Appendix — Bazemore v. Friday
Supreme Court brief1986
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BD A~ QF | Mer-surreme cour, vs
FilLkED
ee a )
Ie ome ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
Oocroper TeRM, 1984
P. E. Bazemors, e? al.,
Petitioners,
v.
WruuM C. Frmay, ef al.,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Epwarp D. RerMan
108 North Eighth Street
Allentown, Pa. 18101
Cressizg H. Tuicren, JB.
Thigpen, Blue & Stephens
Suite 214
Hallmark Building
Raleigh, North Carolina 27601
Juutius LzeVonnge CHAMBERS
Ronaup L. Exuis
Exic ScHNAPPER*
NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc.
16th Floor
99 Hudson Sireet
New York, New York 10013
Counsel for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RALEIGH DIVISION
Filed August 20, 1982 CIV. No. 2879
P. E. BAZEMORE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Plaintiff-Intervenors,
Vs.
WILLIAM C. FRIDAY, et al,
eee ee eee ee ee”
Defendants.
JUDGMENT ON CLASS-WIDE CLAIMS
For the reasons stated in the court's
memorandum of decision this day filed it
is now
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the United States as plaintiff-intervenor
is not entitled to recover of the defen-
dants, or any of them, by reason of any
matters alleged in the Original complaint
in intervention or the amended complaint
in intervention and that the action of
the plaintiff-intervenor be and the same
is hereby dismissed with costs.
s/s
FP. T. DUPREE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August 20, 1982.
By _—s—“‘(ate S/S
Deputy Clerk
» a «
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RALEIGH DIVISION
Filed August 20, 1982 CIV. No. 2879
P. E. BAZEMORE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Plaintiff-Intervenors,
Vs.
WILLIAM C. FRIDAY, et al,
se ee ee ee ee eee eee ee ee”
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
(CLASS-WIDE CLAIMS)
This action instituted in this court
on November 18, 1971, by more than fifty
employees of the North Caroiina Agricul-
tural Extension Service (Extension
Service) alleging racial discrimination in
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employment and the provision of services
came on for trial in December, 1981, and
was tried to the court without a jury over
a period of approximately ten motiie. In
this memorandum of decision the court will
record its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law in conformity with Rule 52,
F.R. Civ. P.
BACKGROUND
The action was based on alleged vio-
tions of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, 42 U.S.C.
§$§ 1981, 1983 and 2000d, and 7 U.S.C. §
To some extent the inordinate delay
between the filing date of the suit and
trial is attributable to docket conditions
in this court over the last ten years, but
perhaps to a greater extent to the action
(and sometimes inaction) of the parties in
obtaining amendments to the pleadings,
extensions of time to complete discovery,
motions for continuance, failure to press
for a trial and their intermittent
assurances to the court that a settlment
of all matters in controversy was proba-
ble,
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341, et seg. The United States intervened
in the action on April 7, 1972, under
Section 902 of Title IX and Sections 601
and 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2, 2000d
and 2000d-1. Named originally as defen-
dants in the action, the Secretary of
Agriculture and the Administrator of the
Federal Extension Service were re-aligned
as plaintiff-intervenors on July 21, 1972.
The United States amended its com-
plaint in intervention on February 28,
1975, to include allegations of racial
discrimination against black and Indian
employees in violation of Section 703 and
706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq.
The defendants are William C. Friday,
President of the University of North
Carolina (which comprises the _ sixteen
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institutions of higher education in the
State), the Chancellor of North Carolina
State University, the Director of the
Extension Service, the Board of Governors
of the University of North Carolina, North
Carolina State University (NCSU), and its
School of Agriculture of which the
Extension Service is a part; and Alamance,
Edgecombe and Mecklenburg Counties.
In addition to their answers contain-
ing general denials the defendants filed a
third-party complaint against the Secre-
tary of Agriculture and the Administrator
of the Federal Extension Service alleging
discriminatory application of the civil
rights regulations of the Department of
Agriculture. The order re-aligning the
parties ordered that this third-party
complaint be treated as a counterclaim.
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North Carolina State University, a
land grant university located at Raleigh,
administers the state's extension program
the purpose of which is to aid in the
dissemination of "useful and practical
information on subjects relating to
agriculture and home economics." Funds
for the program are provided by the
federal government under the Smith-Lever
Act of 1974 (7 U.S.C. § 341, et seq.); by
the State of North Carolina and each of
the 100 counties in the state in the
approximate ratios of forty per cent
federal, forth-three per cent state and
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2
seventeen per cent county.
The Extension Service is a division
of the School of Agriculture and Life
Sciences at NCSU at Raleigh. The present
head of the Extension Service is its
Director, Dr. Chester Black who assumed
the position on January 1, 1982. Dr.
Black, a white male, is also Associate
Dean of the School of Agriculture and Life
Sciences. He is directly responsible to
the Dean of that school and ultimately
responsible to the Chancellor or NCSU, its
Board of Trustees, the President of the
University of North Carolina and the Board
Prior to 1978 funds for extension programs
carried out by North Carolina A&T State
University (A&T), a predominantly black
institution located at Greensboro, North
Carolina, were made available through the
State Director of Cooperative Extension,
but since then have been appropriated
un-der Section 1444 of the Food and
Agri-cultural Act of 1977 (1890 Program)
and are made available tothe Administrator
of the 1890 Extension Programs at A & T.
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of Governors of the University of North
Carolina for the operations of the
Extension Service. The position of
Director of the Extension Service has
always been held by a white male.
Responsibilities of the Director
include programming, planning, managing,
personnel, staffing, budgeting, staff
organization, selection of staff, assign-
ment, promotion of personnel, and the
development and implementation of policies
relating to employment and the delivery of
services of the organization.
The Associate Director of the Exten-
sion Service holds the second highest
position in the organization. Prior to
his elevation to the directorship on
January 1, 1982, the position of Associate
Director was held by Dr. Black. Responsi-
bilities of the position include overall
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administration, budget and organizational
management. This position has always
been held by a white male.
Directly beneath the Associate
Director are five Assistant Directors of
the Extension Service, each with responsi-
bility in one of these areas: staff
development, 4-H, home economics, agricul-
ture and special programs and county
operations. The Assistant Director for
Home Economics is a white female. The
remaining four Assistant Directors are
white males.
The state is divided into six dis-
tricts, the north central, northeastern,
northwestern, southeastern, southwestern
and western. Each district is headed by a
District Extension Chairman who is
responsible for administering all Exten-
sion Service programs within the district.
He or she coordinates the program efforts
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of ali agents and specialists within the
district, interprets administrative
policy, develops and maintains budget for
the district and makes recommendations to
the Director with respect to the hiring,
promotion and salaries of personnel within
the district. Of the District Extension
Chairmen at this time one is a black
female, one is a white female and the
remaining tour are white males.
The top administrative position in
the Extension Service in each of the 100
counties of North Carolina is that of the
County Extension Chairman. Under the
Supervision of the District Extension
Chairman the County Chairman coordinates
all Extension Service activities within
his county and is responsible for deveiop-
ing an effective county extension program.
He is responsible for organizing and
allocating resources, preparing the
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County's extension budget, making recom-
mendations to the District Chairman with
respect to the hiring, promotion, evalua-
tion and salary of all county-level
extension personnel. The County Chairman
reports to the District Extension Chairman
who reports to the Assistant Director for
County Operations. The County Extension
Chairman also reports to the Board of
County Commissioners in his county on
extension programs and matters relating to
budgeting and personnel.
In addition to the employees in the
managerial chain of command the Extension
Service employs some twenty-five or more
"Specialists" whose responsibilities are
to provide technical assistance to the
agents in the counties. Most of the
Specialists are employed at NCSU in
Raleigh. Their areas of responsibility
include such subjects as adult. and
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community college education, agricultural
communications, animal husbandry, dairy
husbandry, food science, 4-H, home
economics, horticulture and wildlife. A
Specialistsis one who has technical exper-
tise in a particular subject matter and/or
does research in a particular area or
matter and renders technical assistance in
that field. They keep agents and recipi-
ents of extension services informed of new
developments within their areas of
specialization, assist in planning,
implementing and evaluating extension
programs. Most Specialists serve the
entire state, but a few of them work
within a limited geographic area. Approxi-
mately two-thirds of the Specialists have
PhD degrees.
There are twelve district program
leaders with responsibility for specific
programs in the areas of home economics,
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agriculture, community development and 4-H
in assigned districts. Program leaders
also kprovide admi8nistrative assistance
to the District Extension chairman with
respect to personnel and programs within
the districts to which they are assigned.
There are two positions for state
agents in home economics, and at the
present time one of the positions is
filled by a white female and the other by
a black female. The latter is primarily
responsible for the Extension Service's
Expanded Food and Nutrition Education
Program (EFNEP).
The Extension Service renders
services in four major extension program
areas: home economics, agriculture, 4-H
and youth, and community resource develop-
ment.
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The home economics program helps
families solve problems and improve the
quality of their lives in the areas of
food, nutrition and health; housing,
energy and environment; clothing and
textiles; family resource management; and
human development and ag ing through
educational programs and an extensive
volunteer organization within each county.
There are three ranks of home
economics agents: home economics agent,
associate home economics agent and
assistant home economics agent. Ordinar-
ily these positions are held by females.
One of the functions of the home eco-
nomics agents at the county level is to
help women organize “homemaker clubs."
These clubs are associations of women who
receive lessons in home economics from the
county agents and from their own members.
Although membership in these clubs is
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entirely voluntary, home economics agents
regularly meet with the clubs, give
lessons to them and train individual club
members to give home economics lessons to
their members.
Another function of the Extension
Service is to operate the EFNEP program
the purpose of which is to improve the
diets of poor families and to increase
their effective utilization of public
assistance food programs. The program
uses non-college graduate para-profes-
sionals as “program aides" who work on a
part-time basis under the day-to-day
supervision of the county home economics
agent responsible for the food _ and
nutrition program in the county. The
majority of the clientele served by this
program is black, and the program is
financed primarily by federal funds.
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There are three ranks of agricultural
extension agents: agent, associate agent
and assistant agent. To qualify for the
position of full agent formerly required a
minimum of seven years' experience with the
Extension Service or equivalent experi-
ence. Since 1979 it has been six years.
The position of associate agent requires a
minimum of three years' experience with
the Extension Service or equivalent
experience, and the position of assistant
agent which is the position into which one
is initially employed requires no previous
experience. While the three ranks of
agents perform essentially the same types
cf tasks, when an agent is promoted his
responsibilities increase and a higher
level of performance is expected of him.
Each agricultural agent is assigned
particular areas of responsibility by the
County Chairman, and the areas of respon-
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sibility normally assigned are the crops
grown in the county and specific live-
stock. Both agricultural agents and home
economics agents can also be assigned to
4-H and community development.
The 4-H and youth program is operated
in each of the 100 counties of the state
and on the Cherokee Indian reservation.
This program is designed to develop good
character and citizenship and to teach
youth useful and practical skills.
Participants have the opportunity to
select from nearly fifty different areas
of study including archery, beef, cloth-
ing, foods and nutrition, home environ-
ment, bicycle repair and safety, electri-
city, entomology, horticulture, conserva-
tion, forestry and veterinary science.
The Specialists at NCSU and A & T prepare
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the subject matter instruction and related
activities that attract 4-H youth to the
program.
One of the functions of the county
agents assigned 4-H as an area of respon-
Sibility is to help organize and serve 4-H
clubs. Prior to the early 1960's these
clubs were organized in the public schools
and county 4-H agents would meet with the
clubs during school hours and present
educational programs to them. Thereafter
the clubs were moved out of the schools
and were organized on a community basis
with adult volunteers serving as leaders
of the clubs.
Community resource development (CRD)
programs deal primarily with problems that
require group or community action. The
CRD programs vary from county to county
depending on the needs of the counties
over a period of time. Many of the
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counties have developed programs that are
Similar in nature such as land use
planning and organization of volunteer
fire departments.
EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE EXTENSION SERVICE
The salaries of Extension Service
agents and county chairmen consist of a
federal share, a state share and a county
share. The federal government allocates a
sum of money to the Extension Service each
fiscal year, and the boards of county
commissioners in each of the one hundred
counties in the state, in conjunction with
the Extension Service, determine how much
each county will pay agents at the time
they are hired. The county chairmen make
recommendations to the county commission-
ers as to what the professional staffs'
Salaries should be. Some extension
agents, such as those who work with the
EFNEP, receive only federal funds.
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The Extension Service has the re-
sponsibility to establish minimum require-
ments and qualifications for employment;
to generate, receive and examine applica-
tions; to interview and screen applicants
to determine their qualifications and
availability; to recommend to county
commissioners qualified applicants for
appointment to vacant or new positions; to
recommend the salaries of extension
agents; to determine jointly with the
county board of commissioners the share of
salaries to be paid by each and to provide
the state and federal share of these
Salaries; to prepare and submit an annual
budget request to the board of commis-
Sioners for the county share of funds for
Salaries and expenses; to provide funds
for travel in the conduct of extension
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work; and to provide extension agents with
official bulletins, leaflets and other
publications for educational purposes.
The Extension Service also has re-
sponsibility for the administration and
supervision of extension programs and
personnel and to develop and administer a
personnel management system that provides
for (a) the annual review of each worker's
performance, (b ) counseling for job
improvement where needed, and (c) periodic
county program reviews. It provides a
staff of specialists to train agents in
technology and other changes affecting
agriculture, home economics, 4-H and CRD
and assists in the conduct of work in
these areas. It prevides extension
workers with training program and develops
and maintains a county advisory leadership
system in each county.
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These responsibilities of the Exten-
Sion Service are set forth in a "Memoran-
dum of Understanding" between the Exten-
Sion Service and the boards of county
commissioners of each county (DX 79). This
agreement also outlines’ the respor :i-
bilities of the boards of county commis-
sioners which include the duty to provide
the county's share of salaries’ for
extension personnel; to provide office
space and equipment, utilities, telephone,
office supplies, demonstration materials
and other items needed for the efficient
operation of the county extension office
and program; to review and consider the
annual budget request from the Extension
Service and take appropriate action by
July 1 of each fiscal year; and to confer
and advise with district and county
extension chairmen and extension advisory
council relative to county extension
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programs. With respect to employment
practices the Extension’ Service
and
commissioners mutually agree as follows:
"That all county extension appoint-
ments and separations are to be
worked out jointly between the North
Carolina Agricultural Extension Ser-
vice and the Board of County
Commissioners, and that no official
action will be taken by either party
regarding appointment or separation
prior to discussion of the matter
with the other party."
Since November, 1972 a monthly
an-
nouncement of vacant county positions has
been sent from the office of the Assistant
Director of the Extension Service
for
county operations on the fifteenth of each
month to all Extension Service offices in
the state and certain universities.
announcement sets forth the area
responsibility, date the position
available and location and deadline
applying. Prior to December, 1980
The
of
is
for
the
Assistant Director for County Operations
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reviewed each application and acknowledged
its receipt by letter. That function is
now handled by a personnel specialist
under the direction of the Associate
Director of the Extension Service. To be
considered from the outside for a profes-
sional position an applicant must have an
overall 2.5 grade point on a 4.0 scale or
a 3.0 grade point in the applicant's major
field.
When a county chairman requests
permission to fill a vacancy and that
request is approved, the district chairman
requests, and is provided, a list of
applicants in the subject matter area by
the personnel specialist. They review the
list and obtain applications to consider
for a specific position from personnel
files. Applicants who possess qualifica-
tions deemed appropriate for specific
positions are interviewed by district
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chairmen and district program leaders.
After the interviewing procedure has been
completed, one or more applicants will be
asked to visit with the county chairman
and staff in the county in which the
vacancy exists. After consultation with
the county chairman and Assistant Direc-
tor, County Operations, a decision is made
as to who will be recommended for the
position. The district chairman, working
with the Assistant Director, County
Operations, suggests the salary to be
offered the applicant subject to county
approval. The county chairman’ then
presents the recommendation to the Board
of County Commissioners or county manager
for approval. Following approval the
Director of the Extension Service makes
the appointment.
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Since 1972 the Extension Service has
used throughout the state a standardized
performance evaluation instrument called a
"Performance Review Guide." The guide was
revised in 1976, and it is used primarily
as a counseling and evaluative tool. A
separate Performance Review Guide for
county chairmen was developed in 1970-71
and revised in 1978.
EXTENSION SERVICE PRIOR TO 1965
Prior to August 1, 1965, the Exten-
sion Service was divided into two
branches, a white branch (which had no
formal racial designation) and a Negro
branch. The Negro branch was composeé
entirely of black personnel and served
only black farmers, homemakers and youth.
The white branch employed no blacks but
did on occasion serve blacks. Both
branches were headed by the Director of
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the Extension Service who was white and
who had the responsibility for the total
operation of the service.
The Negro branch had its headquarters
at A & T in Greensboro, North Carolina, an
agricultural and technical college
maintained by the state for the education
of Negroes. The Negro branch of the
Extension Service was divided into three
geographical districts and maintained
offices in fifty-one of the state's one
hundred counties. . The Negro county
offices were separated from the offices |
maintained for white personnel.
The Negro branch of the Extension |
Service was headed by the "Negro state
agent,” a black mele, who was responsible
directly to the Assistant Director of
Extension Service at Raleigh, both of whom
were white. The responsibilities of the
Negro state agent included the hiring,
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assignment, salary determination, promo-
tion, transfer, discipline and discharge
of all black personnel. He also was
responsible for developing the budget and
a state plan of work for the Negro branch
and for supervising the work of all black
employees.
In each of the fifty-one counties in
which the black branch of the Extension
Service had offices the black organization
had a counterpart in the white organiza-
tion. There was no interchange of
personnel between the two organizations,
but black and white county agents had
identical responsibilities in formulating
and presenting budgets to county commis-
Sioners, developing plans of work, meeting
with clubs and conéucting meetings. County
agent job descriptions were identical
except for the appellation "Negro work"
for blacks.
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The salaries of black agents in the
segregated system were lower than the
Salaries of their white counterparts, and
black agents had inferior office space and
facilities in the segregated system.
On August 1, 1965, which was shortly
after the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the white and Negro
branches of the Extension Service were
merged into a single organization with its
headquarters at NCSU in Raleigh. To
effectuate the merger the six white and
three Negro geographic districts were
eliminated and six new geographic dis-
tricts were created. In conjunction with
the merger various positions were elimi-
nated and new positions were created. The
position of Negro state agent at A & T was
eliminated and the black male who had held
this position, Mr. R. E. Jones, became an
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Assistant Director of the Extension
Service. He continued to maintain his
office at A & T in Greensboro.
This unification and integration of
the Extension Service did not result
immediately in the elimination of some
disparities which had existed between the
Salaries of white personnel and black
personnel, and during the course of the
transition from a segregated to an
integrated system some black agents and
black female home economics agents lost
3
some of their job responsibilities.
3 Conditions as they existed before the
merger and their effects on post-merger
conditions are set forth only as relevant
background evidence in connection with the
Title VII claims in this case which did
not arise until March 24, 1972, the
effective date of the amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant to which
public employers became subject to the
Act.
"A discriminatory act which is not
made the basis for a timely charge
is the legal equivalent of a
dis-criminatoryact whichoccurred
i ie
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The foregoing findings are designed
to afford an overview of the employment
practices of the Extension Service and the
two branches of the service which existed
before the merger in 1965. More detailed
facts are contained in the proposed
findings of fact submitted by the parties,
and the court adopts as its own and
incorporates herein by reference portions
of such proposed findings as follows:
Plaintiff-Intervenor (hereinafter
"the government": Findings numbered 12-37
inclusive; 46; 48 - 59 inclusive; 66-71
inclusive; 73 and 74.
before the statute was passed. It
may constitute relevant back-
ground evidence in a proceeding in
which the status of a current
practice is at issue, but separ-
ately con-sidered,it is merely an
unfortu-nate event in history
which has no present legal
consequences." United Air Lines
Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 556
(1977).
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Defendants: Findings numbered 5-35
inclusive together with all stipulations
of fact set forth in the pre-trial order.
THE CLASS ACTION QUESTION
This action was originally instituted
in the names of sixty-five individual
plaintiffs, seemingly large enough to
constitute a class within themselves, but
they nevertheless alleged “across the
board" discrimination and sought to have
the action certified as a class action
under Rule 23, F.R. Civ. P. It was
proposed that a plaintiffs' class be
certified to include all black employees
of the Extension Service who have been
subjected to employment discrimination by
defendants; all black persons in North
Carolina who have been denied services or
provided inferior services by the Exten-
sion Service; all black females in North
Carolina who have been excluded from
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membership in all white extension home-
maker clubs solely because of their race;
and all black children in North Carolina
who are excluded from all white 4-H clubs
solely because of their wee,
Plaintiffs also proposed that a
defendants" class be certified to include
the boards of county commissioners of all
one hundred counties in North Carolina.
Mindful of the principle adopted in
this circuit and most recently applied in
Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th
. In paragraph 5 of an amended complaint
filed November 30, 1981, it is alleged
that the plaintiffs are "black citizens of
the United States and the State of North
Carolina,” but in paragraph 14 of the
amended complaint it is alleged that
"defendants have pursued and continue to
pursue policies and practices that
discriminate against black and Indian
individuals with respect to their compen-
sation, terms, conditions and privileges
of employment," and class-type relief is
sought on behalf of Indians as well as
blacks. No Indian testified at the trial
and no Indian has come forward to assert
a claim in this action.
a OO et Pr om an
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Cir. 1978), that certification of a class
may await the completion of discovery, the
court deferred final decision on the
question of class certification pending
completion of discovery. Meanwhile,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 the United
States intervened in the action= and
thereafter the named plaintiffs and the
government joined forces in the prosecu-
tion of the action.
Limited originally to allegations of
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
by order of October 9, 1979, the govern-
ment's complaint in intervention was
allowed to be amended to assert a cause of
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. As previously stated, on the eve of
trial the named plaintiffs were allowed to
file an amended complaint alleging
violations of Title VII whereupon the
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discrimination claims of both the named
plaintiffs and the government became
identical.
The order of October 9, 1979 also
denied all motions to certify the action
as a class action, and the motion of the
named plaintiffs to reconsider this order
was denied by order of July 29, 1901. As
recent as the final arguments herein
following trial the named plaintiffs have
continued to insist that the action be
certified, and in their pre-trial brief
a On June 3, 1975, the government had filed
a motion to certify the action as a class
action. It proposed five classes of
blacks and Indians and a defendant class
consisting of the then 477 county commis-
sioners representing the one hundred
counties in the state. Since the October
9, 1979 order the government has not
pressed its class action claim further.
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the named plaintiffs have proposed four
classes of plaintiffs and one class of
6
defendants as follows:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(1) All Black and Indian
employees and potential employ-
ees of the NCAES since November
18, 1971, and thereafter;
All Black and Indian persons who
were recipients or potential
recipients of service from the
NCAES on November 18, 1971, and
thereafter;
All Black and Indian members or
potential members of the NCAES's
4-H Clubs on November 18, 1971,
and thereafter;
All Black and Indian persons who
were members or potential
members of the NCAES's Homemaker
Clubs on November 18, 1971, and
thereafter; and
All County Commissioners in
North Carolina, in their
official capacities, on November
18, 1971, and thereafter.
Contrary to the statement in the brief
that the proposed classes were set forth
in plaintiffs' original complaint filed
November 18, 1971, the word "Indian"
appears for the first time in any pleading
filed by the named plaintiffs in their
amended complaint filed November 30, 1981,
one week before the trial began.
- 38a -
In light of the evidence developed at
trial and further case law developments
since the order of October 9, 1979, the
court remains of opinion that this is not
a proper action for class certification
either as to plaintiff or defendant
classes. It is settled, of course, that
employment discrimination cases are not
entitled to class certification as a
matter of course, but instead the require-
ments of Rule 23 must be satisfied as in
all other type cases. East Texas Motor
Freight v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977);
Kelley v. Norfolk and Western Railway
Company, 584 F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1978).
The plaintiffs apparently canvassed
the entire state and were able to come up
with fifty-five individuais, all black,
who were willing to join in the suit as
named plaintiffs. They apparently seek to
~ 39a -
head a class consisting of "all black and
Indian employees and potential employees
of [the Extension Service] since November
18, 1971 and thereafter" who would present
claims of discrimination in employment.
There was no evidence at the trial that
there exists any other potential class
members who have been subjected to any
alleged discriminatory employment prac-
tices of the defendants.
Five black farmers were named as
plaintiffs, presumably to head a class of
black people allegedly denied services or
provided inferior services by the Exten-
Sion Service sdneky because of their race,
but none of these plaintiffs testified at
the trial and there was no _ evidence
whatever to support the allegations of the
denial of services oor the provision of
inferior services by the Extension Service
to anyone because of race.
- 40a -
Two black females, members of ex-
tension homemaker clubs, were named as
plaintiffs presumably to head a class of
black females allegedly denied membership
in all white extension homemaker clubs and
denied services or provided inferior
services by the Extension Service solely
because of their race. Neither of these
plaintiffs testified at the trial, and
there was no evidence whatever that any
black female has at any time since the
institution of this action been denied
membership in any Extension Service
homemaker club or has been denied services
or provided inferior services by the
Extension Service because of race.
The fathers of three black children
who are members of 4-H clubs were named as
plaintiffs, presumably to head a class of
black children allegedly denied membership
in all white 4-H clubs and denied services
- 4la -
or provided inferior services by the
Extension Service solely because of their
race. Neither of these plaintiffs nor
their children testified at the trial. The
only evidence of any discrimination toward
a black child in 4-H club membership
related to one isolated instance in which
a voluntary worker attempted to discrimi-
nate against a black child, and this
resulted in the prompt removal of the
offending worker by the Extension Service.
There was no evidence whatever that any
other black child was ever denied member-
Ship in a 4-H club or was denied 4-H
services or provided inferior services by
the Extension Service.
What we are left with are the bare,
conclusory allegations of the complaint to
establish numerosity of affected parties,
commonality of questions of law and fact
and typicality of claims and defenses as
- 42a -
required by Rule 23(a). Numerous cases
hold that this is not sufficient, one of
the more recent of which is Wright Vv.
Whitehall Behoo} District , 94 F.R.D. 80
(E
-D. Ark. 1981).
iz
The named plaintiffs and the government
have been represented by exceptionally
able counsel throughout this litigation,
and the court does not reach the question
of whether as representative parties these
plaintiffs satisfy the requisites of Rule
23(a)(4) under the principles set forth in
Rodriguez, supra, and Hill v. Western
Electric Company, Inc., 596 F.2d 99 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929
(1979). It may be said, however, that in
no event could these black plaintiffs
represent a class including Indians in
this action. Neither the original
complaint nor the motion to amend the
complaint (filed in open court on November
23, 1981) made any mention of Indians. The
motion to amend simply asked leave to
assert a cause of action under Title VII
on behalf of seven named plaintiffs who
had filed charges and obtained right-to-
sue letters from the EEOC. Any further
allegations of the amended complaint were
not authorized by the order allowing the
amendment.
et Delmer art eet ee
BR ON AE He lS eae 8 tat ABE A
—_-
A On
- 43a -
Another line of cases supports denial
of class certification here because of the
multiple employing units involved (one
hundred counties each providing funds and
maintaining a voice in as well as the veto
power over all employment decisions at the
county level). Representative of these
cases are Stastny vy. Southern Bell
Telephone and Telegraph Company, 628 F.2d
267 (4th Cir. 1980), and Doninger v.
Specific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d
8
1304 (9th Cir. 1977).
S Compare Penk v. Oregon State Board of
Higher Education, 93 F.R.D. 45 (D. Ore.
) (geographic diversity of eight member
units of the University of Oregon did not
preclude class certification where it
appeared that the state board generated
policy decisions and guidelines for hiring
in the entire system, the member units had
no statutory autonomy to make employment
decisions, and the board received a single
budget appropriation and wrote all payroll
checks).
- 44a -
In Stastny Judge Phillips, quoting
from Harris v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 at page 41 (N.D. Cal.
1977), identified a key question to be
considered in assessing the commonality
criteria of Rule 23(a) in Title VII as
follows:
"How uniform or diverse are the
relevant employment practices of the
employer, considering matters such
as: size of the work force; number
of plants and installations in-
volved; extent of diversity of
employment conditions, occupations
and work activities; degree of
geographic dispersion of the
employees and of intracompany
employee transfers and interchanges;
deg ree of decentralization of
administration and supervision as
opposed to the degree of local
autonomy.”
On the record presently before the court
it clearly appears that the commonality
requirement has not been satisfied.
Pinally, and perhaps most § impor-
tantly, we have here the unusual, if not
- 45a -
indeed unique situation in which the
government exercised its authority under
32 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 to intervene in a
private Suit grounded on employment
discrimination. Three years after the
1972 amendments toc Title VII subjecting
State agencies to its provisions’ the
government sought and was granted leave to
amend its complaint in intervention to
allege a cause of action based on Title
VII. As stated before, the named plain-
tiffs on the eve of trial obtained a
Similar amendment to their complaint.
Thereafter the cases proceeded as one with
the named plaintiffs and the government
making common cause against the defen-
dants. Thereupon for all intents and
purposes the suit became a class action,
for it is now settled law that class
action certification is inappropriate and
unnecessary in pattern and practice suits
- 46a -
brought by the EEOC and the government
pursuant to Title VII. General Telephone
Company v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980). If
the government prevails herein the relief
granted can be as broad as any that could
be granted in any private class action
9
suit. United States v. Masonry Contracto-
rs Association of Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d
871 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Georgia Power Company, 474 F.2d 906 (5th
Cir. 1973).
For the foregoing reasons the court
adheres to its previous rulings denying
class certification for plaintiffs’
classes in this action. What has been said
with reference to the denial of class
5
Indeed the government has submitted a
proposed decree which embodies almost
every conceivable kind of injunctive
relief including back pay, and if such
decree were entered, the named plaintiffs
as prevailing co-parties would appear to
be entitled to attorney fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988.
|
a
- 47a -
certification for the proposed plaintiffs'
classes also suffices to justify denial of
the proposed class of defendants consist-
ing of all the county commissioners in the
10
state. There was simply no evidence of
10°
In urging certification of defendants'
class plaintiffs have taken a position
seemingly contradictory to their position
on the plaintiffs' class question. On the
one hand they argue that the defendants'
policies emanate from a central source and
that these policies have a_ uniform
discriminatory impact on the plaintiff
class, while in an effort to obtain
certification of a defendant class
plaintiffs are obliged to argue that the
counties and county commissioners have
made it their statewide practice to
discriminate against blacks in the areas
of employment, working conditions and
provision of services. It would seem
apparent that if the practices complained
of originate from a central core that the
plaintiffs can obtain the relief desired
without the certification of a defendant
class. Any attempt to impose liability on
the counties under a theory of vicarious
liability as was done in Commonwealth of
Pennslyvania v. Local 542, 469 F. Supp.
329, at pp. 411-413 (E.p. Pa. 1978),
aff'd, 648 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir. 1981) would
seem now to be foreclosed by the Supreme
Court's reversal of those cases. General
Building Contractors Association, Inc. v.
Pennslyvania, U.S. , 50 U.S.L.W.
4975, TS75=80 (June 29, 1982).
- 48a -
any standardized practice among the one
hundred separate counties in the state to
deprive anyone of any rights’ solely
because of race. Prior to the merger of
the two branches of the Extension Service
there were forty-nine counties in which
there were no black agents, and in many
counties of the western part of the state
the percentage of Negroes in the popula-
tion is minuscule.
Case law supports this determination.
United States v. State of South Carolina,
445 F.Supp. 1094 (D.D.C. 1977), summarily
affirmed, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978) (plain-
tiff's attempt to certify a class of
defendants consisting of ninety-two South
Carolina school districts rejected);
Greenhouse v. Greco, 617 F.2d 408 (5th
Cir. 1980) (each church corporation within
a diocese was legally autonomous subject
- 49a -
to bishop's authority only by virtue of
religious obedience to canon law. Bishop
had no legal power to carry out = an
integration decree of a federal court).
For these reasons the court adheres
to its previous rulings denying certifica-
tion of a defendants’ class in this
action.
THE LIABILITY ISSUES
As previously stated, the amended
complaint filed by the named plaintiffs on
November 30, 1981, and the government's
amended complaint in intervention which
was allowed to be filed by the order of
October 9, 1979, contained essentially
11
identical allegations of discrimination.
mM The government's motion for leave to file
an amended complaint was filed on February
28, 1975. In addition to duplicating the
charges made by the named plaintiffs in
their original complaint the proposed
amended complaint attached to the motion
contained allegations of violations of
Title VII on grounds of racial and sex
Giscrimination. The order allowing the
en
It is alleged in each of the amended
complaints that the defendants’ have
implemented policies and practices of
racial discrimination by
(a) maintaining prior to 1965 a
racially dual system of Extension
Service employment and continuing to
assign black ... employees only to
counties which had black ... employ-
ees prior to 1965;
filing of an amended complaint entered
October 9, 1979, limited the allegations
of discrimination to those based on race.
So far as the court has been able to find
in this bulky, ten-year-old record the
government never filed an amended com-
plaint, but the parties have proceeded as
if such complaint had been filed, and the
court has therefore accepted the govern-
ment's proposed amended complaint as
attached to its motion as its amended
complaint but has disregarded the aliega-
tions charting sex discrimination as to
which no evidence was offered at the
trial.
While thegovernment alleged discrim-
ination against Indians in its amended
complaint (but not in its original
complaint in intervention) without
objection on the part of defendants, no
evidence was adduced at the trial relating
to Indians, and the motion of defendants
to dismiss the claims of all parties
relating to discrimination against Indians
will be allowed in a separate order.
ee ee oe ee ee en i oh en ea ee et ee a ae eee
(ob) failing to recruit, hire,
assign and promote blacks .. ona
(sic) equal basis with whites;
(c) denying blacks .. the same
compensation, terms, conditions and
privileges of employment as provided
to whites;
(d) segregating blacks ... in
work assignments;
(e) failing or refusing to
establish valid qualifications,
tests, selection standards and
procedure which are sufficiently
objective to prevent continuing
discrimination in hiring and promo-
tion;
(f) failing or refusing to take
appropriate action to correct the
present effects of past racially
discriminatory policies and prac-
tices;
(g) failing to provide minori-
ties with services equal to those
provided to white persons; failing to
provide services to 4-H Clubs,
Extension Homemaker Clubs, farmers
and other persons on a non-racially
segregated basis; and
(h) failing to maintain
non-racially segregated 4-H Clubs and
Extension Homemaker Clubs.
- 52a -
In addition to general denials the
answers of defendants to the amended
complaints pled the three-year statute of
limitations, failure of the individual
plaintiffs to file charges with EEOC
within 180 days of the alleged discrimina-
tory acts of defendants, good faith,
waiver and the Eleventh Se The
issue thus joined by the pleadings will be
discussed in the sections of this memoran-
dum to follow.
I. Discrimination in Work Assign-
ments — Geographical.
The allegation that defendants as-
signed black employees only to those
counties which had black employees prior
to 1965 has not been supported by the
evidence. Rather, the evidence shows that
12
A counterclaim of defendants against the
United States Department of Agriculture
has been dismissed by separate order.
- 53a -
blacks are employed wherever they apply
for employment in those counties (mostly
in western North Carolina) where the Negro
population is very small and the relative
number of black farmers and prospective
recipients of services offered by the
Extension Service is even smaller.
The defendants’ motion to dismiss
this claim will be allowed.
II. Failing to Recruit, Hire, Assign
and Promote Blacks.
<¢
1. Recruiting.
The government contends that de-
fendants “have not established an af-
firmative recruitment and hiring program
nor agreed to such a plan with the United
States Department of Agriculture which
would eradicate their prior discriminatory
employment practices.” The defendants, of
course, deny that there were any “prior
discriminatory employment practices." The
ee
- 54a -
evidence showed that the Extension Service
recruits agriculture and home economics
graduates by making personal visits to
campuses within North Carolina and nearby
states offering deg ree programs in
agriculture and home economics and by
sending position vacancy announcements to
colleges offering degrees in these
subjects.
Vacancy announcements are sent to
some of the more prestigious out-of-state
schools with nationally recog nized
agriculture and home economics programs
such as the University of Wisconsin,
Southern University in Louisiana and
Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. With the
exception of the latter two institutions
the Extension Service has not recruited at
other predominantly black institutions
outside North Carolina, and the government
contends that had applicants been sought
- 55a -
at nineteen additional schools in the
southern region with substantial black
enrollments the number of agriculture and
home economics graduates available would
have been doubled. The evidence showed,
however, that the Extension Service has
always received a sufficient number of
applicants to keep its position filled,
and since an employer is under no legal
duty to recruit applicants for employment
absent a t{.ading of discrimination
followed by court ordered affirmative
action, the defendants' recruiting
practices in this case cannot be held to
have been discriminatory. Rather, the
court was left with the impression that
the Extension Service's recruiting
practices were designed to obtain the
13
highest qualified applicants.
13,
That the best laid plans for recruitment
may not be productive was illustrated by
the experience Dr. Chester D. Black, the
- 56a -
The recruitment procedures employed
by the Extension Service are set forth in
more detail in defendants' proposed
findings of fact 92(a) - 97 inclusive
which the court adopts as its own and
incorporates herein by reference.
present Director of the Extension Service,
had when he visited Tuskegee Institute in
Alabama. Although he had written the
institution to inform them that he was
coming and that he wanted to interview
potential applicants for positions in
agriculture, the only person who showed up
for interview was one with a master's
degree in sociology "who expressed an
interest in the possibility of working
with extension work." Dr. Black stated
that he was never able to hire anyone from
Tuskegee, and he went on to testify that
"I was awed by -- unless you have been
through it and saw the recruitment effects
put on by major companies -- the Ford
Motor Company at the time I was there had
a display that you would use at a State
Fair to attract people to their company,
and I was recruiting at a real disadvant-
age that day." Tr. 4493-5.
-iS7a -
2. Hiring.
Hiring procedures of the Exten-
sion Service for positions at the state
level differ from the procedures employed
in filling county level positions. This
is because state level positions require
Faculty appointment in the School of
Agriculture and Life Science at North
Carolina State University and are there-
fore subject to the selection and promo-
tion criteria utilized by the University
for filing vacancies on its faculty.
State level positions in the Exten-
Sion Service generally require a minimum
of a master's degree, and the majority
require a PhD degree either in agriculture
and home economics. Because of the very
small number of blacks who obtain master's
and Ph.D degrees in agriculture and home
economics every year the labor pool from
which the Extension Service can recruit
- 58a -
for positions at the state level is
sharply limited. This alone is sufficient
to account for the seemingly small
percentage of blacks who hold state level
positions in the Extension Service.
The selection procedures employed by
the Extension Service in filling state
level positions are set forth in more
detail in defendants' proposed findings of
fact Nos. 214-237 inclusive which the
court adopts as its own and incorporates
herein by reference. These procedures are
non-discriminatory and have been employed
in a non-discriminatory manner.
All applicants for entry level
positions in the counties must have a
bachelor's degree in an area related to
the program responsibility to be assigned
the agent, and a master's degree is highly
desirable. Filling positions at the
county professional staff level also
- 59a -
involves a consideration of the agricul-
tural, social and economic needs of the
particular county, and this in turn
dictates the number of potential appli-
cants who can qualify for a particular
position.
When a vacancy in a county level
position comes open or a new position is
created, it is established for a particu-
lar subject matter responsibility. Prior
to 1972 there were not a great many
alternative employment opportunities for
agriculture graduates, and consequently
the turnover rate for county level
employees was much smaller than it has
been in recent years which have seen an
increase in the number of large farms with
an accompanying increase in employment
opportunities for agriculture agents.
Because of this small turnover rate it was
felt that word-of-mouth notices of
- 60a -
vacancies and announcements in_- the
Extension Service newsletter mailed
monthly to all employees in the organiza-
tion sufficed as adequate notice of
employment vacancies. Since 1972 the
Extension Service has sent monthly vacancy
announcements to all offices within the
state and to the educational institutions
indicating the location, position and
subject matter areas of responsibility
required to fill the vacancy.
No evidence has been offered to show
even one qualified black applicant who
applied and was not accepted for employ-
ment in a county level position with the
Extension Service. BEOC vy. United
Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir.
1980); Shack v. Southworth, 521 F.2d 51,
55 (6th Cir. 1975); Eastland v. Freeman,
528 F. Supp. 862, 881 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
It is perhaps significant also to note
- 61a -
that there is no allegation nor proof in
this record that the Extension Service has
ever discharged any employee on account of
race.
The hiring procedures employed by the
Extension Service in filling county level
positions are set forth in more detail in
defendants' proposed findings of fact Nos.
88-92 inclusive; and 98-102 inclusive
which the court adopts as its own and
incorporates herein by reference. These
procedures are non-discriminatory and have
been employed in a non-discriminatory
manner which is further attested by the
fact that historically the Extension
Service has employed more black profes-
Sionals that any state except Alabama,
where the percentage of total population
that is black is also higher. As of
November, 1981, the Extension Service
employed a total of 1,554 full and
- 62a -
part-time people. The figures include
professionals at both the state and county
level as well as all the para-profes-
sionals and other supporting staff. Of
this total, 444 or 21.4 per cent were
black. The latest census data shows that
blacks represent 22.4 per cent of the
state's total population. Given the
difficulties of recruiting and retaining
qualified blacks, it is apparent that the
Extension Service has done a commendable
job in its minority hiring ey
3. Assignments
There is some evidence that fol-
lowing the merger of the white and black
branches of the Extension Service in 1965
14 More detailed facts concerning the
difficulties of recruiting and retaining
qualified blacks are set forth in defen-
dants' proposed findings of fact Nos.
250-254 inclusive which the court adopts
as its own and incorporates herein by
reference,
- 63a -
blacks, who had previously worked “across
the board" in all subject matter areas of
responsibility, were assigned to more
limited’ areas of responsibility and that
whites were assigned responsibility for
higher revenue-producing crops in some
ee In each instance defendants
were able to establish a sound reason for
the action taken and that the white agent
given the assignment was equally or better
qualified than the black agent who did not
get it. Plaintiffs were unable to show
that the reasons assigned for the action
"5 There was other evidence from which it
appeared that the contrary was true. For
instance, the commodities involved in the
areas for which the plaintiff, P. E.
Bazemore, had responsibility in Union
County before he retired in 1980 were
marketed for over ten million dollars
which represented some thirty to forty per
cent (defendants claims over fifty per
cent) of the total dollar volume of all
the crops and livestock sold in the county
tnat year - Far more than any other agent,
black or white. Tr. pp. 576-579.
- 64a -
taken were pretextual, and the court is
unable to find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the Extension Service
has discriminated against blacks in the
area of job sities
4. Promotions.
(i) County Level Agents.
At the county extension profes-
sional level there are three agent titles,
assistant agent, which is the entry level,
associate agent and full agent. The
requirements for promotion from one rank,
10 If it is true, as the government contends,
that blacks continued to be "under repre-
sented" in some major commodities,it may
well be simply another reflection of the
fact that agricultural agents continue to
be in short supply. See defendants'
proposed finding of fact No. 250 adopted
by the court wherein it is said: "Blacks
are particularly under represented among
graduates in the field of agriculture.
Successful recruitment and retention of
blacks in agriculture is made more
difficult by the fact that black agricul-
tural graduates do not remain in the
field.
- 65a -
to the next above have been in effect for
twenty years and have been well publi-
cized. These include service of time in
rank before an agent can become eligible
for promotion to the next higher rank, but
agents who possess or earn a master's
degree or a doctorate degree are given
additional time credit which enables them
to shorten the time required to be spent
in a particular rank. A credit of one year
is given for the master's degree and two
years for the doctorate.
Upon satisfaction of the time re-
quirements for promotion the agents is
informed of his or her eligibility for
promotion the procedures for which are
uniform throughout the Extension Service.
First, the district extension chairman is
notified annually by the assistant
director for county operatiors of the
agents in each district who are eligible
- 66a -
for promotion consideration based on time
in grade. The district chairman notifies
the agent at the county level of his or
her eligibility and provides the agent
with a promotion form which requires the
agent to give his or her performance,
accomplishments, educational background
and tenure. The agent then makes applica-
tion for promotion by preparing and
delivering the form to the county exten-
sion chairman who reviews the application
and sends it along to the district
chairman with his recommendations for or
against the promotion.
Upon receipt of the application the
district chairman confers’ with the
district program leaders and obtains their
observations ond information pertaining to
the performance of the agent with respect
to his or her areas of subject matter
responsibilities and extension educational
- 676 -
programs which they have been carrying
out. On the basis of the information
obtained from all sources including that
obtained by him personally as a result of
participation in the agent's annual
performance review with the county
chairman biannually and his_ personal
observation of the agent's work from time
to time the district extension chairman
makes a recommendation as to promotion to
the director's office at the state level
where the application is reviewed by the
director, associate director and assistant
director for county operations who either
approve or disapprove the promotion.
The promotion procedures employed by
the Extension Service are set forth in
more detail in defendants' proposed
Findings of fact Nos. 160-170 inclusive
which the court adopts as its own and
incorporates herein by reference.
_
- 68a -
Notwithstanding it has offered no
evidence of non-compliance by the Exten-
sion Service with its promotion procedures
the government contends that black agents
at the county level have not received
title promotions as rapidly as whites, and
to prove the charge it has cited the cases
of four black agents who applied for and
did not immediately receive promotions. A
review of al the evidence surrounding the
failure of these four individuals go gain
promotions initially has failed to
convince the court that such failures were
attributable to racial discrimination.
Jonnie Jones, a named plaintiff and a
black, an admittedly competent agent,
testified at the trial. He came across as
an abrasive, argumentative and belligerent
witness, but the court can only speculate
as to whether these personality traits
played any part in the denial ot his
- 69a -
initial request for a promotion to the
position of full agent. What does appear
is that the request was reviewed by Dr.
Paul Dew, the district chairman at the
time, and all others required by the
promotion procedure to be involved, and
the decision was that Jones did not
satisfy the established requirements for
promotion at that time. There is not the
slightest evidence that race had anything
at all to do with the decision. There-
after Jones accepted a position in Lenoir
County where he obtained promotion to the
position of full agent.
Haywood Harrell, a named plaintiff
and a black, testified at the trial, and
he was also an abrasive and belligerent
witness. He identified several areas of
dissatisfaction with the Extension
Service, but its failure to promote him
was not one of them. In fact he did not
- 70a -
testify that he ever applied for a
promotion, and if he did not, this alone
would eliminate any claim on his behalf
based on a failure to promote him. It
further appears, however, that Harrell was
a very poor student when he was in school
at A & T, his grades consisting mostly of
"D's", and that although he was engaged
primarily in 4-H work and was well aware
of Extension Service policy that required
4-H Clubs to be open to all races, he has
continued to organize all black clubs nor
did he ever bother to instruct’ the
volunteer leaders of the clubs that they
were to be open to all races. There was
no evidence that his failure to gain a
promotion was in any way attributable to
race, and on the contrary there is the
unmistakable inference that he simply was
not qualified for promotion.
- 71a -
Wanda Wilkins, a black but not a named
plaintiff, testified at the trial that
after she had been an assistant agent with
the Extension Service for three years she
applied for promotion to the position of
associate agent but was turned down for
the stated reasons that she had not
performed satisfactorily in her 4-H
programs and was “too concerned about
getting married and going to graduate
school." The government has compared her
case with that of a white women with about
the same tenure who was also engaged to be
married and who was recommended for
promotion at that time. The relative
qualifications of the two agents were not
shown by the evidence. Not satisfied with
her rejection, Wilkins appealed to the
associate director of the Extension
Service who convened ae review panel
consisting of the district chairman, the
- 72a -
county chairman and the two district
program leaders to inquire into the matter
and report back to him. They also
recommended that the promotion be denied
because of “low participation and a weak
program in 4-H," but they agreed to work
with Ms. Wilkins “to improve the produc-
tivity of her program." She accepted this
finding, her performance did improve and
she was thereafter promoted.
Margaret Woods, a black non-plain-
tiff, was called as a witness by the named
plaintiffs to show that the Extension
Service had authority to transfer its
agents between counties. By examination
of this witness the government sought to
show that she had been wrongfully denied a
promotion. While an assistant agent in
Gates County in 1977 Ms. Woods filed an
EEOC charge which resulted in a hearing
before a panel convened by the defendant.
- 138 -
The patter was settled and she was
transferred to Randolph County where she
applied for a promotion to the position of
associate agent in 1980. This was denied,
and in 1981 she transferred to Warren
County where she again requested a
promotion. She was then told by the
district chairman’ that if she made
Satisfactory progress he would recommend
her promotion on December 1, 1981. A
meeting between the district chairman and
Ms. Woods scheduled for November, 1981,
did not take place, but on the basis of
reports from his associates on the good
progress Ms. Woods had made following her
transfer to Warren County the district
chairman did recommend her promotion and
it was granted effective January 1, 1982.
The procedure® including the perform-
ance evaluation system utilized in
connection with promotions by the Exten-
- 74a -
sion Service of county level professionals
are valid, proper and non-discriminatory,
and they have been employed in a non-dis-
criminatory manner.
(ii) County Extension
alrmen
The top administrative position
in the Extension Service at the county
level is that of county extension chair-
man. In addition to. administrative and
leadership responsibilities the chairman
normally carries a subject matter program
workload depending on the particular needs
of the county. While the position is
routinely filled from the ranks of county
level professionals, it is one that has to
be applied for and it is not considered by
the Extension Service to be in the
promotional line within the county.
Rather, it is open to all qualified
applicants from any county or state. A
- 138 -
major portion of the battle here has been
waged around the claims of the named
plaintiffs and the government that the
Extension Service discriminates against
blacks in filling these positions.
Beginning in 1972, the year the Title
VII amendments bringing state agencies
into its cover became effective, the
Extension Service began publishing
announcements of vacancies in the posi-
tions of county chairmen which announce-
ments contain the name of the county in
which a vacancy exists, the subject areas
of responsibility which the county
chairman must carry in addition to his or
her administrative duties and the educa-
tional and experience qualifications
required. All applicants must have at
least a bachelor's degree, and a master's
degree is desirable but not mandatory. Six
years (formerly seven) of service with the
- 76a -
Extension Service or equivalent experience
is required, at least two years of which
must have been in the service of the North
Carolina Extension Service. A master's
degree will count for one year of experi-
ence and a doctorate two years.
All applicants who meet these quali-
fications are iodine, The most
important factors considered in the inter-
view process are subject matter ex-pertise
required in the county, demonstrated
leadership in present and previous
positions, demonstrated administrative and
management capabilities, educational back-
ground, advanced training, human relations
and communications skills. Interview are
7,
These minimum requirements have not been
rigidly adhered to in every single
instance, but where there has been a
variance defendants have shown a valid
reason for recommending the applicant in
question for appointment as_ county
chairman.
- 77a -
conducted separately by the district
chairman, the assistant director’. for
county operations, the associate director
and the director of the Extension Service.
The group then meets and discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of all applicants
and comes to a consensus as to whom they
will recommend to the board of county
commissioners of the county where the
vacancy exists.
Occasionally more than one applicant
will be presented to the board of county
commissioners for interview and selection.
It will be recalled that in the memorandum
of understanding between the Extension
Service and the boards of county commis-
Sioners all appointments are worked out
jointly between the Extension Service and
the commissioners and no official action
can be taken unilaterally by either party
with respect to filling a vacancy.
- 78a -
Accordingly, county commissioners have on
occasion rejected an applicant recommended
by the Extension Service, and some of
these have been black. In more instances,
however, white applicants have _ been
rejected.
Since the institution of statewide
announcements of vacancies in 1972 there
have been seventy-seven county extension
chairmanship position vacancies in the
State. No blacks applied for fifty-nine
of these vacancies, but eighteen indi-
vidual blacks did apply for the remaining
eighteen vacancies. Of the eighteen
vacancies for which blacks applied five
were selected as county chairman. Al-
though highly recommended by the Extension
Service another black, I. W. Murfree, was
rejected by the Board of Commissioners of
Granvilie County.
eee ——-—— ~-——_se-. weeo-™-s
- 8 -
Thirty-seven individual whites applied
For the eighteen vacancies for which the
eighteen individual blacks also applied,
and thirteen of the thirty-seven white
applicants were selected as county
extension chairmen.
It thus appears that of the thirty-
seven individual white applicants thirty-
five per cent were selected and that of
the eighteen black applicants twenty-eight
per cent wer. selected. A comparison of
the white selection percentage with the
black selection percentage shows that the
black selection rate was eighty per cent
of the white selection rate. This is
exactly the rate established in the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures as a rule of thumb for iteter-
- 80a -
mining whether employer policies or
practice have an adverse impact- on
employment ieeiiiaiihtees
Moreover, had the black applicant,
Mr. Murfree, been accepted by then
Commissioners of Granville County the
number of successful black applicants
would have been six out of eighteen, and
the percentage of those applying would
have been raised to thirty-three and
one-third per cent. At the same time the
number of successful white applicants
would have been reduced by one of the
18 section 4D, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,297 (1978),
provides:
"A selection rate for any race ***
which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or
eighty per cent) of the rate for the group
with the highest rate will generally be
regarded by the federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact,
while agreater than four-fifths rate will
generally not be rvcarded by federal
enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact.
——_— ee
- 8la -
percentage of successful white applicants
wease save dropped to thirty-two per
ae.
On the basis of the foregoing evi-
dence the court is unable to find that the
plaintiffs have established a prima facie
case of discrimination in the selection of
county chairmen. The result would be
Despite the suggestion in cases such as
Brown v. Gaston Count Dyeing Machine
company: 457 F.2d 1377, 7, 1384 (4th Cir.
, and more recently given Currency in
EEOC v. American National Bank, 652 F.2d
1176 (4th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en banc
denied by equally divided court, ~ F234
, May 18, 1982), that the use of small
samples such as those involved here may
somehow be justified in order to compen-
Sate for the difficulty encountered by
plaintiffs in proving discriminatory
motive in these cases, these figures
probably serve only to point up the
inherent unrel lability of such evidence as
proof of inferences favorable to either
Side. Other courts have rejected such
evidence as "meaningless." Mayor of
Philadelphia v. Educational Equality
League, 415 U.S. 605 (1574). See also
EEOC v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d
147, 153 (4th Cir. 1986); Allen v. Prince
George's County, 538 F, Supp. 833 (D. Md.
- 82a -
otherwise if only the government's
Statistics were considered at face value.
The government contends that it has
offered evidence tending to show that if
black agents had been appointed to county
chairman positions at a rate proportional
to their 1964 representation in defen-
dants' county professional work force,
they would have received thirty-one county
chairman appointments from 1962 through
November, 1972; that only one. black
chairman was actually appointed during
this period; and that the disparity in the
rate of promotions was 5.98 standard
deviations. Government's Proposed Find-
ing No. 95, The government further
contends that it has offered evidence
tending to show that from 1962 until May,
1981, five blacks and 227 whites were
appointed to county chairman positions;
that from 1974 to 1981 the average
a
- 83a -
representation of blacks among full agents
was 22.4 per cent; that if black agents
had been appointed to county chairman
positions at a rate Proportional to their
representation as full agents, they would
have received fifty-two county chairman
appointments from 1962 until May, 1981;
and that the disparity in the rate of
Promotions was 7.40 Standard deviations.
Government's Proposed Finding No. 127 and
GX 124.1. Standing alone these Statistics
would certainly create a Prima facie case
of discrimination.
There can he no doubt that
Standard deviations of this
magnitude demonstrated that the
low proportions of women in the
technical and managerial
categories were not the result
of chance. But it was a quantum
leap, under Circumstances of
this case, to jump from that
Proposition to the conclusion
that such high Standard devia-
tions proved - or even had any
tendency to prove - that
defen-dants had committed a
legally cognizable wrong. Far
from being conclusive against
- 84a -
defendants, plaintiff's statis-
tical evidence and the EEOC
reports on which it was based
were totally wanting in proba-
tive value.
Ste. Marie v. Eastern Railroad Associa-~
tion, 650 F.2d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 1981).
Such is the case here where closer
examination reveals that the government's
Statistics are fatally flawed.
If the prima facie case is
established by the EEOC's sta-
tistical evidence, the employer
may nevertheless rebut it,
dispelling the inference of a
general policy of discrimina-
tion, by “demonstrating that the
Government's proof is either
inaccurate or insignificant."
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360. ...
One way that static work force
Statistics revealing gross
disparities can be shown
nevertheless to be “insignifi-
cant” is by showing that the
disparities are mainly attribut-
able to pre-Act rather than to
post-Act employment actions.
This may be done in two basic
ways: by focusing on the static
work force statistics and
purging them of all pre-Act
employment actions so that only
post-Act actions remain for
assessment; or, more commonly,
- 85a -
by focusing on post-Act employ-
ment decisions, and showing
either than considered alone,
they affirmatively reveal
nondiscrimination in the
post-Act period or that they are
insufficient in number to
Support an ultimate conclusion
of a post-Act discriminatory
pattern or practice. Hazelwood,
433 U.S. at 309, 313. «wee
EEOC v. American National Bank, 652 F.2d
1176, 1188 (4th Cir. 1981).
The position of county chairman was
created in 1962-63 before the merger of
the two branches of the Extension Service,
and the first one hundred appointees were
white. Not until 1971 was the first black
county chairman appointed. At the time of
trial a total of 232 county chairmen had
been appointed, only five of whom were
black. As previously shown, however,
there have been only seventy-seven
vacancies since 1972 when Title VII was
made applicable to public employers, and
blacks have applied for Only eighteen of
ele The appointment rate for blacks
during this period has been within the
applicable EEOC Guidelines, and the court
must reject the government's attempt to
have pre-Title employment decisions
considered in this instance, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977) ; United
Airlines vy. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977);
20 The possibility of liability for pre-Title
VII discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1983 has been considered, but any such
claims arising prior to November 18, 1968
would be barred by the statute of limita-
tions, and in any event proof of the
intentional discrimination necessary to
Sustain an action under these Statutes
(even if the case is considered as one of
disparate impact as the government would
have the court do) has not been estab-
lished, General Building contractors
Association v. PennSlyvania, U.S.
——
’
90 U.S.L.W. 4975 (June 29,1982). “fhe
named plaintiffs have conceded in their
brief that proof of discriminatory purpose
is required to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983. Plaintiffs' Brief filed February 8,
1982, at p. 5.
- 87a -
Ste. Marie vy. Eastern Railroad Associa-
tion, 650 F.24d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 1981);
EEOC v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147
(4th Cir. 1980); BEOC V.Local 14, 553 F.2a4
251 (2d Civ. 1977).
Thus, in order to be valid, a
Statiscal analysis such as the
one presented here must exclude
those persons hired Prior to
(March 24, 1972, the effective
date of Title vII for public
employers]. To include pre-Act
hires in the statisca] analysis
in this case would improperly
weight the evidence and would
tend to show present discrimina-
tion by an employer if it had
discriminated prior to the
effective date of the Act but
had not discriminated after the
Act took effect.
EEOC v. United Virginia Bank, Supra, at
150.
Plaintiffs' statistics are flawed in
a further respect in that they include the
assumption that every black full agent at
the county level was qualified to fill the
position of county chairman. There was an
- 88a -
utter lack of any proof to substantiate
such a claim, and the persistent efforts
of defendants through discovery and all
the way through the trial to require
plaintiffs to identify the qualified labor
pool from which this nee should be
filled met with no success. While it is
true that most vacancies have been filled
et Evidence of the named plaintiffs that they
were qualified for the position of county
chairman consisted principally of their
own self-serving and conclusory testimony.
Courts uniformly reject such testimony as
insufficient to establish qualifications.
Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir.
“T980).
Smith, of course, testified
that he had versatility, and
that his competence as an
analyst was not confined to the
field of logistics. Smith's
perception of himself, however,
is not relevant. It is the
perceptionof the decision maker
which is relevant.
a at 1067. See also Lovelace v.
erwin-Williams Company, “PP. 2d
(No. 580-179, 4th Cir., vine 15, 1982),
Slip Opinion at 31.
- 89a -
from within the ranks of the county
Professionals, it is equally true that the
POSition of county chairman requires
Special administrative and leadership
Skills not Shared generally by al} Such
employees, and
necessary qualifications) may have
little Probative value.
Hazelwood §choo) District y, United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977),
See also United States vy. Commonwealth of
eS __—
Virginia, 620 P.2d 1018, 1025 (4th Cir,
1980), an@ EEOC y, Radiator Specialty
Company, 610 PF. 24 178, 185 (4th Cir.
1979),
The Plaintiffs have complained that
defendants employ Subjective Criteria in
Selecting applicants to be recommended for
- 90a -
appointments as county chairman, and this
is true to some extent. However, the
Extension Service after considerable study
and effort developed and put into effect
in 1972 a “Performance Review Guide" for
the purpose of evaluating the performance
of its untieeen.”- The performance of each
agent in the Extension Service is eval-
uated annually. Both the agent and the
chairman participate in this process, and
the district chairman participates in it
bi-annually. The persons involved in the
process attempt to reach a consensus on
the evaluation of the agent's performance,
4é The development of the Extension Service's
performance evaluation system is traced in
defendants’ proposed findings of fact Nos.
104-144 inclusive to which plaintiffs have
interposed no serious objections, and as
background information the court adopts
these findings as its own. Significantly,
the plaintiffs produced no evidence to
show that the Extension Service's perform-
ance evaluation system is invalid or
improperly validated.
;
- 9la -
and when the Performance Review Guide is
completed and Signed it is filed with the
district chairman and thereafter used in
matters affecting the agent's performance
when such matters aS promotions and merit
Salary raises are under consideration.
The fact that several persons in-
Cluding the agent himself Participate in
the evaluation and Promotion processes
minimizes the possibility that bias or
prejudice on the Part of any one individ-
23
ual will affect decision. Valentino vy.
United States Postal] Service, 511 FPF, Supp.
197, 933 (D.D.c. 1981), aff'd, 674 F.2a 56
23 At least four of the highest ranking
Officials in the Extension Service
Participate in the county chairman
Selection process. These Officials, each
Of whom holds a doctorate degree from a
leading university, testified at the
trial. They came across as fair-minded,
exceptionally capable Professionals and
the court credits their testimony in which
they disavowed any racial bias or prej-
udice in the performance of their duties,
Particularly with respect to promotions.
- 92a -
(D.C. Cir. 1982). Moreover, in the white
collar employment context courts have
tended in recent years to become more
tolerant of subjectivity in employment
decisions. Wilkins v. University of
Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981);
Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F.
Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d
1275 (3d Cir. 1978). When subjective
criteria are used fairly and with proce-
dural safeguards they have been approved
by the courts and EEOC. Thompson ov.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 416 F.
Supp. 972, 982 (E.D. Mo. 1976). The use
of subjective criteria is certainly not
unlawful per se, for hiring and promotion
decisions in supervisory and managerial
positions cannot realistically be made
using objective standards alone. Rogers
v. International Paper Company, 510 F.2d
1340, 1345 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated on
" ate eit Otte
~ ees ee nL tte eet
- 93a -
other grounds, 432 U.S. 809 (1975), at
these levels the test of legality of white
collar employment Practices is not whether
they are Subjective, as inevitably they
are, but whether they are applied fairly.
see Waintroob, The Developing Law of Egual
Employment Opportunity at the White Collar
and Professional Level, 21 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 45, 48-62 (1979), The plaintiffs
next assert what has come to be known as
"futility claims" - Claims of blacks who
contend they did not apply for the
position of county chairman because they
felt that blacks were being discriminated
against and that it would be futile to do
SO. The court has again reviewed the
testimony of the five black agents relied
upon to establish Such claims, James
Wright, Slater Lloyd, William Wright,
Leroy James, named Plaintiffs, ana Helen
Payne, a non-plaintiff. As a result the
- 94a -
court remains of the opinion formed at the
time of trial that the reasons given by
these witnesses for not applying for
county chairmanships were not credible.
James Wright, a black agricultural
extension agent in Hertford County,
testified that when the position of county
chairman opened in the late 1960's in that
county he did not apply for it because he
thought it was futile to do so. When
another vacancy in the county chairman's
position came open in Hertford County in
1979 Wright was recommended for the
position by the Extension Service and did
27. non-applicant's burden of proving that
he would have applied for a position
except for the perceived employer's
discriminatory practices is not an easy
one. Resolution of such claims not only
requires proof that the claimant would
have applied but for discrimination but
also that he was qualified and yet would
have been discriminatorily rejected had he
applied. Teamsters, supra, 431 U.S. at
368.
- 95a -
in fact apply for it. He was rejected by
the Board of Commissioners of Hertford
County in favor of a white person. Since
the trial that person has resigned, James
Wright has re-applied for the position,
has been appointed and is now serving as
county chairman of Hertford alilba res
Slater Lloyd simply testified that he
did not apply for the position of county
chairman in Granville County in 1971
because he "didn't think they would
appoint a Negro as county chairman at that
time."
William Wright testified that he did
not apply for the position of county
chairman in Nash County about 1971 because
25 This information has been furnished the
court pursuant to the court's directive at
the close of the trial that it be kept
informed of vacancies in county chairman-
Ships and actions taken to fill them.
Wright, incidentally, was selected over
two other applicants for the position, one
white and one black.
- 96a -
he was not aware that there was a vacancy
until it had already been filled. Since
Wright was working everyday in the same
office with the county chairman who
resigned, this evidence was simply
incredible.
Leroy James testified that he did not
apply for a county chairmanship in 1965
because "I had the feeling I wasn't going
to get the job, so I didn't apply.”
Q. Why did you have that feeling?
A. Well I felt that the people
from the state level - I was not
going to be able to reach them.
And I felt maybe on the county
level I hadn't reached the
clientele from that point of
view. So that is the reason I
didn't apply.
Q. Was there any contact or
conversation that you had had
with the administration that
gave you that feeling?
A. Not really.
Direincietintntneneiinninmmmentel
- 97a -
Tr. Vol. 11, pp. 2510-11. James was
recommended by the Extension Service for
the county chairmanship of Johnston County
in 1976, but was not selected. In 1978 he
was recommended for the county chairman-
Ship of his home county of Pitt and was
appointed and is now serving in that
easiiidiome s
Helen Payne testified that she did
not apply for the position of county
chairman in Caswell County in 1974 because
"I felt like it was a waste of time and to
avoid embarrassment .... I didn't know of
any other woman - black home agent - in
the state that was a county chairman." In
1974 Payne already had in more than thirty
years of service with the Extension
Service and was eligible for retirement.
26
The individual claims of the four named
plaintiffs who gave futility claim
testimony will be treated more fully in a
later memorandum.
- 98a -
She did in fact retire a few years
thereafter. The does does not credit any
inference which may arise from the
testimony of this witness that she would
have applied but for discrimination, but
in any event there was no evidence from
which the court could find that she was
qualified for the position and that she
would have been discriminatorily rejected
had she applied.
It thus appears that of the five wit-
nesses on whose testimony the plaintiffs
rely to establish “futility claims" only
one, Helen Payne, testified concerning a
vacancy which occurred after Title VII
became applicable to public employers in
1972. It was the court's impression that
this one witness was clearly not qualified
for the position of county chairman; that
it never crossed her mind to apply for the
position in 1974; and that if she had
- 99a -
applied, she would have been rejected but
not for any discriminatory reason. Of the
other four witnesses to of them did apply
for vacancies after the Extension Service
to the county commissioners of the two
counties in which their applications were
made and eventually each of them was
appointed and is now service as a county
chairman.
Further proof of the lack of merit in
the “futility claims" of the blacks who
did not apply for county chairmanships
lies in the fact that many blacks did
apply for these positions after 1972, and
when they did they were appointed in
approximately the same ratio as were the
white applicants for the same positions.
The court rejects all futility-based
Claims of discrimination.
- 100a -
In sum, the court finds that the sta~-
tistical evidence fails to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination
by the Extension Service in filling county
chairmanship vacancies, but in any event
the defendants have effectively rebutted
plaintiffs’ case by showing the inaccuracy
and insignificance of plaintiffs’ proof.
This has been done by showing that
apparent disparities in plaintiffs' static
work force statistics are mainly attribut-
able to pre-Act rather than post-Act
employment actions; that they are based on
the erroneous assumption that the quali-
fied labor pool consists of every black
professional at the county agent level in
the state; that all black professionals
are available for assignment to any county
in the state; that defendants’ post-Act
decisions which to some extent are based
on subjective criteria reveal non-dis-
oe Pe
- 10la -
crimination in the post-Act period; and
that defendants have adopted proper and
valid procedures for promotions to the
position of county chairman which plain-
tiffs have not questioned. These proce-
dures having been fairly and uniformly
followed without bias or prejudice, the
claims of plaintiffs based on alleged
racial discrimination by the Extension
Service in the selection of county
chairman must fail.
(iii) State Level Positions.
The positions in the Extension
Service other than those at the county
level are known as state level positions.
These include the director, associate and
assistant director, specialists, program
leaders and district extension chairman.
The duties of these various offices have
been more fully described in the back-
ground section of this memorandum.
- 102a -
Traditionally most, but not all, of these
posi: ’ons have been held by whites.
State level positions, with few
exceptions, require a minimum of a
master's degree, and the majority of them
require a PhD either in agriculture or
home osmmaiilinis. Since all state level
positions are also faculty appointments
within the School of Agriculture and Life
Science at NCSU these positions are
subject to the selection and promotion
criteria utilized for recruitment and
promotion of faculty at the university
level. Selection and promotion of state
level personnel in the Extension Service
therefore differs from the selection and
promotion procedures utilized for county
27
The minimum degree requirements for the
various state level positions are set
forth in defendants' propoosed findings of
fact Nos. 219-225 inclusive which the
court adopts as its own and incorporates
by reference.
- 103a -
level positions.
Where, as here, the need for special
qualifications for state level positions
is manifest it is incumbent upon a
plaintiff alleging discrimination to
produce "specially qualified market
statistics” in order to show disparities.
Hazelwood School District Vv. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1976); EEOC v.
Radiator Specialty Company, 610 F.2d 178,
185 (4th Cir. 1979). But here again the
plaintiffs have failed to show the number
of qualified and available blacks in the
labor pool or relevant labor market from
which defendants could fill these state
level positions. Defendants, on the other
nand, have shown that the labor pool from
which defendants recruit is sharply
limited for that
- 104a -
... blacks are greatly underrepre-
sented among the graduates with
master's or PhD's in agriculture and
home economics. For the academic
years 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1977-78
blacks represented from only 1.4% to
2.4% of the total recipients of
master's degrees and from 1.2% to
2.1% of the PhD's in agriculture and
natural resources in the United
States. A total of only 43 blacks
received PhD's in agriculture in the
United States during these three
years. None were awarded in North
Carolina. In the field of home
economics, for the above’ three
years, blacks received from 4.7% to
5.1% of the total number of master's
degrees awarded in the U.S. and from
8.6% to 11.9% of the PhD's.
However, only a total of 20 PhD's
were awarded in home economics to
blacks during this entire three-year
period, with only one awarded in
North Carolina. In North Carolina
the percentage of blacks receiving
master's degrees in home economics
ranged from 8.6% to 11.9% of the
total master's degrees awarded in
this field for the period 1975-78.
Defendants' Proposed Finding of Fact. No.
216.
the
In addition to their failure to show
number of qualified and available
blacks in the relevant labor market the
- 105a -
plaintiffs have failed to produce any
evidence as to how many gQualified blacks
have applied but have not been accepted
for employment by the Extension Service in
a state level position.
The procedures employed by the uni-
versity and the Extension Service to fill
State level positions are designed to
obtain the best qualified persons and at
the same time to comply with all employ-
ment discrimination laws. The employment
and selection system is governed by the
university's affirmative action officer,
Dr. Lawrence M. Clark, who is black. A
search committee is then formed which
makes a nationwide search for interested
and qualified persons. Position announce-
ments are sent to all 1862 and 1890 land
grant institutions and also to nationally-
based journals in the subject area in the
particular vacancy. After interviews with
- 106a -
interested applicants have been con-
ducted decision is made to offer the
position to the candidate thought to be
best qualified, but before he or she is
offered employment, the approval of the
university affirmative action officer is
OT Ti
The admittedly valid procedures
employed by defendants in filling state
level positions having been fairly and
uniformly followed, in the absence of any
evidence tending to show bias or prejudice
in their implementation, it follows that
plaintiffs have failed to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination in
filling these positions,
28
These procedures are set forth in more
detail in defendants’ proposed findings of
fact Nos. 229-237 inclusive to which
plaintiffs have not objected, and the
court adopts them as its own and incorpo-
rates them herein by reference.
;
§
:
.
<
,
;
- 107a -
III. Salaries.
In the language of Title VII the
plaintiffs have alleged that the Extension
Service had denied blacks “the same
compensation, terms, conditions and
Privileges of employment as Provided to
whites," but the Plaintiffs' evidence has
concentrated only on alleged discrepancies
in salaries between blacks and whites. The
establishment of this Claim continues to
be a Primary goal of both the named
Plaintiffs and the government. With
respect to "terms," other than salaries,
"conditions" and "privileges" of employ-
ment, suffice it to Say that such meager
evidence was was Offered either failed to
establish a prima facie case or was
29
conclusively rebutted by defendants, and
For example, in an apparent effort to show
discrimination in Providing office
facilities, Geraldine Ray, a black named
Plaintiff, testified that she felt
"stigmatized" because she was provided
- 108a -
the court will therefore limit its
discussion to the matter of the alleged
with an old desk and that when new
carpeting was installed it did not cover
all the offices but stopped "right at her
door." Tr. p. 2325. Defendants' witness,
worth Gurkin, explained that his request
to the county commissioners to include in
his budget enough money to carpet all the
offices was cut in half and therefore only
one-half the offices were carpeted that
year; that the office of another black
agent was carpeted but his own office and
Ray's were not; and that the desk com-
plained of was a good solid wood desk
which, although it could have used some
sanding and a coat of varnish, is still in
use ten years later. Tr. P- 6332-39. The
claim was patently frivolous.
The original complaint alleged that
blacks were denied the same quality and
quantity of “in service training" as
whites. There was some evidence concern-
ing in service training but it tended to
show that opportunities afforded blacks in
this respect equaled or exceeded those
afforded whites. Significantly, plain-
tiffs have not submitted proposed findings
of fact on this and other subjects related
to "conditions and privileges” of employ-
ment and with respect to the defendants'
proposed findings (207-210 inclusive)
plaintiffs have simply responed under the
"red, blue, yellow" system of marking
opposing parties’ proposed findings used
in this case that the findings are not
denied but are irrelevant.
- 109a -
discriminatory pay practices of the
defendants.
The Extension Service has established
a minimum entry level Salary for all new
professional employees at the county level
who hold a bachelor's degree and have no
prior experience. A Salary differential
is paid those having a master's degree at
the time of employment. On occasion it
has been necessary to pay more than the
entry level salary in order to employ
persons to fill positions requiring
Special skills. Exceptions are also made
in the case of new employees whose prior
experience in teaching or business has
better equipped them to assume responsi-
bilities of their positions more guickly.
Because of inflation Starting sala-
ties have increased rapidly in recent
years, and this in turn has made it
necessary to adjust the salaries of those
ao ee oe tnge it
- 110a -
already employed in order to maintain a
proper relationship between the salaries
of beginners an those who have acquired
some tenure. In order to make such
adjustments is is sometimes necessary to
use funds intended for normal merit salary
increases.
As previously stated, funds for the
payment of salaries derive from three
sources, the counties, the state and the
federal government. The financial ability
of counties to support the local extension
program and the Salaries of its agents
yaries considerably between the lower
income counties and higher income counties
and between the counties in the western,
Piedmont and eastern sections of the
state. The percentage of total salaries
of county extension employees that is
contributed by the counties varies from
Repeat
Pal Pit te”
- lila -
county to county, ranging from a high of
597% in Forsyth County to 18% in Camden
County.
From time to time a given county may
grant across-the-board pay increases to
its employees which may also be in the
form of a specified percentage of the
county portion of the salary or a desig-
nated amount for each employee. Some
counties may not grant such increases at
the same time. There is no fixed proce-
dure between the counties for the granting
of pay increases among counties.
Each year about ten of the counties
also make available to the Extension
Service funds to provide merit Salary
increases. In some cases these increases
are designated by the county commissioners
as to the amount and which agents shall
receive them. In other cases the county
extension chairman will make these merit
- 112a -
increase decisions based on job perform-
ance of the agent for the previous twelve
RR The evaluation of the agent's
performance forms the basis for determina-
tion of his eligibility for a merit salary
increase and the size of that increase, if
any.
Funds furnished by the state to pay
salary increases are usually provided on a
percentage or flat sum basis across the
board to all University employees which
include employees of the Extension
Service. There is no evidence that such
salary increases have not been granted by
the Extension Service in accordance with
the state's authorization and without
30 The job performance evaluation system used
by the Extension Service is described in
detail in defendants' proposed findings of
fact Nos. 104-144 inclusive previously
adopted by the Court. See Footnote 22.
aS a Mes
a mT.
- l1l3a -
discrimination. The same is true with
respect to across-the-board increases
granted by the counties.
In some years the state appropriates
funds to be used to provide employees with
"merit" salary increases. These funds,
usually somewhat less than the cost-of-
living funds, are intended to be used to
reward those employees with superior job
performance records as documented in the
performance evaluation system previously
referred to. In addition to the Perform-
ance Review Guide this system includes
31
"quartile" rankings. The appraisal of the
31 Under the quartile system each agent is
placed in one of four quartile groups by
the district extension chairman, and the
determination of an agent's quartile
ranking for each particular year is based
upon his performance during the preceding
performance evaluation period. In
determining an agent's quartile rank for a
particular year his performance is
measured against his goals and objectives
for the year as set forth in the individ-
ual plan of work and how well the agent
performs the duties and functions called
- 114a -
employee's performance by the county
chairman, the district and state program
leaders and specialists and the district
extension chairman are also taken into
account.
Based on the employee's job perform-
ance as thus evaluated the district
exstension chairman then makes an actual
merit salary recommendation for each
individual agent and county chairman
within his or her district, to be paid
from funds made available from the merit
funds allocated by the assistant director
for county operations to the district.
Each district extension chairman is
advised of the total amount of merit money
available for his or her district, but
forin the job description. Agents do not
compete against other agents' performance
to achieve a quartile ranking but compete
only against themselves and their per form-
ance is measured on an individual basis.
Agents are not ranked within a quartile.
- 115a -
before the allocation of merit money
begins the district extension chairman
must first make salary adjustments to
reflect any increases by the Extension
Service during the previous performance
period in the entry level salary for
positions of assistant, associate and full
eniiae
These procedures for fixing salaries
and awarding merit increases are not in
serious dispute, but plaintiffs Seriously
contend that through the years they have
been discriminatorily implemented with the
For instance, in 1981 the increase in
Starting salaries required an adjustment
in present employees' salaries in the
amount of approximately $70,000. After
this adjustment is made, the district
extension chairman then makes a lump sum
allocation of dollars to each agent within
the first three quartiles. An agent in
the fourth quartile Ordinarily will not
receive a merit increase. However such
agent whose salary was below the entry
level salary for his or her title will
have received the adjustment made prior to
the merit salary allocation process.
- 116a -
result that blacks have been paid substan-
tially lesser salaries than have whites
and that such discrimination has continued
to this day. To prove this charge
plaintiffs have resorted to statistical
evidence and evidence of specific in-
stances of alleged discrimination involv-
ing individuals. For the reasons to
follow the court finds that the plaintiffs
have failed to establish this claim by a
preponderance of the evidence.
(i) The Statistical Evidence
Plaintiffs offered the testimony of
Dr. Charles Mann, an admitted expert
Statistician with extensive experience in
employment discrimination litigation.
Using the now familar multiple regression
33
technique, Dr. Mann conducted a multiple
33
See Baldus and Cole, Statistical Proof of
Discrimination, pp. 239, et seq. (1980);
Article, pexond the Prima Facie Case in
loyment Discrimination Law: Statistical
Proof and Rebuttal, 569 Harvard L. R. 309
- 117a -
regression analysis for each of the years
1974, 1975 and 1981 based on data fur-
nished the United States Department of
Agriculture by the Extension Service with
the following results.
Por the year 1974 he included 540
county level professionals. Controlling
for euieeh” we education he found the
regression coefficient for race, that is,
the excess of the salary of a white over
the salary of a black, to be $1,112.00,
(1975); and Fisher, "Multiple Regression
in Legal Proceedings,” 80 Columbia L. R.
702 (1980).
In Dr. Mann's 1974 and 1975 regression
analyses tenure was defined as_ the
difference between the date of the person-
nel file and the date when the indivi-
dual's current appointment with the
Extension Service began without a break in
service. His 1981 regression analyses
used the defendants' definition of tenure,
that is, the difference between the date
of the personnel file and the date when
the individual's current appointment with
the Extension Service began without a
break in service, plus years of prior
federal service, and added one year.
- 118a -
and he testified that this was statistic-
ally significant. When sex and program
areas were added as independent variables
the race effect exceeded $800 and remained
statistically significant. When job title
was added to tenure and education the race
effect dropped to between $257 and $337
depending on the other variables included,
but the results again remained statistic-
ally significant.
For the year 1975 Dr. Mann included
569 county level professionals. Control-
ling for tenure and education the regres-
sion coefficient for race was $1,207, a
statistically significant effect. When sex
and program area were added as independent
variables the race effect exceeded $880
and remained statistically significant.
When job title was added to tenure and
- 119a -
education the race effect dropped to $312
to $395 depending on the other variable
included.
For the year 1981 he included 560
county level professionals. Controlling
for tenure and education the coefficient
for race was $970 which was statistically
Significant. When sex and program area
were added as independent variables the
race effect exceeded $560 and remained
statistically significant.
In running his regressions Dr. Mann,
of course, included only those variables
which he was requested by his employers,
the plaintiffs, to include. Consequently
he included all county chairmen in all of
his regressions and omitted job title as a
variable in those regressions on which
plaintiffs principally rely. Other vari-
ables which defendants contend impair the
validity of Dr. Mann's regression will be
- 120a -
35
discussed later. In answer to a question
by the court he conceded that the inclu-
sion of other variables could have
affected the results. Tr. pp. 435-436.
(ii) Comparison of Individuals
It is undisputed that prior
to the merger of the white and black
branches of the Extension Service in 1965
salaries of professionals in the black
branch on:-the average were less than those
of their counterparts in the white branch.
Following the merger this disparity was
recognized and steps were taken to begin
its elimination prior to the amendments to
Title VII which brought the Extension
Service under its coverage in 1972.
Nevertheless the government has offered
35 Dr. Mann is a highly qualified statisti-
cian, but he disclaimed any expertise
concerning factors that go into fixing
Salaries in the Extension Service.
Plaintiffs called no expert to supply the
information which Mann was unable to give.
- 12la -
evidence tending to show that as of
January, 1973, the salaries of numerous
black agents throughout the System were
less than those of white agents in the
same counties who were in comparable or
lower positions and who had comparable or
less tenure (GX 102). The government has
also cited defendants' own exhibit (DX 48)
as showing some salary disparities between
blacks and whites as late as October,
1974,
The Extension Service's problem of
bringing black and white salaries into
line has been similar to that which faced
most business enterprises with a prior
history of racial discrimination following
the passage of the Civil RightsAct of
1964, Just as it had been found in the
area of education that there is no such
thing as instant integration, it was soon
found in the field of business's and
- 122a -
industry that there is no such thing as
instant quality in employment. Without
risking serious disruption of a business
by prohivitively costly budgetary aitera-
tions and a possible practice of wholesale
reverse discrimination it was soon
recognized (though not always by the
courts) that the adjustments mandated by
the law simply could not be made over-
night. The dilemma of the Extension
Service was further compounded by the fact
that its operating funds came from three
separate political entities each of which
retains a voice in all major employment
decisions.
To recognize these problems, however,
is not to excuse non-compliance with the
law. The court has therefore carefully
reviewed plaintiffs' evidence showing
individual salary comparisons and as 4a
result has concluded that while on its
- 123a -
face and evidence unquestionably estab-
lishes salary disparities, when viewed in
the light of defendants' explanatory
evidence it fails to prove discrimina-
tion.
The exhibits referred to have not
been found persuasive for several reasons.
To begin with the January, 1973 figures
shown on GX 102 are only selected examples
taken from across the State almost ten
years ago, and in most instances the
differences in Pay between the black
agents and white agents is very small.
There is nothing to show the areas of
responsibility of the agents compared and
more importantly, there is no way to make
a comparison between the Job performances
of the agents. The information contained
in DX 48 is Similarly inconclusive. The
lack of probative force of such evidence
- 124a -
becomes more readily apparent when the
cases of three specific individuals cited
by plaintiffs are considered.
Martha B. Thomas, a named plaintiff
black, was employed as a home economist by
the Extension Service in 1970. She had
come to North Carolina from Mississippi
where she had gained some experience in
the Mississippi Extension Service.
Although there is nothing to indicate that
she was not employed at the then applic-
able entry level salary, she complains
that the salary of a white home economics
agent was $500 more than hers at that
time. In rebuttal defendants showed that
the white agent was already an associate
agent at the time Thomas was first getting
started as an assistant agent. Another
white home economics agent shown by
plaintiffs to have had a higher salary
than Thomas was shown by defendants to
o> . 4 st ” ata, ath bee ate eS
Lem, |. »
- 125a -
have been a full agent with an extensive
backlog of experience both as an extension
agent and as a home economics teacher in
the public. schools. Finally, Thomas
received a reprimand for her consistent
failure after warnings to make certain
required reports on time. She was told
that the reprimand would go into her
personnel record; that it would have an
adverse effect on her future salary
possibilities; and that she had a right to
appeal the decision. She did not do so.
Johnny Jones, a black, was employed
by the Extension Service in Greene County
in February, 1971, with several areas of
responsibility including 4-H. Because of
&@ $100 mix-up" in his Salary, which was
corrected at mid-year, he joined as a
Plaintiff in this action in November of
that year. In July, 1972, he was trans-
ferred to Craven County, promoted to
- 126a -
associate agent and given a salary raise.
In early 1973 he transferred to Durham
county where he worked exclusively in
"urban 4-H" work under a black county
chairman. The extension Service portion
of his pay in Durham County came from
"1890 wn In 1978 for reasons not
quite clear unless it was to return to the
area of his birthplace and _ longtime
residence, Jones applied for and was given
a transfer to Leonoir county to work as an
37
agricultural agent. Jones testified that
3@ punds made available by Congress especi-
ally for the benefit of balcks to be
administered through the 1890 land grant
colleges, inthis case A&T University at
Greensboro, North Carolina.
37 After entering the employment of the
Extension Service Jones pursued a course
of graduate studies at NCSU which ultim-
ately led to a master's degree in adult
and community education in 1977. Had he
remained in urban 4-H work this additional
education would doubtless had been of
considerable value to him and the Exten-
sion Service. Its value in this work as
an agricultural agent would appear to be
minimal, and in any event it does not
- 127a -
he had “buried the hatchet as far as
Salary was concerned," but that it
"resurfaced" when, following a recess in
the trial during which he was shown by a
government attorney that a white agent in
Lenoir county, one Jimmy Pollock, was
being paid about $2,000 per year more than
he, Jones testified "I just feel like I
may be underpaid."
With respect to Jones the evidence of
the defendants showed that while he was a
very competent agent, particularly in his
field of 4-H work, Agent Pollock with whom
he was sought to be compared, was an
exceptionally well qualified livestock
agent with a rare expertise in swine; that
Pollock had been lured away from his
employment with the Extension Service by
Support a claim of disparate salary
treatment when his salary is compared to
that of a competent, experienced ag ricul-
tural agent without a master's degree.
- 128a -
a higher salary with the North Carolina
department of Agriculture where he
continued to add to his knowledge and
expertise over a period of about five
years; that because of Lenoir County's
position of importance both in the state
and nation in livestock production it was
necessary to have an agent of Pollock's
competence to carry on the livestock
program in that county; and that in order
to get Pollock back it was necessary for
the Extension Service to match the salary
which he was paid by the Department of
Agriculture. From all the evidence there
arises absolutely no inference that race
had anything at all to do with the
differential between the salaries of Jones
and Pollock.
Wanda Wilkins, a non-plaintiff black
woman who joined the Extension Service in
Greene County in 1974, testified for the
- 129a -
plaintiffs that she would make $400 less
in 1982 than a white woman agent with
comparable tenure; that she had had a
master's degree since 1980 while the white
woman has only a bachelor's degree; and
that she has concluded that her failure to
get promotions and raises has been because
of her race.
The defendants on the other hand
showed that over the five-year period
during which Wilkins was studying for her
master's degree she was commuting to
Raleigh from Greene Cornty - roughly a one
an one-half to two-hour drive each way;
that she was given a total of eighty-five
days off in which to pursue her graduate
studies but nevertheless her extension
programs suffered during the time she was
commuting to graduate school and still
trying to keep up with her work; that her
performance record, particularly in the
- 130a -
field of 4-H which constituted eighty per
cent of her work, was far short of what
was expected of her; and that her salary
simply reflected her poor ae...
It is perhaps significant that she has
never sought to intervene in this action.
In summary, the statistical evidence
of plaintiffs standing alone and without
further explanation probably suffices to
make a prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion in salaries; the corroboration to be
found in the comparison of salaries of
individuals in the exhibits is at best
38 It appeared that in 1980 out of a poten-
tial of over 4,000 children Wilkins only
had 124 involved in 4-H, down from 213 in
1973, the year before she went to work,
360 in 1977 and 487 in 1978; that she had
nine clubs organized whereas the average
for the 4-H agents in the state is thirty
clubs and 400 members; that her average
day participation in district activity was
five whereas the counties average twelve;
and that participation by her children in
the 4-H Congress never exceeded three
while the average for other agents was
ten.
- 13la -
meager; and the evidence in the three
individual cases proposed by plaintiffs as
representative has been completely
rebutted.
Turning then to defendants' evidence
on the question of salaries we begin by
considering the alleged defects in the
plaintiffs' statistical evidence. It will
be remembered that Dr. Mann's regression
analysis, which forms the centerpiece of
plaintiffs’ salary discrimination claims,
in addition to race contained only two
independent variables, tenure and educa-
tion. Defendants contend, and the court
is constrained to agree, that the omission
of other equally if not more important
variables so flaws the results of the
regression that it cannot be accepted as
preponderant proof of plaintiffs' claims.
Statistics are ... competent in
prov- ing employment discrimina-
tion. We caution only that
Statistics are not irrefutable;
- 132a -
they come in infinite variety
and, like any other kind of
evidence, they may be rebutted.
In short, their usefulness
depends on all the surrounding
facts and circumstances.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 at 339-40.
It has been said that multiple re-
gression models never conclusively prove
anything. They merely describe statisti-
cal relationships. While a negligible
coefficient for race may warrant the
inference that race is not an important
factor to the employer in fixing salaries,
the converse is not necessarily true for
legitimate qualification variables may
have been omitted from the model. Baldus-
Cole, supra, at p. 243. Here the defen-
dants list numerous variables omitted from
plaintiffs' regression which sharply limit
if not indeed destroy its probative force.
- 133a <-
More specifically defendants point to the
failure
include
of plaintiffs' regression to
(1) Performance of agents
measured against the agents'
plan of work;
(2) The variations in
Salaries created by across the
board state raises with the
different percentage of state
contributions in each county;
(3) The across the board
increases in agent salaries by
some counties and not in others;
(4) The merit raises
provided by the state;
(5S) The merit raises
provided for by the counties in
which Extension Service per-
sonnel have no input;
(6) The merit raises
provided by the counties with
limited or full participation in
the merit recommendation by
Extension Service personnel;
(7) The range in merit
Salary increases provided by the
counties (0 - 12% in 1981);
(8) Prior and relevant
experience; and
- 134a -
(9) Variations in salary
due to market demands both at
time of hire and later for
agents with skills in short
supply or prior experience.
It will be observed that all these
variables are difficult if not impossible
to measure and quantify. Thus neither
side undertook to incorporate them in
their regressions. Yet it is indisputable
that following entry level the single most
important factor in determining salaries
for the Extension Service professional
staff is job performance. As previously
stated, each employee is evaluated
annually on the basis of his or her job
performance measured against a standard of
acceptable performance. The agent par-
ticipates in this evaluation process and
the results are reflected in salary
changes such as merit raises made there-
after. But even so, other factors over
- 135a -
which neither the Extension Service nor
the agent has any control are constantly
influencing salary changes. Examples of
Such factors are the differences in the
state contributions to salaries in each
county, the differences in across-the-
board increases in agent salaries and
merit raises in some counties and not in
39
others and market forces. Even among
39
The influence of market forces on Salary
has been illustrated previously in the
case of Agent Pollock. At the time he
was rehired by the Extension Service
livestock agents were in short supply and
it was necessary to pay more to hire and
retain him that it would have been to hire
and retain other more plentiful agency
such as home economists and 4-G agents.
"We had a vacancy in a
dairy agent positionback within
the last twelve months. That
position stayed vacant for
almost a year for the Simple
reason that we could not Find a
dairy-trainedagent at the price
we were able to pay. We have a
Standard starting salary, andwe
simply could not go into the
market and hire a dairy agent
for that price. ... Over the
years, certain areas seem to be
- 136a -
agents with the same program responsibili-
ties the salarydemands may differ substan-
tially from county to county. For
instance, an agent with tobacco responsi-
bility in a large tobacco-growing county
will command a larger salary than an agent
with the same responsibility in a county
where tobacco is not the major crop.
A principal criticism of plaintiffs’
statistics is based on the fact that the
raw data on which they were based includes
the salaries of county chairmen. Although
the selection process, as we have seen, is
not discriminatory, a relatively small
in short supply and therefore
the demand is great and the
starting salaries are high. A
few years we were in almost the
same situation with horticul-
tural agents. But not, there is
a fairly plentiful supply of
horticultural graduates avail-
able. Therefore we generally
can find what we are looking for
in that area. Blalock, Tr. pp.
3457-8.
- 137a -
number of blacks have applied for these
positions and the result is that ninety-
four of the one hundred county chairman
positions are held by whites. Because
these top county positions go to the
highest qualified agents who possess
administrative and leadership qualifica-
tions in addition to their professional
expertise, they naturally command the
highest salaries at the county level - an
average of at least $4,000 per year more
than the average salaries of ali other
agents. It is immediately apparent,
therefore, that when the salaries of these
ninety-four white agents are included with
those of the few hundred other agents in
the plaintiffs' regression, the results
40
are going to be distorted. Plaintiffs,
The size of the distortion depends upon
whose salary data figures are accepted as
accurate. The parties are at odds as to
the correctness of the salary data used by
Dr. Mann in his regression. Since computer
- 138a -
while admitting through Dr. Mann that it
is proper to include job titles (here
assistant agent, associate agent and full
agent) in a salary regression if it does
not “obscure race effect," (Tr. Pp-
369-70), contend that the evidence on
discrimination in promotions in this case
is "overwhelming" and therefore job titles
were properly excluded in Dr. Mann's
tapes were not available for the years
1974 and 1975 Dr. Mann used tapes for
later years together with other personnel
records furnished him by the United States
Department of Agriculture to work backward
and create tapes for those years. While
the regression based on this reconstruc~
tion showed 569 salaries, the defendants
were able to find only 318 salaries
recorded in the column Dr.Mann identified
as having been the source of the salary
data included in his regression. If the
defendants' figures are accepted as
correct, it thus appears that almost
one-third of the salaries included in the
Mann regression were those of county
chairmen. Since the burden was on the
plaintiffs to establish the accuracy of
the data to which their statistics were
based, the court is constrained to accept
defendants' figures as being more accurate
in this instance.
iin
- 139a -
regression, For the reasons previously
Stated the court has rejected this
contention, and it now holds that job
titles were improperly omitted from
plaintiffs' regression and the salaries of
county chairmen were improperly included
therein. Agarwal _v. Arthur G. McKee &
Company, 664 F.2d 8903 (9th Cir. 1981),
affirming Agarwal v. McKee, 19 FEP Cases
5903 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Wilkins v. Univer-
Sity of Houston, 656 F.2d 388 (Sth Cir.
1981), rehearing denied, 662 F.2d 1156
(Sth Cir. 1981); Presseisen v. Swarthmore
College, 42 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978);
Fisher, Supra, 80 Columbia L. R. 702, 721
n.32 (1980).
Dr. Francis Giesbrecht, a qualified
expert in the field of statistics,
prepared several multiple regression
analyses for defendants. Using the same
- 140a -
statistical methodology employed by Dr.
Mann and most of the same data, when he
controlled for the same independent
variables as did Dr. Mann the results were
not significantly different. When the
county chairmen were omitted the coeffi-
cient for race dropped sharply, and when
quartile rankings were added to tenure,
education and job title the race effect
was reduced to $142 in 1981. The use of
these variables accounted for seventy~-
seven per cent of the total salary
variations between blacks and whites. Dr.
Geisbrecht testified that “it is a
subjective decision as to whether that
explains enough of it or not" and that he
would expect that the addition of other
factors such as variations in county
salaries and work in different crops would
lead to some changes. Tr. p. 6210.
- 141la -
After considering the great mass of
Statistical evidence produced by both
sides about the only firm conclusions the
court was able to reach were that when the
only independent variables used in a
salary regression were tenure and educa-
tion the coefficient for race was signifi-
cant; that individual salaries are
affected by a large number of factors;
that when other valid factors were
introduced the race effect diminished but
did not disappear; and that there are
several unmeasured factors, notably job
performance, the absence of which seri-
ously flaws the results.
Multiple regression analysis is a
relatively sophisticated means of
determining the effects that any
number of different factors have on a
particular variable; while it may be
the best, if not the only, means of
proving classwide discrimination with
respect to compensation in a case
such as this - where a number of
factors operate Simultaneously to
influence salary - it is subject to
misuse and thus must be employed with
- 142a -
great care. Ideally, when a multiple
regression analysis is used, it will
be the subject of expert testimony
and knowledgeable cross examination
from both sides. In this manner, the
validity of the model and the
significance of its results will be
fully developed at trial, allowing
the trial judge to make an informed
decision as to the probative value of
the analysis. In the instant case,
the statistical evidence associated
witn the multiple regression analysis
is inconclusive, raising more
questions than it answers.
Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d
388, 402-3 (Sth Cir. 1981), a case
strongly relied on by defendants. On
petition to rehear the case and sugges-
tions for rehearing en banc the plaintiffs
were able to show that defendant's expert
statistician had given testimony (appar-
ently through inadvertence) to the effect
that his regression analysis model without
a sex variable had produced a table
showing that men and women were treated
equally with regard to pay when in fact he
- 143a -
was using another regression analysis
which did contain a sex variable. While
the point was held to cast doubt and
render incorrect statements in the court's
Original opinion which relied on this
erroneous’ testimony, in denying the
petition the court said:
Nonetheless, we still adhere to
our original conclusion and
affirm the district court on the
class plaintiffs' faculty com-
pensation claim.
The thrust of our Original
Opinion on faculty compensation
remains unchanged; Plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate the
validity of the multiple
regression model as a whole. ...
Since multiple reg ression
analysis is subject to misuse,
courts cannot be expected to
accept at a face value conclu-
Sions derived from such a model
absent expert testimony concern-
ing the validity of the model
SGGEEEe ccc (W]hen the class
Plaintiffs purported to use the
university's statistics for
their own purposes, they did not
fulfill their burden of showing
that the multiple regression
analysis model employed was
valid, Without guidance, this
court cannot be expected to
- 144a -
resolve in the class plaintiffs'
favor fundamental questions
relating to the model itself.
(Pootnotes omitted. )
Wilkins v. University of Houston, 662 F.2d
1156, 1157 (Sth Cir. 1981).
In an attempt to explain and distin-
guish Wilkins the plaintiffs filed a
supplemental brief in which they point to
the court's emphasis on “the need for
expert testimony to enable the trial court
to assess the validity of the regression
model and the significance of the re-
sults." Plaintiffs assert that their
expert, Dr. Mann, testified that the
results of his regression were "meaning ful
and statistically significant,” and that
using the same methodology defendants'
expert obtained the same results. The
court accepts this testimony at face value
so far as it goes, but the difficulty with
plaintiffs' argument is that the statisti-
- 145a -
cians disclaimed any expertise in the area
of the factors that go into determining
Extension Service salaries, and the court
was left with only the testimony of
Extension Service professionals to supply
this information (see Footnote 35, supra).
At the same time both statisticians
conceded that if additional variables (not
tainted by race) were included in the
regressions, the results would be substan-
tially altered. Implicit in the testimony
of Dr. Mann as to why he included county
chairmen but not job titles in his
regression was that he felt (or perhaps
had been instructed) that these variables
were tainted by race. Certainly it is
plaintiffs’ position that they were so
tainted, but as stated before the court
41
has rejected this contention.
" It is true, as plaintiffs assert, that
defendants' expert, Dr. Giesbrecht, did
not question Dr. Mann's methodology and
- 146a -
And so, like the court in Wilkins,
this court is left without expert testi-
mony concerning the validity of the
regression model itself, and without such
guidance the court cannot be expected to
resolve fundamental questions relating to
the model in plaintiffs’ favor.
The defendants offered other evidence
tending to negate the inferences raised by
the statistical evidence. In 1976 when
the salaries of all agents except county
chairmen were compared the average salary
of white agents exceeded that of black
agents by $130, but the average tenure of
the white agents exceeded that of the
black agents by 1.5 years. In that same
results, but Dr. Giesbrecht's own ev idence
went considerably further. Dr.Mann came
back to court to hear Dr. Giesbrecht
testify, and the court considered it
significant that he was not recalled to
rebut any Of Dr. Giesbrecht's testimony.
The inference is that he did not disagree
with it.
- 147a -
year the salaries of black agents with a
bachelor's degree exceeded that of white
agents with the same degree by $121
although the average tenure of the white
agents exceeded that of the black agents
by 1.6 years. In 1976 blacks with
master's degrees averaged $409 less in
Salary than whites with master's degrees
and 1.5 years less tenure. The figures
for 1979, 1980 and 1981 showed comparable
results with the blacks with bachelor's
degrees and blacks with master's degrees
exceeding the average salaries of their
white counterparts in five instances out
of six. The fact that the average
Salaries of all white agents when compared
with all black agents is slightly higher
was accounted for by the fact that a far
greater percentage of white agents than
- 148a -
black agents have master's degrees. The
figures are contained in DX 201-205
inclusive.
Finally, the defendants offered a
series of graphs sometimes referred to as
"scattergrams" showing the relationship of
salary to tenure of black and white agents
at the various county job levels for the
years covered by the salary regressions.
DX 256, et seq.? Giesbrecht, Tr. pp. 6180,
et seq. Using the data from defendants’
salary regression when plotted on these
graphs the salaries of blacks and whites
were displayed in a completely random
42
distribution.
42 Each side also introduced exhibits showing
that certain individuals made more or less
than certain other similarly situated
individuals. Because, as has been
previously shown, job performance and
unmeasurable factors go into practically
all salary decisions the court is unable
to assign any significant probative force
to these exhibits.
- 149a -
Having thoroughly considered all of
the evidence bearing on the Salary issue
and the contentions of the parties based
thereon, the court has concluded that it
if be assumed that plaintiffs made out a
prima facie case on this issue, it has
Only been by virtue of the plaintiffs'
Statistical evidence based on the multiple
regressions of Dr. Mann; that because of
their failure to include many of the vital
factors necessary to be considered in
fixing salaries the probative force of
these statistics has been so Substantially
undermined that they cannot sustain a
finding of purposeful discrimination in
Salaries under any of the statutes on
43
which the action is based; that the
43
Faulty statistics do not create a prima
facie case. Allen v. Prince George's
Count 538 F. Supp. 833, 849-55 (D. Ma.
13874 (in an action against a public
employer our same Dr. Charles Mann's
regression analysis was rejected becuse it
did not exclude pre-1972 hires). Even
- 150a -
defendants have not only “articulated”
plausible reasons for the seeming salary
disparities, Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
but have satisfied the court of the
validity of their explanations; and that
the plaintiffs have not shown that
defendants‘ reasons were ameieneaei.’™ It
follows that plainci’ts have failed to
establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Extension Service has
discriminated against black employees in
the matter of salaries.
where the statistical compilation result
in “lopsided ratios," they are not
conclusive proof of discriminatory
employment practices. EEOC v. United
ae inia Bank/Seaboa National, 555 F.2d
Ne Le -
44 "Statistical evidence of the existence of
de facto discrimination is not determina-
tive of the pretext issue." arwal v.
McKee & Company, 644 F.2d 802, B06 (oth
Cir. 1981).
- 15la -
IV. Segregating Blacks In Work
Assignment
Prior to the merger of the two
Oranches of the Extension Service in 1965
black agents worked Only with black
clientele and white agents worked only
with whites. There is no substantial
evidence that this practice continued
after the merger. In those instances in
which black agents continued to Spend a
disproportionate amount of their time
working with blacks there is no evidence
that this has not been a matter of choice
with the agent instead of any requirement
On the part of the Extension Service.
Rather, the evidence showed that the
assignment of agents was largely the
result of numerous Sectors Such as
employee preferences, job guslifications
and conditions affecting job availability.
Such evidence will not Support a finding
- 152a -
that blacks have been intentionally
segregated in their work assignments for
45
racial reasons. Hilton v. Wyman Gordon
Company, 624 F.2d 379 (1st Cir. 1980).
v. Pailing to Sstablish Valid Tests.
The allegation is that the Extension
Service has failed and refused “to
establish valid qualifications, tests,
selection standards and procedures which
are sufficiently objective to prevent
continuing discrimination in hiring and
promotion." It is at once apparent that
the allegation assumes 4 fact which the
S If this has ever been a problem since the
merger, in view of the rapid decline in
the black farmer population it could not
remain one long. According to the United
States Bureau of the Census there are now
only 57,271 farms currently operated by
blacks in the United States, down from
926,000 in 1920. The current rate of
decline of black-operated farms is two and
one-half times the rate of decline of
white-operated farms. Report, U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, The Decline of
Black Farming in America, February,
- 153a -
court has failed to find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that is, that the
defendants have discriminated in their
hiring and promotion procedures. These
procedures have been previously described
in detail in the sections on hiring (Page
20, et seg .) and promotion (pages 23, et
seg.) and will not be repeated here.
Since all professional positions in
the Extension Service are also faculty
positions at NCSU ard all require college
degrees, it is ¢€ (‘ficult to understand
just what additional tests Plaintiffs
contend the Extension Service should
administer in connection with its hiring
46
practices.
46
Plaintiffs produced no evidence of any
person claiming to have been wrong fully
denied employment by the Extension Service
On account of race, and no such person
joined as a plaintiff in the action.
- 154a -
The use of the performance review
guide in connection with promotions has
been referred to previously (see Footnote
22). Chief architect of this performance
evaluation system was Dr. Edgar J. Boone,
an assistant director of the Extension
Service and head of the Department of
Adult and Community College Education at
NCSU. He had had over twenty-five years’
experience in Extension Service work, the
last nineteen of which have been in North
Carolina. He has been engaged principally
in program analysis and personnel develop-
ment. His primary responsibility with the
Extension Service is in the staff develop-
ment program. He is a nationally recog-
nized authority, and the court was
impressed with his expertise in this
field.
- 155a -
Following extensive work during the
1960's in developing a programming guide
and job descriptions for Extension Service
agents work was begun under Dr. Boone in
1970 to develop a method of appraising the
performance of Extension Service workers.
Separate biracial committees were formed
for this purpose, and over a period of two
years there were developed two performance
review guides, one for county agents (Dx
237A) and one for county chairmen (Dx
237B). They are used as counseling and
diagnostic tools, and while their primary
Purposes are to enhance job Satisfaction
and professional competence, to assist
agents in recognizing areas where improve-
ment is needed and to assist the Extension
Service in more effectively accomplishing
its mission, they re also one of the many
things considered in fixing salaries and
awarding promotions. In the opinion of
- 156a -
Dr. Boone the performance review guide
does not discriminate against blacks, has
never been so used and does not have an
adverse impact on eattiiet A grievance
procedure is available to any employee not
satisfied with the evaluation on his or
her work by the performance review guide,
but to date no agent, black or white, has
resorted to the use of this grievance
procedure.
Prior to 1979 USDA at 4 cost of
approximately one million dollars con-
tracted with the American Institute for
Research to develop a national performance
appraisal system for the Extension
Service. A comparison of the results ofe
a7 or. Boone conceded that no studies had
been conducted to make this determination.
Significantly, although charged with the
burden of establishing discrimination, the
plaintiffs with all the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) resources
at their command, have apparently con-
ducted no such study either.
- 157a -
this study with that already developed in
North Carolina by the Extension Service
shows that they both undertake to measure
essentially the same elements of job
performance and that the Only material
differences between the two Systems are
that under the North Carolina System the
agent participates in self-evaluation
while under the national System he does
not; and under the national system weights
are assigned to the various job duties
while under the North Carolina system
weights are not assigned. The national
System is comparatively new and it has
Only been adopted in full in one state.
The North Carolina System, on the other
hand, was first adopted in 1972, and it
has been under’ periodic review and
revision over a period of ten years. It
has been studied by representatives of
- 158a -
forty-one states, and portions if not all
of it have been adopted in a great many
states.
The conclusion is that the perform-
ance review guides in use in North
Carolina are valid devices for measuring
the performance of Extension Service
agents; that they are not racially
discriminatory; and that plaintiffs have
fallen far short of establishing by 4a
preponderance of the evidence that the
Extension Service had failed to establish
valid qualifications, tests, selection
standards and procedures for use in its
hiring and promotion practices.
VI. Faili to Correct Present
Eftects of Past Discrimination.
The allegation is that detendants
have failed and refused "to tre appropri-
ate action to correct the present effects
of past racially discriminatory policies
- 159a -
and practices." Here again the allegation
involves the assumption that there has
been discrimination in the past’ the
effects of which continue, aé_e thesis
staunchly denied by defendants. Assuming
the correctness of the assertion, however,
nowhere in the statute law is there found
any specific requirement that an employer
must take affirmative steps to eradicate
possible continuing effects of prior
discriminatory practices. Plaintiffs have
cited no pertinent employment discrimina-
tion cases in support of their position,
but they have cited and relied on several
school desegregation cases such as Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S.
526 (1979), for the proposition that there
is a continuing duty to dismantle uncon-
Sstitutional school systems which rule by
48
analogy should be applied here.
“8 Insofar as plaintiffs' claims are g rounded
- 160a -
These cases are considered distin-
guishable, however, for in all such cases
a clear and present violation of the law
is involved. By contrast, in the employ-
ment context the fact that a completed
on Title VII Hazelwood, supra, affords
some guidance.
"Racial discrimination by public
employers was not made illeg al
under Title VII until March 24,
1972. A public employer who
from that date forward made all
its employment decisions in a
wholly nondiscriminatory way
would not violate Title VII even
if it had formally maintained an
all-white work force by purpose-
fully excluding Negroes. Id.,
433 U.S. at 309. ane
This court has found that at least since
1972 the defendants have made all their
employment decisions in a wholly nondis-
criminatory manner. Even where a Title
VII violation has been found declaratory
and injunctive relief are not required
where the evidence shows that the for-
bidden employment practice has been
abandoned and the employer has indicated
the intention to comply with the law in
the future. Williams v. Yazoo Valley-
Minter City Oil Mill, inc., 469 F.Supp.
’ N.D. Miss. TOT).
- 16la -
prior discriminatory act has an impact
which continues into the Present is not
actionable under the employment discrimi-
nation laws. United States v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553, 558 (197); Farris Vv. Board of
Education, 576 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1978);
Wilson v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 456
F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1978); Annotation:
49 A.L.R. Fed. 693.
Notwithstanding the lack of any
Statutory or case law requirement that it
take affirmative action looking to the
elimination of any residual discrimination
of pre-Act origin the Extension Service
has taken highly commendable steps to
conform its employment Practices to the
law. It would unnecessarily prolong this
Opinion to list the actions taken, but
they are summarized in detail in defen-
dants' proposed findings of fact Nos.
- 162a -
256-267 inclusive which the court adopts
as its own and incorporates herein by
reference.
The result has been that the number
of black professionals emploved by the
Extension Service increased by 14 per cent
between 1970 and 1979, the latest date for
which figures were available, and during
this period the salaries of black profes-
sionals increased by 121.8 per cent while
salaries of whites were increasing only
114.1 per cent. Nationally the percentage
of non-white protessional Extension
Service employees is five per cent. In
49
North Carolina it is seventeen per cent.
49 Only South Carolina with twenty per cent
ranked higher. By contrast the USDA,
which started out as a co-defendant with
the Extension Service in this action but
wound up on the opposite side of the
versus when the Department of Justice
entered the picture, had only 7.1 per cent
black employees in all pay grades in 1979
and only 3.1 per cent in grade GS-12 and
above. The Extension Service is hampered
in its efforts to recruit even more blacks
- 163a -
The Extension Service currently employs
blacks at a rate approximately three times
the proportion they represent in the total
labor pool from which it recruits.
A violation by the defendant of any
duty, statutor, or otherwise, "to take
appropriate action to correct the present
effects of past racially discriminatory
policies and practices" has not been
established.
VII. Failure to Provide Equal
Services to Minorities.
The allegation that the defendants
have failed to provide minorities with
services equal to those provided white
persons need not detain us, for there was
no evidence at all to Support this
allegation and counsel for the government
by the fact that the USDA actively
competes with the Extension Service for
the highest qualified blacks and is able
to pay higher salaries,
- 164a -
finally conceded that the defendants are
not discriminating in the delivery of
their services to all races. Tr. pp.
3285-6672.
VIII. Pailure to Provide Services On
RK Non-Racially Segregated
Basis.
The allegation is that defendants
have failed “to provide services to 4-H
clubs, extension homemaker clubs, farmers
and other persons on 4a non-racially
segregated basis." There was no evidence
that the Extension Service provides
services to “farmers and other persons" on
a racially segregated basis, but it is not
disputed that there are many 4-H clubs and
extension homemaker clubs throughout the
system whose members are all of one race.
The services provided by the Extension
Service to such clubs of necessity are
provided on a racially seg reg ated
- 165a -
50
basis. The issue thus raised is subsumed
in the question of whether the existence
of such racially segregated clubs violates
federal law, and this is the subject of
the next section of this memorandum.
1X. Maintenance of Racially Segre-
gated 4-H and Extension Home-
maker Clubs.
The allegation is that defendants
have failed to maintain non-racially
seg reg ated 4-H clubs and extension
homemaker clubs. As stated, there are
many such clubs in North Carolina, and
there are many clubs to which members of
both races belong. The question is
whether or not the action of the Extension
Service in recognizing and furnishing
There is no evidence to show that the
quality of such services is any different
for the clubs of one race than for the
other. None of the named plaintiffs
representing 4-H and extension homemaker
clubs gave testimony at the trial.
- 166a -
services to the segregated clubs violates
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which proscribes action
forbidden by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265(1978);
Taylor v. Cohen, 405 F.2d 277, 281 (4th
Cir. 1978). The Act states simply that
No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial
assistance.
Plaintiffs contend that the members
of one-race clubs are subjected to
discrimination in violation of this
statute and the Constitution when they
receive services from the federally-funded
Extension Service; that the Extension
Service should take affirmative steps to
- 167a -
require these clubs to merge with clubs in
the same community that are of another
race; and that should these efforts fail
the Extension Service should withdraw its
services from any club which failed to
integrate. Defendants, on the other hand,
contend that membership in these clubs is
entirely voluntary; that the is no
evidence that any one of either race has
ever been excluded from membership in any
club, Or participation in, or denied
benefits of, any “a Or activity for
the Extension Service; and that Extension
Service produced no witness who testified
31
There was evidence of one isolated
instance in which a black child was told
by a voluntary worker from the community
that he would not be welcome as a member
in a white 4-H club. The worker was
promptly removed by the Extension Service
and the child was admitted.
- 168a -
that he or she had ever been discriminated
against in connection with the delivery of
services by the Extension manne”
The evidence adduced at the trial
fully supports each of defendants’
contentions. No witness appeared to
testify that membership in any 4-H or
extension homemaker club was anything but
voluntary; or that he or she had been
denied membership in any such club on the
basis of race; or that he or she had ever
been subjected to discrimination with
respect to any services offered by the
53
Extension Service. The question remains,
=
Defendants made a further contention that
to withdraw services from these segreg ated
clubs would be to deny such services on
the grounds of race - itself a violation
of Title VI. In view of the court's
finding that the furnishing of services to
the clubs does not violate Title VI it is
not necessary to decide this interesting
question.
53
The evidence shows, and plaintiffs do not
question, that for all phases of club
activity above the community club level,
- 169a -
therefore, as to whether the law requires
that these clubs be integrated. The court
has concluded that it does not.
Since the evidence has failed to show
exclusion from participation in or denial
of benefits of or discrimination in the
delivery of services, no violation of
Section 601 of Title vI, 42 U.S..C. §
2000d, has been established. we neat look
to the regulations adopted by the USDA
pursuant to the directive of Section 602
of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. These
are found in 7 C.F.R. § 15.1, et seq.
Following a general prohibition of
discrimination in language tracking that
of Title VI, Section 15.3(b) of the
regulations lists some Specific discrimi-
all extension staff and volunteer club
leaders, all county-wide, district and
State meetings and training sessions are
fully integrated. In working with the
Clubs all agents work across racial lines.
- 170a -
natory actions which are prohibited. One
of these is that a recipient of federal
funding may not on the grounds of race,
color or national origin *"[sjubject an
individual to segregation or separate
treatment in any matter related to his
receipt of any service, financial aid, or
other benefit under the program."
Section 15.3(b)(6) provides:
(i) In administering a program
regarding which the recipient
has previously discriminated
against persons on the ground of
race, color, or national origin,
the recipient must take affirma-
tive action to overcome the
effects of prior discrimination.
(ii) Even in the absence of
such prior discrimination, 4
recipient in administering 4
program may take affirmative
action to overcome the effects
of conditions which resulted in
Limiting participation by
persons of a particular race,
color or national origin.
- 17la -
Section 15.3(d) lists Programs and
activities together with illustrations, by
way Of example only, of types of activi-
ties covered by the regulations. With
respect to Extension Service programs the
following are listed as prohibited
activities:
(i) Discrimination in the use
in any program or activity of
the Cooperative Extension,
demonstrations, information, and
publications offered by or
through the Cooperative Exten-
Sion Service;
(1i) Discriminationin the use
in any program or activity of
the Cooperative Extension
Service of any facility,
including offices, training
facilities, lecture halls, or
Other structures or improve-
ments; or
(iii) Discrimination
training activities, admission
tO or participation in fairs,
competitions, field days, and
encampments, conducted or
Sponsored by, or in which the
Cooperative Extension Service
Participates,
- 172a -
It will be observed that in order to
establish a violation of any of these
regulations it is first necessary to
establish that the action complained of
was taken "on the ground of race, color,
or national origin." There has been no
such showing in this case. No individual
has been “subjected" to segregation or
separate treatment by the defendants. If
any individual has become a member of a
club composed only of members of his or
her own race, it has been an entirely
voluntary act without = any force or
coercion on the part of the Extension
Service. Indeed, the Extension Service
requires that each club formed certify
that membership in the club is open to all
races. There is no evidence of discrimi-
nation in making available the instruc~
tions, demonstrations, information and
publication of the Extension Service ; OF
- 173a -
in the use of any structure or training
facility; Or in training activities,
competitions or encampments sponsored by
the Extension hiendeees Finally, the
plaintiffs insist that certain "guide-
lines" issued by the USDA in connection
with its regulations require the Extension
Service to use "all reasonable efforts" to
mayen the 4-H and extension homemaker
clubs. Defendants contend that their
efforts to integrate the clubs have been
24 Prior to the merger the North Carolina
Extension Service, like those in all other
southern states, maintained separate
Summer camps for black and white 4-H
clubs. Although many states in the south
closed their 4-H camps in 1964 and 1965,
following the merger the defendant here
elected to continue camp operation and to
work toward a fully integrated camping
program at all 4-H camps. By 1972 all of
the camps in the state had been fully
integrated.
a Because of the pendency of this suit North
Carolina was exempted from the require-
ment of these guidelines that an affirma-
tive action plan be developed. Tr. p.
6520.
- 174a -
reasonable, but in any event the guide-
lines do not have the force of law.
Although requested by the court from time
to time to produce some authority to the
contrary, plaint*ffs were never able to do
so. While administrative interpretations
of statutes and regulations are entitled
to deference, they are not controlling.
The actions of [HEW], as its
guidelines, are entitled to
respectful consideration, for,
in large measure or entirely,
they are a reflection of earlier
judicial opinions. We reach our
conclusion independently, for,
while administrative interrega-
tion may lend a persuasive gloss
to a statute, the definition of
constitutional standards contol-
ling the actions of states and
their subdivisions is peculiarly
a judicial function.
Bowman v. County School Board, 382 F.2d
56
326, 328 (4th Cir. 1976).
5€ whis case also approved "freedom of
choice" in school desegregation cases
provided the initial assignments are not
involuntary and dictated by racial
criteria, a situation not present here.
- 175a -
Two other cases have considered the
question of dismantling segregated 4-H and
extension homemaker clubs by extension
services, Wade v. Mississippi Agricultural
Extension Service, 372 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D.
Miss. 1974), aff'd in part, reversed in
part and vacated and remanded in part, 528
P.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976); and Strain v.
Philpott, 331 F.Supp. 836 (M.D. Ala.
1971), and at variance with the rulings in
these two cases. Closer examination
reveals this not to be true.
In Wade defendants were required
In a companion case decided the same day,
Green v_.County School Board of Kent
County, Virginia, 328 F.2d 338 (4th cir.
), which was appealed, the Supreme
Court, while declining to hold freedom of
choice plans unconstitutional per se, held
that when the use of such plan has proved
totally ineffective in dismantling a
Sstate-imposed dual school system and other
means promise speedier conversion to a
unitary, non-racial school system, freedom
of choice is not acceptable. Green v.
School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430, 439-40 (1968).
- 176a -
to take reasonable steps to eliminate
discriminatory practices of local
clubs by assuring that all private
groups sponsored by MCES or affili-
ated with its program are racially
nondiscriminatory in their membership
policies and methods of operation.
these steps include the discontin-
uance in MCES' sponsoring youth
activities at racially segregated,
private schools established to avoid
public school desegregation, since
such sponsorship is a _ state aid
prohibited by the Constitution.
Id. p. 145. the reported opinion does not
contain the order entered on this ruling,
but the pertinent portion of the order is
set forth in the opinion of the Fifth
Circuit. 528 F.2d at 519 n.9. From this
and the above quoted excerpt it is cle
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