Record and brief — Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action
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De BS5-164-CFX Tithe: Je Se Stringtellows Jresr Et ales Fetitioners
-atuss GRANTED Ve
Concernecs Neigndbors in Actions et al.
pcketesz: Court: united States Court of Apceals
ugust 14 1985 Tor the Ninth Circuit
Counsel ror setitioner: MullikensDavid Le
Counsel Tor respondent: wWoochersFrederic Des Solicitor
General
try Date Note Proceecings ans Oroers
FOO OOS OS OC OOS OOOO S OS OOOO OOSOSS OS SOSS SO CSSSSOESOOOOSCOCSOCECESOCOCOSSSSCOececeoeee
|
1 May <9 1985 mOELICatiOon for extension of time to tile petition and
| ercer granting sare until fAucust Iv 1¥5> Chkennaquist, “ay
; 20s 1V085).
Fo Au3 1 1985 G Petition for writ of certiorari files.
« Aug 12 1985 vrcer extendins time to tile response to setition until
wctover siv 1985.
5 Oct U0 ives vrcer Trurtner extending time to tile response to
retIition until Decemoer 20, 1985.
6 Dec 11 1¥85 vroer Turtner extending time to tile response to
PETITION until February 28, 1986.
7 Fec 10 1¥Be¢e wrcer further extending time to file response to
ReTITION UNTIL April 2%, 1¥BE,.
5 Aor 2 19806 Sup>cemental oriet of petiticners J, Strinctellows et al.
Tilec.
y Aor 11 19806 wroer turtner extensing time to tile response to w
wetTITION until May ids 19806.
J Aor 1171 1986 ihe adove extension acplies to all respondents.
1 May 7 1989 orivet of Fesponcent United States in onvosition tilec.
2 May 13 19B6é wIST¥IDUTED. May 2¥, 1936
c May 12 198% K Briet of respondents Concerned Neicnvors In Actions et al.
1M Oprosition tilec.
~ Jun 2 1980 Fetition GRANTED. Limitec to Question 1 peresertec sy the
° petiticn.
ieee eee eee PPP PPPS S SS CSLSSCTCCTCOCCCOCTCOCC.. See
s May 19 1966 “OCDgINg received.
8 Jul 117 19806 vrcer extending time to file briet of petitioner on the
merits until July 314 1966.
7h Jul 3U 1986 aecora tiles.
jJ Jul 3U 19386 certified copy of original record anc proceedings (20x)
received.
Jul 31 1986 JOINL appendix tiled.
Jul 31 1986 briet of petitioners J. stringtellows et al. filed.
Jul 31 1986 Brier of respondent United States supporting petitioner
Tilec.
Jul 28 1986 mOTION tO Gismiss writ of certiorari as to setitioners
alumax Ince and Hunter Engineering Inc. only and order
Jul 28 1986 vf dismissal oursuant to Rule 53 of this Court.
(8/32/06). :
Aug 12 1¥B6 & mOt1O" Of the Solicitor General tor civicec arcument
PETITION
FOR WRIT OF
~ CERTIORAR
October Term, 1984
J. B STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC.;
BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE
CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;
NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH
COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;
RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING
CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO.;
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR
INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER CoO.,
Petitioners,
VS.
CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LATHAM & WATKINS LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS
DAVID L. MULLIKEN* MAUREEN E. MAHONEY
STEVEN P. McDONALD
ROBERT P. DAHLQUIST
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Suite _1200
701 “B* Street, Suite 2100 Washington, D.C. 20036-1594
San Diego, California 92101 (202) 828-4400
(619) 236-1234
(Additional counsel are listed on signature pages)
July 30, 1985 “Counsel of Record for Petitioners
y
Lawyer's Brief Service, Inc / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457 00!
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Is an order granting permissive intervention but
denying intervention as of right immediately appealable?
2. Did the Ninth Circuit err in reversing the district
court’s holding. that Intervenors, an individual and a
corporation, could intervene permissively but not as of right
in this action in which the United States and the State of
California seek relief concerning the clean-up of a waste
disposal site?
PARTIES BELOW
Plaintiffs-Appellees:
United States of America
State of California
Defendant-Appellees:
J.B. Stringfellow, Jr.
Stringfellow Quarry Co., Inc.
Stringfellow Quarry Company
Paul Hubbs
Lucille Hubbs
E. Moe McCook
Alcan Aluminum Corp.
Alumax, Inc.
- BKK Corporation
Capri Pumping Service
General Electric Co.
General Steel and Wire Co.
Hunter Engineering, Inc.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Montrose Chemical Corporation of California
National Distillers & Chemical Corp.
NI Industries, Inc.
Northrop Corporation
The Deutsch Company
(Continued on next page)
Quemetco, Inc. TOPICAL INDEX
Rainbow Canyon Manufacturing Corp.
: Page
Rheem Manufacturing Co. |
Rockwell International Corp. ) QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Rohr Industries, Inc. : PARTIES BELOW
Standard Dredging Corp. | ERE EI RN eee ROTTEN 2
Stauffer Chemical Co. | JURISDICTION 2
bons sseetion . oe | STATUTES INVOLVED osesssssssssscsssssssssssssesessensesnsseenee 3
ee | STATEMENT OF THE CASE o0...sccceccssssscsssssssccsssssscssssssvees 4
| REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......cccs0000000 10
Intervenors-Appellants: )
EEE SS ee ICRC. A RE 26
| APPENDIX
Order Entered By the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (filed March 18,
oer pabitenl _ : ca ) Se ercicenilaiidetiinhibiesdadiniinicadtetiiinaibiiivntsipieamuiaanincenenees A-1
t t t t
7 raerprpete ten ee ee Opinion of the United States District Court for
t titi i t forth in the A dix. mer . ‘ :
ee the Central District of California (filed
Concerned Neighbors in Action
Penny Newman )
| iii ites A-3
| Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (filed June 4, 1984) ............ A-22
! Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (filed Sept. 6, 1984, after
| CIID ccrcencesieentsnsorennsinsitinictinntnmectitninameceses A-26
| Order Entered By The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Denying
Reconsideration En Banc (filed Oct. 26, 1984) .. A-28
at Se Fee EAS ES Oe Se aN A-30
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Petitioners ............ A-46
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R.
en 12, 13, 18
Cobbledick v. United States
EEE . 11, 18
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay
Be Se ITED ctrsiiccecinenevecncesnemmmingumnensse 14, 18
Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council v. Pennsylvania
674 F.2d 970, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1982)... 23
EEOC v. United Airlines
ey 2 eS ee, Be ee 22
Estelle v. Gamble
BS REESE 7 ew eT eee 24
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord
ESR EEC 24
Flanagan v. United States
eee 24
Forsyth v. City of Hammond
Se Sy III cnet ninicrinesnticnsemesenninedesecnngens 23, 24
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.
EE 11, 16
Kartell v. Blue Shield
687 F.2d 543 (Ist Cir. 1982) oo... eeeeeeees 16, 18
Myers v. Bethelehem Shipbuilding Corp.
ee Sy Me MEE slnitineitedennictenccerncnncccsnnccsemnmecetioene 24
ee ee eae
NAACP v. New York
RE en 22
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe
Line Co.,
690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (Sth Cir. 1982) .... 23
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo
530 F.2d SO1, SOS (3d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom.
Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania
I aii rstercerinsaiaensncetenensceemenmnel ».. 23
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.
606 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1979) ...... 15, 16, 18
State of California v. Block
FS &, Re. 8, 15
United States v. California Co-Operative Canneries
I ia scssenineeenntenensnnees 12
United States v. General Motors Corp.
EE EE ee TE 24
United States v. Hooker Chemicals of Plastics Corp.
749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984) 00... 19, 20-25
Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
$42 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976) ............ ecodatens 22
Wade v. Goldschmidt
673 F.2d 182, 196 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982) ............... 23
Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.
ee GF me Be A | 7, Seen 17, 18
Williams v. Morgan
of ¢ 2 x . sn 12
—iv— : —
Statutes TE EE A EES a TOR 5
a TEE AE A aT Re RENT RN 5
ES Se om 3
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen- TD id ccrenincemasnbiamninmsedenneenttansnenencouseusenennassonnn 8
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 i 5
(“CERCLA”)
§ 104(a)(1), 42 US.C. § 9604(a)( 1) 1 3, 5 42 US.C.§ 1331 SOCCER EEE EEE EEE EERE EERE EEE EEE EEE EEE HEHEHE HEHE RHEE ES 5
§ 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) ..n..ecccceceeceesescesees 3, 5 a ciicitaiiliseceness - eiiiidineaiiidtiiiaiiesnintiulieetis 5
§ 107(a), 42 US.C. § 9607(a) I a ccsccinselsissensiesinattiamiciba dailies 15
§ 113), 42 U.S.C. § 96130)
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure State
SIT IIE Giuicudishiietsehitacensecotininesdinentionnn
FE 6, 16 California Health & Safety Code
Federal Water Pullution Control Act (the “Clean § 25358.3 SOCCER OEE EEE E EEE TERETE EERE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE SESE SEES NEES E EE EEE EEES 5
Water Act” or “CWA”) SS) 25300-25395 CORREO E EEE EEE EEE EEE E EEE EE EES 5
§ 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(C)(1) ceecccecescessesseeseene 4
vam § 04a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) ceeccccessscssseee 4, 5, 19 Other Authorities
wmmmS SOS, 33 USC. § 1365 nercrecsrernssnenneneenenn 4, 6
: 3B Moore’s Federal Practice at 24-163
aeaap anal Environments: Potisy Act ) a 12, 14
Rs ID icsseicscctsstcinccnctecencessitisocons 15 |
H. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong.
a. and Recovery Act Ne ceuamsebunnommnnes 25
ne 4 S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong.
§ 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) -.ocececseesseeens 4, 5, 19 ER NN 25
Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) Supreme Court Rules
§ 1431(a), 42 U5S.C. § 300i(a) ho 4, 5, 6, 19 Rule 18 Tee CUCU CSE e ee eee Tee ere eee eee eet ee eee eee ee eee) x
§ 1449, 42 USC. § 300j-2 EE 4, 6 SE oe <a x
A a re 9
EER a 3, 8 .
I inci ncditibicssineainlabitiiilbainabaldiiedibiahioed passim
SEMEN a | a OE 3, 17
‘ No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
—_
October Term, 1984
J. B STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC.;
BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE
CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;
NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH
COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;
RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING
CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO.;
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR
INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER CO.,
’ Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Petitioners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue
to review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding on
March 18, 1985.
OPINIONS BELOW
The first opinion of the Ninth Circuit, entered June 4,
1984, was reported in the advance sheets of the Federal
Reporter at 734 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1984) but was withdrawn
before publication of the permanent bound edition of such
reporter. That opinion is reported unofficially at 20 Env’t
Rep. (BNA) 2233 (9th Cir. 1984).
A second opinion of the Ninth Circuit, entered on
September 6, 1984, after rehearing, is a memorandum
decision, reported unofficially at 21 Env’t
Rep. (BNA) 2046 (9th Cir. 1984).
The Ninth Circuit’s order reversing in part, vacating in
part and remanding to the District Court, entered
March 18, 1985, is reported at 755 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.
1985). The order states that an opinion explaining the
reasons for the March 18, 1985 order “will follow;” that
opinion has not yet been issued.
The District Court’s Order Granting Leave to Intervene
is reported unofficially at 20 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1659 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
The various opinions and orders of the Court of Appeals,
and the District Court’s Order Granting Leave to
Intervene, are reproduced in their entirety in the Appendix
hereto.
JURISDICTION
The Ninth Circuit's initial opinion granting petitioners’
motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction was
entered June 4, 1984. Upon reconsideration, the Ninth
Circuit withdrew its initial opinion and entered its
September 6, 1984 decision. A Petition for Reconsideration
and Suggestion For Reconsideration En Banc was filed by
petitioners on September 20, 1984. The Ninth Circuit
denied such petition by order entered October 26, 1984.
After briefing on the merits, the Ninth Circuit, on
March 18, 1985, entered its judgment in the form of a per
curiam order which stated that its “opinion will follow.”
Petitioners seek review of the March 18, 1985 judgment.!
By an order entered on May 30, 1985 (Order No. A-907),
Justice Rehnquist extended the time for filing a petition for
writ of certiorari in this matter to and including August 1,
1985. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
STATUTES INVOLVED
1. 28US.C.§ 1291
2. 28US.C.§ 1292
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”):
§ 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)( 1)
§ 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)
4. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 24
'Petitioners seek review of both the merits of the March 18, 1985
judgment and the decision of the Ninth Circuit that it had jurisdiction to
hear Intervenors’ appeal. Although the Ninth Circuit addressed the
jurisdictional issue in its September 6, 1984 opinion, the jurisdictional
issued is properly presented in this petition because the September 6,
1984 opinion was not a final “judgment” under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) and
because the Ninth Circuit, by entering its March 18, 1985 decision,
obviously rejected the jurisdictional arguments contained in the brief on
the merits filed by petitioners in the Ninth Circuit.
5. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the “Clean
Water Act” or “CWA”:
§ 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)
§ 504(a), 33 U.S.C.§ 1364(a)
§ 505, 33 U.S.C.§ 1365
6. Resource Conservation and Recovery’ Act
(“RCRA”):
§ 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
§ 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a)
7. Safe Drinking Water Act(“SDWA”):
§ 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a)
§ 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300}-8
8. Cal. Health & Safety Code
§ 25358.3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The action underlying this petition was commenced in
April .983 by the United States of America and the State of
California (collectively, the “Governmental Plaintiffs’’) in
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California to assert claims respecting the clean-up of the
Stringfellow waste disposal site located near Glen Avon,
California. Among the more than thirty original defendants
named in the action are the former owners of the
Stringfellow site, persons who allegedly transported
materials to the site and persons who allegedly generated
materials which were disposed of at the site. More than 100
additional entities have been named as third party
defendants. Jurisdiction in the District Court was asserted
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 and 42 US.C. §§ 300i,
1321(b)(2), 1331, 1364, 6973, 9613(b).
Five of the Governmental Plaintiffs’ claims for relief
against defendants are asserted under the so-called
“emergency relief” or “substantial endangerment” provi-
sions of four separate federal statutes and one state statute.”
These five claims (the “Emergency Relief Claims”) seek
injunctive relief with respect to alleged endangerments to
the environment in and around the Stringfellow site. The
Governmental Plaintiffs also have asserted four claims
under the cost recovery provisions of various federal and
state statutes. Such claims (the “Cost Recovery Claims”)
seek recovery of funds already expended and to be
expended in the future for the clean-up of the Stringfellow
site. The Governmental Plaintiffs also assert that the
Stringfellow site is a public nuisance under state law.
In July of 1983, Concerned Neighbors in Action, a
corporation, and Penny Newman (collectively,
2The Governmental Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief is asserted under
Section 106(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). The
Third Claim for Relief is asserted under Section 7003 of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6973. The
Fourth Claim for Relief is asserted under Section 504 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (the “Clean Water Act”), 33 U.S.C.§ 1364.
The Sixth Claim for Relief is asserted under Section 1431(a) of the Safe
Drinking Water Act (“SDWA"), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a). The Eleventh
Claim for Relief is asserted under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25358.3.
These and other relevant statutes are reproduced in the appendix hereto.
3The Governmental Plaintiffs’ Second, Fifth, Seventh and Righth
Claims for Relief are based upon the following four statutes: Sections
104 and 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9707(a); Section 311 of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.§ 1321; Section 107 of the CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9607; and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25300-25395.
“Intervenors”) petitioned the District Court for leave to
intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) and/or
permissively under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Intervenors’
proposed Complaint in Intervention asserted nine claims
that were virtually identical to the Governmental Plaintiffs’
Emergency Relief and Cost Recovery Claims. In addition,
the proposed Complaint in Intervention asserted eight new
claims, consisting of claims for personal injury and other
individualized damages and “claims in intervention”
purportedly advanced under the citizen suit provisions of
three federal statutes.4
By its Order Granting Leave to Intervene (the “Order”),
entered on February 17, 1984, the District Court held that
Intervenors were not entitled to intervene as of right but
granted Intervenors leave to intervene permissively under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Order specifically allowed
Intervenors to advance claims in intervention with respect
to all of the Governmental Plaintiffs’ claims in which
intervention was sought, except the Cost Recovery Claims.*
However, the Order prohibited Intervenors from asserting
“their individualized damage and other claims.” Slip op. at
28. This limitation was imposed because the court found
that “allowing applicants to assert their individualized
damage and other claims would burden and expand an
“Claims in intervention” were asserted under Section 505 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; Section 7002 of RCRA, 42 US.C.
§ 6972; and Section 1449 of SDWA, 42 U.S.C.§ 300}-8. ;
5The District Court found that Intervenors’ only interests in
advancing Cost Recovery Claims were their interests as taxpayers, and
were thus insufficient to give standing to pursue such claims. Intervenors
did not address this part of the District Court's holding in their appeal to
the Ninth Circuit and presumably have abandoned their arguments that
they should be entitled to pursue such claims.
already complex litigation and could jeopardize the
possibility of settlement.” Jd.
In an effort “to minimize delay and confusion involved
in discovery in this large, complex case,” the Order also
required Intervenors to meet and confer with all parties and
obtain the concurrence of at least one other party before
initiating discovery or motions. Slip op. at 19. However, the
Order confirmed that Intervenors, as parties, “shall have
the right to attend all other depositions and to participate to
an extent not duplicative of the original parties, and to
receive copies of all discovery to the same extent as any
other party herein.” Jd.
Pursuant to the Order, Intervenors filed a modified
Complaint in Intervention on or about July 24, 1984, and
are now parties to the ongoing District Court action.
After filing the Complaint in Intervention, Intervenor
Newman and approximately 5074 other residents of the
Glen Avon area® commenced an action in the Riverside
County Superior Court of the State of California asserting
claims against more than 100 defendants (including all of
the original defendants in this proceeding) for damages and
other relief relating to the Stringfellow site. Intervenors’
State court complaint purports to assert causes of action for
negligence, strict products liability, strict liability for
ultrahazardous activity, breach of warranty, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, trespass, nuisance, misrep-
resentation, inverse condemnation and maintenance of a
dangerous condition.
*Intervenor Concerned Neighbors In Action purports to represent
more than 400 residents of Glen Avon, California, many or all of whom
are presumably plaintiffs in the Riverside County Superior Court action.
Notwithstanding the grant of leave to intervene and the
actual filing of their Complaint in Intervention, Intervenors
immediately filed a notice of appeal to seek appellate review
of the Order by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The Governmental Plaintiffs and defendants
moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the Order
was not a final and appealable order. In an opinion dated
June 4, 1984 and originally reported at 734 F.2d 436 (9th
Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit, relying upon decisions from
this Court and from three other circuits, held that the Order
was not immediately appealable and dismissed the appeal.
On September 6, 1984, however, the Ninth Circuit
withdrew its initial opinion in response to Intervenors’
petition for rehearing which asserted that the court’s
opinion was inconsistent with State of California v. Block,
690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). In the September 6, 1984
opinion, the court, without elaboration, held simply that
Block was controlling and that “{djenial of intervention as
of right is a final appealable order, despite the grant of
permissive intervention.” A Petition for Reconsideration
and Suggestion for Reconsideration En Banc was denied by
the Ninth Circuit on October 26, 1984.’
7On December’ 20, 1984, Petitioners filed with this Court a Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s September 6,
1984 decision. The petition, which was assigned Case No. 84-999, was
filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(e) and Supreme
Court Rule 18 and sought this Court’s review of the jurisdictional issue
before final judgment in the Ninth Circuit. Pursuant to Rule 29.3 of the
Rules of this Court, the Solicitor General requested and received an
extension of time to March 22, 1985 to file a brief in response to the
petition. Before the expiration of the extension of time, the Ninth Circuit
entered its March 18, 1985 judgment, thereby mooting petitioner’s desire
of obtaining pre-judgment review of the jurisdictional issue. Accord-
ingly, petitioners moved for voluntary dismissal of the petition to allow
After briefing on the merits and oral argument, the Ninth
Circuit entered its judgment in the form of the March 18,
1985 per curiam order. That order reversed the District
Court’s denial of intervention as of right, vacated the grant
of leave to intervene permissively and remanded the action
to the District Court for further proceedings. The Ninth
Circuit’s March 18, 1985 order does not give any reasons
for the decision but states that “[a]n opinion will follow.”
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion still has not been issued.
Shortly before the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari to seek review of the March 18, 1985 judgment
was set to expire, petitioners submitted to Justice Rehnquist
an application for an extension of time to file such a
petition. The application was submitted on the grounds that
under the existing circumstances — where the Ninth
Circuit has entered its judgment but has delayed the
issuance of its opinion — it would be difficult for
petitioners to draft, and nearly impossible for this Court to
consider meaningfully, a petition for certiorari seeking
review of the merits of the March 18, 1985 judgment. On
May 30, 1985, Justice Rehnquist granted an extension of
time for filing such a petition to and including August 1,
1985.
Inasmuch as the extension of time granted by Justice
Rehnquist is about to expire and the Ninth Circuit still has
not issued its opinion, petitioners are filing this petition for
certiorari based upon the record now available. Petitioners
respectfully submit that the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional
them to file the present petition which seeks review of both the
jurisdictional issue and the Ninth Circuit's decision on the merits. The
Court, on May 1, 1985, dismissed the petition in case No. 84-999
pursuant to Rule 53.
— =
analysis justifies the immediate issuance of the requested
writ. Meaningful consideration of the second issue
presented by this petition (relating to the merits of the
Ninth Circuit’s March 18, 1985 judgment) may not be
possible until the Ninth Circuit issues its opinion. Thus
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court not act upon
this petition until after the Ninth Circuit issues its opinion.
Petitioners further respectfully request leave to amend this
petition or to file supplemental briefing once the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion is issued.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This Court should grant the petition for certiorari to
resolve the conflicts created by the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdictional analysis and its decision on the merits.
The reasoning and holding of the Ninth Circuit that it
has jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal from an order
granting permissive intervention but denying intervention as
of right is in conflict with the standards governing appeals
of intervention and other interlocutory orders, established
in a series of decisions by this Court. In addition, the
decision of the Ninth Circuit directly conflicts with three
other decisions on the same issue rendered by three
different Courts of Appeals. Given the inconsistency
between the decision of the Ninth Circuit in this case and
the decisions of this Court, petitioners respectfully submit
that it is appropriate for this Court to reverse or vacate
summarily under Rule 23.
While little can be said of the legal analysis of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision on the merits pending issuance of its
opinion, the result reached by the Ninth Circuit in this case
— a determination that Intervenors are entitled to intervene
|
as of right in this “emergency relief” action — is in conflict
with a recent decision of the Second Circuit. The result
reached by the Ninth Circuit under the facts of this case
also suggests that the Ninth Circuit departed from the legal
standards applied by this Court and by various circuit
Courts of Appeals in appeals from intervention orders.
Accordingly, this Court should grant a writ of certiorari
to review and resolve the conflicts created by the Ninth
Circuit’s holdings on jurisdiction and on the merits.
1, THE JURISDICTIONAL DECISION
BELOW IS CONTRARY TO DECISIONS
OF THIS COURT
The jurisdictional decision of the Ninth Circuit is in
conflict with this Court's interpretation and application of
the so-called ‘final judgment” and “collateral order”
doctrines of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it allows intervenors
to appeal immediately from orders granting intervention
even though such intervenors also have a right of appeal
upon final disposition of a case.
The “final judgment” standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 has
repeatedly been applied by this Court to avoid multiple and
“piecemeal appeals” arising from the component elements
of the same dispute. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978) (appeal of order denying class
certification dismissed). Such decisions curtail “the
obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting
the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals
from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise,
from its initiation to entry of judgment.” Cobbledick y.
United States, 309 US. 323, 325 (1940).
ais
In 1947, this Court, in Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen y. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 331 U.S. 519 (1947),
specifically applied the final judgment standard to orders
respecting intervention and established a series of rules
concerning the jurisdiction of appellate courts to review
intervention orders. In allowing an appeal where a putative
intervenor as of right was not permitted in any respect to
became a party to the underlying action, this Court opined
that orders denying permissive intervention are not
immediately reviewable because a permissive intervenor “‘is
at liberty to assert and protect his interests in some more
appropriate proceeding” while orders denying intervention
altogether where an absolute right to intervene has been
claimed are appealable “since [the applicant] cannot appeal
from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding.”
331 U.S. at 524. In short, Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen establishes that an intervention order is
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 only if the
intervenor is not able to protect its rights in some other
fashion, such as an “appeal from a subsequent order or
judgment.” 331 U.S. at 524.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision allowing an immediate
appeal of an order granting permissive intervention but
denying intervention as of right is at-odds with Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen and the “final judgment” doctrine
because Intervenors, as parties to the district cgurt
proceedings, may protect their rights by appealing from the
final disposition of the case. See, United States v. California
Co-operative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 559 (1929) (“an
appeal by one who was permitted to intervene, like an
appeal by one of the original parties, must be taken direct to
this Court”); Williams v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684, 696 (1884)
(intervenor had right to appeal from final judgment); 3B
Moore’s Federal Practice at 24-169 (2d ed. 1982) and cases
=
cited therein.Instead of requiring Intervenors to pursue and
protect their interests in the district court and in any appeal
from final judgment, the Ninth Circuit has authorized
Intervenors to forestall and multiply the proceedings by
commencing an immediate appeal of one of the component
elements of the litigation. In so acting, the Ninth Circuit has
scuttled the reasoning and mandate of Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen.
The inherent inconsistency between the Ninth Circuit’s
September 6, 1984 opinion and Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen is apparent from the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in
its own June 4, 1984 opinion. There, the Ninth Circuit,
citing Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, opines that an
interlocutory appeal of an intervention order is appropriate
only where “{ilmmediate review is necessary to protect the
interests of the applicant.” Slip op. at 3. The Ninth Circuit’s
June 4, 1984 opinion goes on to explain that immediate
review of an order permitting intervention is unnecessary
(even if intervention as of right is denied concurrently)
because such an order permits the applicant for intervention
to become a party to the action and to protect its rights
through participation in all subsequent proceedings,
including post-judgment appeals. Slip op. at 3-4. All of this
analysis, which flows from this Court’s decision in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, was subsequently
abandoned without explanation by the Ninth Circuit when
it granted a rehearing and reinstated the Intervenors’appeal
on September 6, 1984.
The analysis undertaken by this Court in more recent
decisions further confirms that an order granting
permissive intervention but denying intervention as of right
is not immediately appealable. Under this Court’s decisions,
an order will be considered fina! and appealable only if such
=o
order will “conclusively determine the disputed question,
resolve an important issued separate from the merits of the
action and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 US.
463, 468 (1978). An order granting permissive intervention
but denying intervention as of right fails to meet this
standard because it may be reviewed on appeal from a final
judgment. See 3B Moore's Federal Practice at 24-163 et seq.
(2d ed. 1982) and cases cited therein.
2. THE JURISDICTIONAL DECISION
BELOW IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT
WITH DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE
FIRST, SECOND AND FIFTH CIRCUITS
In its June 4, 1984 opinion, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged and followed decisions from three other
circuits which all held that orders granting permissive
intervention but denying intervention of as right are not
immediately appealable. The Ninth Circuit specifically
observed that two of the other circuits had relied upon “the
strong federal policy against piecemeal appeals” in
dismissing such interlocutory appeals. Slip op. at 4. The
Ninth Circuit also observed that “because intervenors [in
the cases from the other circuits] were allowed to intervene
as parties with full appellate rights, they could protect their
interests adequately on appeal from a final decision.” Slip
op. at 3-4. The Ninth Circuit adopted this analysis from the
other circuits and concluded “that imposing restrictions on
permissive intervention does mot render that decision
immediately reviewable, absent obvious prejudicial error.”
Slip op. at 3.
In its September 6, 1984 opinion, however, the Ninth
Circuit withdrew its initial opinion and held, on the basis of
—
State of California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982),
that “[dJenial of intervention as of right is a fina! appealable
order despite the grant of permissive intervention.”® In so
holding and in refusing to reconsider Block en banc (as
requested by petitioners), the Ninth Circuit elected to
depart from the analysis and holdings of three other circuits
in an apparent effort to maintain consistency of law within
the Ninth Circuit.?
The Ninth Circuit's decision in this action conflicts with
the decisions from the First, Second and Fifth Circuits. In
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. 606 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1979), for example, the Second Circuit held that an order
denying full intervention as of right but granting limited
permissive intervention “for the purpose of participating in
... Settlement approval hearings” was not final or
appealable.'° In so holding, the Secu.id Circuit opined:
®Block involved an appeal of an injunction and judgment entered
against the Forest Service for failing to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332 (1976). In
connection with the post-judgment appeal, an intervenor in the case also
challenged the district court's order granting permissive intervention but
denying intervention as of right. None of the other parties in the case
briefed the intervention question. The Ninth Circuit held that the appeal
of the intervention order was untimely because the order was final and
appealable immediately upon its entry by the district court. 690 F.2d at
776.
°The Block decision was not discovered by any of the parties or by the
Ninth Circuit in this case until after the Ninth Circuit's June 4,1984
opinion was issued because of what appears to be a misprint in the Block
opinion. The Block opinion refers to an application for intervsntion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19a) instead of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
Accordingly, Block is not listed in the annotations under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24, nor was it retrieved by the parties in their computer searches
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
‘The district court in Shore apparently denied intervention as of right
= =
The order ... made appellants parties to the
litigation, thus giving them the right to appeal
from an unsatisfactory final order. On that appeal,
this Court may review the district court’s refusal
to grant all of appellants’ requested relief ....
The district-eourt’s order is therefore interlocu-
tory and cannot now be reviewed on appeal.
}
606 F.2d at 357 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit
expressly noted that its holding was intended to “comport
with the Supreme Court’s [long-established] policy against
piecemeal appeals.’ ”” 606 F.2d at 357 quoting Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. 437 U.S. 478 (1978) and
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
Shore was followed by the First Circuit in Kartell v. Blue
Shield, 687 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1982). There, intervenors who
had sought intervention permissively and as of right
appealed from an order granting limited or conditional
intervention.'!' The First Circuit dismissed the appeal,
holding that the order was “not appealable under either 28
because it found that two of the three elements necessary for
intervention as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) — the so-called
“impairment of interest” and “adequacy of representation” elements —
were not established by the applicants in Shore. 606 F.2d at 357. The
Second Circuit found and held that the district court’s findings on these
“were not prejudicially erroneous.” Id. at 357-58.
'The district court in Kartell “did not indicate whether it had acted
under authority of Rule 24(a) or Rule 24(b)” in allowing intervention.
687 F.2d at 548. However, as set forth in the portion of the First
Circuit’s opinion quoted in the text above, the First Circuit found it
unnecessary to determine the basis for the district court’s action because
intervenors had a right of appeal at the conclusion of the proceedings
regardless of the basis for the district court’s action.
we
U.S.C. § 1291 or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” 687 F.2d at 554.
The Court stated:
We ... conclude that the district court’s order in
the case at bar should be treated as a grant of
intervention, and as such is not now appealable.
The intervenors were allowed to intervene, and as
parties to the suit with full appellate rights in this
action, can adequately protect their interests on
appeal from a final decision. They are therefore
distinguishable from would-be intervenors who if
denied intervention altogether are without appel-
late rights unless allowed immediately to appeal.
Regardless of whether intervenors are in fact
intervenors of right or whether they are entitled to
raise the new claims contained in their complaint
in intervention, these questions can be resolved
upon completion of the proceedings before the
district court with no more prejudice to the
intervenors than is caused to any litigant properly
denied interlocutory review of an unfavorable
order. Their asserted need to protect their right of
full intervention does not justify circumventing
the strong federal policy against piecemeal
appeals.
687 F.2d at 550 (citations omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has also held that an order denying
intervention as of right but granting limited permissive
intervention is not immediately appealable. In Wheeler v.
American Home Products Corp, 582 F.2d 891 (Sth Cir.
1977), intervenors appealed after final judgment from the
district court’s earlier order granting limited leave to
intervene “not as of right, but as a matter of permission.”
=
582 F.2d at 894.'2 The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected
appellee’s argument that the appeal was untimely, opining,
“the order ... did not deny intervention. It allowed
intervention as a matter of discretion. Under the established
rule, the order was not appealable.” 582 F.2d at 896. The
Fifth Circuit thus proceeded to review the intervention
exder in connection with the appeal from the final
judgment.
Each of these decisions from the First, Second and Fifth
Circuits are founded upon the holdings and analysis of
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and its progeny. Indeed,
the Second Circuit’s opinion in Shore expressly relies upon
the three major decisions of this Court which are cited in
Section 1 above: Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen;
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); and
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
The First Circuit’s opinion in Kartell adopts the same
analysis. Petitioners respectfully submit that the decisions
of the First, Second and Fifth Circuits are in accord with
the controlling precedents of this Court and that the Ninth
Circuit’s departure from such precedents warrants issuance
of a writ of certiorari in this action.
"The fact that intervenors in eler sought intervention as of right
is apparent from their argument| that the existing parties did not
adequately represent their interests, an element required for intervention
as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a@). See, 582 F.2d at 894.
a
3. THE DECISION ON THE MERITS
BELOW IS IN CONFLICT WITH A
DECISION FROM THE SECOND CIR-
CUIT.
The ¢ecision of the Ninth Circuit that Intervenors here
are entitled to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24(a) is directly contrary to a recent Second Circuit case
with facts virtually identical to the facts of the case at bar.
In United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984), four environmental
organizations appealed from the district court’s order
denying intervention in an action by the United States and
the State of New York seeking, among other things,
recovery of the costs of cleaning up a four-acre waste
disposal site located in New York. Like the case at bar, the
governmental plaintiffs in Hooker asserted claims for relief
under § 1431 of Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”), 42
U.S.C. § 300i; § 7003 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6973; and § 504 of
the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1364. 749 F.2d
at 970-71. All of these statutes allow the government to
commence actions where conditions or conduct create “an
imminent and substantial endangerment” to public health
or welfare.
The environmental organizations in Hooker, many or all
of whose members were “directly affected” by the pollution
flowing from the disposal site, sought to intervene as of
right under the citizen suit provisions of each of the above
statutes and under the standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24(a)(2) (“Rule 24(a)(2)”). 749 F.2d at 969. At least two
of the organizations also sought permissive intervention
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(6) (“Rule 24(b)”). Id. at 973-74.
= =
The district court denied intervention as of right and also
denied permissive intervention but allowed and “strongly
encouragdd] each of the applicants to participate” as
amicus curiae in the proceedings. 749 F.2d at 976. In a
scholarly opinion by Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that (i) intervention as of right was not
appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) (“Rule 24(a)(1)’”)
because none of the statutes relied upon granted a right to
intervene, and (ii) intervention as of right was not
appropriate under Rule 24(a)(2) because the applicants’
interests were adequately represented by the governmental
plaintiffs in their capacity as parens patriae.
Although the Ninth Circuit’s decision to delay the
issuance of its opinion in this action precludes any in-depth
comparison of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis with that of the
Second Circuit in Hooker, the result reached by the Ninth
Circuit is squarely in conflict with that reached by the
Second Circuit. Like Hooker, the case at bar is one being
pursued by the federal and state governments under the
“imminent and substantial endangerment” or so-called
“emergency relief” provisions of a variety of federal and
state statutes. Like the proposed intervenors in Hooker,
Intervenors here claim to be “directly affected” by the
alleged contamination that is the subject of the action. Like
the proposed intervenors in Hooker who did not want to
prejudice “tort claims” the claimed to have against the
United States and the State of New York for apparent
improper handling of the site, Intervenors here claim that
the governmental plaintiffs are culpable and liable for
conditions at the Stringfellow site. Finally, like the proposed
intervenors in Hooker, Intervenors here argued below that
intervention as of right is appropriate either under the
“citizen suit” provisions of the SDWA, RCRA and CWA
or under the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Under
=— =
these circumstances, the conflict between the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in this action and the Second Circuit's in
Hooker will continue to exist regardless of whether the
Ninth Circuit ultimately seeks to justify its March 18, 1985
Order under Rule 24(a)(1) or Rule 24(a)(2).
To the extent that the Ninth Circuit relies upon
Rule 24(aX(1) to justify the result announced in its
March 18, 1985 Order, a clear conflict concerning the
proper interpretation of the SDWA, RCRA and CWA
exists. The Second Circuit in Hooker, citing a number of
lower court decisions and other authorities, squarely held
“that neither the CWA nor the SDWA nor the RCRA
affords [applicant for intervention] a statutory right to
intervene in a government initiated action under the
emergency powers provision of those acts.” 749 F.2d at 978.
Intervenors in the case at bar cited no statutory bases, other
than the three statutes relied upon in Hooker, upon which
the right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1) could arguably be
granted in this action. Thus, insofar as the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in this action is based upon Rule 24(a)(1), it is
inconsistent with Hooker and a writ of certiorari should be
granted by this Court to resolve the conflict.
Similarly, a confiict with Hooker exists to the extent the
Ninth Circuit relies upon Rule 24(a)(2) to justify its
decision reversing the district court's denial of intervention
as of right. Rule 24(a)(2) provides that intervention as of
right should be granted where an applicant for intervention
“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.” While Intervenors in this action appear to satisfy
~~ we
the first portion of this standard, thev, like the proposed
intervenors in Hooker, are adequate / represented by the
governmental plaintiffs suing on behalf of their citizens.
Indeed, as set forth more fully above, Intervenors here are
in precisely the same position as the applicants for
intervention in Hooker. Inasmuch as the case at bar is, for
purposes of applying Rule 24, factually identical to Hooker,
the difference in the results reached by the Second and
Ninth Circuits can only be attributed to application of
differing legal standards.
The delay in the issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
prevents petitioners from determining precisely what legal
standard was applied by the Ninth Circuit in reaching its
decision. However, based upon the briefing and oral
argument in the Ninth Circuit, petitioners believe that the
legal standard applied by the Ninth Circuit is in conflict
with Hooker and decisions of this Court in at least two
respects. First, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit departed
from an “abuse of discretion” standard in reviewing the
district court’s determinations with respect to the various
elements required to be established for intervention under
Rule 24(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit’s decision is in conflict
with this Court’s decision in NAACP v. New York, 413 US.
345, 366 (1973) (timeliness prong of Rule 24(a)(2) must be
reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard) and
decisions from at least three other circuits. See, e.g., Hooker,
749 F.2d at 990-91; Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United Airlines,
515 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975).
Second, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit failed to
require that Intervenors make “a strong affirmative
showing that the sovereign is not fairly representing [their]
interests,” the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with
= =
Hooker and decisions from the Third, Fifth, and District of
Columbia Circuits, all of which require “that, in litigation
of this sort, a greater showing that representation is
inadequate should be required.” Hooker, 749 F.2d at 985
citing Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied suo nom. Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania,
426 U.S. 921 (1976); Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council v.
Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 970, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1982); New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. . United Gas Pipe Line Co,
690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (Sth Cir. 1982); Wade ».
Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 186 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1982).
Once the Ninth Circuit issues its opinion, the precise legal
standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in reaching its
March 18, 1985 decision will become known and the legal
issues to be considered by this Court may be narrowed and
more easily identified. Accordingly, as noted above,
petitioners respectfully request that the Court allow
petitioners to supplement this petition upon issuance of the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion and that the Court not act upon the
second issue presented by this petition until such opinion is
issued.
4. THE DECISION BELOW IS RIPE FOR
REVIEW
This Court unquestionably has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1254 to review decisions of the Courts of Appeals
which do not represent final judgments. See, e.g., Forsyth v.
City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897). This Court has
repeatedly exercised its discretion to review issues on
certiorari prior to final judgment in underlying district
court actions, where, as here, “the interest of judicial
economy” is better served by a prompt resolution of the
questions presented than by postponement of review until
~_
entry of a final judgment. See, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 US.
97, 115 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting from the Court’s grant
of certiorari).
Review on certiorari is necessary to resolve a conflict in
the circuits created by the decision in this case. Judicial
economy is not served by postponing correction of the
conflict created by the Ninth Circuit. The delay would only
result in uncertainty in the Courts of Appeals and an
increase in the number of decisions subject to review for
error on the questions presented by this petition. For these
reasons, this Court has granted certiorari prior to final
judgment in order to resolve conflicts on a number of
occasions. See, e.g., Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S.
at 515; United States v. General Motors Corp. 323 US. at
373, 377 (1945); Myers v. Bethleham Shipbuilding Corp., 303
US. 41, 43-44 (1938).
Indeed, the procedural posture of this case is virtually
identical to that of two recent cases decided by this Court:
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981)
and Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984). In both
of these cases, the Court granted certiorari prior to final
judgments to resolve conflicts among the circuits on
whether orders granting or denying disqualification of
counsel are appealable.
Moreover, there are compelling reasons for granting the
writ in this particular case. The underlying action is one of
many initiated by federal and state authorities under
RCRA, SDWA, CWA and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(“CERCLA”) to facilitate the clean-up of active or
abandoned waste disposal sites. The United States
~/ Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that as of
1979, “as many as 30,000 to 50,000 [such] sites existed, of
which between 1,200-2,000 present a serious risk to public
health.” H. Rep. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1980). Congress itself enacted CERCLA believing that
many such sites constitute a “serious threat to our Nation’s
pubiic health and environment.” S. Rep. No. 96-848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). While the extent of inis national
problem remains unclear, there is little doubt that the
government, potentially responsible parties, citizens living
near the sites and, ultimately, the nation as a whole have
compelling interests in addressing the problem before the
scope and expense of clean-up becomes unmanageable and
before the public health is threatened.
Piecemeal appeals from the component elements of
emergency relief actions under these various federal
statutes, such as the appeal heard by the Ninth Circuit in
this case, unnecessarily and seriously prejudice and delay
the parties’ abilities to resolve such actions. The likely result
of such piecemeal appeals is an increase in the difficulty
and ultimate expense of cleaning-up waste disposal sites.
Given the number of waste disposal sites which are now,
or may in the future become, the subject of governmental
enforcement actions and the desire of environmental and
industrial groups to participate in such actions, judicial
economy and uniformity of law will best be served by
resolving the issues presented by this petition at this time.
Both Hooker and the case at bar aptly establish the
willingness of the parties involved in governmental
enforcement actions to pursue vigorously their perceived
rights at every level of the federal court system. So long as
the decision entered by the Ninth Circuit in this case
remains the law of that circuit and so long as a conflict
exists among the circuits on the issues presented by this
petition, federal courts at all levels should expect to be
_—
besieged with disputes concerning the role and rights of
intervenors in all actions under CERCLA, RCRA, SOWA
AND CWA. a hasan
For all of these reasons, delaying review of the questions
presented by this petition until after a trial in the district
court would be inappropriate in this case. This Court should
exercise its discretion to review the issues presented at this
time.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow an immediate
appeal of an order granting permissive intervention but
denying intervention as of right is at-odds with the decisions
of this Court and the decisions of three other circuits
following this Court’s directives. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision that Intervenors here are entitled to
intervene as of right is in conflict with a recent decision
from the Second Circuit. The interests of judicial economy
and uniformity of national law justify immediate correction
of these conflicts. Petitioners respectfully request hat a writ
of certiorari be granted and the decision of the Ninth
Circuit reversed or vacated.
—_— =
Respectfully submitted,
LATHAM & WATKINS
David L. Mulliken (Counsel of
Record for Petitioners)
Steven P. McDonald
Robert P. Dahlquist
LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS
Maureen E. Mahoney
Counsel for Petitioner
Montrose Chemical Corporation
of California
HELLER, EHRMAN, WHITE &
McAULIFFE
Richard Goff
Rene P. Tatro
44 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California 94104
Counsel for Petitioners Alumax,
Inc. and Hunter Engineering
McCUTCHEN, DOYLE, BROWN &
ENERSEN
Barry P. Goode
Three Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, California 94111
Counsel for Petitioner
Rohr Industries
— =
CHASE, ROTCHFORD, DRUKKER
& BOGUST
Vincent Fish
606 South Olive Street
Los Angeles, California 90014
Counsel for Petitioner
Weyerhaeuser Co.
LEWIS, D’AMATO, BRISBOIS &
BISGAARD
Christopher P. Bisgaard
Suite 300
261 S. Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Counsel for Petitioners
J.B. Stringfellow, Jr.
Stringfellow Quarry Company and
Stringfellow Quarry Co. Inc.
FOLGER & LEVIN
Michael A. Kahn
Douglas Sullivan
5O California Street
San Francisco, California 94111
Counsel for Petitioner
The Deutsch Company
= =
LaFOLLETTE, JOHNSON,
SCHROETER & DEHAAS
Robert E. Kelly
320 North Vermont Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90004
Counsel for Petitioner
Rainbow Canyon Manufacturing
Corp.
PACHTER, GOLD & SCHAFFER
Cliford L. Schaffer
6th Floor
6420 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90048
Counsel for Petitioner
Pos’ Transportation Co.
MUNGER, TOLLES &
RICKERSHAUSER
Peter R. Taft
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
Counsel for Petitioners
Northrop Corporation and
Rockwell International Corp.
SIDLEY & AUSTIN
Charles S. Vogel
Robert I. McMurry
2049 Century Park East
Los Angeles, California 90067
Counsel for Petitioner
BKK Corporation
McCUTCHEN, BLACK, VERLEGER
& SHEA
Richard Doty
Michael Hickok
600 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017
Counsel for Petitioner
Rheem Manufacturing Co.
APPENDIX
A-1
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES of America
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
J.B. STRINGFELLOW, Jr., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
Concerned Neighbors In Action and
Penny Newman,
Intervenors-Appellants. °
No. 84-5682.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
March 18, 1985
Before GOODWIN and REINHARD uit Judges,
and SOLOMON,” District Judge.
ORDER
The portion of the order of February 17, 1984 denying
appellants’ motion to intervene as of right is reversed. The
portion of the order granting appellants leave to intervene
permissively is vacated. Upon remand appellants shall be
granted leave to intervene as of right.
* Hon. Gus D. Solomon, Senior United States District Judge fo the
District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
rT ~.
In view of the decision set forth above, we need not
decide the question as to the appropriateness of the
conditions that the district court attached to the appellants’
participation as a Permissive intervenor. We, of course,
express no view as to what conditions, if any, may
appropriately be placed upon the appellants’ participation in
the litigation in their capacity as intervenors as of right, or
upon the participation of any other parties to the litigation.
An opinion will follow.
REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
No. CV-83-2501-MML
United States District Court
Central District of California
United States of America, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
J. B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al.,
Defendants.
Concerned Neighbors in Action,
etc., et al.,
Intervenors
United States Department of the Air Force,
et al.,
Third Party Defendants.
February 17, 1984
The motion of Concerned Neighbors in Action (“CNA”)
and Penny Newman came on for hearing before the Court,
the Honorable Malcolm M. Lucas, District Judge,
presiding, on October 3, 1983. Having carefully considered
the papers filed and the oral argument of counsel, the Court
grants CNA and Newman leave to intervene permissively
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).
FACTS
Plaintiffs United States of American and the State of
California filed svit on April 21, 1983 seeking an order
|
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compelling (1) abatement of the releases and threatened
releases of hazardous substances from the Stringfellow Acid
Pits, located in Glen Avon, California; (2) all actions
necessary to remedy the conditions which have caused or
may contribute to or present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health, welfare and environ-
ment caused by such releases; and (3) reimbursement of all
funds expended by plaintiffs for the response, removal, and
remedial costs and damage to natural resources. Plaintiffs
named thirty-one waste generator, transporter, and owner
individuals and companies as defendants in the action.
CNA, a non-profit corporation, and Penny Newman, a
resident, taxpayer, Gien Avon property owner, and
chairperson of CNA, have moved the Court for leave to
intervene. The applicants assert an unconditional right to
intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)
(intervention as of right) and the right to intervene by
permission of the Court pursuant to Rule 24(b).
Plaintiffs oppose intervention as of sight, and support
permissive intervention. Plaintiffs urge that certain
conditions be placed on such intervention.
Defendants oppose applicants’ motion for intervention as
of right, but concede that CNA and Newman may
intervene permissively, subject to limitations that the Court
may impose in its discretion.
DISCUSSION
The Court concludes, for the following reasons, that
applicants cannot intervene as of right. The Court permits
applicants to intervene under Rule 24(b) subject to certain
conditions.
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(1) Intervention as of Right
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) When a statute of the United
States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action
and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
(a) No statute Confers an Unconditional Right
to Intervene
Applicants argue that they have the right to intervene
under:
(1) Section 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(i)(a); (“SDWA”)
(2) Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 6973; (“RCRA”)
(3) Sections 514 and 311 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 US.C.§§ 1364, 1321 (“CWA”).
Thé@@ourt will discuss each statute in turn.
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300(iXa)
Plaintiffs assert in their First Amended Complaint, Sixth
Claim for Relief, a claim under the “Emergency Powers”
provision of the SDWA. This provision states:
the Administrator [of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency], upon receipt of information that a
contaminant which is present in or is likely to
enter a public water system may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the
health of such persons, may take such actions as
he may deem necessary in order to protect the
health of such persons... The action which the
Administrator may take may include ... (2)
commencing a civil action for appropriate relief,
including a restraining order or permanent or
temporary injunction. 42 U.S.C. § 300(i)(a).
Applicants contend that the “Citizen suit” provision of
the SDWA confers an unconditional right to intervene in
this “imminent danger” proceeding by the Administrator.
This “Citizen suit” section provides:
(a) Except as provided in §§ (b) of this section,
any person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf —
(1) against any person .. . who is alleged to be
in violation of any requirement prescribed by or
under this title. . . .
. -(6) No civil action may be commenced —
(1)... .B) If the Administrator, the Attorney
General, or the State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of
the United States to require compliance with such
requirement, but in any such action in a Court of
the United States any person may intervene as a
matter of right... .”
42 U.S.C. § 300j-8. (Emphasis added.)
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The Court finds that the right to intervene set forth in the
Citizen Suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 300}-8, is limited to cases
in which the Administrator seeks compliance with a
“requirement” of the SDWA. Plaintiffs in the instant case
do not seek such compliance, but sue for injunctive relief to
remedy an “imminent and substantial endangerment to
health.” SDWA’s citizen suit provision does not apply. See
Town of North Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 482
F.Supp. 900, 904 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (Court dismissed
plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 300}-8, stating that the
statute authorized a civil action only where a violation of a
regulation prescribed by or under the Act was alleged).
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6973
Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for Relief, First Amended
Complaint, is based on the “imminent Hazard” provision of
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (9182) which provides in part:
upon receipt of evidence that the handling,
storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of
any solid waste or hazardous waste may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment, the Administrator may
bring suit . . . to immediately restrain any person
contributing to such handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal to stop such
handling. . . or to take such other action as may be
necessary. .
Applicants CNA and Newman seek to intervene under
RCRA’s citizen suit provision, which is similar to that of
SDWA:
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(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)
of this section, any person may commence a civil
action on his own behalf (1) against any person
. .. who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement or
order which has become effective pursuant to this
Act;
(6b) No action may be commenced under
paragraph (a)(1) of this section ... (2) if the
Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in
a court of the United States or a state to require
compliance with such permit, standard regulation,
condition, requirement, or order; provided, how-
ever, that in any such action in a court of the
United States, any person may intervene as a
matter of right.
42 US.C.§ 6972 (Emphasis added.)
Like that of SDWA, the Citizen Suit provisions of
RCRA do not mention any right to intervene in actions
brought pursuant to the Administrator’s emergency powers.
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corporation,
540 F.Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
In Hooker, supra, the court held that the Citizen Suit
provision of RCRA did not confer a right to intervene in
the Imminent Hazard provision.
The federal government sued Hooker, owner of an
industrial waste disposal facility, pursuant to the emergency
relief provision of RCRA and other statutes. Local
property owners and a public interest group applied to
intervene based on RCRA’s Citizen Suit provision. The
court allowed intervention in the government’s emergency
relief action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 6973.
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The court pointed out that RCRA’s Citizen Suit
provision extended only to RCRA actions seeking
compliance with a “permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, or order.” 540 F.Supp. at 1080-1081 n. 7.
Plaintiffs in Hooker, like those in the instant case, did not
seek such compliance, but injunctive relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 6973. Id.
The Court is not persuaded by applicants’ claim that the
Imminent Hazard section of RCRA “provides an
alternative or supplementary procedure” to the Citizens
Suit section. Applicants cite United States v. Olin
Corporation. Civil Action No. 80-PT-5300-NE (N.D. Ala.
1982), an unpublished opinion, in support of their
argument. In Olin, the City of Triana, Alabama, moved to
intervene in a suit by the United States against Olin
Corporation pursuant to inter alia, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a) and RCRA § 6972.
The court stated that, in its complaint, the United States
generally categorized Olin’s activities as being “unlawful,”
Id. At p.4. The City therefore had the right to intervene
pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.§ 1365(6)(1)(B),
by virtue of Section § 1365(f), which defined “effluent
standard or limitation” as “(1) an unlawful act under
subsection (a) of Section 1311 of this title.” Id. Without
citing any authority, the Olin court then found that because
of RCRA § 6973(a)’s similarity to CWA § 1364, RCRA’s
citizen suit provision also allowed intervention. Contra
Hooker, supra, and United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical
Corporation, 546 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (Court
stated that § 6973 was never intended to “be used as a
substitute procedure for chronic and recurring pollution
problems that may be dealt with under other status.” 546
F.Supp. at 1110).
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_ Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 *
Applicants also claim that the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365, provides a statutory right to intervene.
However, the Court finds that, like that of RCRA and
SDWA, the plain language of the statute’s emergency relief
and citizens’ suit provisions does not confer such an
unconditional right to intervene.
Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief are based
on Sections 504 and 311 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.§ 1364 and
§ 1321, nespectively.
Section 504 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364
provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Act, the Administrator [of the Environmental
Protection Agency] upon receipt of evidence that
a pollution source or combination of sources is
presenting an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the health of persons . . . may bring suit
on behalf of the United States in the appropriate
district court to immediately restrain any person
causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to
stop the discharge of pollutants causing or
contributing to such pollution or to take such
other action as may be necessary.
Section 311 prohibits the discharge of hazardous
substances into navigable waters of the United States,
providing that whenever such substance is discharged or
there is a substantial threat of such discharge the President
is authorized to act to remove this substance. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(6)(3) and (c).
Finally, Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, provides for
citizens suits:
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Section 505 states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this
section, any citizen may commence a civil action
on his own behalf
(1) against any person .. . who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (b) an order issued by
Administrator or a State will respect to such a
standard or limitation. . .
The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to
enforce such an effluent standard or limitation or
such an order . . . as the case may be, and to apply
any appropriate civil penalties under section
309(d) of this Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1319).
(b) No action may be commenced — under
subsection (a)(1) of this section — if the
Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in
a court of the United States, or a State to require
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order,
but in any such action in a court of the United
States any citizen may intervene as a matter of
right. 33 U.S.C.§ 1365. (Emphasis added.)
Section 5O05(f) defines the term “effluent standard or
limitation”:
The term “effluent standard or limitation under
this Act’ means (1) effective July 1, 1973, an
unlawful act under subsection (a) of Section 301
of this Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1311); (2) an effluent
limitation or other limitation under section 301 or
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302 of this Act (33 U.S.C § 1311 or 1312); (3)
standard of performance under section 306 of this
Act (33 U.S.C. § 1316); (4) prohibition, effluent
standard pretreatment standards under section
307 of this Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1317); (5) certification
under section 401 of this Act (33 U.S.C. § 1341);
or (6) a permit or condition thereof issued under
section 402 of this Act (33 U.S.C. § 1342), which
is in effect under this Act (including a
requirement applicable by reason of section 313 of
this Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1323).
The Court concludes that, because violations of §§ 1321
and 1364 are not expressly enumerated among the
violations of “effluent standards or limitations,” citizens do
not have a statutory right to intervene in emergency relief
actions under 33 U.S.C.§ 1365.
The legislative history of the Clean Water Act is
consistent with this finding. The Senate Report stated:
“The provision in this bill is carefully restricted to actions
where violations of standards and regulations or a failure
on the part of officials to act are alleged.” S. Rep. No. 414,
92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1972) U.S. Code Cong.
and Ad. News 3745.
Finally, judicial interpretations of the Clean Water Act’s
citizen suit provision seem also to preclude intervention by
applicants in the emergency relief proceedings. For
example, in Stream Pollution Control Board y. United
States Steel Corporation, 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975),
plaintiff sued under the federal common law of nuisance to
abate pollution of a Lake Michigan tributary. A private
citizen claimed an unconditional right to intervene under
the citizen suit provision of the CWA. Upholding the
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district cout’ denial of the motion to intervene, the
Seventh Circuit stated:
Under 33 US.C. § 1365(6)(1)(B) ... a private
citizen ... is entitled to intervene if, and only if,
the underlying action was commenced and is
being prosecuted to require compliance with a
’standard, limitation, or order’ within the meaning
of the 1972 Act. We hold that an action to abate a
nuisance ... is not such an action and that the
motion to intervene was therefore correctly
denied. Id. at 1041.
In the instant case, plaintiffs like that of plaintiff in Stream
\Control, seek to abate an imminent and substantial
endangerment. This is not an action to require compliance
with a “standard, limitation, or order,” therefore, § 1365
does not confer any right to intervene on applicants in this
suit.
In addition, the court’s discussion of § 1365 in City of
Philadel phia v. Stepan Chemical Company 544F Supp. 1135
(E\D. Pa. 1982) supports this view. In Stepan, the court held
that the citizen suit provision of CWA did not provide the
City with a cause of action for damages: cleanup cost in
removing hazardous substances discharged into the
Delaware river in violation of 33 U.S.C.§ 1321.
The court stated that § 1365 “evidence(d) a congressional
intent to carefully channel citizen participation in the
enforcement of the Act ... its sole purpose is to provide
private parties with a mechanism to compel the
enforcement of effluent standards promulgated pursuant to
the Act.” Id. at 1145, 1146. Spl Applicants CNA and
Penny Newman cite United States v. Hooker Chemicals &
lastics Corporation, 540 F.Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982),
in support of their motion to intervene under CWA. Indeed,
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in Hooker, the court held that the citizen suit provision of
SWA allowed intervention, but that of RCRA did not. (See
discussion of RCRA, supra). Unlike the Stringfellow case,
the underlying action in Hooker involved claims for relief
under § 1319 of CWA. Section 1319 authorizes penalties
for violations of the “effluent standards” established by
§ 1311. The citizen suit provision, § 1365, expressly
authorizes suits on such claims.
In conclusion, the Court finds that none of the statutes
cited by applicants expressly confer “‘an unconditional right
to intervene” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. Proc. 24(a)(1).
(b) No Intervention as of Right under
Fed.R.Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2)
The Ninth Circuit has established a four-part test for
determining whether applications to intervene as of right
should be granted pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2):
(1) The applicant’s motion must be timely;**
(2) The applicant must assert an interest
relating to the property or transaction;
(3) The applicant must be so situated that
without intervention, the disposition may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest; and
(4) The applicant’s interest must be adequately
. represented by the other parties.
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. vy Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir.
1983) (Citing Smith v. Pangilinan, 651 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. .
** The parties agree that the application was timely.
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1981)). Applying this test to the instant case, the Court finds
that applicants do not properly intervene under 24(a)(2).
(1) Applicants have an “Interest”
An applicant for intervention need only show that she has
a “protectable interest” in the outcome of the litigation of
sufficient magnitude to warrant inclusion in the action.
Smith, supra. It is obvious that applicants CNA and Penny
Newman possess such an interest: Living and working in
the neighborhood of the Site, they claim a direct and
substantial interest in the immediate abatement of further
toxic waste releases, and cleanup of past releases.
(2) Practical Impairment of Applicants’ Inter-
ests
The purpose of the second requirement of Rule 24(a)(2)
is to allow intervention by those who might be practically
disadvantaged by the disposition of the action. 7A Wright,
Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1908,
p. 514. Stare decisis may supply this practical disadvantage;
however, the stare decisis problem is “greatly lessened
where there are parties already in the suit whose position on
the issues is the same as the absent parties.” Blake v. Pallan,
$55 F 2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977).
(3) Adequate of Current Representation
For the purposes of determining adequacy of current
representation, the Ninth Circuit has outlined a three-part
test:
(i) Are the interests of the present party in the
suit sufficiently similar to that of the absentee
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such that the legal arguments of the latter will
undoubtedly be made by the former;
(ii) Is that present party capable and willing to
make such arguments, and
(iii) If permitted to intervene, would the
intervenor add some necessary element to the
proceedings which would not be covered by the
parties in the suit?
County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980).
In addition to this showing, applicants must overcome the
presumption of adequacy of representation by state and
federal governmental agencies: “In the absence of a very
compelling showing to the contrary, it will be assumed that
the United States adequately represents the interest of its
citizens ... The very rare cases in which a member of the
public is allowed to intervene . . . are cases in which a very
strong showing of inadequate representation has been
made. 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra at § 1909, pp. 528-
531 (Citing Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 386 U.S.129 (1967)).
Under the Ninth Circuit test and the — #7 of a
compelling showing of inadequate representation, applic-
ants cannot properly intervene under Rule 24 (a)(2).
() Applicants and Existing Parties Share
Similar Interests
- Both applicants and plaintiffs seek the expeditious
abatement and cleanup of the Stringfellow site. However,
applicants allege certain “conflicts of interest” among
existing plaintiffs that would hinder vigorous litigation by
existing plaintiffs. For example, applicants allege that the
United States Air Force was the ninth largest dumper of
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toxic wastes at the site, but plaintiffs have not named it as a
defendant.
However, the United States agrees that permissive
intervention is appropriate with respect to the claims of
intervenors seeking relief against the Air Force. The Court
finds that both federal and state governments, by initiating
the suit and vigorously advocating their claims, actively
represent the interests of the applicants. In addition,
existing defendants have filed counterclaims against
plaintiffs, and thus share similar interests of proposed
intervenors in their claims against the government.
(ii) Existing Parties are Capable and Willing to
Make these Arguments
Applicants assert seventeen claims in their proposed
complaint. The factual allegations and the first nine claims
almost duplicate the First Amended Complaint. The
,2pplicants’ adoption of the allegations and claims of the
First Amended Complaint demonstrates that existing
plaintiffs are capable and willing to make these arguments.
Applicants’ claims for nuisance, strict liability and
negligence, while noi part of the plaintiffs’ suit, will not be
impaired by allowing the existing parties to complete the
litigation on the present claims.
(iii) No Necessary Element will be Added by
Intervention
Although applicants CNA and Penny Newman, as
residents of Glen Avon, have suffered more directly and
immediately from the effects of the toxic wastes, this point
of view does not add any “necessary” element to the suit.
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Finally, regarding the showing of inadequacy of
representation required, applicants argue that they need
make only a “minimal” showing of inadequacy. In support
of this contention, applicants cite Sagebrush Rebellion,
supra.
In that case, the Sagebrusl. |ebellion, a non-profit group
interested in land use, sued the Secretary of Interior. The
group challenged the legality of (former) Secretary
Andrus’s actions in recommending the creation of a
national conservation area in Idaho.
The Audubon Society (and fifteen others) sought to
intervene as of right, as they supported the creation of the
conservation area. The Ninth Circuit found that Audubon
demonstrated sufficient interest and inadequacy of current
representation. In finding Secretary Watt’s representation
inadequate, the court emphasized that he was previously
head of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, which
represented Sagebrush Rebellion in the action.
Sagebrush represented a special case in which applicants
for intervention were defending the actions of a former
government official against a group which had been
represented by the present secretary. In the instant case,
applicants have cited no similar “changes in viewpoint”
which satisfy their burden of showing inadequacy of
representation by existing parties.
In conclusion, the Court finds that although applicants
have an interest in the litigation, their interests are
adequately represented by existing parties, and they cannot
intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2).
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(2) Permissive Intervention
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(b) provides in relevant part: (b)
Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone
may be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when an
applicant’s claim or defense“and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common... In exercising its
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties.
As discussed earlier in this Order, the first nine claims in
applicants’ proposed complaint in intervention are identical
to those in plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. Thus, the
two have common questions of fact or law, and permissive
intervention is appropriate.
Pursuant to Rule 24(b), the Court imposes conditions
upon granting applicants’ motion to intervene. 7A Wright,
Miller & Kane, supra at § 1922, p. 623-624; Van Hoomissen
v. Xerox Corp., 497 F.2d 180, 181 (9th Cir. 1974).
The Court therefore imposes the following conditions on
intervention:
(1) No Claims Shall Be Asserted Which Have
Not Been Asserted by the Original Parties
The Court finds that allowing applicants to assert their
individualized damage and other claims would burden and
expand an already complex litigation, and could jeopardize
the possibility of settlement. Applicants are thus permitted
to intervene in the litigation of the issues raised by the
original parties.
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(2) Applicants May Not Intervene in Cost
Recovery Claims
The applicants can assert no claim with a question of law
or fact in common with the Second, Fifth, Seventh and
Eighth claims of the First Amended Complaint. In these
claims, the governments seek reimbursement under
CERCLA for the costs of cleaning up the site. Thus,
applicants’ interest is more like that of a taxpayer, and they
lack standing to pursue these claims. See Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968).
(3) Restrictions on Intervenors’ Power to Initi-
ate Discovery or Motions
The Court wishes to minimize any delay and confusion
involved in discovery in this large, complex case. Therefore,
the Court holds that applicants may initiate no motion or
discovery unless they have (a) met and conferred with all
parties or their authorized representatives; (b) and obtained
the concurrence of at least one current party to the
initiation of such motion or discovery. The Court
emphasizes that applicants shall have the right to attend all
depositions and to participate to an extent not duplicative of
the original parties, and to receive copies of all discovery to
the same extent as any other party herein.
IT ISSO ORDERED.
. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve,
by United States mail, copies of this Order on counsel for
the parties in this matter.
/
4
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MALCOLM M. LUCAS
Malcolm M. Lucas
United States District Judge
Dated: February 17,1984
——
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No. 84-5682
In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
United States of America, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appeliees,
vs.
J.B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Concerned Neighbors in Action
and Penny Newman,
Intervenors-Appellants.
Filed June 4, 1984
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
District Judge Malcolm M. Lucas, Presiding
Submitted April 23, 1984
Before: WRIGHT, SKOPIL, and NORRIS, Circuit J udges.
WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
The Unite? “tates and the State of California sued 31
defendants connected with the Stringfellow Acid Pits, a
hazardous waste dumpsite near Glen Avon, California. The
defendants are former owners of the dumpsite, persons
alleged to have transported materials to the dumpsite, and
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those alleged to have generated materials deposited there.
Plaintiffs seek recovery of costs expended in cleaning up
the dumpsite and injunctive relief under federal and state
Statutes.
Appellants sought leave from the district court to
int@rvene both as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and
permissively under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Appellants are
Concerned Neighbors in Action, comprised of residents,
taxpayers, and property owners in the vicinity of the
dumpsite, and Penny Newman, co-founder and chair of
Concerned Neighbors in Action.
The district court denied appellants’ motion for leave to
intervene as of right but granted permissive intervention,
subject to conditions. The intervenors may not assert claims
other than those asserted by the parties, may not join in
plaintiffs’ cost recovery claims, and may not file a motion
or initiate discovery unless they confer with all parties and
obtain the permission of at least one party to do so.
The intervenors appeal from the district court’s denial of
their motion to intervene as of right. They assert that the
district court order is reviewable immediately under the
collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp, 337 US. 541, 545-47 (1949), and under 28
U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1) as the denial of injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs and some defendants have moved to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The motions to dismiss were
granted in an order entered May 1, 1984. This opinion
explains our prior action.
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for leave to intervene
as of right is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a final
order. Country of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th
Cir. 1980). The unsuccessful applicant for intervention is
not a party and cannot appeal from the final judgment in
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the litigation. Brotherhood of [Railway Trainmen vy.
Baltimore & Ohio R.r., 331 U.S. 519, 524 (1947). Immediate
review is necessary to protect the interests of the applicant.
An order allowing intervention is not a final order,
however, and is not appealable. Van Hoomissen v. Xerox
Corp. 497 F.2d 180, 181 (9th Cir. 1974). While the district
court denied intervention as of right, it granted permissive
intervention with restrictions.
We conclude that a denial of intervention as of right is
not immediately reviewable when the diserict court grants
permissive intervention. The intervenors’ interests are
protected adequately by their participation as permissive
intervenors. See Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.,
582 F.2d 891, 894-97 (Sth Cir. 1977).
Because the district court imposed conditions upon
appellants’ intervention, however, arguably the permissive
intervention was denied in part. See Van Hoomissen, 497
F.2d at 181. Denial of permissive intervention is appealable
if there is an abuse of discretion. Id.
Two other circuits have held that imposing restrictions on
intervention as of right does not render that decision
immediately reviewable. Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc, 687
F.2d 543, 549-50 (1st Cir. 1982); Shore v. Parklane Hosiery
Co., 606 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1979). Those courts stated
that because the intervenors were allowed to intervene as
parties with full appellate rights, they could protect their
interests adequately on appeal from a final decision.
Kartell, 687 F.2d at 550; Shore, 606 F.2d at 357. Both
courts noted the strong federal policy against piecemeal
appeals. Kartell, 687 F.2d at 550; Shore, 606 F.2d at 357.
For the same reasons, we conclude that imposing
restrictions on permissive intervention does not render that
decision immediately reviewable, absent obvious prejudicial
A-25
error. See Shore, 606 F.2d at 357. We find no such error
here. The appellants can protect their interests adequately
on appeal from the final decision.
Appellant’s assertion that the order is appealable under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as a denial of injunctive relief is
meritless also. To establish appealability under that section,
the “must show more than that the order has the practical
effect of refusing an injunction.” Carson v. American
Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981). They have not shown
the requisite “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence s]”
or inability to challenge the order effectually at some other
point. Id.
The motions to dismiss this appeal are granted. The
dismissal is without prejudice to the intervenors’ right to
appeal after the district court enters a final decision.
A-26 A-27
Appendix The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The appeal
will be calendared for a decision on the merits in due
No. 84-5682 course.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
United States of America, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
J. B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al,
Defendants-Appellees.
Concerned Neighbors in Action,
A non-profit Corporation, et al,
Intervenors-Appellants
September 6, 1984
Before: WRIGHT, SKOPIL, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.
The opinion filed on June 4, 1984 is withdrawn. A
petition for rehearing has advised us that we did not
consider the effect of State of California ». Block, 690 F.2d
753 (9th Cir. 1982) in the prior opinion. That case was not
cited in the briefs or at oral argument and it was not
discovered earlier because its discussion of intervention
cited the wrong Rule of Civil Procedure which resulted in
improper indexing.
It appears that Block controls and is not distinguishable
from this case. Denial of intervention as of right is a final
appealable order, despite the grant of permissive inter-
vention. Block, 690 F.2d at 776.
A-28
No. 84-5682
United States Cougt of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
United States of America
Plaintiff -Anpellee,
vs.
J. B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al,
Defendants-Appellees.
Concerned Neighbors in Action,
Penny Newman,
Intervenors-Appellants
October 26, 1984
Before: W ral GHT, SKOPIL, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.
The panel as constituted has denied the petition by
appellee Montrose Chemical Corporation for reconsider-
ation. Judges Skopil and Norris have voted to reject the en
blanc suggestion.
The active judges of the court have considered the
suggestion of en banc review. No judge has requested a vote
on it.
The petition for reconsideration is denied and the en banc
suggestion is rejected.
The appellants’ request to publish the order of
September 6, 1984, is denied. Their motion to expedite is
granted.
This briefing schedule will be followed:
Appellants’ opening brief will be filed by November 15,
1984. Appellees’ answering briefs are due by December 7,
1984. A reply brief may be filed by December 17, 1984.
A-29
The clerk will calendar the case as $@o0n as practicable.
The parties shall comply with page limitations established
in Fed. R. App. P. 28(g). The district court is requested to
forward the certificate of record as soon as practicable.
A-30
STATUTES INVOLVED
1. 28U.S.C.§ 1291:
§ 1291. Final decision of district courts
The courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States, the United States District Court for the District of
the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court.
2. 28U.S.C.§ 1292:
§ 1292. Interlocutory decisions
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this
section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts
of the United States, the United States District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the
District Court of Guam, and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof,
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court;
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers,
or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to
take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof,
such as directing sales or other disposals of
property;
A-31
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district
courts or the judges thereof determining the rights
and liabilities of the parties of admiralty cases in
which appeals from final decrees are allowed.
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an
order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be
of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
differences of opinion and that an immediate appeal from
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application
is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, that application for an appeal hereunder
shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof
shall so order.
(c) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction —
(1) of an appeal from an interlocutory order or
decree described in subsection (a) of this section
in any case over which the court would have
jurisdiction of an appeal under section 1295 of
this title; and
(2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil
action for patent infringement which would
otherwise be appealable to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final
except for an accounting.
(d)(1) When the chief judge of the Court of
International Trade issues an order under the
provisions of section 256(b) of this title, or when
A-32
any judge of the Court of International Trade, in
issuing any other interlocutory order, includes in
the order a statement that a controlling question
of law is involved with respect to which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from that order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit
an appeal to be taken from such order, if
application is made to that Court within ten days
after the entry of such order.
(2) When any judge of the United States
Claims Court, in issuing an interlocutory order,
includes in the order a statement that a
controlling question of law is involved wi
respect to which there is a substantial ground fi
difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from that order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, the
United §tates Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to
be taken from such order, if application is made to
that Court within ten days after the entry of such
order.
(3) Neither the application for nor the granting
of an appeal under this subsection shall stay in
proceedings in the Court of International Trade
or in the Claims Court, as the case may be, unless
a stay is ordered by a judge of the Court of
International Trade or of the Claims Court or by
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or a judge of that court.
A-33
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”):
Section 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1):
(a) Removal and other remedial action by President;
applicability of national contingency plan; definition
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is
released or there is a substantial threat of such a
release into the environment, or (B) there is a
release of substantial threat of release into the
environment of any pollutant or contaminant
which mav present in imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare, the
President is authorized to act, consistent with the
national contingency plan, to remove or arrange
for the removal of, and provide for remedial
action relating to such hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including
its removal from any contaminated natural
resource), or take any other response measure
consistent with the national contingency plan
which the President deems necessary to protect
the public health or welfare of the environment,
unless the President determines that such removal
and remedial action will be done properly by the
owner or operator of the vessel or facility from
which the release or threat or release emanates, or
by any other responsible party.
Section 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a):
(a) Maintenance, jurisdiction, etc.
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local
government, when the President determines that there may
be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare or the environment be@ause of an action
or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a
facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United
States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate
such danger or threat, and the district court of the United
States n the district in which the threat occurs shall have
jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and
the equities of the case may require. The President may
also, after notice to the affected State, take other action
under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such
orders as may be necessary to protect public health and
welfare and the environment.
Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a):
(a) Covered persons; scope
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of iaw, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this
section.
(1) the owner and operator of a_ vessel
(otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility owned or operated
by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States Government or a
State not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or
loss of natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release.
P\ Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rule 24:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when a statute of the United States confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
A-36
the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing
parties. —
(6) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact
in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of
claim or defense upon any statute or executive order
administered by a federal or state governmental officer or
agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or
agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or
executive order, the officer or agency upon timely
application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In
exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve
a motion to intervene upon the parties in Rule 5. The
motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or
defense for which intervention is sought. The same
procedure shall be followed when a statute of the United
States gives a right to intervene. When the constitutionality
of an act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn
in question in any action to which the United States or an
officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a party, the court
shall notify the Attorney General of the United States as
provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 2403.
A-37
5. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the
“Clean Water Act” or “CWA”):
Section 311(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(cX1):
Removal of discharged oil or hazardous substances;
National Contingency Plan
(c)(1) Whenever any oil or a hazardous substance
is discharged, or there is a substantial threat of
such discharge, into or upon the navigable waters
of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into
or upon the waters of the contiguous zone, or in
connection with activities under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act or the Deepwater
Port Act of 1974, or which may affect natural
resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under
the exclusive management authority of the United
States (including resources under the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976) the
President is authorized to act to remove or
arrange for the removal of such oil or substance at
any time, unless he determines su~h removal will
be done properly by the owner or operator of the
vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from
which the discharge occurs. f
Section 504(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a):
Emergency powers.
(a) Nectwithstanding any other provision of this chapter,
the Administrator upon receipt of evidence that a pollution
source or combination of sources is presenting an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to
“\
A-38
the welfare of persons where such endangerment is to the
livelihood of such persons, such as inability to market
shellfish, may bring suit on behalf of the United States in
the appropriate district court of immediately restrain any
person causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to
stop the discharge of pollutants causing or contributing to
such pollution or to take such other action as may be
necessary.
Section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365:
Authorization; jurisdiction
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf -
(1) against any person (including (i) the United
States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumen-
tality or agency to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a State with
respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator. _
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard
to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties, t» enforce such an effluent standard or limitation,
or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any
appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this
title.
A-39
Notice
(b) No action may be commenced -
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section -
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has
given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the
Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged
violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
criminal action in a court of the United States, or
a State to require compliance with the standard,
limitation, or order, but in any such action in a
court of the United States any citizen may
intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior
to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of
such action to the Administrator, except that such
action may be brought immediately after such
notification in the case of an action under this
section respecting a violation of sections 1316 and
1317(a) of this title. Notices under this subsection
shall be given in such manner as the Adminis-
trator shall prescribe by regulation.
6. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”):
Section 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972:
(a) In general
A-40
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section,
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf -
(1) against any person (including (a) the
United States, and (b) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution,
who is alleged to abe in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or
order which has effective pursuant to this chapter;
or
(2) against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall
be brought in the district court for the district in which the
alleged violation occurred. Any action brought under
paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be brought in the
district court for the district in which the alleged violation
occurred or in the District Court of the District of
Columbia. The district court shall have jurisdiction, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of
the parties, to enforce such regulation or order, or to order
the Administrator to perform such act or duty as the case
may be.
(b) Actions prohibited No action may be commenced
under paragraph (a)(1) of this section -
(1) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has
given notice of the violation (A) to the Adminis-
trator; (B)to the State in which the alleged
violation occurs; a.1d (C) to any alleged violator of
such permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, or order; or
A-41
(2) if the Administrator or State has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
criminal action in a court of the United States or a
State to require compliance with such permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or in
a court of the United States, any person may
intervene as a matter of right.
Section 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. §6973(a):
(a) Authority to Administer
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter,
upon receipt of evidence that the handling, storage,
treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or
hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment, the Adminis-
trator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the
appropriate district court to immediately restrain any
person contributing to such handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal to stop such handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal or to take such other
action as may be necessary. The Administrator shall
provide notice to the affected State of any such suit. The
Administrator may also, after notice to the affected State,
take other action under this section including, but not
liraited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to
protect public health and the environment.
7. Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”):
Section 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a):
Actions authorized against imminent and substantial
endangerment to health.
A-42
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchap-
ter, the Administrator, upon receipt of information that a
contaminant which is present in or is likely to enter a public
water system may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons, and that
appropriate State and local authorities have not acted to
protect the health of such persons, may take such actions as
he may deem necessary in order to protect the health of
such persons. To the extent he determines it to be
practicable in light of such imminent endangerment, he
shall consult with the State and local authorities in order to
confirm the correctness of the information on which action
proposed to be taken under this subsection is based and to
ascertain the action which such authorities are or will be
taking. The action which the Administrator may take may
include (but shall not be limited to) (1) issuing such orders
as may be necessary to protect the health of persons who
are or may be users of such system (including travelers),
and (2) commencing a civil action for appropriate relief,
including a restraining order of permanent or temporary
injunction.
Section 1448, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8:
Persons subject to civil action; jurisdiction of enforcement
proceedings
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
any person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf -
(1) against any person (including (A) the
United States, and (B) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)
A-43
who is alleged to be in violation of any
requirement prescribed by or under this subchap-
ter, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this subchapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator. No action
may be brought under paragraph (1) against a
public water system for a violation of a
requirement prescribed by or under this subchap-
ter which occurred within the 27-month period
beginning on the first day of the month in which
this subchapter is enacted. The United States
district courts shall have jurisdiction, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to enforce in an action
brought under this subsection any requirement
prescribed by or under this subchapter or to order
the Administrator to perform an act or duty
described un paragraph (2), as the case may be.
Conditions for commencement of civil action; notice
(b) No civil action may be commenced -
(1) under subsection (a)(2) of this section
respecting violation of a requirement prescribed
by or under this subchapter -
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has
given notice of such violation (i) to the Adminis-
trator, (ii)to any alleged violator of such
requirement and (iii) to the State in which the
violation occurs, or
(B) if the Administrator, the Attorney
General, or the State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of
A-44 >
the United States to require compliance with such
requirement, but in any such action in a court of
the United States any person may intervene as a
matter of right; or
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior
to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of
such action to the Administrator.
Notice required by this subsection shall be given in such
manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.
No person may commence a civil action under
subsection (a) of this section to require a State to prescribe a
schedule under section 300g-4 or 300g-5 of this title for a
variance or exemption, unless such person shows to the
satisfaction of the court that the State has in a substantial
number of cases failed to prescribe such schedules.
8. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25358.3
Imminent or substantial public endangerment;
removal or remedial actions; testing and investig-
atory actions and studies; contracts
(a) Whenever the director determines that there may be
an imminent or substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare or to the environment, because of a release
or a threatened release of a hazardous substance, the
director may do any or all of the following:
_(1) Order any responsible party or parties to take
appropriate removal or remedial action necessary to protect
the public health and safety and the environment. No order
under this section shall be made to an owner of real
property solely on the basis of that ownership.
A-45
(2) Take or contract for any necessary removal or
remedial action.
(3) Request the Attorney General to secure relief that
may be necessary to abate the danger or threat. The
superior court of the county in which the threat or danger
occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant therelief which the
public interest and equities of the case may require.
(b) When the director determines that a release of a
hazardous substance has occurred or is about to occur, the
director may do any or all of the following:
(1) Undertake those investigations, monitoring, surveys,
testing, and other information gathering necessary to
identify the existence, source, nature, and extent of the
hazardous substances involved and the extent of danger to
the public health or environment.
(2) Undertake those planning, legal, fiscal, economic,
engineering, architectural, and other studies or investiga-
tions which are necessary or appropriate to plan and direct
response actions, to recover thecost of those actions, and to
enforce this chapter.
(c) Whenever there is a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance into the environment, the director may
take or contract for any necessary removal or remedial
action and may take or contract for any actions authorized
by subdivision (b), in compliance with the provisions of this
chapter, including, but not limited to, subdivision (b) of
Section 25355.
A-46
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES OF
PETITIONERS
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Petitioner
Alumax, Inc.:
Alumax Aluminum Corporation
Alumax Aluminum Sales Corporation
Alumax Bauxite Corporation
Alumax Building Specialties Corporation
Alumax Culvert Corporation
Alumax Dispatch Corporation
Alumax Export Corporation
Alumax Extrusions, Inc.
Alumax Fabricated Products, Inc.
Alumas Foil Industrial Redevelopment Corporation
Alumax Foils, Inc.
Alumax of Georgia, Inc.
Alumax of Maryland, Inc.
Alumax Mill Products, Inc.
Alumax Mobile Home Products of Florida, Inc.
Alumax of New South Wales, Inc.
Alumax Pacific Corporation
Alumax Quebec, Inc.
-Alumax Recycling Group, Inc.
Alumax Remelt Corporation
Alumax 6100 South Broadway Redevelopment Corpora-
tion
Alumax of South Carolina, Inc.
A-47
Alumax Technical Services, Inc.
Alumax Warehouse Corporation
Alumax of Washington, Inc.
Alumet Corporation
Alumet Holding Corporation
Decatur Aluminum Company, Inc.
Eastalco Aluminum Company
Eastalco Share, Inc. at
Hillyard Aluminum Recovery Corporation
Homefront, Inc.
Intalco Aluminum Corporation
K & S Products, Inc.
Kawneer Company, Inc.
Kawneer France, Inc.
Mt. Holly Plantation, Inc.
Quaker State Manufacuring Company
Resource Products Corp.
Sailor Mfg., Inc.
Texas Aluminum Company, Inc.
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of BKK
Corporation:
BKK Company of Nevada, Inc. (d/b/a Sun Television)
El Segundo Solid Waste Co., Inc. (d/b/a Eagle Refuse)
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Montrose
Chemical Corporation of California:
Chris Craft Industries, Inc.
A-48
Stauffer Chemical Corporation
Subsiffaries and Affiliates of Northrup
Corporation:
=
Alabama Industries, Inc.
Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A.(CASA)
DSD International DISC, Inc.
DSD International, Inc.
Electronica Basica, S.A. (ELBASA)
Fuller-Shuwayer Co., Ltd.
Northrop A viation Sales, Inc.
Northrop Data Systems, Inc.
Northrop Global, Inc.
Northrop Hueneme Corporstion
Northrop Intercontinental, Ltd.
Northrop International Airezait, Inc.
Northrop International Finance, N.V.
Northrop International, Inc.
Northrop International Services, Inc.
Northrop Korea Investments, Inc.
Northrop Overseas Services, Ltd.
Northrop Product Sales, Inc.
Northrop Radio Services, Inc.
Northrop Services, Inc.
Northrop Support Systems, Inc.
Northrop Technology Enterprise Co.
Northrop Universal, Ltd.
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc.
A-49
__N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse Vleigtuigenfabriek
Fokker
Page Communications Engineers, Inc.
747 NOC I, Inc.
747 NOC II, Inc.
747 NOC III, Inc.
747 NOC IV, Inc.
Tiger Insurance Company, Ltd.
Wilcox Aviation Sales, Inc.
Wilcox Electric, Inc.
World Wide Wilcox, Inc.
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of The Deutsch
Company: )
Bowthorpe Holding, Limited
Compagnie Deutsch
Deutsch Aerospace Fittings Corp.
Deutsch Electromechanical Industries, Limited
Deutch Real Estate Development, Inc.
Nikko Deutsch
Permaswage S.A.
Sharir Precision Engineering, Limited
The Deutsch Company Electronic Components Division
The Deutsch Company Metal Components Division
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rheem
Manufacturing Co.:
Rheem Canada, Inc.
A-30 A-51
Rheem Puerto Rico, Inc.
Europlastique S.A.
Rheem Textile Systems, Inc. Flexible, Inc.
Romolus Holding Company Hills-McCanna Company
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rockwell magnon Ce. £46.
International Corp.: Industrias Erlo, S.A. de C.V.
Industrias Teluq, S.A.
AJ. Sage and Co., Pty. Limited Maine Electronics, Inc.
Amforge, Inc. Manufacturers Leasing Associates XX XV
Arpel, S.A. Metalpan S.A.
Atomics Internationa’, Inc. Metalurgica Carabobo, S.A. “Metalcar”
Audco-Rockwell lialiana S.R.L. MGD Graphic Systems, Inc.
Automotive Axles Limited Moligal Productora de Assentos de Automovel, Limitada
Autonetica, S.A. M.P. O’Rourke Pty., Limited
Autonetics, Inc. Narland Corporation
Braseixos S/A North American Aviation, Inc.
Brasprenas S/A North American Rockwell Corporation
Camdan Investment Trust, Limited Nottrim Services Limited
Collins International Service Company Naud Corporation
Collins Radio Company PHI Magnetronics Limited
Collins Radio Company of Japan, Ltd. Press Kogyo-Rockwell Co., Ltd.
Collins Radio Constructors, Inc. Racticon Corporation
Collins Systems International Inc. Rocketdyne Corporation
Compagnie Industrieiie de Mecanisaes, S.A. Rocketdyne, Inc.
Componantes Automotrices Rockwell-Standard y Com- Rockitt, Ltd.
pania Limitada ~ Rockwell Aerospace & Electronics, Inc.
Constantine Insurance Company, Ltd. Rockwell (Bermuda) Ltd.
Dina Rockwell Nacional S.A. Rockwell Cerdans, S.A.
Electronic Fabriek N.V.
Rockwell-Collins (Australasia) Pty. Ltd.
A-52
Rockwell-Collins (Far East) Limited
Rockwell-Collins (U.K.) Limited
Rockwell-Collins de Mexico, S.A.
Rockwell-Collins de Nogales, S.A. _
Rockwell-Collins France S.A.
Rockwell-Collins G.m.b.H. :
Rockwell-Collins International, Inc.
Rockwell-Collins Italiana S.p.A.
Rockwell CVC OMEVI S.p.A.
Rockwell do Brasil Industria e. Comercio Ltda.
Rockwell Financial Services Corporation
Rockwell Golde G.m.b.H.
Rockwell Golde Italiana S.p.A.
Rockwell Graphic Systems Limited
Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc.
Rockwell International Corporation
Rockwell International Credit Corporation
Rockwell International G.m.b.H.
Rockwell International Holdings Limited
Rockwell International Limited
Rockwell International Manufacturing Pte. Ltd.
Rockwell International of Canada Ltd.
_ Rockwell International Operations, Inc.
Rockwell International Overseas Capital Corporation
Rockwell International Overseas Corporation
Rockwell International Pension Trustees Limited
Rockwell International S.A. (France)
Rockwell International S.A. (Switzerland)
A-53
Rockwell International Sales Corporation
Rockwell International Systems, Inc.
Rockwell International Taiwan Company, Ltd.
Rockwell International Trading Company
Rockwell International Ventures, Inc.
Rockwell Limited
Rockwell Manufacturing Company
Rockwell-Maudslay Limited
Rockwell Mexicana, S.A.
L— /
Rockwell-Rimoldi da Amazonia, Industria e Comercio
Limitada ‘
Rockwell Rimoldi Espanola S.A.
Rockwell Rimoldi France S.A.
Rockwell-Rimoldi G.m.b.H.
Rockwell-Rimoldi (Great Britan) Limited
Rockwell-Rimoldi of America, Inc.
Rockwell-Rimoldi S.p.A.
Rockwell Shuttle Operations, Inc.
Rockwell-Standard Corporation
Rockwell-Standard de Venezuela C.A.
Rockwell Standard of Australia Limitea
Rockwell Systems Graphiques, S.A.
Rockwell Telecommunications Inc.
Rockwell Thompson Limited
Rockwell Transmission Company
Rockwell U.K. Limited
Rockwell Valves Limited
Rockwell Valves S.A.
A-M4
Rockwell Walther Australia Pty. Ltd.
Rockwell Western Trade Corporation
R.O.R. - Sevem S.A.
Rubery Owen-Rockwell (Europa) B.V.
Rubery Owen-Rockwell (Manufacturing) Limited
Rubery Owen-Rockwell Limited
Ruedas de Venzuela S.A.
Sapart, A.G.
Sasab Ag Eschen
SCI Aux Pres Renard
S.C.I1. Volta
S.C.I. de Sully sur Loire
Serrature Auto Ferroviarie Edili SpA.
Serrature Auto Meridionali Stampi Attreature SpA.
Setec S.p.A.
Silvant Plastics Limited
Smith-Blair Inc.
Societe d’Execution Rationelle de Mecanique Automo-
bile s.a.r.l.
Sumlock Anita Services Limited
Tamet Compania Anonima
Tokyo Buhin Rockwell Co., Ltd.
Truflo G.m.b.H.
' Tyseley Estates Limited
W. B. Bumpers Limited
Wescom-Alco Associates
Wescom Leasing Corporation
Wescom (U.K.) Limited
A-55
Wilmot Breeden Australia Nominees Pty. Ltd.
Wilmot Breeden (Australia) Pty Limited
Wilmot Breeden Continental, S.A.
Wilmot Breeden Employees Trust Limited
Wilmot Breeden Group Properties Limited
Wilmot Breeden (Holdings) Limited
Wilmot Breeden International, Inc.
Wilmot Breeden Limited
Wilmot Breeden (Pressings) Limited
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Rohr Industries,
Inc.:
International Transportation Systems, Inc.
Rohr Aero Services, Inc.
Rohr Credit Corporation
Rohr Finance Corporation
Rohr France, S.A.
Rohr Industrial Systems, Inc.
Rohr Southern Industries, Inc.
San Diego Prestressed Concrete Co.
Transportation Insurance Limited
Subsidiaries and Affiliates of Weyerhauser
Co.:
Camac Veneer, Inc.
Cargal Hellas E.P.E.
Cartonneries du Forez
Cartonpack, S.A.
A-56
Centennial Homes, Inc.
Chehalis Western Railroad Company
Columbia & Cowlitz Railway Company
Combustion Power Company, Inc.
Cornerstone Development Company
Curtis, Milburn and Eastern Railroad Company
de Bes’ Insurance Ltd.
Descartes S.A.R.L.
DeQueen and Eastern Railroad Company
Dixieline Builders Fund Control, Inc.
Dixieline Lumber Company
Dropsy Carton S.N.C.
Duma, Inc.
Fisher Lumber Company
Golden Triangle Railroad
Great Northern Insured Annuity Corporation
Green Arrow Motor Express Company
Kennedy Bay Timber Sendirian Berhad
Marmont Realty Company
Mississippi & Skuna Valley Railroad Company
Mountain Tree Farm Company
Norpac Export Inc.
North Pacific Paper Corporation
Oregon Aqua-Foods, Inc.
Oregon, California & Eastern Railway Company
Pacific Hardwoods, Sdn. Bhd.
Pardee Construction Company
Pardee Construction Company of Nevada
A-57
Par-West Financial
Quadrant Development Limited
Quill Corporation
Scarborough Construction, Inc.
Scarborough Corporation
Seyfert International, S.A.
Shemex International B.V.
Shemin Nurseries, Inc.
Silam Forest Products Sdn. Bhd.
Societe Nouvelle des Papeteries de La Haye
Texas, Oklahoma & Eastern Railroad Company
The Baboock Company
The Capricorn Corporation
The Giddings Company
The Giddings Mortgage Investment Company
The Quadrant Corporation
Trendmaker Homes, Inc.
ver Bes’ Insurance Co.
Westminster Company
Westwood Associates
Westwood Escrow Company
Westwood Insurance Agency
Westwood Insurance Agency of Arizona, Inc.
Westwood Securities Company
Westwood Shipping Liftes, Inc.
Weyerhaeuser (Aust.) Pty. Ltd.
Weyerhaeuser Canada Ltd.
Weyerhaeuser Capital Corp. N.V.
A-58
Weyerhaeuser China, Ltd.
Weyerhaeuser Construction Company
Weyerhaeuser Export, Inc.
Weyerhaeuser (Far East) Limited
Weyerhaeuser GMBH
Weyerhaeuser International, Inc.
Weyerhaeuser Italia, S.R.L.
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Arizona
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Nevada
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company of Texas
Weyerhaeuser Overseas Finance Company
Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Company
Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Company of Nevada
Weyerhaeuser S.A.
Weyerhaeuser (U.K.) Limited
Weyerhaeuser Venture Company
Wight Nurseries, Inc.
Winchester Homes, Inc.
SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF
Supreme Court, U.S. |
} FILED
No. 85-184 ~— APR 2 1008
IN THE JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES*"
October Term, 1985
J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC,;
BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE
CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;
NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH
COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;
RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING
CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO,;
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR
INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER
COo.,
Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,
Respondents.
PETITIONERS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
LATHAM & WATKINS LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS
DAVID L. MULLIKEN* MAUREEN E. MAHONEY
STEVEN P McDONALD Suite 1200
ROBERT P. DAHLQUIST 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Suite 2100 Washington D.C. 20036
701 “B” Street (202) 828-4400
San Diego, California 92101
(619) 236-1234
(Additional counsel are listed in the Appendix.)
March 28, 1986 *Counsel of Record for Petitioners
Lawyer's Brief Service, Inc. / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457
TOPICAL INDEX
Page
5 The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Offers No
Justification For The Conflict Between The
Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional Decision And
The Decisions Of This Court And Three
I a ceatilenetanbncntanee 2
II. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Departs From
The Intervention Standards Established By
This Court and by Other Circuits .............cccceeees 5
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Use Of A De Novo
Standard Of Review Conflicts With The
Abuse Of Discretion Standard Of Review
Adopted by this Court and Other Circuits .......... 6
B. The Standard Used By the Ninth Circuit
For Determining Adequacy Of Repres-
entation Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2) Is Inconsistent With
The Established Standard Used Every-
where Outside the Ninth Circuit «0.0.0.0... 7
ac I os ried ccrodiaiciaideipsitnlanbllannageieesenncencecase 9
APPENDIX
List of Parties Joining in the Filing of this
TIT sic sn ictininsttetlaienminciidineeiphinesennasincsense A-1
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (filed Feb. 18, 1986) ............. A-5
—
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R.
Se Wea Fee CORD cece 3, 4
California v. Block
690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir. 1982) .........0000.... 3, 4
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo
530 F.2d SO1, SOS (3d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Fire Officers Unim v.
Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921 (1976) ............. ee. 8
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay
Ga Wi: Gee GE. ettiniseintsntieiominnine 3, 4
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higgison
RS 8: Fo Bs ee = x
EEOC v. United Airlines
515 F.2d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1975) .......0.0.0.0... 6-7
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord
GaP Te Gk Oe CED vicdiscccstcietenoianinies 4
Kartell v. Blue Shield
fs & f) £- | eee 3
NAACP v. New York
SES DR Beee. Be CCD cemtiicinention 6
New Orleans Public Services, Inc. v. United Gas
Pipeline Co.
oe Me Be A 8
— Wi
Page
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller
—— a 2 ee ee. ener 4
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc.
ES, , 3
United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp.
749 F.2d 968 (2nd Cir. 1984) ...... 5, 7-8
Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
See aes BO, SEO CU CR. TGF) ...0000000000000.02.... 6
Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp.
ME ES MED 1. .cs, ccccsnssencccscesconsooes 3
Statutes
ceca caepnscnstinnieccusseoseecsnccesessos 2
Rules
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
ca aceinc cen nsecgeénnsontcccescounsocsecnes 6-8
SET AD 5-8
Other Authorities
Supreme Court Rules
aaa caccenssmsconstesesessnnsesescosencosnee 2
No. 85-184
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1985
J.B. STRINGFELLOW, JR.; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY; STRINGFELLOW
QUARRY COMPANY, INC.; ALUMAX INC,;
BKK CORPORATION; MONTROSE
CHEMICAL CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA;
NORTHROP CORPORATION; THE DEUTSCH
COMPANY; POST TRANSPORTATION CO.;
RAINBOW CANYON MANUFACTURING
CORP.; RHEEM MANUFACTURING COQO,;
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP.; ROHR
INDUSTRIES, INC.; and WEYERHAEUSER
CoO.,
Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,
Respondents.
PETITIONERS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
Pursuant to Rule 22.6 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court, Petitioners hereby submit this supplemental brief to
invite the Court’s attention to the opinion entered in this
matter by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on
February 18, 1986.' The Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which is
reproduced in the appendix hereto,” provides f urther
justification for this Court to exercise its discretion to issue
a writ of certiorari directed to the Ninth Circuit and to
reverse or vacate the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
I
The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Offers No
Justification For The Conflict Between ‘The
Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional Decision And The
Decisions Of This Court And Three Other
Circuits
As set forth more fully in the Petition For a Writ of
Certiorari filed herein, three different circuit courts of
appeals have held that orders granting: permissive
intervention but denying intervention as of right are not
appealable orders under 28 US.C.§ 1291. See, Petition For
a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
| The Ninth Circuit entered its judgment in this action on March 18,
1985, in the form of a two paragraph order which simply announced the
result reached by the Ninth Circuit. In the March 18, 1985 Order, the
Ninth Circuit stated that its opinion would follow. A Petition for a Wret
of Certiorari was filed with this Court shortly before the jurisdictional
time limit for seeking review of the March 18, 1985 judgment expired in
"le in Circuit’s February 18, 1986 Opinion was certified for
publication but has not yet appeared in the Federal Reporter.
for the Ninth Circuit, dated July 30, 1985 [hereinafter “Pet.
Cert.”] at 11-18 citing Kartell v. Blue Shield, 687 F.2d 543
(ist Cir. 1982); Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 606
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1979); Wheeler v. American Home
Products Corp., 582 F.2d 891 (Sth Cir. 1977). Such holdings
follow directly from this Court's analysis in Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen y. Baltimore of Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519
(1947), and from the collateral order standards set forth in
Coopers & Lybrand vy. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
Confronted with the conflict between the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit in this action and the law established by this
Court and three other circuits, the Ninth Circuit, in its
February 18, 1986 opinion, makes an astonishing election.
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit elects not to offer any
rationale as to why its rule of law is more reasoned than
that established elsewhere; it elects not to try to distinguish
this case from others previously decided; and it elects not to
offer any rationale for modifying or adjusting the law
established by this Court and by three other circuit courts
of appeals. Instead, it elects to ignore all non-Ninth Circuit
decisions and to ignore any obligation to explain the conflict
created by its decision in this action. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit ignores Brotherhood, Coopers & Lybrand, Kartell,
Shore and Wheeler altogether, citing only a single Ninth
Circuit decision — California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776
(9th Cir. 1982), which also igwores Brotherhood and its
progeny — in support of its judgment. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit opines simply, ‘“‘we have previously held that an
order denying intervention as of right is a final appealable
order, notwithstanding a simultaneous grant of permissive
intervention, California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir.
1982), and are bound by that holding.” Appendix to
Petitioners’ Supplemental Brief in Support of Petition For a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit [““App.”] at A-10, A-11.
By blindly adhering to Block (and by refusing to
reconsider the rule of Block en banc, as requested by
petitioners), the Ninth Circuit has created an inconsistency
between Ninth Circuit decisions and the decisions of this
Court, and a direct conflict between Ninth Circuit decisions
and the decisions of three other circuit courts of appeals.
After the Ninth Circuit entered its March 18, 1985
judgment in this action, this Court, in Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. v. Koller, _. U.S. —, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985), again
examined and applied the collateral order standards of
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In
Koller, this Court held that orders disqualifying counsel in
civil cases are not appealgble. In so holding, the Court
reconfirmed that “{t}he collateral order doctrine is a
‘narrow exception’ [to the final judgment standard of 28
U.S.C. § 1291] whose reach is limited to trial court orders
affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence
of an immediate appeal.” _ U.S. at —; 105 S. Ct. at 2761
quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 US.
368, 374 (1981). Consistent with its election to ignore
Brotherhood, Coopers & Lybrand and the relevant decisions
from the various circuit courts of appeal, the Ninth
Circuit’s February 18, 1986 opinion does not acknowledge
or make any effort to square its March 18, 1985 judgment
with this Court’s analysis in Koller.
Petitioners respectfully submit that this is a case that so
plainly and inexplicably departs from established law that it
cries out for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, and
possibly, a summary reversal. At a minimum, a writ of
certiorari should be used, and the case remanded to the
Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Koller.
—
II
The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Departs From The
Intervention Standards Established By This
Court And By Other Circuits
The Ninth Circuit’s February 18, 1986 opinion creates
(or perpetuates) two major inconsistencies between the law
of the Ninth Circuit and the holdings of this Court and of
other circuit courts of appeal. The first conflict exists
because the Ninth Circuit held that intervention orders
under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“Rule 24(a)(2)”) are reviewed under a de novo
standar@ «yhile this Court and other circuit courts of appeal
review such orders under an abuse of discretion standard.
The second conflict created by the Ninth Circuit relates
to the burden that members of the public bear in showing
inadequacy of representation by federal and _ state
governments in actions commenced by such governments to
protect and assert public rights. The Ninth Circuit held that
the burden of showing inadequacy of representation under
Rule 24(a)(2) in such cases is satisfied if the applicant for
intervention makes the “minimal” showing that the
representation “may be” inadequate, while othér courts of
appeals have held that a presumption of adequate
representation exists in such cases and that the burden is
satisfied only by “a strong affirmative showing that the
sovereign is not fairly representing the interests of the
applicant.” Compare, U.S. v. Stringfellow, App. at A-16
with United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,
749 F.2d 968, 985 (2nd Cir. 1984).
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Use Of A De Novo
Standard Of Review Conflicts With The
Abuse Of Discretion Standard Of Review
Adopted By This Court And Other Circuits
In its February 18, 1986 opinion, the Ninth Circuit held
that orders granting or denying intervention under Rule
24(a)(2) are reviewed under a de novo standard of review.
App. at A-12. This holding is inconsistent with the decisions
of this Court and other circuits.
This Court has held specifically that an order denying, on
timeliness grounds, a Rule 24 motion to intervene must not
be set aside by a reviewing court absent an abuse of
discretion. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973)
(‘(Timeliness under Rule 24] is to be determined by the
court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that
discretion is abused, the court’s ruling will not be disturbed
on review.””) Timeliness, like inadequacy of representation,
is one of the four prongs of the Rule 24(a)(2) intervention
standard.
Moreover, at least three circuit courts of appeal have
held that orders denying Rule 24(a)(2) intervention on any
grounds, including adequacy of representation, must be
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp. 749
F.2d 968, 990 (2d Cir. 1984) (“it is now the rule in this
circuit that denials of motions to intervene as of right under
Rule 24(a)(2) also are to be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard”); Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976); (“The test on
review [of an order denying intervention under Rule
24(a)(2)] is whether the district judge abused his discretion
in denying the motion for intervention”); EEOC vy. United
Airlines, 515 F.2d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1975) (‘“‘we find no
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that
the appellants’ interests are adequately represented”).
The Ninth Circuit’s unexplained departure from the
abuse of discretion standard creates inconsistency and
uncertainty in the law relating to intervention under
Rule 24. A writ of certiorari should be issued in this case to
secure uniformity and consistency of law throughout the
nation on this issue.
B. The Standard Used By The Ninth Circuit
For Determining Adequacy Of Rep-
resentation Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 24(a)(2) Is Inconsistent With
The Established Standard Used Everywhere
Outside The Ninth Circuit
In its February 18, 1986 opinion, the Ninth Circuit held
that the burden borne by a citizen to show inadequacy of
representation by the federal and state governments in an
aciion commenced by such governments to assert public
rights is satisfied if the citizen makes a “minimal” showing
that the existing representation “may be” inadequate. App.
at A-16. As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, this standard
“clearly conflicts” with the standard applied in other
circuits. App. at A-16.
Indeed, every circuit (other than the Ninth Circuit) that
has considered this issue has recognized something akin to a
“presumption of adequate representation” in cases where
the government sues in its parens patriae capacity and has
acknowledged the more “stringent burden” placed on
applicants for intervention in such cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968,
a oe
985 (2d Cir. 1984) (‘we agree with the Third, Fifth and
District of Columbia Circuits that, in litigation of this sort,
a greater showing that representation is inadequate should
be required”); New Orleans Public Services, Inc. v. United
Gas Pipe Line Co. 690 F.2d 1203, 1213 & n.7 (Sth Cir.
1982) (citing, with approval, a District of Columbia circuit
case for the proposition that ‘where governmental parties
are already present in case, private parties must make more
than a minimal showing of inadequate representation”’);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631 F.2d
738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“to intervene in a suit in district
court in which a state is already a party, a citizen or
subdivision of that state ... must demonstrate that its
interest is in fact different from that of the state and that
that imterest will not be represented by the state”);
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, (3rd Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Fire Officers Union v. Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. 921
(1976) (“‘a presumption of adequate representation gener-
ally arises when the representative is a governmental body
or officer charged by law with representing the interests of
the absentee”’).
The Ninth Circuit's desire to justify the result announced
in its March 18, 1985 order has created a standard for
intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) in the Ninth Circuit that is
radically different from the standard used everywhere else
in the nation. The Ninth Circuit’s standard is not one that
was compelled by application of logic or public policies to a
pending case; rather, it is an after-the-fact standard created
to explain an otherwise inexplicable result in a case decided
a full year ago. The Ninth Circuit’s standard, and the
opinion which created it, will cause nationwide
uncertainties and inconsistencies in all cases involving
intervention under Rule 24. For this reason, and for the
other reasons set forth in the Petition For a Writ of
Certiorari on file herein, a writ of certiorari should be
issued in this action.
Ill
CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that a writ of certiorari
be issued and the decision of the Ninth Circuit reversed or
vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
David L. Mulliken
of Latham & Watkins
Counsel of Record for Petitioners
APPENDIX
The following parties join in the filing of this Supplemental
Brief :
LATHAM & WATKINS
David L. Mulliken (Counsel of
Record for Petitioners)
Steven P. McDonald
Robert P. Dahlquist
LATHAM, WATKINS & HILLS
Maureen E. Mahoney
Counsel for Petitioner
Montrose Chemical Corporation
Of California
HELLER, EHRMAN, WHITE &
McAULIFFE
Richard L. Goff
Rene P. Tatro
44 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California 94101
Counsel for Petitioners Alumax,
Inc. and Hunter Engineering
McCUTCHEN, DOYLE, BROWN &
ENERSEN
Barry P. Goode
Three Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, California 94111
Counsel for Petitioner
Rohr Industries
CHASE, ROTCHFORD, DRUKKER
& BOGUST
Vincent Fish
606 South Olive Street
Los Angeles, California 90014
Counsel for Petitioner
Weyerhaeuser Co.
LEWIS, D’AMATO, BRISBOIS &
BISGAARD
Christopher P, Bisgaard
Suite 300
261 S. Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Counsel for Petitioners
J.B. Stringfellow, Jr.
Stringfellow Quarry Company
and Stringfellow
Quarry Co., Inc.
FOLGER & LEVIN
Michael A. Kahn
Douglas Sullivan
50 California Street
San Francisco, California 94111
Counsel for Petitioner
The Deutsch Company
A-3
LaFOLLETTE, JOHNSON,
SCHROETER & DEHAAS
Robert E. Kelly
320 North Vermont Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90004
Counsel for Petitioner
Rainbow Canyon
Manufacturing Corp.
PACHTER, GOLD & SCHAFFER
Cliford L. Schaffer
6th Floor
6420 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90048
Counsel for Petitioner
Post Transportation Co.
MUNGER, TOLLES &
RICKERSHAUSER
Peter R. Taft
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
Counsel for Petitioners
Northrop Corporation and
Rockwell International Corp.
A-4
SIDLEY & AUSTIN
Charles S. Vogel
Robert I. McMurry
2049 Century Park East
Los Angeles, California 90067
Counsel for Petitioner
BKK Corporation
McCUTCHEN, BLACK, VERLEGER
& SHEA
Richard Doty
Michael Hickok
600 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017
Counsel for Petitioner
Rheem Manufacturing Co.
A-5
For Publication
é
‘
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
wv
FILED
FEB 18 1986
CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 84-5684
D.C. NO. CV-83-2501-MML
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Plaintiff -Appellees,
vs.
J.B. STRINGFELLOW, Jr., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
CONCERNED NEIGHBORS IN ACTION and
PENNY NEWMAN,
Intervenors-Appellants.
OPINION
A-6
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Malcolm M. Lucas, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 6, 1985
Pasadena, California
Before: GOODWIN and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges,
and SOLOMON, District Judge*
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
Concerned Neighbors in Action (“CNA”) and _ its
chairwoman, Penny Newman, appeal the district court's
denial of their motion to intervene as of right in an action
brought by the United States and the State of California
against thirty-one parties who are allegedly responsible for
release of hazardous wastes from the Stringfellow Acid Pits.
We conclude that the district court erred in finding that
appellants failed to meet the requirements of intervention
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(.). !
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
CNA is a nonprofit organization consisting of over 400
residents of Glen Avon, California and its surrounding
communities. The organization was founded in 1979 in
response to releases of hazardous wastes from Stringfellow.
CNA was formed to ensure adequate clean-up of the acid
* Gus Solomon, Senior United States District Judge for the Distriet of
Oregon, sitting by designation.
' On March 18, 1985, we issued an order reversing the court's denial
of appellants’ motion and directing the court to grant appellants leave to
intervene as of right. We stated in that order that we would file an
opinion at a later date.
pits; to monitor the performance of government agencies
involved in clean-up efforts; and to protect the health and
well-being of its members who, according to appellants,
have all been exposed to hazardous wastes deposited at
Stringfellow. Penny Newman, in addition to being the
chairwoman of CNA, is a resident of Glen Avon.
Stringfellow is a 20-acre hazardous waste disposal site
constructed by the State of California and located one mile
from Glen Avon. According to appellants’ proposed
complaint in intervention, dumping of hazardous waste into
the acid pits began in 1956 and continued until closure of
the site in 1972. During this period, approximately 34
million gallons of hazardous wastes were dumped into the
site by more than two hundred parties, including agencies
of the federal government.
As early as 1969, it became apparent that the hazardous
waste was noi being confined to the site and was escaping
into the adjacent Pyrite Creek through which surface water
flows down into the community of Glen Avon. In March,
1S69, heavy rains caused the site to overflow, discharging
contaminated water into Glen Avon. Heavy rainfall during
the winter of 1977-78 caused similar overflowing. In 1978,
the State of California released 800,000 gallons of
contaminated water into Pyrite Creek, which in turn
drained into the Streets of Glen Avon. Additional flooding
resulted from heavy rains in 1979 and 1982.
In April, 1983, the United States and the State of
California brought suit against thirty-one defendants,
including the former owners of the site and other private
parties who generated or transported wastes which were
dumped at the site (“the waste-generators”). The two
governmental entities sought to enjoin the release of
hazardous wastes from Stringfellow pursuant to the
“imminent hazard” provisions of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982); the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982);
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),
42 US.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1982); and the Safe Drinking
Water ACT (“SDWA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300)-10 (1982).
They also asserted claims for cost recovery pursuant to both
state and federal law.”
In July, 1983, CNA and Newman (hereinafter collective-
ly referred to as “CNA’”’) moved to intervene as of right,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a)(1) and 24(a)(2). In the
alternative, CNA moved to intervene permissively, pur-
suant to Fed. R. Civ. P 24(b). In its complaint in
intervention, CNA asserted claims against the plaintiff state
and federal governments as well as the thirty-one waste
generators named as defendants in the existing action. In
addition to joining in the plaintiffs’ claims for relief, CNA
sought additional injunctive i viief against both the plaintiffs
and the defendants, including permanent abatement of the
hazard by total removal of the hazardous substances from
the site, and the conducting of health studies.
The district court denied CNA’s motion to intervene as
of right, concluding that neither Rule 24(a)(1) nor Rule
24(a)(2) provided a basis upon which to grant intervention.
With respect to Rule 24(a)(1), which provides for
intervention as of right “when a statute of the United States
confers an unconditional right to intervene,” the district
court reasoned that although the “citizen suit” provisions of
2 In August, 1983, several waste-generators asserted counterclaims
against both governmental parties.
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the SDWA, the RCRA and the CWA provide for citizen
intervention as of right in certain types of actions, these
statutory rights of intervention do not apply to suits such as
this which have been brought by the United States pursuant
to the “emergency powers” provision of the SDWA, the
“imminent hazard” provision of the RCRA, and the
“emergency relief” provision of the CWA. Accordingly, the
court concluded that Rule 24(a)(1) did not authorize CNA
to intervene.
The district court also denied CNA’s motion under Rule
24(a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) provides for intervention as of right
when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant’s interest is adequately represented
by existing parties.
The district court concluded that CNA had failed to show
that it would be practically disadvantaged by disposition of
the litigation or that the existing parties would not
adequately represent its interests.
Notwithstanding its denial of CNA’s motion to intervene
as of right, the district court granted CNA leave to
intervene permissively, reasoning that since CNA’s
proposed complaint in intervention and the complaint filed
by the United States and California raised common
questions of fact and law, permissive intervention was
appropriate. However, the court imposed conditions upon
its grant of permissive intervention. CNA claims that those
conditions severely limit its ability to influence the results of
the litigation. Specifically, the district court’s order
prohibited appellant from (1) asserting any claims not
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already asserted by the original parties; (2) intervening in
the original parties’ cost recovery claims; and (3) initiating
any motion or discovery, unless appellant had conferred
with the original parties and had secured the concurrence
of at least one of them in the proposed mofien or discovery.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
In this appeal, CNA raises two issues, only one of which
we need address. First, it contends that the district court’s
determination that it failed to make the requisite showing
under Rule 24(a)(2) was erroneous. Second, and in the
alternative, it contends that the district court erred in
finding that the statutes pursuant to which the original
plaintiffs brought this action confer upon it no right of
intervention. Because we reverse the district court’s denial
of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), we do not rule on
appellant’s statutory right of intervention claim.
Ill. APPEALABILITY OF THE DISTRICT
COURT’S ORDER
The waste-generators challenge our jurisdiction over this
appeal. They contend that an order denying intervention as
of right but granting permissive intervention is not a “final
decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982),
and hence is not appealable. They also contend that because
appellant availed itself of the benefits of permissive
intervention by filing briefs and pleadings, it is, in effect,
estopped from appealing the district court’s denial of its
motion to intervene as of right.
We reject the waste-generators’ contentions. First, we
“have previously held that an order denying intervention as
of right is a final appealable order, notwithstanding a
simultaneous grant of permissive intervention, California vy.
Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir. 1982), and are bound by
that holding. > Second, CNA’s participation in the litigation
aS a permissive intervenor does not estop it from timely
appealing that portion of the order denying intervention as
of right. * A party is not required to reject the benefits of a
judgment it deems inadequate in order to preserve its right
to appeal, so long as the party does not consent to the
judgment. United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312
(1960);° United States for Use & Benefit of H & S
Industries, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Co., 525 F.2d 760, 764-65 (7th
Cir. 1975); Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp. v. Friendly
Broadcasting Co. 414 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1969); 9 J.
Moore & B. Ward, Moore’s Federal Practice 1 203.06, at 3-
26 (2d ed. 1985). Here, although it may have unwillingly
participated in the igation as a permissive intervenor,
CNA made if clear that it was not consenting to the denial
of its right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). Moreover, to
3 The governments and several of the waste-generators originally
moved, before a motions panel of this court, to dismiss CNA’s appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. Neither party brought California v. Block, supra to
that panel’s attention, due to the fact that the case is not annotated under
Rule 24. The panel decided the jurisdictional issue against CNA,
dismissed the appeal and issued an opinion for publication. CNA then
moved for rehearing on the ground that the order of dismissal was in
conflict with Block. The panel agreed. It withdrew its opinion, held that
we had jurisdiction over CNA’s appeal and ordered, in an unpublished
memorandum, that the appeal be calendared for a hearing on the merits.
* We note that CNA, unlike the applicant in Block, has demonstrated
that its limited status as a permissive intervenor impedes its ability to
fully prosecute its claims. In Block, we stated that the applicant had
failed to show with any specificity that it was prejudiced by the court's
actions in granting it permissive intervention status.
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hold otherwise would force CNA to give up one important
right in order to preserve another.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL OF
APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO INTER-
VENE AS OF RIGHT UNDER RULE
24(a)(2)
A. Standard of Review
Although the waste-generators contend that the district
court’s denial of appellant’s motion to intervene as of right
should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, we
traditionally conduct a de novo review of such orders. See,
e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc., v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527
(9th Cir. 1983); Washington State Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Smith v.
Pangilinan, 651 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1981); Idaho y.
Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980); County of
Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980); Legal
Aid Society v. Dunlop, 618 F.2d 48, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1980);
Johnson v. San Francisco United School District, 500 F.2d
349, 352-54 (9th Cir. 1974). We do so because our review of
the district court’s decision involves application of a rule of
law to the established facts, and because the issue primarily
' involves consideration of legal concepts in the mix of fact
and law. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,
1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 101 (1984).
See also 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1902 (1972).
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B. The Validity of the District Court’s
Decision
Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of applicants for
intervention. Washington State Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.
1982); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1904. We have
adopted a four-part test to determine whether applications
for intervention as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) should
be granted. An order granting intervention as of right is
appropriate if (1) the applicant’s motion is timely; (2) the
applicant has asserted an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the
applicant is so situated that without intervention the
disposition may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its
ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s
interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties.
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d at 527; County
of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d at 438. In applying this test
we are guided primarily by practical considerations. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee note (“if an
[applicant] would be substantially affected in a practical
sense by the determination made in an action, [the
applicant] should, as a general
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