Record and brief — Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action

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De BS5-164-CFX Tithe: Je Se Stringtellows Jresr Et ales Fetitioners

-atuss GRANTED Ve

Concernecs Neigndbors in Actions et al.

pcketesz: Court: united States Court of Apceals

ugust 14 1985 Tor the Ninth Circuit

Counsel ror setitioner: MullikensDavid Le

Counsel Tor respondent: wWoochersFrederic Des Solicitor

General

try Date Note Proceecings ans Oroers

FOO OOS OS OC OOS OOOO S OS OOOO OOSOSS OS SOSS SO CSSSSOESOOOOSCOCSOCECESOCOCOSSSSCOececeoeee

|

1 May <9 1985 mOELICatiOon for extension of time to tile petition and

| ercer granting sare until fAucust Iv 1¥5> Chkennaquist, “ay

; 20s 1V085).

Fo Au3 1 1985 G Petition for writ of certiorari files.

« Aug 12 1985 vrcer extendins time to tile response to setition until

wctover siv 1985.

5 Oct U0 ives vrcer Trurtner extending time to tile response to

retIition until Decemoer 20, 1985.

6 Dec 11 1¥85 vroer Turtner extending time to tile response to

PETITION until February 28, 1986.

7 Fec 10 1¥Be¢e wrcer further extending time to file response to

ReTITION UNTIL April 2%, 1¥BE,.

5 Aor 2 19806 Sup>cemental oriet of petiticners J, Strinctellows et al.

Tilec.

y Aor 11 19806 wroer turtner extensing time to tile response to w

wetTITION until May ids 19806.

J Aor 1171 1986 ihe adove extension acplies to all respondents.

1 May 7 1989 orivet of Fesponcent United States in onvosition tilec.

2 May 13 19B6é wIST¥IDUTED. May 2¥, 1936

c May 12 198% K Briet of respondents Concerned Neicnvors In Actions et al.

1M Oprosition tilec.

~ Jun 2 1980 Fetition GRANTED. Limitec to Question 1 peresertec sy the

° petiticn.

ieee eee eee PPP PPPS S SS CSLSSCTCCTCOCCCOCTCOCC.. See

s May 19 1966 “OCDgINg received.

8 Jul 117 19806 vrcer extending time to file briet of petitioner on the

merits until July 314 1966.

7h Jul 3U 1986 aecora tiles.

jJ Jul 3U 19386 certified copy of original record anc proceedings (20x)

received.

Jul 31 1986 JOINL appendix tiled.

Jul 31 1986 briet of petitioners J. stringtellows et al. filed.

Jul 31 1986 Brier of respondent United States supporting petitioner

Tilec.

Jul 28 1986 mOTION tO Gismiss writ of certiorari as to setitioners

alumax Ince and Hunter Engineering Inc. only and order

Jul 28 1986 vf dismissal oursuant to Rule 53 of this Court.

(8/32/06). :

Aug 12 1¥B6 & mOt1O" Of the Solicitor General tor civicec arcument

PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

~ CERTIORAR

October Term, 1984

J. B STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW

QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW

QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC.;

BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE

CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;

NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH

COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;

RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING

CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO.;

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR

INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER CoO.,

Petitioners,

VS.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and

PENNY NEWMAN,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LATHAM & WATKINS LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS

DAVID L. MULLIKEN* MAUREEN E. MAHONEY

STEVEN P. McDONALD

ROBERT P. DAHLQUIST

1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Suite _1200

701 “B* Street, Suite 2100 Washington, D.C. 20036-1594

San Diego, California 92101 (202) 828-4400

(619) 236-1234

(Additional counsel are listed on signature pages)

July 30, 1985 “Counsel of Record for Petitioners

y

Lawyer's Brief Service, Inc / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457 00!

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Is an order granting permissive intervention but

denying intervention as of right immediately appealable?

2. Did the Ninth Circuit err in reversing the district

court’s holding. that Intervenors, an individual and a

corporation, could intervene permissively but not as of right

in this action in which the United States and the State of

California seek relief concerning the clean-up of a waste

disposal site?

PARTIES BELOW

Plaintiffs-Appellees:

United States of America

State of California

Defendant-Appellees:

J.B. Stringfellow, Jr.

Stringfellow Quarry Co., Inc.

Stringfellow Quarry Company

Paul Hubbs

Lucille Hubbs

E. Moe McCook

Alcan Aluminum Corp.

Alumax, Inc.

- BKK Corporation

Capri Pumping Service

General Electric Co.

General Steel and Wire Co.

Hunter Engineering, Inc.

McDonnell Douglas Corp.

Montrose Chemical Corporation of California

National Distillers & Chemical Corp.

NI Industries, Inc.

Northrop Corporation

The Deutsch Company

(Continued on next page)

Quemetco, Inc. TOPICAL INDEX

Rainbow Canyon Manufacturing Corp.

: Page

Rheem Manufacturing Co. |

Rockwell International Corp. ) QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Rohr Industries, Inc. : PARTIES BELOW

Standard Dredging Corp. | ERE EI RN eee ROTTEN 2

Stauffer Chemical Co. | JURISDICTION 2

bons sseetion . oe | STATUTES INVOLVED osesssssssssscsssssssssssssesessensesnsseenee 3

ee | STATEMENT OF THE CASE o0...sccceccssssscsssssssccsssssscssssssvees 4

| REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......cccs0000000 10

Intervenors-Appellants: )

EEE SS ee ICRC. A RE 26

| APPENDIX

Order Entered By the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (filed March 18,

oer pabitenl _ : ca ) Se ercicenilaiidetiinhibiesdadiniinicadtetiiinaibiiivntsipieamuiaanincenenees A-1

t t t t

7 raerprpete ten ee ee Opinion of the United States District Court for

t titi i t forth in the A dix. mer . ‘ :

ee the Central District of California (filed

Concerned Neighbors in Action

Penny Newman )

| iii ites A-3

| Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit (filed June 4, 1984) ............ A-22

! Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit (filed Sept. 6, 1984, after

| CIID ccrcencesieentsnsorennsinsitinictinntnmectitninameceses A-26

| Order Entered By The United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Denying

Reconsideration En Banc (filed Oct. 26, 1984) .. A-28

at Se Fee EAS ES Oe Se aN A-30

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Petitioners ............ A-46

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore &

Ohio R.R.

en 12, 13, 18

Cobbledick v. United States

EEE . 11, 18

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay

Be Se ITED ctrsiiccecinenevecncesnemmmingumnensse 14, 18

Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council v. Pennsylvania

674 F.2d 970, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1982)... 23

EEOC v. United Airlines

ey 2 eS ee, Be ee 22

Estelle v. Gamble

BS REESE 7 ew eT eee 24

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord

ESR EEC 24

Flanagan v. United States

eee 24

Forsyth v. City of Hammond

Se Sy III cnet ninicrinesnticnsemesenninedesecnngens 23, 24

Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.

EE 11, 16

Kartell v. Blue Shield

687 F.2d 543 (Ist Cir. 1982) oo... eeeeeeees 16, 18

Myers v. Bethelehem Shipbuilding Corp.

ee Sy Me MEE slnitineitedennictenccerncnncccsnnccsemnmecetioene 24

ee ee eae

NAACP v. New York

RE en 22

New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe

Line Co.,

690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (Sth Cir. 1982) .... 23

Pennsylvania v. Rizzo

530 F.2d SO1, SOS (3d Cir.), cert. denied

sub nom.

Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania

I aii rstercerinsaiaensncetenensceemenmnel ».. 23

Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.

606 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1979) ...... 15, 16, 18

State of California v. Block

FS &, Re. 8, 15

United States v. California Co-Operative Canneries

I ia scssenineeenntenensnnees 12

United States v. General Motors Corp.

EE EE ee TE 24

United States v. Hooker Chemicals of Plastics Corp.

749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984) 00... 19, 20-25

Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

$42 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976) ............ ecodatens 22

Wade v. Goldschmidt

673 F.2d 182, 196 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982) ............... 23

Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.

ee GF me Be A | 7, Seen 17, 18

Williams v. Morgan

of ¢ 2 x . sn 12

—iv— : —

Statutes TE EE A EES a TOR 5

a TEE AE A aT Re RENT RN 5

ES Se om 3

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen- TD id ccrenincemasnbiamninmsedenneenttansnenencouseusenennassonnn 8

sation, and Liability Act of 1980 i 5

(“CERCLA”)

§ 104(a)(1), 42 US.C. § 9604(a)( 1) 1 3, 5 42 US.C.§ 1331 SOCCER EEE EEE EEE EERE EERE EEE EEE EEE EEE HEHEHE HEHE RHEE ES 5

§ 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) ..n..ecccceceeceesescesees 3, 5 a ciicitaiiliseceness - eiiiidineaiiidtiiiaiiesnintiulieetis 5

§ 107(a), 42 US.C. § 9607(a) I a ccsccinselsissensiesinattiamiciba dailies 15

§ 113), 42 U.S.C. § 96130)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure State

SIT IIE Giuicudishiietsehitacensecotininesdinentionnn

FE 6, 16 California Health & Safety Code

Federal Water Pullution Control Act (the “Clean § 25358.3 SOCCER OEE EEE E EEE TERETE EERE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE SESE SEES NEES E EE EEE EEES 5

Water Act” or “CWA”) SS) 25300-25395 CORREO E EEE EEE EEE EEE E EEE EE EES 5

§ 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(C)(1) ceecccecescessesseeseene 4

vam § 04a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) ceeccccessscssseee 4, 5, 19 Other Authorities

wmmmS SOS, 33 USC. § 1365 nercrecsrernssnenneneenenn 4, 6

: 3B Moore’s Federal Practice at 24-163

aeaap anal Environments: Potisy Act ) a 12, 14

Rs ID icsseicscctsstcinccnctecencessitisocons 15 |

H. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong.

a. and Recovery Act Ne ceuamsebunnommnnes 25

ne 4 S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong.

§ 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) -.ocececseesseeens 4, 5, 19 ER NN 25

Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) Supreme Court Rules

§ 1431(a), 42 U5S.C. § 300i(a) ho 4, 5, 6, 19 Rule 18 Tee CUCU CSE e ee eee Tee ere eee eee eet ee eee eee ee eee) x

§ 1449, 42 USC. § 300j-2 EE 4, 6 SE oe <a x

A a re 9

EER a 3, 8 .

I inci ncditibicssineainlabitiiilbainabaldiiedibiahioed passim

SEMEN a | a OE 3, 17

‘ No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

—_

October Term, 1984

J. B STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW

QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW

QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC.;

BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE

CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;

NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH

COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;

RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING

CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO.;

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR

INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER CO.,

’ Petitioners,

vs.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and

PENNY NEWMAN,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue

to review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding on

March 18, 1985.

OPINIONS BELOW

The first opinion of the Ninth Circuit, entered June 4,

1984, was reported in the advance sheets of the Federal

Reporter at 734 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1984) but was withdrawn

before publication of the permanent bound edition of such

reporter. That opinion is reported unofficially at 20 Env’t

Rep. (BNA) 2233 (9th Cir. 1984).

A second opinion of the Ninth Circuit, entered on

September 6, 1984, after rehearing, is a memorandum

decision, reported unofficially at 21 Env’t

Rep. (BNA) 2046 (9th Cir. 1984).

The Ninth Circuit’s order reversing in part, vacating in

part and remanding to the District Court, entered

March 18, 1985, is reported at 755 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.

1985). The order states that an opinion explaining the

reasons for the March 18, 1985 order “will follow;” that

opinion has not yet been issued.

The District Court’s Order Granting Leave to Intervene

is reported unofficially at 20 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1659 (C.D.

Cal. 1984).

The various opinions and orders of the Court of Appeals,

and the District Court’s Order Granting Leave to

Intervene, are reproduced in their entirety in the Appendix

hereto.

JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit's initial opinion granting petitioners’

motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction was

entered June 4, 1984. Upon reconsideration, the Ninth

Circuit withdrew its initial opinion and entered its

September 6, 1984 decision. A Petition for Reconsideration

and Suggestion For Reconsideration En Banc was filed by

petitioners on September 20, 1984. The Ninth Circuit

denied such petition by order entered October 26, 1984.

After briefing on the merits, the Ninth Circuit, on

March 18, 1985, entered its judgment in the form of a per

curiam order which stated that its “opinion will follow.”

Petitioners seek review of the March 18, 1985 judgment.!

By an order entered on May 30, 1985 (Order No. A-907),

Justice Rehnquist extended the time for filing a petition for

writ of certiorari in this matter to and including August 1,

1985. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

1. 28US.C.§ 1291

2. 28US.C.§ 1292

3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-

tion and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”):

§ 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)( 1)

§ 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)

§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)

4. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rule 24

'Petitioners seek review of both the merits of the March 18, 1985

judgment and the decision of the Ninth Circuit that it had jurisdiction to

hear Intervenors’ appeal. Although the Ninth Circuit addressed the

jurisdictional issue in its September 6, 1984 opinion, the jurisdictional

issued is properly presented in this petition because the September 6,

1984 opinion was not a final “judgment” under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) and

because the Ninth Circuit, by entering its March 18, 1985 decision,

obviously rejected the jurisdictional arguments contained in the brief on

the merits filed by petitioners in the Ninth Circuit.

5. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the “Clean

Water Act” or “CWA”:

§ 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)

§ 504(a), 33 U.S.C.§ 1364(a)

§ 505, 33 U.S.C.§ 1365

6. Resource Conservation and Recovery’ Act

(“RCRA”):

§ 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972

§ 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a)

7. Safe Drinking Water Act(“SDWA”):

§ 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a)

§ 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300}-8

8. Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 25358.3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The action underlying this petition was commenced in

April .983 by the United States of America and the State of

California (collectively, the “Governmental Plaintiffs’’) in

the United States District Court for the Central District of

California to assert claims respecting the clean-up of the

Stringfellow waste disposal site located near Glen Avon,

California. Among the more than thirty original defendants

named in the action are the former owners of the

Stringfellow site, persons who allegedly transported

materials to the site and persons who allegedly generated

materials which were disposed of at the site. More than 100

additional entities have been named as third party

defendants. Jurisdiction in the District Court was asserted

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 and 42 US.C. §§ 300i,

1321(b)(2), 1331, 1364, 6973, 9613(b).

Five of the Governmental Plaintiffs’ claims for relief

against defendants are asserted under the so-called

“emergency relief” or “substantial endangerment” provi-

sions of four separate federal statutes and one state statute.”

These five claims (the “Emergency Relief Claims”) seek

injunctive relief with respect to alleged endangerments to

the environment in and around the Stringfellow site. The

Governmental Plaintiffs also have asserted four claims

under the cost recovery provisions of various federal and

state statutes. Such claims (the “Cost Recovery Claims”)

seek recovery of funds already expended and to be

expended in the future for the clean-up of the Stringfellow

site. The Governmental Plaintiffs also assert that the

Stringfellow site is a public nuisance under state law.

In July of 1983, Concerned Neighbors in Action, a

corporation, and Penny Newman (collectively,

2The Governmental Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief is asserted under

Section 106(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). The

Third Claim for Relief is asserted under Section 7003 of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6973. The

Fourth Claim for Relief is asserted under Section 504 of the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act (the “Clean Water Act”), 33 U.S.C.§ 1364.

The Sixth Claim for Relief is asserted under Section 1431(a) of the Safe

Drinking Water Act (“SDWA"), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a). The Eleventh

Claim for Relief is asserted under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25358.3.

These and other relevant statutes are reproduced in the appendix hereto.

3The Governmental Plaintiffs’ Second, Fifth, Seventh and Righth

Claims for Relief are based upon the following four statutes: Sections

104 and 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9707(a); Section 311 of

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.§ 1321; Section 107 of the CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. § 9607; and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25300-25395.

“Intervenors”) petitioned the District Court for leave to

intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) and/or

permissively under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Intervenors’

proposed Complaint in Intervention asserted nine claims

that were virtually identical to the Governmental Plaintiffs’

Emergency Relief and Cost Recovery Claims. In addition,

the proposed Complaint in Intervention asserted eight new

claims, consisting of claims for personal injury and other

individualized damages and “claims in intervention”

purportedly advanced under the citizen suit provisions of

three federal statutes.4

By its Order Granting Leave to Intervene (the “Order”),

entered on February 17, 1984, the District Court held that

Intervenors were not entitled to intervene as of right but

granted Intervenors leave to intervene permissively under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Order specifically allowed

Intervenors to advance claims in intervention with respect

to all of the Governmental Plaintiffs’ claims in which

intervention was sought, except the Cost Recovery Claims.*

However, the Order prohibited Intervenors from asserting

“their individualized damage and other claims.” Slip op. at

28. This limitation was imposed because the court found

that “allowing applicants to assert their individualized

damage and other claims would burden and expand an

“Claims in intervention” were asserted under Section 505 of the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; Section 7002 of RCRA, 42 US.C.

§ 6972; and Section 1449 of SDWA, 42 U.S.C.§ 300}-8. ;

5The District Court found that Intervenors’ only interests in

advancing Cost Recovery Claims were their interests as taxpayers, and

were thus insufficient to give standing to pursue such claims. Intervenors

did not address this part of the District Court's holding in their appeal to

the Ninth Circuit and presumably have abandoned their arguments that

they should be entitled to pursue such claims.

already complex litigation and could jeopardize the

possibility of settlement.” Jd.

In an effort “to minimize delay and confusion involved

in discovery in this large, complex case,” the Order also

required Intervenors to meet and confer with all parties and

obtain the concurrence of at least one other party before

initiating discovery or motions. Slip op. at 19. However, the

Order confirmed that Intervenors, as parties, “shall have

the right to attend all other depositions and to participate to

an extent not duplicative of the original parties, and to

receive copies of all discovery to the same extent as any

other party herein.” Jd.

Pursuant to the Order, Intervenors filed a modified

Complaint in Intervention on or about July 24, 1984, and

are now parties to the ongoing District Court action.

After filing the Complaint in Intervention, Intervenor

Newman and approximately 5074 other residents of the

Glen Avon area® commenced an action in the Riverside

County Superior Court of the State of California asserting

claims against more than 100 defendants (including all of

the original defendants in this proceeding) for damages and

other relief relating to the Stringfellow site. Intervenors’

State court complaint purports to assert causes of action for

negligence, strict products liability, strict liability for

ultrahazardous activity, breach of warranty, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, trespass, nuisance, misrep-

resentation, inverse condemnation and maintenance of a

dangerous condition.

*Intervenor Concerned Neighbors In Action purports to represent

more than 400 residents of Glen Avon, California, many or all of whom

are presumably plaintiffs in the Riverside County Superior Court action.

Notwithstanding the grant of leave to intervene and the

actual filing of their Complaint in Intervention, Intervenors

immediately filed a notice of appeal to seek appellate review

of the Order by the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit. The Governmental Plaintiffs and defendants

moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the Order

was not a final and appealable order. In an opinion dated

June 4, 1984 and originally reported at 734 F.2d 436 (9th

Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit, relying upon decisions from

this Court and from three other circuits, held that the Order

was not immediately appealable and dismissed the appeal.

On September 6, 1984, however, the Ninth Circuit

withdrew its initial opinion in response to Intervenors’

petition for rehearing which asserted that the court’s

opinion was inconsistent with State of California v. Block,

690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). In the September 6, 1984

opinion, the court, without elaboration, held simply that

Block was controlling and that “{djenial of intervention as

of right is a final appealable order, despite the grant of

permissive intervention.” A Petition for Reconsideration

and Suggestion for Reconsideration En Banc was denied by

the Ninth Circuit on October 26, 1984.’

7On December’ 20, 1984, Petitioners filed with this Court a Petition for

a Writ of Certiorari seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s September 6,

1984 decision. The petition, which was assigned Case No. 84-999, was

filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(e) and Supreme

Court Rule 18 and sought this Court’s review of the jurisdictional issue

before final judgment in the Ninth Circuit. Pursuant to Rule 29.3 of the

Rules of this Court, the Solicitor General requested and received an

extension of time to March 22, 1985 to file a brief in response to the

petition. Before the expiration of the extension of time, the Ninth Circuit

entered its March 18, 1985 judgment, thereby mooting petitioner’s desire

of obtaining pre-judgment review of the jurisdictional issue. Accord-

ingly, petitioners moved for voluntary dismissal of the petition to allow

After briefing on the merits and oral argument, the Ninth

Circuit entered its judgment in the form of the March 18,

1985 per curiam order. That order reversed the District

Court’s denial of intervention as of right, vacated the grant

of leave to intervene permissively and remanded the action

to the District Court for further proceedings. The Ninth

Circuit’s March 18, 1985 order does not give any reasons

for the decision but states that “[a]n opinion will follow.”

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion still has not been issued.

Shortly before the time for filing a petition for writ of

certiorari to seek review of the March 18, 1985 judgment

was set to expire, petitioners submitted to Justice Rehnquist

an application for an extension of time to file such a

petition. The application was submitted on the grounds that

under the existing circumstances — where the Ninth

Circuit has entered its judgment but has delayed the

issuance of its opinion — it would be difficult for

petitioners to draft, and nearly impossible for this Court to

consider meaningfully, a petition for certiorari seeking

review of the merits of the March 18, 1985 judgment. On

May 30, 1985, Justice Rehnquist granted an extension of

time for filing such a petition to and including August 1,

1985.

Inasmuch as the extension of time granted by Justice

Rehnquist is about to expire and the Ninth Circuit still has

not issued its opinion, petitioners are filing this petition for

certiorari based upon the record now available. Petitioners

respectfully submit that the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional

them to file the present petition which seeks review of both the

jurisdictional issue and the Ninth Circuit's decision on the merits. The

Court, on May 1, 1985, dismissed the petition in case No. 84-999

pursuant to Rule 53.

— =

analysis justifies the immediate issuance of the requested

writ. Meaningful consideration of the second issue

presented by this petition (relating to the merits of the

Ninth Circuit’s March 18, 1985 judgment) may not be

possible until the Ninth Circuit issues its opinion. Thus

Petitioners respectfully request that this Court not act upon

this petition until after the Ninth Circuit issues its opinion.

Petitioners further respectfully request leave to amend this

petition or to file supplemental briefing once the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion is issued.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should grant the petition for certiorari to

resolve the conflicts created by the Ninth Circuit’s

jurisdictional analysis and its decision on the merits.

The reasoning and holding of the Ninth Circuit that it

has jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal from an order

granting permissive intervention but denying intervention as

of right is in conflict with the standards governing appeals

of intervention and other interlocutory orders, established

in a series of decisions by this Court. In addition, the

decision of the Ninth Circuit directly conflicts with three

other decisions on the same issue rendered by three

different Courts of Appeals. Given the inconsistency

between the decision of the Ninth Circuit in this case and

the decisions of this Court, petitioners respectfully submit

that it is appropriate for this Court to reverse or vacate

summarily under Rule 23.

While little can be said of the legal analysis of the Ninth

Circuit’s decision on the merits pending issuance of its

opinion, the result reached by the Ninth Circuit in this case

— a determination that Intervenors are entitled to intervene

|

as of right in this “emergency relief” action — is in conflict

with a recent decision of the Second Circuit. The result

reached by the Ninth Circuit under the facts of this case

also suggests that the Ninth Circuit departed from the legal

standards applied by this Court and by various circuit

Courts of Appeals in appeals from intervention orders.

Accordingly, this Court should grant a writ of certiorari

to review and resolve the conflicts created by the Ninth

Circuit’s holdings on jurisdiction and on the merits.

1, THE JURISDICTIONAL DECISION

BELOW IS CONTRARY TO DECISIONS

OF THIS COURT

The jurisdictional decision of the Ninth Circuit is in

conflict with this Court's interpretation and application of

the so-called ‘final judgment” and “collateral order”

doctrines of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it allows intervenors

to appeal immediately from orders granting intervention

even though such intervenors also have a right of appeal

upon final disposition of a case.

The “final judgment” standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 has

repeatedly been applied by this Court to avoid multiple and

“piecemeal appeals” arising from the component elements

of the same dispute. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting

Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978) (appeal of order denying class

certification dismissed). Such decisions curtail “the

obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting

the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals

from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise,

from its initiation to entry of judgment.” Cobbledick y.

United States, 309 US. 323, 325 (1940).

ais

In 1947, this Court, in Brotherhood of Railroad

Trainmen y. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 331 U.S. 519 (1947),

specifically applied the final judgment standard to orders

respecting intervention and established a series of rules

concerning the jurisdiction of appellate courts to review

intervention orders. In allowing an appeal where a putative

intervenor as of right was not permitted in any respect to

became a party to the underlying action, this Court opined

that orders denying permissive intervention are not

immediately reviewable because a permissive intervenor “‘is

at liberty to assert and protect his interests in some more

appropriate proceeding” while orders denying intervention

altogether where an absolute right to intervene has been

claimed are appealable “since [the applicant] cannot appeal

from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding.”

331 U.S. at 524. In short, Brotherhood of Railroad

Trainmen establishes that an intervention order is

immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 only if the

intervenor is not able to protect its rights in some other

fashion, such as an “appeal from a subsequent order or

judgment.” 331 U.S. at 524.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision allowing an immediate

appeal of an order granting permissive intervention but

denying intervention as of right is at-odds with Brotherhood

of Railroad Trainmen and the “final judgment” doctrine

because Intervenors, as parties to the district cgurt

proceedings, may protect their rights by appealing from the

final disposition of the case. See, United States v. California

Co-operative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 559 (1929) (“an

appeal by one who was permitted to intervene, like an

appeal by one of the original parties, must be taken direct to

this Court”); Williams v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684, 696 (1884)

(intervenor had right to appeal from final judgment); 3B

Moore’s Federal Practice at 24-169 (2d ed. 1982) and cases

=

cited therein.Instead of requiring Intervenors to pursue and

protect their interests in the district court and in any appeal

from final judgment, the Ninth Circuit has authorized

Intervenors to forestall and multiply the proceedings by

commencing an immediate appeal of one of the component

elements of the litigation. In so acting, the Ninth Circuit has

scuttled the reasoning and mandate of Brotherhood of

Railroad Trainmen.

The inherent inconsistency between the Ninth Circuit’s

September 6, 1984 opinion and Brotherhood of Railroad

Trainmen is apparent from the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in

its own June 4, 1984 opinion. There, the Ninth Circuit,

citing Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, opines that an

interlocutory appeal of an intervention order is appropriate

only where “{ilmmediate review is necessary to protect the

interests of the applicant.” Slip op. at 3. The Ninth Circuit’s

June 4, 1984 opinion goes on to explain that immediate

review of an order permitting intervention is unnecessary

(even if intervention as of right is denied concurrently)

because such an order permits the applicant for intervention

to become a party to the action and to protect its rights

through participation in all subsequent proceedings,

including post-judgment appeals. Slip op. at 3-4. All of this

analysis, which flows from this Court’s decision in

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, was subsequently

abandoned without explanation by the Ninth Circuit when

it granted a rehearing and reinstated the Intervenors’appeal

on September 6, 1984.

The analysis undertaken by this Court in more recent

decisions further confirms that an order granting

permissive intervention but denying intervention as of right

is not immediately appealable. Under this Court’s decisions,

an order will be considered fina! and appealable only if such

=o

order will “conclusively determine the disputed question,

resolve an important issued separate from the merits of the

action and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a

final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 US.

463, 468 (1978). An order granting permissive intervention

but denying intervention as of right fails to meet this

standard because it may be reviewed on appeal from a final

judgment. See 3B Moore's Federal Practice at 24-163 et seq.

(2d ed. 1982) and cases cited therein.

2. THE JURISDICTIONAL DECISION

BELOW IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT

WITH DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE

FIRST, SECOND AND FIFTH CIRCUITS

In its June 4, 1984 opinion, the Ninth Circuit

acknowledged and followed decisions from three other

circuits which all held that orders granting permissive

intervention but denying intervention of as right are not

immediately appealable. The Ninth Circuit specifically

observed that two of the other circuits had relied upon “the

strong federal policy against piecemeal appeals” in

dismissing such interlocutory appeals. Slip op. at 4. The

Ninth Circuit also observed that “because intervenors [in

the cases from the other circuits] were allowed to intervene

as parties with full appellate rights, they could protect their

interests adequately on appeal from a final decision.” Slip

op. at 3-4. The Ninth Circuit adopted this analysis from the

other circuits and concluded “that imposing restrictions on

permissive intervention does mot render that decision

immediately reviewable, absent obvious prejudicial error.”

Slip op. at 3.

In its September 6, 1984 opinion, however, the Ninth

Circuit withdrew its initial opinion and held, on the basis of

—

State of California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982),

that “[dJenial of intervention as of right is a fina! appealable

order despite the grant of permissive intervention.”® In so

holding and in refusing to reconsider Block en banc (as

requested by petitioners), the Ninth Circuit elected to

depart from the analysis and holdings of three other circuits

in an apparent effort to maintain consistency of law within

the Ninth Circuit.?

The Ninth Circuit's decision in this action conflicts with

the decisions from the First, Second and Fifth Circuits. In

Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. 606 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.

1979), for example, the Second Circuit held that an order

denying full intervention as of right but granting limited

permissive intervention “for the purpose of participating in

... Settlement approval hearings” was not final or

appealable.'° In so holding, the Secu.id Circuit opined:

®Block involved an appeal of an injunction and judgment entered

against the Forest Service for failing to comply with the National

Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332 (1976). In

connection with the post-judgment appeal, an intervenor in the case also

challenged the district court's order granting permissive intervention but

denying intervention as of right. None of the other parties in the case

briefed the intervention question. The Ninth Circuit held that the appeal

of the intervention order was untimely because the order was final and

appealable immediately upon its entry by the district court. 690 F.2d at

776.

°The Block decision was not discovered by any of the parties or by the

Ninth Circuit in this case until after the Ninth Circuit's June 4,1984

opinion was issued because of what appears to be a misprint in the Block

opinion. The Block opinion refers to an application for intervsntion

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19a) instead of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

Accordingly, Block is not listed in the annotations under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24, nor was it retrieved by the parties in their computer searches

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.

‘The district court in Shore apparently denied intervention as of right

= =

The order ... made appellants parties to the

litigation, thus giving them the right to appeal

from an unsatisfactory final order. On that appeal,

this Court may review the district court’s refusal

to grant all of appellants’ requested relief ....

The district-eourt’s order is therefore interlocu-

tory and cannot now be reviewed on appeal.

}

606 F.2d at 357 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit

expressly noted that its holding was intended to “comport

with the Supreme Court’s [long-established] policy against

piecemeal appeals.’ ”” 606 F.2d at 357 quoting Gardner v.

Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. 437 U.S. 478 (1978) and

Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).

Shore was followed by the First Circuit in Kartell v. Blue

Shield, 687 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1982). There, intervenors who

had sought intervention permissively and as of right

appealed from an order granting limited or conditional

intervention.'!' The First Circuit dismissed the appeal,

holding that the order was “not appealable under either 28

because it found that two of the three elements necessary for

intervention as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) — the so-called

“impairment of interest” and “adequacy of representation” elements —

were not established by the applicants in Shore. 606 F.2d at 357. The

Second Circuit found and held that the district court’s findings on these

“were not prejudicially erroneous.” Id. at 357-58.

'The district court in Kartell “did not indicate whether it had acted

under authority of Rule 24(a) or Rule 24(b)” in allowing intervention.

687 F.2d at 548. However, as set forth in the portion of the First

Circuit’s opinion quoted in the text above, the First Circuit found it

unnecessary to determine the basis for the district court’s action because

intervenors had a right of appeal at the conclusion of the proceedings

regardless of the basis for the district court’s action.

we

U.S.C. § 1291 or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” 687 F.2d at 554.

The Court stated:

We ... conclude that the district court’s order in

the case at bar should be treated as a grant of

intervention, and as such is not now appealable.

The intervenors were allowed to intervene, and as

parties to the suit with full appellate rights in this

action, can adequately protect their interests on

appeal from a final decision. They are therefore

distinguishable from would-be intervenors who if

denied intervention altogether are without appel-

late rights unless allowed immediately to appeal.

Regardless of whether intervenors are in fact

intervenors of right or whether they are entitled to

raise the new claims contained in their complaint

in intervention, these questions can be resolved

upon completion of the proceedings before the

district court with no more prejudice to the

intervenors than is caused to any litigant properly

denied interlocutory review of an unfavorable

order. Their asserted need to protect their right of

full intervention does not justify circumventing

the strong federal policy against piecemeal

appeals.

687 F.2d at 550 (citations omitted).

The Fifth Circuit has also held that an order denying

intervention as of right but granting limited permissive

intervention is not immediately appealable. In Wheeler v.

American Home Products Corp, 582 F.2d 891 (Sth Cir.

1977), intervenors appealed after final judgment from the

district court’s earlier order granting limited leave to

intervene “not as of right, but as a matter of permission.”

=

582 F.2d at 894.'2 The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected

appellee’s argument that the appeal was untimely, opining,

“the order ... did not deny intervention. It allowed

intervention as a matter of discretion. Under the established

rule, the order was not appealable.” 582 F.2d at 896. The

Fifth Circuit thus proceeded to review the intervention

exder in connection with the appeal from the final

judgment.

Each of these decisions from the First, Second and Fifth

Circuits are founded upon the holdings and analysis of

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and its progeny. Indeed,

the Second Circuit’s opinion in Shore expressly relies upon

the three major decisions of this Court which are cited in

Section 1 above: Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen;

Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); and

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).

The First Circuit’s opinion in Kartell adopts the same

analysis. Petitioners respectfully submit that the decisions

of the First, Second and Fifth Circuits are in accord with

the controlling precedents of this Court and that the Ninth

Circuit’s departure from such precedents warrants issuance

of a writ of certiorari in this action.

"The fact that intervenors in eler sought intervention as of right

is apparent from their argument| that the existing parties did not

adequately represent their interests, an element required for intervention

as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a@). See, 582 F.2d at 894.

a

3. THE DECISION ON THE MERITS

BELOW IS IN CONFLICT WITH A

DECISION FROM THE SECOND CIR-

CUIT.

The ¢ecision of the Ninth Circuit that Intervenors here

are entitled to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(a) is directly contrary to a recent Second Circuit case

with facts virtually identical to the facts of the case at bar.

In United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,

749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984), four environmental

organizations appealed from the district court’s order

denying intervention in an action by the United States and

the State of New York seeking, among other things,

recovery of the costs of cleaning up a four-acre waste

disposal site located in New York. Like the case at bar, the

governmental plaintiffs in Hooker asserted claims for relief

under § 1431 of Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”), 42

U.S.C. § 300i; § 7003 of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6973; and § 504 of

the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1364. 749 F.2d

at 970-71. All of these statutes allow the government to

commence actions where conditions or conduct create “an

imminent and substantial endangerment” to public health

or welfare.

The environmental organizations in Hooker, many or all

of whose members were “directly affected” by the pollution

flowing from the disposal site, sought to intervene as of

right under the citizen suit provisions of each of the above

statutes and under the standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(a)(2) (“Rule 24(a)(2)”). 749 F.2d at 969. At least two

of the organizations also sought permissive intervention

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(6) (“Rule 24(b)”). Id. at 973-74.

= =

The district court denied intervention as of right and also

denied permissive intervention but allowed and “strongly

encouragdd] each of the applicants to participate” as

amicus curiae in the proceedings. 749 F.2d at 976. In a

scholarly opinion by Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit

affirmed, holding that (i) intervention as of right was not

appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) (“Rule 24(a)(1)’”)

because none of the statutes relied upon granted a right to

intervene, and (ii) intervention as of right was not

appropriate under Rule 24(a)(2) because the applicants’

interests were adequately represented by the governmental

plaintiffs in their capacity as parens patriae.

Although the Ninth Circuit’s decision to delay the

issuance of its opinion in this action precludes any in-depth

comparison of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis with that of the

Second Circuit in Hooker, the result reached by the Ninth

Circuit is squarely in conflict with that reached by the

Second Circuit. Like Hooker, the case at bar is one being

pursued by the federal and state governments under the

“imminent and substantial endangerment” or so-called

“emergency relief” provisions of a variety of federal and

state statutes. Like the proposed intervenors in Hooker,

Intervenors here claim to be “directly affected” by the

alleged contamination that is the subject of the action. Like

the proposed intervenors in Hooker who did not want to

prejudice “tort claims” the claimed to have against the

United States and the State of New York for apparent

improper handling of the site, Intervenors here claim that

the governmental plaintiffs are culpable and liable for

conditions at the Stringfellow site. Finally, like the proposed

intervenors in Hooker, Intervenors here argued below that

intervention as of right is appropriate either under the

“citizen suit” provisions of the SDWA, RCRA and CWA

or under the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Under

=— =

these circumstances, the conflict between the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in this action and the Second Circuit's in

Hooker will continue to exist regardless of whether the

Ninth Circuit ultimately seeks to justify its March 18, 1985

Order under Rule 24(a)(1) or Rule 24(a)(2).

To the extent that the Ninth Circuit relies upon

Rule 24(aX(1) to justify the result announced in its

March 18, 1985 Order, a clear conflict concerning the

proper interpretation of the SDWA, RCRA and CWA

exists. The Second Circuit in Hooker, citing a number of

lower court decisions and other authorities, squarely held

“that neither the CWA nor the SDWA nor the RCRA

affords [applicant for intervention] a statutory right to

intervene in a government initiated action under the

emergency powers provision of those acts.” 749 F.2d at 978.

Intervenors in the case at bar cited no statutory bases, other

than the three statutes relied upon in Hooker, upon which

the right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1) could arguably be

granted in this action. Thus, insofar as the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in this action is based upon Rule 24(a)(1), it is

inconsistent with Hooker and a writ of certiorari should be

granted by this Court to resolve the conflict.

Similarly, a confiict with Hooker exists to the extent the

Ninth Circuit relies upon Rule 24(a)(2) to justify its

decision reversing the district court's denial of intervention

as of right. Rule 24(a)(2) provides that intervention as of

right should be granted where an applicant for intervention

“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction

which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that

the disposition of the action may as a practical matter

impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless

the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing

parties.” While Intervenors in this action appear to satisfy

~~ we

the first portion of this standard, thev, like the proposed

intervenors in Hooker, are adequate / represented by the

governmental plaintiffs suing on behalf of their citizens.

Indeed, as set forth more fully above, Intervenors here are

in precisely the same position as the applicants for

intervention in Hooker. Inasmuch as the case at bar is, for

purposes of applying Rule 24, factually identical to Hooker,

the difference in the results reached by the Second and

Ninth Circuits can only be attributed to application of

differing legal standards.

The delay in the issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion

prevents petitioners from determining precisely what legal

standard was applied by the Ninth Circuit in reaching its

decision. However, based upon the briefing and oral

argument in the Ninth Circuit, petitioners believe that the

legal standard applied by the Ninth Circuit is in conflict

with Hooker and decisions of this Court in at least two

respects. First, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit departed

from an “abuse of discretion” standard in reviewing the

district court’s determinations with respect to the various

elements required to be established for intervention under

Rule 24(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit’s decision is in conflict

with this Court’s decision in NAACP v. New York, 413 US.

345, 366 (1973) (timeliness prong of Rule 24(a)(2) must be

reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard) and

decisions from at least three other circuits. See, e.g., Hooker,

749 F.2d at 990-91; Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United Airlines,

515 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975).

Second, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit failed to

require that Intervenors make “a strong affirmative

showing that the sovereign is not fairly representing [their]

interests,” the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with

= =

Hooker and decisions from the Third, Fifth, and District of

Columbia Circuits, all of which require “that, in litigation

of this sort, a greater showing that representation is

inadequate should be required.” Hooker, 749 F.2d at 985

citing Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied suo nom. Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania,

426 U.S. 921 (1976); Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council v.

Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 970, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1982); New

Orleans Public Service, Inc. . United Gas Pipe Line Co,

690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (Sth Cir. 1982); Wade ».

Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 186 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1982).

Once the Ninth Circuit issues its opinion, the precise legal

standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in reaching its

March 18, 1985 decision will become known and the legal

issues to be considered by this Court may be narrowed and

more easily identified. Accordingly, as noted above,

petitioners respectfully request that the Court allow

petitioners to supplement this petition upon issuance of the

Ninth Circuit’s opinion and that the Court not act upon the

second issue presented by this petition until such opinion is

issued.

4. THE DECISION BELOW IS RIPE FOR

REVIEW

This Court unquestionably has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1254 to review decisions of the Courts of Appeals

which do not represent final judgments. See, e.g., Forsyth v.

City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897). This Court has

repeatedly exercised its discretion to review issues on

certiorari prior to final judgment in underlying district

court actions, where, as here, “the interest of judicial

economy” is better served by a prompt resolution of the

questions presented than by postponement of review until

~_

entry of a final judgment. See, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 US.

97, 115 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting from the Court’s grant

of certiorari).

Review on certiorari is necessary to resolve a conflict in

the circuits created by the decision in this case. Judicial

economy is not served by postponing correction of the

conflict created by the Ninth Circuit. The delay would only

result in uncertainty in the Courts of Appeals and an

increase in the number of decisions subject to review for

error on the questions presented by this petition. For these

reasons, this Court has granted certiorari prior to final

judgment in order to resolve conflicts on a number of

occasions. See, e.g., Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S.

at 515; United States v. General Motors Corp. 323 US. at

373, 377 (1945); Myers v. Bethleham Shipbuilding Corp., 303

US. 41, 43-44 (1938).

Indeed, the procedural posture of this case is virtually

identical to that of two recent cases decided by this Court:

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981)

and Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984). In both

of these cases, the Court granted certiorari prior to final

judgments to resolve conflicts among the circuits on

whether orders granting or denying disqualification of

counsel are appealable.

Moreover, there are compelling reasons for granting the

writ in this particular case. The underlying action is one of

many initiated by federal and state authorities under

RCRA, SDWA, CWA and the Comprehensive Environ-

mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

(“CERCLA”) to facilitate the clean-up of active or

abandoned waste disposal sites. The United States

~/ Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that as of

1979, “as many as 30,000 to 50,000 [such] sites existed, of

which between 1,200-2,000 present a serious risk to public

health.” H. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18

(1980). Congress itself enacted CERCLA believing that

many such sites constitute a “serious threat to our Nation’s

pubiic health and environment.” S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th

Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). While the extent of inis national

problem remains unclear, there is little doubt that the

government, potentially responsible parties, citizens living

near the sites and, ultimately, the nation as a whole have

compelling interests in addressing the problem before the

scope and expense of clean-up becomes unmanageable and

before the public health is threatened.

Piecemeal appeals from the component elements of

emergency relief actions under these various federal

statutes, such as the appeal heard by the Ninth Circuit in

this case, unnecessarily and seriously prejudice and delay

the parties’ abilities to resolve such actions. The likely result

of such piecemeal appeals is an increase in the difficulty

and ultimate expense of cleaning-up waste disposal sites.

Given the number of waste disposal sites which are now,

or may in the future become, the subject of governmental

enforcement actions and the desire of environmental and

industrial groups to participate in such actions, judicial

economy and uniformity of law will best be served by

resolving the issues presented by this petition at this time.

Both Hooker and the case at bar aptly establish the

willingness of the parties involved in governmental

enforcement actions to pursue vigorously their perceived

rights at every level of the federal court system. So long as

the decision entered by the Ninth Circuit in this case

remains the law of that circuit and so long as a conflict

exists among the circuits on the issues presented by this

petition, federal courts at all levels should expect to be

_—

besieged with disputes concerning the role and rights of

intervenors in all actions under CERCLA, RCRA, SOWA

AND CWA. a hasan

For all of these reasons, delaying review of the questions

presented by this petition until after a trial in the district

court would be inappropriate in this case. This Court should

exercise its discretion to review the issues presented at this

time.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow an immediate

appeal of an order granting permissive intervention but

denying intervention as of right is at-odds with the decisions

of this Court and the decisions of three other circuits

following this Court’s directives. Moreover, the Ninth

Circuit’s decision that Intervenors here are entitled to

intervene as of right is in conflict with a recent decision

from the Second Circuit. The interests of judicial economy

and uniformity of national law justify immediate correction

of these conflicts. Petitioners respectfully request hat a writ

of certiorari be granted and the decision of the Ninth

Circuit reversed or vacated.

—_— =

Respectfully submitted,

LATHAM & WATKINS

David L. Mulliken (Counsel of

Record for Petitioners)

Steven P. McDonald

Robert P. Dahlquist

LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS

Maureen E. Mahoney

Counsel for Petitioner

Montrose Chemical Corporation

of California

HELLER, EHRMAN, WHITE &

McAULIFFE

Richard Goff

Rene P. Tatro

44 Montgomery Street

San Francisco, California 94104

Counsel for Petitioners Alumax,

Inc. and Hunter Engineering

McCUTCHEN, DOYLE, BROWN &

ENERSEN

Barry P. Goode

Three Embarcadero Center

San Francisco, California 94111

Counsel for Petitioner

Rohr Industries

— =

CHASE, ROTCHFORD, DRUKKER

& BOGUST

Vincent Fish

606 South Olive Street

Los Angeles, California 90014

Counsel for Petitioner

Weyerhaeuser Co.

LEWIS, D’AMATO, BRISBOIS &

BISGAARD

Christopher P. Bisgaard

Suite 300

261 S. Figueroa Street

Los Angeles, California 90012

Counsel for Petitioners

J.B. Stringfellow, Jr.

Stringfellow Quarry Company and

Stringfellow Quarry Co. Inc.

FOLGER & LEVIN

Michael A. Kahn

Douglas Sullivan

5O California Street

San Francisco, California 94111

Counsel for Petitioner

The Deutsch Company

= =

LaFOLLETTE, JOHNSON,

SCHROETER & DEHAAS

Robert E. Kelly

320 North Vermont Avenue

Los Angeles, California 90004

Counsel for Petitioner

Rainbow Canyon Manufacturing

Corp.

PACHTER, GOLD & SCHAFFER

Cliford L. Schaffer

6th Floor

6420 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90048

Counsel for Petitioner

Pos’ Transportation Co.

MUNGER, TOLLES &

RICKERSHAUSER

Peter R. Taft

612 South Flower Street

Los Angeles, California 90017

Counsel for Petitioners

Northrop Corporation and

Rockwell International Corp.

SIDLEY & AUSTIN

Charles S. Vogel

Robert I. McMurry

2049 Century Park East

Los Angeles, California 90067

Counsel for Petitioner

BKK Corporation

McCUTCHEN, BLACK, VERLEGER

& SHEA

Richard Doty

Michael Hickok

600 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90017

Counsel for Petitioner

Rheem Manufacturing Co.

APPENDIX

A-1

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES of America

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, Jr., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

Concerned Neighbors In Action and

Penny Newman,

Intervenors-Appellants. °

No. 84-5682.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

March 18, 1985

Before GOODWIN and REINHARD uit Judges,

and SOLOMON,” District Judge.

ORDER

The portion of the order of February 17, 1984 denying

appellants’ motion to intervene as of right is reversed. The

portion of the order granting appellants leave to intervene

permissively is vacated. Upon remand appellants shall be

granted leave to intervene as of right.

* Hon. Gus D. Solomon, Senior United States District Judge fo the

District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

rT ~.

In view of the decision set forth above, we need not

decide the question as to the appropriateness of the

conditions that the district court attached to the appellants’

participation as a Permissive intervenor. We, of course,

express no view as to what conditions, if any, may

appropriately be placed upon the appellants’ participation in

the litigation in their capacity as intervenors as of right, or

upon the participation of any other parties to the litigation.

An opinion will follow.

REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND

REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

No. CV-83-2501-MML

United States District Court

Central District of California

United States of America, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

J. B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al.,

Defendants.

Concerned Neighbors in Action,

etc., et al.,

Intervenors

United States Department of the Air Force,

et al.,

Third Party Defendants.

February 17, 1984

The motion of Concerned Neighbors in Action (“CNA”)

and Penny Newman came on for hearing before the Court,

the Honorable Malcolm M. Lucas, District Judge,

presiding, on October 3, 1983. Having carefully considered

the papers filed and the oral argument of counsel, the Court

grants CNA and Newman leave to intervene permissively

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).

FACTS

Plaintiffs United States of American and the State of

California filed svit on April 21, 1983 seeking an order

|

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compelling (1) abatement of the releases and threatened

releases of hazardous substances from the Stringfellow Acid

Pits, located in Glen Avon, California; (2) all actions

necessary to remedy the conditions which have caused or

may contribute to or present an imminent and substantial

endangerment to the public health, welfare and environ-

ment caused by such releases; and (3) reimbursement of all

funds expended by plaintiffs for the response, removal, and

remedial costs and damage to natural resources. Plaintiffs

named thirty-one waste generator, transporter, and owner

individuals and companies as defendants in the action.

CNA, a non-profit corporation, and Penny Newman, a

resident, taxpayer, Gien Avon property owner, and

chairperson of CNA, have moved the Court for leave to

intervene. The applicants assert an unconditional right to

intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)

(intervention as of right) and the right to intervene by

permission of the Court pursuant to Rule 24(b).

Plaintiffs oppose intervention as of sight, and support

permissive intervention. Plaintiffs urge that certain

conditions be placed on such intervention.

Defendants oppose applicants’ motion for intervention as

of right, but concede that CNA and Newman may

intervene permissively, subject to limitations that the Court

may impose in its discretion.

DISCUSSION

The Court concludes, for the following reasons, that

applicants cannot intervene as of right. The Court permits

applicants to intervene under Rule 24(b) subject to certain

conditions.

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(1) Intervention as of Right

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action: (1) When a statute of the United

States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or

(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the

property or transaction which is the subject of the action

and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may

as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect

that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately

represented by existing parties.

(a) No statute Confers an Unconditional Right

to Intervene

Applicants argue that they have the right to intervene

under:

(1) Section 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(i)(a); (“SDWA”)

(2) Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 6973; (“RCRA”)

(3) Sections 514 and 311 of the Clean Water

Act, 33 US.C.§§ 1364, 1321 (“CWA”).

Thé@@ourt will discuss each statute in turn.

Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 300(iXa)

Plaintiffs assert in their First Amended Complaint, Sixth

Claim for Relief, a claim under the “Emergency Powers”

provision of the SDWA. This provision states:

the Administrator [of the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency], upon receipt of information that a

contaminant which is present in or is likely to

enter a public water system may present an

imminent and substantial endangerment to the

health of such persons, may take such actions as

he may deem necessary in order to protect the

health of such persons... The action which the

Administrator may take may include ... (2)

commencing a civil action for appropriate relief,

including a restraining order or permanent or

temporary injunction. 42 U.S.C. § 300(i)(a).

Applicants contend that the “Citizen suit” provision of

the SDWA confers an unconditional right to intervene in

this “imminent danger” proceeding by the Administrator.

This “Citizen suit” section provides:

(a) Except as provided in §§ (b) of this section,

any person may commence a civil action on his

own behalf —

(1) against any person .. . who is alleged to be

in violation of any requirement prescribed by or

under this title. . . .

. -(6) No civil action may be commenced —

(1)... .B) If the Administrator, the Attorney

General, or the State has commenced and is

diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of

the United States to require compliance with such

requirement, but in any such action in a Court of

the United States any person may intervene as a

matter of right... .”

42 U.S.C. § 300j-8. (Emphasis added.)

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The Court finds that the right to intervene set forth in the

Citizen Suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 300}-8, is limited to cases

in which the Administrator seeks compliance with a

“requirement” of the SDWA. Plaintiffs in the instant case

do not seek such compliance, but sue for injunctive relief to

remedy an “imminent and substantial endangerment to

health.” SDWA’s citizen suit provision does not apply. See

Town of North Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 482

F.Supp. 900, 904 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (Court dismissed

plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 300}-8, stating that the

statute authorized a civil action only where a violation of a

regulation prescribed by or under the Act was alleged).

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42

U.S.C. § 6973

Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for Relief, First Amended

Complaint, is based on the “imminent Hazard” provision of

RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (9182) which provides in part:

upon receipt of evidence that the handling,

storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of

any solid waste or hazardous waste may present

an imminent and substantial endangerment to

health or the environment, the Administrator may

bring suit . . . to immediately restrain any person

contributing to such handling, storage, treatment,

transportation, or disposal to stop such

handling. . . or to take such other action as may be

necessary. .

Applicants CNA and Newman seek to intervene under

RCRA’s citizen suit provision, which is similar to that of

SDWA:

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(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)

of this section, any person may commence a civil

action on his own behalf (1) against any person

. .. who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,

standard, regulation, condition, requirement or

order which has become effective pursuant to this

Act;

(6b) No action may be commenced under

paragraph (a)(1) of this section ... (2) if the

Administrator or State has commenced and is

diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in

a court of the United States or a state to require

compliance with such permit, standard regulation,

condition, requirement, or order; provided, how-

ever, that in any such action in a court of the

United States, any person may intervene as a

matter of right.

42 US.C.§ 6972 (Emphasis added.)

Like that of SDWA, the Citizen Suit provisions of

RCRA do not mention any right to intervene in actions

brought pursuant to the Administrator’s emergency powers.

United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation,

540 F.Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).

In Hooker, supra, the court held that the Citizen Suit

provision of RCRA did not confer a right to intervene in

the Imminent Hazard provision.

The federal government sued Hooker, owner of an

industrial waste disposal facility, pursuant to the emergency

relief provision of RCRA and other statutes. Local

property owners and a public interest group applied to

intervene based on RCRA’s Citizen Suit provision. The

court allowed intervention in the government’s emergency

relief action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 6973.

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The court pointed out that RCRA’s Citizen Suit

provision extended only to RCRA actions seeking

compliance with a “permit, standard, regulation, condition,

requirement, or order.” 540 F.Supp. at 1080-1081 n. 7.

Plaintiffs in Hooker, like those in the instant case, did not

seek such compliance, but injunctive relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 6973. Id.

The Court is not persuaded by applicants’ claim that the

Imminent Hazard section of RCRA “provides an

alternative or supplementary procedure” to the Citizens

Suit section. Applicants cite United States v. Olin

Corporation. Civil Action No. 80-PT-5300-NE (N.D. Ala.

1982), an unpublished opinion, in support of their

argument. In Olin, the City of Triana, Alabama, moved to

intervene in a suit by the United States against Olin

Corporation pursuant to inter alia, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a) and RCRA § 6972.

The court stated that, in its complaint, the United States

generally categorized Olin’s activities as being “unlawful,”

Id. At p.4. The City therefore had the right to intervene

pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.§ 1365(6)(1)(B),

by virtue of Section § 1365(f), which defined “effluent

standard or limitation” as “(1) an unlawful act under

subsection (a) of Section 1311 of this title.” Id. Without

citing any authority, the Olin court then found that because

of RCRA § 6973(a)’s similarity to CWA § 1364, RCRA’s

citizen suit provision also allowed intervention. Contra

Hooker, supra, and United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical

Corporation, 546 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (Court

stated that § 6973 was never intended to “be used as a

substitute procedure for chronic and recurring pollution

problems that may be dealt with under other status.” 546

F.Supp. at 1110).

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_ Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 *

Applicants also claim that the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1365, provides a statutory right to intervene.

However, the Court finds that, like that of RCRA and

SDWA, the plain language of the statute’s emergency relief

and citizens’ suit provisions does not confer such an

unconditional right to intervene.

Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief are based

on Sections 504 and 311 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.§ 1364 and

§ 1321, nespectively.

Section 504 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364

provides as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this

Act, the Administrator [of the Environmental

Protection Agency] upon receipt of evidence that

a pollution source or combination of sources is

presenting an imminent and substantial endanger-

ment to the health of persons . . . may bring suit

on behalf of the United States in the appropriate

district court to immediately restrain any person

causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to

stop the discharge of pollutants causing or

contributing to such pollution or to take such

other action as may be necessary.

Section 311 prohibits the discharge of hazardous

substances into navigable waters of the United States,

providing that whenever such substance is discharged or

there is a substantial threat of such discharge the President

is authorized to act to remove this substance. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(6)(3) and (c).

Finally, Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, provides for

citizens suits:

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Section 505 states in pertinent part:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this

section, any citizen may commence a civil action

on his own behalf

(1) against any person .. . who is alleged to be in

violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation

under this chapter or (b) an order issued by

Administrator or a State will respect to such a

standard or limitation. . .

The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to

enforce such an effluent standard or limitation or

such an order . . . as the case may be, and to apply

any appropriate civil penalties under section

309(d) of this Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1319).

(b) No action may be commenced — under

subsection (a)(1) of this section — if the

Administrator or State has commenced and is

diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in

a court of the United States, or a State to require

compliance with the standard, limitation, or order,

but in any such action in a court of the United

States any citizen may intervene as a matter of

right. 33 U.S.C.§ 1365. (Emphasis added.)

Section 5O05(f) defines the term “effluent standard or

limitation”:

The term “effluent standard or limitation under

this Act’ means (1) effective July 1, 1973, an

unlawful act under subsection (a) of Section 301

of this Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1311); (2) an effluent

limitation or other limitation under section 301 or

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302 of this Act (33 U.S.C § 1311 or 1312); (3)

standard of performance under section 306 of this

Act (33 U.S.C. § 1316); (4) prohibition, effluent

standard pretreatment standards under section

307 of this Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1317); (5) certification

under section 401 of this Act (33 U.S.C. § 1341);

or (6) a permit or condition thereof issued under

section 402 of this Act (33 U.S.C. § 1342), which

is in effect under this Act (including a

requirement applicable by reason of section 313 of

this Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1323).

The Court concludes that, because violations of §§ 1321

and 1364 are not expressly enumerated among the

violations of “effluent standards or limitations,” citizens do

not have a statutory right to intervene in emergency relief

actions under 33 U.S.C.§ 1365.

The legislative history of the Clean Water Act is

consistent with this finding. The Senate Report stated:

“The provision in this bill is carefully restricted to actions

where violations of standards and regulations or a failure

on the part of officials to act are alleged.” S. Rep. No. 414,

92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1972) U.S. Code Cong.

and Ad. News 3745.

Finally, judicial interpretations of the Clean Water Act’s

citizen suit provision seem also to preclude intervention by

applicants in the emergency relief proceedings. For

example, in Stream Pollution Control Board y. United

States Steel Corporation, 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975),

plaintiff sued under the federal common law of nuisance to

abate pollution of a Lake Michigan tributary. A private

citizen claimed an unconditional right to intervene under

the citizen suit provision of the CWA. Upholding the

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district cout’ denial of the motion to intervene, the

Seventh Circuit stated:

Under 33 US.C. § 1365(6)(1)(B) ... a private

citizen ... is entitled to intervene if, and only if,

the underlying action was commenced and is

being prosecuted to require compliance with a

’standard, limitation, or order’ within the meaning

of the 1972 Act. We hold that an action to abate a

nuisance ... is not such an action and that the

motion to intervene was therefore correctly

denied. Id. at 1041.

In the instant case, plaintiffs like that of plaintiff in Stream

\Control, seek to abate an imminent and substantial

endangerment. This is not an action to require compliance

with a “standard, limitation, or order,” therefore, § 1365

does not confer any right to intervene on applicants in this

suit.

In addition, the court’s discussion of § 1365 in City of

Philadel phia v. Stepan Chemical Company 544F Supp. 1135

(E\D. Pa. 1982) supports this view. In Stepan, the court held

that the citizen suit provision of CWA did not provide the

City with a cause of action for damages: cleanup cost in

removing hazardous substances discharged into the

Delaware river in violation of 33 U.S.C.§ 1321.

The court stated that § 1365 “evidence(d) a congressional

intent to carefully channel citizen participation in the

enforcement of the Act ... its sole purpose is to provide

private parties with a mechanism to compel the

enforcement of effluent standards promulgated pursuant to

the Act.” Id. at 1145, 1146. Spl Applicants CNA and

Penny Newman cite United States v. Hooker Chemicals &

lastics Corporation, 540 F.Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982),

in support of their motion to intervene under CWA. Indeed,

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in Hooker, the court held that the citizen suit provision of

SWA allowed intervention, but that of RCRA did not. (See

discussion of RCRA, supra). Unlike the Stringfellow case,

the underlying action in Hooker involved claims for relief

under § 1319 of CWA. Section 1319 authorizes penalties

for violations of the “effluent standards” established by

§ 1311. The citizen suit provision, § 1365, expressly

authorizes suits on such claims.

In conclusion, the Court finds that none of the statutes

cited by applicants expressly confer “‘an unconditional right

to intervene” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. Proc. 24(a)(1).

(b) No Intervention as of Right under

Fed.R.Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2)

The Ninth Circuit has established a four-part test for

determining whether applications to intervene as of right

should be granted pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2):

(1) The applicant’s motion must be timely;**

(2) The applicant must assert an interest

relating to the property or transaction;

(3) The applicant must be so situated that

without intervention, the disposition may, as a

practical matter, impair or impede his ability to

protect that interest; and

(4) The applicant’s interest must be adequately

. represented by the other parties.

Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. vy Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir.

1983) (Citing Smith v. Pangilinan, 651 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. .

** The parties agree that the application was timely.

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1981)). Applying this test to the instant case, the Court finds

that applicants do not properly intervene under 24(a)(2).

(1) Applicants have an “Interest”

An applicant for intervention need only show that she has

a “protectable interest” in the outcome of the litigation of

sufficient magnitude to warrant inclusion in the action.

Smith, supra. It is obvious that applicants CNA and Penny

Newman possess such an interest: Living and working in

the neighborhood of the Site, they claim a direct and

substantial interest in the immediate abatement of further

toxic waste releases, and cleanup of past releases.

(2) Practical Impairment of Applicants’ Inter-

ests

The purpose of the second requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)

is to allow intervention by those who might be practically

disadvantaged by the disposition of the action. 7A Wright,

Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1908,

p. 514. Stare decisis may supply this practical disadvantage;

however, the stare decisis problem is “greatly lessened

where there are parties already in the suit whose position on

the issues is the same as the absent parties.” Blake v. Pallan,

$55 F 2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977).

(3) Adequate of Current Representation

For the purposes of determining adequacy of current

representation, the Ninth Circuit has outlined a three-part

test:

(i) Are the interests of the present party in the

suit sufficiently similar to that of the absentee

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such that the legal arguments of the latter will

undoubtedly be made by the former;

(ii) Is that present party capable and willing to

make such arguments, and

(iii) If permitted to intervene, would the

intervenor add some necessary element to the

proceedings which would not be covered by the

parties in the suit?

County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980).

In addition to this showing, applicants must overcome the

presumption of adequacy of representation by state and

federal governmental agencies: “In the absence of a very

compelling showing to the contrary, it will be assumed that

the United States adequately represents the interest of its

citizens ... The very rare cases in which a member of the

public is allowed to intervene . . . are cases in which a very

strong showing of inadequate representation has been

made. 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra at § 1909, pp. 528-

531 (Citing Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El Paso Natural

Gas Co., 386 U.S.129 (1967)).

Under the Ninth Circuit test and the — #7 of a

compelling showing of inadequate representation, applic-

ants cannot properly intervene under Rule 24 (a)(2).

() Applicants and Existing Parties Share

Similar Interests

- Both applicants and plaintiffs seek the expeditious

abatement and cleanup of the Stringfellow site. However,

applicants allege certain “conflicts of interest” among

existing plaintiffs that would hinder vigorous litigation by

existing plaintiffs. For example, applicants allege that the

United States Air Force was the ninth largest dumper of

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toxic wastes at the site, but plaintiffs have not named it as a

defendant.

However, the United States agrees that permissive

intervention is appropriate with respect to the claims of

intervenors seeking relief against the Air Force. The Court

finds that both federal and state governments, by initiating

the suit and vigorously advocating their claims, actively

represent the interests of the applicants. In addition,

existing defendants have filed counterclaims against

plaintiffs, and thus share similar interests of proposed

intervenors in their claims against the government.

(ii) Existing Parties are Capable and Willing to

Make these Arguments

Applicants assert seventeen claims in their proposed

complaint. The factual allegations and the first nine claims

almost duplicate the First Amended Complaint. The

,2pplicants’ adoption of the allegations and claims of the

First Amended Complaint demonstrates that existing

plaintiffs are capable and willing to make these arguments.

Applicants’ claims for nuisance, strict liability and

negligence, while noi part of the plaintiffs’ suit, will not be

impaired by allowing the existing parties to complete the

litigation on the present claims.

(iii) No Necessary Element will be Added by

Intervention

Although applicants CNA and Penny Newman, as

residents of Glen Avon, have suffered more directly and

immediately from the effects of the toxic wastes, this point

of view does not add any “necessary” element to the suit.

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Finally, regarding the showing of inadequacy of

representation required, applicants argue that they need

make only a “minimal” showing of inadequacy. In support

of this contention, applicants cite Sagebrush Rebellion,

supra.

In that case, the Sagebrusl. |ebellion, a non-profit group

interested in land use, sued the Secretary of Interior. The

group challenged the legality of (former) Secretary

Andrus’s actions in recommending the creation of a

national conservation area in Idaho.

The Audubon Society (and fifteen others) sought to

intervene as of right, as they supported the creation of the

conservation area. The Ninth Circuit found that Audubon

demonstrated sufficient interest and inadequacy of current

representation. In finding Secretary Watt’s representation

inadequate, the court emphasized that he was previously

head of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, which

represented Sagebrush Rebellion in the action.

Sagebrush represented a special case in which applicants

for intervention were defending the actions of a former

government official against a group which had been

represented by the present secretary. In the instant case,

applicants have cited no similar “changes in viewpoint”

which satisfy their burden of showing inadequacy of

representation by existing parties.

In conclusion, the Court finds that although applicants

have an interest in the litigation, their interests are

adequately represented by existing parties, and they cannot

intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2).

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(2) Permissive Intervention

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(b) provides in relevant part: (b)

Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone

may be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when an

applicant’s claim or defense“and the main action have a

question of law or fact in common... In exercising its

discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention

will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights

of the original parties.

As discussed earlier in this Order, the first nine claims in

applicants’ proposed complaint in intervention are identical

to those in plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. Thus, the

two have common questions of fact or law, and permissive

intervention is appropriate.

Pursuant to Rule 24(b), the Court imposes conditions

upon granting applicants’ motion to intervene. 7A Wright,

Miller & Kane, supra at § 1922, p. 623-624; Van Hoomissen

v. Xerox Corp., 497 F.2d 180, 181 (9th Cir. 1974).

The Court therefore imposes the following conditions on

intervention:

(1) No Claims Shall Be Asserted Which Have

Not Been Asserted by the Original Parties

The Court finds that allowing applicants to assert their

individualized damage and other claims would burden and

expand an already complex litigation, and could jeopardize

the possibility of settlement. Applicants are thus permitted

to intervene in the litigation of the issues raised by the

original parties.

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(2) Applicants May Not Intervene in Cost

Recovery Claims

The applicants can assert no claim with a question of law

or fact in common with the Second, Fifth, Seventh and

Eighth claims of the First Amended Complaint. In these

claims, the governments seek reimbursement under

CERCLA for the costs of cleaning up the site. Thus,

applicants’ interest is more like that of a taxpayer, and they

lack standing to pursue these claims. See Flast v. Cohen, 392

U.S. 83 (1968).

(3) Restrictions on Intervenors’ Power to Initi-

ate Discovery or Motions

The Court wishes to minimize any delay and confusion

involved in discovery in this large, complex case. Therefore,

the Court holds that applicants may initiate no motion or

discovery unless they have (a) met and conferred with all

parties or their authorized representatives; (b) and obtained

the concurrence of at least one current party to the

initiation of such motion or discovery. The Court

emphasizes that applicants shall have the right to attend all

depositions and to participate to an extent not duplicative of

the original parties, and to receive copies of all discovery to

the same extent as any other party herein.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve,

by United States mail, copies of this Order on counsel for

the parties in this matter.

/

4

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MALCOLM M. LUCAS

Malcolm M. Lucas

United States District Judge

Dated: February 17,1984

——

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No. 84-5682

In the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

United States of America, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appeliees,

vs.

J.B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Concerned Neighbors in Action

and Penny Newman,

Intervenors-Appellants.

Filed June 4, 1984

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

District Judge Malcolm M. Lucas, Presiding

Submitted April 23, 1984

Before: WRIGHT, SKOPIL, and NORRIS, Circuit J udges.

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

The Unite? “tates and the State of California sued 31

defendants connected with the Stringfellow Acid Pits, a

hazardous waste dumpsite near Glen Avon, California. The

defendants are former owners of the dumpsite, persons

alleged to have transported materials to the dumpsite, and

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those alleged to have generated materials deposited there.

Plaintiffs seek recovery of costs expended in cleaning up

the dumpsite and injunctive relief under federal and state

Statutes.

Appellants sought leave from the district court to

int@rvene both as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and

permissively under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Appellants are

Concerned Neighbors in Action, comprised of residents,

taxpayers, and property owners in the vicinity of the

dumpsite, and Penny Newman, co-founder and chair of

Concerned Neighbors in Action.

The district court denied appellants’ motion for leave to

intervene as of right but granted permissive intervention,

subject to conditions. The intervenors may not assert claims

other than those asserted by the parties, may not join in

plaintiffs’ cost recovery claims, and may not file a motion

or initiate discovery unless they confer with all parties and

obtain the permission of at least one party to do so.

The intervenors appeal from the district court’s denial of

their motion to intervene as of right. They assert that the

district court order is reviewable immediately under the

collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial

Loan Corp, 337 US. 541, 545-47 (1949), and under 28

U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1) as the denial of injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs and some defendants have moved to dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The motions to dismiss were

granted in an order entered May 1, 1984. This opinion

explains our prior action.

Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for leave to intervene

as of right is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a final

order. Country of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th

Cir. 1980). The unsuccessful applicant for intervention is

not a party and cannot appeal from the final judgment in

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the litigation. Brotherhood of [Railway Trainmen vy.

Baltimore & Ohio R.r., 331 U.S. 519, 524 (1947). Immediate

review is necessary to protect the interests of the applicant.

An order allowing intervention is not a final order,

however, and is not appealable. Van Hoomissen v. Xerox

Corp. 497 F.2d 180, 181 (9th Cir. 1974). While the district

court denied intervention as of right, it granted permissive

intervention with restrictions.

We conclude that a denial of intervention as of right is

not immediately reviewable when the diserict court grants

permissive intervention. The intervenors’ interests are

protected adequately by their participation as permissive

intervenors. See Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.,

582 F.2d 891, 894-97 (Sth Cir. 1977).

Because the district court imposed conditions upon

appellants’ intervention, however, arguably the permissive

intervention was denied in part. See Van Hoomissen, 497

F.2d at 181. Denial of permissive intervention is appealable

if there is an abuse of discretion. Id.

Two other circuits have held that imposing restrictions on

intervention as of right does not render that decision

immediately reviewable. Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc, 687

F.2d 543, 549-50 (1st Cir. 1982); Shore v. Parklane Hosiery

Co., 606 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1979). Those courts stated

that because the intervenors were allowed to intervene as

parties with full appellate rights, they could protect their

interests adequately on appeal from a final decision.

Kartell, 687 F.2d at 550; Shore, 606 F.2d at 357. Both

courts noted the strong federal policy against piecemeal

appeals. Kartell, 687 F.2d at 550; Shore, 606 F.2d at 357.

For the same reasons, we conclude that imposing

restrictions on permissive intervention does not render that

decision immediately reviewable, absent obvious prejudicial

A-25

error. See Shore, 606 F.2d at 357. We find no such error

here. The appellants can protect their interests adequately

on appeal from the final decision.

Appellant’s assertion that the order is appealable under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as a denial of injunctive relief is

meritless also. To establish appealability under that section,

the “must show more than that the order has the practical

effect of refusing an injunction.” Carson v. American

Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981). They have not shown

the requisite “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence s]”

or inability to challenge the order effectually at some other

point. Id.

The motions to dismiss this appeal are granted. The

dismissal is without prejudice to the intervenors’ right to

appeal after the district court enters a final decision.

A-26 A-27

Appendix The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The appeal

will be calendared for a decision on the merits in due

No. 84-5682 course.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

United States of America, et al.

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.

J. B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al,

Defendants-Appellees.

Concerned Neighbors in Action,

A non-profit Corporation, et al,

Intervenors-Appellants

September 6, 1984

Before: WRIGHT, SKOPIL, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

The opinion filed on June 4, 1984 is withdrawn. A

petition for rehearing has advised us that we did not

consider the effect of State of California ». Block, 690 F.2d

753 (9th Cir. 1982) in the prior opinion. That case was not

cited in the briefs or at oral argument and it was not

discovered earlier because its discussion of intervention

cited the wrong Rule of Civil Procedure which resulted in

improper indexing.

It appears that Block controls and is not distinguishable

from this case. Denial of intervention as of right is a final

appealable order, despite the grant of permissive inter-

vention. Block, 690 F.2d at 776.

A-28

No. 84-5682

United States Cougt of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

United States of America

Plaintiff -Anpellee,

vs.

J. B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al,

Defendants-Appellees.

Concerned Neighbors in Action,

Penny Newman,

Intervenors-Appellants

October 26, 1984

Before: W ral GHT, SKOPIL, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

The panel as constituted has denied the petition by

appellee Montrose Chemical Corporation for reconsider-

ation. Judges Skopil and Norris have voted to reject the en

blanc suggestion.

The active judges of the court have considered the

suggestion of en banc review. No judge has requested a vote

on it.

The petition for reconsideration is denied and the en banc

suggestion is rejected.

The appellants’ request to publish the order of

September 6, 1984, is denied. Their motion to expedite is

granted.

This briefing schedule will be followed:

Appellants’ opening brief will be filed by November 15,

1984. Appellees’ answering briefs are due by December 7,

1984. A reply brief may be filed by December 17, 1984.

A-29

The clerk will calendar the case as $@o0n as practicable.

The parties shall comply with page limitations established

in Fed. R. App. P. 28(g). The district court is requested to

forward the certificate of record as soon as practicable.

A-30

STATUTES INVOLVED

1. 28U.S.C.§ 1291:

§ 1291. Final decision of district courts

The courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of appeals

from all final decisions of the district courts of the United

States, the United States District Court for the District of

the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the

District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where direct

review may be had in the Supreme Court.

2. 28U.S.C.§ 1292:

§ 1292. Interlocutory decisions

(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this

section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of

appeals from:

(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts

of the United States, the United States District

Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the

District Court of Guam, and the District Court of

the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof,

granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or

dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or

modify injunctions, except where a direct review

may be had in the Supreme Court;

(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers,

or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to

take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof,

such as directing sales or other disposals of

property;

A-31

(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district

courts or the judges thereof determining the rights

and liabilities of the parties of admiralty cases in

which appeals from final decrees are allowed.

(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be

of the opinion that such order involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

differences of opinion and that an immediate appeal from

the order may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.

The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion,

permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application

is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:

Provided, however, that application for an appeal hereunder

shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the

district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof

shall so order.

(c) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction —

(1) of an appeal from an interlocutory order or

decree described in subsection (a) of this section

in any case over which the court would have

jurisdiction of an appeal under section 1295 of

this title; and

(2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil

action for patent infringement which would

otherwise be appealable to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final

except for an accounting.

(d)(1) When the chief judge of the Court of

International Trade issues an order under the

provisions of section 256(b) of this title, or when

A-32

any judge of the Court of International Trade, in

issuing any other interlocutory order, includes in

the order a statement that a controlling question

of law is involved with respect to which there is a

substantial ground for difference of opinion and

that an immediate appeal from that order may

materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit

an appeal to be taken from such order, if

application is made to that Court within ten days

after the entry of such order.

(2) When any judge of the United States

Claims Court, in issuing an interlocutory order,

includes in the order a statement that a

controlling question of law is involved wi

respect to which there is a substantial ground fi

difference of opinion and that an immediate

appeal from that order may materially advance

the ultimate termination of the litigation, the

United §tates Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to

be taken from such order, if application is made to

that Court within ten days after the entry of such

order.

(3) Neither the application for nor the granting

of an appeal under this subsection shall stay in

proceedings in the Court of International Trade

or in the Claims Court, as the case may be, unless

a stay is ordered by a judge of the Court of

International Trade or of the Claims Court or by

the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit or a judge of that court.

A-33

3. Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act

(“CERCLA”):

Section 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1):

(a) Removal and other remedial action by President;

applicability of national contingency plan; definition

(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is

released or there is a substantial threat of such a

release into the environment, or (B) there is a

release of substantial threat of release into the

environment of any pollutant or contaminant

which mav present in imminent and substantial

danger to the public health or welfare, the

President is authorized to act, consistent with the

national contingency plan, to remove or arrange

for the removal of, and provide for remedial

action relating to such hazardous substance,

pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including

its removal from any contaminated natural

resource), or take any other response measure

consistent with the national contingency plan

which the President deems necessary to protect

the public health or welfare of the environment,

unless the President determines that such removal

and remedial action will be done properly by the

owner or operator of the vessel or facility from

which the release or threat or release emanates, or

by any other responsible party.

Section 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a):

(a) Maintenance, jurisdiction, etc.

In addition to any other action taken by a State or local

government, when the President determines that there may

be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public

health or welfare or the environment be@ause of an action

or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a

facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United

States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate

such danger or threat, and the district court of the United

States n the district in which the threat occurs shall have

jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and

the equities of the case may require. The President may

also, after notice to the affected State, take other action

under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such

orders as may be necessary to protect public health and

welfare and the environment.

Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a):

(a) Covered persons; scope

Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of iaw, and

subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this

section.

(1) the owner and operator of a_ vessel

(otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States) or a facility,

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of

any hazardous substance owned or operated any

facility at which such hazardous substances were

disposed of,

(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or

otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or

arranged with a transporter for transport for

disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances

owned or possessed by such person, by any other

party or entity, at any facility owned or operated

by another party or entity and containing such

hazardous substances, and

(4) any person who accepts or accepted any

hazardous substances for transport to disposal or

treatment facilities or sites selected by such

person, from which there is a release, or a

threatened release which causes the incurrence of

response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be

liable for -

(A) all costs of removal or remedial action

incurred by the United States Government or a

State not inconsistent with the national contin-

gency plan;

(B) any other necessary costs of response

incurred by any other person consistent with the

national contingency plan; and

(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or

loss of natural resources, including the reasonable

costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss

resulting from such a release.

P\ Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rule 24:

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application

anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:

(1) when a statute of the United States confers an

unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant

claims an interest relating to the property or transaction

which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that

the disposition of the action may as a practical matter

impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless

A-36

the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing

parties. —

(6) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application

anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:

(1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional

right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim or

defense and the main action have a question of law or fact

in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of

claim or defense upon any statute or executive order

administered by a federal or state governmental officer or

agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or

agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or

executive order, the officer or agency upon timely

application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In

exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the

intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication

of the rights of the original parties.

(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve

a motion to intervene upon the parties in Rule 5. The

motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be

accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or

defense for which intervention is sought. The same

procedure shall be followed when a statute of the United

States gives a right to intervene. When the constitutionality

of an act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn

in question in any action to which the United States or an

officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a party, the court

shall notify the Attorney General of the United States as

provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 2403.

A-37

5. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the

“Clean Water Act” or “CWA”):

Section 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(cX1):

Removal of discharged oil or hazardous substances;

National Contingency Plan

(c)(1) Whenever any oil or a hazardous substance

is discharged, or there is a substantial threat of

such discharge, into or upon the navigable waters

of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into

or upon the waters of the contiguous zone, or in

connection with activities under the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act or the Deepwater

Port Act of 1974, or which may affect natural

resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under

the exclusive management authority of the United

States (including resources under the Fishery

Conservation and Management Act of 1976) the

President is authorized to act to remove or

arrange for the removal of such oil or substance at

any time, unless he determines su~h removal will

be done properly by the owner or operator of the

vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from

which the discharge occurs. f

Section 504(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a):

Emergency powers.

(a) Nectwithstanding any other provision of this chapter,

the Administrator upon receipt of evidence that a pollution

source or combination of sources is presenting an imminent

and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to

“\

A-38

the welfare of persons where such endangerment is to the

livelihood of such persons, such as inability to market

shellfish, may bring suit on behalf of the United States in

the appropriate district court of immediately restrain any

person causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to

stop the discharge of pollutants causing or contributing to

such pollution or to take such other action as may be

necessary.

Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365:

Authorization; jurisdiction

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,

any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf -

(1) against any person (including (i) the United

States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumen-

tality or agency to the extent permitted by the

eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is

alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent

standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an

order issued by the Administrator or a State with

respect to such a standard or limitation, or

(2) against the Administrator where there is

alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform

any act or duty under this chapter which is not

discretionary with the Administrator. _

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard

to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the

parties, t» enforce such an effluent standard or limitation,

or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform

such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any

appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this

title.

A-39

Notice

(b) No action may be commenced -

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section -

(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has

given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the

Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the

alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged

violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or

(B) if the Administrator or State has com-

menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or

criminal action in a court of the United States, or

a State to require compliance with the standard,

limitation, or order, but in any such action in a

court of the United States any citizen may

intervene as a matter of right.

(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior

to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of

such action to the Administrator, except that such

action may be brought immediately after such

notification in the case of an action under this

section respecting a violation of sections 1316 and

1317(a) of this title. Notices under this subsection

shall be given in such manner as the Adminis-

trator shall prescribe by regulation.

6. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(“RCRA”):

Section 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972:

(a) In general

A-40

Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section,

any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf -

(1) against any person (including (a) the

United States, and (b) any other governmental

instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted

by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution,

who is alleged to abe in violation of any permit,

standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or

order which has effective pursuant to this chapter;

or

(2) against the Administrator where there is

alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform

any act or duty under this chapter which is not

discretionary with the Administrator.

Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall

be brought in the district court for the district in which the

alleged violation occurred. Any action brought under

paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be brought in the

district court for the district in which the alleged violation

occurred or in the District Court of the District of

Columbia. The district court shall have jurisdiction, without

regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of

the parties, to enforce such regulation or order, or to order

the Administrator to perform such act or duty as the case

may be.

(b) Actions prohibited No action may be commenced

under paragraph (a)(1) of this section -

(1) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has

given notice of the violation (A) to the Adminis-

trator; (B)to the State in which the alleged

violation occurs; a.1d (C) to any alleged violator of

such permit, standard, regulation, condition,

requirement, or order; or

A-41

(2) if the Administrator or State has com-

menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or

criminal action in a court of the United States or a

State to require compliance with such permit,

standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or in

a court of the United States, any person may

intervene as a matter of right.

Section 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. §6973(a):

(a) Authority to Administer

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter,

upon receipt of evidence that the handling, storage,

treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or

hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial

endangerment to health or the environment, the Adminis-

trator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the

appropriate district court to immediately restrain any

person contributing to such handling, storage, treatment,

transportation or disposal to stop such handling, storage,

treatment, transportation, or disposal or to take such other

action as may be necessary. The Administrator shall

provide notice to the affected State of any such suit. The

Administrator may also, after notice to the affected State,

take other action under this section including, but not

liraited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to

protect public health and the environment.

7. Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”):

Section 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a):

Actions authorized against imminent and substantial

endangerment to health.

A-42

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchap-

ter, the Administrator, upon receipt of information that a

contaminant which is present in or is likely to enter a public

water system may present an imminent and substantial

endangerment to the health of persons, and that

appropriate State and local authorities have not acted to

protect the health of such persons, may take such actions as

he may deem necessary in order to protect the health of

such persons. To the extent he determines it to be

practicable in light of such imminent endangerment, he

shall consult with the State and local authorities in order to

confirm the correctness of the information on which action

proposed to be taken under this subsection is based and to

ascertain the action which such authorities are or will be

taking. The action which the Administrator may take may

include (but shall not be limited to) (1) issuing such orders

as may be necessary to protect the health of persons who

are or may be users of such system (including travelers),

and (2) commencing a civil action for appropriate relief,

including a restraining order of permanent or temporary

injunction.

Section 1448, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8:

Persons subject to civil action; jurisdiction of enforcement

proceedings

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,

any person may commence a civil action on his own

behalf -

(1) against any person (including (A) the

United States, and (B) any other governmental

instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted

by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)

A-43

who is alleged to be in violation of any

requirement prescribed by or under this subchap-

ter, or

(2) against the Administrator where there is

alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform

any act or duty under this subchapter which is not

discretionary with the Administrator. No action

may be brought under paragraph (1) against a

public water system for a violation of a

requirement prescribed by or under this subchap-

ter which occurred within the 27-month period

beginning on the first day of the month in which

this subchapter is enacted. The United States

district courts shall have jurisdiction, without

regard to the amount in controversy or the

citizenship of the parties, to enforce in an action

brought under this subsection any requirement

prescribed by or under this subchapter or to order

the Administrator to perform an act or duty

described un paragraph (2), as the case may be.

Conditions for commencement of civil action; notice

(b) No civil action may be commenced -

(1) under subsection (a)(2) of this section

respecting violation of a requirement prescribed

by or under this subchapter -

(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has

given notice of such violation (i) to the Adminis-

trator, (ii)to any alleged violator of such

requirement and (iii) to the State in which the

violation occurs, or

(B) if the Administrator, the Attorney

General, or the State has commenced and is

diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of

A-44 >

the United States to require compliance with such

requirement, but in any such action in a court of

the United States any person may intervene as a

matter of right; or

(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior

to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of

such action to the Administrator.

Notice required by this subsection shall be given in such

manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.

No person may commence a civil action under

subsection (a) of this section to require a State to prescribe a

schedule under section 300g-4 or 300g-5 of this title for a

variance or exemption, unless such person shows to the

satisfaction of the court that the State has in a substantial

number of cases failed to prescribe such schedules.

8. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25358.3

Imminent or substantial public endangerment;

removal or remedial actions; testing and investig-

atory actions and studies; contracts

(a) Whenever the director determines that there may be

an imminent or substantial endangerment to the public

health or welfare or to the environment, because of a release

or a threatened release of a hazardous substance, the

director may do any or all of the following:

_(1) Order any responsible party or parties to take

appropriate removal or remedial action necessary to protect

the public health and safety and the environment. No order

under this section shall be made to an owner of real

property solely on the basis of that ownership.

A-45

(2) Take or contract for any necessary removal or

remedial action.

(3) Request the Attorney General to secure relief that

may be necessary to abate the danger or threat. The

superior court of the county in which the threat or danger

occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant therelief which the

public interest and equities of the case may require.

(b) When the director determines that a release of a

hazardous substance has occurred or is about to occur, the

director may do any or all of the following:

(1) Undertake those investigations, monitoring, surveys,

testing, and other information gathering necessary to

identify the existence, source, nature, and extent of the

hazardous substances involved and the extent of danger to

the public health or environment.

(2) Undertake those planning, legal, fiscal, economic,

engineering, architectural, and other studies or investiga-

tions which are necessary or appropriate to plan and direct

response actions, to recover thecost of those actions, and to

enforce this chapter.

(c) Whenever there is a release or threatened release of a

hazardous substance into the environment, the director may

take or contract for any necessary removal or remedial

action and may take or contract for any actions authorized

by subdivision (b), in compliance with the provisions of this

chapter, including, but not limited to, subdivision (b) of

Section 25355.

A-46

SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES OF

PETITIONERS

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Petitioner

Alumax, Inc.:

Alumax Aluminum Corporation

Alumax Aluminum Sales Corporation

Alumax Bauxite Corporation

Alumax Building Specialties Corporation

Alumax Culvert Corporation

Alumax Dispatch Corporation

Alumax Export Corporation

Alumax Extrusions, Inc.

Alumax Fabricated Products, Inc.

Alumas Foil Industrial Redevelopment Corporation

Alumax Foils, Inc.

Alumax of Georgia, Inc.

Alumax of Maryland, Inc.

Alumax Mill Products, Inc.

Alumax Mobile Home Products of Florida, Inc.

Alumax of New South Wales, Inc.

Alumax Pacific Corporation

Alumax Quebec, Inc.

-Alumax Recycling Group, Inc.

Alumax Remelt Corporation

Alumax 6100 South Broadway Redevelopment Corpora-

tion

Alumax of South Carolina, Inc.

A-47

Alumax Technical Services, Inc.

Alumax Warehouse Corporation

Alumax of Washington, Inc.

Alumet Corporation

Alumet Holding Corporation

Decatur Aluminum Company, Inc.

Eastalco Aluminum Company

Eastalco Share, Inc. at

Hillyard Aluminum Recovery Corporation

Homefront, Inc.

Intalco Aluminum Corporation

K & S Products, Inc.

Kawneer Company, Inc.

Kawneer France, Inc.

Mt. Holly Plantation, Inc.

Quaker State Manufacuring Company

Resource Products Corp.

Sailor Mfg., Inc.

Texas Aluminum Company, Inc.

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of BKK

Corporation:

BKK Company of Nevada, Inc. (d/b/a Sun Television)

El Segundo Solid Waste Co., Inc. (d/b/a Eagle Refuse)

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Montrose

Chemical Corporation of California:

Chris Craft Industries, Inc.

A-48

Stauffer Chemical Corporation

Subsiffaries and Affiliates of Northrup

Corporation:

=

Alabama Industries, Inc.

Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A.(CASA)

DSD International DISC, Inc.

DSD International, Inc.

Electronica Basica, S.A. (ELBASA)

Fuller-Shuwayer Co., Ltd.

Northrop A viation Sales, Inc.

Northrop Data Systems, Inc.

Northrop Global, Inc.

Northrop Hueneme Corporstion

Northrop Intercontinental, Ltd.

Northrop International Airezait, Inc.

Northrop International Finance, N.V.

Northrop International, Inc.

Northrop International Services, Inc.

Northrop Korea Investments, Inc.

Northrop Overseas Services, Ltd.

Northrop Product Sales, Inc.

Northrop Radio Services, Inc.

Northrop Services, Inc.

Northrop Support Systems, Inc.

Northrop Technology Enterprise Co.

Northrop Universal, Ltd.

Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc.

A-49

__N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse Vleigtuigenfabriek

Fokker

Page Communications Engineers, Inc.

747 NOC I, Inc.

747 NOC II, Inc.

747 NOC III, Inc.

747 NOC IV, Inc.

Tiger Insurance Company, Ltd.

Wilcox Aviation Sales, Inc.

Wilcox Electric, Inc.

World Wide Wilcox, Inc.

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of The Deutsch

Company: )

Bowthorpe Holding, Limited

Compagnie Deutsch

Deutsch Aerospace Fittings Corp.

Deutsch Electromechanical Industries, Limited

Deutch Real Estate Development, Inc.

Nikko Deutsch

Permaswage S.A.

Sharir Precision Engineering, Limited

The Deutsch Company Electronic Components Division

The Deutsch Company Metal Components Division

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rheem

Manufacturing Co.:

Rheem Canada, Inc.

A-30 A-51

Rheem Puerto Rico, Inc.

Europlastique S.A.

Rheem Textile Systems, Inc. Flexible, Inc.

Romolus Holding Company Hills-McCanna Company

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rockwell magnon Ce. £46.

International Corp.: Industrias Erlo, S.A. de C.V.

Industrias Teluq, S.A.

AJ. Sage and Co., Pty. Limited Maine Electronics, Inc.

Amforge, Inc. Manufacturers Leasing Associates XX XV

Arpel, S.A. Metalpan S.A.

Atomics Internationa’, Inc. Metalurgica Carabobo, S.A. “Metalcar”

Audco-Rockwell lialiana S.R.L. MGD Graphic Systems, Inc.

Automotive Axles Limited Moligal Productora de Assentos de Automovel, Limitada

Autonetica, S.A. M.P. O’Rourke Pty., Limited

Autonetics, Inc. Narland Corporation

Braseixos S/A North American Aviation, Inc.

Brasprenas S/A North American Rockwell Corporation

Camdan Investment Trust, Limited Nottrim Services Limited

Collins International Service Company Naud Corporation

Collins Radio Company PHI Magnetronics Limited

Collins Radio Company of Japan, Ltd. Press Kogyo-Rockwell Co., Ltd.

Collins Radio Constructors, Inc. Racticon Corporation

Collins Systems International Inc. Rocketdyne Corporation

Compagnie Industrieiie de Mecanisaes, S.A. Rocketdyne, Inc.

Componantes Automotrices Rockwell-Standard y Com- Rockitt, Ltd.

pania Limitada ~ Rockwell Aerospace & Electronics, Inc.

Constantine Insurance Company, Ltd. Rockwell (Bermuda) Ltd.

Dina Rockwell Nacional S.A. Rockwell Cerdans, S.A.

Electronic Fabriek N.V.

Rockwell-Collins (Australasia) Pty. Ltd.

A-52

Rockwell-Collins (Far East) Limited

Rockwell-Collins (U.K.) Limited

Rockwell-Collins de Mexico, S.A.

Rockwell-Collins de Nogales, S.A. _

Rockwell-Collins France S.A.

Rockwell-Collins G.m.b.H. :

Rockwell-Collins International, Inc.

Rockwell-Collins Italiana S.p.A.

Rockwell CVC OMEVI S.p.A.

Rockwell do Brasil Industria e. Comercio Ltda.

Rockwell Financial Services Corporation

Rockwell Golde G.m.b.H.

Rockwell Golde Italiana S.p.A.

Rockwell Graphic Systems Limited

Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc.

Rockwell International Corporation

Rockwell International Credit Corporation

Rockwell International G.m.b.H.

Rockwell International Holdings Limited

Rockwell International Limited

Rockwell International Manufacturing Pte. Ltd.

Rockwell International of Canada Ltd.

_ Rockwell International Operations, Inc.

Rockwell International Overseas Capital Corporation

Rockwell International Overseas Corporation

Rockwell International Pension Trustees Limited

Rockwell International S.A. (France)

Rockwell International S.A. (Switzerland)

A-53

Rockwell International Sales Corporation

Rockwell International Systems, Inc.

Rockwell International Taiwan Company, Ltd.

Rockwell International Trading Company

Rockwell International Ventures, Inc.

Rockwell Limited

Rockwell Manufacturing Company

Rockwell-Maudslay Limited

Rockwell Mexicana, S.A.

L— /

Rockwell-Rimoldi da Amazonia, Industria e Comercio

Limitada ‘

Rockwell Rimoldi Espanola S.A.

Rockwell Rimoldi France S.A.

Rockwell-Rimoldi G.m.b.H.

Rockwell-Rimoldi (Great Britan) Limited

Rockwell-Rimoldi of America, Inc.

Rockwell-Rimoldi S.p.A.

Rockwell Shuttle Operations, Inc.

Rockwell-Standard Corporation

Rockwell-Standard de Venezuela C.A.

Rockwell Standard of Australia Limitea

Rockwell Systems Graphiques, S.A.

Rockwell Telecommunications Inc.

Rockwell Thompson Limited

Rockwell Transmission Company

Rockwell U.K. Limited

Rockwell Valves Limited

Rockwell Valves S.A.

A-M4

Rockwell Walther Australia Pty. Ltd.

Rockwell Western Trade Corporation

R.O.R. - Sevem S.A.

Rubery Owen-Rockwell (Europa) B.V.

Rubery Owen-Rockwell (Manufacturing) Limited

Rubery Owen-Rockwell Limited

Ruedas de Venzuela S.A.

Sapart, A.G.

Sasab Ag Eschen

SCI Aux Pres Renard

S.C.I1. Volta

S.C.I. de Sully sur Loire

Serrature Auto Ferroviarie Edili SpA.

Serrature Auto Meridionali Stampi Attreature SpA.

Setec S.p.A.

Silvant Plastics Limited

Smith-Blair Inc.

Societe d’Execution Rationelle de Mecanique Automo-

bile s.a.r.l.

Sumlock Anita Services Limited

Tamet Compania Anonima

Tokyo Buhin Rockwell Co., Ltd.

Truflo G.m.b.H.

' Tyseley Estates Limited

W. B. Bumpers Limited

Wescom-Alco Associates

Wescom Leasing Corporation

Wescom (U.K.) Limited

A-55

Wilmot Breeden Australia Nominees Pty. Ltd.

Wilmot Breeden (Australia) Pty Limited

Wilmot Breeden Continental, S.A.

Wilmot Breeden Employees Trust Limited

Wilmot Breeden Group Properties Limited

Wilmot Breeden (Holdings) Limited

Wilmot Breeden International, Inc.

Wilmot Breeden Limited

Wilmot Breeden (Pressings) Limited

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rohr Industries,

Inc.:

International Transportation Systems, Inc.

Rohr Aero Services, Inc.

Rohr Credit Corporation

Rohr Finance Corporation

Rohr France, S.A.

Rohr Industrial Systems, Inc.

Rohr Southern Industries, Inc.

San Diego Prestressed Concrete Co.

Transportation Insurance Limited

Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Weyerhauser

Co.:

Camac Veneer, Inc.

Cargal Hellas E.P.E.

Cartonneries du Forez

Cartonpack, S.A.

A-56

Centennial Homes, Inc.

Chehalis Western Railroad Company

Columbia & Cowlitz Railway Company

Combustion Power Company, Inc.

Cornerstone Development Company

Curtis, Milburn and Eastern Railroad Company

de Bes’ Insurance Ltd.

Descartes S.A.R.L.

DeQueen and Eastern Railroad Company

Dixieline Builders Fund Control, Inc.

Dixieline Lumber Company

Dropsy Carton S.N.C.

Duma, Inc.

Fisher Lumber Company

Golden Triangle Railroad

Great Northern Insured Annuity Corporation

Green Arrow Motor Express Company

Kennedy Bay Timber Sendirian Berhad

Marmont Realty Company

Mississippi & Skuna Valley Railroad Company

Mountain Tree Farm Company

Norpac Export Inc.

North Pacific Paper Corporation

Oregon Aqua-Foods, Inc.

Oregon, California & Eastern Railway Company

Pacific Hardwoods, Sdn. Bhd.

Pardee Construction Company

Pardee Construction Company of Nevada

A-57

Par-West Financial

Quadrant Development Limited

Quill Corporation

Scarborough Construction, Inc.

Scarborough Corporation

Seyfert International, S.A.

Shemex International B.V.

Shemin Nurseries, Inc.

Silam Forest Products Sdn. Bhd.

Societe Nouvelle des Papeteries de La Haye

Texas, Oklahoma & Eastern Railroad Company

The Baboock Company

The Capricorn Corporation

The Giddings Company

The Giddings Mortgage Investment Company

The Quadrant Corporation

Trendmaker Homes, Inc.

ver Bes’ Insurance Co.

Westminster Company

Westwood Associates

Westwood Escrow Company

Westwood Insurance Agency

Westwood Insurance Agency of Arizona, Inc.

Westwood Securities Company

Westwood Shipping Liftes, Inc.

Weyerhaeuser (Aust.) Pty. Ltd.

Weyerhaeuser Canada Ltd.

Weyerhaeuser Capital Corp. N.V.

A-58

Weyerhaeuser China, Ltd.

Weyerhaeuser Construction Company

Weyerhaeuser Export, Inc.

Weyerhaeuser (Far East) Limited

Weyerhaeuser GMBH

Weyerhaeuser International, Inc.

Weyerhaeuser Italia, S.R.L.

Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company

Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Arizona

Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Nevada

Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Texas

Weyerhaeuser Overseas Finance Company

Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Company

Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Company of Nevada

Weyerhaeuser S.A.

Weyerhaeuser (U.K.) Limited

Weyerhaeuser Venture Company

Wight Nurseries, Inc.

Winchester Homes, Inc.

SUPPLEMENTAL

BRIEF

Supreme Court, U.S. |

} FILED

No. 85-184 ~— APR 2 1008

IN THE JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES*"

October Term, 1985

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW

QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW

QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC,;

BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE

CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;

NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH

COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;

RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING

CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO,;

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR

INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER

COo.,

Petitioners,

vs.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and

PENNY NEWMAN,

Respondents.

PETITIONERS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN

SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

LATHAM & WATKINS LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS

DAVID L. MULLIKEN* MAUREEN E. MAHONEY

STEVEN P McDONALD Suite 1200

ROBERT P. DAHLQUIST 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Suite 2100 Washington D.C. 20036

701 “B” Street (202) 828-4400

San Diego, California 92101

(619) 236-1234

(Additional counsel are listed in the Appendix.)

March 28, 1986 *Counsel of Record for Petitioners

Lawyer's Brief Service, Inc. / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

5 The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Offers No

Justification For The Conflict Between The

Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional Decision And

The Decisions Of This Court And Three

I a ceatilenetanbncntanee 2

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Departs From

The Intervention Standards Established By

This Court and by Other Circuits .............cccceeees 5

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Use Of A De Novo

Standard Of Review Conflicts With The

Abuse Of Discretion Standard Of Review

Adopted by this Court and Other Circuits .......... 6

B. The Standard Used By the Ninth Circuit

For Determining Adequacy Of Repres-

entation Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a)(2) Is Inconsistent With

The Established Standard Used Every-

where Outside the Ninth Circuit «0.0.0.0... 7

ac I os ried ccrodiaiciaideipsitnlanbllannageieesenncencecase 9

APPENDIX

List of Parties Joining in the Filing of this

TIT sic sn ictininsttetlaienminciidineeiphinesennasincsense A-1

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit (filed Feb. 18, 1986) ............. A-5

—

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore &

Ohio R.R.

Se Wea Fee CORD cece 3, 4

California v. Block

690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir. 1982) .........0000.... 3, 4

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo

530 F.2d SO1, SOS (3d Cir.), cert. denied

sub nom. Fire Officers Unim v.

Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921 (1976) ............. ee. 8

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay

Ga Wi: Gee GE. ettiniseintsntieiominnine 3, 4

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higgison

RS 8: Fo Bs ee = x

EEOC v. United Airlines

515 F.2d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1975) .......0.0.0.0... 6-7

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord

GaP Te Gk Oe CED vicdiscccstcietenoianinies 4

Kartell v. Blue Shield

fs & f) £- | eee 3

NAACP v. New York

SES DR Beee. Be CCD cemtiicinention 6

New Orleans Public Services, Inc. v. United Gas

Pipeline Co.

oe Me Be A 8

— Wi

Page

Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller

—— a 2 ee ee. ener 4

Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc.

ES, , 3

United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp.

749 F.2d 968 (2nd Cir. 1984) ...... 5, 7-8

Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.

See aes BO, SEO CU CR. TGF) ...0000000000000.02.... 6

Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.

ME ES MED 1. .cs, ccccsnssencccscesconsooes 3

Statutes

ceca caepnscnstinnieccusseoseecsnccesessos 2

Rules

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

ca aceinc cen nsecgeénnsontcccescounsocsecnes 6-8

SET AD 5-8

Other Authorities

Supreme Court Rules

aaa caccenssmsconstesesessnnsesescosencosnee 2

No. 85-184

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1985

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW

QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW

QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC,;

BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE

CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;

NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH

COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;

RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING

CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING COQO,;

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR

INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER

CoO.,

Petitioners,

vs.

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and

PENNY NEWMAN,

Respondents.

PETITIONERS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN

SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

Pursuant to Rule 22.6 of the Rules of the Supreme

Court, Petitioners hereby submit this supplemental brief to

invite the Court’s attention to the opinion entered in this

matter by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on

February 18, 1986.' The Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which is

reproduced in the appendix hereto,” provides f urther

justification for this Court to exercise its discretion to issue

a writ of certiorari directed to the Ninth Circuit and to

reverse or vacate the decision of the Ninth Circuit.

I

The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Offers No

Justification For The Conflict Between ‘The

Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional Decision And The

Decisions Of This Court And Three Other

Circuits

As set forth more fully in the Petition For a Writ of

Certiorari filed herein, three different circuit courts of

appeals have held that orders granting: permissive

intervention but denying intervention as of right are not

appealable orders under 28 US.C.§ 1291. See, Petition For

a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

| The Ninth Circuit entered its judgment in this action on March 18,

1985, in the form of a two paragraph order which simply announced the

result reached by the Ninth Circuit. In the March 18, 1985 Order, the

Ninth Circuit stated that its opinion would follow. A Petition for a Wret

of Certiorari was filed with this Court shortly before the jurisdictional

time limit for seeking review of the March 18, 1985 judgment expired in

"le in Circuit’s February 18, 1986 Opinion was certified for

publication but has not yet appeared in the Federal Reporter.

for the Ninth Circuit, dated July 30, 1985 [hereinafter “Pet.

Cert.”] at 11-18 citing Kartell v. Blue Shield, 687 F.2d 543

(ist Cir. 1982); Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 606

F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1979); Wheeler v. American Home

Products Corp., 582 F.2d 891 (Sth Cir. 1977). Such holdings

follow directly from this Court's analysis in Brotherhood of

Railroad Trainmen y. Baltimore of Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519

(1947), and from the collateral order standards set forth in

Coopers & Lybrand vy. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).

Confronted with the conflict between the judgment of the

Ninth Circuit in this action and the law established by this

Court and three other circuits, the Ninth Circuit, in its

February 18, 1986 opinion, makes an astonishing election.

In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit elects not to offer any

rationale as to why its rule of law is more reasoned than

that established elsewhere; it elects not to try to distinguish

this case from others previously decided; and it elects not to

offer any rationale for modifying or adjusting the law

established by this Court and by three other circuit courts

of appeals. Instead, it elects to ignore all non-Ninth Circuit

decisions and to ignore any obligation to explain the conflict

created by its decision in this action. Indeed, the Ninth

Circuit ignores Brotherhood, Coopers & Lybrand, Kartell,

Shore and Wheeler altogether, citing only a single Ninth

Circuit decision — California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776

(9th Cir. 1982), which also igwores Brotherhood and its

progeny — in support of its judgment. Thus, the Ninth

Circuit opines simply, ‘“‘we have previously held that an

order denying intervention as of right is a final appealable

order, notwithstanding a simultaneous grant of permissive

intervention, California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir.

1982), and are bound by that holding.” Appendix to

Petitioners’ Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition For a

Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit [““App.”] at A-10, A-11.

By blindly adhering to Block (and by refusing to

reconsider the rule of Block en banc, as requested by

petitioners), the Ninth Circuit has created an inconsistency

between Ninth Circuit decisions and the decisions of this

Court, and a direct conflict between Ninth Circuit decisions

and the decisions of three other circuit courts of appeals.

After the Ninth Circuit entered its March 18, 1985

judgment in this action, this Court, in Richardson-Merrell,

Inc. v. Koller, _. U.S. —, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985), again

examined and applied the collateral order standards of

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In

Koller, this Court held that orders disqualifying counsel in

civil cases are not appealgble. In so holding, the Court

reconfirmed that “{t}he collateral order doctrine is a

‘narrow exception’ [to the final judgment standard of 28

U.S.C. § 1291] whose reach is limited to trial court orders

affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence

of an immediate appeal.” _ U.S. at —; 105 S. Ct. at 2761

quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 US.

368, 374 (1981). Consistent with its election to ignore

Brotherhood, Coopers & Lybrand and the relevant decisions

from the various circuit courts of appeal, the Ninth

Circuit’s February 18, 1986 opinion does not acknowledge

or make any effort to square its March 18, 1985 judgment

with this Court’s analysis in Koller.

Petitioners respectfully submit that this is a case that so

plainly and inexplicably departs from established law that it

cries out for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, and

possibly, a summary reversal. At a minimum, a writ of

certiorari should be used, and the case remanded to the

Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Koller.

—

II

The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Departs From The

Intervention Standards Established By This

Court And By Other Circuits

The Ninth Circuit’s February 18, 1986 opinion creates

(or perpetuates) two major inconsistencies between the law

of the Ninth Circuit and the holdings of this Court and of

other circuit courts of appeal. The first conflict exists

because the Ninth Circuit held that intervention orders

under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (“Rule 24(a)(2)”) are reviewed under a de novo

standar@ «yhile this Court and other circuit courts of appeal

review such orders under an abuse of discretion standard.

The second conflict created by the Ninth Circuit relates

to the burden that members of the public bear in showing

inadequacy of representation by federal and _ state

governments in actions commenced by such governments to

protect and assert public rights. The Ninth Circuit held that

the burden of showing inadequacy of representation under

Rule 24(a)(2) in such cases is satisfied if the applicant for

intervention makes the “minimal” showing that the

representation “may be” inadequate, while othér courts of

appeals have held that a presumption of adequate

representation exists in such cases and that the burden is

satisfied only by “a strong affirmative showing that the

sovereign is not fairly representing the interests of the

applicant.” Compare, U.S. v. Stringfellow, App. at A-16

with United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,

749 F.2d 968, 985 (2nd Cir. 1984).

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Use Of A De Novo

Standard Of Review Conflicts With The

Abuse Of Discretion Standard Of Review

Adopted By This Court And Other Circuits

In its February 18, 1986 opinion, the Ninth Circuit held

that orders granting or denying intervention under Rule

24(a)(2) are reviewed under a de novo standard of review.

App. at A-12. This holding is inconsistent with the decisions

of this Court and other circuits.

This Court has held specifically that an order denying, on

timeliness grounds, a Rule 24 motion to intervene must not

be set aside by a reviewing court absent an abuse of

discretion. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973)

(‘(Timeliness under Rule 24] is to be determined by the

court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that

discretion is abused, the court’s ruling will not be disturbed

on review.””) Timeliness, like inadequacy of representation,

is one of the four prongs of the Rule 24(a)(2) intervention

standard.

Moreover, at least three circuit courts of appeal have

held that orders denying Rule 24(a)(2) intervention on any

grounds, including adequacy of representation, must be

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g.,

United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp. 749

F.2d 968, 990 (2d Cir. 1984) (“it is now the rule in this

circuit that denials of motions to intervene as of right under

Rule 24(a)(2) also are to be reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard”); Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric

Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976); (“The test on

review [of an order denying intervention under Rule

24(a)(2)] is whether the district judge abused his discretion

in denying the motion for intervention”); EEOC vy. United

Airlines, 515 F.2d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1975) (‘“‘we find no

abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that

the appellants’ interests are adequately represented”).

The Ninth Circuit’s unexplained departure from the

abuse of discretion standard creates inconsistency and

uncertainty in the law relating to intervention under

Rule 24. A writ of certiorari should be issued in this case to

secure uniformity and consistency of law throughout the

nation on this issue.

B. The Standard Used By The Ninth Circuit

For Determining Adequacy Of Rep-

resentation Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 24(a)(2) Is Inconsistent With

The Established Standard Used Everywhere

Outside The Ninth Circuit

In its February 18, 1986 opinion, the Ninth Circuit held

that the burden borne by a citizen to show inadequacy of

representation by the federal and state governments in an

aciion commenced by such governments to assert public

rights is satisfied if the citizen makes a “minimal” showing

that the existing representation “may be” inadequate. App.

at A-16. As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, this standard

“clearly conflicts” with the standard applied in other

circuits. App. at A-16.

Indeed, every circuit (other than the Ninth Circuit) that

has considered this issue has recognized something akin to a

“presumption of adequate representation” in cases where

the government sues in its parens patriae capacity and has

acknowledged the more “stringent burden” placed on

applicants for intervention in such cases. See, e.g., United

States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968,

a oe

985 (2d Cir. 1984) (‘we agree with the Third, Fifth and

District of Columbia Circuits that, in litigation of this sort,

a greater showing that representation is inadequate should

be required”); New Orleans Public Services, Inc. v. United

Gas Pipe Line Co. 690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (Sth Cir.

1982) (citing, with approval, a District of Columbia circuit

case for the proposition that ‘where governmental parties

are already present in case, private parties must make more

than a minimal showing of inadequate representation”’);

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631 F.2d

738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“to intervene in a suit in district

court in which a state is already a party, a citizen or

subdivision of that state ... must demonstrate that its

interest is in fact different from that of the state and that

that imterest will not be represented by the state”);

Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, (3rd Cir.), cert. denied

sub nom. Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921

(1976) (“‘a presumption of adequate representation gener-

ally arises when the representative is a governmental body

or officer charged by law with representing the interests of

the absentee”’).

The Ninth Circuit's desire to justify the result announced

in its March 18, 1985 order has created a standard for

intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) in the Ninth Circuit that is

radically different from the standard used everywhere else

in the nation. The Ninth Circuit’s standard is not one that

was compelled by application of logic or public policies to a

pending case; rather, it is an after-the-fact standard created

to explain an otherwise inexplicable result in a case decided

a full year ago. The Ninth Circuit’s standard, and the

opinion which created it, will cause nationwide

uncertainties and inconsistencies in all cases involving

intervention under Rule 24. For this reason, and for the

other reasons set forth in the Petition For a Writ of

Certiorari on file herein, a writ of certiorari should be

issued in this action.

Ill

CONCLUSION

Petitioners respectfully request that a writ of certiorari

be issued and the decision of the Ninth Circuit reversed or

vacated.

Respectfully submitted,

David L. Mulliken

of Latham & Watkins

Counsel of Record for Petitioners

APPENDIX

The following parties join in the filing of this Supplemental

Brief :

LATHAM & WATKINS

David L. Mulliken (Counsel of

Record for Petitioners)

Steven P. McDonald

Robert P. Dahlquist

LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS

Maureen E. Mahoney

Counsel for Petitioner

Montrose Chemical Corporation

Of California

HELLER, EHRMAN, WHITE &

McAULIFFE

Richard L. Goff

Rene P. Tatro

44 Montgomery Street

San Francisco, California 94101

Counsel for Petitioners Alumax,

Inc. and Hunter Engineering

McCUTCHEN, DOYLE, BROWN &

ENERSEN

Barry P. Goode

Three Embarcadero Center

San Francisco, California 94111

Counsel for Petitioner

Rohr Industries

CHASE, ROTCHFORD, DRUKKER

& BOGUST

Vincent Fish

606 South Olive Street

Los Angeles, California 90014

Counsel for Petitioner

Weyerhaeuser Co.

LEWIS, D’AMATO, BRISBOIS &

BISGAARD

Christopher P, Bisgaard

Suite 300

261 S. Figueroa Street

Los Angeles, California 90012

Counsel for Petitioners

J.B. Stringfellow, Jr.

Stringfellow Quarry Company

and Stringfellow

Quarry Co., Inc.

FOLGER & LEVIN

Michael A. Kahn

Douglas Sullivan

50 California Street

San Francisco, California 94111

Counsel for Petitioner

The Deutsch Company

A-3

LaFOLLETTE, JOHNSON,

SCHROETER & DEHAAS

Robert E. Kelly

320 North Vermont Avenue

Los Angeles, California 90004

Counsel for Petitioner

Rainbow Canyon

Manufacturing Corp.

PACHTER, GOLD & SCHAFFER

Cliford L. Schaffer

6th Floor

6420 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90048

Counsel for Petitioner

Post Transportation Co.

MUNGER, TOLLES &

RICKERSHAUSER

Peter R. Taft

612 South Flower Street

Los Angeles, California 90017

Counsel for Petitioners

Northrop Corporation and

Rockwell International Corp.

A-4

SIDLEY & AUSTIN

Charles S. Vogel

Robert I. McMurry

2049 Century Park East

Los Angeles, California 90067

Counsel for Petitioner

BKK Corporation

McCUTCHEN, BLACK, VERLEGER

& SHEA

Richard Doty

Michael Hickok

600 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90017

Counsel for Petitioner

Rheem Manufacturing Co.

A-5

For Publication

é

‘

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

wv

FILED

FEB 18 1986

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 84-5684

D.C. NO. CV-83-2501-MML

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Plaintiff -Appellees,

vs.

J.B. STRINGFELLOW, Jr., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and

PENNY NEWMAN,

Intervenors-Appellants.

OPINION

A-6

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Malcolm M. Lucas, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 6, 1985

Pasadena, California

Before: GOODWIN and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges,

and SOLOMON, District Judge*

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Concerned Neighbors in Action (“CNA”) and _ its

chairwoman, Penny Newman, appeal the district court's

denial of their motion to intervene as of right in an action

brought by the United States and the State of California

against thirty-one parties who are allegedly responsible for

release of hazardous wastes from the Stringfellow Acid Pits.

We conclude that the district court erred in finding that

appellants failed to meet the requirements of intervention

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(.). !

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

CNA is a nonprofit organization consisting of over 400

residents of Glen Avon, California and its surrounding

communities. The organization was founded in 1979 in

response to releases of hazardous wastes from Stringfellow.

CNA was formed to ensure adequate clean-up of the acid

* Gus Solomon, Senior United States District Judge for the Distriet of

Oregon, sitting by designation.

' On March 18, 1985, we issued an order reversing the court's denial

of appellants’ motion and directing the court to grant appellants leave to

intervene as of right. We stated in that order that we would file an

opinion at a later date.

pits; to monitor the performance of government agencies

involved in clean-up efforts; and to protect the health and

well-being of its members who, according to appellants,

have all been exposed to hazardous wastes deposited at

Stringfellow. Penny Newman, in addition to being the

chairwoman of CNA, is a resident of Glen Avon.

Stringfellow is a 20-acre hazardous waste disposal site

constructed by the State of California and located one mile

from Glen Avon. According to appellants’ proposed

complaint in intervention, dumping of hazardous waste into

the acid pits began in 1956 and continued until closure of

the site in 1972. During this period, approximately 34

million gallons of hazardous wastes were dumped into the

site by more than two hundred parties, including agencies

of the federal government.

As early as 1969, it became apparent that the hazardous

waste was noi being confined to the site and was escaping

into the adjacent Pyrite Creek through which surface water

flows down into the community of Glen Avon. In March,

1S69, heavy rains caused the site to overflow, discharging

contaminated water into Glen Avon. Heavy rainfall during

the winter of 1977-78 caused similar overflowing. In 1978,

the State of California released 800,000 gallons of

contaminated water into Pyrite Creek, which in turn

drained into the Streets of Glen Avon. Additional flooding

resulted from heavy rains in 1979 and 1982.

In April, 1983, the United States and the State of

California brought suit against thirty-one defendants,

including the former owners of the site and other private

parties who generated or transported wastes which were

dumped at the site (“the waste-generators”). The two

governmental entities sought to enjoin the release of

hazardous wastes from Stringfellow pursuant to the

“imminent hazard” provisions of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982); the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the

Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982);

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),

42 US.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1982); and the Safe Drinking

Water ACT (“SDWA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300)-10 (1982).

They also asserted claims for cost recovery pursuant to both

state and federal law.”

In July, 1983, CNA and Newman (hereinafter collective-

ly referred to as “CNA’”’) moved to intervene as of right,

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a)(1) and 24(a)(2). In the

alternative, CNA moved to intervene permissively, pur-

suant to Fed. R. Civ. P 24(b). In its complaint in

intervention, CNA asserted claims against the plaintiff state

and federal governments as well as the thirty-one waste

generators named as defendants in the existing action. In

addition to joining in the plaintiffs’ claims for relief, CNA

sought additional injunctive i viief against both the plaintiffs

and the defendants, including permanent abatement of the

hazard by total removal of the hazardous substances from

the site, and the conducting of health studies.

The district court denied CNA’s motion to intervene as

of right, concluding that neither Rule 24(a)(1) nor Rule

24(a)(2) provided a basis upon which to grant intervention.

With respect to Rule 24(a)(1), which provides for

intervention as of right “when a statute of the United States

confers an unconditional right to intervene,” the district

court reasoned that although the “citizen suit” provisions of

2 In August, 1983, several waste-generators asserted counterclaims

against both governmental parties.

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the SDWA, the RCRA and the CWA provide for citizen

intervention as of right in certain types of actions, these

statutory rights of intervention do not apply to suits such as

this which have been brought by the United States pursuant

to the “emergency powers” provision of the SDWA, the

“imminent hazard” provision of the RCRA, and the

“emergency relief” provision of the CWA. Accordingly, the

court concluded that Rule 24(a)(1) did not authorize CNA

to intervene.

The district court also denied CNA’s motion under Rule

24(a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) provides for intervention as of right

when the applicant claims an interest relating to

the property or transaction which is the subject of

the action and he is so situated that the disposition

of the action may as a practical matter impair or

impede his ability to protect that interest, unless

the applicant’s interest is adequately represented

by existing parties.

The district court concluded that CNA had failed to show

that it would be practically disadvantaged by disposition of

the litigation or that the existing parties would not

adequately represent its interests.

Notwithstanding its denial of CNA’s motion to intervene

as of right, the district court granted CNA leave to

intervene permissively, reasoning that since CNA’s

proposed complaint in intervention and the complaint filed

by the United States and California raised common

questions of fact and law, permissive intervention was

appropriate. However, the court imposed conditions upon

its grant of permissive intervention. CNA claims that those

conditions severely limit its ability to influence the results of

the litigation. Specifically, the district court’s order

prohibited appellant from (1) asserting any claims not

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already asserted by the original parties; (2) intervening in

the original parties’ cost recovery claims; and (3) initiating

any motion or discovery, unless appellant had conferred

with the original parties and had secured the concurrence

of at least one of them in the proposed mofien or discovery.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

In this appeal, CNA raises two issues, only one of which

we need address. First, it contends that the district court’s

determination that it failed to make the requisite showing

under Rule 24(a)(2) was erroneous. Second, and in the

alternative, it contends that the district court erred in

finding that the statutes pursuant to which the original

plaintiffs brought this action confer upon it no right of

intervention. Because we reverse the district court’s denial

of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), we do not rule on

appellant’s statutory right of intervention claim.

Ill. APPEALABILITY OF THE DISTRICT

COURT’S ORDER

The waste-generators challenge our jurisdiction over this

appeal. They contend that an order denying intervention as

of right but granting permissive intervention is not a “final

decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982),

and hence is not appealable. They also contend that because

appellant availed itself of the benefits of permissive

intervention by filing briefs and pleadings, it is, in effect,

estopped from appealing the district court’s denial of its

motion to intervene as of right.

We reject the waste-generators’ contentions. First, we

“have previously held that an order denying intervention as

of right is a final appealable order, notwithstanding a

simultaneous grant of permissive intervention, California vy.

Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir. 1982), and are bound by

that holding. > Second, CNA’s participation in the litigation

aS a permissive intervenor does not estop it from timely

appealing that portion of the order denying intervention as

of right. * A party is not required to reject the benefits of a

judgment it deems inadequate in order to preserve its right

to appeal, so long as the party does not consent to the

judgment. United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312

(1960);° United States for Use & Benefit of H & S

Industries, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Co., 525 F.2d 760, 764-65 (7th

Cir. 1975); Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp. v. Friendly

Broadcasting Co. 414 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1969); 9 J.

Moore & B. Ward, Moore’s Federal Practice 1 203.06, at 3-

26 (2d ed. 1985). Here, although it may have unwillingly

participated in the igation as a permissive intervenor,

CNA made if clear that it was not consenting to the denial

of its right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). Moreover, to

3 The governments and several of the waste-generators originally

moved, before a motions panel of this court, to dismiss CNA’s appeal for

lack of jurisdiction. Neither party brought California v. Block, supra to

that panel’s attention, due to the fact that the case is not annotated under

Rule 24. The panel decided the jurisdictional issue against CNA,

dismissed the appeal and issued an opinion for publication. CNA then

moved for rehearing on the ground that the order of dismissal was in

conflict with Block. The panel agreed. It withdrew its opinion, held that

we had jurisdiction over CNA’s appeal and ordered, in an unpublished

memorandum, that the appeal be calendared for a hearing on the merits.

* We note that CNA, unlike the applicant in Block, has demonstrated

that its limited status as a permissive intervenor impedes its ability to

fully prosecute its claims. In Block, we stated that the applicant had

failed to show with any specificity that it was prejudiced by the court's

actions in granting it permissive intervention status.

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hold otherwise would force CNA to give up one important

right in order to preserve another.

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL OF

APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO INTER-

VENE AS OF RIGHT UNDER RULE

24(a)(2)

A. Standard of Review

Although the waste-generators contend that the district

court’s denial of appellant’s motion to intervene as of right

should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, we

traditionally conduct a de novo review of such orders. See,

e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527

(9th Cir. 1983); Washington State Building & Construction

Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Smith v.

Pangilinan, 651 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1981); Idaho y.

Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980); County of

Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980); Legal

Aid Society v. Dunlop, 618 F.2d 48, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1980);

Johnson v. San Francisco United School District, 500 F.2d

349, 352-54 (9th Cir. 1974). We do so because our review of

the district court’s decision involves application of a rule of

law to the established facts, and because the issue primarily

' involves consideration of legal concepts in the mix of fact

and law. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,

1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 101 (1984).

See also 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1902 (1972).

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B. The Validity of the District Court’s

Decision

Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for

intervention. Washington State Building & Construction

Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.

1982); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1904. We have

adopted a four-part test to determine whether applications

for intervention as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) should

be granted. An order granting intervention as of right is

appropriate if (1) the applicant’s motion is timely; (2) the

applicant has asserted an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the

applicant is so situated that without intervention the

disposition may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its

ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s

interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties.

Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d at 527; County

of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d at 438. In applying this test

we are guided primarily by practical considerations. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee note (“if an

[applicant] would be substantially affected in a practical

sense by the determination made in an action, [the

applicant] should, as a general

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Record and brief — Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action · 480 U.S. 370 | Frix