Appellees Brief — Maine v. Taylor

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Supreme Court, U.S 2

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4) DEC 19 1985

No. 85-62

| JOSEPH - PANIOL, IR.

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

STATE OF MAINE, APPELLANT

Vv.

ROBERT J. TAYLOR AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS APPELLEE

SUPPORTING APPELLANT

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

F. HENRY HABICHT II

Assistant Attorney General

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

Deputy Solicitor General

JERROLD J. GANZFRIED

Assistant to the Solicitor General

DONALD A, CARR

Dik D. SNEL

MARGARET A. HILL

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(2), this

Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the consti-

tutional question presented in this case.

2. Whether the State of Maine’s blanket statutory

ban against importation into Maine of “any live fish

* * * commonly used for bait fishing” is invalid under

the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitu-

tion, thus necessitating dismissal of a federal indict-

ment charging a violation of the Maine statute as

assimilated by Section 3(a)(2)(A) of the Lacey Act

Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. 3372(a) (2) (A).

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

; ,

Upinions below

Jurisdiction

Statement 9

~ ImmMmary\ of argvun ent ’

Argument

US. 1254(2) since a state statute has been

held unconstitutional by a federal court of

appeals Ly

\. The plain language of 28 U.S.C. 1254(2)

establishes this Court’s appellate jurisd

tion |

B. The State of Maine has standing to-main

tain this appeal although the United States

did not appeal 14

l] The State of Maine has demonstrated the legit

mate local purpose of the statute and the lack

of less discriminatory alternatives, and there

fore the statute-is-valid under the Commerce

Clause 19

\. The court of appeals disregarded the appro-

priate standard of review by reevaluating

Maine substantial scientific evidence 19

B. The court of appeals did not sufficiently con

sider the eriou consequences to Maine’s

ecology of invalidating the challenged stat

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

A nderson \ Re ropmer ( ty. No 23.1623 (Mar 19.

1955) 22.

isbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251

29, 19384)

Bo ‘ Corp \ f nsvwmMme? I]nion of linited Ntate

Inc., No. 82-1246 (Apr. 30, 1984)

Roston Stock EF change V. State Ta Comm’? 129

Chevron U.S.A In \ Natural Resources Di

fense Council. Inc.. No. 82-1005 (June 25, 1984)

Container Corp. Vv. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S

Di Santo v. Pennsylvania. 273 U.S. 34

Director. OWCP v. Perini North River Associate

159 U.S. 297

Fishaold v. Sullivan Drudock & Renain Corp 9

U.S

‘waa

Zio

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S

71, aff’d on reh’g, 339 U.S. 605

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Vv. Cottrell, 424

U.S. 366

Gunn V. University Committee to End the War ir

Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383

Heckler v. Edwards, No. 82-874 (Mar. 21, 1984)

Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lahor

atories., Inc.. No 3.1925 (June Fi 1985)

Hughes Vv. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322....7, 8, 19, 20, 25, 26,

Hunt v. Washington Apple idvertising Comm’)

132 U.S. 33:

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919

Inte rnational Union of Mine Worke rs, Locals Nos

15, 17, 107, 108 & 111 v. Eagle-Picher Mining

& Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335

International Union. linited Automob le Workers

Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205

Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S

>

Cases—Continued :

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614

M nnesota V Clove Leat (_reameryu Ce... 149 8 ~

156

Neu England Power Cr \ New Hamopsi we, 45°

U.S. 331

VV; rfthern P pel i, ("nnati ction {_0 \ Ma?

Ph lad lp} a \ Neu le) CY, 137 U Ss. 617 >

Pike Vv. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 7, 2

P) neeton linaversaity \ Schmid. 155 8 ~ LOO LS,

Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137

Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440

Ruotolo v. Ruotolo, 572 F.2d 336

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp 164 U.S. 238

Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate vy. Bee

106 U.S. 187

South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell

Bros., Inc., 308 U.S. 177

South-Central Timber Development. Inc. v. Wun

nicke, No. 82-1608 (Mav 22. 1984)

Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S

94]

linited States v. California Coonerative Canneris

279 U.S. 558

United States vy. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154

linoted NStates vy Miuns nowear. Ine 2340 U.S. 36

Iinited States v l’nited States Gunaum Co 5.4.5

U.S. 364

Zenith Radio Corp. Vv. Hazeltine Research. In

95 TTS. 100

Constitution, statutes and rules

LS. Const

Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) i, 8, 19,

Art. ITI

Act of Feb. 13, 1925 (Judges Act), ch. 229. § 1.

i838 Stat. 938 (§ 240(b))

Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. 3731 1]

VI

Constitution, statutes and rules—Continued:

Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C.

Supp. II) 3371 et seq.

§ 3(a) (2), 16 U.S.C

8(a)(2),.16 U.S.C. 2

13 Stat. 939

18 U.S.C. 371

28 U.S.C. 1252

28 U.S.C. 1253

28 U.S.C. 1254(2)

3372 (a) (2)

337

372(a) (2) (A)

28 U.S.C. (& Supp. I) 2101

28 U.S.C. 2403 (a)

28 U.S.C. 2403 (b)

Ala. Code § 9-2-13 (198

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.

Mich. Stat. Ann. § 13-1586 (5a)

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 101.42, subd. 6 (West 197

wb

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 503.31

N.C. Gen. Stat. §

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52

())

12, § 7613 (1981)

0 (1983)

+ 113.160 (1983)

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (a) (2)

Sup. Ct. R. 10.4

Wash. Admin. Code R

Miscellaneous:

66 Cong. Rec. (1925):

—- -

Dp. 2400

p. 2919

232-12-144 (1981)

2A N. Singer. Sutherland Statutory Constr

(C. Sands 4th ed. 1984)

R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice

(5th ed. 1978)

C. Wright, Federal

(1982)

) )

Practice and Proc

(Callaghan 1981)

14

14

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 85-62

STATE OF MAINE, APPELLANT

LOBERT J. TAYLOR AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS APPELLEE

SUPPORTING APPELLANT

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (J.S. App. Al-

Al14) is reported at 752 F.2d 757. The opinion of the

distr:et court (J.S. App. D1-D9) is reported at 585

I’. Supp. 393. The recommended decision of the mag-

istrate (J.S. App. E1-E12) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on January 18, 1985. A petition for rehearing was

(1)

2

denied on April 10, 1985, as corrected by order of

April 11, 1985 (J.S. App. C1-C2). The State of

Maine filed a notice of appeal to this Court on May

18, 1985 (J.S. App. F1), and the jurisdictional state-

ment was filed on July 9, 1985. On November 4,

1985, this Court entered an order postponing further

consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the

hearing of the case on the merits. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(2).’

See discussion at pages 11-14, infra.

STATEMENT

1. A Maine statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,

§ 7613 (1981), prohibits importation into Maine of

“any live fish * * * commonly-used for bait fishing

in inland waters.” Section 3(a)(2) and (A) of the

Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C, 3872(a)

(2) and (A), “assimilates” Maine’s statute by mak-

ing it a federal crime “to import, * * * transport, sell,

receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate * * * com-

merce * * * any fish * * * taken, possessed, trans-

ported, or sold in violation of any law * * of any

State.”

The United States, an appellee in this Court (see

Sup.: Ct. R. 10.4), initiated this federal prosecution

against appellee Robert J. Taylor, a resident of

Maine who produces and sells live bait fish.? On Feb-

1 The T'nited States filed a protective notice of appeal to this

Court on May 10, 1985 (J.A. 311-312). Thereafter, the Acting

Solicitor General determined not to pursue the appeal, and the

court of appeals granted the United States’ motion to dismiss

its appeal on July 16, 1985 (J.A. 315).

2 Taylor had previously been convicted in state court for a

prior violation of the Maine statute. No. 15571 (Me. 9th Dist.

Ct. Feb. 8, 1979). He was fined $500, the maximum fine per-

3

ruary 24, 1984, a ‘rand jury in the District of Maine

returned a two-coi 1t indictment charging that Tay-

lor had imported, and had conspired to import, into

Maine golden shiners, which are commonly used for

bait fishing (J.S. 4; J.S. App. Dl & n.2, El). The

federal indictment specified that Taylor’s conduct, by

breaching the state ban against importing live bait

fish, violated the Lacey Act and also violated the

federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371. Taylor

moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the

State’s import ban placed an impe nissible burden

on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce

Clause. J.S. 4; J.S. App. D1-D2. Thereafter, pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(b), the district court allowed

the State of Maine, the appellant here, to intervene

in support of its statute’s constitutionality.

2. A hearing on Taylor’s moticn to dismiss was

held before a magistrate. The key issues were whether

the exclusion of out-of-state bait fish served a legiti-

mitted under state law. In 1980, Taylor approached the state

legislature.urging repeal of the live bait fish law (Tr. 149).

* The United States Attorney brought this Lacey Act prose-

cution as a felony. Subsequent to the commencement of this

action, the Justice Department revised its United States At-

torneys’ Manual regarding Lacey Act feloi charges. The

current policy, rooted in concern for oversight of the eleva-

tion of state misdemeanors to federal felonies, requires prior

review at the Department level. Congress plainly intended

that, where interstate commercial transactions above a certain

threshold are concerned, certain state law violations should

be charged as felonies in appropriate cases. However, it is

the policy of the Department of Justice thai prosecutorial dis-

cretion must be very carefully and consistently exercised in

such cases to ensure that the sanction sought is in proportion

to the facts and circumstances underlying the offense com-

mitted.

d

mate local purpose, unrelated to economic protection-

ism, and whether less restrictive methods short of a

complete ban could accomplish that same purpose.

Three scientific experts testified for the prosecution,

and one scientific expert testified for the defense.

Maine’s three experts were Peter Walker, tre State

fish pathologist since 1979; Dr. W. Harry Everhart,

a Professor of Zoology at the University of Maine;

and Dr. John Plumb, an Associate Professer in the

Department of Fisheries at Auburn University in

Alabama. The defendant’s expert was Dr. Robert C.

Summerfelt, Chairman of the Department of Animal

Oncology at Iowa State University.* ,The prosecu-

tion experts demonstrated that Maine’s small and

unique wild fish population, including its own indige-

nous golden shiners,° would be placed at risk by three

types of parasites prevalent in bait fish found outside

of Maine.® Indeed, two such parasites were found in

* Walker testified that he has a certificate of advanced study

in fish pathology (Tr. 9); Dr. Everhart has been a professor

of zoology for 19 years and at one time was the Chief of

Fisheries for the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and

Game (Tr. 65); and Dr. Plumb is an expert in infectious

diseases in fish (Tr. 92-94). The defense expert, Dr. Summer-

felt, stated that he is not a certified fish pathologist (Tr, 104)

and that he is not familiar with Maine’s fisheries (Tr. 131).

> Expert testimony at the hearing indicated that Maine’s

golden shiner is biologically different from its southern coun-

terpart. Tr. 18. :

®* The three parasites, prevalent in bait fish from the south-

eastern United States, are Capillaria catastomi, a small round

worm that can kill the fish; Pleistophera ovariae, a disease

organism that destroys the ability of a female fish to repro-

duce; and Bothriocephalus opsalichthydis, an Asian tapeworm

that can kill the fish (J.S. App. A3, D3-D5).

The defense expert opined that these and other organisms

associated with warm-water bait fish are not considered as

5

the out-of-state golden shiners comprising Taylor’s

confiscated shipment (J.S. App. D4).

As Walker testified, none of these parasites are

common to the wild fish population in Maine (Tr.

15, 19, 21), and their introduction to the State could

have a detrimental impact on Maine’s fish (Tr. 21).

For example, in discussing the impact that Bothrio-

cephalus opsalichthydis (as Asian tapeworm) could

have on the domestic fish population, Walker noted

that (7bid.) “this worm has no host specificity, it

has no preference as to what kind of fish it [a] ffects

* * * [and] if it were to become established in Maine

it would have an adverse effect upon [Maine’s]

wild fish populations * * *.”

The prosecution also produced evidence demon-

strating the adverse impact that exotic species, i.e.,

non-native species commingled with shipments of live

bait fish, could have on Maine’s ecology. Specifically,

the experts cited the effect of rivalry from exotic

species on Maine’s unique landlocked salmon popu-

lation and its limited food resources and habitat for

native fisheries (Tr. 71,.72).7. As Walker. explained

(Tr. 23-24):

* * *

serious as disease organisms found in cold-water fish. As the

district court noted (J.S. App. D7), however, the opinion of

the defense expert was based on studies of hatchery fish, not

wild fish (the focus of Maine’s concern), nor did it involve,

“to any significant degree,” studies of cold-water fish. The

district court also found that the defense expert was un-

acquainted “with the wild fish population of Maine or the

northeast” (tbid.).

7 Dr. Everhart testified that the introduction of non-native

exotic species could result in either competition for food or

the destruction of a species if an exotic fish is a new predator.

Tr. 71, 72.

6

[T]he Maine fish communities are rather unique

among the eastern states. The state of Maine

during the ice age was pretty much scoured clean

of ice and glaciers where golden shiners resided.

The state was recolonized by the comparatively

small number of fish. In the state of Maine we

have very pure and clean waters in most of our

lakes—this differs from lakes further south—

and they were populated by a rather delicate

community of just a few species of fish * * *.

We had a-balance of just a few fish species

which are not able to compete with other fish

species * * *,

Similarly, Dr. Everhart explained (Tr. 69) that “we

are dealing with a limited productivity and any intro-

duction of a competitor in any way would be enough

to upset the ecosystem or the total environment.”

The prosecution experts further testified that there

is currently no scientifically accepted procedure to

inspect incoming shipments of live bait fish for dis-

ease organisms or for commingled exotic species. The

minute size of the bait fish (70 specimens per pound)

prevents inspection of each fish in a shipment; indeed,

a single shipment may contain hundreds of thousands

of fish." Even apart from the problem of size, the

bait fish could not survive the ordeal of individual

inspection: the fish must be killed to be tested for

parasite infestation. Moreover, there are no scien-

tifically accepted sampling procedures that would per-

mit the selection of a representative number of fish

in a shipment for testing.® A disease-free certification

®* Taylor’s confiscated shipment contained 158,000 fish (J.S.

App. E9 n.7).

* As Dr. Plumb noted (Tr. 97), although there are accepted

testing procedures for salmonid fish, there are no scientifically

7

program at the out-of-state point of origin would be

equally unworkable, because the same unsound test-

ing and sampling procedures would have to be used.

J.S. App. D8-D9, E9; Tr. 45, 46.

The district court accepted the magistrate’s report

and recommendation to deny Taylor’s motion to dis-

miss and issued an opinion upholding the constitu-

tionality of the Maine statute (J.S. App. D1-D9). The

district court held that, although the Maine statute

was facially discriminatory (as Maine and the United

States conceded), it still met the requirements of

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S 322 (1979).” The

court reasoned that the statute was a permissible

burden on interstate commerce because (1) the

United States and the State of Maine demonstrated a

legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the

accepted techniques for testing live bait fish, and therefore,

“the comparison between the two is sort of apples and

oranges.”

” In Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336, this Court adopted the follow-

ing test to be applied to state statutes alleged to violate the

Commerce Clause:

(1) whether the challenged statute regulates even-

handedly with only “incidental” effects on interstate

commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce

either on its face or in practical effect;

(2) whether the statute serves a legitimate purpose;

and, if so,

(3) whether alternative means could promote this local

purpose as well without discriminating against interstate

commerce.

See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 4837 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) :

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 187, 142 (1970). Once

a statute is determined to be discriminatory, the state has the

burden of justifying the local benefits and the lack of less

discriminatory alternatives. Huqhes, 441 U.S. at 336.

8

importation of live bait fish," and (2) the expert evi-

dence. presented by the government demonstrated the

lack of less discriminatory alternatives (J.S.. App.

D7-D9)." After his motion to dismiss wag denied,

Taylor entered a conditional plea of guilty (Fed. R.

Crim, P. 11(a)(2)), and the district caurt fined him

$3,000 on each of the two counts (J.A. 6).

3. The court of appeals concluded that the Maine

statute violates the Commerce Clause; it therefore

reversed and remanded the case with directions to

dismiss the indictment (J.S. App. Al-Al4). First,

the court questioned—but did not decide—the legiti-

macy of the local purpose and Maine’s characteriza-

tion of its statute as a wildlife protection law. Although

it did not rest its decision on this ground, the court

suggested that the State’s real purpose was economic

protectionism (id. at A7-A8)."* Even assuming that

1! This Court has already recognized a state’s interest in

preserving its environment as a legitimate local purpose. In

Hughes, the Court acknowledged that Oklahoma’s interest in

preserving the ecological balance in its waters by restricting

he removal of large numbers of minnows might wel! qualify

as a legitimate local purpose. The Court characterized a state’s

interest in conservation and protection of wild animals as

similar to the interest in protecting the health and safety of

its citizens. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337.

2 The district court rejected Maine’s alternative argument

that the Lacey Act Amendments automatically validate state

laws enacted for the protection or conservation of wildlife.

The court agreed with the magistrate’s conclusion that the

legislative history of the Lacey Act Amendments did not

demonstrate a clear and express congressional intent to in-

sulate such state legislation from attack under the Commerce

Clause. J.S. App. D2 n.3, E11.

'8'To support its view that the legitimacy of Maine’s loca!

purpose was in doubt, the court of appeals relied on one line

9

the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, however,

the court held that Maine did not meet its burden of

proving the lack of less discriminatory alternatives

(id. at A8-A10). The court also rejected Maine’s

contention that the state statute was validated by

congressional consent as evidenced by passage of the

Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. (& Supp.

Il) 3371 et seg. (J.S. App. A10-A14).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. This case falls within this Court’s appellate ju-

risdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1254(2) because a state

statute has been invalidated as unconstitutional by a

federal court of appeals. The plain language of Sec-

tion 1254(2) encompasses this case, even though it

is a criminal case in which the validity of a federal

indictment turns on the constitutionality of a state

statute. While other statutes that invest this Court

with appellate jurisdiction are expressly limited to

from a statement prepared by one of Maine’s experts in 1981 in

connection with a proposed repeal of the prohibition on the im-

portation of live bait fish. The statement (J.S. App. A4),

suggesting that more could be done to promote a local bait

fishery industry, was interpreted by the court of appeals as

evidence of economic protectionism. However, the court of

appeals quoted the statement out of context. The magistrate,

on the other hand, examined the entire document of which

the statement was but a minor part and concluded that, in con-

text, the statement was made to “counter the argument that

inadequate bait supplies in Maine require[d] acceptance of

the environmental risks of imports.” Jd. at E5-E6 n.4. See

J.A. 294-310. In addition, expert testimony at the hearing

before the magistrate revealed that Maine’s statute was

originally enacted in the late 1950’s in response to the State’s

fear of parasite disease in smelts that were being imported

from New Hampshire (J.S. App. E6; Tr. 66-67).

10

civil actions (28 U.S.C. 1252, 1253), the appellate

jurisdiction conferred by Section 1254(2) contains

no such restriction and there is no reason to construe

it to apply only to civil actions.

In addition, the State of Maine has standing to

pursue an appeal in the absence of a separate appeal

by the United States. Reversal of the decision below

would result in an automatic reinstatement of the

indictment and the conviction since appellee Taylor’s

guilty plea was conditioned only on the reservation

of his challenge to the constitutionality of the Maine

statute. It would be contrary to the purpose of 28

U.S.C.. 2403(b), the provision under which Maine

intervened to defend the constitutionality of its stat-

ute, to preclude Maine from seeking appellate review

in the circumstances of this case.

2. On the merits, the United States submits that

the court of appeals erred, first, in failing to apply the

correct standard of appellate review... The court of

appeals erroneously reexamined the trial court’s find-

ings of fact on the lack of less discriminatory alterna-

tives—findings that were based on substantial evi-

dence showing that Maine’s statute is constitutional.

It was only by disregarding the appropriate standard

of review (the clearly erroneous standard) that the

court of appeals reached its decision to reverse.

Moreover, the court of appeals did not sufficiently

consider—as it was required to do—the serious con-

sequences to Maine’s environment and ecology of in-

validating the challenged statute. Where, as here, the

State has presented substantial scientific evidence

demonstrating the reasons for its fears of ecological

harm, it should not be required to bear the unneces-

sary risk that could result from the importation of

live bait fish.

11

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION

UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1254(2) SINCE A STATE STATUTE

HAS BEEN HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY A

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS

A. The Plain Language Of 28 U.S.C. 1254(2) Estab-

lishes This Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction

Maine invokes the appellate jurisdiction of this

Court under 28 U.S.C. 1254(2). That Section pro-

vides as follows:

Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed

by the Supreme Court by the following methods:

~ * . . .

By appeal by a party relying on a State stat-

ute held by a court of appeals to be invalid

as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties

or laws of the United States, but such ap-

peal shall preclude review by writ of certi-

orari at the instance of such appellant, and

the review on appeal shall be restricted to

the Federal questions presented]. |

This case fits comfortably within the plain lan-

guage of Section 1254(2) since Maine seeks review

of the court of appeals’ judgment that Me. Rev. Stat.

Ann. tit. 12, § 7613 (1981), violates the Commerce

Clause. We note, however, that Section 1254(2),

which has seldom been construed, is unique among

the statutes defining this Court’s appellate jurisdic-

tion. In particular, the other statutes that invest this

Court with appellate jurisdiction to review the judg-

ments of lower federal courts (28 U.S.C. 1252,

1253) are limited, by their terms, to “civil actions.”

Thus, one leading treatise has stated the general rule

that, ever since the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.

12

3731, was revised in 1970, this Court’s jurisdiction in

federal criminal cases “has been confined to review

by certiorari of ‘the decisions of the courts of ap-

peals.” R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court

Practice § 2.11, at 82 (5th ed. 1978). In contrast to

civil cases involving the constitutionality of a federal

statute, the authors observe that this limitation holds

true even if the “dismissal of an indictment or infor-

mation is premised on the invalidity or unconstitu-

tionality of the federal statute upon which the indict-

ment or information is based.” Jd. at 81 (footnote

omitted).

This case is unusual, however, and does not seem

to fit within that general rule. Although the case is a

federal criminal prosecution, the only issue before

this Court is the constitutionality of a state statute.

There is no indication that Congress contemplated

this remarkable situation. Accordingly, the consid-

eration given by Congress to the proper mode of re-

view in federal criminal cases involving the constitu-

tionality of federal statutes (see R. Stern & E. Gress-

man, supra, § 2.11, at 79-82) would seem to have no

applicability to this case. In these circumstances, the

Court should be guided by the plain language of Sec-

tion 1254(2), which does not limit jurisdiction to

“civil actions.” Notwithstanding the general rule

that statutes authorizing appeals to this Court are to

be strictly construed (see, e.g., Silkwood y. Kerr-

McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 246-247 (1984) ), we can

see no occasion for reading inte Section 1254(2)

words of limitation (7.e., “civil actions”) that are con-

spicuously absent from the statute."* Where Congress

4 Another anomaly to be noted here is that neither the Rules

of this Court nor the United States Code specifies any time

limit for the filing of a notice of appeal in a criminal case

13

has sought to impose such a limitation (e.g. 28 U.S.C.

1252, 1253), it knows how to say so and has ex-

pressed the restriction in the statutory language.

Moreover, a literal reading of Section 1254(2)

does not result in a situation where “the sense of the

statute and the literal language are at loggerheads.”’

Heckler v. Edwards, No. 82-874 (Mar. 21, 1984), slip

op. 8. In Heckler v. Edwards, which arose under

Section 1252, the Court observed that “to give the

surface literal meaning to a jurisdictional provision

would confer upon this Court a jurisdiction beyond

what ‘naturally and properly belongs to it.’”’ Slip op.

8. A literal reading of Section 1252 would have given

a party the right to a direct appeal to this Court

from any district court judgment in a case involving

the constitutionality of a federal statute, even if the

constitutional question was not decided in the judg-

ment or raised on appeal. The Court concluded—

with abundant support in the legislative history—

that such a result was contrary to the “commonsense

view that the constitutional holding must be at issue

for direct review in this Court to lie” (slip op. 9).”

invoking jurisdiction under Section 1254(2). See 28 U.S.C.

(& Supp. I) 2101. Again, this fact suggests that Congress

did not contemplate the situation presented by this case; it

does not, in our view, furnish grounds for concluding that

appellate jurisdiction is lacking. Maine filed its notice of

appeal within 30 days (exclusive of a final weekend) of the

court of appeals’ denial of rehearing. Since there is no cate-

gory of cases requiring the filing of a notice of appeal in less

than. 30 days, Maine’s notice should be deemed timely.

'° The legislative history of Section 1254(2) provides little

enlightenment for the present case. But the history of its

statutory predecessor, Section 240(b) of the Act of Feb. 13,

1925 (Judges Act), ch. 229, §1, 43 Stat. 938, demonstrates

that some members of Congress were concerned that the

Judges Act (in its draft form) would provide for direct

14

In contrast to the situation in Heckler v. Edwards,

it is evident that the Court’s jurisdiction under Sec-

tion 1254(2) is limited to the constitutional question

at issue. No inference could be drawn from Section

1254(2) that Congress intended to confer independ-

ent jurisdiction on this Court for issues collateral to

statutory unconstitutionality, thereby expanding the

Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. Therefore, there

would appear to be no need for the Court to construe

Section 1254(2) to preclude review by appeal of a de-

cision in a federal criminal case invalidating a state

statute as unconstitutional. See 2A N. Singer, Suth-

erland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 92 (C.

Sands 4th ed. 1984). Indeed, applying Section 1254

(2) to such a case would be consonant with the

Section’s evident purpose of assuring a right to ap-

pellate review by this Court of federal court decisions

invalidating state statutes.

B. The State Of Maine Has Standing To Maintain

This Appeal Although The United States Did Not

Appeal

Yet another jurisdictional peculiarity is presented

by this case. Although this is a federal criminal pros-

ecution, the sole appellant in this Court is the State

of Maine, an intervenor in the district court."* Be-

appeal of a state’s highest court’s decision sustaining the

constitutionality of a state statute, but only for discretionary

review by writ of certiorari when a fed@ral court of appeals’

decision invalidated a state statute. 66 Cong. Rec. 2755 (1925)

(remarks of Sen. Copeland). To overcome this objection, the

predecessor of Section 1254(2) was amended in a fashion that

is consistent with the present statute. 43 Stat. 939. See 66

Cong. Rec. 2919 (1925) (remaks of Sen. Cummins)

16 Maine intervened in the district court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 2403 (b), which provides that:

In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the

United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or

15

cause the Acting Solicitor General determined that

other cases were entitled to priority in selecting the

limited number of cases the government would ask

this Court to review, the United States chose not to

appeal in this case (see United States v. Mendoza,

464 U.S. 154, 160-161 (1984); International Union,

United Automobile Workers, Local 283 v. Scofield,

382 U.S. 205, 214 (1965)). In these unusual circum-

stances, there is a question as to Maine’s standing to

appeal.

1. It is, of course, not unknown for a party that

has intervened in the lower court to be the sole party

seeking appellate review. E.9., Bryant v. Yellen, 447

U.S. 352, 365-368. (1980); Sixty-Seventh Minnesota

State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 193-194 (1972);

International Union, United Automobile Workers,

Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. at 214; Fishgold v.

Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 280,

281-283 (1936) ; International Vnion of Mine Work-

ers, Locals Nos. 15, 17, 107, 108, & 111 v. Eagle-

Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 338

(1945); cf. United States v. California Cooperative

Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 559 (1929). Where Maine’s

statute has been declared unconstitutional, thereby

employee thereof is not a party, whereir the constitution-

ality of any statute of that State affecting the public inter-

est is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact

to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the

State to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence

is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on

the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject

to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of

a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to

court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presenta-

tion of the facts and law relating to the question of con-

stitutionality.

16

adversely affecting the state’s efforts to. protect its

environment, it clearly was “sufficiently aggrieved”

(INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 980 (1983) ) and has

a “sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy

to afford [it] standing to appeal” (Bryant v. Yellen,

447 U.S. at 368).

Any other result would make Section 2403(b) a

trap for the unwary. A state whose statute is subject

to constitutional challenge in federal court and which

has accepted the statutory invitation to participate,

subject to applicable law, with “all the rights of a

party” (28 U.S.C. 2403(b)), could find that the entry

of an adverse judgment leaves it without any opportu-

nity for further review. Yet, the state would face the

collateral consequences of a judgment in a case in

which it had participated as a party. Thus, even

though the case did not involve a state prosecution,

“when confronted with such an opinion by a federal

court, state officials would no doubt hesitate long be-

fore disregarding it.” Gunn v. University Committee

to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 3838, 390

(1970).

Faced with that potential trap, states might deem

it prudent to decline the invitation to intervene under

Section 2403(b) and to wait for an occasion to defend

the same statute in later litigation, in which it would

be assured of an opportunity to seek appellate review.

Federal court challenges to the constitutionality of

state legislation would then proceed in cases like the

present one, but without the chief benefit Section 2403

(b) was intended to provide: the participation of the

party best able to explain and defend the state statute.

We are not unmindful that the United States could

find itself in a situation analogous to Maine’s posture

in this case. Section 2403(a) affords to the United

17

States a similar opportunity to enter private litigation

in whieh the constitutionality of a federal statute is

drawn in question. We do not believe that Section

2403(a) permits an interpretation that could produce

the unseemly circumstance of a lower court holding

that a federal statute is unconstitutional while the

government is left.powerless to obtain appellate re-

view. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Construction Co.

v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982)

(plurality opinion). Nor does Subsection (b) abide

a construction that would place-a state in the same

hapless straits.

2. The fact that this is a federal criminal prosecu-

tion adds one further complication. If a reversal of the

decision below would necessitate further action on

remand, such as retrial, Maine obviously could not

take over the role of the prosecution and proceed on

the remand in the absence of the United States. The

basis for the state’s appeal might therefore be under-

mined if the United States had determined to discon-

tinue the prosecution. In the present case, however,

appellee Taylor entered a guilty plea conditioned only

on the reservation of his challenge to the constitution-

ality of the Maine statute. Accordingly, reversal of

the decision below would result in automatic reinstate-

ment of the indictment and Taylor’s conviction." As

‘7 There is, of course, an exception to the rule that a

government-intervenor should always be entitled to appeal

from a judgment holding one of its statutes unconstitutional

if the parties have entirely “composed their difference” and

the case is settled. Ruotolo v. Ruotolo, 572 F.2d 336, 339 (1st

Cir. 1978). This arguably could arise here if the United States

were to announce that it would affirmatively seek to dismiss

the indictment even in the event that Maine prevails in this

Court. The United States, however, disavows any such in-

tention. Even ii the case were to become moot, moreover, the

18

in Director, OWCP vy. Perini North River Associates,

459 U.S. 297, 302-305 (1983) (presence of injured

employee as a party respondent in this Court ensures

necessary adversity for Article III purposes, even if

Director’s standing to petition for a writ of certiorari

is in doubt), the presence of the United States, even

in the capacity of an appellee supporting the appel-

lant, satisfies the requirement that there be a live con-

troversy before this Court concerning reinstatement

of the conviction.

Moreover, the role of the United States here serves

to distinguish this case from those in which the pros-

ecuting party has absented itself from further pro-

ceedings but an intervenor seeks nonetheless to pursue

an «peal. In Princeton University v. Schmid, 455

U.S. 100 (1982), the State of New Jersey declined to

take a position before this Court on the merits of a

university regulation held unconstitutional in the

course of a state criminal proceeding. The Court con-

cluded that New Jersey’s “presence,” without a posi-

tion on the merits, “does not provide a sound jurisdic-

tional basis.” 455 U.S. at 102. Here, the United

States has not only supported Maine’s jurisdictional

statement, but its position on the merits as well. Two

additional factors distinguish this case from Prince-

ton University v. Schmid. First, in that case the con-

troversy was moot because the regulation at issue was

no longer in force; the university could implement its

new regulations unimpeded by the judgment. Maine,

however, has not amended its environmental prohibi-

tion, so the statute’s validity is very much a live issue.

proper procedure would be for this Court to vacate the judg-

ment below (United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S.

36, 39 (1950) ), which would effectively remove from the state

the burden of an adverse judgment.

19

And finally, since the appellant is a sovereign state

seeking to defend its statute, this case does not impli-

cate the principle that a private yarty ‘lacks a judi-

cially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-

prosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,

410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see 455 U.S. at 103.

Il. THE STATE OF MAINE HAS DEMONSTRATED

THE LEGITIMATE LOCAL PURPOSE OF THE

STATUTE AND THE LACK OF LESS DISCRIMINA-

TORY ALTERNATIVES, AND THEREFORE THE

STATUTE IS VALID UNDER THE COMMERCE

CLAUSE

A. The Court Of Appeals Disregarded The Appropriate

Standard Of Review By Reevaluating Maine’s Sub-

stantial Scientific Evidence

Maine’s experts presented ample scientific evidence

in the trial court supporting the statutory ban on

importing live bait fish. In reversing the judgment,

the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of ap-

pellate review and erroneously chose to retry the last

two factors of the test described in Hughes vy. Okla-

homa, 1.e., legislative intent and the availability of

less discriminatory alternatives. In Container Corp.

v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983)

(quoting Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340

U.S. 534, 538 (1951) (emphasis added) ), the Court

stated:

[I]n constitutional cases, we have power to ex-

amine the whole record to arrive at an independ-

ent judgment as to whether constitutional rights

have been invaded, but that does not mean that

we will re-examine, as a court of first instance,

findings of fact supported by substantil evi-

dence.

20

Similarly, here, the court of appeals should have

upheld the findings of the district court regarding the

lack of less diseriminatory alternatives, because sub-

stantial evidence was presented at the trial level to

demonstrate that the Maine statute satisfies the

Hughes test. In essence, the court of appeals reevalu-

ated the credibility of the three prosecution experts

and the specific evidence and reached its own

“scientific” conclusions that are neither supported by

the evidence nor adequately explained in the court’s

opinion.” Only by disregarding the standard of re-

view as to findings of fact supported by substantial

evidence did the court of appeals reach the conclusion

that Maine’s statute is unconstitutional.

In its memorandum and order denying rehearing,

the court of appeals stated that the question whether

Maine’s statute meets the Hughes requirement of no

less discrii».natory alternative, is a mixed question of

law and fact (J.S. App. B2). This, however, does not

mean that an appellate court owes no deference to the

trial court’s findings witn respect to the factual com-

ponents of that mixed question. The court of appeals

nevertheless concluded that it “was free to examine

carefully the factual record and to draw its own con-

clusions” (ibid.). In support of this proposition, the

court cited two cases, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,

No. 82-1565 (June 29, 1984) (rejecting Hawaii’s

argument that okolehao and pineapple wine do not

compete with other products sold by liquor whole-

18 What is more, the court of appeals manifestly over-

stepped its role in giving any credence (1.8. App. A9-A10)

to the suggestion by respondent’s counsel at oral argument

that Maine could feasibly, and with less burden on com-

merce, send its inspectors to hatcheries in other states and

require the exporter to pay the cost.

21

salers), and Boston Stock Exchange v. State Taz

Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (rejecting state court’s

holding that transfer tax on securities transactions

was not discriminatory). Those cases, however, do

not govern here. In neither case did this Court fail to

accept findings of underlying fact that were supported

by the evidence. The court of appeals’ holding here,

however, was squarely premised on a reevaluation of

the scientific evidence produced at trial concerning

the lack of less discriminatory alternatives. Only by

discrediting this scientific evidence was the court of

appeals able to conclude that less discriminatory alter-

natives exist.

In order to support that conclusion, the court rea-

soned that, because Maine has established inspection

and certification procedures for freshwater fish (trout

and salmon or eggs), the same procedures could be

adopted for live bait fish (J.S. App. A8-A9). How-

ever, Maine’s expert demonstrated that, unlike fresh-

water fish, out-of-state bait fish are not grown in

small, controlled environments (J.S. App. E9) sus-

ceptible to a system of out-of-state certification. Thus,

disease-free certification for live bait fish is an

unworkable alternative.

Similarly, the court of appeals erred in supposing

(J.S. App. A9) that inspection procedures offer a

feasible alternative. The evidence showed that there

are no scientifically accepted inspection procedures for

live bait fish.” According to the expert testimony, “at

9 Other state statutes are also restrictive in their regulation

of live bait fish. For example, Washington prohibits the use

of live fish for bait, thus removing the ineentive for importing

them. Wash. Admin. Code R. 232-12-144 (1981). Minnesota

issues permits only for the transportation of minnows (bait

fish) “into or through” the State for a period of 12 hours.

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 101.42, subd. 6 (West 1977). Similarly,

"oO

the present time we do not have any established pro-

cedures for the inspection of these particular diseases

of particular concern.” Tr. 31. The court of appeals

therefore had no license to substitute instead its own

assumption that “Maine has [not] searched for and

found the least discriminatory alternative.” (J.5.

App. Al0).*” The court’s doubts cannot displace the

concrete evidence and findings of faet compiled in the

district court.

This Court’s recent decision in Anderson v. Bes-

semer City, No. 83-1623 (Mar. 19, 1985), rendered

after the court of appeals’ decision in this case, reaf-

firms the importance of proper adherence by review-

ing courts to the “clearly erroneous” standard. In

reiterating this standard in Anderson, the Court

stated;-slip op. 8: *

other states grant authority to either a game commission or a

commissioner to prohibit the importation of certain birds,

animals and fish; see Nev. Rev. Stat. 503.310 (1983); Ala.

Code § 9-2-13 (1980); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 13-1586(5a) (Cal-

laghan 1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113.160 (1983).

20°In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Vv. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., No. 82-1005 (June 25, 1984), the Court deferred

to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency’s decision to use a plantwide definition for programs

designed to improve air quality pursuant to the Clean Air

Act. The Court reasoned that the EPA Administrator's “in-

terpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of mani-

festly compfeting interests and is entitled to deference. The

regulatory scheme is technical and complex * * *.” Slip op. 26.

Similarly, in this case the appellate court should have defez red

to the state legislature’s conclusion that less discriminatory

alternatives are not available in view of the scientific evidence

presented at trial by the State’s witnesses and the district

court’s findings.

“1 While the present case,“unlike Anderson, is a criminal

case, “there is general agreement that the ‘clearly erroneous’

23

“TA] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-

mitted.” United States v. United States Gypsum

Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). This standard

plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to re-

verse the finding of the trier of fact simply be-

cause it would have decided the case differently.

With particular reference to the findings of a district

court sitting without a jury, the Court noted that

appellate courts must remember that “ ‘their function

is not to decide factual issues de novo’” (ibid., quot-

ing Zenith Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)). As the Court observed,

test should be applied [to issues other than guilt] and that it

has the same meaning in-criminal cases as it has in civil

cases.”” 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 374,

at 316 (1982) (footnote omitted).

An appellate court’s power to review the whole record and

make an independent judgment in constitutional cases is, of

course, wholly consistent with the proper scope of the clearly

erroneous standard of livle 52, Fed. R. Civ. P. As the Court

stated in Bose Corp. Vv. Consumer Union of United States, Inc..,

No. 82-1246 (Apr. 30, 1984), slip op. 13, “Rule 52(a) never

forbids [an independent] examination, and indeed our seminal!

decision on the rule expressly contemplated a review of the

entire record, stating that ‘a finding is “clearly erroneous”

when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite, and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed’” (quoting

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

(1948) (emphasis in original)). The Court has recently ap-

plied the clearly erroneous standard in a case in which the

constitutionality of municipal ordinances was in question. See

Hillsborough County Vv. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,

No. 83-1925 (June 3, 1985), slip op. 13.

24

among the reasons.for deferring to the trial court’s

findings of fact are: (1) the trial judge’s experi-

ence in making determinations of fact and in evaluat-

ing the credibility of witnesses; and (2) the fact that

the parties have already expended their energy and

resources in “persuading the trial judge that their

account of facts is the correct one.’’ Anderson, slip

op. 9.

“TO]nly the trial judge can be aware of the varia-

tions in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so

heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief

of what is said.” Anderson, slip op. 10. In the pres-

ent case, most of the evidence offered to the trial

judge was submitted by experts (three for the prose-

cution and one for the defense). In such circum-

stances, deference to the trial] court’s findings is par-

ticularly appropriate. As this Court explained in

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271,

274 (1949), aff'd on reh’g, 339 U.S. 605 (1950):

*

To no type case is * * * [the clearly erroneous

standard] more appropriately applicable than to

the one before us, where the evidence is largely

the testimony of experts as to which a trial court

may be enlightened by scientific [evidence].

Finally, it bears mention that the sole defense

expert’s testimony was discredited on the basis of his

lack of familiarity with Maine’s wild fish population

or cold-water fish.~.In sum, there was no credible

expert factual foundation for the court of appeals’

revision of the evidence. Had it correctly deferred to

the trial court’s findings of fact, it could not have con-

cluded that Maine’s statute was unconstitutional for

failure to incorporate a less intrusive alternative.

#2 See pages 4-5, supra.

25

B. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Sufficiently Consider

The Serious Consequences To Maine’s Ecology Of

Invalidating The Challenged Statute

It is of course well established that’ “the commerce

clause is not a guaranty of the right to import into a

state whatever one may please * * * regardless of

the effects of the importation upon the local commu-

nity.” Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 458

(1946). See Hughes v: Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 338-339

(states are not powerless to promote the legitimate

purpose of “protect[ing] and conserv{ing] . wild

animal life within their borders’).

This Court’s Commerce Clause cases emphasize the

importance of considering the “ultimate consequences”

to a state if it is not allowed to regulate the activity

or commerce in the “questioned” manner. In contrast,

the court of appeals utterly failed to consider the

significant risk and ultimate consequences to Maine,

demonstrated in the record, if it is not allowed to

regulate the importation of live bait fish in the “ques-

tioned” manner. As this Court noted in Great Atlan-

tic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 373

(1976) (citation omitted), if a state demonstrates a

substantial interest (as Maine has—the protection of

its environment and ecology), a further inquiry is

necessary to determine whether:

adequate and less burdensome alternatives exist

* * * since any “ ‘realistic’ judgment” whether

a given state action “unreasonably” trespasses

upon national interests must, of course, consider

the “consequences to the state if its own action

were disallowed.” '**!

*%3 In observing that this additional inquiry is needed, the

Court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. Vv. Cottrell, 424 U.S.

at 372 n.6, also quoted the following passage from Justice

26

As a consequence of its rejection of the scientific

evidence presented by Maine’s experts, the court failed

to give adequate consideration to the significant’ risk

to Maine’s ecology if its statute cannot be enforced.

Maine provided compelling evidence demonstrating the

statute’s legitimate purpose as the elimination of that

risk, 7.e., diseased fish and exotic fish that could

seriously harm Maine’s aquatic environment. More-

over, the court of appeals imposed an overly stringent

burden of proof on the State of Maine, not warranted

by the Hughes test, by requiring the State to negate

all impermissibly discriminatory economic purposes

and conceivable nondiscriminatory alternatives.* Af-

ter all, Hughes does not require automatic invalida-

tion of a statute because some less restrictive alterna-

tive may be divined subsequently. Rather, Hughes is

concerned with the practical availability of options

and speaks of an alternative ‘that is “ ‘adequate to

Stone’s dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44

(1927):

[I]t seems clear that those interferences [with interstate

commerce] not deemed forbidden are to be sustained * * *

because a consideration of all the facts and circumstances,

such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the

character of the business involved and the actual effects

on the flow of ecommerce, leads to the conclusion that the

regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and do®Snot

infringe the national interest in mai:itaining the freedom

of commerce across the lines.

** Hughes involved an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the

export of three dozen minnows. It is significant that in

Hughes, Oklahoma presented the statute’s purported legiti-

mate purpose (an effort to maintain the State’s ecological

balance) for the first time in this Court. As this Court noted,

“(t]he late appearance of this argument and the total absence

of any record support for the questionable factual assumptions

that underlie it give the flavor of a post hoc rationalization.”

441 U.S. at 338 n.20 (emphasis in original). By contrast, the

27

preserve the local interests at stake’” (441 U.S. at

336, quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising

Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) ). Omly alternatives

that promote the local purpose equally “as well” as the

challenged statute are relevant. 441 U.S. at 336. See

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

Nor should Maine have been required to prove again

in the court of appeals the facts that led both the

state legislature and the district court properly to

determine that Maine’s ecology could not be protected

effectively by any means short of a total ban on

importing live bait fish.” Accordingly, the court of

appeals erred in holding that the Constitution requires

the State to bear the inordinate risk that could result

from the importation of live bait fish when the over-

whelming scientific evidence demcnstrated the reasons

for the State’s fears.”

trial record here provides ample evidence to support Maine’s

justification for its statute.

25 The absence of an accepted testing procedure for live

bait fish makes this case unusual. Ordinarily, one would

expect that tests could be used to bar only diseased animals

from entry (e.g. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908) ; Reid

v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902)). But that assumption is

misplaced here. As the experts testified, the only way to

detect the presence of threatening parasites in bait fish is

to kill the specimen. That, of course, would destroy the fish’s

value as “live” bait. Moreover, since Maine does not ban dead

bait fish, the test would render the statutory restriction re-

dundant.

26 Although we support Maine’s principal argument, we do

not agree with its alternative submission (J.S. 12-13) that the

invalidation of Maine’s statute “flies directly in the face of [the]

* * * Lacey Act Amendments of 1981” (id. at 12). Rather,

we agree with the court of appeals (J.S. App. A13) that the

Lacey Act Amendments, although evincing congressional in-

tent to strengthen the enforcement of valid state laws en-

28

We note, finally, that this case is a good example of

why greater deference is sometimes appropriate for

a statute, such as this one, that bans imports for

health and environmental reasons, than would be ap-

propriate for a similar statute that bans exports.”

In prohibiting the importation of live bait fish, Maine

is seeking to ensure the protection of its fisheries from

parasitic-infested or exotic predatory fish. The ex-

perts testified that the inadvertent importation of

even two such specimens in a shipment of live bait

fish could multiply to hundreds and adversely affect

Maine’s ecology (Tr. 36; J.S. App. E9 n.7). As this

Court stated in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.

617, 628-629 (1978) (citation omitted) :

certain quarantine laws have not been consid-

ered forbidden protectionist measures, even

though they were directed against out-of-state

commerce. But those quarantine laws banned the

acted for the protection of wildlife, cannot be interpreted as

“clear congressional intent to uphold all state laws that dis-

criminate against interstate commerce in fish and wildlife.”

See, e.g., South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,

No. 82-1608 (May 22, 1984), slip op. 7-10. Maine’s contrary

argument._is at odds with prior decisions of this Court. See,

e.g., South-Central; Sporhase vy. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,

458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New

Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982) ; Lewis v. BT Investment

Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 49 (1980).

27 Taylor is an in-state seller of live bait fish. Thus, the effect

of the statutory ban is not limited to out-of-state persons.

As this Court noted in a case where the challenge to a state

statute came primarily from domestic firms, “[t]he existence

of major in-state interests adversely affected by the Act is a

powerful safeguard against legislative abuse.” Minnesota v.

Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981),

citing South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros.,

Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 178 (1938).

29

importation of articles such as diseased livestock

that required destruction as soon as possible be-

cause their very movement risked contagion and

other evils.

So, here, the absence of scientifically accepted testing

procedures to minimize a substantial risk of infesta-

tion puts this case within the narrow category where

a total ban on importation passes constitutional

muster, On the present record Maine has established

that out-of-state live bait fish “are more likely to

possess the evils of [parasitic infestation] * * * than

their homegrown counterparts” and that “outright

prohibition of entry, rather than some intermediate

form of regulation, is the only effective method of

protecting against the presumed evils.” Lewis v. BT

Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43 (1980).

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

F,. HENRY HABICHT II

Assistant Attorney General

LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

Deputy Solicitor General

JERROLD J. GANZFRIED

Assistant to the Solicitor General

DONALD A. CARR

DIRK D. SNEL

MARGARET A. HILL

Attorneys

DECEMBER 1985

Uv. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING Office; 19865 491507 20107

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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