Amicus Curiae Brief — English v. General Elec. Co.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1989

A

—_

VERA M. ENGLISH,

Petitioner,

GENERAL PLECTRIC COMPANY,

Respondent.

a

A

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court

Of Appeals For The Fourth Circuit

,%

4

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTEK

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

” *

-

STEPHEN M. Konun

MicHaet D. Konn

KOHN, KouHn & Corapinto, P.C.

517 Florida Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 234-4663

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

National Whistleblower Center

=

——EEE

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

| Supreme Court, U.S,

FILED

VAR 6B 1880

No. 89-152 JOSEPH F. SP4NIOL, UR,

CLERK

| TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EE arch be biu kensev Oi ween ts pensews i

I ga yokes 600 60 kek eeeeseecesvenese ii

Statement of Interest of Amicus Curiae National

Eo aioe bie ey NOUN s 9.8% 604s 1

EY I GRIND oo cencnsvcctceerescsccvess 1

PES Reco ee pec cc eusevecendeeeecceeneevsseoees 2

I. Congress Did Not Intend Sec. 210 of the Energy

Reorganization Act to pre-empt State Tort

Claims for Employment Discrimination........ 2

II. Vera English’s Tort Claim is Not Subject to Fed-

eral Pre-emption Under Supreme Court : rece-

DC PUUCLCCEG GLC S beeeTsbaehecoees i vests seeens 4

III. No Conflict Exists Between Sec. 210 and State

AO IPL PUTT Pey er ES a TEE Ee TET 6

IV. The District Court Case of “Snow v. Bechtel”

Does Not Provide Additional Grounds for Justi-

EE I 9 66. 50:0¢ veers cvsvecweveies 10

' ee oie ois. ce abun ews scedeede> 13

|

_— —— ,

yo as ie Lae ee Se ee ee |

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

SupREME Court Cases

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)..... 4

Atchison, Tope!a & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Buell, 480

US. S67 (3907) . 0... co0sscigeescsennannenene 4

Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450

US. 728 (1961) ... 100+. 008900800cu0 nue 4

California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,

458 U.S. S72 (1GG7) .... . ssveccceccsucaudeenee 6, 7

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Conti-

nental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963)................ 4

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.

i | rrr 3, 4,5

Mconald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284

(. FOE)... cc ccncccnccesccesee ene enue iain 4

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.

ret, .) re 4

Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 US.

S76 CISTI)... nevcsvcccecvencuede none annnn 7, 8

NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972)............... 11

NLRi ov. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. 393

(IDES)... cone veenscneens 50 asin einen 8

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources

Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).................. 4,5

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1985)..... 5

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 US. 268 (1961) .......000c0s05suuu nena 8

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

OTHER FeperRAL Cases

Commonwealth-Lord Join Venture v. Donovan, 724

IN, MED so vo vc cdeccevecccecccvsccess 12

Deford v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th Cir.

CeCe EEG eas beeseceeesseveccccces 9, 11

Snow v. Bechtel Const. Inc., 647 FSupp. 1514 (C.D.

Leth ewrcenessesercvevces 2, 10, 11

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

Cox v. Radiology Consulting Associates, Inc., 86-

ERA-17, Recommended Decision and Order of

Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge

(8/22/86), adopted by the Secretary of Labor

asd. pec bee teecersccecccsce: 10

Landers v. Commonwealth-Lord Joint Venture, 83-

ERA-5, slip op. of Administrative Law Judge

(5/11/83), adopted by Secretary of Labor (Sept.

Re Laces cacccesvccasscsecess 9, 12

OTHER Cases

Belts v. Stroehmann Bros., 415 A.2d 1280 (Pa. Super.

UE easy vecccesasnsccsccscsccess 8

Eckstein v. Kuhn, 408 N.W. 2d 131 (Mich. App.

Te Sea soccer esse vesceseccccecess 8

McClung v. Marion Co., 360 S.F. 2d 221 (W.Va.

EE Ie 8

Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,

pe 5 a). ) ) See 8

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

STATUTES

Ce ee ee, Ge eS cio baad beeebaceene 3

ee, Oe, es ce oc bk eh tne naen ee es 2

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

RE oy A Bel oc 2 are SOR nee AE oS SD 2

Federa! Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.

Tees ee rete ve thy ne ee ne 3

Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185...... 2

Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C.

SC as oe eo uk Sawn PEUk Poe wen Named os 6 to 2

Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. 955..... 3

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

a i a eee eee G 3

Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42

SN es cnccves teedensarnakonsskecchesen passim

OrTHER AUTHORITIES

134 Congressional Record 1451 (Feb. 23, 1988)....... 10

Fidell, “Federal Protection of Private Sector

Health and Safety Whistleblowers: A Report to

the Administrative Conference of the United

OS RS BE ee Na! RT eae et EAE Re 10

Kohn, Protecting Environmental and Nuclear Whis-

tleblowers, (Nuclear Information and Resource

ee, We a cc ee eceueden 9, 12

1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1405............ 11

1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7302..........3, 11

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER

The National V/histleblower Center is a project of

Northwest Environmental Advocates (NWEA), a non-

profit organization formed in 1969. The Center was cre-

ated in 1988 in response to the need to protect whis-

tleblowers who could not find representation from

existing public interest organizations and attorneys. The

Center seeks to protect employees who made safety re-

lated disclosures at nuclear power facilities from retalia-

tion. Since its inception, the Center has provided

assistance to whistleblowers throughout the country in-

cluding employees at the following nuclear power plants:

Palo Verde in Arizona, Nine Mile Point in New York,

Plant Vogtle in Georgia, the Savannah River Project in

South Carolina, Grand Gulf in Mississippi, Comanche

Peak in Texas, and Peach Bottom in Pennsylvania.

The disposition of this case will effect the legal rights

of other employee whistleblowers at nuclear power facili-

ties.

Counsel for Petitioner Vera M. English and Respon-

dent ( ~veral Electric Company have consented to the

filing o this amicus curiae brief.

+

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The Legislative History of Section 210 of the Energy

Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851, indicates that

Section 210 was modeled after other laws to which

the doctrine of federal pre-emption does not apply.

II. Supreme Court precedent regarding the application

of federal pre-emption in employment discrimina-

tion cases mandates that Vera English’s tort claim

not be dismissed due to pre-emption.

III. The District Court in English incorrectly found that

the state tort of intentional infliction of emotional

distress could conflict with Section 210 of the Energy

Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851.

IV. Section 210 is not primarily a health and safety

statute, and the reasoning of the District Court in

Snow v. Bechtel does not justify pre-emption.

+

ARGUMENT

I. Congress did not intend Section 210 of the Energy

Reorganization Act to pre-empt state tort claims for

employment discrimination

In enacting Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization

Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851, Congress did not intend to pre-empt

employees at nuclear power facilities from filing state tort

claims (such as intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress) against their employer.

Congress modeled Section 210 after four anti-retalia-

tion employment discrimination laws: the employee pro-

tection provisions cf the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7622;

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367;

Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. 820(b) and

the National Labor Management Act [i.e., the Labor Man-

agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the National

Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(4)]. The Senate Re-

port for Section 210 states:

This amendment is substantially identical to

mrovisions in the Clean Air Act and Federal

Water Pollution Control Act. The legislative his-

tory of those acts indicated that such provisions

were patterned after the National Labsr Man-

agement Act and a similar provision in Public

Law 91-173 relating to the health and safety of

the Nation’s coal miners.

1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7303.

Congress intended that the rights afforded employee

whistleblowers who disclose informaticn concerning po-

tential violations of the Atomic Energy Act wculd be

equivalent to the rights afforded employees who disclose

information, under, for exampie, the Clean Air Act.

When Congress adopted the Clean Air Act, the Water

Pollution Control Act and the Mine Health and Safety

Act, they explicitly allowed states to enact stronger pro-

tections than the federal standard. See, Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. 7416, Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1370

and Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. 955. Similarly,

in 1988 this Court declined to judicially pre-empt state

retaliatory discharge tort claims under the Labor Manage-

ment Relations Act. See, e.g. Lingle v. Norge Division of

Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).

None of the models used by Congress in enacting

Section 210 provided for the pre-emption of state wrong-

ful discharge or employment tort law. Congress modeled

the statutory provisions of Section 210 on employee pro-

tection laws which did not provide for pre-emption of

state labor law. Congress did not intend Se..ion 210 to

pre-empt state employment law. Pre-emption is inap-

propriate in circumstances where Congress did not in-

tend to pre-empt such state action. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co. v. Massachussetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985).

II. Vera English’s tort claim is not subject to Federal

pre-emption under Supreme Court Precedent

This Cour: has long recognized that federal and state

remedies in employment discrimination or tort actions

can mutually co-exist even if the state and federal remedy

arises from an identical core of operative facts. See, e.g.

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399

(1988); Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Buell,

480 U.S. 557 (1987); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466

L.>. 284 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,

Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,

415 U.S. 36 (1974); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commis-

sion v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963). The fact

that an employment discrimination claim or state tort

claim may arise in the area of atomic energy is not suffi-

cient to depart from the standard rule.

Specifically, the scope of federal pre-emption under

the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization

Act is limited. The U.S. Supreme Court explicated this

limitation in its holding in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.

State Energy Resources Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983):

.. . Congress, in passing the 1954 Act [the Atom-

ic Energy Act] and in subsequently amending it,

intended that the Federal Government should

regulate the radiological safety aspect involved

in the construction and operation of a nuclear

power plant, but that the states retain their tradi-

tional responsibility in the field of regulating elec-

trical utilities for determining questions of need,

reliability, cost, and other related state concerns.

461 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added).

Traditional “state concerns” were not subject to fed-

eral pre-emption.! In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court held

that states could regulate the economic issues of atomic

energy — even though such regulation could have an

effect on the safety of nuclear plant operations.

The Silkwood case is consistent with Pacific Gas &

Electric. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238 (1985). Over-

lap between federal safety regulation and state tort lia-

bility can exist (in Silkwood, the NRC had jurisdiction to

review and fine the utility for the very infraction which

laid the basis for the state tort suit). The Court recognized

that utilities may be open to both civil fines for safety

infractions leveled by the NRC and punitive damages

under traditional state tort laws. The -.ere fct that such

overlap could exist was not grounds for finding pre-

emption. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257

(1984) (“Congress did not believe that it was inconsistent

to vest the NRC with exclusive regulatory authority over

the safety aspects of nuclear development while at the

same time allowing plaintiffs like Mr. Silkwood to recover

for injuries caused by nuclear hazards.”).

' Unquestionably, labor relations is an area u. traditional

state concern. See, e.g. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef,

Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412 (1988) (“the establishment of labor

standards falls within the traditional police powers of the

State.”).

Ili. No conflict exists between Section 210 and state

tort claims

In the proceedings below, the District Court found

pre-emption, reasoning that there was an “irreconcilable

conflict between the federal and state standards” con-

cerning employee relations at commercial nuclear facili-

ties and that this conflict would “frustrate the objectives

of federal law.” Appendix to petition for writ of certiorari

pp. 19a. In making these findings the lower court misap-

p'.ed the law on federal pre-emption.

The District Court reviewed the language of Section

210 of the Energy Keorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851, and

articulated hypothetical circumstances in which Section

210 and state law may conflict. Nothing on the record

supported a finding, at the summary judgment stage, that

such conflicts actually existed. Instead, based on the hy-

pothetical possibility that conflicts may possibly exist

between the state and federal law the lower court found

pre-emption. This was an error of law.

In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,

480 U.S. 572 (1987), this Court articulated the standard for

applying the hypothetical reasoning to pre-emption

cases:

To defeat Granite Rock’s [Granite Rock Co. al-

leged that the actions of the California Coastal

Commission were pre-empted] facial challenge,

the Coastal Commission needed merely to identify

a possible set of permit conditions not in conflict

with federal law.”

480 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added).

~~

In California Coastal Commission, this Court did not

find pre-emption based on hypothetical circumstances. To

the contrary, the state was given the right to “identify a

possible” set of “conditions not in conflict with federal

law.” California Coastal Commission, supra, 480 U.S. at 593.

When the alleged “conflicts” between Section 210

and state tort law are scrutinized, it ‘s ¢’ that no

conflict sufficient to justify pre-emption uctual.y ‘ists.

The District Court erred when it attempted to use subsec-

tion (g) of Section 210, 42 U.S.C. 5851(g), as proof that

Section 210 and state tort remedies “conflict.” Likewise,

the District Court erred when it found that the 30 day

statute of limitations under Section 210 created a conflict

with state tort remedies.

Subsection (g) of Section 210 states that relief is not

available where an employee “acting without direction

from his or her employer, deliberately causes a violation

of this chapter...” But, there is no support for the

proposition that state wrongful discharge or tort law

could result in the reinstatement of an empioyee who in

fact was guilty of a true subsection (g) violation. No

federal pre-emption exists where, as here, the common

law does not, in fact, contlict with federal law. A federal

court cannot simply manufacture state law and then find

that this manufactured law demonstrates federal pre-

emption exists. Moreover, the lower court simply ignored

the case precedent under ‘oth federal and state law that

allows an employer to discharge an employee for valid

reasons — even if the discharge was caused, in part, for

retaliatory reasons. See, Mt. Healthy (ity School District v.

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).

Essentially, subsection (g) merely codifies the land-

mark Mt. Healthy Supreme Court decision. Under Mt.

Healthy, even if an employee can make out a prima facie

case (i.e., a violation of subsection (a) of Section 210), the

employee still loses if the employer successfully articu-

lates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the dis-

charge. Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S.

274, 287. Employee conduct violative of subsection (g)

would constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

for the discharge. The Mt. Healthy analysis has been uni-

formly followed by ..2te and federal courts. See e.g.,

NLRB v. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. 393, 403

(1983); Texas Devartment of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, (1981); Belts v. Stroehmann Bros., 415 A.2d

1280, 1281 (Pa. Super. 1986); Eckstein v. Kuhn, 408 N.W. 2d

131 (Mich. App. 1987); McClurg v. Marion Co., 360 S.E. 2d

221 (W.Va. 1987). For example, in Pugh v. See’s Candies,

Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927-28

(1981), a California court, applying state wrongful dis-

charge law, warned that “care must be taken. . . not to

interfere with the legitimate exercise of managerial dis-

cretion...” It is only reasonable to interpret state tort

suits under North Carolina law consistent with other

federal and state courts which have uniformly followed

Mt. Healthy and its progeny.

The “timeliness” issue raised by the District Court is

another red herring. The lower court hypothesized that

one of the reasons Section 210 had expedited time limita-

tions was to ensure prompt resolution of safety problems.

However, the District Court failed to distinguish between

a complaint filed before the U.S. Department of Labor

(DOL) and a complaint filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regu-

latory Commission (NRC). Specifically, a Section 210

complaint does not need to allege any safety violation by

an employer. Deford v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 286

(6th Cir. 1983). Also see, Kohn, Protecting Environmental

and Nuclear Whistleblowers, p. 29 (Nuclear Information

Resource Service, Wash., D.C. 1985), quoting Landers v.

Commonwealth-Lord Joint Veniure, 83-ERA-5, slip op. of

Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge, p. 3

(5/11/83), adopted by Secretary of Labor (9/9/83). The

corplaint need not contain any evidence that an NRC

regulation was violated, and at trial the veracity of any

safety allegation is never an issue. It is well settled that

whether an «employer in fact violated any NRC regula-

tions is irrelevant in a Section 210 proceeding, and the

DOL has no jurisdiction over these matters. See Kohn,

Protecting Environmental and Nuclear Whistleblowers, at pp.

28-30 (Nuclear iv.formation and Resource Service, Wash.,

D.C. 1985). Filing a complaint with the DOL under Sec-

tion 210 will not, in and of itself, lead to any investigation

or resolution of the underlying employee allegations. Sec-

tion 210 did not, directly or indirectly, cede any of the

NRC’s jurisdiction over nuclear safety to the DOL. A\l-

though the DOL may share information with the NRC, a

proceeding under Section 210 is not an NRC proceeding.

Nothing in Section 210 establishes any statute of

limitations for an employee to file a safety complaint with

the NRC. Section 210 does not require an employee to

alert the NRC within 30 days of identifying a potential

safety violation, and often retaliatory discharge occurs

months or years after the reported safety disclosure. See,

Part IV of this Brief, Infra.

10

A 30 day statute of limitations is not an aspect of the

law which has facilitated the exposure of health and

safety problems to the NRC. In a thorough report by the

U.S. Administrative Conference, the 30-day statute of

limitations was criticized as “unreasonable” and the un-

fortunate fact that numerous cases are dismissed by the

DOL (both at the investigatory and the adjudicatory

stages) due to failure to comply with the statute of limita-

tions was documented. Fidell, “Federal Protection of Pri-

vate Sector Health and Safety Whistleblowers: A Report

to the Administrative Conference of the United States,”

reprinted at 134 Cong. Record 1451, 1454 (February 23,

1988). Likewise, the U.S. Department of Labor has recog-

nized the unfortunate hardship often caused employees

by the 30 day statute of limitation:

“The 30 day time limitation for filing claims is

shcrt and may result in significant numbers of

well-founded claims not being investigated.

Moreover, it may thwart the purpose of the ERA

by diminishing the protection of employ-

8...”

Cox v. Radiology Consulting Associates, Inc., 86-ERA-17,

Recommend Decision and Order of Department of Labor

Administrative Law Judge (8/22/86), adopted by the Sec-

retary of Labor (11/6/86).

Allowing employees to file employment discrimina-

tion claims under state law after the 30 day statute of

limitations under Section 210 has expired will facilitate

the Congressional purpose of Section 210.

IV. District Court Case “Snow v. Bechte” does not

provide additional grounds for justifying pre-emp-

tion

The lower court in english correctly found that “em-

ployee protection” was the “paramount” purpose behind

11

Section 210 of the ERA. This holding differed from a

decision by the U.S. District Court for the Central District

of California, Snow v. Bechtei Const. inc., 647 F.Supp. i514

(C.D. Cal. 1986), which held that Section 210 pre-empted

state wrongful discharge law because “nuclear safety”

regulation is “pre-empted by the federal regulatory sub-

poena.” Id., 647 F.Supp. at 1517.

The lower court correctly refused to follow the rea-

soning of Snow. The Snow court ignored the statute's

legislative history and the rulings of the U.S. Secretary of

Labor in reaching its decision. The legislative history of

Section 210 states that it was modeled directly after simi-

lar employee protection laws found in the Clean Air Act

(CAA) and the Federal Water Pollution Act (FWPC). 1978

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7303. Significantly, the

legislative history of Section 210’s models explicitly did

not require that the whistleblower’s information be health

or safety significant. The laws were designed to protect

the workers’ right to express concerns - even if those

concerns were found to have no relevance to safety. In

relevant part the legislative history of the Clean Air Act's

employee protection provision stated: “Moreover, as in

the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Federal Water Pollu-

tion Act, the employer would not have to be proven to be

in violation of the Clean Air Act requirement in order for

this section to protect the employee’s action.” 1977 U.S.

Code Cong. & Ad. News 1405.

Section 210 has been interpreted as not requiring that

any of the employee's allegations be proven or even

“unique” in their revelations. Deford v. Secretary of Labor,

700 F.2d 281, 286, (6th Cir. 1983), accord, NLRB v.

Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972). The Secretary of Labor

12 13

has repeatedly held that the legitimacy of the employee CONCLUSION

safety allegations is legally irrelevant, and that the U.S.

ee

For the above-mentioned reasons, this Court should

Department of L2bor has no jurisdiction to decide safety find that Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act

issues. According to one such Department of Labor rul- does not pre-empt employees who work at nuclear facili-

ing: ties the right to proceed under state law with a tort claim

“However, it is clear that this office does not for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

have jurisdiction to decide any issues relative to

the quality of the construction work in question. Respectfully submitted,

Those questions are within tne province of other

federal regulatory agencies. Therefore, any ref-

erences to quality in this Decision and Order are

STEPHEN M. KonHn

MicHaet D. KoHn

i indine i Koun, KouHn & Co rapinto, P.C.

act aa i aaa in any manner as finding in 517 Florida Ave. NW.

Washington, D.C. 20001

Landers v. Commonwealth-Lord Joint Venture, 83-ERA-5, slip (202) 234-4663

op. of ALJ at 3 (5/11/83), adopted by Secretary of Labor Counsel for Amicus Curiae

(Sept. 9, 1983); stay denied, Commonwealth-Lord Joint Ven- National Whistleblower Center

ture v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1983). March 8, 1990

The veracity of an employee’s safety concerns are

irrelevant in a Section 210 case. See, Kohn, Protecting

Environmental and Nuclear Whistleblowers, pp. 28-30. Sec-

tion 210 is an employee protection statute.

+