Respondents Brief — English v. General Elec. Co.
Supreme Court brief1990
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BEST AVAILABLE COPY
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization
Act, which provides a comprehensive federal administra-
tive remedy (‘including compensatory damages) for em-
ployees at nuclear facilities as an integral part of the
government’s program to ensure safety in the opera-
tions of those facilities, preempts state law claims for
intentional infliction of emotiomal distress arising out of
allegedly retaliatory changes in the terms and condi-
tions of employment for raising safety concerns at a
nuclear facility.
(i)
ii
RULE 29.1 STATEMENT
Genera! Electric Company has no parent company.
The subsidiaries of General Electric Company that have
outstanding equity or debt securities that are publicly
held are listed in the brief in opposition to the petition
for certiorari and in the supplemental brief.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ..... .................
RULE 29.1 STATEMENT .................. eR a oe
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................... EN OE .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......2..000.0.0.......-:ecesceseeeeees
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..........000......... si liletahatab icici
Neen a crceepnnsnsnennnencseereors
I.
Il.
A STATE LAW CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
‘ARISING OUT OF RETALIATORY EMPLOY-
MENT ACTIONS AT A NUCLEAR FACIL-
ITY INVADES THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR
SAFETY AND OPERATIONS AND IS
THEREFORE PREEMPTED ......... =). ates ous
A. Congress Has Preempted The Entire Field
Of Nuclear Safety And Operations ...............
B. Section 210 Lies Squarely Within The Field
Of Nuclear Safety Concerns ................... rete
C. Section 210 Preempts State Law Claims For
Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress
That Arise Out Of Retaliatory Employment
Action For Whistleblowing At A Nuclear
ST
D. State Law That Infringes On A Field Re-
served Exclusively For Federal Control Is
Preempted Regardless Of Its Purpose ..........
PETITIONER’S STATE LAW CLAIM IS
PREEMPTED BECAUSE IT STANDS AS AN
OBSTACLE TO THE FULL ACHIEVEMENT
OF CONGRESS’S OBJECTIVES IN REGU-
LATING THE SAFETY AND OPERATIONS
OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES ..........000000000000......
(iii)
11
12
12
16
27
32
36
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
A. Congress’s Objective In Enacting Section
210 Was To Create A Balanced Scheme That
Would Further The Goal Of Ensuring The
Safe Operation Of Nuclear Facilities
B. Failure To Preempt State Law Claims For
Injuries Arising Out Of Conduct Regulated
By Section 210 Would Preclude This Statute
From Fully Achieving Its Purposes ..............
C. Allowing Employees To Seek Punitive Dam-
ages Fundamentally Conflicts With Con-
gress’s Intent ...... sesiodulinaataitiotadipudlainnatataass ilashedatnce.
Ill. BY ANALOGY TO LABOR PREEMPTION
DOCTRINES, SECTION 210 PREEMPTS A
CLAIM FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARIS-
ING OUT OF ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN RETALIATION FOR
REPORTING NUCLEAR SAFETY COM-
SF Ta iicnsniishceahecncigaiiabseciaadibiadisaaiaellakgiaiceaiaibateetelmions
A. Under Labor Preemption Principles, Peti-
tioner’s Ciaim Is Preempted Because It
Arises Out Of Conduct Addressed By Sec-
ERE Re rere eae ca tar oe
B. Labor Preemption Principles Require Pre-
emption Where, As Here, There Is An Im-
minent Possibility That State Law Remedies
Will Conflict With Federal Law ...... ASH
UIP sich Sickinicinssiconininiisidciteieatiapbabtaphesibaiataiaicecedsins
Page
37
38
42
45
46
48
50
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Vv. Buell, 480 U.S. 557
a a 25, 41
Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634
SESE rea ele e-em * SPREE 48
Belknap, Inc. Vv. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983) —........... 46
Bonito Boats, Inc. Vv. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
Be ee HE IID ss da scasesoncecsinsasaindabademeistdiindadntindss 37
Bowen V. Massachusetts, 108 S.Ct. 2722 (1988)... 28
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2510
ERS eae aD AP eR EOT OARST. ba wee 45
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491
i ie 28
Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029
dallas 39
California v. ARC America Corp., 109 S.Ct. 1661
I i ai a a URC ERe NGS ERE RTE 26
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691
a 34
Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile
eka a sie 29
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411
a einsliaiiias 29
Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. Vv. Donovan, 673
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982) ....... RON SSSR NS eA ene 39
County of Rockland v. N.R.C., 709 F.2d 766 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983) ............. 15
DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th
aa ER RIT RU ASS iy see area 21, 32
Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293,
ne nn ssmeseticaniiaiasite 25
English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.
RTE SE se ae ane NO EI OU ae 6, 29
Erlenbaugh v. U.S., 409 U.S. 239 (1972) .....0........ 24
Exxon Corp. Vv. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).... 12
Farmer Vv. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430
Or I, passim
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n V. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141 (1982)...................... SS eee NEE 13
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
Ue es, I rc i tee 9, 34
Fortune Vv. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass.
e fF 2 — & Ee _ . : Seaman eaaeen 25
Frampton Vv. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249,
eS ne en 25
Garner V. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346
Ef 8 ess I SD 48
Georgia Power Co. Vv. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250
al I a oe 25
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,
A 34, 37
Guy V. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 812 F.2d 911
I 24
Harless Vv. First National Bank, 162 W. Va. 116,
I a 25
Hines V. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ...... 9, 11, 12, 36
Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital, 352 So.2d 1130
I a 25
Hisquierdo Vv. Hisquierdo, 4839 U.S. 572 (1979)... 37
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).. 41
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
v. Foust, 4468 US. 4B (1078) ...............<....-.........-- 43
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204,
RRR CORE eS EER ee, 23, 32, 37
834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987) 20000. 43
Jackson V. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330,
og REESE eR a 25
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. Vv. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505
(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1011
aN AS SAAT eI OED 7 Pe a 39
Lingle Vv. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108
I 48
Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735
¢ BB: 2 1. ke ASSEN 39
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)........ 36
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. Vv. Russell, 473
‘S$ i FSi ~ F
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
sage
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
p NET RE ee ee EO aE 25
Motor Coach Employees Vv. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
scarab beauationandedioe 46, 49
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).. 25
Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota,
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 USS.
i i setenenonesaboadenamdannsoptaban 15
Northwest Airlines, Inc. Vv. Transport Workers,
A, i i ON ai ceeelanisiih 24, 36
O’Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390
I I is rina ine eicusinanseteteaidlicnaiintnntintaniia 25
Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190
(= RSG OURAN er ers es NO en passim
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) ................. 34
Petermann V. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) .. 25
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. DeDeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(RSET EES a a Os nS RO 24, 37
Porter County Chapter v. N.R.C., 606 F.2d 1363
ty I iia nnn didnpcitlipihianinidhsapienalabienmennon 15
Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union,
SERIE ETRE Ere inmnent os renees 15
Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216
S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950) ............................. 25
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) ..........................- 25
Reynolds v. United States, 286 F.2d 433 (9th Cir.
i er ES SIT te ON Ten aT ee 15
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
| ES PI oa ETP OP RTI 8, 12, 33, 35
Rockford League of Women Voters v. N.R.C.,
Be Bs By. Be S| een 15
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council Vv. Garmon, 359
CR I IIT cxnsaihnen/ evistiieeteiecbuntsenasesnontin 29, 45, 48, 49
Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky.
RR TID. cattictcnsss scsensecsinnseicnieniainiciiiniinmnipimianbetiqen 25
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978)........ 45
Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So.2d 89 (Fla.
I kil tal cic eid, saci cilatagiinlaieadtain eeedaieiainanteaaaeas 25
Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 400 F.2d 778
I a ae 15
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
a a passim
State of New Hampshire Vv. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
caesar ideasianien 15
Stephens v. Jus*iss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So.2d 510
Ne) EP aie cen 25
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245
RI rn A os 25
Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S.
ee memeiaivanion 28
Tivin V. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group,
I i a cceuiieanisibiaetice 37
Tro«scontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil
and Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409 (1986) 2.000 .. 26
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
a ae 6k SS OE | eee 48
University of Tennessee Vv. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788
a a 44
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
ee a a lsisibieeeneniichs 15
Wisconsin Dept. of Indus. Vv. Gould, Inc., 475 USS.
SEA 2, SEE: TAA ee eee 48, 49
Yanta v. Montgomery Ward £ Co., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d
& FF & Ss & By | Reeeeeeceoeen 25
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES &
REGULATIONS _
alta passim
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et
seq.) .. sew alee adiae pinasbensedsinsaasscaaee
42 U.S.C. '§2012(e) . a aetna ele ee 8,13
42 U.S.C. § 2014 (aa) .................... arvensis 1
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
4B UBL. 6 BOD ..nccceserees ciebacadeeaciichilanidehadaiiaaiaatint 13
I tant cenieeediaiaiintabiiten m 14
TTT aa 1,14
I a iccniicncnciniiiameemnncninnte aatieniie 14
42 U.S.C. § 2021 (k). ......... worevpnnenneeosenseesenesessnsesnes 31, 32
I sic iia sisi dalidcdiliddn cilities eure 13, 32
I oi Liccintsnicsiencsianbitiaininidimnilibeynnits 1
I an entteptsiypmanenpnesncbeieniend 8,18
i oa cstscadssnsennagunionemitelh 1,18
I cscs ccncenpuisbsntnmnsiognecinssaadiiod 2, 8, 13, 18
a ET a ce ee 18
Taian cpnneesenepnsnenabenin 8
ESTEE See en 18
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at
| | Ef LF "nna eaneTeTee passim
a ssepuiensnnenieoes 15,18
42 U.S.C. § 5843 (b) (2) (A) _.................. aie 16
ie Ce CE CID on nnnccccccnsccccccceoscevencess 16
il TS STREETS A ART PT EE: 16
I cadets 8, 16, 18
ee ee ose. passim
I I ae aalihlcespiecialiindnaininnn 16, 17
| Eee 17
42 U.3B.C. § 6661 (b) (3) (B) ........................... 17, 23, 43
id asalites acieienneisteminaniantadiiil 18, 23, 43
NE passim
I aiircticiccnneensereniotindggeamietinaininase 16
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch.
120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amendec at 29
FS eG RF} earn 48
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat.
449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151 et seq.)
BD UBC. © TBS GEP (G6) .....---22--000000.. ...-cereesener scornees 46
BD UB... § 1G] ......22---2020000.2.22ccecceeseesreroseees hie. can 46
BD U.S.C. 8 16D Oe) «.....-----.20000.000--nccrcccocererccceses- oes 37
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Price Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256,
71 Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012,
REE CLE UTD satiakemertsauisiiidinca da teiikes 31
Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88
Stat. 1682 (1974) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. $§ 300f et seq.)
42 U.S.C. § 300j-9 (i) (2) (B) (ii) .....0..-e ee. 23
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469,
90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. $§ 2601 et seq.)
ia ices eininlaciiinniennadio’ 23
10 C.F.R. Parts 0-171:
Part 2:
: SPECS onetime ees 5
SS DRERREDEYSFasres enorme treet eae ere ETE E 18, 20
Part 8
ae es 15
SIN anc easestescel. ciate opie eshahtdeciarascueiigiedtiodads 15
Fart 19:
ie IN iidssiideii da soainsadisanéadllantdamediaiadin A ...8, 16, 19
8 SII AD ee SORT COE ITT 19
§ 19.15 ......... CER En > Daeciaceaitaaas sei 19
al ak ies re ae hee a 19
ERR See anne eae ere an tree ee 8
RENEE pcre eee NOC re A 2
Part 21:
RRR AEST c ae EP aR Nr 18
(8 ERAS EEE es Sor eyes en Deen Mae 8,18
8) RR ew a ALES I TE 19
I la Soe. wes 18
Part 50:
SN TIT <duhsshiciddectodsshioisemecateashimicasnedebsibeideildeitd trade bikes 3
Part 70:
RETIRES Se Re aL PO er 2
¢ a SSSI REE Res ot MEE EDIRNE AOE 1
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
ERA Re TI ps a OTS el Nee 1
EEA RS cael ae eee Ore EER 8, 20, 39
AS PR ene Se Ae PRR AMEE 20
I ie 1
§ 70.22 (a) (7) ............ wovencussescaensesenonsnsesesecees 2
§ 70.22 (a) (8) ............. saalenpioaba deahesasaledbiseassmuncsadaisid 2
I ER RII AER AAT Te TE COPE 2,3
RAI A RE era ene OR ian 2
I olsun telaneicantibeniiaisadepiaienas 2
i a 2,18
ESR SA Es a RC BR 18
| ON A EES ee en koe easton Sas 18
ats crea dih Mi inhasdin spans hncnbiicnndenanibdenanididduaities 18
SEE SAS oe) Se ENT REA OE 18
| Rn ne Oe Cee ene ee eee 18
SSE ree a 18
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I oct tcechhceatlbebbadaealabiesinetios 18
Part 150:
IIIT cris itis fines leaiasutiaaisadaaasiseeaionsiieneniates 2,14
te EERE ee a Oe Aa nN 5
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MATERIALS
S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2872.. 15
S. Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted
in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7303....passim
Federal-State Relationships in the Atomic Energy
Field, Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on
Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959)... 14
Whistleblower Protection Act: Hearing on H.R.
3368 Before the Subcomm. on _ Labor-
Management Relations of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(ERE Eee aa ee ee ee ED 39
120 Cong. Rec. 36,398 (1974) .....................cccccscceeseesss. 37
Be Cs CI CT wiciccccescesesececoncccesecccecseense 21
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
phe FS, | nea
Fe re Bs I BR icrtcccincoscceneuticseonnsccenconcicness
GT TOE, TRG, Be CIE caeeeececncccceccnscscncccocecesces e200
GT TOR, TORR GO CTD nesses cecsccccevenecesnesss 17,
Ashcraft v. University of Cincinnati, 83-ERA-7
(Secretary’s Decision, Nov. 1, 1984) ....0
Darety Vv. Zack Co., 82-ERA-2 (Secretary’s Deci-
Ss I TN I ci iaiieictliaectt altace cssdausees
Francis V. Bogan, 86-ERA-8 (Secretary’s Decision,
REESE SS MER a ne ea OC NaN
In re Illinois Power Co., EA 86-143 \Dec. 17,
SUUIUIIT sictscssasdaittenetaleasussiaeesebianedeasasenunpebdieinlaeh ieiaetaibiiebasiscs
Lopez V. West Texas Util., 86-ERA-25 (Secretary’s
Ss a as
Nunn V. Duke Power Co., A.L.J. Dec., Vol. 1, No.
4, 84-ERA-27 (July-Aug. 1987) ......00..00000000000...
In re Tennessee Valley Auth., EA 86-93 (July 10,
UII sininsieesuasesnbcainsssdldinennassidiansdandibanantadamaiadakiilaieieleiss dina
A REIS cle ie AE MOM ie RDA PESTO
Wilson V. Bechtel Constr., Inc., A.L.J. Dec., Vol. 2,
No. 1, 86-ERA-34 (Jan.-Feb. 1988) ......... SHEARS
Wood v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 79-ERA-3 (Secre-
tary’s Decision, Nov. 8, 1979) ......... oncaunaiaidetaes.
8, 19
20, 22
4d
24
39
20
39
20, 39
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1989
No. 89-152
VERA M. ENGLISH,
" Petitioner,
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Respondent General Electric Company operates a
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing Department in Wilming-
ton, North Carolina. The Wilmington Department is a
fuel fabrication plant. It uses “special nuclear material”
as defined by the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2014(aa); 10° C.F.R. § 70.4(m), to produce
bundles of uranium fuel rods used at nuclear reactcr
sites to generate electric power.
The Atomic Energy Act grants the Nuclear egula-
tory Commission (“NRC”) exclusive authority to issue
a license for a fuel fabrication piant such as the Wil-
mington Department. 42 U.S.C. $$ 2073(a), 2077,
2021(b); 10 C.F.R. $$ 70.3, 70.21(a) (1). The Act also
gives the NRC exclusive authority to establish such
2
standards “to govern the possession and use of special
nuclear material . . . as the Commission may deem
necessary ... to protect health or to minimize danger to
life or property.” 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b). Pursuant to
this authority, the NRC has promulgated comprehensive
regulations governing the licensing and operation of fuel
fabrication plants (see generally 10 C.F.R. Part 70).
These include, for example, regulations governing the
safety of workers and of the public (10 C.F.R. Part 20),
the need to track and account for the large quantities of
special nuclear material used in fuel fabrication (10
C.F.R. § 70.51), and the safety risks of “accidental
criticality” that are posed by significant quantities of
special ruclear material. 10 C.F.R. §§ 70.22(a) (8),
70.24.1 The NRC will not issue a license if it “would
constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety
of the public.’ 10 C.F.R. § 70.31(d).
The Chemical Metallurgical Laboratory (‘“Chemet
Lab”) is located within the larger building that houses
the Wilmington Department. Chemet Lab workers reg-
ularly conduct metallurgical, chemical and spectrographic
analyses on uranium samples “to assure that standards of
the [NRC] are met.” Pet. App. 33a n.3. In performing
these tests, employees work with both powder and liquid
forms of uranium compounds. Jd. The quality control
responsibilities of the Chemet Lab workers are part of
the Department’s quality assurance program, which is
1 The large quantities of special nuclear material used in a fuel
fabrication plant pose special safety concerns because they far ex-
ceed the quantity needed to form a critical mass (start a self-
sustaining nuclear reaction). 10 C.F.R. § 150.11. Thus, to obtain
a license from the NRC for a fuel fabrication plant, an appli-
cant must develop “procedures to avoid accidental criticality”
(10 C.F.R. § 70.22(a)(8)) and describe how its “handling devices,
working areas, shields, measuring and monitoring instruments,
devices for the disposal of radioactive effluent and wastes, storage
facilities, [and] criticality accident alarm systems” will be sufficient
“to protect health and minimize danger to life or property.” 10
C.F.R. § 70.22(a) (7), (f).
" eee a
~
a
3
required by the NRC. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. B; 10
C.F.R. § 70.22(f) & n.2.
The Chemet Lab contains several laboratories. In
“controlled areas” of these laboratories, specific safety
precautions must be strictly observed. Before leaving a
controlled area, a hand-held monitor or frisker is used
to detect the presence of any radioactive contamination
on a person’s body or clothing. Workers must wear
gloves, a lab coat and safety glasses in both controlled
and semi-controlled areas. Pet. App. 33a n.3. The con-
trolled areas contain hoods with fans that pull airborne
radioactive contamination away from those working be-
low. In addition, “{s]afety rules require that any spill-
age of uranium powder or uranium liquid be brushed
or cleaned off from time to time during the work hours,
and especially before leaving the work shift.” Jd.
2. Petitioner, Vera English, was employed as a radia-
tion laboratory technician at the Chemet Lab for almost
twelve years. She was responsible for performing cer-
tain quality control tests, “in which samples of uranium
powder are weighed, oxidized, weighed again, dissolved
in nitric acid and finally weighed again.” Jd. at 34a.
Petitioner and other workers used marble work benches
with marble legs because the “marble material is not
affected by vibrations and is easier to clean than other
material.” Jd. at 33a n.3.
On February 13, 1984, petitioner complained to the
NRC about “what she perceived” to be violations of
safety standards and Company procedures at the Wil-
mington Department. Jd. at Ta-8a. On February 24,
1984, petitioner forwarded these same concerns in a writ-
ten report (dated February 21, 1984) to the Company’s
Quality Assurance Manager. /d. at 8a, 34a.
The Company investigated her complaints on March
8-21 and March 26-30, 1984. Id. at 34a. A Chemet Lab
Safety Report (dated March 29, 1984) concluded that
lab safety procedures were adequate, but a subsequent
4
Quality Assurance Review (dated April 26, 1984) con-
cluded that some of petitioner’s allegations of “violations
of company practice and procedure had substance.” Jd.
Similarly, the NRC conducted an investigation into peti-
tioner’s complaints from March 26 through March 29,
1984. Id. at 33a. The NRC subsequently “concluded that
[her complaints] were unsubstantiated.” Jd. at 34a.
After reporting her complaints, but prior to the NRC
and Company investigations, petitioner (according to
her subsequent testimony) took steps “to prove to man-
agement that her co-workers were extremely lax in
their performance of clean-up duties.” Jd. at 35a. On
March 10, 1984, petitioner discovered stains on her
work table resulting from a spill of contaminated ma-
terial. /d. at 8a, 34a. Petitioner purposefully chose not
to clean the contamination, and decided instead to mark
off the stained area with tape “as a warning to fellow
workers” and “so she would be able to point it out to
her supervisor” when he next returned to the lab. 7d.
at 35a. The contamination stain remained upon the
table when she returned to work two days later, despite
the interim presence of other shift workers. Jd. at 8a.
Petitioner reported the stain to her supervisor, and
also reported to him that a radiation safety employee
had failed on March 5 to detect contaminated nuclear
material that she had deliberately swept into a pile at
the back of her table “to see whether he would discover”
it. Id. at 8a-9a.
3. On March 15, 1984, respondent charged petitioner
with several safety violations, including intentional
failure to clean up contamination. Jd. at 36a-37a. Re-
spondent determined that petitioner had committed the
latter violation, relieved her of her laboratory responsi-
bilities, removed her from any controlled areas and as-
signed her to a temporary position outside the con-
trolled areas. Jd. at 37a. Petitioner was advised to apply
for an open position within the Department, outside of
the Chemet Lab. Petitioner did not obtain such a posi-
5
tion within 90 days, and so was laid off on July 30,
1984. Id.
4. On August 24, 1984, petitioner filed a complaint
with the United States Department of Labor under Sec-
tion 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
(“ERA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, and as imple-
mented in 29 C.F.R. § 24.3.2. Section 210 prohibits em-
ployers licensed by the NRC from discharging or chang-
ing the “compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment” of any employee in retaliation for that
employee’s reports about nuclear safety, and entitles em-
ployees to full compensatory relief. Section 210 does not
apply, however, to any employee who “deliberately causes
a violation of [the Energy Reorganization] Act or the
Atomic Energy Act, as amended.” 42 U.S.C. § 5851/g)
(“subsection (g)”’).
In her Section 210 complaint, petitioner alleged that
her transfer from the Chemet Lab, her ultimate layoff
and other related actions were taken by the Company in
retaliation for her safety complaints. Pet. App. 46a.
The Company claimed that under subsection (g), peti-
tioner was not entitled to recovery because she deliber-
ately caused a violation of safety standards by intention-
ally failing to clean up the spill; the Company also main-
tained that “the lengths [petitioner] would go to in pro-
moting her views on safety practices” posed “a threat to
other employees’ safety.” /d. at 42a. After an initial de
cision by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion, both parties appealed to an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). Jd. at 31a.
The ALJ conducted a “formal hearing” over 11 days
during which “the parties were afforded full opportunity
2 Petitioner also filed a complaint with the NRC pursuant to 10
C.F.R. § 2.206. See Pet. App. 57a-58a. Aithough the NRC eventually
issued a civil penalty of $20,000, based solely on the recommended
ruling by the Department of Labor’s ALJ, the NRC denied petition-
er’s request for further enforcement actions, including petitioner's
request that the NRC impose a civil penalty of over $40 million. 7d.
6
to present evidence and argument,” and during which
petitioner’s psychologist testified concerning the emotional
distress petitioner had suffered. Jd. at 3la, 37a-39a.
On August 1, 1985, the ALJ entered an order granting
petitioner full compensatory relief. Jd. at 56a. The ALJ
found “little doubt that [petitioner] was a difficult em-
ployee to handle,” and that “she disrupted workplace
activity at times.” Jd. at 41a. The ALJ also recognized
that petitioner’s intentional failure to clean up the spill
“was considered a violation [of the Atomic Energy Act]
by NRC.” Jd. at 44a. Nevertheless, the ALJ held that,
under the circumstances, petitioner’s failure to clean up
the spill should be deemed a protected “means of report-
ing violations, albeit unorthodox.” Jd. at 45a. The ALJ
therefore ordered that petitioner be reinstated with back
pay plus interest “to make her whole,” and awarded her
compensatory damages of $70,000 for past and future
medical expenses as recompense for petitioner’s “humilia-
tion and mental suffering.” Jd. at 55a.
The Secretary of Labor subsequently reversed the
ALJ’s decision because petitioner’s complaint was not
filed within the 30-day limitations period provided in
Section 210. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of petitioner’s discharge claim as time-barred,
but remanded to permit the Secretary to determine
whether petitioner had established a course of retaliatory
harassment within the filing time period. English v.
Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988). This case is
still pending before the Secretary.
5. On March 13, 1987, petitioner filed a diversity suit
against the Company in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The com-
plaint sought relief under state tort theories of wrongful
discharge and “intentional infliction of economic and emo-
tional harm by reprisal and punishment inflicted upon
plaintiff in violation of the laws of the United States and
North Carolina, with respect to her terms and conditions
of employment.” J.A. 7. For example, petitioner a!leged
7
that after she reported her safety concerns, the Company
removed her from the Chemet Lab under guard, con-
stantly observed her and isolated her from other em-
ployees. J.A. 14-15. She also claimed that respondent
transferred her to “a degrading ‘make work’ job” and
subsequently discharged her because the Company “de-
sire{d] to punish her for raising safety concerns.” J.A.
16. For her two claims for wrongful discharge and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, petitioner sought
approximately $1.3 million in compensatory damages and
approximately $2.3 billion in punitive damages. J.A. 21;
Pet. App. 6a.
In a lengthy opinion, the district court dismissed the
complaint, holding that Congress intended Section 210 to
“preempt state actions for wrongful discharge and other
discrimination with respect to nuclear whistleblowers.”
Id. at 21a. The court of appeals affirmed, adopting the
district court’s reasoning and agreeing that Section 210
of the ERA was “intended by Congress to constitute the
sole remedy for nuclear facility employees who allege dis-
crimination resulting from safety complaints, and, there-
fore, English’s state law claim was preempted by the
federal statute.” Jd. at 3a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
A. Petitioner and her amici assume without arguing
that Section 210 lies outside the field of nuclear safety.
There can be no doubt, i.owever, that the Atomic Energy
Act and its progeny, including Section 210, occupy “the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited
powers expressly ceded to the States.” Pacific Gas &
Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (19838). At the core of
this field is the NRC’s exclusive responsibility to ensure
that nuclear facilities are licensed and operated in ac-
8
cordance with public health and safety requirements.
42 U.S.C. $§ 2012(e), 2073(b), 2201(b), 21383(b). One
vital component of nuclear safety is the responsibility
of all employees at nuclear facilities to report safety
violations. 42 U.S.C. § 5846; 10 C.F.R. §$ 19.12, 21.21.
The NRC so values these reports that it treats retalia-
tory employment action against such employees as an
independent safety violation requiring serious penalties,
including revocation of a license. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,453
(1982); 10 C.F.R. $$ 70.7(¢), 19.20. Thus, Section 210,
which prohibits such retaliation and protects employees
who voice safety concerns, falls squarely within the com-
prehensive federal regulatory scheme to protect health
and safety.
The importance of Section 210 to the framework of
federal nuclear safety regulation is reflected in the NRC’s
regulations, in the legislative history of Section 210 (S.
Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1978)) and in
the structure of Section 210 itself. Section 210 is de-
signed to encourage prompt federal action in response
to employer retaliation, and to balance the need to pro-
tect the NRC’s channels of information against the need
to ensure that nuclear employers are not deterred from
taking appropriate disciplinary actions. Reflecting Con-
gress’s careful and comprehensive concern about promot-
ing nuclear safety, subsection (g) denies protection to
alleged “whistleblowers” who deliberately cause violations
of safety regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(g). Because Sec-
tion 210 is an integral part of Congress’s exclusively fed-
eral scheme of nuclear safety regulation, this case should
be analyzed under field preemption principles.
B. It is well settled that any state law that intrudes
into an area occupied by the federal government is pre-
empted, even if the state law’s purpose is fully consistent
with that of the federal government, Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947), unless Con-
gress expressly ceded the state authority to act. Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251-256 (1984).
9
There can be no doubt that petitioner’s claim invades
that portion of the nuclear safety field defined by Section
210. Jd. That provision, inter alia, grants petitioner
compensatory relief for all claims of discrimination in
any term or condition of employment imposed by respond-
ent in retaliation for reporting safety violations. As the
district court held, once the claims in petitioner’s com-
plaint that allege discriminatiom in terms and conditions
of employment are deleted, what is left does not “in and
of itself support a cause of action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress” under state law. Pet. App.
28a.
The only remaining issue is whether Congress has
expressly ceded North Carolina authority to regulate
safety in the nuclear workplace through the use of its
tort laws. The answer is clearly no. Neither petitioner
nor her amici present one shred of evidence that Con-
gress enacted Section 210 with the understanding that
states could supplement the federal remedies with tort
actions. Nor is there any basis for concluding that Con-
gress did not preempt petitioner’s claim because the
State’s purpose is not to regulate nuclear safety. Con-
trary to the argument of the Solicitor General, it is black
letter law under the Supremacy Clause that it is irrele-
vant whether the state and federal laws “are aimed at
similar or different objectives.” Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. Vv. Paul, 373 U.S. 182, 142 (1963). Ac-
cordingly, petitioner’s claim is preempted by Section 210.
II.
Even if Section 210 could be interpreted as outside the
federally occupied field of nuclear safety, it is neverthe-
less plain that permitting petitioner’s claims to be liti-
gated in state court will “stand[] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941). Specifically, Congress intended to make
certain that claims regarding retaliation were filed
10
promptly, and to balance the need to encourage employees
to come forward with safety concerns against the need
not to deter employers from taking appropriate discipli-
nary action to assure safe operations in a nuclear facility.
The district. court correctly identified the elements of
Section 210 that are jeopardized by state law: the 30-day
time limit for filing; an administrative claim, the preclu-
sion of relief for employees who deliberately violate a
safety requirement and the decision to entrust only the
Secretary with the discretion to seek punitive damages.
Allowing state tort actions to be filed years after a safety
problem exists (even if the problem is the employer’s will-
ingness to retaliate), and allowing damages to be awarded
to employees without an expert evaluation of the regula-
tory and safety questions at issue will inevitably frus-
trate the achievement of Section 210’s safety-related
purposes.
Allowing employees to obtain punitive damages, more-
over, will completely vitiate Congress’s effort to promote
safety through a balanced administrative scheme. It is
simply inconceivable that a plaintiff’s lawyer will be con-
tent to settle for the compensatory and back pay relief
that Section 210 provides when state law holds out the
promise of a billion dollar punitive award and the settle-
ment leverage such an award offers. Moreover, the avail-
ability of a large punitive award creates the perverse
incentive that the worst abuses by nuclear facilities
would be precisely the ones a plaintiff would most want
to bring only in state court, thereby depriving the NRC
of information vital to nuclear safety. The repudiation
of Congress’s intent to encourage prompt administrative
filings and not to deter employer responses to safety prob-
lems created by employees clearly must be preempted.
III.
Petitioner and her amici urge the Court to resolve this
case under labor preemption principles. Although the
case is more properly analyzed as a nuclear safety case,
1l
the analogy to the labor laws provides an independent
basis for affirming the judgment below.
By providing a specialized forum for evaluating work-
place issues in an area—nuclear safety—traditionally
regulated by the federal government, Congress in Section
210 has created a remedial scheme similer to the scheme
administered by the National Labor Relations Board.
The case that most closely fits this one under this labor
analogy is Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
430 U.S. 290 (1977). But in that case, this Court
did not hold that all claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress survive the existence of a federal
remedy. Instead, the Court held that “it is essential that
the state tort be either unrelated to employment discrimi-
nation or a function of the particularly abusive manner
in which the discrimination is accomplished or threatened
. 2’ Id. at 305. As noted above, the district court,
applying the analysis in Farmer, held that once the em-
ployment discrimination claims are severed from the com-
plaint, the remainder does not state a claim under state
law. Thus, even apart from the federal interest in nu-
clear safety, petitioner’s claim is preempted under tradi-
tional labor preemption principles.
ARGUMENT
The general principles of preemption are accurately
described in the Solicitor General’s brief (S.G. Br. 9-11)
and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that peti-
tioner’s state law claim is preempted under both of two
independent theories: Her claim (1) directly invades the
field of nuclear safety which Congress has occupied ex-
clusively for over 40 years and (2) creates an insuperable
obstacle “to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress” and therefore con-
flicts with the specific elements of Section 210. Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 37 (1941). In addition, her
claim is preempted under well-settled principles of
labor law preemption, which provide a useful analogy in
12
analyzing the Supremacy Clause issue in this case. We
address each ground of preemption in turn.
I. A STATE LAW CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL IN-
FLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING
OUT OF RETALIATORY EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS
AT A NUCLEAR FACILITY INVADES THE FIELD
OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATIONS AND
IS THEREFORE PREEMPTED.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
$$ 2011 et seq., and the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. $§ 5801 et seq., exclusively
reserve the entire field of nuclear safety to federal con-
trol. Congress has given the NRC exclusive authority
over the licensing and regulation of nuclear facilities, and
pursuant to this authority the Commission has enacted
detailed regulations in furtherance of its paramount re-
sponsibility to protect the public from the health and
safety hazards of nuclear operations. Any state law that,
in effect, rerulates the safe operation of a nuclear fa-
cility, regardless of its purpose or its potential to disrupt
the federal scheme, is preempted to the extent it tres-
passes in this exclusively federal area. Pacific Gas &
Electric, 461 U.S. at 212-213; see. e.g., Exxon Corp. v.
Eaqerton, 462 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1983): Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 231-36 (1947); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
A. Congress Has Preempted The Entire Field Of Nu-
clear Safety And Operations.
In Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 205-212, this
Court reviewed in detail the statutory language, struc-
ture and legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seg. Based on this review. the
Court concluded that “the Federal Government has oc-
cupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except
the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.” 461
U.S. at 212. In this, as in any preemption case, the
touchstone of analysis is Congress’s intent to preempt.
ee
13
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 152 (1982). The Atomic Energy Act provides
the basic framework against which Congress’s decision
in 1978 to enact Section 210 must be interpreted.
As this Court explained in Pacific Gas & Electric,
“ft]he Atomic Energy Act must be read” for preemp-
tion purposes against the unique background of exclusive
federal control over nuclear energy. 461 U.S. at 206.
Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 to end
the prior federal monopoly over all aspects of nuclear
technology and allow private industry to participate in
the commercial development of nuclear technology under
a scheme of exclusive federal regulation and licensing.
461 U.S. at 207. In particular, Congress expressly re-
served to the federal government the right to regulate
nuclear facilities to assure the protection of health and
safety.” Id. Congress gave the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion exclusive licensing authority for the possession and
distribution of special nuclear material (42 U.S.C.
$$ 2073, 2077), and empowered the Commission to estab-
lish such regulations “to govern the possession and use
of special nuclear material . . . as the Commission may
deem necessary ... to protect health or to minimize
danger to life or property.” 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b).
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 preserved intact the
dual federal ‘state regulatory structure over the sale and
transmission of commercial electric energy (42 U.S.C.
§$ 2019), but did not provide any other regulatory role
for the states, especially a safety role. In 1959, after
extensive hearings on federal and state roles in regulat-
ing nuclear power, Congress added Section 274, which
created only a limited role for states in the nuclear
regulatory scheme—and then only by express agreement
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (“regulation by the United States of
the production and utilization of atomic energy and of the facilities
used in connection therewith is necessary in the national intere: t
to assure the common defense and security and to protect the healch
and safety of the public”) (emphasis added).
14
with the Commission.* 42 U.S.C. § 2021. Notably, Sec-
tion 274 allowed the Commission to grant the states
regulatory authority only for byproduct, source and
“special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to
form a critical mass.” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b). Congress
thus carefully preserved the Commission’s exclusive au-
thority over other aspects of nuclear safety, including
the licensing and regulation of plants, such as respond-
ent’s Wilmington Department, that use special nuclear
materials in quantities far greater than that needed “to
form a critical mass.” ° Jd.; see 10 C.F.R. § 150.11 (defin-
ing critical mass). As this Court concluded in Pacific
Gas & Electric, by reaffirming the exclusivity of federal
authority over the field of nuclear safety concerns, the
1959 Amendments “reinforced th[e] fundamental divi-
sion of authority” between the Commission and the states
under which the states may share limited commercial
regulation but the federal government has exclusive re-
sponsibility for nuclear safety. 461 U.S. 208.°
4 Congress also authorized the Commission to terminate any such
agreement with a State “if the Commission finds that such termina-
tion or suspension is required to protect the public health and
safety.”” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(j).
5In adding Section 274, therefore, Congress was careful not to
create even the possibility that a state could regulate the health
and safety aspects of a fuel fabrication facility such as the Wil-
mington Department. In any event, North Carolina does not have
an agreement with the Commission to regulate even limited quanti-
ties of special nuclear materials.
6 As the AEC explained during hearings on Section 274, “[q]uan-
tities of special nuclear material which may present hazards of ac-
cidental criticality are excluded from the scope of the bill .... As
a consequence ... such activities as the processing of special nuclear
material, fabrication of fuel elements and similar activities will
remain subject to the licensing requirements and other regulatory
controls of the Commission.” Federal-State Relationships in Atomic
Energy Field, Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy,
86th Cong., Ist Sess. 297 (1959) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Senate Report accompanying the 1959 amendments
confirms that they were “not intended to leave any room for the
15
Subsequent developments underscore both Congress’s
awareness of and commitment to exclusive federal con-
trol over the operation and safety of nuclear facilities.’
In 1969, for example, the General Counsel of the AEC
published in the Federal Register the Commission’s view
that Congress, in amending the Atomic Energy Act in
1959, “intended to preempt to the Federal Government
the total responsibility and authority for regulating, from
the standpoint of radiological health and safety, the
specified nuclear facilities and materials.” 10 C.F.R.
$ 8.4(i) (emphasis added); see 10 C.F.R. § 8.4(d) (re-
counting history of 1959 amendments).
In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization
Act, 42 U.S.C. §$§ 5801 et seg., which abolished the AEC
and transferred its regulatory and licensing authority to
the NRC. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(f). The 1974 Act also ex-
exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by States to control
radiation hazards by regulating byproduct, source, or special nu-
clear materials.” S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in
1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2872, 2879; see id. (recogniz-
ing “the dangers of conflicting, overlapping and inconsistent stand-
ards in different jurisdictions, to the hindrance of industry and
jeopardy of public safety”).
7This Court and numerous courts of appeals have consistently
recognized the Commission’s exclusive responsibility for ensuring
nuclear safety. See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union,
367 U.S. 396, 404, 415 (1961) (“the responsibility for safeguarding
that [public] health and safety belongs under the statute to the
Commission”); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
435 U.S. 519, 526, 550 (1978) (NRC’s “prime area of concern .. .
is national security, public health, and safety”); Northern States
Power Co, vy. State of Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1150 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); County of Rockland v. N.RC.,
709 F.2d 766, 770 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983);
Rockford League of Women Voters v. N.R.C., 679 F.2d 1218, 1223
(7th Cir. 1982); Porter County Chapter v. N.R.C., 606 F.2d 1363,
1370, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 400
F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968); State of New Hampshire v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962
(1969); Reynolds v. United States, 286 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1960).
16
panded the number and range of safety responsibilities
charged to the NRC, e.g., 42 U.S.C. $$ 5843(b) (2) (A)-
(B), 5844(b), 5877(c)), and (in Section 206) imposed
new safety-related reporting requirements on responsible
officers and directors of licensees. 42 U.S.C. § 5846. Fi-
nally, in 1978, Congress passed a set of amendments (in-
cluding several that were safety-related) to both the
Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act.
Pub. L. No. 95-601, 92 Stat. 2947 (1978). Among them
is Section 210, which encourages employees to report
safety violations to the NRC, and provides the mecha-
nism for protecting them against retaliation for doing
so—unless they have deliberately violated safety regu-
lations.
B. Section 210 Lies Squarely Within The Field Of
Nuclear Safety Concerns.
Section 210 falls squarely within the field of nuclear
safety concerns because it is intended to assist the NRC
in carrying out its exclusive responsibility to ensure
that nuclear facilities are licensed and operated in a
manner consistent with public health and safety. The
essential purpose of Section 210 is to ensure that em-
plovees are not deterred from performing “their respon-
sibility to report promptly” to the NRC (10 C.F.R.
$ 19.12) by fear of retaliatory employment action.‘
Section 210(a) states that no employer in the nuclear
industry “may discharge any employee or otherwise dis-
criminate against any employee with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
§ Respondent uses the term “retaliatory employment action” as a
shorthand reference to the scope of conduct prohibited by Section
210. It is important to note that, by its plain terms, Section 210
covers neither all retaliatory acts nor al! changes in the terms and
conditions of employment. Instead, Section 210 covers only conduct
that involves both of these concerns—retaliation for whistleblowing
that takes the form of discharge or other changes in ‘‘compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§$ 5851(a). See pages 28-29, infra.
17
because the employee” has taken one of the following
actions:
(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is
about to commence or cause to be commenced a pro-
ceeding under this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or a proceeding for the adminis-
tration or enforcement of any requirement imposed
under this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended;
(2) testified or is about to testify in any such pro-
ceeding or;
(3) assisted or participated . . . in such a proceed-
ing or in any other manner in such a proceeding
or in any other action to carry out the purposes of
this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended.
42 U.S.C. §$ 5851(a). Any employee who believes that
he or she has been the victim of such retaliation may
file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 30
days after the violation occurs. Jd. § 5851(b)(1). The
Secretary, who promptly notifies the NRC upon receipt
of the complaint (47 Fed. Reg. 54,585), is required to
conduct and complete an investigation within 30 days,
and to issue an order within 90 days either dismissing
the complaint or providing appropriate relief. Should a
violation be found, the Secretary is authorized to award
comprehensive injunctive relief and monetary “compen-
sation.” ® Should an employer fail to comply with the
Secretary’s order, the Secretary is authorized “to file
a civil action” in federal district court and has discretion
to seek “all appropriate relief including, but not limited
® See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B) (“the Secretary shall order the
person who committed such violation to (i) take affirmative action
to abate the violation, and (ii) reinstate the complainant to his
former position together with the compensation (including back
pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment, and the
Secretary may order such person to provide compensatory damages
to the complainant”); see also id. (providing for recovery of costs
and attorney’s fees).
18
to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary dam-
ages.” 42 U.S.C. § 5851(d) (emphasis added).
1. The NRC’s regulations implementing Section 210
and other provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act
and Atomic Energy Act confirm that Section 210 is an
integral part of the federal government’s long-established
exclusive authority to regulate the use of special nuclear
materials and the safe operation of nuclear facilities.
42 U.S.C. $$ 2073(b) 2201(b), 2133, 2137, 5841(f).
Pursuant to this authority, the NRC has adopted a com-
prehensive enforcement program, “the purpose” of which
“is to promote and protect the radiological health and
safety of the public, including employees’ health and
safety.” 10 C.F.R. Part 2, App. C at 129-30. The NRC
imposes detailed record-keeping and reporting require-
ments upon licensees such as respondent, and periodically
conducts inspections to monitor compliance.’ To assist
the NRC in this oversight, Congress, in Section 206 of
the Energy Reorganiz tion Act, placed a special obliga-
tion on “any individual director or responsible officer”
of a licensee: such persons must “immediately notify
the Commission” of any failure to comply with any Com-
mission rule or regulation related to certain safety haz-
ards, and failure to report certain specified hazards may
result in civil fines. 42 U.S.C. § 5846; 10 C.F.R. §§ 21.1,
21.21, 21.61; see 10 C.F.R. Part 2, App. C at 132.
The NRC’s regulations also reveal the importance it
places on receiving reports from employees concerning
1 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 70.51 (material balances, inventory and
record-keeping requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.52 (accident, loss and
theft reporting requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.53 (material status
reporting requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.54 (nuclear material trans-
fer reporting requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.55 (NRC inspection
requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.56 (licensee and NRC testing re-
quirements) ; 10 C.F.R. § 70.57 (nuclear material measurement con-
trol program) ; 10 C.F.R. § 70.58 (fundamental nuclear material con-
trols); 10 C.F.R. § 70.59 (effluent monitoring reporting require-
ments).
19
possible safety violations. Although employees, unlike
directors and responsible officers, are not subject to civil
penalties for a failure to report safety problems, the
NRC has taken a number of steps to encourage them
to notify the Commission of any violations they dis-
cover. The regulations require, for example, that em-
ployers establish procedures to ensure that responsible
officers and directors in fact réceive employees’ reports of
safety problems (10 C.F.R. § 21.21(a) (2)); in addition,
employees must be “instructed of their responsibility to
report promptly to the licensee any condition which may
lead to or cause a violation of Commission regulations and
licenses” (10 C.F.R. § 19.12) (emphasis added): allowed
“to consult privately” with Commission inspectors dur-
ing facility inspections concerning matters that may
relate to “any violation of the [Atomic Energy] act”
(10 C_.F.R. §§ 19.14, 19.15); and allowed to “request”
that the NRC conduct an inspection (10 C.F.R. § 19.16).
The NRC’s regulations implementing Section 210 dem-
onstrate that this provision, like Section 206, plays an
integral role in ensuring that the NRC receives the in-
formation it needs to ensure safe operation of nuclear
facilities. The Commission itself has explained that “to
effectively fulfill its mandate, [the NRC] requires com-
plete, factual, and current information concerning the
regulated activities of its licensees. Employees are an
important source of such information and should be en-
couraged to come forth with any items of potential sig-
nificance to safety without fear of retribution from their
employers.” 47 Fed. Reg. 30,453 (1982); see also Pet.
App. 4la (“The need to protect channels of information
from being dried up by employer intimidation is the
purpose of the Act”). Accordingly, “to ensure that em-
ployees are aware that employment discrimination for
. contacting the Commission is illegal and that a
remedy exists,” the Commission has developed a stand-
ard form (Form NRC-3) that alerts employees to their
reporting responsibilities and the protection afforded them
by Section 210. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,453. The Commission
20
requires all licensees to keep this form posted ‘at loca-
tions sufficient to permit employees protected by [Sec-
tion 210] to observe a copy on the way to or from
their place of work.” 10 C.F.R. § 70.7(e). Moreover, the
NRC has entered into an agreement with the Secretary
of Labor to ensure that it promptly receives notice of
any Section 210 claim filed with the Secretary and can
“cooperate to the fullest extent possible” in the investi-
gation. 47 Fed. Reg. 54,585 (1982) ."
Most telling, however, is the significance that the NRC
places on retaliation against those who report safety
concerns. Proof of such retaliation by a licensee is itself
a safety concern so serious that it is grounds for, among
other penalties, “denial, revocation, or suspension of the
license.” 10 C.F.R. § 70.7(c). See 10 C.F.R. Part 2, App.
C at V.D and Supp. VII.A.4, B.4, C.4 (retaliation deemed
comparable in severity to other “serious” safety viola-
tions). Accordingly, the NRC has investigated and pun-
ished licensees who retaliate against employees who raise
safety concerns. See, e.g., In re Toledo Edison Co., EA
88-234 (Nov. 10, 1988) (modifying license and imposing
$80,000 fine); Jn re Tennessee Valley Auth., EA 86-93
(July 10, 1986) ($150,000 fine); Jn re Illinois Power
Co., EA 86-143 (Dec. 17, 1986) ($50,000 fine); see also
note 2, supra.
2. The NRC’s integration of Section 210 into its core
safety and licensing responsibility is fully consistent with
Congress’s intent. Indeed, it is apparent from the legisla-
tive history and structure of Section 210 that Congress
intended to integrate this provision into the broader
11 The Secretary of Labor has recognized the employee’s important
role in providing information to the NRC. See, e.g., Nunn v. Duke
Power Co., A.L.J. Dec., Vol. 1, No. 4, 84-ERA-27 (July-Aug. 1987)
(As set out in Form NRC-3, “violations of NRC rules should be
reported immediately to the employee’s supervisor and if adequate
corrective action is not taken, then to N.R.C.”); Wilson v. Bechtel
Constr., Inc., A.L.J. Dec., Vol. 2, No. 1, 86-ERA-34 (Jan.-Feb. 1988)
(same).
21
scheme of nuclear safety regulation over which it had
given the NRC exclusive control. As the Senate Report
accompanying Section 210 explains, ‘“[u]nder this sec-
tion, employees and union officials could help assure that
employers do not violate requirements of the Atomic
Energy Act.” S. Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.
2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
7303, 7304. Rep. Udall, in alerting his colleagues in the
House to the Senate bill in which the language of Section
210 first appeared, underscored the link between the
NRC’s exclusive responsibility for ensuring nuclear safety
and the role of Section 210:
[T]he other body does have language in its bill deal-
ing with the subject of whistleblower protection,
language which I look upon sympathetically. . . . I,
for one, believe that the NRC must be able to pro-
tect its sources of information to do an effective
job of protecting the health and safety of the Amer-
ican people.
124 Cong. Rec. 33,255 (1978) (emphasis added).'*
Moreover, the structure of Section 210 confirms what
the legislative history makes plain, which is that Con-
gress viewed employee protection in the nuclear context
not simply as an end in itself, but as a means jto the
ultimate end of enhancing nuclear safety.'* For example,
if employee protection were the only significant purpose
for Section 210, then the requirement that any complaint
12 See also 124 Cong. Rec. 29,769 (1978) (statement of Sen.
McClure) (Finally, the Committee has recommended a provision to
protect any worker who is discriminated against by his employer for
providing assistance to the NRC in the discharge of its regulatory
responsibilities”) (emphasis added); Pet. App. 18a-19a (‘‘the legis-
lative history” of Section 210 indicates that safety concerns are
“inextricably intertwined” with employee protection).
13 See DeFord vy. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir.
1983) (“The purpose of the Act is to prevent employers from dis-
couraging cooperation with NRC investigators, and not merely to
prevent employers from inhibiting disclosure of particular facts or
types of information” ).
22
be brought within 30 days of the alleged violation would
seem unnecessarily strict. But this short time-require-
ment makes perfect sense given the broader recognition,
explicit in the NRC regulations, that the fact of em-
ployer retaliation is itself a serious safety concern: The
NRC views retaliation as an independent basis for re-
voking or modifying a license, and as an action which
should be reported to the NRC without delay."* See
page 20, supra.
The structure of Section 210 also reflects Congress’s
awareness that whistleblower protection, while critical to
achieving optimal workplace safety, nevertheless carries
its own threat to safety if abused. This recognition of
the need to balance the provision of employee protection
against the broader concern of ensuring overall work-
place safety is explicit in subsection (g). This provi-
sion denies statutory protection “to any employee who,
acting without direction from his or her employer .. .
deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of this
Act or of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.”
42 U.S.C. § 5851(g). The Senate Report explains that
Congress added subsection (g) “to avoid abuse of the
protection afforded under this section” (S. Rep. No. 848
at 30).
14 Amici National Conference of State Legislatures, et al.
(“NCSL”) relies (Br. 17) upon Congress’s decision to use the Sec-
retary of Labor to administer Section 210 as evidence that Congress
did not intend to use that provision to promote safety concerns.
But the memorandum of understanding between the NRC and the
Secretary (47 Fed. Reg. 54,585) reveals clearly the closeness of the
relationship between Section 210 and the NRC’s plenary authority to
control safety in the operations of a nuclear facility. It seems obvi-
ous that Congress chose the Secretary of Labor to receive these com-
plaints in order to encotrage individuals to file them. Congress
recognized that employees, such as petitioner, who have attempted
without success to bring a safety concern to the attention of the
NRC would be more willing to file a complaint if it would be heard
by a neutral, third party. Thus, the Secretary's role is fully con-
sistent with the provisior’s purpose of promoting safety in the
operation of a nuclear facility.
23
By excluding from coverage those employees who them-
selves have deliberately caused a safety or other viola-
tion, Congress intended subsection (g) to assure employ-
ers that they can take appropriate measures to discipline
employees who deliberately create safety hazards, with-
out running a significant risk of liability. As petitioner’s
own conduct illustrates, the question whether an employee
has deliberately violated safety regulations and thereby
poses a threat to the health and safety of workers and
the public lies at the heart of the safe operation of a
nuclear facility. In the context of four decades of exclu-
sive federal control over nuclear safety, “[i]t is unlikely
—to say the least—that Congress intended” to allow this
vital question to be resolved under “a variety of common-
law rules,” Jnternational Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 496-97 (1987), or to allow tort actions in state
courts to strip employers of the immunity so carefully
built into subsection (g), when the alleged “whistleblow-
er” is also a safety violator. The inclusion of subsection
(g) alone establishes that Congress intended Section 210
to operate as an integral part of the system of exclusive
federal control over nuclear safety.
Congress’s approach to the controversial and important
subject of punitive damages is also revealing. If Con-
gress’s sole interest was to encourage workers to bring
complaints by deterring retaliation, it would have au-
thorized employees to obtain punitive damages (and
might well have dispensed with administrative review
altogether). Instead, Section 210(b)(2)(B) authorizes
only the Secretary to seek punitive damages, and then
only when the employer has compounded the underlying
violation by flouting the Secretary’s remedial order. 42
U.S.C. $5851(d). It is desirable, for safety reasons,
for employers not to be deterred from taking appropriate
disciplinary action, and the clear limit in Section 210 on
18 Whistleblower-protection provisions in two other statutes ex-
pressly allow the employee to seek punitive damages. See Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B) (ii); Toxie Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b).
24
the use of punitive damages reflects the statute’s over-
all purpose of enhancing the safe operation of nuclear
facilities.'®
As this Court has often observed, “‘[t]he presump-
tion that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a
statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a com-
prehensive legislative scheme including an integrated sys-
tem of procedures for enforcement.’” Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985),
quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,
Inc., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). Moreover, as with other
statutes providing comprehensive enforcement procedures,
in construing Section 210 the Court may reasonably
conclude that important “policy choices [are] reflected
in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others. .. .” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. DeDeaux, 481 US.
41, 54 (1987). Here, Congress’s decision to allow only
the Secretary, and not employees, to seek punitive dam-
ages makes eminently good sense in light of the overall
safety purposes of Section 210.
Given the long history of exclusive federal control over
nuclear energy, Congress is presumed to have been aware
when it added Section 210 to the Energy Reorganization
Act that it was legislating in an area of exclusive federal
eontrol. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244
(1972). Indeed, Congress could not have chosen simply
to build on existing state remedies because the aspect of
16 See, e.g., Guy Vv. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 812 F.2d 911,
917 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the “danger that the always
uncertain prospects of [wrongful discharge] litigation will deter
employers . . . from legitimate personnel decisions”); Dartey Vv.
Zack Co., 82-ERA-2, slip op. 11 (Secretary’s Decision, April 25,
1983) (employer “may well have been justified in firing’ employee,
but instead suspended him “out of an excess of caution because .. .
it was mindful of the protections of section 5851”); Wood v.
Yeargin Constr. Co., 79-ERA-3, slip op. 8-9 (Secretary’s Decision,
Nov. 8, 1979) (dismissing section 210 claim and noting that “[i]n
view of the risk to the plant and public offered by [employee’s}
propensities, his discharge was overdue when it occurred’’).
25
employee protection at issue here (unlike in Silkwood) is
not a traditional area of state concern. When Congress
enacted Section 210 in 1978, the vast majority of states
did not even recognize a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge,"’ and state law with regard to “intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress’ was no more clear or
consistent than it is today. See Atchi m, T. & S. F.
Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568-70 & nn. 17-19 (1987)
(discussing at length “the doctrinal divergences” in state
law on intentional infliction of emotional distress).
3. Petitioner and the United States assert, but do not
argue directly, that Section 210 lies outside the field of
nuclear safety regulation. Pet. Br. 22 n.9; S.G. Br. 12.
17 [',,aei the at-will doctrine, terminated employees cannot recover
damages under a cause of action for wrongful, abusive or retaliatory
discharge. By 1978 only ten states had recognized a cause of action
where an employer terminated an employee in clear contravention of
a stror.g public poiicy of the state or in bad faiir See Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P-2c 25 (Cal. 1959):
Frampton vy. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974): Nees v.
Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d
151 (Mich. 1976) ; Jacksoa v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54
(Idaho 1977); Fortune y. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d
1251 (Mass. 1977); O’Suliivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2¢ 149 (N.J. 1978):
Harless vy. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1972):
Reuther v Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. 1978). More-
over, when Section 210 was enacted, eight states had expressly re-
jected such a cause of action. See Raley v. Darling Shop of Green-
ville, Inc., 59 S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 1950); Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil
Co., 300 So.2d 510 (La. App. 1974); Yanta v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 389 (Wis. 1974): Hinrichs v. Tranauilaire
Hospital, 352 So.2a 1130 (Ala. 1977); Segal v. Arrow Industries
Corp., 364 So.2d 89 (Fla. App. 1978); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin,
250 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 197°); Seroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d
881 (Ky. App. 1977); Dockery \. Lampart Table Co., 244 S.E.2d
272 (N.C. App. 1978). While today at least 26 states allow common
law exceptions to the at-will doctrine, whether a discharged em-
ployee can recover depends upon the particuler state’s law. Thus,
when Congress enacted Section 210, it did not impose an adminis-
trative scheme upon an area traditionally regulated by the states.
26
They attempt to hide behind the district court’s statement
that the “paramount purpose” of Section 210 is not to
pro.note nuclear safety (Pet. App. 19a), and move on to
argue against preemption on other grounds. But the
district court’s observation provides no real shelter, for
two reasons. First, as the foregoing discussion illustrates,
the district court simply erred in viewing Section 210
apart from its statutory context and history. Second,
the district court asked the wrong question. By stating
that “[t]he question, therefore, is whether Congress put
safety or employee protection first” (Pet. App. 19a), the
district court implied that Section 210 could have only
one significant purpose. Statutes as complex as Section
210 typically have multiple purposes, however, and the
relevant question for preemption purposes is whether
promoting nuclear safety is at least one of Section 210’s
important purposes. The NRC’s regulations alone es-
tablish that Section 210 is an integral part of the NRC’s
exclusive and core responsibility to ensure the safe op-
eration of nuclear facilities.
The Solicitor General’s further argument that Section
210, as a single provision, cannot “occupy a ‘field’”’ (S.G.
Br. 8) is similarly without merit. By asking the Court
to view Section 210 in isolation from the statute it
amended, the Solicitor General arbitrarily compartmen-
talizes the analysis. The Solicitor General’s approach
would have merit if Cor.cess had enacted Section 210
alone as a private, federal cause of action and had not
enacted the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reor-
ganization Act. Compare California v. ARC America
Corp., 109 S.Ct. 1661 (1989) (passage of one remedial
statute does not necessarily preempt complementary state
remedial action). But Congress enacted Section 210 as
an integral part of the entire package of nuclear safety
legislation. A proper field-preemption analysis, no less
than any proper statutory analysis, must take into ac-
count the broader statutory framework of which a par-
ticular provision is simply one part. EF.g., Transcontin-
ental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 474
27
U.S. 409, 422-23 (1986). Section 210’s statutory struc-
ture confirms what is apparent from the legislative his-
tory and from the NRC’s implementing regulations: Con-
gress intended Section 210 to be interpreted as an impor-
tant part of the broader scheme of federal nuclear safety
legislation that defines an area of exclusive federal con-
trol, off limits to all state regulation—that which conflicts
and that which may complement the federal scheme.
C. Section 210 Preempts State Law Claims For Inten-
tional Infliction Of Emotional Distress That Arise
Out Of Retaliatory Employment Action For Whis-
tleblowing At A Nuclear Facility.
1. Because Section 210 falls squarely within “the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns” (Pacific Gas &
Electric, 461 U.S. at 212) over which Congress has given
the federal government exclusive authority, it necessarily
follows that Congress has displaced state law reinedies
for this same conduct. See Silkwood v. Kerr-lIcGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250-51, 256 (1984) (acknowledging
that state tort law remedies can intrude into the feld of
nuclear safety regulation). As the district court cor-
rectly recognized, virtually all of the conduct supporting
petitioner’s claim for intentional infliction of emoticnal
distress is conduct related to the “terms, conditions, ard
privileges of employment” for which Section 210 provide:
a comprehensive compensatory remedy. Pet. App. 18a,
28a; J.A. 7. To determine, as a matter of state law,
whether these changes in the terms of employment con-
stituted “outrageous conduct” or were instead an appro-
priate response, consistent with subsection (g), to an
employee who posed a significant risk to workplace safety,
the jury would necessarily be forced to consider and re-
solve questions of the proper operation of a nuclear
facility that Congress intended the Secretary of Labor,
in consultation with the NRC, to address.'®
18The proceeding before the ALJ in this case illustrates the
overlap between petitioner’s state law claim and the scope of Sec-
tion 210. The ALJ held 11 days of hearings, heard testimony from
petitioner’s psychologist concerning her emotional distress, and
28
It is worth emphasizing that the preemption of state
tort law in this context is not an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion. A proper preemption analysis requires a court to
examine the state law claim against the field that
Congress has occupied. Section 210 provides a safety-
related mechanism for protecting employees in the nu-
clear industry against retaliatory employment action for
their legitimate attempts to report safety concerns. Fed-
eral law preempts this subject, even if the employee char-
acterizes the employer’s employment-related discipline as
a tort. To the extent the employee’s claim arises from
conduct clearly outside the scope of Section 219, however,
state law is not displaced. See note 8, supra.
In this case, the district court performed precisely this
analysis. Although it held that petitioner’s allegations
stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, it also held that what is left of petitioner’s com-
plaint after removing those allegations that are within
the ambit of Section 210 “would not in and of itself
support a cause of action” under North Carolina law for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pet. App. 28a.
This interpretation of state law by a district judge sitting
in North Carolina, which was affirmed by the court of
appeals, is ordinarily not subject to review by this
Court.’® and has never been challenged by petitioner and
her amici. Nor could it be.”°
awarded petitioner $70,000 damages “as recompense for [her]
humiliation and mental suffering.” Pet. App. 37a-39a, 55a. See
also id. 45a-46a n.& (Secretary “must determine whether Claimant’s
overall conduct was so generally inimical to Employer’s interests
and so excessive as to be beyond the protection of the statute....
fand] balance the setting in which the activity arises and the in-
terests and motivations of both Employer and Employee”).
19 See, e.g., Bowen Vv. Massachusetts, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 2739 (1988) ;
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1985);
Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629-30 (1946).
20 The district court’s interpretation is plainly correct. In inter-
preting a complaint in this area, a court must be guided by the
29
Petitioner therefore is simply wrong in arguing (Pet
Br. 18) that if this Court holds ll saline ~
claim preempted, then it must hold that all tort claims
against an employer are preempted. Petitioner contends
that if respondent “decided to retaliate against Ms. Eng-
lish for her activities by hiring some ‘thugs’ and actually
physically assaulting her, the decision below leaves her
with no remedy for injuries and medical bills.’ Jd.
N onsense. A decision to hire thugs to assault an employee
is hardly a decision to change the “terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment” within the meaning of Section
210. This Court has never had difficulty distinguishing
between claims for “intentional infliction of emotional
distress” arising out of changes in the terms and condi-
tions of employment and similar claims arising out of
other illegal conduct. E.g., Farmer v. United Brother-
hood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 303-07 (1977). Thus
in holding petitioner’s claim preempted in this case be-
cause it is based on the same employment-related conduct
addressed by Section 210, this Court need not and should
not reach out to preempt state law remedies for injuries
inflicted on whistleblowing employees through conduct
ago that Page, within the compass of” Section
, San Diego Bldq. Trades mei 59 U
oe uae aan g Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S
rule that “compliance with the intent of Congress cannot be avoided
by mere artful pleading.” Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. vy Kalo
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 324 (1981). Here, dismissal of the
complaint is consistent even with petitioner’s broadest allegations.
Her claims of ridicule and’ harassment are allegations which by
definition will exist almost always whenever an employee is subjected
to discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. These allega-
tions are fully cognizable under Section 210. English v Whit field
858 F.2d 957, 963-64 (4th Cir, 1988). . ae hi
; *1 In evaluating the sweep of the preempted field defined by Sec-
tion 210, the Court should employ the same standard embraced for
labor law preemption, viz., there can be no remedy under state law
for conduct that either is prohibited or is “arguable” prohibited
by Section 210. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246. This rule fully protects
the federal interest while allowing the states to provide yemedies
30
2. In Pacific Gas & Electric, this Court affirmed the
principle that when Congress has preempted a field, state
law that intrudes into that field is preempted, regardless
of its purpose or potential for conflict, unless there is
evidence that Congress “expressly ceded to the States”
the authority to act. Jd. at 212. Thus, the appropriate
analytic framework in this case is precisely the opposite
of that put forth by petitioner and her amici. This is
not a situation where the Company must demonstrate
manifest congressional intent to preempt this specific
state tort rule; the “special features” of the congressional
scheme regulating nuclear safety establish Congress’s pre-
emptive intent. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Ter-
minal, 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973). Instead, it is incumbent
upon petitioner to demonstrate that Congress specifically
intended te authorize a tort action that overlaps with a
Section 210 proceeding.
In both Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), this Court upheld
state laws that operated in fields where Congress had
expressly ceded the states a role. In Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric, the Court upheld the California moratorium on new
plant construction because Congress had expressly con-
ferred upon the states the right “to determine—as a mat-
ter of economics—whether a nuclear plant . . . should be
built.” 461 U.S. at 222.
In Silkwood, the Court recognized that allowing state
law remedies for those injured by radiation in a nuclear
plant intruded on the exclusive field of nuclear safety.
Id. at 250-51, 256. The Court upheld the state law at
issue in Silkwood against field preemption, however, be-
cause it found express evidence in the legislative history
for conduct that simr’y has nothing to do with Section 210. Thus,
for instance, becau acts of violence are not arguably within Sec-
tion’s 210’s prohiL.cion, state law torts for assault or battery would
not be preempted.
31
of the Atomic Energy Act,”* consistent with the test
established in Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 212,
that “Congress assumed that traditional principles of
State tort law would apply with full force” to compen-
sate those who suffered radiation injuries, and “intended
-. .. to tolerate whatever tension” might result with the
NRC’s exclusive authority over nuclear safety. 464 U.S.
at 255-56. The Court found further support in the fact
that Congress had not provided any comparable remedy
for victims of radiation. Id. at 251. In so holding, the
Court emphasized that its holding was a narrow one lim-
ited to “damages for radiation injuries,” and was not
intended to “suggest that there could never be an instance
in which the federal law would pre-empt the recovery of
damages based on state law.” Jd. at 256.
There has been no showing in this case, nor could
there be a showing, that Congress expressly ceded to the
states the right to regulate the aspect of nuclear safety
otherwise fully regulated by Section 210. Neither pe-
titioner nor the United States is able to point to any-
thing in the language or the legislative history of Section
210, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended,
or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, that
refers in any way to the right of states to regulate the
aspect of nuclear safety addressed by Section 210.%
*2Specifically, the Court looked to the legislative history of the
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (which
amended the Atomic Energy Act), and to subsequent amendments
of Price-Anderson. 464 U.S. at 251-55.
*3 Petitioner does suggest that in Section 274(k) of the Atomic
Energy Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k), Congress granted
states authority “to regulate activities connected with atomic
energy.” See Pet. Br. 21-22. Subsection (k) provides petitioner
no support, however, for two reasons. First, this Court squarely
foreclosed an expansive reading of subsection (k) in Pacific Gas &
Electric: It held that subsection (k) “does not represent an affirma-
tive grant of power to the States.” 461 U.S. at 210. The Court
explained that subsection (k) simply “underscored the distinction
drawn in 1954 between the spheres of activity left respectively
32
The critical facts on which the Court based its de-
cision not to preempt the state laws in Pacific Gas &
Electric and in Silkwood are therefore absent here. Un-
like Pacific Gas & Electric, phe law ai a
does not operate in the field of economic concern -
pressly aa by Congress to the states. Unlike Silkwood,
there is no legislative history of any kind from which to
draw an inference of congressional intent not to preempt
these state law remedies. More striking still, unlike in
Silkwood, Congress here has enacted a comprehensive
remedial and enforcement scheme, providing not only re-
instatement and back pay, but also full compensatory
relief, costs, and attorney’s fees for those who suffer
injuries of the sort alleged here. E.g., DeF ord v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 288-89 (6th Cir. 1983).
Under this Court’s established field preemption doctrine,
as applied in both Pacific Gas & Electric and in Silkwood,
there is no basis for exempting petitioner’s claim from
preemption.
D. State Law That Infringes On A Field Reserved Ex-
clusively For Federal Control Is Preempted Re-
gardless Of Its Purpose.
Because they have no evidence that Congress intended
to allow the States to regulate the “whistleblower” as-
pect of nuclear operations and safety, petitioner and the
United States have resorted to the argument that state
law may invade a field exclusively reserved to the fed-
eral government se long as the state’s purpose in passing
its law is different from the purpose behind the federal
law. See Pet. Br. 10; S.G. Br. 7, 12-14. That argument
to the Federal Government and the States.” Jd. Second, as the
Court also explained in Pacific Gas & Electric, subsection (k) by
its plain terms “limits only the pre-emptive effect of this section,
that is, § 274 [governing federal-state agreements].” Id. It there-
fore does not serve to limit the preemptive scope of other sections,
such as Section 53, 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (under which respondent's
facility is licensed) or Section 210 of the ERA. See International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492-94 (1987).
33
fundamentally distorts the doctrine of field preemption
as this Court has consistently applied it.”
In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1947), this Court addressed a federal statutory scheme
giving “exclusive” authority to the Secretary of Agri-
culture to license and regulate warehouses. 331 U.S. at
233. In light of this exclusive authority, the Court es-
tablished the following test for determining questions of
preemption:
The test, therefore, is whether the matter on which
the State asserts the right to act is in any way reg-
ulated by the Federal Act. If it is, the federal
scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less
pervasive regulatory plan than that of the State.
Id. at 236 (emphasis added). Rice squarely forecloses
the Solicitor General’s theory of preemption, because
what matters according to Rice is not the purpose for
the state’s action but “the matter on which the State
asserts the right to act.” Id. As Rice makes plain, once
a court finds that this matter is one that is “in any
way regulated by the Federal Act,” the state law is
preempted. Jd. In subsequent decisions, this Court has
*4 Amici NCSL, et al., are more open in their attempt to undo
the doctrine of field preemption. They argue (Br. 15-16) that in
Silkwood this Court abandoned field preemption in the nuclear
field and held that “preemption analysis in matters nuclear would
henceforth focus on whether ‘there is an irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the federal and state standards or whether the imposition
of a state standard in a damages action would frustrate the ob-
jectives of the federal law’ (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256).
But in the very passage in Silkwood on which NCSL relies, the
Court explains that conflict preemption is relevant only “insofar
as damages for radiation injuries are concerned” because Congress
had expressly indicated that its preemption of the field of nuclear
safety did not extend to state tort law remedies for such injv ‘ies.
Id. Apart from this misreading of Silkwood, neither the NCSL
nor the Solicitor General explains why the Court should overrule
decades of settled preemption law or substitute “conflict” preemp-
tion standards for field preemption standards ‘n an area of un-
questioned federal supremacy.
34
squarely rejected the “suggestjion] that... |preemp-
tion] should depend upon whether the purposes of the
two laws are parallel or divergent.” Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. V. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)
(emphasis in original) ; see, e.g., id. (“The test of whether
both federal and state regulations may operate... is
whether both regulations can be enforced without im-
pairing the federal superintendence of the field, not
whether they are aimed at similar or different objec-
tives”); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los An-
geles, 475 U.S. 608, 618-19 (1986) (although city’s pur-
pose is “simply” to exercise ‘a traditional municipal
function,” its action is preempted because it “intrudes
into the collective bargaining process’) ; Perez v. Camp-
bell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) (“such a doctrine would
enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted
federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative com-
mittee report articulating some state interest or policy—
other than frustration of the federal objective—that
would be tangentiaily furthered by the proposed state
law’). Compare Br. for United States at 26-27, Pacific
Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation
and Dev. Comm’n, No. 81-1945 (1983) (“This Court has
long recognized the irrelevance of legislative motives to
questions of preemption”’).
In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court held the preemp-
tion rule announced in Fice fully applicable to the field
of nuclear safety:
25 For example, under the Solicitor General’s view, a state law
prohibiting cable television operators from broadcasting commer-
cials for alcoholic beverages would no longer be subject to field
preemption, despite its invasion of the federal government’s ex-
clusive authority over cable communications, because the state law
“also effectuates a public policy [reducing alcohol abuse] distinct
from [the agency’s purpose of regulating signal carviage].” S.G.
Br. 14 n.8. But that result is flatly inconsistent with this Court’s
decision in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. vy. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 704-05
(1984) (state law prohibiting alcoholic beverage commercials “‘tres-
passes into the exclusive domain of the FCC” and is preempted).
35
When the Federal Government completely occupies
a given field or an identifiable portion of it, as it
has done here, the test of preemption is whether
“the matter on which the State asserts the right to
act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.”
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S., at 236.
461 U.S. at 212-13. The application of this test here is
straightforward. The ‘matter on which the state as-
serts the right to act” is the emotional distress allegedly
suffered by an employee at a nuclear facility because
her employer allegedly retaliated against her for raising
safety concerns about the plant. This is a matter that
is directly regulated by federal law as part of a com-
prehensive scheme of nuclear licensing exclusively re-
served by Congress to the NRC. Under the test estab-
lished in Rice and reaffirmed in Pacific Gas & Electric,
petitioner’s claim is preempted because Congress has
deliberately and carefully occupied this field.
The Solicitor General’s suggestion (S.G. Br. 12-13)
that this Court somehow altered this basic preemption
principle by examining the purpose behind the California
statute in Pacific Gas & Electr: is flatly wrong. Al-
though the Court examined the state’s legislative pur-
pose, it did so solely to determine whether the reguiation
fell within the limited area that Congress explicitly
carved out of the otherwise preempted field.** Not only
did the Court in Pacific Gas & Electric explicitly reaf-
firm the reasoning in Rice (461 U.S. at 212-13), it,ex-
pressly stated that the state legislature’s purpose was
irrelevant to the question of field preemption:
*6 The Court explained that an inquiry into legislative purpose
was essential in order to determine how that law should be ‘“‘con-
strued and classified.” Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 212-13.
As the Court explained, “[a] state moratorium on nuclear construc-
tion grounded in safety concerns falls squarely within the pro-
hibited field,” while a moratorium “aimed at economic problems,”
the resolution of which Congress had expressly ceded to the States,
does not. Jd. at 213.
36
At the outset, we emphasize that the statute does
not seek to regulate the construction or operation of
a nuclear powerplant. It would clearly be imper-
missible for California to attempt to do so, for
such regulation, even if enacted out of nonsafety
concerns, would nevertheless directly conflict with
the NRC’s exclusive authority over plant construc-
tion and operation.
461 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added). That holding lays
to rest petitioner’s and her amici’s heavy reliance upon
the purpose of state law as a legitimate basis for avoid-
ing preemption in this case.
Il. PETITIONER’S STATE LAW CLAIM IS PRE-
EMPTED BECAUSE IT STANDS AS AN OBSTA-
CLE TO THE FULL ACHIEVEMENT OF CON-
GRESS’S OBJECTIVES IN REGULATING THE
SAFETY AND OPERATIONS OF NUCLEAR FA-
CILITIES.
As discussed above, when Congress has reserved a par-
ticular field to the exclusive control of the federal gov-
ernment, state regulation that trespasses on that field is
preempted regardless of whether it conflicts with or even
complements federal law. Petitioner’s claim, however,
also “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67. This frus-
tration of congressional purpose establishes an independ-
ent basis for preemption under this Court’s conflict-
preemption principles. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 US.
725, 747 (1981).
In analyzing conflict preemption, Section 210 should
not be viewed as “merely a single statutory provision
granting a remedy to employees in one industry for one
type of discrimination by employers.” S.G. Br. 17. Sec-
tion 210 is “‘a comprehensive legislative scheme includ-
ing an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.’ 24
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 147 (1985), quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. V.
37
Transport Workers, Inc., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). In
examining such schemes, the Court has observed that
the remedies Congress has chosen to provide and to omit
must be presumed to reflect important policy choices
and has preempted state law that would upset the “care-
ful balancing” that these choices reflect. Pilot Life Ins
Co. V. DeDeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).2* Furthermore,
Section 210 must be analyzed not in isolation, or against
employee protection provisions in other statutes.2* but
against the background and purposes of the ERA and
the Atomic Energy Act. International Paper Co. v
Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 498 (1987) (for preemption pur-
poses, statutory provision must be analyzed in the context
of the statute “as a whole, its purposes and its history”).
A. Congress’s Objective In Enacting Section 210 Was
To Create A Balanced Scheme That Would Further
The Goal of Ensuring The Safe Operation Of
Nuclear Facilities.
Section 210 is not concerned with the ordinary terms
of employment in the nuclear industry, but with a dis-
tinct aspect .of the employment relationship: protecting
employees against job-related retaliation based on their
report of possible safety hazards. As we have discussed
the structure, legislative history and regulations imple-
menting Section 210 all reveal the basic point that the
*7 See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles
rage — 619 (1986); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
oats, Ine., 109 S.Ct. 971, 975 (1989); Hisquierd ] er
439 U.S. 572, 588 (1979). ——
*8 Employee protection provisions in other statutes are of little
relevance here. First, those statutes, which typically adopt a
joint federal/state approach to regulation, differ Sendumantaliy
from the Atomic Energy Act. Train vy. Colorado Pub Retevest
Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). Second the seevi-
sions themselves vary significantly across statutes. For example
two such provisions allow employees to obtain punitive damages.
see note 15, supra, while one does not even provide compensatory
relief. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). Each provision therefore reflects Con-
gress’s attempt “to tailor [employee protection] to the needs of
th[e] bill.” 120 Cong. Rec. 36,393 (1974) (statement of Rep. Heinz).
38
employee protection provided by Section 210 is an impor-
tant means to the fundamental goal of ensuring the safe
operation of nuclear facilities. ~
Allowing state tort claims for injuries that are com-
pensable under Section 210 would frustrate two impor-
tant safety-related purposes of Section 210. First, allow-
ing such claims would significantly delay or eliminate
notification to the NRC that an allegation of retaliation
has been made, an incident that is itself a serious safety
concern. Second, allowing such claims would undermine
Congress’s goal of ensuring that employers are not un-
duly deterred from taking responsible disciplinary action.
Thus, the courts below correctly held that petitioner’s
claim directly impeded the purposes of Section 210 as re-
flected in the various elements of this remedial scheme.
B. Failure To Preempt State Law Claims For Injuries
Arisin, 1+ Of Conduct Regulated By Section 210
Would P:. ‘ude This Statute From Fully Achieving
Its Purposc’
1. Allowing employees to bring state tort claims based
on the same conduct governed by Section 210 would
seriously impair the ability of the NRC to fulfill its
statutory mandate to ensure nuclear workplace safety.
E.q., 47 Fed. Reg. 30,452 (1982). While Section 210
requires employees to file their claims of workplace dis-
crimination within 30 days, and requires the Secretary
to investigate such claims promptly, state tort claims
have statutes of limitations measured in years rather
than days; an employee therefore could delay for years
before bringing her claim. Moreover, even if the claim
is brought in court relatively quickly, such a filing does
not trigger any notice to the NRC.
Petitioner argues that as a practical matter the NRC
will always receive notice because the premise for the
retaliation will necessarily be a complaint to the NRC.
But this argument is flawed in two fundamental re-
spects. First, Section 210 repeatedly has been held to
preclude retaliation not only for complaints made to the
. —e es
39
NRC, but also for threats to complain to the NRC and
for complaints voiced solely to the employer.*’ Second,
and more fundamentally, the NRC views an act of re-
taliation itself as a safety violation of significant concern
—potentially serious enough to warrant revocativn of a
license. 10 C.F.R. § 7 (c); see page 20, supra. State
law remedies that allow employees to bypass the statu-
torily provided complaint procedures and therefore fail
to notify the Secretary (who in ‘urn notifies the NRC)
of retaliatory employment action seriously impede a cen-
tral purpose of the statute.”
2. Allowing state law claims such as petitioner’s to go
forward also would deter employers from taking appro-
priate disciplinary action by creating considerable un-
certainty and inconsistency in the treatment of employ-
*9 All appellate courts (but one) that have reached the issue
have held that Section 210 applies to retaliation for safety com-
plaints voiced only to the employer. See, e.g., Mackowiak v. Uni-
versity Nuclear Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984):
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1511-13 (10th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1011 (1986); Consolidated Edison Co.
of N.Y., Inc. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982). But see
Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1031 (5th Cir.
1984). The Secretary has consistently ruled that internal com-
plaints constitute protected activity, Lopez v. West Texas Util.
86-ERA-25 (July 26, 1988) (citing Francis v. Bogan, 86-ERA-2
(April 1, 1988) ), and has expressly rejected Brown & Root. Nunn v.
Duke Power Co., 84-ERA-27 (July 30, 1987).
* The Department of Labor recentiy recognized the potential for
conflict between a state tort remedy and Section 210. During hear-
ings on H.R. 3368, an omnibus whistleblower protection bill cur-
rently pending in Congress, the Solicitor of Labor testified that “in
order to preclude duplicative State law proceedings,” the bill “should
preempt State whistleblower claims premised on State wrongful
discharge statutes and common law.” Whistleblower Protection Act:
Hearing on H.R. 3368 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management
Relations of the House Cow a. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong.,
Ist ‘Sess. 69 (1989). The dministration later explained that a fed-
eral remedial scheme shou preempt state law claims because other-
wise “the federal agency wit substantive health and safety responsi-
bilities” would not be notifie. ‘and an important goal of [the fed-
eral law] would be frustrated.” d. at 246.
40
ment discrimination claims. Subsection (g), which pre-
cludes recovery for an employee who “deliberately causes
a violation of any requirement of [the Energy Reorgani-
zation] Act or of the Atomic Energy Act” (42 U.S.C.
§ 5851(g), reflects Congress’s concern not to deter em-
ployers from taking appropriate disciplinary action
where necessary to protect workplace safety. As the dis-
trict court found, state cort law contains no analogue to
subsection (g).
The Solicitor General suggests that the subsection (g)
exemption could be treated by juries as a federal defense.
S.G. Br. 21. Such an approach does not avoid the conflict
problems, but compounds them. Treating subsection (g)
as a “defense” for the jury merely to weigh against
plaintiff’s claims would still conflict with Congress’s in-
tent, because subsection (g) excludes from coverage em-
ployees who deliberately cause nuclear violations; treat-
ing subsection .g) as an absolute bar to relief under
state law, however, merely begs the question why, if
subsection (g) effectively preempts state law, the balance
of Section 210 does not do so as well. Moreover, the
Solicitor General’s disagreement with the courts below
over the scope and meaning of subsection (g) demon-
strates how employers will be subjected to conflicting de-
terminations of liability even if subsection (g) is trans-
formed into a federal defense.”
31 The Solicitor General’s interpretation that subsection (g) bars
relief only for employees who “have ‘blown the whistle’ on the very
safety violation that they have caused” (S.G. Br. 22 n.14) is unduly
narrow. It authorizes the Secretary of Labor to reinstate (and pro-
vide compensatory relief to) employees who have deliberately
caused numerous violations of the Atomic Energy Act, so long as
they have reported other safety violations to the NRC. Surely Con-
gress intended to foreclose such a dangerous result when it added
subsection (g).
Moreover, as a practical matter the Solicitor General’s interpre-
tation would significantly deter licensed employers from taking
appropriate disciplinary action. Because alerting their supervisors
or the NRC to actual or potential safety violations is one of the
basic responsibilities of all employees in a nuclear facility, vir-
41
This legal inconsistency will be further compounded by
the confusion that will arise as juries are asked to evalu-
ate the facts related to a subsection (g) issue. To de-
termine whether an employer acted retributively or
responsibly in changing an employee’s terms of employ-
ment, juries will be required to resolve technically diffi-
cuit factual questions involving the meaning and signifi-
cance of various provisions of the Atomic Energy Act,
the ERA, and the Commission’s long and complex set
of regulations. In this case, for example, any judgment
whether the Company acted responsibly or reprehensibly
necessarily involves a determination whether petitioner’s
intentional failure to clean up contaminated matter vio-
lated “any requirement” of the ERA or Atomic Energy
Act, and whether and to what degree petitioner’s will-
ingness to violate safety rules (as she concededly did)
in order to d.amatize her safety concerns itself posed a
threat to the health and safety of other employees. Un-
like the Secretary of Labor, however, juries addressing
these issues will not be able to draw upon the “full
cooperation” of the NRC or on prior experience in the
field.
Furthermcre, claims for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress arising out of allegedly retaliatory employ-
ment actions necessarily require an evaluation whether
the employer’s conduct was “outrageous,” but the stand-
ards for determining what is “outrageous” vary widely
from state to state. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Buell,
480 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1987); Hustler Magazine v. Fal-
well, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). And no matter what stend-
ard applies in a given state, in order to determine
whether an employer acted “outrageously” in retaliating
against a whistleblower, the jury will necessarily have to
tually any employee could claim that disciplinary action was in re-
sponse to an “unrelated” safety complaint to someone. Nothing
in the language of subsection 210(g) requires this odd construc-
tion; indeed, Congress’s express purpose for including subsection
(g) was “to avoid abuse of the protection afforded in this section.”
S. Rep. No. 848 at 30.
42
evaluate whether the employer had valid reasons, includ-
ing reasonable safety-based concerns, to support the
employment-related responses it made. Thus, even apart
from subsection (g), the possibility that the jury’s eval-
uation of the employer’s and employee’s competing safety
interests will differ from that of the Secretary of Labor
and the NRC is obviously real, and the consequent un-
certainty over the scope of liability will inevitably deter
employers from taking appropriate disciplinary action.
Because such deterrence will upset the careful balance
that Congress created in Section 210, such state law
claims should be preempted.
C. Allowing Employees to Seek Punitive Damages Con-
flicts Fundamentally With Congress’s Intent.
By atiowing employees to seek a remedy—punitive
damages—that Congress deliberately withheld from them
under Section 210, state law claims such as petitioner’s
both exacerbate the likelihood that employees will bypass
Section 210 review altogether and further deter em-
ployers from taking the responsible disciplinary action
that Congress intended. This clear conflict with Con-
gress’s purposes requires preemption of petitioner’s
claim.
There is no doubt that Congress’s decision not to allow
employees to obtain punitive damages was deliberate.
“*The presumption that a remedy was deliberately
omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has
enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme ‘in*luding an
integrated system of procedures for enivrcement.’”’
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
147 (1985) (citation omitted). Congress knows how to
make punitive damages available to employees when it
wants to, because the whistleblower provisions in two
other statutes expressly grant employees authorization
to obtain them. See note 15, supra. Here, moreover,
Congress did not overlook the question of punitive dam-
ages; it expressly reserved to the Secretary the discre-
tion to determine when to seek them, and even then only
for the separate act of deliberately ignoring the Secre-
43
tary’s remedial order. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5851(b) (2) (B),
5851(d). Replacing the Secretary’s carefully bounded
discretion with the unlimited private interest of an em-
ployee and her attorney flatly conflict’: with Congress’s
intent.
In addition, this Court has previously recognized the
powerful impact that the availability of punitive dam-
ages may have on the balance of incentives inherent in
a statutory scheme. In I/nternational Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979), for
example, this Court refused to allow a discharged rail-
road employee to recover punitive damages for a union’s
breach of the duty o1 fair representation. The Court
L . that punitive damages “could undermine [tie] care-
ful accommodation” of interests reflected in the statute
(id. at 50), and in particular that unions “could be
deterred by the possibility of punitive damages from
taking actions clearly in the interest of union members.”
Id. at 52.
Similarly, to allovy employees in the nuclear industry
to seek enormous punitive damage awards (such as the
$2.3 billion sought here) under shifting state standards
would significantly deter employers from taking any ac-
tion to change the terms, corditions or privileges of a
particular employee’s job. Such a powerful deterrent
would perhaps be consistent with the interest in avoiding
retaliation and might be justified if there were no trade-
offs, that is, if no employee ever violated safety require-
ments or otherwise presented a risk to the safe operation
of a nuclear facility Nonetheless, certain employees do
pose this risk in the workplace, as Corgress’s decision to
include subsection (g) reveals. Decisions of the Secretary
under Section 210 and of courts in analogous contexts
confirm that it is vitally important to allow nuclear in-
dustry employers some room to act in dealing with em-
ployees who are perceived as irresponsible. If the em-
32 See note 16, supra: see also Jowa Elec. Light & Power Co. vy.
Local Union 204, 834 F.2d 1424, 1429 (8th Cir. 1987) (employee
who violated federal safety rule “is no longer to be trusted to work
44
ployer in fact acts in retaliation for safety complaints,
Section 210 provides a remedy. But the decision to pre-
clude a punitive damages claim reflects Congress’s view
of the importance of constructing a careful balance be-
tween competing safety interests.
Finally, permitting state courts to award enormous
punitive damages will directly undermine Congress's
avowed goal to have employees bring Section 210 claims
promptly to the Secretary’s attention. See pages 21-22,
38-39, supra. It is difficult to believe that very many
employees will choose Section 210 as the preferred remedy
if they may pursue multi-million dollar awards in state
court." Indeed, the NRC is unlikely to learn of the most
serious complaints, because these complainants will have
the most incentive to seek a windfall punitive damages
award under state law. The two amici briefs filed on
behalf of petitioner by “plaintiffs’ trial lawyers” are
vivid testimony to a crucial fact of life: Few plaintiffs’
lawyers are likely to recommend that their clients seek
redress from the Secretary of Labor when a pot of gold
—claimed in this case to be $2.3 billion—may lie at the
end of the state court rainbow. In sum, to allow employ-
ees to seek punitive damages in court before a jury would
create a powerful incentive to avoid administrative re-
view altogether, thereby (1) frustrating Congress’s goal
of ensuring prompt investigation of retaliation com-
plaints, (2) overriding the Secretary’s carefully circum-
seribed discretion when to seek punitive damages, and
in such a critical [nuclear power] environment . . . [because he]
will jeopardize the safety of the public”); Ashcraft v. University
of Cincinnati, 83-ERA-7 (Secretary’s Decision, Nov. 1, 1984) (Sec-
tion 210 complaint dismissed because employee suspended for mis-
handling radioactive materials).
33 Although employees would not be barred jurisdictionally from
filing a Section 210 claim as well as a state court suit, they would
have no incentive to do so and good reason not to. An adverse
decision from the Secretary would lead to dismissal of the state
court action by collateral estoppel, see University of Tennessee V.
Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 797-98 (1986), and any damages the Secretary
might award would likely be subtracted from a subsequent jury
award.
45
(3) deterring nuclear employers from taking appro-
priate disciplinary action.
lil. BY ANALOGY TO LABOR PREEMPTION DOC-
TRINES, SECTION 210 PREEMPTS A CLAIM FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING OUT OF
ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN
RETALIATION FOR REPORTING NUCLEAR
SAFETY COMPLAINTS. ~
Petitioner suggests that Section 210 is appropriately
analyzed as a labor relations provision that governs cer-
tain aspects of the employer-employee relationship. Pet.
Br. t 26-31; but see S.G. Br. at 19 n.12. Although in
our view Section 210 is inextricably a part of the field
of nuclear safety regulation, the analogy to labor law
simply underscores the case for preemption, and provides
an independent basis for affirming the judgments below.
This Court has long recoznized the “comprehensive
regulation of incustrial relations by Congress.” San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 226
239 i. 1959). Because Congress “entrusted administration
of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized ad-
ministrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and
equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative
experience” (id. at 242), the reasons underlying pre-
emption have their “greatest force” when states attempt
to regulate labor relations. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Car-
penters, 450 U.S. 180. 193 (1978). Section 210 thus lies
at the intersection of two predominant, traditional fed-
eral interests, each of which alone has been held sufficient
to preempt state law. Cf. Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2514-2516 & n.4 (1988) (com-
bination of two uniquely federal interests weighs in favor
of preempting liability under state law).
Federal labor law and its premption doctrines are par-
ticularly significant in two respects. First, as recognized
by petitioner, to the extent that Section 210 may be fairly
characterized as regulating the employment relationship,
its nearest analogy lies in Section 8 of the National Labor
46
Relations Act (“NLRA”).** Like Section 210, the NLRA
prohibits certain discrimination by the employer in re
taliation for protected employee conduct. The point at
which Section 210 and the NLRA diverge—remedies
(limited under the NLRA to back pay and reinstate-
ment)—simply reinforces the conclusion that Section 210
preempts petitioner’s cause of action. Second, federal
labor policy reflects congressional intent to use an ad-
ministrative scheme “to provide an informed and coherent
basis for stabilizing labor relations conflict and for equi-
tably and delicately structuring the balance of power
among competing forces so as to further the common
good.” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 286 (1971) (footnote omitted); see also Belknap,
Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 511 (1983). Similarly, Con-
gress used Section 210 to create an administrative scheme
that calibrates at the national level the benefits and risks
of affording employee protection to assure the optimum
protection of health and safety in the nuclear workplace
and of the public generally.
A. Under Labor Preemption Principles, Petitioner’s
Claim Is Preempted Because It Arises Out Of Con-
duct Addressed By Section 210.
In holding that Section 210 preempts petitioner’s claim
for emotional distress arising from changes in the terms
and conditions of her employment, the district court cor-
rectly applied the labor preemption analysis enunciated
in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S.
290 (1977). The plaintiff in Farmer alleged that union
officials “had intentionally engaged in outrageous con-
34 Congress indicated that Section 8(a)(4) was one of the pro-
visions on which Section 210 was patterned. S. Rep. No. 848, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 7303, 7303. Section 8(a)(4) provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer or union “to discharge or otherwise dis-
criminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given
testimony under this [Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). The National
Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to hear com-
plaints concerning unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160; see
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 508-509 (1983).
+ she
47
duct, threats, and intimidation, and had thereby caused
him to suffer grievous emotional distress resulting in
bodily injury.” Jd. at 295. The particular acts constitut-
ing “outrageous conduct” were discrimination in re-
ferrals to employers and “a campaign of personal abuse
and harassment.” Jd. at 292 & n.2.
This Court held that while sqme state tort claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress would not be
preempted by federal law, “fu]jnion discrimination in
employment opportunities cannot itself form the under-
lying ‘outrageous’ conduct on which the state-court tort
action is based.” Id. at 305. The Court explained that
to avoid preemption:
it is essential that the state tort be either un-
related to employment discrimination or a function
of the particularly abusive manner in which the dis-
crimination is accomplished or threatened rather
than a function of the actual or threatened discrim-
ination itself.
Id. (footnote omitted). A remand was therefore neces-
sary because the “focus of the trial was on employment
discrimination rather than the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.” Jd. at 306 n.14.
Under Farmer, petitioner’s claim is preempted be-
cause petitioner does not allege tortious conduct beyond
the job-related retaliation addressed by Section 210. In-
stead, she complains solely about emotional distress
caused by the circumstances surrounding the changes in
the terms and conditions of her employment following
her safety reports. As already discussed, the district
court here correctly recognized the difference stressed in
Farmer between tort claims that arise out of conduct
subject to exclusive federal regulation and tort claims
that arise out of conduct not subject to federal regula-
tion. Pet. App. 28a. When petitioner’s complaint is
stripped of the impermissible, preempted claims, it fails
to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under state law. Because both courts
below agreed on that issue of North Carolina law, this
48
Court should defer to that judgment. See supra, page
28 and note 19.”
B. Labor Preemption Principles Require Preemption
Where, As Here, There Is An Imminent Possibility
That State Law Remedies Will Conflict With Fed-
eral Law.
Allowing a state to regulate the conduct alleged in
this case would not merely provide an additional un-
intended remedy to employees but also would seriously
clash with Congress’s carefully tailored administrative
scheme and evoke the very conflicts that the preemption
principles governing employment relations are designed
to prevent. First, this Court has recognized that “ ‘con-
flict is imminent’ whenever ‘two separate remedies are
brought to bear on the same activity.’”” Wisconsin Dept.
of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986) (quot-
ting Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S.
485, 498-499 (1953)); see Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247.
Second, the coexistence of various state court procedures
with a federal administrative scheme inevitably creates
a direct conflict with Congress’s purposes, because
“fejonflict in technique can be fully as disruptive. . . as
35 Petitioner’s reliance upon Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958) and United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) is similarly misplaced. In these cases,
state law was not preempted because “[n]lothing in the federal
labor statutes protects or immunizes from state action violence
or the threat of violence... .” Farmer, 430 U.S. at 299. But peti-
tioner’s claim is not of that kind; it arises solely out of changes
in the customary terms of employment and is—as the Labor De-
partment ALJ already ruled—squarely covered by timely complaint
under Section 210.
Petitioner’s reference to Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
108 S.Ct. 1877, 1880 (1988), is inapposite. Lingle involves Section
801(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which preempts
state-law claims “if the resolution of a state-law claim depends
upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Jd. at
1881. Although any analogy to Section 301 seems strained, the fact
that petitioner’s state law claim “would depend on the meaning of”
federal statutes and regulations argues once again for preemption.
49
conflict in overt policy.” Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971); Gould, 475 U.S.
at 286, 288 n.5. These concerns about substantial con-
flicts apply with equal force to Section 210. See Part II,
supra.
Even if petitioner’s claim were entirely consistent
with the purposes of Section 210, moreover, the fact re-
mains that a “simple congruity of legal rules does not,
in [the labor relations] area, prove the absence of un-
tenable conflict.” Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 290. For in-
stance, this Court in Gould struck down a state law
barring firms who have violated the NLRA from con-
ducting business in the state because such a remedy
“would interfere with Congress’ ‘integrated scheme of
regulation’ by adding a remedy to those prescribed by
the NLRA.” 475 U.S. at 287 (quoting Garmon, 359
U.S. at 247) (emphasis added). It made no difference
in Gould that the “supplemental” state remedy was “dif-
ferent in kind from those that may be ordered by the
[NLRB].” Jd. (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243): see
Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 292. The proper focus is not
whether the state remedy would be available under fed-
eral law, but rather on the nature of the regulated ac-
tivities. Gould, 475 U.S. at 287. “[T]o allow the State
to grant a remedy ... which has been withheld from
the [NLRB] only accentuates the danger of conflict,”
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247, “because ‘the range and na-
ture of those remedies that are and are not available is
a fundamental part’ of the comprehensive system estab-
lished by Congress.” Gould, 475 U.S. at 287 (quoting
Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 287)). Thus, the analogy to
labor law underscores the conclusion that Section 210
preempts petitioner’s claim.
* * * *
At bottom, this case calls on the Court to reconcile
the competing interests of the federal and state govern-
ments in an area of extreme sensitivity—nuclear safety.
Unlike petitioner, the Company is not asking the Court
to accord preeminence to either set of interests. We
50
recognize that the State of North Carolina has a sub-
stantial interest in ensuring that victims of extreme and
outrageous conduct are compensated for their emotional
injuries. But there is nothing in the c.clusivity of Sec-
tion 210 that undermines the State’s interest. For em-
ployer conduct prohibited by Section 210, the Secretary
of Labor will provide compensation that serves the
State’s interest. For conduct beyond the bounds of Sec-
tion 210, the State remains free to provide whatever
remedies the State deems appropriate.
On the other side of the ledger, allowing Section 210
to operate free of state law interference will protect the
overriding federal interest in promoting nuclear safety.
Section 210’s role in this regard is critical because the
NRC properly regards employer retaliation itself a ser-
ious nuclear safety hazard. Thus, the Court simply can-
not allow the incentives created by this state tort claim
to interfere with Section 210 and still be faithful to
Congress’s intent to retain exclusive federal control over
safety in the operation of nuclear facilities.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court
of appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BENJAMIN W. HEINEMAN, JR. REX E. LEE
PHILIP A. LACOVARA CARTER G. PHILLIPS *
BARTON A. SMITH MARK E. HADDAD
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY NANCY A. TEMPLE
3135 Easton Turnpike SIDLEY & AUSTIN
Fairfield, CT 06431 1722 Eye Street, N.W.
(203) 373-2492 Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 429-4000
Counsel for Respondent
April 12, 1990 * Counsel of Record
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