was making could, as a matter
of law, be applied only to a small fraction of com-
mercial airlines actually engaged in transporting
handicapped travelers.
This interpretation of the extent of its regulatory
authority represented a substantial constriction of
the CAB’s original position as expressed in its 1979
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.” There the Board
had interpreted the scope of its rulemaking authority
broadly, emphasizing that such regulation of air
transportation could be based not only upon section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act but also upon the ade-
quacy of service and antidiscrimination provisions of
section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1874.* To the extent to which the Board expressed
any doubt as to the reach of its regulatory authority
or the wisdom of applying the proposed rules to all
carriers, it was hesitant only with regard to the em-
ployment practices of airline companies,” the im-
87 See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
* Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 32, 401-02.
® See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. “The
Board did not propose provisions governing employment be-
cause it did not consider employment to be covered by Section
504 .... A recent decision by the Supreme Court, North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell [456 U.S. 512 (1982) ]
. . « however, caused the Board to reverse this view.” Final
Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,947.
25a
position of structural requirements for aircraft,” and
the possibility that regulations reasonably applied to
most established airlines and large aircraft might
prove too burdensome or impractical for certain small
carriers." By the time it issued its Final Rule in
1982, however, the Board was evidently hesitant to
apply any specific requirements at all. Although it
reaffirmed its reliance upon section 504 and upon
section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act as “the req-
uisite authority” for applying Subpart A of the
rule—the general antidiscrimination provision—to
all carriers,” it construed its statutory power to
regulate discriminatory practices as extending no
further:
The specific requirements in Subparts B and C
of this rule . . . will apply only to those carriers
receiving subsidy from the Board under sections
406 or 419 of the Act, in recognition of the
limited jurisdictional basis of section 504. Those
carriers subject only to the general provisions of
Subpart A should look to the specific require-
ments of Subpart B as guidance for meeting
their general obligation not to discriminate.”
In promulgating its Final Rule, the Board rea-
soned that because section 504 prohibits discrimina-
tion “under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance,” “* it was powerless, in im-
7 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 18 and 25 and accompanying text.
Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.
78 Id. at 25,937-38.
™ 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
26a
plementing the statute, to “reach” any program or
activity that was not receiving such assistance. “In
our view,” the Board announced, “only subsidy paid
under either sections 406 or 419 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act qualifies” as federal financial assistance.”
In consequence, as petitioners note, the specific pro-
visions of the rules designed to protect handicapped
travelers apply only to those carriers receiving sub-
sidies for the transportation of mail,” and to several
small local and regional air carriers directly sub-
sidized with federal funds for providing essential air-
transportation to small communities.” As a practical
™ Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.
7 At the time this petition for review was filed, three car-
riers were so subsidized: Frontier Airlines, Piedmont Air-
lines, and Republic Airlines. Under the original section 406
program of the Federal Aviation Act, certain airlines were
compensated by the federal government for the transporta-
tion of mail. See 49 U.S.C. § 1876(c), as amended (Supp. V
1981). This program was supplanted by a more limited pro-
gram in 1982 (shortly after the CAB’s Final Rules were
promulgated) as part of the congressional plan to “deregu-
late” air transport and to “sunset” the CAB. See PVA Brief
at 10; see also infra notes 212, 213 and accompanying text.
™ Under the section 419 program, airlines providing essen-
tial air service to a small community received federal sub-
sidies under sections 419(a)(5) or (b)(6) of the Federal
Aviation Act. In its Final Rule, the CAB noted that these
small local and regional carriers would be required to comply
with Subparts B and C of the nondiscrimination rule. In
addition to the three carriers noted in note 76, supra, the
Board identified Ozark, Air Midwest, Skywest, Alaska Air-
lines, Wien Air Alaska and Kodiak Western as carriers which,
by virtue of their receipt of federal subsidies, would be subject
to the specific requirements and compliance provisions of the
rule. Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,938.
Curiously, the CAB elected not to apply Subparts B and C
to air carriers receiving compensation retroactively for losses
27a
matter, it is undisputed that in 1983 the CAB did
not require any airline with regularly scheduled
flights across the United States or overseas to com-
ply with Subparts B or C of the regulations.”
Petitioners argue, in general, that the CAB’s inter-
pretation of its rulemaking authority under section
504 is excessively narrow, and that its construction
of the scope of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is in-
consistent with the intent of Congress, the regula-
tions of other agencies, and controlling legal prece-
dent.” In particular, in addition to their challenge
of two specific provisions of the rules,” petitioners
urge on several grounds that the agency erred as a
matter of law in failing to apply its rules to all
commercial airlines, “because these airlines receive
federal financial assistance sufficient to bring them
within the scope of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.” It is this last but most fundamental issue
which, in our discussion of the considerable com-
incurred when they have been required to continue providing
services which they have requested authority to terminate.
Such retroactive compensation, pursuant to section 419(a) (7),
was deemed “short term and after-the-fact,” making com-
pliance “impractical.” Jd. By contrast, the Department of
Justice’s Civil Rights Division believed the retroactivity of
the compensation did not justify different treatment of such
carriers. See J.A. at 59; PVA Brief at 11.
% Examples of major commercial air carriers that have no
legal obligation to comply with Subparts B and C, in the
Board’s view, are American, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, Pan
American, Trans World, and United Airlines.
7 See, e.g., PVA Brief at 19.
8 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
$1 PVA Brief at 12.
28a
plexities involved in this petition for review, shall
be first.
8 Jurisdiction in this case is provided by 49 U.S.C.
§ 1486(a) (1976) :
Any order . . . issued by the Board . . . shall be subject
to review by the court . . . upon petition, filed within
sixty days after the entry of such order, .... After the
expiration of said sixty days a petition may be filed only
by leave of court upon a showing of reasonable grounds
for failure to file the petition theretofore.
Respondents argue that petitioners’ filing for review in this
case six months after the CAB’s promulgation of its Final
Rule precludes judicial review entirely. They suggest, more-
over, that the Board’s amendments to its Final Rule, which
were issued on November 18, 1982 after further comment to
the Board from the Department of Justice and disabled
citizens, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,857, see infra, notes 179, 202 and
accompanying text, were merely interpretive, so that judicial
review remains time-barred.
It is undisputed that petitioners did file for review within
sixty days of the Board’s promulgation of its Amended Final
Rule. More importantly, the CAB explicitly left its rulemak-
ing docket open in order to receive additional comments from
the public as well as from the Department of Justice. Final
Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,948. Aware that the rule might be
undergoing modification, and unable to predict how extensive
any modification would be, petitioners elected to wait until
the regulation was in final form before seeking review. In-
deed, PVA and other groups representing the handicapped
submitted comments to the Board during this period, see
supra note 64, and it was entirely reasonable of them to ex-
pect the agency to “respond in a reasoned manner to the
comments received ....” Action on Smoking and Health v.
CAB, 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ; Rodway v. De-
partment of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(citations omitted). Any delay simply served properly to ex-
haust petitioners’ administrative remedies, and to conserve
the resources of both the litigants and this court. Reasonable
grounds having been shown, we grant review in this case
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (a).
29a
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Scope of Section 504: Defining “Federal Fi-
nancial Assistance” in Context
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 established “a com-
prehensive federal program aimed at improving the
lot of the handicapped.” * Section 504 of the Act
represented an effort, closely modeled upon civil
rights legislation already in force, to offer handi-
capped individuals an opportunity to pursue em-
ployment, educational, and recreational goals free of
the additional handicap of discrimination against
them.** Aware that with section 504 Congress in-
tended “to eradicate the longstanding prejudice
against the handicapped,” * courts have duly noted
the extent to which the language of the section corre-
sponds to that of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 * and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972," frequently applying the case law developed
88 Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 104 S.Ct. 1248
(1984).
** See generally White House Conference on Handicapped
Individuals Act, Pub. L. 93-651, § 301, 80 Stat. 2 et seq.
(1974), 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 (historical note) ; S. Rep. No. 1297,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE Conc. & AD. NEws at 6406.
a Wegner, supra note 4, at 403.
% Title VI provides: “No person in the United States shall,
on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance.” Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 601, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1976) ; cf. supra text accompanying note 3.
8? Title [X provides: “No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be de-
30a
in those areas to the resolution of problems arising
under the Rehabilitation Act. In our review of the
rulemaking proceeding below, and particularly in our
analysis of what constitutes sufficient federal “finan-
cial assistance” to bring a “program or activity”
within the reach of section 504, we shall do the same.
We emphasize at the outset, however, the extent
to which the issue of discrimination against the
handicapped, particularly in the complex realm of
commercial air transportation, is sui generis.” Ac-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal finarcial
assistance... .” Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-318, § 901 (a), 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 168(a)
(1982) ).
88 See, e.g., Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 767 (5th Cir.
1981) ; see also, Wegner, supra note 4.
8° The difficult choices necessitated by the idiosyncratic na-
ture and extent of any particular individual’s disability and
the peculiar requirements of air safety make rulemaking in
this area especially delicate, as our review of the background
of this case in Part I suggests. Even in the arguably less com-
plicated area of ground transportation, it may be no simple
task to determine what section 504’s deceptively clear mandate
requires:
What must be done to provide handicapped persons with
the same right to utilize mass transportation facilities
as other persons? Does each bus have to have special
capacity? Must each seat on each bus be removable?
Must the bus routes be changed to provide stops at all
hospitals, therapy centers and nursing homes? Is it
required that buses be -*> to accommodate bedridden
persons? Is it discriminatory to answer any of these
questions in the negative? Will the operation of hydraulic
lifts on buses involve stigmatizing effects on the persons
3la
cordingly, our holding today is a narrow one which
must be understood in the unique context of two
intersecting considerations. First, we are interpret-
ing a statute that was explicitly addressed not merely
to enhancing employment and ending discrimination
but to expanding the mobility of handicapped per-
sons, to reducing barriers to transportation. Second,
we are concerned with the appropriate regulation of
an industry that is an integral part of a “program
in activity” of a very special kind. In fact, the analy-
sis of what constitutes “federal financial assistance”
in this case, and the related question of how properly
to apply section 504 to the airline industry, turn in
significant part upon the specific and “special” ways
in which, whether directly subsidized or not, all air
carriers are inextricably intertwined with the fed-
erally-funded “program or activity” of commercial
air transportation. Even at its most doctrinal, this is
a case, above all, about access to airplanes and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
1. Exclusive Operating Certificates
In its rulemaking proceeding the CAB properly
disposed of the argument made by petitioners and
others that all certificated air carriers should be sub-
ject to section 504 because they receive federal finan-
who use them? If so, is that a discrimination solely by
reason of handicap within the meaning of § 504?
Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. 825, 831
(D. Colo. 1978). See also Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d
644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982); American Public Transit Ass’n v.
Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
32a
cial assistance in the form of “operating certificates
giving exclusive domain over valuable air routes.” ”
While an operating certificate may be of some
value, it no longer gives airlines exclusive do-
main over routes, see section 1601(a) (1) (C) of
the Act. It therefore presents a situation similar
- to Gottfried v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), where it
was held that broadcast licenses do not count as
financial assistance within the meaning of sec-
tion 504.”
As appropriate as the Board’s reliance upon our
holding in Gottfried was, however, that case merts
a brief discussion here, not only because it represe.its
an important earlier construction of the statute, but
also because its holding must be understood in its
appropriate—and somewhat limited—context.
In Gottfried this court remanded to the FCC a
challenge to the license renewal of a public television
station on the ground that the Commission had failed
to inquire specifically into the station’s efforts to
meet the programming needs of the hearing im-
paired.” Its obligation to do so, the court noted, was
founded upon section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
to which the public station was bound by virtue of
its receipt of federal financial assistance.” The court
* Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.
%1 Jd,
* Gottfried v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 655 F.2d
297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. Com-
munity Television of S. Cal., 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
* The assistance in Gottfried was both indirect (‘‘congres-
sional appropriations channelled ... through . . . the Depart-
33a
expressly held, however, that Congress did not “in-
tend broadcast licenses to count as ‘financial assis-
tance’ within the meaning of section 504.” * Accord-
ingly, it declined to remand a parallel challenge to
the license renewal of seven commercial stations to
which, it concluded, section 504 did not apply.”
In so doing, this court in Gottfried reviewed the
“legislative heritage” of section 504 and of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 upon which it was modeled and
discovered “no reference to the FCC or to any other
government program involving issuance of federal
licenses.” °° Moreover, we noted that in its original
regulations issued for the guidance of all federal
agencies, HEW “never explicitly classified broadcast
licenses as financial assistance,” *’ even though not
only federal “funds” but “services of Federal person-
nel” and “real and personal property or any interest
in or use of such personal property” and other less
obviously “financial” assistance was so included.”
Finally, we observed that the Justice Department,
which had recently been designated by Executive Or-
der as the agency responsible for coordinating fed-
eral efforts to implement section 504, had specifically
held that “ ‘[t]he term “Federal financial assistance”
. . - does not include licenses, for example, since li-
ment of Commerce and the Corporation for Public Broadcast-
ing’), id. at 655 F.2d 306, and “more direct and traditional”
(restricted program grants to the particular station from par-
ticular federal agencies) , id. at 307.
* Id, at 312.
% Jd. at 301, 312.
* Id, at 312, 313.
*7 Jd. at 314 n.63.
% Id. at 314, citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(h), 85.3(e) (1979).
34a
censes are not Federal assistance grants, contracts,
loans, or cooperative agreements.’ ’”
In relying upon Gottfried to justify its rejection
of the argument that operating certificates granted
to carriers constitute “federal financial assistance”
within the meaning of section 504, therefore, the
Board was correct.’” The license-specific nature of
Gottfried’s holding and rationale, however, limits its
applicability when considering other types of federal
financial assistance.*”
2. Favorable Tax Treatment
Petitioners note that “[f]rom its inception, the
commercial aviation industry has received substan-
tial direct and indirect assistance from the federal
government,” and that “[m]ost of the major airlines”
received direct subsidies “in their early years.” ”
% Jd. at 314 n.65 (quoting Nondiscrimination Based on
Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs—Implementing
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Executive
Order 11914, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,632 (June 3, 1980) ).
10 This is not to say that broadcast or other federal licenses
cannot be of great value. It has been suggested that even
twenty years ago television broadcast licenses were worth
$1,500,000, see Levin, Economic Effects of Broadcast Licens-
ing, 72 J. Pot. Econ. 151 (1964), and it has been argued
that granting such a license is the functional equivalent of
“Government subsidization of broadcasters,” Columbia Broad-
casting Syst., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’] Committee, 412 U.S.
94, 174 n.5 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Our holding in
Gottfried was made in the face of such suggestions and argu-
ments, which are less weighty here, since airline operating
certificates are no longer exclusive.
101 See, e.g., infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text
(discussion of Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.).
12 PVA Brief at 13.
35a
Currently, they argue, such federal financial assist-
ance takes the form not only of money subsidies un-
der certain sections of the Federal Aviation Act but
also of special investment tax credits made avail-
able to “certain railroads and airlines” by the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 46(a)(8) (1976
& Supp. V 1980). Respondents, by contrast, find it
“inconceivable” that Congress “intended to place
nondiscrimination obligations on every commercial
enterprise enjoying some form of favorable tax treat-
men 9? 103
Petitioners find support for their position in Mc-
Glotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972)
(three-judge court), which held “that assistance pro-
vided through the tax system is within the scope of
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” since
[i]n the absence of strong legislative history to
the contrary, the plain purpose of the statute is
controlling. Here that purpose is clearly to elim-
inate discrimination in programs or activities
benefitting from federal financial assistance.
Distinctions as to the method of distribution of
federal funds or their equivalent seem beside the
Pe
The three-judge court in McGlotten ruled that the tax
exemption provided fraternal orders by section 501
(c)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code, “[s]ince it is
available only to particular groups . . . operates in
fact as a subsidy in favor of the particular activities
these groups are pursuing. It thus falls within the
108 Respondents’ Brief at 29.
1% McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C.
1972) (three-judge court) .
36a
coverage of the Civil Rights Act.”*” By direct and
legitimate analogy, petitioners suggest, the invest-
ment tax credit available to railroads and airlines in
particular by section 46(a)(8) constitutes sufficient
federal financial assistance to airlines so “subsi-
dized” ** to trigger coverage by section 504.
In its rulemaking proceeding the CAB failed to
address the tax subsidy argument. To this court, re-
spondents argue that McGlotten is petitioners’ “sole
authority,” that it “has had no case law progeny,”
that its discussion of Title VI and “federal financial
assistance” was merely “dictum” in a case that was
really about the state action doctrine and the equal
protection clause, and that in its recent decisions
holding that tax exemptions and tax deductibility do
indeed constitute “a form of subsidy that is admin-
istered through the tax system,” Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540,
1% Id. at 462. McGlotten noted also that the deductibility of
charitable contributions to § 501(c) (8) fraternal orders “op-
erates in effect as a Government matching grant,” id. (cita-
tions omitted) and therefore, like the exemption available
to such groups, constitutes a “grant of federal financial assist-
ance.” Jd. The court concluded that the fraternal organiza-
tions in McGlotten, which excluded nonwhites from member-
ship, were subject to Title VI.
106 McGlotten observed that “the deductions provided in the
Code are not all cut from the same cloth. Most relate primarily
to the operation of the tax itself, and thus would not consti-
tute a grant of federal financial assistance.” Jd. at 461. In
this case, however, the Code provision is highly specific, re-
lating not to the “tax itself” but to “airline property . . . used
by the taxpayer directly in connection with . . . the furnish-
ing or sale of transportation as a common carrier by air
subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board or
the Federal Aviation Administration.” 26 U.S.C. § 46(a)
(8) (E) (1976 & Supp. V 1980).
37a
544 (1983), the Supreme Court “conspicuously failed
to invoke” McGlotten.“” None of these arguments is
convincing. Both in Regan and Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Supreme
Court affirmed McGlotten’s fundamental approach.
More important, we think, is the possibility that Con-
gress did not intend, by granting a limited tax in-
centive to a particular industry or group, to thereby
encompass every such industry or group, or, for that
matter, individual within some ever-widening and
potentially almost limitless definition of “federal
financial assistance.”
It is true that the industry-specific nature of the
accelerated depreciation allowance permitted airline
property may obviate that danger in this case. But
it is also true that the exemptions and deductions at
issue in McGlotten, Bob Jones, and Regan were of a
much more fundamental nature than the modest in-
centive to capital expenditures to which petitioners
point here.** To find that the government could force
an airline to comply with a federal antidiscrimination
mandate solely because it takes advantage of section
107 Respondents’ Brief at 29 n.17. Respondents fail to note
that a crucial companion case tec Regan prominently credits
McGlotten with prompting Congress to enact a Code pro-
vision denying tax subsidies to segregated social clubs. Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, —— n.26 (1983)
(“Section 501(i) was enacted primarily in response to that
decision.’”’).
108 We note, for example, that the discussion of charitable
exemptions and deductions in Bob Jones emphasizes their
historic importance and fundamental nature, and that neither
Regan nor Bob Jones discusses any (of the multitude of)
Code provisions other than plenary exemptions and deducti-
bility of the sort applied exclusively to non-profit organiza-
tions.
38a
46(a)(8) tax credits would be to find the govern-
ment impotent to compel such compliance if any air-
line should elect to forego such credits. If Congress
did intend handicapped citizens to have access to air
transportation and to apply the nondiscrimination
principles of section 504 to all carriers, we would
violate that intent by holding that a carrier could
avoid compliance through its accountant, or that Con-
gress would be giving a green light to discrimination
if it ever chose to enhance federal revenues in this
deficit-plagued era by closing tax loopholes or sim-
plifying the Code.
3. The National Air Traffic Control System
If interpreting every de minimis tax incentive as
sufficient “federal financial assistance” to trigger the
coverage of federal antidiscrimination statutes would
be overbroad in its consequences and reach, petition-
ers’ argument that the government’s expenditure of
some two billion dollars annually to provide airlines
with a national system of air traffic control seems, by
contrast, appropriately narrow and specific.” This
program employs, on a twenty-four hour basis,
highly-trained air traffic management personnel who
monitor and control takeoffs, landings, and en route
flights of civil and military aircraft in order to as-
sure safe and expeditious air transportation. By di-
rectly financing the operation of twenty-five control
centers, more than four hundred terminal control
10 Tn 1983 and 1984 the federal government allocated $2.2
billion and $2.3 billion, respectively, for the operation, instal-
lation and maintenance of the air traffic control system. Ex-
ecutive Office of the President, Office of Management and
Budget, Appendix to the Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment, 1984 at I-Q27.
39a
facilities, and additional flight service stations, as
well as by administering its flight standards and
medical fitness programs, petitioners argue, the fed-
eral government provides financial assistance that is
“absolutely critical to the operation of the air-
lines.” 110
It cannot be seriously disputed that the safe and
efficient operation of commercial air transportation
depends in great measure (if not, as petitioners
assert, “entirely”) upon “the proper functioning of
the national air traffic control system.” ™ One can
scarcely imagine a modern airline representing to
its customers that a regularly scheduled flight will
leave at a time certain and arrive reliably at its des-
tination if this “essential service” *” provided by the
FAA did not exist. Moreover, this crucial assistance
may reasonably be considered “financial.” Defini-
tions of “federal financial assistance” issued by both
the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Department of Justice state explicitly that the
term encompasses
any grant, loan, contract, . . . or any other ar-
rangement by which the agency provides or oth-
erwise makes available assistance in the form
of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal person-
nel; or (3) Real and personal property or any
interest in or use of such property... .1
110 See PVA Brief at 14.
111 Td, at 18.
1122 United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Org., 653 F.2d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981).
18 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(e) (1983) (Department of Justice).
Most federal agencies construe “federal financial assistance”
40a
Consequently, petitioners’ argument that the federal
air traffic control system is an “arrangement” that
“provides or otherwise makes available assistance in
the form of . . . services of Federal personnel” leads
reasonably to the conclusion that the system does in-
deed constitute federal financial assistance to all com-
mercial air carriers. It follows, therefore, that any
and all carriers making use of the federal air traffic
control system should be subject to any regulations
promulgated under section 504.
Respondents attack this argument on _ several
grounds. First, they contend that “regulatory his-
tory and common sense” makes it clear that the
current “services of Federal personnel” language
really means “the loan or detail of Federal person-
nel to carry out functions which private (7.e., air-
line) employees would otherwise have to perform,
e.g., fly airplanes.” ** We are not persuaded, how-
ever, that the language of the Justice Department’s
implementing regulations should be taken to signify
anything less than the plain meaning of the words
themselves. ‘As a general matter, courts eschew nar-
row interpretations of remedial statutes. Instead,
remedial statutes are normally accorded broad con-
struction in order to effectuate their purpose.” *” As
at least as broadly. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. Part 1040.3(0) (1984)
(Department of Energy) ; 22 C.F.R. § 142.3(h) (1983) (De-
partment of State) ; 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1983) (Department of
Education); 38 C.F.R. § 18.408(h) (1983) (Veterans Ad-
ministration).
114 Respondents’ Brief at 25.
115 Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681
F.2d 1376, 1880 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1591
(1984) ; accord, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968);
Ayers v. Wolfinberger, 491 F.2d 8, 16 (5th Cir. 1974).
4la
the Senate report on the 1974 amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act explained, “section 504 was en-
acted to prevent discrimination against all h-ndi-
capped individuals . . . in relation to Federal assist-
ance in employment, housing, transportation, educa-
tion, health services, or any other Federally-aided
programs.” "* To that end, section 504 and the civil
rights statutes with which it shares a common lan-
guage and heritage must “be liberally construed in
order that their beneficent objectives may be real-
ized to the fullest extent possible.” *”
Respondents’ more substantial line of attack re-
iterates a point first articulated by the Board in
justifying its Final Rule below: “It is the position of
the FAA, with which we concur, that its air traffic
control services are not financial assistance to air-
lines. Rather, they are services provided to the pub-
lie generally to ensure flight safety.” ‘* The federal
air traffic control and safety programs, respondents
suggest to this court, must be considered
in the general category of “public goods.” They
are the goods and services from which all citi-
11¢ 5. REP. NO. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S. CopE Conc. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6388 (emphasis added) ;
see also S. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CopE Conc. & AD. NEwWs 7312, 7404.
117 United States v. El Camino Community College Dist.,
454 F. Supp. 825, 829 (C.D. Calif. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1278
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980), citing
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05
at 392 (4th ed. 1974) (‘To this end, courts favor broad and
inclusive application of statutory language by which cov-
erage of legislation to protect and implement civil rights
is defined.”) ; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88
1971).
118 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.
42a
zens and businesses benefit .... Thus, for ex-
ample, the government may assure clean air
through a variety of means, Federally financed
or operated. But the recipient of the benefit can-
not be precisely located, and no one enjoys an
exclusive benefit. The air controllers help to
assure “safe skies’; this “assists” airlines more
directly than it assists other enterprises; yet it
also assists all enterprises that use the airlines
or fly private planes in the course of their busi-
ness. It also protects those on the ground from
plane crashes. It does not, however, amount to
“Federal financial assistance.”
If, as PVA seems to assume, Congress had
wanted to cover every enterprise benefitting
from a federal program, it would have said so,
but it did not.’”
It is true that in important respects the provision
of air traffic controllers might be analogized to the
provision of highway patrolmen or traffic signs or
signal; federal funding of such programs would not
be likely to be considered the sort of “Federal finan-
cial assistance” sufficient to bring every private
trucking business or other enterprise that used the
highways within the scope of section 504. On the
other hand, respondents concede that the air control-
ler program “assists” airlines more directly and
extensively and specifically than other enterprises.
Moreover, as petitioners observe, it would be absurd
to exempt a federally-funded local transit authority
or school system from compliance with section 504
on the ground that public transportation benefits pas-
sengers as well as transit systems and, like public
19 Respondents’ Brief at 27, 28 (citations omitted).
43a
education and safe air travel, it is a “public good.” ”°
The fact is that the air traffic control system is in-
dispensable to the very existence of modern commer-
cial aviation, and that if it were not provided by the
federal program now in place, it would have to be
provided, and paid for, by the airlines themselves.™
It is at this juncture, however, that our analysis
must be informed by the Supreme Court’s resolu-
tion of a related problem in a case that has been de-
cided since we heard oral argument in this matter. In
Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984),
the Court construed the language of Title IX’s prohi-
bition against sex discrimination in any “education
program or activity” that is “receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance” in a manner that compels us to focus
less on the mode of assistance than on the “program
or activity” being assisted. In particular, although
the Court warned that nothing in Title IX justified
“making the application of the nondiscrimination
principle dependent on the manner in which a pro-
120 See PVA Reply Brief at 8-11.
121 See id. Indeed, some recent proposals to substitute a
privately owned and operated system of air traffic control
would lead, presumably, to just such a result—that is, airlines
would contract with and pay for the services of the private
program operator(s). The “assistance” provided the air-
lines in the form of the FAA’s flight standards program,
however—certifying aircraft, pilot competence, etc.—is more
purely regulatory in nature, and therefore more analogous
to the Gottfried analysis, see supra at notes 90-101 and ac-
companying text. To require a private company to acquire
a license or adhere to a federal standard, and then to call
the costs of regulation and of monitoring compliance a “bene-
fit” to the regulated company which amounts to “financial
assistance,” would constitute bootstrapping and would exceed
the boundaries of liberal statutory construction in the inter-
ests even of remedial action and civil rights.
44a
gram or activity receives federal assistance,” *” it.
emphasized as well that an agency’s authority to reg-
ulate under Title IX was limited by “the program
specific nature of the statute.” ** Thus, even if the
“economic ripple effects” of federal financial aid to
a college’s students resulted in additional funds for
the institution’s general operating budget, a plural-
ity of the Court held, per Justice White, that only
“the College’s own financial aid program . . . may
properly be regulated under Title IX.” *
The implications of the Grove City analysis for the
case before us are not completely clear. To the ex-
tent to which petitioners argue that a national air
traffic control system would have to be provided at
the airlines’ own expense if it were not provided by
the federal government (i.e., that this federal pro-
gram has “economic ripple effects” that make addi-
tional funds available for other airline operations),
the Grove City plurality would appear to be unsym-
pathetic. And if the federal air traffic control sys-
tem is the “program or activity” which is deemed to
receive “federal financial assistance,” then the pro-
gram-specific mandate of Grove City would imply
12 Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (1984).
123 Td. at 1221.
124 Jd. at 1221, 22. Otherwise, the plurality reasoned, “an
entire school would be subject to Title IX merely because one
of its students received a small BEOG [Basic Educational
Opportunity Grant] or because one of its departments re-
ceived an earmarked federal grant. This result cannot be
squared with Congress’ intent . .. [W]e have found no per-
suasive evidence suggesting that Congress intended that the
Department’s regulatory authority follow federally aided
students from classroom to classroom, building to building,
or activity to activity.” Id.
——
45a
that only that particular system—its personnel prac-
tices and physical facilities, for example—could be
regulated under section 504. If, on the other hand,
the “program or activity” at issue is deemed to be
that of commercial air transportation as engaged in
by the air carriers, and if the air traffic system is
deemed—via its personnel and facilities—to be the
“federal financial assistance” provided to that pro-
gram, then any “program specificity” problem with
petitioners’ argument is avoided.
Such a problem is not before us in the instant case,
however, because we need not reach it to hold that
the CAB erred as a matter of law in failing to apply
its section 504 regulations to all commercial air car-
riers. We base this holding upon the federal govern-
ment’s funding of airports and “airways,” upon the
necessary and inextricable integration of these facil-
ities with all commercial air carriers and, above all,
upon the clear intent of Congress in passing the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 and the effort cf appropriate
agencies to effectuate the mandate of section 504 in
the unique context of commercial air transportation.
4. Federally Assisted Airports
The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970,
49 U.S.C. § 1714, as amended, authorized the Secre-
tary of Transportation “to make grants for airport
development” in order ‘to bring about, in conform-
ity with the national airport system plan, the estab-
lishment of a nationwide system of public airports
adequate to meet the present and future needs of
civil aeronautics ....”” To this end Congress es-
tablished the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, mon-
ies from which are used to construct, acquire, lease
125 49 U.S.C. § 1714(a), as amended (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
46a
and improve facilities and equipment used in civil
aviation, currently in the amount of several billion
dollars annually.“* Grants received by airports are
not “earmarked” but are “obtained through the use
of a single project application to cover all airport
improvement projects contained in the airport’s an-
nual expenditure program.” Typical capital proj-
ects undertaken with the substantial federal finan-
cial assistance so obtained have been airport land
acquisition, runway construction, passenger termi-
nals, airport lighting, airport access and service
roads, electronic and visual approach aids, taxiway
construction, obstruction removal, and fire/rescue
equipment and buildings.* It is undisputed that this
extensive federal financial assistance to airports sub-
jects them to the nondiscrimination mandate of the
federal civil rights laws, including section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”
The critical question then becomes whether, as re-
spondents contend, the scope of section 504 “extends
to the threshold of the planes themselves, but not
126 49 U.S.C. § 1742, as amended (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
127 Between 1982 and 1984 an estimated $17 billion were
available for apportionment by the Secretary. Estimates of
actual disbursements, consistent with a statutory formula
now based, inter alia, upon the number of passengers em-
planed at a particular airport, were about one third that
amount. See PVA Brief at 17 n.14; 49 U.S.C.A. § 2206(a) (1)
(West Supp. 1984) (codifying the Airport and Airway Im-
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 671, Sept. 3,
1982).
128 National Transportation Policy Study Commission Final
Report, National Transportation Policies Through the Year
2000 (June 1979) at 187-88.
129 See, e.g., Respondents’ Brief at 29, 30 (citing the Title
VI regulations of DOT and FAA and DOT’s section 504 regu-
lation).
eee
47a
beyond.” *° Such a result is required, respondents
argue, by virtue of “longstanding administrative in-
terpretation,” Supreme Court precedent, and a case
in our own district court which “has squarely held”
that the indirect assistance provided airlines using
federally-funded airports did not trigger the cover-
age of section 504.“ We consider, and reject, each
of these arguments in turn.
First, the longstanding and, until this proceeding,
consistent interpretation of federal civil rights stat-
utes has supported the position not of respondents
but of PVA. For example, in applying its Title VI
regulations to federally assisted airports, the Depart-
ment of Transportation explicitly included
restaurants, snack bars, gift shops, ticket count-
ers, baggage handlers, car rental agencies, lim-
ousines and taxis franchised by the airport spon-
sor, insurance underwriters, and other busi-
nesses catering to the public at the airport.”
If these businesses are construed as receiving federal
financial assistance by virtue of federal aid to air-
ports, it is nonsensical to exclude the air carriers
themselves, which surely are businesses “catering to
the public at the airport.” Indeed, in its own sec-
tion 504 rulemaking, DOT explained that its regu-
lations apply, inter alia, to ticket counters, boarding
devices, baggage check-in and retrieval, and teletype-
writers, “all of which are owned and operated by the
130 Jd, at 30.
131 Jd, at 30-81.
182 49 C.F.R. Part 21, Appendix C (1984).
48a
airlines at most airports.” ** DOT’s decision in 1979
not to extend its own rules to air carriers’ in-flight
activities obviously was a result of the CAB’s asser-
tion of such authority at that time, and of DOT’s
commendable effort to avoid redundant, overlapping
regulations:
Following publication of [DOT’s] NPRM, repre-
sentatives of the DOT, FAA, HEW and the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) met to discuss the
respective legal authority and responsibilities for
improving the accessibility of air travel to hand-
icapped persons. Following this meeting, the
CAB determined that it had statutory authority
to issue regulations governing air transportation
of handicapped persons .... Action by the CAB
... would ensure the uniform provision of serv-
ices and equipment by the airlines, needed to
accomplish accessibility to air travel for handi-
capped persons... .'™
Of course, the CAB’s initial interpretation of its
rulemaking authority under section 504 was consis-
tent with this expectation. Its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking assumed that all certificated carriers
would be covered, and invited comment specifically
only as to whether small commuter carriers with
planes of fewer than thirty seats should be ex-
empted.** This initial position of the CAB was in
188 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Feder-
ally-Assisted Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefit-
ting from Federal Financial Assistance, 44 Fed. Reg. 31,442,
“ar (May 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as DOT Section 504
ules].
4 Td. at 31,451 (emphasis added).
135 See supra note 35; Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. at 32,405.
Commenting in this regard on the CAB’s proposed section
49a
fact consistent with its own “longstanding admin-
istrative interpretation” of its Title VI regulations
as covering programs “including’”—but not limited
to—those receiving direct money subsidies, and as
applying not only to “money paid” but to “other
federal financial assistance extended.” ** The Board’s
sudden reversal in this regard was contrary not only
to the interpretation of other agencies in this context,
but to its own.
A more substantial argument advanced by re-
spondents is based upon two recent Supreme Court
cases, one of which was sub judice at the time the
instant petition for review was heard. In North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982), the Court concluded “that an agency’s au-
thority under Title IX both to promulgate regula-
tions and to terminate funds is subject to the pro-
gram-specific limitation of §§ 901 and 902.” *” Thus,
respondents argue, “[w]hile an airline may utilize a
federally-funded program, i.e., airport operations, it
is not a federally funded program itself by virtue of
the airport’s receipt of aid.” ** North Haven’s em-
phasis upon “program specificity” was, as we have
504 rules, DOT urged the more inclusive coverage: “We do
not believe application of Part 382 should be limited... .
DOT believes that handicapped travelers should not be de-
prived of air transportation [on planes of less than 30 seats],
unless a carrier can show that, because of aircraft structure
restrictions, certain types of handicapped passengers cannot
be safely accommodated.” Comments of the U.S. Department
of Transportation before the Civil Aeronautics Board at 4, 5
(Sept. 13, 1979), J.A. 78, 79.
136 14 C.F.R. § 379.2 (1983).
137 456 U.S. at 538.
188 Respondents’ Brief at 32.
50a
noted, reaffirmed by the Court’s more recent decision
in Grove City College v. Bell.’ But it is also true
that in its North Haven opinion the Court expressly
did ‘‘not undertake to define ‘program’” “° and that
in Grove City the plurality emphasized not only that
the student financial aid at issue was “sui generis”
but that the intent of Congress in passing Title IX
was central to its analysis.“ In considering what we
believe must also be termed the sui generis nature
of commercial air transportation, as well as the
intent of Congress in passing the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, combined with the postenactment adminis-
trative and legislative construction of section 504, we
find that the regulations promulgated in this case
must be applied to all air carriers using federally-
funded airports in their “program or activity” of
providing commercial air transportation.
Airports and airlines are inextricably inter-
twined.*” The indissoluble nexus between them is the
189 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984).
140 456 U.S. at 540.
141104 S.Ct. at 1221, 23.
142 For example, as the Board itself has observed, at some
airports “a single airline may have its own terminal building”
and substantial parts of the airport’s physical plant may be
“carrier-owned.” In other cases “the design of most of the
facilities, perhaps even including parking facilities, may well
be under the airlines’ control [including control “over their
selection, design, construction or alteration”], even if the
property is leased from an airline authority.” Final Rule,
47 Fed. Reg. at 25,940. Especially in the case of the larger,
most widely used airports and air carriers, the structural, and
a fortiori the functional, integration of airport and air carrier
is self-evident. As has been noted, “in the airline industry,
two inputs (airline services and airport services) are required
to produce a single output (air transportation).” Note, Air-
5la
provision of commercial air transportation. Although
airports may lease space to gift shops and airlines
may publish in-flight magazines or own a chain of
resort hotels, when it comes to the “program or
activity” of providing air transportation to the trav-
eling public, the two entities are so functionally in-
tegrated that they become one. While it may be the
case, as respondents urge, that the airline as a cor-
porate entity does not become a federally-assisted
“program” by virtue of its use of federally-assisted
airports, its “program or activity” of providing com-
mercial air transportation certainly does. Thus, sec-
tion 504 may or may not reach the practices of a
hotel owned and operated by an airline company;
but it certainly must reach, in our view, the treat-
ment afforded a passenger who boards that company’s
aircraft at, deplanes to, and reaches his destination
safely and efficiently only because of, a federally-
funded airport. Just as the plurality in Grove City
distinguished the college’s financial aid program
from other programs within the institution, an air-
line’s commercial aviation program, its activity in
actually carrying passengers from one place to an-
other, may be distinguished from its other programs
or activities.
Respondents attempt to avoid this holding, finally,
by pointing to a case in our district court which
“squarely held” ** that to “hold that commercial air-
lines fall within section 504 merely because of assist-
ance provided to airports would expand improperly
the accepted proposition that section 504 is limited to
line Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J. 319
n.1 (1983). See also the Board’s initial definition of “facility”
in its Proposed Rule, supra note 27.
143 Respondents’ Brief at 30.
52a
direct recipients of Federal funds.” ’** The Board
quoted in full and explicitly relied upon this language
from Angel v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.”
We reject it on at least three grounds, and declare
Angel squarely overruled.
First, even if “airlines” on a company-wide basis
are not covered by section 504, we believe their pro-
grams and activities providing commercial air trans-
portation are, as noted above. Second, Grove City
directly undermines any notion that coverage of fed-
eral antidiscrimination statutes is in any way—
much less as an “accepted proposition”—“limited to
direct recipients of Federal funds.” As the Court
held unambiguously in Grove City:
Nothing . . . suggests that Congress elevated
form over substance by making the application
of the non-discrimination principle dependent on
the manner in which a program or activity re-
ceives federal assistance. There is no basis in the
statute for the view that only institutions that
themselves apply for federal aid or receive
checks directly from the federal government are
subject to regulation.’
Third, Angel depends for its holding upon an un-
justifiably broad reading of Gottfried v. FCC, a case
which, as we have discussed in some detail, is license-
specific in its holding and rationale, and which in the
consideration of federal financial assistance to air-
4 Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 519 F. Supp.
1173, 1178 (D.D.C. 1981).
145 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.
46 104 S.Ct. at 1217.
53a
ports and air transportation is thoroughly inappo-
site.'*’
5. Additional Considerations: The Special Ad-
ministrative and Legislative Context
Our holding today that section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 applies to all commercial air car-
riers and that the CAB erred in restricting the ap-
plication of its section 504 regulations to those few
small carriers receiving direct money subsidies is
buttressed by several unique features of this case.
These include the particular concern evidenced by
Congress for the right of handicapped persons to
travel and to have the greatest possible access to
employment opportunitie
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