Record and brief — Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America

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AT THE TIME OF FILMING. sa

BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE

WILL BE ISSUED.

IF AND WHEN A

Oe 85-289-CFX Title: United States Department cf Transportations et al.,s

tatus: GRANTED Petitioners

' Ve

Paralyzed Veterans of Americas et al.

ocketed:

ugust 20 1985 Court: United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit

Counsel for petitioner: Solicitor General

Counsel tor responcent: ParkersDouglas Les Davison-Calvin

ntry Date Note

Proceedings and Orders

1 Jul 11 1985 Application tor extension of time to file petition arc

orcer granting same until August 26 1985 (Whites July

137 1965).

; 2 Aug 20 1985 G Petition for writ of certiorari filed.

6 Seo 11 1985 urcer extending time to file response to petition until

September <c6s 1985.

5 Sep 26 1985 Briet of respondents Paralyzed Veterans of America, et al.

In opposition tiled.

6 Sep 26 1985 Locging received.

7 Oct 2 1985 DISTRIBUTEV. October 18, 1985

8 Oct 3 1985 X Reply triet of petitioners U.S. DOTs et al. filed.

9 Oct 21 1985 retition GrANTcD.

REE EERE ERE EREEERERRREERESE

10 Nov 1 1985 G potion of the solicitor General to dispense with

printing tne joint appendix filec.

motion of the solicitor General to dispense with

printing tne joint apoendix GRANTED.

Urocer extending time to file brief of petitioner on the

merits untrl December 19, 1985.

14 Dec 19 1985 Sriet amicus curiae of Equal Employment Acvisory Counsel

11 Nov 18 1985

13 Nov 25 1985

tilec.

15 Dec 19 1985 Brier amicus curiae of International Air Transport Assn.

tiled.

16 Dec 19 1985 Brier of petitioners U.S. DOT» et al. filed.

17 Dec 19 1985 Briet amicus curiae of Air Transport Assn. of America filec.

18 Jan 13 1986 kecord filed.

19 Jan 18 1986 Briet of respondent Paralyzed Veterans of America, et al.

tilec.

20 Jan 18 1986 Briet amicus curiae of National Federation of the Blind

tiled.

21 Feb 4 1986 SET FOR ARGUMENTs Wednesdays March 267 1986. (2nc case)

22 Fed 4 1986 CIRCULATED.

23 Mar 19 1986 X Reply briet of petitioners U.S. DOTr et al. tiled.

24 Mar 26 1986 ARGUED.

14

PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

~ CERTIORARI

oupreme VUOUTL, U.o-

85-289 a FILED

AUG 20 1985

No.

1 =

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

VU.

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ET AL.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

CHARLES FRIED

Acting Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS

Assistant Attorney General

CHARLES J. COOPER

MARK R. DISLER

Deputy Assistant Attorneys General

KATHRYN A. OBERLY

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER

MIRIAM R. EISENSTEIN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether federal financial assistance to airport

operators renders Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, applicable to the on-board

activities of airlines using federally-assisted airports.

2. Whether the federally-operated air traffic con-

trol system constitutes a form of federal financial as-

sistance to airlines.

(I)

II

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

In addition to the United States Department of

Transportation, the respondents in the court of ap-

peals included the Civil Aeronautics Board and the

Federal Aviation Administration. The CAB ceased

operations on December 31, 1984, pursuant to the

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-

504, 92 Stat. 1705 et seqg., and the Civil Aeronautics

Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98

Stat. 1703 et seq. See note 1, infra. The Department

of Transportation assumed the CAB’s functions under

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and it is the petitioner

in this Court, along with its constituent agency, the

Federal Aviation Administration.

In addition to Paralyzed Veterans of America, the

petitioners in the court of appeals included the Amer-

ican Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, Inc. and

the American Council of the Blind. All three organi-

zations are respondents in this Court.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .........................0..-c--cce-eeesecesecerecsennsecnsenssenes 1

ip pesnenenooanesannces 1

Statute and regulations involved .......................-.-----------+ 2

a _..___.cessnsnneounnenpanonnaesces 2

A. The history of the CAB’s regulations ................... 4

B. The court of appeals’ decision ............................---- 14

Reasons for granting the petition .................................... 18

io ceeernnnenOnNDSUROOSDONS 30

I i cicincsiviocetschithiniteneniesnenemerengnonsuscesovervotenseecceneeneses la

ic ainceaninetnenmapatnerescevenemscsecoceneocers 77a

ar nesigesaneonernemanosnesennnneoreeeerenecerns 78a

a eeesnaeteptbaetenneetnnneesccenececcoosees 84a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. CAB, 667 F.2d 181 -........... 4

Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597,

a 19-20

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, No. 82-1005 (June

EEE EEE ee 24

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, No. 82-862

tail nciaarninsennctonccereineanees 11, 18, 21, 27

Fitzgerald vy. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,

EE EEE ES Se 9

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555... 24

Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 ...................-..----....... 15

Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792 (Feb. 28,

IE Ee 5-6, 16, 18, 27, 28, 29

Jacobson V. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202..18, 24, 25,

26, 27

North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 .... 11, 18,

21, 27

United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp.

i cuesngunsananecesasos 9

IV

Statutes and regulations: Page

Act of Oct. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-276, § 130, 96

| RITE ETE apes eran es Sen SOE eS 5

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-

ee ee —cassemmesemtaidaguaindsaaues 3

aaa 5

I eicainheudions 5

§ 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744 (to be codified at 49

Co ones 12

Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub.

L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 et seq. _....022...e cee... 4

Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982,

Pub. L. No. 97-248, Tit. V, 96 Stat. 671 et seq. (to

be codified at 49 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.) 0.00... 4, 20

Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub.

L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 et seq. ...20000.002 eee. 3

a ts TIE sccnicccicennieninsnpnsneninanssissinsastiineasnies 3

I ne 4

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d.... 5,19

Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L.

No. 89-670, § 3(e) (1), 80 Stat. 982 00. 4

Department of Transportation and Related Agen-

cies Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-

369, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 1778-1779 ............................ 5

Education Amendments of 1972, Tit. IX, 20 U.S.C.

Fe TET aT we RE Soe 11, 19, 21

Federal Airport Act, ch. 251, 60 Stat. 170 et seq..... 4

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.

BS ee I ciate berermitcrtaiccnncs,. 4

§ 404, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1374...... 11, 12

§ 404(a), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V)

EEE Ie La OE OG eee 12, 13, 14

§ 404(a) (1), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)

RE ee ne ener era 12

§ 404(b), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1374(b) _........ 9, 12, 25,

29, 30

§ 406, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1376....3, 5, 14

§ 406(b), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)

SPITE .ixcisittirnssenieiiaiashinielenaniniteiaiiadansbetaaell 3, 4, 5

Vv

Statutes ar regulations—Continued: Page

§ 406(c), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)

RE, IEE a es 5

§ 419, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V) 1389 .......... 3,14

§ 419(a) (4), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)

I i ae 3,4

§ 419(b) (5), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V)

I a nel 3, 4,14

§ 1006, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1486 —..000000.. 2-3

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. 794....passim

RRR CrereR eomnee Orne Wer AROnT RFE RAE 19

nN 4

Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117-118 (1977)... 13

Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981) ........... 13

14C.F.R.:

Pt. 15:

Section 15.5(c) (1965) ............................... 7

Section 15.28(8) (1966) .............................. 23

Pt. 379:

i 7

ao 6

ES ET ne ec 7

Section 879.8(b) (1965) .................................. 6

I 7

eae 7

Section $379.12 (1965) .................................. 6

Rg LTS Se CA ee 2,13

REITER es er ne rn 14

TEESE aa See MO ea 14

SEE A A See easel 14

Ee een OR a 24

49 C.F.R.:

Pt. 21:

BS a ee 23

FG, | ARR ae nese een 8

App. C (a) (1) (iii) (1971) —2000 9

VI

Statutes and regulations—Continued : Page

App. C(a) (1) (vi) (1971) ......................---. 9

App. C(a) (1) (vii) (1971) ~....................... 9

(la MATIN ch et AA Bieter 28

29 Fed. Reg. (1964)

AE a ew oT ee oe en 7

I ai lta iilaae aabaltindiaiadaianbi 23

Ee ne On Re nC 6

p. 192889 .............. i a aa aa tid 6

35 Fed. Reg. (1970) :

III si cstnncsidciitencgnecngindensiphudpnathdeniibonededionds 7

FNS a eee ea ae a ane eee 8

43 Fed. Reg. (1978)

ES ee eT 23

inertia siaclciatahintenbdiiisnets 23

44 Fed. Reg. (1979):

I i nisnuss tetcccsiniecatinadiitesncntsiantiiliieiataellinnes 28

Ee nae 11

ao etnanioioaneanil 10

St ns 11

EEE Ce OE TO CL 10

NEE A A A a 7

47 Fed. Reg. (1982) :

Pe Fe I on enccccnnevenccccecenccseeneresensennseseoneneresren 2

I 105-0 cicnrnnsrenancsinienseesinnidininiiamniiiiuns 2

ec a ee 13

SR A Ae AR ON 13

SEE Ec ee ee Se. Aa 14

EE NS a SO Fc a 13-14

ITI sensi cirectsninpiinsiiicninnateniaiceitaichienitinabianns 2

Miscellaneous:

110 Cong. Rec. 18880 (1964) ...................................... 22

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

ET AL., PETITYONERS

Vv.

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ET AL.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

The Acting Solicitor General, on behalf of the

United States Department of Transportation and the

Federal Aviation Administration, petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra,

la-76a) is reported at 752 F.2d 694. The opinion dis-

senting from the denial of rehearing en banc (App.,

infra, 80a-83a) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on January 18, 1985. A petition for rehearing was

denied on April 26, 1985 (App., infra, 77a). On

(1)

2

July 13, 1985, Justice White extended the time for

filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and in-

cluding August 26, 1985. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

29 U.S.C. 794, provides in pertinent part as follows:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual

in the United States, as defined in section 706

(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason o- his

handicap, be excluded from the participation in,

be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-

crimination under any program or activity re-

ceiving Federal financial assistance or under

any program or activity conducted by any Exec-

utive agency or by the United States Postal Ser-

vice.

2. Regulations promulgated by the Civil Aero-

nautics Board to implement Section 504 of the Re-

habilitation Act of 1973 were published at 47 Fed.

Reg. 25936 et seg. (1982), as amended by 47 Fed.

Reg. 51857 et seg. (1982), and codified at 14 C.F.R.

Pt. 382. Because the issues in this case are limited

to the question of the proper jurisdictional reach of

the regulations and do not involve the details of the

regulations themselves, only the preamble to the reg-

ulations (47 Fed. Reg. 25936-25939 (1982) ), setting

forth the Board’s legal rationale for the scope of the

regulations, is reproduced in the appendix to this pe-

tition (App., infra, 84a-95a).

STATEMENT

Respondents, the Paralyzed Veterans of America

and two other organizations representing handicapped

individuals brought this action under Section 1006 of

3

the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1486,

seeking review of regulations issued by the Civil Aero-

nautics Board to implement Section 504 of the Re

habilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. Section 504

prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in

“any program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance.” In its final rulemaking, the Board de-

termined, with the approval of the Department of

Justice, that only those airlines receiving a subsidy

from the Board under Section 406(b) or Section

419(a)(4) and (b)(5) of the Federal Aviation

Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V) 1376(b) and

1389(a)(4) and (b)(5), were federally assisted

within the meaning of Section 504.

The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the

commercial aviation activities of all certificated air-

lines constitute federally assisted programs or ac-

tivities because the airlines have the use of federally

assisted airports. In addition, the court of appeals

was of the view that the federally-operated air traffic

control system constitutes federal financial assistance

- to the commercial aviation activities of all airlines.

Accordingly, the court vacated the Board’s regula-

tions insofar as they were limited in their application

to carriers receiving subsidies under Section 406 or

419 of the Federal Aviation Act and instructed the

CAB’s successor agency, the Department of Trans-

portation, to promulgate new regulations applicable

to all commercial airlines.’

The CAB ceased operations on December 31, 1984. See

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat.

1705 et seg.; Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984,

Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 et seq. Section 3(e) of the

Sunset Act (98 Stat. 1704) devolved all remaining authority of

the CAB on the Department of Transportation, unless other-

4

A. The History Of The CAB’s Regulations

1. Prior to the “sunset” of the CAB, federal regu-

lation of aviation was divided between the CAB and

the Federal Aviation Administration? The FAA

was and is responsible for operating the air traffic

control system and ensuring the safety of airline

operations. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. CAB, 667

F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In addition, the FAA

has, since 1946, granted federal financial assistance

to airport operators (typically, municipalities or

other units of local government) for the construction

and improvement of terminals, runways, and airport

safety equipment.*

The CAB, on the other hand, was responsible for

the economic regulation of the airline industry. In

that capacity, the Board regulated airline routes,

fares, and service under the authority of the Federal

Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1301

et seq. Of particular relevance to this case was the

Board’s administration of subsidies to a few airlines

pursuant to Sections 406(b) and 419(a) (4) and (b)

(5) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976

ed. Supp. V) 1376(b) and 1389(a) (4) and (b) (5).

wise provided. Section 12(a) of the Sunset Act (98 Stat. 1710)

preserved all CAB rules and regulations in effect at the time

of transfer.

2 The FAA became a component of the Department of Trans-

portation by virtue of Section 3(e) (1) of the Department of

Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 932,

recodified at 49 U.S.C. 106.

3 See the Federal Airport Act, ch. 251, 60 Stat. 170 et seq.;

the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L.

No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 et seq.; and the Airport and Airway

Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, Tit. V, 96

Stat. 671 et seg. (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.).

a a a eee

5

Until 1978, Section 406 was the Board’s only subsidy

program. Designed to guarantee air service neces-

sary to transport the mail to small communities, the

original statutory scheme provided that the Post-

master General was to pay the airlines for the basic

cost of transporting mail, while the Board was to

pay the airlines additional amounts as subsidies if

necessary to ensure the carriage of mail. See Section

406(b) and (c), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V) 1376

(b) and (c). The Section 406 program was sharply

curtailed in 1978, and it was terminated entirely at

the end of fiscal year 1982. See Airline Deregulation

Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 24, 92 Stat. 1725;

Act of Oct. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-276, § 130, 96

Stat. 1196-1197; Department of Transportation and

Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L.

No. 97-369, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 1778-1779.

Also in 1978, the CAB began operating the “Sec-

tion 419 prezram,” in order to subsidize “small com-

munity” and other essential air service that would

not otherwise be provided. See Airline Deregulation

Act of 1978, Pub. L. No, 95-504, § 33, 92 Stat. 1732.

This program, which is to operate through 1988, is

unrelated to the provision of mail service under Sec-

tion 406.

2. In 1964, Congress passed Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, prohibiting

discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national

origin in federally assisted programs and activities.*

* Title VI is widely recognized as the congressional model

for subsequently-enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination

in federally assisted programs or activities, and case law

interpreting Title VI is generally applicable to issues arising

under the later-enacted statutes, including the Rehabilitation

Act. See Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792 (Feb. 28,

6

Both aviation agencies, the CAB and the FAA, pub-

lished regulations implementing Title VI on Decem-

ber 31, 1964. The only federally-assisted grant pro-

gram administered by the Board at that time was

the Section 406 mail subsidy program, and the

Board’s initial Title VI regulations, while leaving

open the possibility of Title VI coverage for unspeci-

fied, future programs, expressly applied only to the

activities of airlines receiving payments under the

Section 406 program (14 C.F.R. 379.2 (1965), 29

Fed. Reg. 19287 (1964) ):

This part applies to any program for which

Federal financial assistance is authorized under

a law administered by the Board, including the

payment of compensation by the Board under

section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958

(49 U.S.C. 13769."

After 1978, the Board modified its Title VI regula-

tions to include its only other subsidy program, the

1984), slip op. 10; App., infra, 29a-30a & nn. 86-88. Accord-

ingly, regulations issued by the FAA and the CAB to imple-

ment Title VI form the critical backdrop for consideration of

the Board’s Section 504 regulations at issue in this case.

5 See also 14 C.F.R. 379.3(b) (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19287

(1964) :

Specific discriminatory actions prohibited. No air car-

rier shall subject any person to discrimination on the

ground of race, color, or national origin in connection

with any air transportation for which such carrier is

receiving or has claimed compensation payable by the

Board under section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of

1958.

Similarly, the only definition the Board specified for the term

“Federal financial assistance” was “grants of Federal funds

under section 406 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.” 14

C.F.R. 379.12 (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19289 (1964).

ne ee See ee er ee | ee

a ar nt st

T

newly-enacted Section 419 program. 14 C.F.R. 379.2,

379.3, 379.4, and 379.12, 44 Fed. Reg. 42175-42176

(1979).

Meanwhile, the FAA, based on its administration

of grants to airport operators, proscribed discrim-

inatory treatment by airport operators and by lessees

of airport operators who furnished services at the

airport; the illustrative examples given in the FAA’s

Title VI regulations make it clear that its regulatory

authority extended to the threshold of the planes but

no farther.’ After the FAA became a part of the

Department of Transportation (see note 2, supra),

its Title VI regulations were subsumed within DOT’s

own Title VI regulations (35 Fed. Reg. 10080 et seq.

(1970) ). DOT’s regulations contained equivalent il-

lustrative examples that, if anything, made it even

clearer that the regulatory jurisdiction conferred by

virtue of federal financial assistance to airport oper-

*The FAA’s original Title VI regulations provided (14

C.F.R. 15.5(c) (1965), 29 Fed. Reg. 19283 (1964)):

Examples. The following examples illustrate the ap-

plication of the non-discrimination provisions of Title VI

of the Civil Rights Act and this part:

(1) The operator of an airport who is the recipient of

Federal financial assistance must give assurance that an

entrepreneur who rents space at the airport and there

operates a restaurant will not in any manner discriminate

between patrons for reasons of race, color, or national

origin.

(2) The operator of an airport who is the recipient of

Federal financial assistance is bound by the conditions and

covenants in the conveyance that prohibit, among other

thinys, discrimination for reason of color, race, or na-

tional origin in admission of the public to waiting rooms,

sightseeing areas, sanitary facilities, and any other facili-

ties under the control of the airport operator himself.

8

ators extended to services provided at the airport,

but not to the interior of aircraft.’ Indeed, DOT’s

7 Appendix C to DOT’s Title VI regulations gave the follow-

ing pertinent examples of FAA programs subject to regulation

(49 C.F.R. Pt. 21, App. C(a) (1) (1971), 35 Fed. Reg. 10085

(1970) ):

Federal Aviation Administration. (i) The airport spon-

sor or any of his lessees, concessionaires, or contractors

may not differentiate between members of the public be-

cause of race, color, or national origin in furnishing, or

admitting to, waiting rooms, passenger holding areas,

aircraft tiedown areas, restaurant facilities, restrooms,

or facilities operated under the compatible land use con-

cept.

(ii) The airport sponsor and any of his lessees, con-

cessionaires, or contractors must offer to all members of

the public the same degree and type of service without

regard to race, color, or national origin. This rule applies

to fixed base operators, restaurants, snack bars, gift shops,

ticket counters, baggage handlers, car rental agencies,

limousines, and taxis franchised by the airport sponsor,

insurance underwriters, and other businesses catering to

the public at the airport.

(iii) An aircraft operator may not be required to park

his aircraft at a location that is less protected, or less

accessible from the terminal facilities, than locations of-

fered to others, because of his race, color, or national

origin.

(iv) The pilot of an aircraft may not be required to

help more extensively in fueling operations, and may not

be offered less incidental service (such as windshield

wiping), than other pilots, because of his race, color, or

national origin.

(v) No pilot or crewmember eligible for access to a

pilot’s lounge or to unofficial communication facilities

such as a UNICOM frequency may be restricted in that

access because of his race, color, or national origin.

(vi) Access to facilities maintained at the airport by

air carriers or commercial operators for holders of first-

9

regulations prohibited airport administrators from

discriminating against aircraft operators because of

the race of the pilot (49 C.F.R. Pt. 21, App. C(a)

(1) (iii) (1971), set forth at note 7, supra). Sig-

nificantly, however, the exhaustive list of examples

made no mention of passengers in airplanes; the

only provisions for passengers related to the use of

facilities at the airport and the use of grownd trans-

portation to leave the airport. 49 C.F.R. Pt. 21, App.

C(a)(1)(vi) and (vii) (1971), set forth at note 7,

supra).

In sum, the regulatory agencies recognized from

the very outset that Title VI did not reach the on-

board activities of commercial airlines, except for

those few airlines that received subsidies from the

CAB.°

class transportation tickets or frequent users of the car-

rier’s or operator’s services may not be restricted on the

basis of race, color, or national origin.

(vii) Passengers and crewmembers seeking ground

transportation from the airport may not be assigned to

different vehicles, or delayed or embarrassed in assign-

ment to vehicles, by the airport sponsor or his lessees,

eencessionaires, or contractors, because of race, color, or

national origin.

§ Although Title VI was never construed to reach the on-

board activities of nonsubsidized air carriers, courts had early

interpreted the general “antidiscrimination” clause of Section

404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.)

1374(b), to prohibit racial discrimination by all air carriers.

See Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229

F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) ; United States v. City of Montgomery,

201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962). As described at pages

12-13, infra, however, Section 404(b) “lapsed” as part of the

phase-out of the CAB.

10

8. Using their Title VI regulations as a model,

DOT and the Board divided regulatory jurisdiction

under Section 504 in the same fashion, with DOT tak-

ing responsibility for regulations covering activities

at airports and the Board ultimately assuming re-

sponsibility only for the on-board activities of subsi-

dized carriers. Initially, however, both agencies ex-

pected the CAB to be able to promulgate regulations

governing the on-board activities of all certificated air-

lines, using authority derived from the Federal Avia-

tion Act to supplement its more limited authority un-

der Section 504. Thus, on June 6, 1979, the CAB

published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in which

it announced its intention to promulgate regulations

“to prohibit unlawful discrimination against disabled

travelers and to implement section 504 of the Re-

habilitation Act of 1973.” 44 Fed. Reg. 32401 (em-

phasis added). The Board’s notice made clear its

position that its jurisdiction under Section 504 was

limited to those few carriers to which the Board ex-

tended federal subsidies. 44 Fed. Reg. 32402 (1979).°

® That this was the Board’s view is demonstrated by its

explanation for deciding not to regulate employment practices

of the airlines (44 Fed. Reg. 32402 (1979) (emphasis added) ) :

In accordance with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,

the Board will be phasing out its operations over the next

6 years. * * * Under the circumstances, it would be very

difficult to develop a new program in an area where we

have little experience or background, and then to allocate

and train staff to implement it. This use of resources

would be particularly unwise because the benefits that

would flow from Board regulation of employment would

be small. The Board extends direct Federal subsidies only

to a small number of air carriers, so that the reach of our

section 504 jurisdiction would not have a significant effect

11

For that reason, the Board proposed to prohibit all

carriers from discriminating against handicapped air

travellers not in reliance on Section 504, but instead

based on its authority under Section 404 of the Fed-

eral Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V)

1374. As the Board explained (44 Fed. Reg. 32401-

32402 (1979) (emphasis added) ):

[The proposed rules] would implement section

504 * * *, which prohibits discrimination against

the handicapped in any program or activity re-

ceiving Federal financial assistance. In addition,

the proposed rules would emphasize that the

on industry employment. While we can prevent discrimi-

nation in air transportation under section 404 of the Fed-

eral Aviation Act without clear section 504 jurisdiction,

the same is not true of employment. The Board would

have no authority to regulate employment practices of

unsubsidized carriers unless those practices somehow

caused discrimination in transportation.

Of course, the Board’s statement was issued prior to this

Court’s decisions in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.

512 (1982), and -onsolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, No. 82-

862 (Feb. 28, 1984). But those decisions, holding that Title IX

of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.,

and Section 504 encompass employment discrimination, are not

pertinent to the issue here, which is whether nonsubsidized

carriers receive “Federal financial assistance” that would

render their “program or activity” of transporting passengers

from one place to another subject to Section 504 at all.

Contrary to the view of the court of appeals (see App., infra,

48a), it is also clear that DOT understood the Board’s position

with respect to its Section 504 jurisdiction. In the preamble

to DOT’s final Section 504 regulations, the Department noted

that “the CAB determined that it had statutory authority to

issue regulations governing air transportation of handicapped

persons, both under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and

under sections 404 and 411 of the Federal Aviation Act.”

44 Fed. Reg. 31451 (1979) (emphasis added).

12

handicapped are protected by the adequacy of

service and antidiscrimination provisions of sec-

tion 404 of the Federal Aviation Act * * *, which

are applicable to all air carriers, whether or not

receiving Federal financial assistance.

Section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.

(1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1374, as it existed at the

time of the Board’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,

contained two provisions relevant to this case. Sec-

tion 404(a) (1), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed. Supp. V) 13874

(a) (1), contained a “safe and adequate service” re-

quirement, obligating all air carriers to “provide safe

and adequate service, equipment, and facilities in

connection with [interstate and overseas air] trans-

portation.” Section 404(b), 49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.)

1374(b), contained a general “antidiscrimination”

clause, prohibiting any carrier from “subject[ing]

any particular person, port, locality, or description of

traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimina-

tion or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-

advantage in any respect whatsoever.”

As set forth above, the Board was of the view that

the “safe and adequate service” and “antidiscrimina-

tion” provisions of Section 404, taken together, gave

the Board sufficient authority to require all carriers

to comply with regulations prohibiting discrimination

against handicapped air travellers, whether or not a

particular carrier was receiving federal financial as-

sistance. Pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act

of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744

(to be codified at 49 U.S.C. 1551(a) (2) (B)), how-

ever, the “antidiscrimination” clause of Section 404(b)

lapsed as of January 1, 1983; only the “safe and

adequate service” requirement of Section 404(a), 49

U.S.C. (1976 ed. & Supp. V) 1374(a), remains in

effect.

13

This contraction of the Board’s statutory authority

required it to reevaluate its jurisdiction to impose the

proposed regulations on all carriers. After studying

the numerous comments received and consulting with

the Department of Justice,”° the Board concluded that

the “safe and adequate service” clause of Section

404(a) might support a general prohibition against

discrimination on the basis of handicap applicable to

all carriers, but that it was too slender a reed to

justify the imposition of more specific regulations ap-

plicable to the on-board activities of nonsubsidized

carriers. 47 Fed. Reg. 25937-25938 (1982) (App.,

infra, 85a-91a). In reaching this conclusion, the

Board carefully considered, but ultimately rejected,

the contention that all certificated carriers receive

federal financial assistance within the meaning of

Section 504 by virtue of their use of the federally-

operated air traffic control system and federally-

assisted airports. 47 Fed. Reg. 25937 (1982) (App.,

infra, 88a). Accordingly, the Board concluded that

the on-board activities of only those airlines receiving

subsidies from the Board could be regulated under

Section 504. 47 Fed. Reg. 25937-25938 (1982) (App.,

infra, 85a-91a).

The final regulations promulgated by the Board

(14 C.F.R. Pt. 382, 47 Fed. Reg. 25948 et seq.

1° Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298

(1981), the Attorney General was directed to coordinate the

implementation and enforcement by Executive agencies of the

nondiscrimination provisions contained in a number of civil

rights statutes, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act. Previously, this coordinating function had been exercised

by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (see Execu-

tive Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117-118 (1977)) and, later,

by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

14

(1982) ) contain three subparts. Subpart A is a gen-

eral prohibition against discrimination in air trans-

portation against qualified handicapped persons. Sub-

part B of the Board’s final rules sets forth specific

requirements to be followed by each regulated carrier

in providing air transport service to the handi-

capped.’ Subpart C establishes compliance and en-

forcement mechanisms. By virtue of the “safe and

adequate service” provision of Section 404(a) of the

Federal Aviation Act, the Subpart A prohibition ap-

plies to all certificated carriers, whether or not they

receive federal financial assistance. In recognition of

the limited jurisdictional reach of Section 504, how-

ever, Subparts B and C of the final regulations apply

only to those carriers receiving federal subsidies un-

der Section 406 or 419 of the Federal Aviation Act.”

The Attorney General approved the CAB’s final regu-

lations (see note 10, supra).

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision

After setting forth the history of the rulemaking,

the court of appeals turned to respondents’ contention

that all commercial airlines are subject to Section

504. The court first rejected respondents’ arguments

that operating certificates and preferential tax treat-

ment for airlines constitute “Federal financial as-

11 Subpart B deals with such matters as the availability of

information for deaf persons, guide dogs, wheelchairs, special

lifts to help handicapped passengers board and deplane, and

the carrying of medically-needed oxygen on board the aircraft.

22 The Board did, however, urge nonsubsidized carriers to

look to Subpart B of the Section 504 regulations for guidance

in complying with the general antidiscrimination provision of

Subpart A applicable by virtue of Section 404(a) alone. 47

Fed. Reg. 25938 (1982) (App., infra, 90a-9la).

15

sistance” to airlines within the meaning of Section

504.° The court next considered respondents’ con-

tention that the federally-operated air traffic control

system constitutes federal financial assistance to air-

lines and concluded that it does (App., infra, 39a-

40a, 48a (footnotes omitted) ) :

It cannot be seriously disputed that the safe

and efficient operation of commercial] air trans-

portation depends in great measure (if not, as

[respondents] assert, “entirely”) upon “the

proper functioning of the national air traffic

control system.” * * * Moreover, this crucial

assistance may reasonably be considered “finan-

cial.” * * * Consequently, [respondents’] argu-

ment that the federal air traffic control system

is an “arrangement” that “provides or other-

wise makes available assistance in the form of

. . . Services of Federal personnel’ leads reason-

ably to the conclusion that the system does in-

deed constitute federal financial assistance to

all commercial air carriers. It follows, therefore,

that any and all carriers making use of the fed-

18 With respect to operating certificates, the court endorsed

the CAB’s reliance (App., infra, 88a) on Gottfried v. FCC, 655

F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in which the court had held that

broadcast licenses issued by the FCC do not constitute federal

financial assistance for purposes of Section 504 (App., infra,

34a). With respect to tax credits, the court of appeals doubted

that “Congress * * * intend[ed], by granting a limited tax

incentive to a particular industry or group, to thereby encom-

pass every such individual or group, or, for that matter, indi-

vidual within some ever-widening and potentially almost limit-

less definition of ‘federal financial assistance.’” Jd. at 37a.

The court also noted the anomaly that would result from

allowing the airlines themselves to determine whether they

wished to comply with Section 504 simply by deciding whether

or not to take advantage of tax credits (App., infra, 37a-38a).

16

eral air traffic control system should be subject

to any regulations promulgated under section

504.

* * * * *

The fact is that the air traffic control system is

indispensable to the very existence of modern

commercial aviation, and that if it were not pro-

vided by the federal program now in place, it

would have to be provided, and paid for, by the

airlines themselves.

Despite the court’s conclusion that the air traffic

control system constitutes federal financial assistance

to all commercial airlines, the court declined to in-

validate the Board’s rules on that basis, apparently

because it found itself unable to define the “program

or activity” that is federally assisted by the air

traffic control system. Taking note of this Court’s

decision in Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792

(Feb. 28, 1984), the court observed that if the assisted

“program or activity” were deemed to be the federal

air traffic control system, then “only that particular

system—its personnel practices and physical facili-

ties, for example—could be regulated under section

504” (App., infra, 45a). On the other hand, the court

reasoned that, if the assisted “program or activity”

were deemed to be that of “commercial air trans-

portation as engaged in by- the ai carriers,” then

Grove City’s program-specific mandate would not be

violated by applying Section 504 to the on-board ac-

tivities of all commercial airlines (App., infra, 45a).

The court then concluded that it need not resolve

the “program or activity” question in the context of

the air traffic control system. Instead, the court rea-

soned that the CAB “erred as a matter of law in fail-

ing to apply its section 504 regulations to all com-

17

mercial air carriers” because of the federal govern-

ment’s funding of airports and airways used by those

carriers. App., infra, 45a. The court stated (id. at

50a-51a (footnotes omitted) ) :

Airports and airlines are inextricably inter-

twined. The indissoluble nexus between them is

the provision of commercial air transportation.

Although airports may lease space to gift shops

and airlines may publish in-flight magazines or

own a chain of resort hotels, when it comes to

the “program or activity” of providing air

transportation to the traveling public, the two

entities are so functionally integrated that they

become one. While it may be the case * * * that

the airline as a corporate entity does not become

a federally-assisted “program’’ by virtue of its

use of federally-assisted airports, its “program

or activity” of providing commercial air trans-

portation certainly does.

Accordingly, the court vacated the CAB’s regula-

tions insofar as they failed te apply to all commercial

airlines and remanded the regulations to the Depart-

ment of Transportation (the CAB’s successor) for re-

promulgation in accordance with its opinion.”

The government’s petition for rehearing and sug-

gestion that rehearing be en banc were denied. Judges

Bork, Scalia, and Starr dissented from the denial] of

rehearing en banc. In an opinion written by Judge

Bork, the dissenters expressed the view that the panel’s

14 Respondents also challenged two specific aspects of the

Board’s final regulations—the Board’s definition of “qualified

handicapped person” and a requirement that handicapped

persons who require “extensive special assistance” notify the

airlines 48 hours in advance of flight. These challenges

were resolved in the Board’s favor (App., infra, 62a-72a), and

they are not pertinent to the issues before this Court.

18

decision could not be squared with this Court’s de-

cisions in Grove City and North Haven Bd. of Educ.

v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (App., infra, 82a-83a

(footnote omitted) ) :

Under Grove City, the airlines here are clearly

not “recipients” of federal funds. The airports

are, and the ground activities of the airlines in-

tegral to the operation of the airport may be,

subject to section 504. However, the non-airport

activities of the airlines, such as in-flight pro-

cedures, are outside the scope of that section.

The panel’s attempts to distinguish this case

from Grove City are wholly unpersuasive. It

would unduly extend this dissent, however, to

deal with those contentions in detail. The Su-

preme Court has been over this ground, and we

ought to accept, rather than evade, its conclu-

sion.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The court of appeals’ decision that all commercial

airlines, by virtue of their use of federally assisted

airports, are thereby subject to regulation under Sec-

tion 504 in their “program or activity” of “providing

commercial air transportation” completely ignores the

distinction between a “recipient” operating a fed-

erally assisted “program or activity” and a “bene-

ficiary” of that assistance; disregards the “program

specific” limitation on Section 504’s coverage required

by this Court’s decisions in Grove City College v.

Bell, No. 82-792 (Feb. 28, 1984); Consolidated Rail

Corp. v. Darrone, No. 82-862 (Feb. 28, 1984), slip

op. 11-12; and North Haven Bd. of Educ. vy. Bell, 456

U.S. 512, 540 (1982); and conflicts with the decision

of the Ninth Circuit in Jacobson v. Delta Airlines,

Inc., 742 F.2d 1202 (1984). Maintenance of the dis-

tinction between a “recipient” operating a federally

19

assisted “program or activity” and a “beneficiary” of

that assistance, as well as the “program specific”

mandate contained in the language of Section 504, is

essential if Congress’s expressed intent to impose

some limits on the reach of the statute is to be re-

spected. The court of appeals’ decision, which dis-

torts longstanding administrative interpretations of

the key concepts at issue, requires the regulation of

activities that the administering agencies have con-

sistently regarded as beyond the purview of Section

504. Moreover, the recipient/beneficiary dichotomy

and the program-specific limitation at issue in this

case apply not only to Section 504, but also to Title

VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d,

Title [IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20

U.S.C. 1681, and to a host of other general and spe-

cific revenue sharing statutes. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C.

6716. Accordingly, the court of appeals’ decision may

well have substantial impacts beyond this case. Fi-

naily, the conflict within the circuits means that nei-

ther the Department of Transportation nor the air-

lines can be certain of their obligations under Section

504. In these circumstances, review by this Court is

appropriate.

1. a. The court of appeals’ conclusion that com-

mercial airlines are “recipients” of federal financial

assistance by virtue of their use of federally assisted

airports totally obliterates any distinction between a

“recipient” operating a federally assisted “program

or activity” and a “beneficiary.” The two are not the

same. Section 504 prohibits those who receive federal

financial assistance—i.e., recipients—from discrimi-

nating in the conduct of assisted programs against

the intended beneficiaries of that assistance. Impor-

tantly, however, the intended beneficiaries of the fed-

eral funding are not themselves regulated by the stat-

ute. See Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F.

20

Supp. 597, 601 n.15 (D. S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d

514 (4th Cir. 1975) (Table).

In this case, airport operators clearly are “re-

cipients” of funds extended under the Airport and

Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-

248, Tit. V, 96 Stat. 671 et seqg., and its predecessor

statutes (see note 3, supra). Members of the travel-

ling public, on the other hand, are “beneficiaries” of

federal grants to airport operators, because the pur-

pose of the federal grants is to benefit those who use

airports. For the same reason, airlines using fed-

erally assisted airports are beneficiaries of grants to

airport operators, but they are not, by virtue of use

alone, “recipients” of federal financial assistance.

As Judge Bork recognized in his opinion dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc, the court of

appeals’ approach to the “recipient” issue is bound-

lessly latitudinal (App., infra, 80a-81a) :

[The panel’s] reading of section 504’s statu-

tory language would make every commercial en-

terprise a “recipient” of federal aid when it

merely makes use of a service or facility that

receives any federal assistance. That idea has

great potential. Trucking and bus companies use

federally constructed and maintained highways,

and their businesses are thus inextricably inter-

twined with a federally assisted program. Many

electric companies rely on dams constructed and

maintained with federal funds. Without the

National Weather Service farmers would be un-

able to plan, protect, and cultivate their crops

in an effective manner. It ought surely to be

true that federal funding of federal courts re-

sults in the regulation of law firms since courts

are inextricably intertwined with and indispen-

sable to lawyering.

There is no merit, therefore, to the court of ap-

peals’ rationale that an “indissoluble nexus” (App.,

21

infra, 50a) between airports and airlines transforms

the airlines into “recipients” of grants to airport

operators. Virtually the same argument would apply

with equai force to all businesses that rely on air

travel to sell goods and services in a nationwide mar-

ket. Most if not all of the Nation’s major corpora-

tions require extensive air travel by their personnel.

Under the court of: appeals’ reasoning, \hose busi-

nesses, like the airlines, all would have to be treated

as “recipients” of federal financial assistance. Yet

Congress clearly did not intend that all those who

rely on air travel be deemed “recipients” of federal

financial assistance to airports.

b. The court of appeals also erred in holding that

the services of federal air traffic controllers consti-

tute federal financial assistance to airlines.” The

% As previously noted (see page 16, supra), the court of

appeals did not base its ultimate holding on this conclusion.

Nevertheless, we believe that the issue is properly before the

Court. The situation is comparable to that presented by North

Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), in which the

Court held that Title IX of the Education Amendments of

1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seg., encompasses employment discrim-

ination on the basis of gender, but declined to define the

federally-funded program at issue (456 U.S. at 540). See also

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, No. 82-862 (Feb. 28,

1984), slip op. 11-12. Here, too, the court of appeals held that

the air traffic control system constitutes federal financial assist-

ance to all airlines within the meaning of Section 504, but de-

clined to define the program or activity covered by that assist-

ance. Thus, if this Court were to grant review and reverse only

that part of the decision holding that federal assistance to air-

ports requires airlines to comply with Section 504 in their

“program or activity” of “providing commercial air transpor-

tation” (App., infra, 50a), the Department of Transportation

still would be left with a holding that all airlines receive federal

financial assistance within the meaning of Section 504 by

virtue of their use of the air traffic control system. Although

it would be open to the Department to define the relevant “pro-

22

legislative history of Title VI makes it clear that fed-

erally conducted programs—that is, programs funded

solely by federal money—such as dams, harbors, or

the air traffic control system—have only “beneficiar-

ies’; there are no intermediate “recipients.” As

then-Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach explained

(110 Cong. Reg. 13380 (1964) (footnote omitted) ) :

Activities wholly carried out by the United

States with Federal funds, such as river and

harbor improvements and other public works,

defense installations, veterans’ hospitals, mail

service, etc., are not included in the list [of fed-

erally assisted programs]. Such activities, being

wholly owned by, and operated by or for, the

United States, cannot fairly be described as re-

ceiving Federal “assistance.” While they may

result in general economic benefit to neighbor-

ing communities, such benefit is not considered

to be financial assistance to a program or activ-

ity within the meaning of title VI.

Stated differently, programs like the air traffic

control system fall in the general category of “public

goods”—goods and services from which all citizens

and businesses benefit. The air traffic control system

helps to ensure “safe skies.” Arguably, this public

benefit may “assist” airlines more directly than it as-

sists other enterprises, yet it also assists all enter-

prises that use the airlines or fly private planes in the

course of their business. It also protects those on the

gram or activity” in the first instance, it still would presum-

ably be required to repromulgate the challenged regulations in

some fashion. On the other hand, a decision by this Court

that the air traffic control system is not federal financial assist-

ance at all would obviate the need for further administrative

and judicial proceedings regarding the scope of the “program

or activity.”

23

ground from plane crashes. It does not, however, con-

stitute ‘Federal financial assistance” to anyone.

The court of appeals was able to reach a contrary

conclusion only by distorting a consistent adminis-

trative interpretation of “Federal financial assist-

ance” that dates back to 1964. The FAA’s original

Title VI regulations included the “detail of Federal

personnel” as an example of “Federal financial assist-

ance.” 14 C.F.R. 15.238(3) (1965), 29 Fed. Reg.

19286 (1964) (emphasis added). DOT’s current

Title VI regulations continue the use of that phrase.

49 C.F.R. 21.23(c) (3). Clearly, the operation of the

air traffic control system does not involve the “de-

tail” of any federal personnel to the airlines. In-

deed, as earlier noted (see page 22, supra), the air

traffic control system is far more aptly described as a

self-contained federally conducted program.

In 1978, the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare published guidelines for other agencies to

follow in promulgating regulations under Section 504

(see note 10, swpra). HEW’s guidelines substituted

the word “services” for “detail,” so that “Federal

financial assistance” under Section 504 included the

“Ts]lervices of Federal personnel.” 43 Fed. Reg. 2137

(1978) (emphasis added). It is clear, however, that

HEW did not intend by this change to work any sub-

stantive alteration in the definition of ‘Federal fi-

nancial assistance” (43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1978)):

Despite some difference in the wording of the

definitions of federal] financial assistance in the

regulations implementing section 504 and title

VI, the substance of the two definitions does not

differ.

When the Department of Justice assumed over-

sight responsibility for Section 504 (see note 10, sw-

pra), it retained HEW’s definition of “Federal finan-

24

cial assistance,” including the “[s]ervices of Federal

personnel.” 28 C.F.R. 41.3(e). Again, however, there

is nothing to indicate that the term “services” of Fed-

eral personnel was to be construed any differently than

the “detail” of Federal personnel. But only by conclud-

ing that the “services” of Federal personnel means

something entirely different than the “detail” of Fed-

eral personnel was the court of appeals able to hold

that the federally-operated air traffic control system

constitutes federal financial assistance to airlines

(App., infra, 39a-40a). The court clearly erred in

disregarding the longstanding and consistent admin-

istrative interpretation of the agencies charged with

administering Title VI and Section 504. See, e.g.,

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, No. 82-1005 (June 25,

1984), slip op. 5-7; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mil-

hollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980).

e. In Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202

(9th Cir. 1984), the court of appeals held that neither

the use of federally-assisted airports nor the air traffic

control system constitutes federal financial assistance

to airlines within the meaning of Section 504. The

court below did not discuss Jacobson, but it is clear

that the two decisions cannot be reconciled. The

result of the conflict is that neither the airlines nor

the Department of Transportation can be certain of

their obligations under Section 504. Consistency in

the administration of this nationwide program re-

quires resolution of the conflict.

The plaintiff in Jacobson, who was confined to a

wheelchair because of cerebral palsy, challenged the

airline’s requirement that he sign a statement, in

advance of flight, acknowledging the airline’s right to

refuse him passage or to remove him at any stop “if

it becomes necessary for the comfort and safety of

other passengers” (742 F.2d at 1204). The court of

25

appeals agreed that the airline had subjected him to

unlawful discrimination, reasoning that the “anti-

discrimination” clause of the Federal Aviation Act,

49 U.S.C. (1976 ed.) 1374(b), incorporated Section

504’s basic prohibition against discrimination on the

basis of handicap (742 F.2d at 1205).”°

Having prevailed on his basic claim, plaintiff then

sought attorney’s fees. The request for fees required

the court of appeals to determine whether plaintiff had

stated a claim under Section 504 itself, because the Fed-

eral Aviation Act contains no fee-shifting provision.

Considering arguments remarkably similar to those

advanced by respondents in this case, the Ninth Cir-

cuit held that plaintiff had not stated a claim under

Section 504 because the airline did not receive federal

financial assistance (742 F.2d at 1208).

Although he apparently recognized that, in general,

airlines, like other corporations and persons, are

simply beneficiaries of government-supported services,

the plaintiff in Jacobson argued that airlines benefit

so much more than others from the use of federally

assisted airports and the air traffic contro] system

that they should be treated as recipients of federal

financial assistance (742 F.2d at 1213). The court of

appeals found it unnecessary to decide “whether a

person can become subject to the Rehabilitation Act

by benefiting to a substantially greater degree than

the general public from services provided primarily

for the general public” (ibid.). Instead, the court

concluded that “even though air carriers benefit from

16 There is no indication that either the Ninth Circuit or

the parties were aware of the fact that Section 404(b) of the

Federal Aviation Act expired on January 1, 1983. See page

12, supra. In any event, the discrimination of which plaintiff

complained occurred in 1980 (see 742 F.2d at 1204).

26

federal airport grants and federal air traffic control

* * * to a greater degree than the general public,

they also pay for those services, as Congress intended

them to, to a greater degree than the general public

does” (ibid.). This was so, the court concludea, be-

cause the trust fund from which grants to airport op-

erators are made is supported in large part by taxes

on aviation fuel, airplane tires and tubes, and other

products used by the airlines (id. at 1213-1214).

Because Congress established a user fee system under

which the airlines were to pay for services rendered,

the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress could not

simultaneously have intended that the airlines’ use of

federally assisted airports and the air traffic control

system would constitute federal financial “assistance”

(id. at 1215). Accordingly, the court held that

17 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the airport trust fund

is supplemented as necessary with general tax revenues and

that an FAA study prepared in 1978 reported that the air-

lines were not contributing to the trust fund to the same

extent that they were benefitting from federal services (742

F.2d at 1214). For two reasons, these facts did not alter the

court of appeals’ conclusion that the airlines are not “recipi-

ents” of federal financial assistance. First, the court observed

that “Congress might reasonably have concluded that the serv-

ices provided by the FAA confer benefits on the general public

over and above the benefits they confer on the users of the sys-

tem,” thus making it reasonable for the general public to bear

some of the costs (ibid.). Second, the court deemed it irrelevant

that, at any given point in time, airlines might be paying less

than their “fair share” as calculated under a strict user fee

system. Any temporary distortions meant only that the user

fee system required fine-tuning to implement congressional

intent; they did not suggest that Congress ever conceived of

the airlines as “recipients” of federal financial assistance

(id. at 1214-1215). Moreover, the court thought it would be

anomalous for the determination of “recipient” status under

Section 504 to vary from day to day, depending on “whether

the congressionally mandated system is operating flawlessly or

27

plaintiff had not stated a claim under the Rehabilita-

tion Act and that he could not recover attorney’s fees

under that Act (ibid.)."*

2.a. In deciding that the “program or activity”

that is federally assisted in this case is the “pro-

vi{sion of] commercial air transportation” by all

certificated carriers (App., infra, 50a), the court of

appeals seriously misapplied this Court’s decision in

Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792 (Feb. 28,

1984). In Grove City, the Court reaffirmed the doc-

trine that where a statute prohibits discrimination in

a “program or activity” receiving “Federal financial

assistance,” the reach of the statute is “program

specific.” See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Dar-

roné, No. 82-862 (Feb. 28, 1984), slip op. 11-12;

and North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,

539-540 (1982). Applying “program specific” reason-

ing to tuition grants, the Court held in Grove City

that Congress did not intend the Department of Edu-

whether accountants’ studies demonstrate that changes in allo-

cation formulas are required” (742 F.2d at 1215 (footnote

omitted) ).

18 We note that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Jacobson

is by no means the only route to a conclusion that a “bene-

ficiary” of federal services is not a “recipient” of federal

financial assistance. Indeed, most beneficiaries of federal

financial assistance are in quite a different position than the

airlines—like the students receiving tuition grants in Grove

City, beneficiaries generally pay little or nothing for the bene-

fits they receive. It does not follow, however, that they should

be treated as “recipients” of federal financial assistance. Stated

simply, “beneficiaries” of federal financial assistance are those

that Congress intended to benefit; they are not, however, those

that Congress intended to regulate. “Recipients,” on the other

hand, are the entities that are carrying on an assisted “pro-

gram or activity” with the help of federal aid, and it is the

receipt of that federal aid that subjects them to regulation

in the conduct of such a “program or activity.”

28

cation (or the courts) to attempt to trace federal

money “from classroom to classroom, building to

building, or activity to activity.” Grove City, slip op.

17. The obvious purpose of tuition grants, the Court

found, was to assist a school’s financial aid program.

Ibid. Accordingly, receipt by the school (or its stu-

dents) of tuition grants meant that only the school’s

financial aid program was subject to regulation under

Title IX. Ibid.

Thus, the clear teaching of Grove City is that the

boundaries of a federally assisted program or activity

are defined by the underlying grant statute. Grants

under the Airport and Airway Improvement Act

(and its predecessor statutes) are made to airport

operators to support “program[s] or activit[ies]”’

involved in running an airport.” The grant statute

provides, in general terms, for the construction and

improvement of airports and associated ground facili-

ties; it furnishes no funds whatever for the purpose

of transporting people from one place to another. (It

is undisputed in this case that not one penny of

federal funds is given to airlines under the Airport

and Airway Improvement Act or its predecessor stat-

utes.) Accordingly, it is clear that all federally as-

sisted activities at airports, including the ground

operations (e.g., ticketing and baggage handling) of

all airlines using such airports, are indeed subject to

Section 504. See 49 C.F.R. Pt. 27, 44 Fed. Reg.

31442 et seg. (1979) (DOT’s Section 504 regula-

tions). But it is equally clear that Section 504’s

1® As the court of appeals recognized (App., infra, 46a (foot-

note omitted) ), the grants are used for such purposes as “air-

port land acquisition, runway construction, passenger termi-

nals, airport lighting, airport access and service roads, elec-

tronic and visual approach aids, taxiway construction, ob-

struction removal, and fire/rescue equipment and buildings.”

29

coverage cannot extend beyond the program or ac-

tivity conducted by or under the auspices of the

grant recipient. Neither the agency granting funds

to airport operators nor the airport operators them-

selves have the authority under Section 504 to regu-

late an airline’s practices on board its planes, because

air transport is simply not within the scope of the

grant program. Contrary to the court of appeals’

view that it would be “nonsensical” to distinguish

between an airline’s activities at the airport and its

activities on board its planes (App., infra, 47a), we

submit that such a distinction is the only interpreta-

tion consistent with the program-specific Jimitation on

coverage mandated by this Court’s decision in Grove

City. Simply stated, Section 504 is inapplicable to

the “program or activity” of “providing commercial

air transportation” (App., infra, 50a) unless and

until Congress furnishes the airlines with federal

financial assistance for flying.

b. As was the case with its analysis of the air

traffic control system (see pages 23-24, supra), the

court of appeals was able to conclude that the on-

board activities of commercial airlines are a federally

assisted “program or activity” only by distorting two

decades of consistent administrative interpretation.

The history of the Section 504 regulations, set forth

at pages 4-13, supra, demonstrates that the regula-

tory agencies never understood Title VI to reach the

on-board activities of airlines not receiving subsidies

from the CAB. Regulation of such activities was to

be accomplished, however, under Section 404(b) of

the Federal Aviation Act, which had been judicially

interpreted to prohibit racial discrimination in air

travel. See note 8, supra. It is true that both

DOT and the Board initially expected the Board to

promulgate regulations prohibiting all certificated

30

carriers from discriminating against handicapped air

travellers; this was to be accomplished, however,

through renewed reliance on Section 404(b), and not

Section 504 alone. But the congressionally mandated

“sunset” of Section 404(b) made it impossible for

the Board to carry out its original intent to write

regulations that would cover both subsidized and non-

subsidized carriers. The court of appeals erred in

failing to acknowledge that, with the expiration of

Section 404(b), the Board lost the authority it in-

tended to invoke to issue the all-encompassing regula-

tions mandated by the court. Neither DOT nor the

Board ever expressed the view that Section 504 alone

provided the Board with such sweeping authority, and

the court of appeals should have respected the agen-

cies’ determination of their own jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Acting Solicitor General

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS

Assistant Attorney General

CHARLES J. COOPER

MARK R. DISLER

Deputy Assistant Attorneys General

KATHRYN A. OBERLY

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER

MIRIAM R. EISENSTEIN

Attorneys

AUGUST 1985

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 83-1055

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA,

AMERICAN COALITION OF CITIZENS WITH DISABILITES,

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE BLIND, PETITIONERS

Vv.

CriviL AERONAUTICS BOARD,

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

RESPONDENTS

REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION, INTERVENOR

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Civil Aeronautics Board

Argued October 31, 1983

Decided January 18, 1985

Before: WALD and MIKvVA, Circuit Judges, and

BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

BAZELON.

‘ (la)

2a

BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge: Petitioners Para-

lyzed Veterans of America (PVA) and other organi-

zations representing disabled citizens ' challenge final

regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB or

Board) implementing section 504 of the Rehabilita-

tion Act of 1973 (the Act) with respect to commercial

airlines. The regulations were designed to prevent

discrimination against handicapped persons in air

transportation. The most important issue presented

by this case concerns the scope of the CAB’s Amended

Final Rule, which the Board has applied only to cer-

tain small airlines receiving direct federal subsidies.

Petitioners maintain that te Board is required by

law to apply its regulations to all commercial air car-

riers. We agree. As to the substance of those regula-

tions, however, which petitioners challenge on account

of the CAB’s definition of “qualified handicapped in-

dividual” and aspects of its 48-hour advance notice

1 Joining PVA as petitioners in this case are the American

Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, Inc., a nationwide coali-

tion of 127 organizations representing all major disability

groups, and the American Council of the Blind. PVA is com-

prised of veterans of the United States Armed Forces who

have suffered spinal cord injury or disease.

? Joining respondent CAB in this case are the Federal Avia-

tion Administration and the United States Department of

Transportation. Intervenor in this case on behalf of respon-

dents is the Regional Airline Association, the trade association

of the regional/commuter air carrier industry, representing

approximately 130 airline members. Because the CAB ceased

operations on December 31, 1984, pursuant to the Airline

Deregulation Act of 1978 and the Civil Aeronautics Board

Sunset Act of 1984, see infra notes 212-214 and accompanying

text, references in this opinion to the CAB or Board should

be construed, where appropriate, to include the CAB’s succes-

sor agency, the Department of Transportation.

3a

provision, we find respondents’ position more per-

suasive. Accordingly, we vacate the regulations in

part and remand them in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. From Statute to Rulemaking

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (sec-

tion 504) provides:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual

. . . Shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-

der any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.*

As enacted, the statute did not provide for adminis-

trative implementation of section 504’s mandate; it

was silent as to the exercise of regulatory authority.*

In 1976, however, the President issued Executive Or-

8 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87

Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp.

V 1981)). Title V of the Act also required federal agencies

and federal contractors undertaking contracts in excess of

$2,500 to take affirmative action to employ handicapped in-

dividuals. Sections 501, 503, 29 U.S.C. § 791. In addition,

and of considerable relevance to the case before us, see infra

notes 150, 154, 174 and accompanying text, section 502 estab-

lished the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Com-

pliance Board in an effort to lower the “architectural, trans-

portation and attitudinal barriers” confronting handicapped

citizens. 29 U.S. c. § 792 (emphasis added).

4 See Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered:

Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap

Urjer Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69

CORNELL L. REV. 401, 411-12 (1984).

4a

der 11,914, requiring the Secretary of Health, Edu-

cation and Welfare (HEW) to coordinate the imple-

mentation and enforcement of section 504 by all fed-

eral agencies.° In 1977, prodded by an order of our

district court,° HEW did adopt regulations implement-

ing section 504 as it applied to those programs and

activities for which HEW was itself a source of fed-

eral financial assistance.” Finally, on January 13,

1978, the Secretary of HEW issued guidelines direct-

ing other federal agencies to begin their own rule-

making proceedings within ninety days and to issue

final regulations no later than one hundred thirty-

five days following the close of the comment periods

for the proposed rules.*

5 Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).

® Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). The

court found “that Congress contemplated swift implementa-

tion of § 504 through a comprehensive set of regulations.” Jd.

at 927.

7 See 42 Fed. Reg. 22, 676 (1977); see also Note, Ending

Discrimination Against the Handicapped or Creating New

Problems? The HEW Rules and Regulations Implementing

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 6 FORDHAM

Urs. L. J. 399 (1978); Note, Administrative Action to End

Discrimination Based on Handicap: HEW’s Section 504 Reg-

ulations, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59 (1979).

8 Implementation of Executive Order 11,914, Nondiscrimi-

nation on the Basis of Handicap in Federally Assisted Pro-

grams, 43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2137 (1978) (codified at 45 C.F.R.

§ 85 (1982)). When Congress divided HEW into two new

agencies in 1979, both the Department of Education and the

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) repub-

lished regulations implementing section 504 within the agen-

cies themselves. Authority for coordinating the implementa-

tion and enforcement of section 504 throughout the executive

branch was transferred first to HHS, then to the Department

5a

The Civil Aeronautics Board commenced its rule

making proceedings on June 6, 1979.° Because of the

complexities of the issues in this case, both jurisdic-

tional and substantive, it will be helpful to summa-

rize those proceedings in considerable detail.

In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the Board

proposed “new rules to prohibit unlawful discrim-

ination against disabled travelers and to implement

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” *°

Although the CAB noted that “[t]his proceeding be-

gan at the Board’s initiative and with a petition for

rulemaking filed by the National Federation of the

Blind,” petitioners observe, and respondents do

not dispute, that “the Board’s initiative’ was

prompted at least in part by pressure from HEW

Secretary Joseph Califano.” In its discussion of the

of Justice, were it currently resides. See C.F.R. § 41 (1982)

(guidelines . ublished by Department of Justice pursuant to

Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981)). The original

guidelines promulgated by HEW to assist other agencies in

implementing section 504 are now deemed to have been issued

by the Attorney General and it is clear, as one commentator

has noted, that “[i]n the future the Department of Justice

will play a leading role in the interpretation of § 504.”

Wegner, supra note 4, at 417 n.42.

® Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 382, Nondiscrimina

tion on the Basis of Handicap, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,401 (1979)

[hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule].

10 Id.

1 Jd,

12 As the proceedings continued, further prompting was ap-

parently necessary before the Board would adopt final rules.

In addition to Secretary Califano’s letter of January 29, 1979

urging the CAB to give the matter a high priority, the Board’s

slow pace elicited a formal request from the White House in

6a

proposed new rules’ “Introduction and Background,”

however, the Board’s position was a strong one:

A review of the problems that have been pre-

sented to the Board regarding difficulties en-

countered by handicapped persons in air trans-

portation demonstrates not only a need for reg-

ulations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, but also a significant need for the handi-

capped to receive adequate, nondiscriminatory

service in air transportation in general... .

Therefore, we have decided that the scope of

this rulemaking should include any discrimina-

tion against passengers and prospective passen-

gers on the basis of a handicapping condition,

and the availability of adequate, reasonable serv-

ice to handicapped persons. We believe that the

burden of showing that airline service to handi-

capped persons cannot be provided should be on

the air carrier.”

Also included in the Board’s “Introduction and

Background” discussion were several important ref-

erences to the agency’s statutory authority. First,

the CAB wished to “emphasize that the handicapped

are protected by the adequacy of service and anti-

November, 1980 that the CAB’s section 504 obligations be ful-

filled. “When the CAB still had not issued final rules by July

2, 1981, a district court ordered the agency to inform all of its

subsidized carriers of their obligation to comply with the re-

quirements of Section 504. Paralyzed Veterans of America,

et al. v. William French Smith, et al., No. 79-1979 (C.D. Cal.

July 2, 1981). The CAB complied with this order by sending

a letter on June 12, 1981 to all carriers receiving federal pay-

ments under Section 419 of the Federal Aviation Act.” Peti-

tioner’s Brief at 7 n.4 [hereinafter cited as PVA Brief].

18 Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,401 at 32,402.

ee

7a

discrimination provisions of section 404 of the Fed-

eral Aviation Act [49 U.S.C. § 1374], which are

applicable to all air carriers, whether or not receiv-

ing Federal financial assistance.”** It relied upon

this fact as a partial justification for declining to

propose any regulation of airline employment prac-

tices, noting that other agencies, such as the Depart-

ment of Labor or the Justice Department, would have

“the experience and skill necessary to do the job ef-

fectively.” ” Moreover, the CAB reasoned:

The Board. extends direct Federal subsidies only

to a small number of air carriers, so that the

reach of our section 504 jurisdiction would not

have a significant effect on industry employment.

While we can prevent discrimination in air

transportation under section 404 of the Fed-

eral Aviation Act without clear section 504 juris-

diction, the same is not true of employment. The

Board would have no authority to regulate em-

ployment practices of unsubsidized carriers un-

less those practices somehow caused discrimina-

tion in transportation.”

The CAB’s initial efforts to implement section 504

were further constrained by its decision “not to pro-

pose to require structural modifications of aircraft

at this time” on the ground of its having insufficient

information regarding alternatives, costs, and ben-

efits.” Nevertheless, the Board proposed, and in-

14 Id. at 32,401-02.

6 Id. at 32,402.

16 Td.

17 Id. Some implications of this limitation pertaining to

recent case law in this area are discussed infra at note 155.

8a

vited public comment upon, regulations that would

apply “to all certificated carriers and air taxis [com-

muter carriers] in their operations with aircraft of

more than 30-seat passenger capacity.” * Conceding

tha. “some aspects of the rules would merely make

exp icit what is already implicitly required by sec-

tion 404,” ” and that they might prove too burden-

some or impractical for certain small carriers, the

Board went on to suggest regulations that it believed

strike a reasonable balance among the interest

of handicapped persons in the greatest possible

convenience and freedom of choice in their use

of air transportation services, the legitimate re-

quirements of air safety, and the economic real-

ity that costs incurred by carriers will be passed

on to consumers in the form of higher air fares,

or to the handicapped in the form of special

charges.”

B. The Proposed Rules: Substance and Scope

The regulations developed by the CAB were tri-

partite. Subpart A—‘General Provisions”—prohib-

ited “discrimination in air transportation against

qualified handicapped persons.” * It stated that the

CAB’s purpose in adding a new Part 382—“Non-

discrimination on the Basis of Handicap”—to Chap-

ter II of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations was

to ensure: (a) That handicapped persons re-

ceive reasonable access to commercial air trans-

8 Id.

19 Td.

2% Id. at 32,402-03.

21 Id. at 32,405.

9a

portation, (b) that certain specific practices are

prohibited, and (c) that certain specific changes

in service are made. The part is designed to

ensure that transportation of handicapped per-

sons is integrated into the overall air transpor-

tation system as much as possible.”

Section 382.4 of Subpart A—a single sentence titled

“Prohibition against discrimination”—provided:

A carrier shall not, on the basis of handicap, ex-

clude any qualified handicapped persons from

participation in, deny them the benefits of, or

otherwise subject them to discrimination in the

provision of air transportation or related serv-

ices.”

Section 382.5 of Subpart A prohibited air carriers

from providing “different or separate” transporta-

tion services to qualified handicapped persons, or

from denying any services available to other passen-

gers, unless such actions were “reasonably neces-

sary.” ** Subpart A left the specific words ‘‘reason-

ably necessary” undefined, but did, in section 382.3,

define the terms “Carrier,”* “Conditions for air

2 Id.

23 Id. at 32,406.

*4 Id. Section 382.5(a) permits different or separate service

if “reasonably necessary to provide a qualified handicapped

person with access to air transportation or related services or

if requested by such a person.” Section 382.5(b) permits

carriers to deny transportation or services available to other

passengers if “such action is reasonably necessary to accom-

modate the handicapped passenger in order to comply with

the conditions for air transportation.” Id.

25 In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the CAB defined

“carrier” as including “(1) any holder of a certificate of pub-

10a

transportation,” * ‘Facility,’ ** “Handicapped per-

son,” * and “Qualified handicapped person,” *” each

of which assumes considerable significance in the

controversy before us.

lic convenience and necessity issued by the Board authorizing

the transportation of passengers, and (2) any air taxi opera-

tor” using aircraft seating more than thirty passengers. Al-

though the Notice was explicit about its applicability “to all

certificated carriers,” i.e., major commercial airlines, it spe-

cifically invited comment on the subject of commuter carriers;

indeed, it included language for an alternative regulation that

would not routinely exempt aircraft with fewer than thirty

seats. Id. at 32,405.

26'To be “qualified,” a handicapped person was required to

satisfy these conditions, defined as:

the tender of payment for air transportation, the absence

of any indication that air transportation of the passenger

will jeopardize flight safety, and the absence of any indi-

cation that the passenger is unwilling or unable to comply

with reasonable requests of airline personnel. Any re-

quest of airline personnel that is inconsistent with this

part will not be considered reasonable for the purposes of

this definition.

Id.

27 “ ‘Facility’ means all or any portion of a carrier’s air-

craft, buildings, structures, equipment, roads, walks, parking

lots, and other real or personal property, normally used by

passengers or prospective passengers, or interest in such

property.” Id.

28“ *Handicapped person’ means a person who (i) has a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an im-

pairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.”

Id.

29“ ‘Qualified handicapped person’ means a handicapped

person who has satisfied all the conditions for receiving air

transportation services (‘conditions for air transportation’)

that are required for the non-handicapped.” Jd. at 32,405-06.

lla

Subpart B—“Specific Requirements’—provided de-

tailed guidelines to be followed by each carrier with

regard to accessibility of facilities and services,” the

availability of information,” refusal of service,”

%® As to accessibility, § 382.10 did not require “that every

facility or every part of the facilities for each flight be made

accessible to or usable by handicapped persons,” but did man-

date that “[eJach carrier’s facilities and services, when

viewed in their entirety, shall be reasonably accessible to and

usable by handicapped persons.” Jd. at 32,406.

31 Paragraph (a) of § 382.11 required that carriers “‘estab-

lish a method for ensuring that deaf passengers receive

necessary information in emergencies” and that necessary

information be provided “in a timely manner .. . by use of

written material, signs, placards, flashing signal lights, or

other means.” Jd. Paragraph (b) provided that any informa-

tion available to passengers on printed emergency cards must

also be made available to blind passengers in Braille. /d.

32 Appropriately, the “refusal of service” regulations of

§ 382.12 were the most lengthy and detailed of any in the

Notice. Although they explicitly granted carriers the right

to refuse transportation to “handicapped persons who are

intoxicated by alcohol or drugs, who are seriously ill with a

condition that may require immediate treatment, who have

a contagious disease, who would endanger flight safety, or

whose condition results in disruptive behavior by the handi-

capped person,” § 382.12(a), they equally explicitly estab-

lished the following presumption and elaborated upon its

proper application in practice:

Handicapped persons shall be presumed to meet all condi-

tions for the provision of air transportation. A carrier

shall not refuse transportation to a handicapped person in

accordance with this paragraph unless it reasonably

believes that the person does not meet those conditions.

If the handicapped person presents a medical certificate

from a licensed physician that the person is eligible for

12a

guide dogs,” the use of Braille,** and service to be

provided to incontinent passengers and to passengers

unable to feed themselves.” Subpart B also specif-

air transportation, a carrier shall not refuse transporta-

tion without compelling evidence to the contrary.

Id.

Paragraph (b) of § 382.12 permitted carriers to require

that a personal nurse or attendant accompany “a handicapped

person who needs extraordinary care during flight” or who

“would need substantial assistance to deplane in an emer-

gency” or who would necessarily, because of the ai’ raft’s

structure, “obstruct the emergency deplaning of other pas-

sengers.” The paragraph pointedly provided, however, that a

carrier “shall not require persons who are blind or deaf but

not both, or persons who are unable to walk but who can

deplane reasonably expeditiously in an emergency by using

their arms, to have attendants for that reason.” Id.

%3 Blind and deaf passengers were permitted by § 382.13,

“Guide dogs and personal equipment,” to be accompanied

on aircraft by guide dogs, and to use canes or crutches and

“to keep those aides near them at all times.” Paragraph (c)

of § 382.13 further required carriers to permit handicapped

persons to take folding wheelchairs aboard and to stow the

wheelchairs in the passenger compartment, and paragraph

(d) required carriers to “accept as baggage battery-powered

wheelchairs and personal oxygen supplies of handicapped

passengers” to the extent that such storage and baggage-

carrying did not violate Federal Aviation Regulations or De-

partment of Transportation regulations for the transportation

of hazardous materials (49 C.F.R. Parts 172, 173, and 175).

Id.

% See supra note 31.

% According to § 382.12(c) :

A carrier shall not refuse transportation to, or require

attendants for, persons because they are unable to feed

themselves, if they elect not to eat during the flight. A

carrier shall not refuse transportation to or require

attendants for, persons because they are incontinent or

13a

ically prohibited carriers from conditioning the car-

riage of handicapped passengers or their baggage,

including wheelchairs, on any waiver of liability for

personal injury or property damage and forbade “any

limitation of liability that is stricter than the limita-

tions applied to all passengers and baggage.” ** That

section of Subpart B with which the instant case is

most concerned, however, and which serves as an

important illustration of the specificity and detail

of the regulations at issue, was section 382.14,

“Availability of services and equipment,” providing

in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Carriers shall ensure the availability of:

(1) Necessary life-support systems, such as

oxygen, for on-board use; and

(2) Personnel and equipment to assist in

boarding, moving to restrooms, deplaning, bag-

gage handling, and making ground connections,

including ground wheelchairs, aisle chairs and,

if necessary, mechanical boarding lifts.

(b) Carriers shall not establish advance no-

tice requirements for the provision of special as-

sistance unless that assistance is extensive. Car-

riers may establish reasonable advance notice

persons who are unable to use the restrooms without

assistance, if they have made adequate alternative ar-

rangements for waste disposal.

Id.

36 Exceptions to these prohibitions were contained in

§ 382.15(b), which permitted carriers to “insist upon a waiver

of liability for injury that: (1) Results from a handicap

traveling with which presents an extraordinary hazard, and

(2) Occurs despite the exercise of due care by the carrier.”

Id. at 32,407.

l4a

requirements of up to 48 hours for the provision

of extensive special assistance. For the purposes

of this paragraph, carrier-provided wheelchairs,

oxygen for on-board use, and mechanical board-

ing lifts will be considered extensive special

assistance.”

Subpart C of the regulations initially proposed by

the Board—‘“Compliance”—mandated that each car-

rier provide formal assurances to the CAB “that it

wiil comply with this part” * and specified the means

for so doing. Each carrier, for example, was re-

quired to “maintain an employees’ manual contain-

ing company rules for accommodating handicapped

passengers,” * to formally designate “at least one

person . . . to coordinate its efforts to comply with

37 Id. at 32,406. Additional paragraphs of § 382.14 per-

mitted carriers to charge handicapped passengers “the costs

of the assistance including a reasonable profit,” § 382.14(c),

and enjoined carriers from forcing special assistance upon a

handicapped person “who does not request it, unless the

assistance is reasonably necessary to physically accommodate

the passenger or to enable the passenger to meet the condi-

tions for air transportation,” § 382.14(d). Jd. Supplementing

'§ 382.14’s definition of “extensive special assistance,” the

Subpart B guidelines on “refusal of service” provided in

§ 382.12(d) as follows:

A carrier may refuse transportation to a person who

will need extensive special assistance from the carrier,

such as the provision of wheelchairs, oxygen, or mechan-

ical boarding lifts, if the person fails to comply with ad-

vance notice requirements established by the carrier in

accordance with § 382.14(b).

Id.

88 Id. at 32,407 (§ 382.20).

8° Td. (§ 382.21).

15a

this part,” “® and not only to “[e]valuate its current

policies and practices and effects for compliance” but

also to “[e]stablish a system for periodically review-

ing and updating the evaluation.” ** The requisite

“evaluation and modification of practices” was to in-

clude “a reasonable effort to consult with and obtain

the views of handicapped persons and experts on

handicapping conditions.” *

In addition, under Subpart C, every carrier was

required, within 180 days after the effective date of

the proposed regulations, to “adopt a plan that pro-

vides for the prompt and equitable resolution of com-

plaints alleging any action prohibited by this part

...’* Such a complaint might be filed by any

person who believed “that he or she has been a vic-

tim of discriminatory action” by a carrier.“ Finally,

section 382.26 of Subpart C, Procedures for noncom-

pliance,” authorized the Director of the Bureau of

Consumer Protection to institute enforcement pro-

ceedings. If, after notice and opportunity for a hear-

ing, such proceedings “[f]ound a failure by the car-

rier to comply with a requirement of this part,” the

Board was empowered to “order suspension or ter-

mination of, or refuse to grant or continue Federal

financial assistance” to the offending carrier, or to

“use any other means authorized by law to ensure

compliance.” *

Id. (§ 382.23).

“1 Id. (§ 382.22).

“2 Td.

* Id. (§ 382.24).

** Id. (§ 382.25).

* Id. (§ 382.26).

l6a

In response to its request for comments on its pro-

posed regulations, the CAB received a large number

of suggestions and criticisms from airlines, airline

trade associations, flight crew unions, government

agencies, disabled individuals and organizations rep-

resenting handicapped persons, including petition-

ers.**

C. The Final Rules: Comment, Compromise, and

Constriction

In general, the airlines objected to the adoption of

the proposed regulations, arguing that such rules

were inconsistent with recent congressional initia-

tives aimed at reducing regulation of the air trans-

port industry and that they were unduly burdensome

and duplicative.’ At least one commenting airline

contended “that unjust discrimination on the basis

of handicap does not exist” and that the proposed

rulemaking of the Board was not only “unnecessary”

but “would cause confusion and ambiguous interpre-

tation with the undesired result of diminished spe-

#6 Additional groups included the National Association of

the Deaf, the National Capital Chapter of the National Multi-

ple Sclerosis Society, the Disability Rights Center, the Na-

tional Center for Law and the Deaf, and the National Associ-

ation for Retarded Citizens.

47 American Airlines argued, for example, that “[t]he FAA

currently enforces its own regulations regarding accommoda-

ting handicapped travelers. These regulations are both com-

prehensive and reasonable. There is no need, therefore, for

the Board to involve itself in duplicating the efforts of the

FAA, particularly when it lacks the FAA’s technical exper-

tise.” Comments of American Airlines, Inc. before the Civil

Aeronautics Board, Aug. 31, 1971, J.A. at 154, 156; see also

Respondents’ Brief at 10.

17a

cial service to handicapped persons.” ** While repre-

sentatives of commuter airlines could see some merit

in the proposed regulations as they applied to the

large certificated carriers, they concluded that “if

applied to commuter air carriers, [the rules] would

result in a substantial burden on such carriers. The

mere recitation of the detail and scope of the pro-

posed requirements ‘is staggering.” ** The larger air-

lines, through the comments of the Air Transport

Association and several individual companies, con-

tended not only that the proposed regulations were

“redundant, confusing, and, in some cases, conflict-

ing,” but that the CAB was without jurisdiction to

apply them to any airlines but those few (generally

smaller ones) that received direct money subsidies

from the Board.”

This jurisdictional contention was vigorously op-

posed by groups representing handicapped citizens,

all of which supported the CAB’s initial assertion of

rulemaking authority over every certificated carrier.

As to the scope of rulemaking, these groups criticized

the agency, if at all, for its tentative proposal to

exempt from its regulations those small commuter or

air taxi operators using aircraft of fewer than thirty

seats.” Although the substantial submission of the

*8 Comments of Pacific Southwest Airlines before the Civil

Aeronautics Board, Sept. 4, 1979, J.A. at 137, 139.

*? Comments of Commuter Airline Association of America,

Inc. before the Civil Aeronautics Board, Sept. 4, 1979, J.A. at

98, 102.

5° Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Final Rule,

47 Fed. Reg. 25,936 (1982) (codified at 14 C.F.R. Part 382)

[hereinafter cited as Final Rule].

51 See, e.g., Comments of PVA before the Civil Aeronautics

Board, Sept. 5, 1979, J.A. at 83, 85 (citing the increasing

18a

Disability Rights Center and eight other groups”

did address the legal issue of the proper reach of

section 504—arguing that all airlines, whether sub-

sidized or not, received “federal financial assistance”

in the form of development grants to airports, the

federal air traffic control system, exclusive operating

certificates, and special investment tax credits—the

vast majority of comments were directed to the sub-

stance of the rules themselves.”

In this regard the rulemaking proceeding below

appears to have been an exemplary one. The record

contains many examples of difficult and sensitive is-

sues being painstakingly resolved, of diverse view-

points being conscientiously considered. For example,

the Board redrafted its rules to eliminate any refer-

ence to medical certificates,* agreeing with commen-

ters representing the disabled who argued that terms

like “reasonable belief” and “compelling evidence”

were too vague, that travelers were the best judges

of their own medical status and ability to fly as far

as their own risk was concerned, and that the re-

quirement might discriminate in practice between

those in whom a handicap was apparent and those

in whom it was not.” In cases where risks to other

frequency of such flights, noting their importance in making

mid-route connections, and arguing that “[a]t most, these

carriers should be individually and temporarily exempted’’) ;

regarding the CAB’s concern on this score see note 25, supra.

52 These included the three petitioners in this case and the

groups enumerated in note 46 supra.

53 See J.A. at 111; Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

54 See supra note 32.

55 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,942 (discussing proposed

§ 382.12 (now § 382.13) ).

19a

passengers are potentially involved, however, such as

where “the likelihood that aggravation of the pas-

senger’s condition will cause an in-flight emergency

or unscheduled landing,” the Board concluded “that

airlines must make determinations of flight worthi-

ness.” ** This was to be accomplished not on the basis

of a required medical certificate from “passengers’

doctors [who, the airlines contended] are generally

inexpert in aerospace medicine, and, therefore, un-

qualified to determine whether the passenger can fly”

but rather “on the basis of standards clearly related

to flight safety, applied in a nondiscriminatory man-

ner by personnel who are assigned specific respon-

sibility for this task.” ™

In general the Board’s response to the comments it

received upon specific provisions of the proposed rules

resulted in its granting enhanced discretion to the

regulated carriers. For example, a proposed rule re-

quiring Braille information cards" was dropped in

favor of a section that, according to the Board, “now

clearly states the airlines’ obligation to provide both

emergency and important non-emergency information

to blind or deaf passengers, but allows more flexi-

bility in choosing methods for providing it.” ° Simi-

larly, in dismissing the objection of several commen-

tators to the use of the phrase “reasonably accessi-

ble” in sections 382.1 and 382.11 of the proposed rules

rather than of the words “readily accessible” (the

standard of the HHS guidelines in 14 C.F.R. § 85.57

(a)), the Board concluded that its original language

56 Jd.

57 Td,

58 See supra note 31.

5° Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,941.

20a

reflected “the accessibility standard most appropriate

to the airline industry.” ” In such areas of evident

concern to handicapped persons as the storage of

blind travelers’ canes“ and in-flight wheelchair

policy,” the Board’s decisionmaking resulted in Final

% Jd. at 25,940.

61“The question of whether a blind person may have his

cane during flight,” according to a “‘Fact Sheet” submitted to

the Board by the National Federation of the Blind, s no

exception to th[e] chaotic configuration of procedur.3 and

practices by the airlines.” Noting that many airlines treated

canes as any other carry-on baggage to be stowed at the dis-

cretion of the carrier, the Federation noted that “[t]he white

cane is of functional necessity to its owners just as the guide-

dog is inextricably bound to its master,” placing it “entirely

out of the category of portable hardware when it comes to the

importance that the white cane holds for blind persons. The

white cane represents one of two full-proof methods of inde-

pendent travel for the blind, and is therefore symbolic of the

mobility and self-sufficiency which blind people strive for.

Stowing a blind person’s cane in some far-off closet is not like

doing so to another person’s extra clothes bag.” J.A. at 174.

On this subject, the Board, in explaining its Final Rule,

noted that the “primary authority” on the matter was the

Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], which “has consid-

ered the air safety implications” [45 Fed. Reg. 75,138 (1980) ]

and “determined that the stowage of travel canes under pas-

senger seats is consistent with its safety mandate provided

that the cane is placed flat on the floor and does not protrude

into an aisle or exit row.” The Board therefore amended its

Final Rule § 382.14[b] to require carriers to permit stowage

of travel canes whenever the FAA’s conditions can be met.

Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,943-44.

®2 The proposed rules would have required airlines to carry

folding wheelchairs in the passenger compartment if permis-

sible under FAA and Department of Transportation [DOT]

regulations—a proposal that was warmly embraced by com-

menters representing the handicapped and strongly criticized

2la

Rules that appear to have successfully balanced the

felt necessities of the handicapped with the require-

ments of the airlines for flexibility and the need for

deference to the expertise of agencies that are

charged more directly with ensuring the safety of air

transportation.®

by the airlines, flight attendants’ unions, and the Aerospace

Industries Association. The critics contended that passenger-

area storage space was too limited and that folding wheel-

chairs could be “doortagged” (taken from the passenger and

stored in the plane’s belly just before boarding and returned

just after deplaning). Advocates of the proposed rule, how-

ever, argued that chairs were more likely to be damaged by

such a procedure and that passenger-compartment stowage

was much less uncomfortable because it permitted use of a

personal chair for the longest possible time. Jd. at 25,944.

In its Final Rule, the CAB decided “that airlines need more

flexibility” and modified its proposed rule “to require carriers

to make reasonable efforts to provide passenger-area storage,

and otherwise to doortag,” stating its expectation that airlines

would make “good faith efforts to accommodate folding wheel-

chairs in the passenger compartment when possible.” Jd. On

the other hand, the Board refused to cede to the airlines’

request that it further relax its proposed § 382.13(d), which

required airlines to carry battery-operated wheelchairs in the

baggage compartment to the extent permitted by DOT rules

on the carriage of hazardous materials. It noted that any

need for more flexibility here was offset by the “strong coun-

tervailing interest” of the handicapped traveler’s access to

such “extremely important belongings.” Jd.

*8 A final illustration involves paragraphs (b) and (c) of

proposed § 382.12 (now § 382.13), which permitted airlines

to require handicapped passengers to travel with attendants

when nursing or other extensive personal care would be

necessary during flight and when a passenger would require

assistance to exit during an emergency. Responding to com-

ments seeking greater specificity in the rules, the Board in

its Final Rule sought to “make clear that minor assistance

with meals, such as opening silverware packages or telling a

22a

Nevertheless, the Board’s determinations regarding

two specific aspects of the Final Rules have been

challenged by petitioners in this case. The first in-

volves the CAB’s definition, in its Amended Final

Rule, of “Qualified Handicapped Person,” to which

blind passenger what is being served and where each item is

located on the tray, should not be considered feeding assistance

requiring a passenger to travel attended or forego food.” Id.

at 25,942. Otherwise the Board relied on what it in another

context termed the airlines’ “courtesy and common sense.” /d.

at 25,941. Thus:

The normal range of flight attendant services, including

the occasional modest extra efforts provided for some

passengers—escorting them to seats, providing games to

restless children, soothing first-flight anxieties—can be

easily distinguished from the kind of time-consuming

attention or specialized services (such as administering

injections or assisting a passenger in the lavatory) that

passengers would not expect as a matter of course.

Id. at 25,942.

As to the requirement of an attendant when necessary for

emergency deplaning, the Board concluded that airlines should

be permitted to require this “substantial logistical and finan-

cial barrier to travel,” id., only “when reasonably necessary

for the safety of other passengers, in accordance with the

regulations and policies of the FAA.” Id. at 25,943. Noting

that the FAA had still not resolved the question to its own

satisfaction, but had found in a preliminary study that “ ‘the

potential for handicapped passengers delaying aircraft evacu-

ations would appear minimal,’ ” the Board concluded that

[a]s with decisions on refusing service, decisions re-

quiring attendants must be made by designated personnel.

The name of the designated person must be made known

to any person that requests it. Additionally, we will ex-

pect airlines to be able to provide specific justifications

for their determinations that safety requires a passenger

to be attended.

Id.

23a

petitioners object on two grounds: that it “unlaw-

fully allow[s] airlines to selectively impose require-

ments on disabled passengers which are not required

of all other passengers” and that it lacks “objective

guidelines and criteria to ensure that airlines do not

arbitrarily impose unnecessary conditions on dis-

abled passengers,” thus rendering the definition

“vague and confusing for both airline personnel and

disabled travelers.” “* Petitioners’ second specific ob-

jection is‘ to section 382.15(c) of the Final Rule,

which allows airlines to require all passengers who

will need “extensive special assistance” to notify the

airline 48 hours in advance of their flight.“ This

provision, petitioners contend, is “especially arbi-

trary” and “overly broad” and “inconsistent with

Section 504” because it would permit airlines “to

circumvent their Section 504 responsibilities.” *

A discussion of the administrative background of

these disputed sections of the Final Rule, and of the

arguments advanced for and against their validity

by the parties to this case, is best deferred until a

* PVA Brief at 51. When its Final Rule was published,

the Board noted that “[i]n order to aid in any revisions or

analysis that may be necessary, we are leaving this rulemaking

docket open for further comments on possible changes... .

42 Fed. Reg. at 25,948. Such comments were in fact received

from the Department of Justice and several groups represent-

ing the handicapped, resulting in some minor changes dis-

cussed infra at note 179. The amendments, characterized by

the CAB as “interpretative” and promulgated without notice

or public comment, were published on November 18, 1982.

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Amendment

No. 1 to Part 382, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,857 (1982) [hereinafter

cited as Amended Final Rule].

* PVA Brief at 60; see Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,949.

* PVA Brief at 61-62.

24a

related and more fundamental question has been re-

solved: What airlines, in fact, have section 504 “re-

sponsibilities”? The question arises because the CAB,

having engaged in the extensive and apparently

scrupulous rulemaking procedure only partially sum-

marized in the foregoing paragraphs and notes, de-

cided that the rules it was making could, as a matter

of law, be applied only to a small fraction of com-

mercial airlines actually engaged in transporting

handicapped travelers.

This interpretation of the extent of its regulatory

authority represented a substantial constriction of

the CAB’s original position as expressed in its 1979

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.” There the Board

had interpreted the scope of its rulemaking authority

broadly, emphasizing that such regulation of air

transportation could be based not only upon section

504 of the Rehabilitation Act but also upon the ade-

quacy of service and antidiscrimination provisions of

section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.

§ 1874.* To the extent to which the Board expressed

any doubt as to the reach of its regulatory authority

or the wisdom of applying the proposed rules to all

carriers, it was hesitant only with regard to the em-

ployment practices of airline companies,” the im-

87 See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.

* Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 32, 401-02.

® See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. “The

Board did not propose provisions governing employment be-

cause it did not consider employment to be covered by Section

504 .... A recent decision by the Supreme Court, North

Haven Board of Education v. Bell [456 U.S. 512 (1982) ]

. . « however, caused the Board to reverse this view.” Final

Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,947.

25a

position of structural requirements for aircraft,” and

the possibility that regulations reasonably applied to

most established airlines and large aircraft might

prove too burdensome or impractical for certain small

carriers." By the time it issued its Final Rule in

1982, however, the Board was evidently hesitant to

apply any specific requirements at all. Although it

reaffirmed its reliance upon section 504 and upon

section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act as “the req-

uisite authority” for applying Subpart A of the

rule—the general antidiscrimination provision—to

all carriers,” it construed its statutory power to

regulate discriminatory practices as extending no

further:

The specific requirements in Subparts B and C

of this rule . . . will apply only to those carriers

receiving subsidy from the Board under sections

406 or 419 of the Act, in recognition of the

limited jurisdictional basis of section 504. Those

carriers subject only to the general provisions of

Subpart A should look to the specific require-

ments of Subpart B as guidance for meeting

their general obligation not to discriminate.”

In promulgating its Final Rule, the Board rea-

soned that because section 504 prohibits discrimina-

tion “under any program or activity receiving Fed-

eral financial assistance,” “* it was powerless, in im-

7 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

71 See supra notes 18 and 25 and accompanying text.

Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

78 Id. at 25,937-38.

™ 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).

26a

plementing the statute, to “reach” any program or

activity that was not receiving such assistance. “In

our view,” the Board announced, “only subsidy paid

under either sections 406 or 419 of the Federal Avia-

tion Act qualifies” as federal financial assistance.”

In consequence, as petitioners note, the specific pro-

visions of the rules designed to protect handicapped

travelers apply only to those carriers receiving sub-

sidies for the transportation of mail,” and to several

small local and regional air carriers directly sub-

sidized with federal funds for providing essential air-

transportation to small communities.” As a practical

™ Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

7 At the time this petition for review was filed, three car-

riers were so subsidized: Frontier Airlines, Piedmont Air-

lines, and Republic Airlines. Under the original section 406

program of the Federal Aviation Act, certain airlines were

compensated by the federal government for the transporta-

tion of mail. See 49 U.S.C. § 1876(c), as amended (Supp. V

1981). This program was supplanted by a more limited pro-

gram in 1982 (shortly after the CAB’s Final Rules were

promulgated) as part of the congressional plan to “deregu-

late” air transport and to “sunset” the CAB. See PVA Brief

at 10; see also infra notes 212, 213 and accompanying text.

™ Under the section 419 program, airlines providing essen-

tial air service to a small community received federal sub-

sidies under sections 419(a)(5) or (b)(6) of the Federal

Aviation Act. In its Final Rule, the CAB noted that these

small local and regional carriers would be required to comply

with Subparts B and C of the nondiscrimination rule. In

addition to the three carriers noted in note 76, supra, the

Board identified Ozark, Air Midwest, Skywest, Alaska Air-

lines, Wien Air Alaska and Kodiak Western as carriers which,

by virtue of their receipt of federal subsidies, would be subject

to the specific requirements and compliance provisions of the

rule. Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,938.

Curiously, the CAB elected not to apply Subparts B and C

to air carriers receiving compensation retroactively for losses

27a

matter, it is undisputed that in 1983 the CAB did

not require any airline with regularly scheduled

flights across the United States or overseas to com-

ply with Subparts B or C of the regulations.”

Petitioners argue, in general, that the CAB’s inter-

pretation of its rulemaking authority under section

504 is excessively narrow, and that its construction

of the scope of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is in-

consistent with the intent of Congress, the regula-

tions of other agencies, and controlling legal prece-

dent.” In particular, in addition to their challenge

of two specific provisions of the rules,” petitioners

urge on several grounds that the agency erred as a

matter of law in failing to apply its rules to all

commercial airlines, “because these airlines receive

federal financial assistance sufficient to bring them

within the scope of section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act.” It is this last but most fundamental issue

which, in our discussion of the considerable com-

incurred when they have been required to continue providing

services which they have requested authority to terminate.

Such retroactive compensation, pursuant to section 419(a) (7),

was deemed “short term and after-the-fact,” making com-

pliance “impractical.” Jd. By contrast, the Department of

Justice’s Civil Rights Division believed the retroactivity of

the compensation did not justify different treatment of such

carriers. See J.A. at 59; PVA Brief at 11.

% Examples of major commercial air carriers that have no

legal obligation to comply with Subparts B and C, in the

Board’s view, are American, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, Pan

American, Trans World, and United Airlines.

7 See, e.g., PVA Brief at 19.

8 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.

$1 PVA Brief at 12.

28a

plexities involved in this petition for review, shall

be first.

8 Jurisdiction in this case is provided by 49 U.S.C.

§ 1486(a) (1976) :

Any order . . . issued by the Board . . . shall be subject

to review by the court . . . upon petition, filed within

sixty days after the entry of such order, .... After the

expiration of said sixty days a petition may be filed only

by leave of court upon a showing of reasonable grounds

for failure to file the petition theretofore.

Respondents argue that petitioners’ filing for review in this

case six months after the CAB’s promulgation of its Final

Rule precludes judicial review entirely. They suggest, more-

over, that the Board’s amendments to its Final Rule, which

were issued on November 18, 1982 after further comment to

the Board from the Department of Justice and disabled

citizens, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,857, see infra, notes 179, 202 and

accompanying text, were merely interpretive, so that judicial

review remains time-barred.

It is undisputed that petitioners did file for review within

sixty days of the Board’s promulgation of its Amended Final

Rule. More importantly, the CAB explicitly left its rulemak-

ing docket open in order to receive additional comments from

the public as well as from the Department of Justice. Final

Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,948. Aware that the rule might be

undergoing modification, and unable to predict how extensive

any modification would be, petitioners elected to wait until

the regulation was in final form before seeking review. In-

deed, PVA and other groups representing the handicapped

submitted comments to the Board during this period, see

supra note 64, and it was entirely reasonable of them to ex-

pect the agency to “respond in a reasoned manner to the

comments received ....” Action on Smoking and Health v.

CAB, 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ; Rodway v. De-

partment of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975)

(citations omitted). Any delay simply served properly to ex-

haust petitioners’ administrative remedies, and to conserve

the resources of both the litigants and this court. Reasonable

grounds having been shown, we grant review in this case

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (a).

29a

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Scope of Section 504: Defining “Federal Fi-

nancial Assistance” in Context

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 established “a com-

prehensive federal program aimed at improving the

lot of the handicapped.” * Section 504 of the Act

represented an effort, closely modeled upon civil

rights legislation already in force, to offer handi-

capped individuals an opportunity to pursue em-

ployment, educational, and recreational goals free of

the additional handicap of discrimination against

them.** Aware that with section 504 Congress in-

tended “to eradicate the longstanding prejudice

against the handicapped,” * courts have duly noted

the extent to which the language of the section corre-

sponds to that of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 * and Title IX of the Education Amendments of

1972," frequently applying the case law developed

88 Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 104 S.Ct. 1248

(1984).

** See generally White House Conference on Handicapped

Individuals Act, Pub. L. 93-651, § 301, 80 Stat. 2 et seq.

(1974), 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 (historical note) ; S. Rep. No. 1297,

reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE Conc. & AD. NEws at 6406.

a Wegner, supra note 4, at 403.

% Title VI provides: “No person in the United States shall,

on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded

from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-

jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-

ing Federal financial assistance.” Civil Rights Act of 1964,

§ 601, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d (1976) ; cf. supra text accompanying note 3.

8? Title [X provides: “No person in the United States shall,

on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be de-

30a

in those areas to the resolution of problems arising

under the Rehabilitation Act. In our review of the

rulemaking proceeding below, and particularly in our

analysis of what constitutes sufficient federal “finan-

cial assistance” to bring a “program or activity”

within the reach of section 504, we shall do the same.

We emphasize at the outset, however, the extent

to which the issue of discrimination against the

handicapped, particularly in the complex realm of

commercial air transportation, is sui generis.” Ac-

nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any education program or activity receiving Federal finarcial

assistance... .” Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.

92-318, § 901 (a), 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 168(a)

(1982) ).

88 See, e.g., Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 767 (5th Cir.

1981) ; see also, Wegner, supra note 4.

8° The difficult choices necessitated by the idiosyncratic na-

ture and extent of any particular individual’s disability and

the peculiar requirements of air safety make rulemaking in

this area especially delicate, as our review of the background

of this case in Part I suggests. Even in the arguably less com-

plicated area of ground transportation, it may be no simple

task to determine what section 504’s deceptively clear mandate

requires:

What must be done to provide handicapped persons with

the same right to utilize mass transportation facilities

as other persons? Does each bus have to have special

capacity? Must each seat on each bus be removable?

Must the bus routes be changed to provide stops at all

hospitals, therapy centers and nursing homes? Is it

required that buses be -*> to accommodate bedridden

persons? Is it discriminatory to answer any of these

questions in the negative? Will the operation of hydraulic

lifts on buses involve stigmatizing effects on the persons

3la

cordingly, our holding today is a narrow one which

must be understood in the unique context of two

intersecting considerations. First, we are interpret-

ing a statute that was explicitly addressed not merely

to enhancing employment and ending discrimination

but to expanding the mobility of handicapped per-

sons, to reducing barriers to transportation. Second,

we are concerned with the appropriate regulation of

an industry that is an integral part of a “program

in activity” of a very special kind. In fact, the analy-

sis of what constitutes “federal financial assistance”

in this case, and the related question of how properly

to apply section 504 to the airline industry, turn in

significant part upon the specific and “special” ways

in which, whether directly subsidized or not, all air

carriers are inextricably intertwined with the fed-

erally-funded “program or activity” of commercial

air transportation. Even at its most doctrinal, this is

a case, above all, about access to airplanes and the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

1. Exclusive Operating Certificates

In its rulemaking proceeding the CAB properly

disposed of the argument made by petitioners and

others that all certificated air carriers should be sub-

ject to section 504 because they receive federal finan-

who use them? If so, is that a discrimination solely by

reason of handicap within the meaning of § 504?

Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. 825, 831

(D. Colo. 1978). See also Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d

644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982); American Public Transit Ass’n v.

Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Edwards, J.,

concurring).

32a

cial assistance in the form of “operating certificates

giving exclusive domain over valuable air routes.” ”

While an operating certificate may be of some

value, it no longer gives airlines exclusive do-

main over routes, see section 1601(a) (1) (C) of

the Act. It therefore presents a situation similar

- to Gottfried v. Federal Communications Commis-

sion, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), where it

was held that broadcast licenses do not count as

financial assistance within the meaning of sec-

tion 504.”

As appropriate as the Board’s reliance upon our

holding in Gottfried was, however, that case merts

a brief discussion here, not only because it represe.its

an important earlier construction of the statute, but

also because its holding must be understood in its

appropriate—and somewhat limited—context.

In Gottfried this court remanded to the FCC a

challenge to the license renewal of a public television

station on the ground that the Commission had failed

to inquire specifically into the station’s efforts to

meet the programming needs of the hearing im-

paired.” Its obligation to do so, the court noted, was

founded upon section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

to which the public station was bound by virtue of

its receipt of federal financial assistance.” The court

* Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

%1 Jd,

* Gottfried v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 655 F.2d

297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. Com-

munity Television of S. Cal., 459 U.S. 498 (1983).

* The assistance in Gottfried was both indirect (‘‘congres-

sional appropriations channelled ... through . . . the Depart-

33a

expressly held, however, that Congress did not “in-

tend broadcast licenses to count as ‘financial assis-

tance’ within the meaning of section 504.” * Accord-

ingly, it declined to remand a parallel challenge to

the license renewal of seven commercial stations to

which, it concluded, section 504 did not apply.”

In so doing, this court in Gottfried reviewed the

“legislative heritage” of section 504 and of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 upon which it was modeled and

discovered “no reference to the FCC or to any other

government program involving issuance of federal

licenses.” °° Moreover, we noted that in its original

regulations issued for the guidance of all federal

agencies, HEW “never explicitly classified broadcast

licenses as financial assistance,” *’ even though not

only federal “funds” but “services of Federal person-

nel” and “real and personal property or any interest

in or use of such personal property” and other less

obviously “financial” assistance was so included.”

Finally, we observed that the Justice Department,

which had recently been designated by Executive Or-

der as the agency responsible for coordinating fed-

eral efforts to implement section 504, had specifically

held that “ ‘[t]he term “Federal financial assistance”

. . - does not include licenses, for example, since li-

ment of Commerce and the Corporation for Public Broadcast-

ing’), id. at 655 F.2d 306, and “more direct and traditional”

(restricted program grants to the particular station from par-

ticular federal agencies) , id. at 307.

* Id, at 312.

% Jd. at 301, 312.

* Id, at 312, 313.

*7 Jd. at 314 n.63.

% Id. at 314, citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(h), 85.3(e) (1979).

34a

censes are not Federal assistance grants, contracts,

loans, or cooperative agreements.’ ’”

In relying upon Gottfried to justify its rejection

of the argument that operating certificates granted

to carriers constitute “federal financial assistance”

within the meaning of section 504, therefore, the

Board was correct.’” The license-specific nature of

Gottfried’s holding and rationale, however, limits its

applicability when considering other types of federal

financial assistance.*”

2. Favorable Tax Treatment

Petitioners note that “[f]rom its inception, the

commercial aviation industry has received substan-

tial direct and indirect assistance from the federal

government,” and that “[m]ost of the major airlines”

received direct subsidies “in their early years.” ”

% Jd. at 314 n.65 (quoting Nondiscrimination Based on

Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs—Implementing

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Executive

Order 11914, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,632 (June 3, 1980) ).

10 This is not to say that broadcast or other federal licenses

cannot be of great value. It has been suggested that even

twenty years ago television broadcast licenses were worth

$1,500,000, see Levin, Economic Effects of Broadcast Licens-

ing, 72 J. Pot. Econ. 151 (1964), and it has been argued

that granting such a license is the functional equivalent of

“Government subsidization of broadcasters,” Columbia Broad-

casting Syst., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’] Committee, 412 U.S.

94, 174 n.5 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Our holding in

Gottfried was made in the face of such suggestions and argu-

ments, which are less weighty here, since airline operating

certificates are no longer exclusive.

101 See, e.g., infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text

(discussion of Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.).

12 PVA Brief at 13.

35a

Currently, they argue, such federal financial assist-

ance takes the form not only of money subsidies un-

der certain sections of the Federal Aviation Act but

also of special investment tax credits made avail-

able to “certain railroads and airlines” by the In-

ternal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 46(a)(8) (1976

& Supp. V 1980). Respondents, by contrast, find it

“inconceivable” that Congress “intended to place

nondiscrimination obligations on every commercial

enterprise enjoying some form of favorable tax treat-

men 9? 103

Petitioners find support for their position in Mc-

Glotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972)

(three-judge court), which held “that assistance pro-

vided through the tax system is within the scope of

Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” since

[i]n the absence of strong legislative history to

the contrary, the plain purpose of the statute is

controlling. Here that purpose is clearly to elim-

inate discrimination in programs or activities

benefitting from federal financial assistance.

Distinctions as to the method of distribution of

federal funds or their equivalent seem beside the

Pe

The three-judge court in McGlotten ruled that the tax

exemption provided fraternal orders by section 501

(c)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code, “[s]ince it is

available only to particular groups . . . operates in

fact as a subsidy in favor of the particular activities

these groups are pursuing. It thus falls within the

108 Respondents’ Brief at 29.

1% McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C.

1972) (three-judge court) .

36a

coverage of the Civil Rights Act.”*” By direct and

legitimate analogy, petitioners suggest, the invest-

ment tax credit available to railroads and airlines in

particular by section 46(a)(8) constitutes sufficient

federal financial assistance to airlines so “subsi-

dized” ** to trigger coverage by section 504.

In its rulemaking proceeding the CAB failed to

address the tax subsidy argument. To this court, re-

spondents argue that McGlotten is petitioners’ “sole

authority,” that it “has had no case law progeny,”

that its discussion of Title VI and “federal financial

assistance” was merely “dictum” in a case that was

really about the state action doctrine and the equal

protection clause, and that in its recent decisions

holding that tax exemptions and tax deductibility do

indeed constitute “a form of subsidy that is admin-

istered through the tax system,” Regan v. Taxation

with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540,

1% Id. at 462. McGlotten noted also that the deductibility of

charitable contributions to § 501(c) (8) fraternal orders “op-

erates in effect as a Government matching grant,” id. (cita-

tions omitted) and therefore, like the exemption available

to such groups, constitutes a “grant of federal financial assist-

ance.” Jd. The court concluded that the fraternal organiza-

tions in McGlotten, which excluded nonwhites from member-

ship, were subject to Title VI.

106 McGlotten observed that “the deductions provided in the

Code are not all cut from the same cloth. Most relate primarily

to the operation of the tax itself, and thus would not consti-

tute a grant of federal financial assistance.” Jd. at 461. In

this case, however, the Code provision is highly specific, re-

lating not to the “tax itself” but to “airline property . . . used

by the taxpayer directly in connection with . . . the furnish-

ing or sale of transportation as a common carrier by air

subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board or

the Federal Aviation Administration.” 26 U.S.C. § 46(a)

(8) (E) (1976 & Supp. V 1980).

37a

544 (1983), the Supreme Court “conspicuously failed

to invoke” McGlotten.“” None of these arguments is

convincing. Both in Regan and Bob Jones University

v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Supreme

Court affirmed McGlotten’s fundamental approach.

More important, we think, is the possibility that Con-

gress did not intend, by granting a limited tax in-

centive to a particular industry or group, to thereby

encompass every such industry or group, or, for that

matter, individual within some ever-widening and

potentially almost limitless definition of “federal

financial assistance.”

It is true that the industry-specific nature of the

accelerated depreciation allowance permitted airline

property may obviate that danger in this case. But

it is also true that the exemptions and deductions at

issue in McGlotten, Bob Jones, and Regan were of a

much more fundamental nature than the modest in-

centive to capital expenditures to which petitioners

point here.** To find that the government could force

an airline to comply with a federal antidiscrimination

mandate solely because it takes advantage of section

107 Respondents’ Brief at 29 n.17. Respondents fail to note

that a crucial companion case tec Regan prominently credits

McGlotten with prompting Congress to enact a Code pro-

vision denying tax subsidies to segregated social clubs. Bob

Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, —— n.26 (1983)

(“Section 501(i) was enacted primarily in response to that

decision.’”’).

108 We note, for example, that the discussion of charitable

exemptions and deductions in Bob Jones emphasizes their

historic importance and fundamental nature, and that neither

Regan nor Bob Jones discusses any (of the multitude of)

Code provisions other than plenary exemptions and deducti-

bility of the sort applied exclusively to non-profit organiza-

tions.

38a

46(a)(8) tax credits would be to find the govern-

ment impotent to compel such compliance if any air-

line should elect to forego such credits. If Congress

did intend handicapped citizens to have access to air

transportation and to apply the nondiscrimination

principles of section 504 to all carriers, we would

violate that intent by holding that a carrier could

avoid compliance through its accountant, or that Con-

gress would be giving a green light to discrimination

if it ever chose to enhance federal revenues in this

deficit-plagued era by closing tax loopholes or sim-

plifying the Code.

3. The National Air Traffic Control System

If interpreting every de minimis tax incentive as

sufficient “federal financial assistance” to trigger the

coverage of federal antidiscrimination statutes would

be overbroad in its consequences and reach, petition-

ers’ argument that the government’s expenditure of

some two billion dollars annually to provide airlines

with a national system of air traffic control seems, by

contrast, appropriately narrow and specific.” This

program employs, on a twenty-four hour basis,

highly-trained air traffic management personnel who

monitor and control takeoffs, landings, and en route

flights of civil and military aircraft in order to as-

sure safe and expeditious air transportation. By di-

rectly financing the operation of twenty-five control

centers, more than four hundred terminal control

10 Tn 1983 and 1984 the federal government allocated $2.2

billion and $2.3 billion, respectively, for the operation, instal-

lation and maintenance of the air traffic control system. Ex-

ecutive Office of the President, Office of Management and

Budget, Appendix to the Budget of the United States Gov-

ernment, 1984 at I-Q27.

39a

facilities, and additional flight service stations, as

well as by administering its flight standards and

medical fitness programs, petitioners argue, the fed-

eral government provides financial assistance that is

“absolutely critical to the operation of the air-

lines.” 110

It cannot be seriously disputed that the safe and

efficient operation of commercial air transportation

depends in great measure (if not, as petitioners

assert, “entirely”) upon “the proper functioning of

the national air traffic control system.” ™ One can

scarcely imagine a modern airline representing to

its customers that a regularly scheduled flight will

leave at a time certain and arrive reliably at its des-

tination if this “essential service” *” provided by the

FAA did not exist. Moreover, this crucial assistance

may reasonably be considered “financial.” Defini-

tions of “federal financial assistance” issued by both

the Department of Health and Human Services and

the Department of Justice state explicitly that the

term encompasses

any grant, loan, contract, . . . or any other ar-

rangement by which the agency provides or oth-

erwise makes available assistance in the form

of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal person-

nel; or (3) Real and personal property or any

interest in or use of such property... .1

110 See PVA Brief at 14.

111 Td, at 18.

1122 United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers

Org., 653 F.2d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454

U.S. 1083 (1981).

18 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(e) (1983) (Department of Justice).

Most federal agencies construe “federal financial assistance”

40a

Consequently, petitioners’ argument that the federal

air traffic control system is an “arrangement” that

“provides or otherwise makes available assistance in

the form of . . . services of Federal personnel” leads

reasonably to the conclusion that the system does in-

deed constitute federal financial assistance to all com-

mercial air carriers. It follows, therefore, that any

and all carriers making use of the federal air traffic

control system should be subject to any regulations

promulgated under section 504.

Respondents attack this argument on _ several

grounds. First, they contend that “regulatory his-

tory and common sense” makes it clear that the

current “services of Federal personnel” language

really means “the loan or detail of Federal person-

nel to carry out functions which private (7.e., air-

line) employees would otherwise have to perform,

e.g., fly airplanes.” ** We are not persuaded, how-

ever, that the language of the Justice Department’s

implementing regulations should be taken to signify

anything less than the plain meaning of the words

themselves. ‘As a general matter, courts eschew nar-

row interpretations of remedial statutes. Instead,

remedial statutes are normally accorded broad con-

struction in order to effectuate their purpose.” *” As

at least as broadly. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. Part 1040.3(0) (1984)

(Department of Energy) ; 22 C.F.R. § 142.3(h) (1983) (De-

partment of State) ; 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1983) (Department of

Education); 38 C.F.R. § 18.408(h) (1983) (Veterans Ad-

ministration).

114 Respondents’ Brief at 25.

115 Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681

F.2d 1376, 1880 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1591

(1984) ; accord, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968);

Ayers v. Wolfinberger, 491 F.2d 8, 16 (5th Cir. 1974).

4la

the Senate report on the 1974 amendments to the

Rehabilitation Act explained, “section 504 was en-

acted to prevent discrimination against all h-ndi-

capped individuals . . . in relation to Federal assist-

ance in employment, housing, transportation, educa-

tion, health services, or any other Federally-aided

programs.” "* To that end, section 504 and the civil

rights statutes with which it shares a common lan-

guage and heritage must “be liberally construed in

order that their beneficent objectives may be real-

ized to the fullest extent possible.” *”

Respondents’ more substantial line of attack re-

iterates a point first articulated by the Board in

justifying its Final Rule below: “It is the position of

the FAA, with which we concur, that its air traffic

control services are not financial assistance to air-

lines. Rather, they are services provided to the pub-

lie generally to ensure flight safety.” ‘* The federal

air traffic control and safety programs, respondents

suggest to this court, must be considered

in the general category of “public goods.” They

are the goods and services from which all citi-

11¢ 5. REP. NO. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974

U.S. CopE Conc. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6388 (emphasis added) ;

see also S. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), re-

printed in 1978 U.S. CopE Conc. & AD. NEwWs 7312, 7404.

117 United States v. El Camino Community College Dist.,

454 F. Supp. 825, 829 (C.D. Calif. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1278

(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980), citing

SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05

at 392 (4th ed. 1974) (‘To this end, courts favor broad and

inclusive application of statutory language by which cov-

erage of legislation to protect and implement civil rights

is defined.”) ; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88

1971).

118 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

42a

zens and businesses benefit .... Thus, for ex-

ample, the government may assure clean air

through a variety of means, Federally financed

or operated. But the recipient of the benefit can-

not be precisely located, and no one enjoys an

exclusive benefit. The air controllers help to

assure “safe skies’; this “assists” airlines more

directly than it assists other enterprises; yet it

also assists all enterprises that use the airlines

or fly private planes in the course of their busi-

ness. It also protects those on the ground from

plane crashes. It does not, however, amount to

“Federal financial assistance.”

If, as PVA seems to assume, Congress had

wanted to cover every enterprise benefitting

from a federal program, it would have said so,

but it did not.’”

It is true that in important respects the provision

of air traffic controllers might be analogized to the

provision of highway patrolmen or traffic signs or

signal; federal funding of such programs would not

be likely to be considered the sort of “Federal finan-

cial assistance” sufficient to bring every private

trucking business or other enterprise that used the

highways within the scope of section 504. On the

other hand, respondents concede that the air control-

ler program “assists” airlines more directly and

extensively and specifically than other enterprises.

Moreover, as petitioners observe, it would be absurd

to exempt a federally-funded local transit authority

or school system from compliance with section 504

on the ground that public transportation benefits pas-

sengers as well as transit systems and, like public

19 Respondents’ Brief at 27, 28 (citations omitted).

43a

education and safe air travel, it is a “public good.” ”°

The fact is that the air traffic control system is in-

dispensable to the very existence of modern commer-

cial aviation, and that if it were not provided by the

federal program now in place, it would have to be

provided, and paid for, by the airlines themselves.™

It is at this juncture, however, that our analysis

must be informed by the Supreme Court’s resolu-

tion of a related problem in a case that has been de-

cided since we heard oral argument in this matter. In

Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984),

the Court construed the language of Title IX’s prohi-

bition against sex discrimination in any “education

program or activity” that is “receiving Federal finan-

cial assistance” in a manner that compels us to focus

less on the mode of assistance than on the “program

or activity” being assisted. In particular, although

the Court warned that nothing in Title IX justified

“making the application of the nondiscrimination

principle dependent on the manner in which a pro-

120 See PVA Reply Brief at 8-11.

121 See id. Indeed, some recent proposals to substitute a

privately owned and operated system of air traffic control

would lead, presumably, to just such a result—that is, airlines

would contract with and pay for the services of the private

program operator(s). The “assistance” provided the air-

lines in the form of the FAA’s flight standards program,

however—certifying aircraft, pilot competence, etc.—is more

purely regulatory in nature, and therefore more analogous

to the Gottfried analysis, see supra at notes 90-101 and ac-

companying text. To require a private company to acquire

a license or adhere to a federal standard, and then to call

the costs of regulation and of monitoring compliance a “bene-

fit” to the regulated company which amounts to “financial

assistance,” would constitute bootstrapping and would exceed

the boundaries of liberal statutory construction in the inter-

ests even of remedial action and civil rights.

44a

gram or activity receives federal assistance,” *” it.

emphasized as well that an agency’s authority to reg-

ulate under Title IX was limited by “the program

specific nature of the statute.” ** Thus, even if the

“economic ripple effects” of federal financial aid to

a college’s students resulted in additional funds for

the institution’s general operating budget, a plural-

ity of the Court held, per Justice White, that only

“the College’s own financial aid program . . . may

properly be regulated under Title IX.” *

The implications of the Grove City analysis for the

case before us are not completely clear. To the ex-

tent to which petitioners argue that a national air

traffic control system would have to be provided at

the airlines’ own expense if it were not provided by

the federal government (i.e., that this federal pro-

gram has “economic ripple effects” that make addi-

tional funds available for other airline operations),

the Grove City plurality would appear to be unsym-

pathetic. And if the federal air traffic control sys-

tem is the “program or activity” which is deemed to

receive “federal financial assistance,” then the pro-

gram-specific mandate of Grove City would imply

12 Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (1984).

123 Td. at 1221.

124 Jd. at 1221, 22. Otherwise, the plurality reasoned, “an

entire school would be subject to Title IX merely because one

of its students received a small BEOG [Basic Educational

Opportunity Grant] or because one of its departments re-

ceived an earmarked federal grant. This result cannot be

squared with Congress’ intent . .. [W]e have found no per-

suasive evidence suggesting that Congress intended that the

Department’s regulatory authority follow federally aided

students from classroom to classroom, building to building,

or activity to activity.” Id.

——

45a

that only that particular system—its personnel prac-

tices and physical facilities, for example—could be

regulated under section 504. If, on the other hand,

the “program or activity” at issue is deemed to be

that of commercial air transportation as engaged in

by the air carriers, and if the air traffic system is

deemed—via its personnel and facilities—to be the

“federal financial assistance” provided to that pro-

gram, then any “program specificity” problem with

petitioners’ argument is avoided.

Such a problem is not before us in the instant case,

however, because we need not reach it to hold that

the CAB erred as a matter of law in failing to apply

its section 504 regulations to all commercial air car-

riers. We base this holding upon the federal govern-

ment’s funding of airports and “airways,” upon the

necessary and inextricable integration of these facil-

ities with all commercial air carriers and, above all,

upon the clear intent of Congress in passing the Re-

habilitation Act of 1973 and the effort cf appropriate

agencies to effectuate the mandate of section 504 in

the unique context of commercial air transportation.

4. Federally Assisted Airports

The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970,

49 U.S.C. § 1714, as amended, authorized the Secre-

tary of Transportation “to make grants for airport

development” in order ‘to bring about, in conform-

ity with the national airport system plan, the estab-

lishment of a nationwide system of public airports

adequate to meet the present and future needs of

civil aeronautics ....”” To this end Congress es-

tablished the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, mon-

ies from which are used to construct, acquire, lease

125 49 U.S.C. § 1714(a), as amended (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

46a

and improve facilities and equipment used in civil

aviation, currently in the amount of several billion

dollars annually.“* Grants received by airports are

not “earmarked” but are “obtained through the use

of a single project application to cover all airport

improvement projects contained in the airport’s an-

nual expenditure program.” Typical capital proj-

ects undertaken with the substantial federal finan-

cial assistance so obtained have been airport land

acquisition, runway construction, passenger termi-

nals, airport lighting, airport access and service

roads, electronic and visual approach aids, taxiway

construction, obstruction removal, and fire/rescue

equipment and buildings.* It is undisputed that this

extensive federal financial assistance to airports sub-

jects them to the nondiscrimination mandate of the

federal civil rights laws, including section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”

The critical question then becomes whether, as re-

spondents contend, the scope of section 504 “extends

to the threshold of the planes themselves, but not

126 49 U.S.C. § 1742, as amended (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

127 Between 1982 and 1984 an estimated $17 billion were

available for apportionment by the Secretary. Estimates of

actual disbursements, consistent with a statutory formula

now based, inter alia, upon the number of passengers em-

planed at a particular airport, were about one third that

amount. See PVA Brief at 17 n.14; 49 U.S.C.A. § 2206(a) (1)

(West Supp. 1984) (codifying the Airport and Airway Im-

provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 671, Sept. 3,

1982).

128 National Transportation Policy Study Commission Final

Report, National Transportation Policies Through the Year

2000 (June 1979) at 187-88.

129 See, e.g., Respondents’ Brief at 29, 30 (citing the Title

VI regulations of DOT and FAA and DOT’s section 504 regu-

lation).

eee

47a

beyond.” *° Such a result is required, respondents

argue, by virtue of “longstanding administrative in-

terpretation,” Supreme Court precedent, and a case

in our own district court which “has squarely held”

that the indirect assistance provided airlines using

federally-funded airports did not trigger the cover-

age of section 504.“ We consider, and reject, each

of these arguments in turn.

First, the longstanding and, until this proceeding,

consistent interpretation of federal civil rights stat-

utes has supported the position not of respondents

but of PVA. For example, in applying its Title VI

regulations to federally assisted airports, the Depart-

ment of Transportation explicitly included

restaurants, snack bars, gift shops, ticket count-

ers, baggage handlers, car rental agencies, lim-

ousines and taxis franchised by the airport spon-

sor, insurance underwriters, and other busi-

nesses catering to the public at the airport.”

If these businesses are construed as receiving federal

financial assistance by virtue of federal aid to air-

ports, it is nonsensical to exclude the air carriers

themselves, which surely are businesses “catering to

the public at the airport.” Indeed, in its own sec-

tion 504 rulemaking, DOT explained that its regu-

lations apply, inter alia, to ticket counters, boarding

devices, baggage check-in and retrieval, and teletype-

writers, “all of which are owned and operated by the

130 Jd, at 30.

131 Jd, at 30-81.

182 49 C.F.R. Part 21, Appendix C (1984).

48a

airlines at most airports.” ** DOT’s decision in 1979

not to extend its own rules to air carriers’ in-flight

activities obviously was a result of the CAB’s asser-

tion of such authority at that time, and of DOT’s

commendable effort to avoid redundant, overlapping

regulations:

Following publication of [DOT’s] NPRM, repre-

sentatives of the DOT, FAA, HEW and the Civil

Aeronautics Board (CAB) met to discuss the

respective legal authority and responsibilities for

improving the accessibility of air travel to hand-

icapped persons. Following this meeting, the

CAB determined that it had statutory authority

to issue regulations governing air transportation

of handicapped persons .... Action by the CAB

... would ensure the uniform provision of serv-

ices and equipment by the airlines, needed to

accomplish accessibility to air travel for handi-

capped persons... .'™

Of course, the CAB’s initial interpretation of its

rulemaking authority under section 504 was consis-

tent with this expectation. Its Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking assumed that all certificated carriers

would be covered, and invited comment specifically

only as to whether small commuter carriers with

planes of fewer than thirty seats should be ex-

empted.** This initial position of the CAB was in

188 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Feder-

ally-Assisted Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefit-

ting from Federal Financial Assistance, 44 Fed. Reg. 31,442,

“ar (May 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as DOT Section 504

ules].

4 Td. at 31,451 (emphasis added).

135 See supra note 35; Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. at 32,405.

Commenting in this regard on the CAB’s proposed section

49a

fact consistent with its own “longstanding admin-

istrative interpretation” of its Title VI regulations

as covering programs “including’”—but not limited

to—those receiving direct money subsidies, and as

applying not only to “money paid” but to “other

federal financial assistance extended.” ** The Board’s

sudden reversal in this regard was contrary not only

to the interpretation of other agencies in this context,

but to its own.

A more substantial argument advanced by re-

spondents is based upon two recent Supreme Court

cases, one of which was sub judice at the time the

instant petition for review was heard. In North

Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512

(1982), the Court concluded “that an agency’s au-

thority under Title IX both to promulgate regula-

tions and to terminate funds is subject to the pro-

gram-specific limitation of §§ 901 and 902.” *” Thus,

respondents argue, “[w]hile an airline may utilize a

federally-funded program, i.e., airport operations, it

is not a federally funded program itself by virtue of

the airport’s receipt of aid.” ** North Haven’s em-

phasis upon “program specificity” was, as we have

504 rules, DOT urged the more inclusive coverage: “We do

not believe application of Part 382 should be limited... .

DOT believes that handicapped travelers should not be de-

prived of air transportation [on planes of less than 30 seats],

unless a carrier can show that, because of aircraft structure

restrictions, certain types of handicapped passengers cannot

be safely accommodated.” Comments of the U.S. Department

of Transportation before the Civil Aeronautics Board at 4, 5

(Sept. 13, 1979), J.A. 78, 79.

136 14 C.F.R. § 379.2 (1983).

137 456 U.S. at 538.

188 Respondents’ Brief at 32.

50a

noted, reaffirmed by the Court’s more recent decision

in Grove City College v. Bell.’ But it is also true

that in its North Haven opinion the Court expressly

did ‘‘not undertake to define ‘program’” “° and that

in Grove City the plurality emphasized not only that

the student financial aid at issue was “sui generis”

but that the intent of Congress in passing Title IX

was central to its analysis.“ In considering what we

believe must also be termed the sui generis nature

of commercial air transportation, as well as the

intent of Congress in passing the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, combined with the postenactment adminis-

trative and legislative construction of section 504, we

find that the regulations promulgated in this case

must be applied to all air carriers using federally-

funded airports in their “program or activity” of

providing commercial air transportation.

Airports and airlines are inextricably inter-

twined.*” The indissoluble nexus between them is the

189 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984).

140 456 U.S. at 540.

141104 S.Ct. at 1221, 23.

142 For example, as the Board itself has observed, at some

airports “a single airline may have its own terminal building”

and substantial parts of the airport’s physical plant may be

“carrier-owned.” In other cases “the design of most of the

facilities, perhaps even including parking facilities, may well

be under the airlines’ control [including control “over their

selection, design, construction or alteration”], even if the

property is leased from an airline authority.” Final Rule,

47 Fed. Reg. at 25,940. Especially in the case of the larger,

most widely used airports and air carriers, the structural, and

a fortiori the functional, integration of airport and air carrier

is self-evident. As has been noted, “in the airline industry,

two inputs (airline services and airport services) are required

to produce a single output (air transportation).” Note, Air-

5la

provision of commercial air transportation. Although

airports may lease space to gift shops and airlines

may publish in-flight magazines or own a chain of

resort hotels, when it comes to the “program or

activity” of providing air transportation to the trav-

eling public, the two entities are so functionally in-

tegrated that they become one. While it may be the

case, as respondents urge, that the airline as a cor-

porate entity does not become a federally-assisted

“program” by virtue of its use of federally-assisted

airports, its “program or activity” of providing com-

mercial air transportation certainly does. Thus, sec-

tion 504 may or may not reach the practices of a

hotel owned and operated by an airline company;

but it certainly must reach, in our view, the treat-

ment afforded a passenger who boards that company’s

aircraft at, deplanes to, and reaches his destination

safely and efficiently only because of, a federally-

funded airport. Just as the plurality in Grove City

distinguished the college’s financial aid program

from other programs within the institution, an air-

line’s commercial aviation program, its activity in

actually carrying passengers from one place to an-

other, may be distinguished from its other programs

or activities.

Respondents attempt to avoid this holding, finally,

by pointing to a case in our district court which

“squarely held” ** that to “hold that commercial air-

lines fall within section 504 merely because of assist-

ance provided to airports would expand improperly

the accepted proposition that section 504 is limited to

line Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J. 319

n.1 (1983). See also the Board’s initial definition of “facility”

in its Proposed Rule, supra note 27.

143 Respondents’ Brief at 30.

52a

direct recipients of Federal funds.” ’** The Board

quoted in full and explicitly relied upon this language

from Angel v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.”

We reject it on at least three grounds, and declare

Angel squarely overruled.

First, even if “airlines” on a company-wide basis

are not covered by section 504, we believe their pro-

grams and activities providing commercial air trans-

portation are, as noted above. Second, Grove City

directly undermines any notion that coverage of fed-

eral antidiscrimination statutes is in any way—

much less as an “accepted proposition”—“limited to

direct recipients of Federal funds.” As the Court

held unambiguously in Grove City:

Nothing . . . suggests that Congress elevated

form over substance by making the application

of the non-discrimination principle dependent on

the manner in which a program or activity re-

ceives federal assistance. There is no basis in the

statute for the view that only institutions that

themselves apply for federal aid or receive

checks directly from the federal government are

subject to regulation.’

Third, Angel depends for its holding upon an un-

justifiably broad reading of Gottfried v. FCC, a case

which, as we have discussed in some detail, is license-

specific in its holding and rationale, and which in the

consideration of federal financial assistance to air-

4 Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 519 F. Supp.

1173, 1178 (D.D.C. 1981).

145 Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937.

46 104 S.Ct. at 1217.

53a

ports and air transportation is thoroughly inappo-

site.'*’

5. Additional Considerations: The Special Ad-

ministrative and Legislative Context

Our holding today that section 504 of the Rehabili-

tation Act of 1973 applies to all commercial air car-

riers and that the CAB erred in restricting the ap-

plication of its section 504 regulations to those few

small carriers receiving direct money subsidies is

buttressed by several unique features of this case.

These include the particular concern evidenced by

Congress for the right of handicapped persons to

travel and to have the greatest possible access to

employment opportunitie

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Record and brief — Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America · 477 U.S. 597 | Frix