Respondents Brief — English v. General Elec. Co.

Supreme Court brief1990

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BEST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization

Act, which provides a comprehensive federal administra-

tive remedy (‘including compensatory damages) for em-

ployees at nuclear facilities as an integral part of the

government’s program to ensure safety in the opera-

tions of those facilities, preempts state law claims for

intentional infliction of emotiomal distress arising out of

allegedly retaliatory changes in the terms and condi-

tions of employment for raising safety concerns at a

nuclear facility.

(i)

ii

RULE 29.1 STATEMENT

Genera! Electric Company has no parent company.

The subsidiaries of General Electric Company that have

outstanding equity or debt securities that are publicly

held are listed in the brief in opposition to the petition

for certiorari and in the supplemental brief.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ..... .................

RULE 29.1 STATEMENT .................. eR a oe

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................... EN OE .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......2..000.0.0.......-:ecesceseeeeees

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..........000......... si liletahatab icici

Neen a crceepnnsnsnennnencseereors

I.

Il.

A STATE LAW CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

‘ARISING OUT OF RETALIATORY EMPLOY-

MENT ACTIONS AT A NUCLEAR FACIL-

ITY INVADES THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR

SAFETY AND OPERATIONS AND IS

THEREFORE PREEMPTED ......... =). ates ous

A. Congress Has Preempted The Entire Field

Of Nuclear Safety And Operations ...............

B. Section 210 Lies Squarely Within The Field

Of Nuclear Safety Concerns ................... rete

C. Section 210 Preempts State Law Claims For

Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress

That Arise Out Of Retaliatory Employment

Action For Whistleblowing At A Nuclear

ST

D. State Law That Infringes On A Field Re-

served Exclusively For Federal Control Is

Preempted Regardless Of Its Purpose ..........

PETITIONER’S STATE LAW CLAIM IS

PREEMPTED BECAUSE IT STANDS AS AN

OBSTACLE TO THE FULL ACHIEVEMENT

OF CONGRESS’S OBJECTIVES IN REGU-

LATING THE SAFETY AND OPERATIONS

OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES ..........000000000000......

(iii)

11

12

12

16

27

32

36

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

A. Congress’s Objective In Enacting Section

210 Was To Create A Balanced Scheme That

Would Further The Goal Of Ensuring The

Safe Operation Of Nuclear Facilities

B. Failure To Preempt State Law Claims For

Injuries Arising Out Of Conduct Regulated

By Section 210 Would Preclude This Statute

From Fully Achieving Its Purposes ..............

C. Allowing Employees To Seek Punitive Dam-

ages Fundamentally Conflicts With Con-

gress’s Intent ...... sesiodulinaataitiotadipudlainnatataass ilashedatnce.

Ill. BY ANALOGY TO LABOR PREEMPTION

DOCTRINES, SECTION 210 PREEMPTS A

CLAIM FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARIS-

ING OUT OF ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION IN RETALIATION FOR

REPORTING NUCLEAR SAFETY COM-

SF Ta iicnsniishceahecncigaiiabseciaadibiadisaaiaellakgiaiceaiaibateetelmions

A. Under Labor Preemption Principles, Peti-

tioner’s Ciaim Is Preempted Because It

Arises Out Of Conduct Addressed By Sec-

ERE Re rere eae ca tar oe

B. Labor Preemption Principles Require Pre-

emption Where, As Here, There Is An Im-

minent Possibility That State Law Remedies

Will Conflict With Federal Law ...... ASH

UIP sich Sickinicinssiconininiisidciteieatiapbabtaphesibaiataiaicecedsins

Page

37

38

42

45

46

48

50

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Vv. Buell, 480 U.S. 557

a a 25, 41

Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634

SESE rea ele e-em * SPREE 48

Belknap, Inc. Vv. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983) —........... 46

Bonito Boats, Inc. Vv. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,

Be ee HE IID ss da scasesoncecsinsasaindabademeistdiindadntindss 37

Bowen V. Massachusetts, 108 S.Ct. 2722 (1988)... 28

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2510

ERS eae aD AP eR EOT OARST. ba wee 45

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491

i ie 28

Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029

dallas 39

California v. ARC America Corp., 109 S.Ct. 1661

I i ai a a URC ERe NGS ERE RTE 26

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691

a 34

Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile

eka a sie 29

City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411

a einsliaiiias 29

Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. Vv. Donovan, 673

F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982) ....... RON SSSR NS eA ene 39

County of Rockland v. N.R.C., 709 F.2d 766 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983) ............. 15

DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th

aa ER RIT RU ASS iy see area 21, 32

Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293,

ne nn ssmeseticaniiaiasite 25

English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.

RTE SE se ae ane NO EI OU ae 6, 29

Erlenbaugh v. U.S., 409 U.S. 239 (1972) .....0........ 24

Exxon Corp. Vv. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).... 12

Farmer Vv. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430

Or I, passim

Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n V. De La Cuesta,

458 U.S. 141 (1982)...................... SS eee NEE 13

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,

Ue es, I rc i tee 9, 34

Fortune Vv. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass.

e fF 2 — & Ee _ . : Seaman eaaeen 25

Frampton Vv. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249,

eS ne en 25

Garner V. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346

Ef 8 ess I SD 48

Georgia Power Co. Vv. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250

al I a oe 25

Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,

A 34, 37

Guy V. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 812 F.2d 911

I 24

Harless Vv. First National Bank, 162 W. Va. 116,

I a 25

Hines V. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ...... 9, 11, 12, 36

Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital, 352 So.2d 1130

I a 25

Hisquierdo Vv. Hisquierdo, 4839 U.S. 572 (1979)... 37

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).. 41

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

v. Foust, 4468 US. 4B (1078) ...............<....-.........-- 43

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481

Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204,

RRR CORE eS EER ee, 23, 32, 37

834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987) 20000. 43

Jackson V. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330,

og REESE eR a 25

Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. Vv. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505

(10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1011

aN AS SAAT eI OED 7 Pe a 39

Lingle Vv. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108

I 48

Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735

¢ BB: 2 1. ke ASSEN 39

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)........ 36

Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. Vv. Russell, 473

‘S$ i FSi ~ F

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

sage

Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316

p NET RE ee ee EO aE 25

Motor Coach Employees Vv. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274

scarab beauationandedioe 46, 49

Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).. 25

Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota,

447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 USS.

i i setenenonesaboadenamdannsoptaban 15

Northwest Airlines, Inc. Vv. Transport Workers,

A, i i ON ai ceeelanisiih 24, 36

O’Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390

I I is rina ine eicusinanseteteaidlicnaiintnntintaniia 25

Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources

Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190

(= RSG OURAN er ers es NO en passim

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) ................. 34

Petermann V. International Brotherhood of Team-

sters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) .. 25

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. DeDeaux, 481 U.S. 41

(RSET EES a a Os nS RO 24, 37

Porter County Chapter v. N.R.C., 606 F.2d 1363

ty I iia nnn didnpcitlipihianinidhsapienalabienmennon 15

Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union,

SERIE ETRE Ere inmnent os renees 15

Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216

S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950) ............................. 25

Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.

Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) ..........................- 25

Reynolds v. United States, 286 F.2d 433 (9th Cir.

i er ES SIT te ON Ten aT ee 15

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218

| ES PI oa ETP OP RTI 8, 12, 33, 35

Rockford League of Women Voters v. N.R.C.,

Be Bs By. Be S| een 15

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council Vv. Garmon, 359

CR I IIT cxnsaihnen/ evistiieeteiecbuntsenasesnontin 29, 45, 48, 49

Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky.

RR TID. cattictcnsss scsensecsinnseicnieniainiciiiniinmnipimianbetiqen 25

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist.

Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978)........ 45

Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So.2d 89 (Fla.

I kil tal cic eid, saci cilatagiinlaieadtain eeedaieiainanteaaaeas 25

Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 400 F.2d 778

I a ae 15

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238

a a passim

State of New Hampshire Vv. Atomic Energy

Comm’n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,

caesar ideasianien 15

Stephens v. Jus*iss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So.2d 510

Ne) EP aie cen 25

Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245

RI rn A os 25

Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S.

ee memeiaivanion 28

Tivin V. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group,

I i a cceuiieanisibiaetice 37

Tro«scontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil

and Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409 (1986) 2.000 .. 26

United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.

a ae 6k SS OE | eee 48

University of Tennessee Vv. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788

a a 44

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

ee a a lsisibieeeneniichs 15

Wisconsin Dept. of Indus. Vv. Gould, Inc., 475 USS.

SEA 2, SEE: TAA ee eee 48, 49

Yanta v. Montgomery Ward £ Co., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d

& FF & Ss & By | Reeeeeeceoeen 25

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES &

REGULATIONS _

alta passim

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et

seq.) .. sew alee adiae pinasbensedsinsaasscaaee

42 U.S.C. '§2012(e) . a aetna ele ee 8,13

42 U.S.C. § 2014 (aa) .................... arvensis 1

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

4B UBL. 6 BOD ..nccceserees ciebacadeeaciichilanidehadaiiaaiaatint 13

I tant cenieeediaiaiintabiiten m 14

TTT aa 1,14

I a iccniicncnciniiiameemnncninnte aatieniie 14

42 U.S.C. § 2021 (k). ......... worevpnnenneeosenseesenesessnsesnes 31, 32

I sic iia sisi dalidcdiliddn cilities eure 13, 32

I oi Liccintsnicsiencsianbitiaininidimnilibeynnits 1

I an entteptsiypmanenpnesncbeieniend 8,18

i oa cstscadssnsennagunionemitelh 1,18

I cscs ccncenpuisbsntnmnsiognecinssaadiiod 2, 8, 13, 18

a ET a ce ee 18

Taian cpnneesenepnsnenabenin 8

ESTEE See en 18

Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.

93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at

| | Ef LF "nna eaneTeTee passim

a ssepuiensnnenieoes 15,18

42 U.S.C. § 5843 (b) (2) (A) _.................. aie 16

ie Ce CE CID on nnnccccccnsccccccceoscevencess 16

il TS STREETS A ART PT EE: 16

I cadets 8, 16, 18

ee ee ose. passim

I I ae aalihlcespiecialiindnaininnn 16, 17

| Eee 17

42 U.3B.C. § 6661 (b) (3) (B) ........................... 17, 23, 43

id asalites acieienneisteminaniantadiiil 18, 23, 43

NE passim

I aiircticiccnneensereniotindggeamietinaininase 16

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch.

120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amendec at 29

FS eG RF} earn 48

National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat.

449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§§ 151 et seq.)

BD UBC. © TBS GEP (G6) .....---22--000000.. ...-cereesener scornees 46

BD UB... § 1G] ......22---2020000.2.22ccecceeseesreroseees hie. can 46

BD U.S.C. 8 16D Oe) «.....-----.20000.000--nccrcccocererccceses- oes 37

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Price Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256,

71 Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012,

REE CLE UTD satiakemertsauisiiidinca da teiikes 31

Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88

Stat. 1682 (1974) (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. $§ 300f et seq.)

42 U.S.C. § 300j-9 (i) (2) (B) (ii) .....0..-e ee. 23

Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469,

90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. $§ 2601 et seq.)

ia ices eininlaciiinniennadio’ 23

10 C.F.R. Parts 0-171:

Part 2:

: SPECS onetime ees 5

SS DRERREDEYSFasres enorme treet eae ere ETE E 18, 20

Part 8

ae es 15

SIN anc easestescel. ciate opie eshahtdeciarascueiigiedtiodads 15

Fart 19:

ie IN iidssiideii da soainsadisanéadllantdamediaiadin A ...8, 16, 19

8 SII AD ee SORT COE ITT 19

§ 19.15 ......... CER En > Daeciaceaitaaas sei 19

al ak ies re ae hee a 19

ERR See anne eae ere an tree ee 8

RENEE pcre eee NOC re A 2

Part 21:

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(8 ERAS EEE es Sor eyes en Deen Mae 8,18

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Part 50:

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Part 70:

RETIRES Se Re aL PO er 2

¢ a SSSI REE Res ot MEE EDIRNE AOE 1

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

ERA Re TI ps a OTS el Nee 1

EEA RS cael ae eee Ore EER 8, 20, 39

AS PR ene Se Ae PRR AMEE 20

I ie 1

§ 70.22 (a) (7) ............ wovencussescaensesenonsnsesesecees 2

§ 70.22 (a) (8) ............. saalenpioaba deahesasaledbiseassmuncsadaisid 2

I ER RII AER AAT Te TE COPE 2,3

RAI A RE era ene OR ian 2

I olsun telaneicantibeniiaisadepiaienas 2

i a 2,18

ESR SA Es a RC BR 18

| ON A EES ee en koe easton Sas 18

ats crea dih Mi inhasdin spans hncnbiicnndenanibdenanididduaities 18

SEE SAS oe) Se ENT REA OE 18

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SSE ree a 18

al clipe ac etbsibaabiddaceddaenidges 18

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Part 150:

IIIT cris itis fines leaiasutiaaisadaaasiseeaionsiieneniates 2,14

te EERE ee a Oe Aa nN 5

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE

MATERIALS

S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted

in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2872.. 15

S. Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted

in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7303....passim

Federal-State Relationships in the Atomic Energy

Field, Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on

Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959)... 14

Whistleblower Protection Act: Hearing on H.R.

3368 Before the Subcomm. on _ Labor-

Management Relations of the House Comm.

on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.

(ERE Eee aa ee ee ee ED 39

120 Cong. Rec. 36,398 (1974) .....................cccccscceeseesss. 37

Be Cs CI CT wiciccccescesesececoncccesecccecseense 21

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

phe FS, | nea

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GT TOE, TRG, Be CIE caeeeececncccceccnscscncccocecesces e200

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Ashcraft v. University of Cincinnati, 83-ERA-7

(Secretary’s Decision, Nov. 1, 1984) ....0

Darety Vv. Zack Co., 82-ERA-2 (Secretary’s Deci-

Ss I TN I ci iaiieictliaectt altace cssdausees

Francis V. Bogan, 86-ERA-8 (Secretary’s Decision,

REESE SS MER a ne ea OC NaN

In re Illinois Power Co., EA 86-143 \Dec. 17,

SUUIUIIT sictscssasdaittenetaleasussiaeesebianedeasasenunpebdieinlaeh ieiaetaibiiebasiscs

Lopez V. West Texas Util., 86-ERA-25 (Secretary’s

Ss a as

Nunn V. Duke Power Co., A.L.J. Dec., Vol. 1, No.

4, 84-ERA-27 (July-Aug. 1987) ......00..00000000000...

In re Tennessee Valley Auth., EA 86-93 (July 10,

UII sininsieesuasesnbcainsssdldinennassidiansdandibanantadamaiadakiilaieieleiss dina

A REIS cle ie AE MOM ie RDA PESTO

Wilson V. Bechtel Constr., Inc., A.L.J. Dec., Vol. 2,

No. 1, 86-ERA-34 (Jan.-Feb. 1988) ......... SHEARS

Wood v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 79-ERA-3 (Secre-

tary’s Decision, Nov. 8, 1979) ......... oncaunaiaidetaes.

8, 19

20, 22

4d

24

39

20

39

20, 39

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

No. 89-152

VERA M. ENGLISH,

" Petitioner,

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Respondent General Electric Company operates a

Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing Department in Wilming-

ton, North Carolina. The Wilmington Department is a

fuel fabrication plant. It uses “special nuclear material”

as defined by the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, 42

U.S.C. § 2014(aa); 10° C.F.R. § 70.4(m), to produce

bundles of uranium fuel rods used at nuclear reactcr

sites to generate electric power.

The Atomic Energy Act grants the Nuclear egula-

tory Commission (“NRC”) exclusive authority to issue

a license for a fuel fabrication piant such as the Wil-

mington Department. 42 U.S.C. $$ 2073(a), 2077,

2021(b); 10 C.F.R. $$ 70.3, 70.21(a) (1). The Act also

gives the NRC exclusive authority to establish such

2

standards “to govern the possession and use of special

nuclear material . . . as the Commission may deem

necessary ... to protect health or to minimize danger to

life or property.” 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b). Pursuant to

this authority, the NRC has promulgated comprehensive

regulations governing the licensing and operation of fuel

fabrication plants (see generally 10 C.F.R. Part 70).

These include, for example, regulations governing the

safety of workers and of the public (10 C.F.R. Part 20),

the need to track and account for the large quantities of

special nuclear material used in fuel fabrication (10

C.F.R. § 70.51), and the safety risks of “accidental

criticality” that are posed by significant quantities of

special ruclear material. 10 C.F.R. §§ 70.22(a) (8),

70.24.1 The NRC will not issue a license if it “would

constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety

of the public.’ 10 C.F.R. § 70.31(d).

The Chemical Metallurgical Laboratory (‘“Chemet

Lab”) is located within the larger building that houses

the Wilmington Department. Chemet Lab workers reg-

ularly conduct metallurgical, chemical and spectrographic

analyses on uranium samples “to assure that standards of

the [NRC] are met.” Pet. App. 33a n.3. In performing

these tests, employees work with both powder and liquid

forms of uranium compounds. Jd. The quality control

responsibilities of the Chemet Lab workers are part of

the Department’s quality assurance program, which is

1 The large quantities of special nuclear material used in a fuel

fabrication plant pose special safety concerns because they far ex-

ceed the quantity needed to form a critical mass (start a self-

sustaining nuclear reaction). 10 C.F.R. § 150.11. Thus, to obtain

a license from the NRC for a fuel fabrication plant, an appli-

cant must develop “procedures to avoid accidental criticality”

(10 C.F.R. § 70.22(a)(8)) and describe how its “handling devices,

working areas, shields, measuring and monitoring instruments,

devices for the disposal of radioactive effluent and wastes, storage

facilities, [and] criticality accident alarm systems” will be sufficient

“to protect health and minimize danger to life or property.” 10

C.F.R. § 70.22(a) (7), (f).

" eee a

~

a

3

required by the NRC. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. B; 10

C.F.R. § 70.22(f) & n.2.

The Chemet Lab contains several laboratories. In

“controlled areas” of these laboratories, specific safety

precautions must be strictly observed. Before leaving a

controlled area, a hand-held monitor or frisker is used

to detect the presence of any radioactive contamination

on a person’s body or clothing. Workers must wear

gloves, a lab coat and safety glasses in both controlled

and semi-controlled areas. Pet. App. 33a n.3. The con-

trolled areas contain hoods with fans that pull airborne

radioactive contamination away from those working be-

low. In addition, “{s]afety rules require that any spill-

age of uranium powder or uranium liquid be brushed

or cleaned off from time to time during the work hours,

and especially before leaving the work shift.” Jd.

2. Petitioner, Vera English, was employed as a radia-

tion laboratory technician at the Chemet Lab for almost

twelve years. She was responsible for performing cer-

tain quality control tests, “in which samples of uranium

powder are weighed, oxidized, weighed again, dissolved

in nitric acid and finally weighed again.” Jd. at 34a.

Petitioner and other workers used marble work benches

with marble legs because the “marble material is not

affected by vibrations and is easier to clean than other

material.” Jd. at 33a n.3.

On February 13, 1984, petitioner complained to the

NRC about “what she perceived” to be violations of

safety standards and Company procedures at the Wil-

mington Department. Jd. at Ta-8a. On February 24,

1984, petitioner forwarded these same concerns in a writ-

ten report (dated February 21, 1984) to the Company’s

Quality Assurance Manager. /d. at 8a, 34a.

The Company investigated her complaints on March

8-21 and March 26-30, 1984. Id. at 34a. A Chemet Lab

Safety Report (dated March 29, 1984) concluded that

lab safety procedures were adequate, but a subsequent

4

Quality Assurance Review (dated April 26, 1984) con-

cluded that some of petitioner’s allegations of “violations

of company practice and procedure had substance.” Jd.

Similarly, the NRC conducted an investigation into peti-

tioner’s complaints from March 26 through March 29,

1984. Id. at 33a. The NRC subsequently “concluded that

[her complaints] were unsubstantiated.” Jd. at 34a.

After reporting her complaints, but prior to the NRC

and Company investigations, petitioner (according to

her subsequent testimony) took steps “to prove to man-

agement that her co-workers were extremely lax in

their performance of clean-up duties.” Jd. at 35a. On

March 10, 1984, petitioner discovered stains on her

work table resulting from a spill of contaminated ma-

terial. /d. at 8a, 34a. Petitioner purposefully chose not

to clean the contamination, and decided instead to mark

off the stained area with tape “as a warning to fellow

workers” and “so she would be able to point it out to

her supervisor” when he next returned to the lab. 7d.

at 35a. The contamination stain remained upon the

table when she returned to work two days later, despite

the interim presence of other shift workers. Jd. at 8a.

Petitioner reported the stain to her supervisor, and

also reported to him that a radiation safety employee

had failed on March 5 to detect contaminated nuclear

material that she had deliberately swept into a pile at

the back of her table “to see whether he would discover”

it. Id. at 8a-9a.

3. On March 15, 1984, respondent charged petitioner

with several safety violations, including intentional

failure to clean up contamination. Jd. at 36a-37a. Re-

spondent determined that petitioner had committed the

latter violation, relieved her of her laboratory responsi-

bilities, removed her from any controlled areas and as-

signed her to a temporary position outside the con-

trolled areas. Jd. at 37a. Petitioner was advised to apply

for an open position within the Department, outside of

the Chemet Lab. Petitioner did not obtain such a posi-

5

tion within 90 days, and so was laid off on July 30,

1984. Id.

4. On August 24, 1984, petitioner filed a complaint

with the United States Department of Labor under Sec-

tion 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974

(“ERA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, and as imple-

mented in 29 C.F.R. § 24.3.2. Section 210 prohibits em-

ployers licensed by the NRC from discharging or chang-

ing the “compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges

of employment” of any employee in retaliation for that

employee’s reports about nuclear safety, and entitles em-

ployees to full compensatory relief. Section 210 does not

apply, however, to any employee who “deliberately causes

a violation of [the Energy Reorganization] Act or the

Atomic Energy Act, as amended.” 42 U.S.C. § 5851/g)

(“subsection (g)”’).

In her Section 210 complaint, petitioner alleged that

her transfer from the Chemet Lab, her ultimate layoff

and other related actions were taken by the Company in

retaliation for her safety complaints. Pet. App. 46a.

The Company claimed that under subsection (g), peti-

tioner was not entitled to recovery because she deliber-

ately caused a violation of safety standards by intention-

ally failing to clean up the spill; the Company also main-

tained that “the lengths [petitioner] would go to in pro-

moting her views on safety practices” posed “a threat to

other employees’ safety.” /d. at 42a. After an initial de

cision by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Divi-

sion, both parties appealed to an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”). Jd. at 31a.

The ALJ conducted a “formal hearing” over 11 days

during which “the parties were afforded full opportunity

2 Petitioner also filed a complaint with the NRC pursuant to 10

C.F.R. § 2.206. See Pet. App. 57a-58a. Aithough the NRC eventually

issued a civil penalty of $20,000, based solely on the recommended

ruling by the Department of Labor’s ALJ, the NRC denied petition-

er’s request for further enforcement actions, including petitioner's

request that the NRC impose a civil penalty of over $40 million. 7d.

6

to present evidence and argument,” and during which

petitioner’s psychologist testified concerning the emotional

distress petitioner had suffered. Jd. at 3la, 37a-39a.

On August 1, 1985, the ALJ entered an order granting

petitioner full compensatory relief. Jd. at 56a. The ALJ

found “little doubt that [petitioner] was a difficult em-

ployee to handle,” and that “she disrupted workplace

activity at times.” Jd. at 41a. The ALJ also recognized

that petitioner’s intentional failure to clean up the spill

“was considered a violation [of the Atomic Energy Act]

by NRC.” Jd. at 44a. Nevertheless, the ALJ held that,

under the circumstances, petitioner’s failure to clean up

the spill should be deemed a protected “means of report-

ing violations, albeit unorthodox.” Jd. at 45a. The ALJ

therefore ordered that petitioner be reinstated with back

pay plus interest “to make her whole,” and awarded her

compensatory damages of $70,000 for past and future

medical expenses as recompense for petitioner’s “humilia-

tion and mental suffering.” Jd. at 55a.

The Secretary of Labor subsequently reversed the

ALJ’s decision because petitioner’s complaint was not

filed within the 30-day limitations period provided in

Section 210. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the

dismissal of petitioner’s discharge claim as time-barred,

but remanded to permit the Secretary to determine

whether petitioner had established a course of retaliatory

harassment within the filing time period. English v.

Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988). This case is

still pending before the Secretary.

5. On March 13, 1987, petitioner filed a diversity suit

against the Company in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The com-

plaint sought relief under state tort theories of wrongful

discharge and “intentional infliction of economic and emo-

tional harm by reprisal and punishment inflicted upon

plaintiff in violation of the laws of the United States and

North Carolina, with respect to her terms and conditions

of employment.” J.A. 7. For example, petitioner a!leged

7

that after she reported her safety concerns, the Company

removed her from the Chemet Lab under guard, con-

stantly observed her and isolated her from other em-

ployees. J.A. 14-15. She also claimed that respondent

transferred her to “a degrading ‘make work’ job” and

subsequently discharged her because the Company “de-

sire{d] to punish her for raising safety concerns.” J.A.

16. For her two claims for wrongful discharge and inten-

tional infliction of emotional distress, petitioner sought

approximately $1.3 million in compensatory damages and

approximately $2.3 billion in punitive damages. J.A. 21;

Pet. App. 6a.

In a lengthy opinion, the district court dismissed the

complaint, holding that Congress intended Section 210 to

“preempt state actions for wrongful discharge and other

discrimination with respect to nuclear whistleblowers.”

Id. at 21a. The court of appeals affirmed, adopting the

district court’s reasoning and agreeing that Section 210

of the ERA was “intended by Congress to constitute the

sole remedy for nuclear facility employees who allege dis-

crimination resulting from safety complaints, and, there-

fore, English’s state law claim was preempted by the

federal statute.” Jd. at 3a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

A. Petitioner and her amici assume without arguing

that Section 210 lies outside the field of nuclear safety.

There can be no doubt, i.owever, that the Atomic Energy

Act and its progeny, including Section 210, occupy “the

entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited

powers expressly ceded to the States.” Pacific Gas &

Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation and

Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (19838). At the core of

this field is the NRC’s exclusive responsibility to ensure

that nuclear facilities are licensed and operated in ac-

8

cordance with public health and safety requirements.

42 U.S.C. $§ 2012(e), 2073(b), 2201(b), 21383(b). One

vital component of nuclear safety is the responsibility

of all employees at nuclear facilities to report safety

violations. 42 U.S.C. § 5846; 10 C.F.R. §$ 19.12, 21.21.

The NRC so values these reports that it treats retalia-

tory employment action against such employees as an

independent safety violation requiring serious penalties,

including revocation of a license. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,453

(1982); 10 C.F.R. $$ 70.7(¢), 19.20. Thus, Section 210,

which prohibits such retaliation and protects employees

who voice safety concerns, falls squarely within the com-

prehensive federal regulatory scheme to protect health

and safety.

The importance of Section 210 to the framework of

federal nuclear safety regulation is reflected in the NRC’s

regulations, in the legislative history of Section 210 (S.

Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1978)) and in

the structure of Section 210 itself. Section 210 is de-

signed to encourage prompt federal action in response

to employer retaliation, and to balance the need to pro-

tect the NRC’s channels of information against the need

to ensure that nuclear employers are not deterred from

taking appropriate disciplinary actions. Reflecting Con-

gress’s careful and comprehensive concern about promot-

ing nuclear safety, subsection (g) denies protection to

alleged “whistleblowers” who deliberately cause violations

of safety regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(g). Because Sec-

tion 210 is an integral part of Congress’s exclusively fed-

eral scheme of nuclear safety regulation, this case should

be analyzed under field preemption principles.

B. It is well settled that any state law that intrudes

into an area occupied by the federal government is pre-

empted, even if the state law’s purpose is fully consistent

with that of the federal government, Rice v. Santa Fe

Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947), unless Con-

gress expressly ceded the state authority to act. Silkwood

v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251-256 (1984).

9

There can be no doubt that petitioner’s claim invades

that portion of the nuclear safety field defined by Section

210. Jd. That provision, inter alia, grants petitioner

compensatory relief for all claims of discrimination in

any term or condition of employment imposed by respond-

ent in retaliation for reporting safety violations. As the

district court held, once the claims in petitioner’s com-

plaint that allege discriminatiom in terms and conditions

of employment are deleted, what is left does not “in and

of itself support a cause of action for intentional inflic-

tion of emotional distress” under state law. Pet. App.

28a.

The only remaining issue is whether Congress has

expressly ceded North Carolina authority to regulate

safety in the nuclear workplace through the use of its

tort laws. The answer is clearly no. Neither petitioner

nor her amici present one shred of evidence that Con-

gress enacted Section 210 with the understanding that

states could supplement the federal remedies with tort

actions. Nor is there any basis for concluding that Con-

gress did not preempt petitioner’s claim because the

State’s purpose is not to regulate nuclear safety. Con-

trary to the argument of the Solicitor General, it is black

letter law under the Supremacy Clause that it is irrele-

vant whether the state and federal laws “are aimed at

similar or different objectives.” Florida Lime & Avocado

Growers, Inc. Vv. Paul, 373 U.S. 182, 142 (1963). Ac-

cordingly, petitioner’s claim is preempted by Section 210.

II.

Even if Section 210 could be interpreted as outside the

federally occupied field of nuclear safety, it is neverthe-

less plain that permitting petitioner’s claims to be liti-

gated in state court will “stand[] as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.

52, 67 (1941). Specifically, Congress intended to make

certain that claims regarding retaliation were filed

10

promptly, and to balance the need to encourage employees

to come forward with safety concerns against the need

not to deter employers from taking appropriate discipli-

nary action to assure safe operations in a nuclear facility.

The district. court correctly identified the elements of

Section 210 that are jeopardized by state law: the 30-day

time limit for filing; an administrative claim, the preclu-

sion of relief for employees who deliberately violate a

safety requirement and the decision to entrust only the

Secretary with the discretion to seek punitive damages.

Allowing state tort actions to be filed years after a safety

problem exists (even if the problem is the employer’s will-

ingness to retaliate), and allowing damages to be awarded

to employees without an expert evaluation of the regula-

tory and safety questions at issue will inevitably frus-

trate the achievement of Section 210’s safety-related

purposes.

Allowing employees to obtain punitive damages, more-

over, will completely vitiate Congress’s effort to promote

safety through a balanced administrative scheme. It is

simply inconceivable that a plaintiff’s lawyer will be con-

tent to settle for the compensatory and back pay relief

that Section 210 provides when state law holds out the

promise of a billion dollar punitive award and the settle-

ment leverage such an award offers. Moreover, the avail-

ability of a large punitive award creates the perverse

incentive that the worst abuses by nuclear facilities

would be precisely the ones a plaintiff would most want

to bring only in state court, thereby depriving the NRC

of information vital to nuclear safety. The repudiation

of Congress’s intent to encourage prompt administrative

filings and not to deter employer responses to safety prob-

lems created by employees clearly must be preempted.

III.

Petitioner and her amici urge the Court to resolve this

case under labor preemption principles. Although the

case is more properly analyzed as a nuclear safety case,

1l

the analogy to the labor laws provides an independent

basis for affirming the judgment below.

By providing a specialized forum for evaluating work-

place issues in an area—nuclear safety—traditionally

regulated by the federal government, Congress in Section

210 has created a remedial scheme similer to the scheme

administered by the National Labor Relations Board.

The case that most closely fits this one under this labor

analogy is Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters,

430 U.S. 290 (1977). But in that case, this Court

did not hold that all claims for intentional infliction

of emotional distress survive the existence of a federal

remedy. Instead, the Court held that “it is essential that

the state tort be either unrelated to employment discrimi-

nation or a function of the particularly abusive manner

in which the discrimination is accomplished or threatened

. 2’ Id. at 305. As noted above, the district court,

applying the analysis in Farmer, held that once the em-

ployment discrimination claims are severed from the com-

plaint, the remainder does not state a claim under state

law. Thus, even apart from the federal interest in nu-

clear safety, petitioner’s claim is preempted under tradi-

tional labor preemption principles.

ARGUMENT

The general principles of preemption are accurately

described in the Solicitor General’s brief (S.G. Br. 9-11)

and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that peti-

tioner’s state law claim is preempted under both of two

independent theories: Her claim (1) directly invades the

field of nuclear safety which Congress has occupied ex-

clusively for over 40 years and (2) creates an insuperable

obstacle “to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress” and therefore con-

flicts with the specific elements of Section 210. Hines v.

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 37 (1941). In addition, her

claim is preempted under well-settled principles of

labor law preemption, which provide a useful analogy in

12

analyzing the Supremacy Clause issue in this case. We

address each ground of preemption in turn.

I. A STATE LAW CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL IN-

FLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING

OUT OF RETALIATORY EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS

AT A NUCLEAR FACILITY INVADES THE FIELD

OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATIONS AND

IS THEREFORE PREEMPTED.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

$$ 2011 et seq., and the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. $§ 5801 et seq., exclusively

reserve the entire field of nuclear safety to federal con-

trol. Congress has given the NRC exclusive authority

over the licensing and regulation of nuclear facilities, and

pursuant to this authority the Commission has enacted

detailed regulations in furtherance of its paramount re-

sponsibility to protect the public from the health and

safety hazards of nuclear operations. Any state law that,

in effect, rerulates the safe operation of a nuclear fa-

cility, regardless of its purpose or its potential to disrupt

the federal scheme, is preempted to the extent it tres-

passes in this exclusively federal area. Pacific Gas &

Electric, 461 U.S. at 212-213; see. e.g., Exxon Corp. v.

Eaqerton, 462 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1983): Rice v. Santa Fe

Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 231-36 (1947); Hines v.

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).

A. Congress Has Preempted The Entire Field Of Nu-

clear Safety And Operations.

In Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 205-212, this

Court reviewed in detail the statutory language, struc-

ture and legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seg. Based on this review. the

Court concluded that “the Federal Government has oc-

cupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except

the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.” 461

U.S. at 212. In this, as in any preemption case, the

touchstone of analysis is Congress’s intent to preempt.

ee

13

Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458

U.S. 141, 152 (1982). The Atomic Energy Act provides

the basic framework against which Congress’s decision

in 1978 to enact Section 210 must be interpreted.

As this Court explained in Pacific Gas & Electric,

“ft]he Atomic Energy Act must be read” for preemp-

tion purposes against the unique background of exclusive

federal control over nuclear energy. 461 U.S. at 206.

Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 to end

the prior federal monopoly over all aspects of nuclear

technology and allow private industry to participate in

the commercial development of nuclear technology under

a scheme of exclusive federal regulation and licensing.

461 U.S. at 207. In particular, Congress expressly re-

served to the federal government the right to regulate

nuclear facilities to assure the protection of health and

safety.” Id. Congress gave the Atomic Energy Commis-

sion exclusive licensing authority for the possession and

distribution of special nuclear material (42 U.S.C.

$$ 2073, 2077), and empowered the Commission to estab-

lish such regulations “to govern the possession and use

of special nuclear material . . . as the Commission may

deem necessary ... to protect health or to minimize

danger to life or property.” 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b).

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 preserved intact the

dual federal ‘state regulatory structure over the sale and

transmission of commercial electric energy (42 U.S.C.

§$ 2019), but did not provide any other regulatory role

for the states, especially a safety role. In 1959, after

extensive hearings on federal and state roles in regulat-

ing nuclear power, Congress added Section 274, which

created only a limited role for states in the nuclear

regulatory scheme—and then only by express agreement

3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (“regulation by the United States of

the production and utilization of atomic energy and of the facilities

used in connection therewith is necessary in the national intere: t

to assure the common defense and security and to protect the healch

and safety of the public”) (emphasis added).

14

with the Commission.* 42 U.S.C. § 2021. Notably, Sec-

tion 274 allowed the Commission to grant the states

regulatory authority only for byproduct, source and

“special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to

form a critical mass.” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b). Congress

thus carefully preserved the Commission’s exclusive au-

thority over other aspects of nuclear safety, including

the licensing and regulation of plants, such as respond-

ent’s Wilmington Department, that use special nuclear

materials in quantities far greater than that needed “to

form a critical mass.” ° Jd.; see 10 C.F.R. § 150.11 (defin-

ing critical mass). As this Court concluded in Pacific

Gas & Electric, by reaffirming the exclusivity of federal

authority over the field of nuclear safety concerns, the

1959 Amendments “reinforced th[e] fundamental divi-

sion of authority” between the Commission and the states

under which the states may share limited commercial

regulation but the federal government has exclusive re-

sponsibility for nuclear safety. 461 U.S. 208.°

4 Congress also authorized the Commission to terminate any such

agreement with a State “if the Commission finds that such termina-

tion or suspension is required to protect the public health and

safety.”” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(j).

5In adding Section 274, therefore, Congress was careful not to

create even the possibility that a state could regulate the health

and safety aspects of a fuel fabrication facility such as the Wil-

mington Department. In any event, North Carolina does not have

an agreement with the Commission to regulate even limited quanti-

ties of special nuclear materials.

6 As the AEC explained during hearings on Section 274, “[q]uan-

tities of special nuclear material which may present hazards of ac-

cidental criticality are excluded from the scope of the bill .... As

a consequence ... such activities as the processing of special nuclear

material, fabrication of fuel elements and similar activities will

remain subject to the licensing requirements and other regulatory

controls of the Commission.” Federal-State Relationships in Atomic

Energy Field, Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy,

86th Cong., Ist Sess. 297 (1959) (emphasis added).

Moreover, the Senate Report accompanying the 1959 amendments

confirms that they were “not intended to leave any room for the

15

Subsequent developments underscore both Congress’s

awareness of and commitment to exclusive federal con-

trol over the operation and safety of nuclear facilities.’

In 1969, for example, the General Counsel of the AEC

published in the Federal Register the Commission’s view

that Congress, in amending the Atomic Energy Act in

1959, “intended to preempt to the Federal Government

the total responsibility and authority for regulating, from

the standpoint of radiological health and safety, the

specified nuclear facilities and materials.” 10 C.F.R.

$ 8.4(i) (emphasis added); see 10 C.F.R. § 8.4(d) (re-

counting history of 1959 amendments).

In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization

Act, 42 U.S.C. §$§ 5801 et seg., which abolished the AEC

and transferred its regulatory and licensing authority to

the NRC. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(f). The 1974 Act also ex-

exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by States to control

radiation hazards by regulating byproduct, source, or special nu-

clear materials.” S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in

1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2872, 2879; see id. (recogniz-

ing “the dangers of conflicting, overlapping and inconsistent stand-

ards in different jurisdictions, to the hindrance of industry and

jeopardy of public safety”).

7This Court and numerous courts of appeals have consistently

recognized the Commission’s exclusive responsibility for ensuring

nuclear safety. See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union,

367 U.S. 396, 404, 415 (1961) (“the responsibility for safeguarding

that [public] health and safety belongs under the statute to the

Commission”); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

435 U.S. 519, 526, 550 (1978) (NRC’s “prime area of concern .. .

is national security, public health, and safety”); Northern States

Power Co, vy. State of Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1150 (8th Cir.

1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); County of Rockland v. N.RC.,

709 F.2d 766, 770 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983);

Rockford League of Women Voters v. N.R.C., 679 F.2d 1218, 1223

(7th Cir. 1982); Porter County Chapter v. N.R.C., 606 F.2d 1363,

1370, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 400

F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968); State of New Hampshire v. Atomic

Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962

(1969); Reynolds v. United States, 286 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1960).

16

panded the number and range of safety responsibilities

charged to the NRC, e.g., 42 U.S.C. $$ 5843(b) (2) (A)-

(B), 5844(b), 5877(c)), and (in Section 206) imposed

new safety-related reporting requirements on responsible

officers and directors of licensees. 42 U.S.C. § 5846. Fi-

nally, in 1978, Congress passed a set of amendments (in-

cluding several that were safety-related) to both the

Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act.

Pub. L. No. 95-601, 92 Stat. 2947 (1978). Among them

is Section 210, which encourages employees to report

safety violations to the NRC, and provides the mecha-

nism for protecting them against retaliation for doing

so—unless they have deliberately violated safety regu-

lations.

B. Section 210 Lies Squarely Within The Field Of

Nuclear Safety Concerns.

Section 210 falls squarely within the field of nuclear

safety concerns because it is intended to assist the NRC

in carrying out its exclusive responsibility to ensure

that nuclear facilities are licensed and operated in a

manner consistent with public health and safety. The

essential purpose of Section 210 is to ensure that em-

plovees are not deterred from performing “their respon-

sibility to report promptly” to the NRC (10 C.F.R.

$ 19.12) by fear of retaliatory employment action.‘

Section 210(a) states that no employer in the nuclear

industry “may discharge any employee or otherwise dis-

criminate against any employee with respect to his com-

pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment

§ Respondent uses the term “retaliatory employment action” as a

shorthand reference to the scope of conduct prohibited by Section

210. It is important to note that, by its plain terms, Section 210

covers neither all retaliatory acts nor al! changes in the terms and

conditions of employment. Instead, Section 210 covers only conduct

that involves both of these concerns—retaliation for whistleblowing

that takes the form of discharge or other changes in ‘‘compensa-

tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.

§$ 5851(a). See pages 28-29, infra.

17

because the employee” has taken one of the following

actions:

(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is

about to commence or cause to be commenced a pro-

ceeding under this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended, or a proceeding for the adminis-

tration or enforcement of any requirement imposed

under this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

as amended;

(2) testified or is about to testify in any such pro-

ceeding or;

(3) assisted or participated . . . in such a proceed-

ing or in any other manner in such a proceeding

or in any other action to carry out the purposes of

this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended.

42 U.S.C. §$ 5851(a). Any employee who believes that

he or she has been the victim of such retaliation may

file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 30

days after the violation occurs. Jd. § 5851(b)(1). The

Secretary, who promptly notifies the NRC upon receipt

of the complaint (47 Fed. Reg. 54,585), is required to

conduct and complete an investigation within 30 days,

and to issue an order within 90 days either dismissing

the complaint or providing appropriate relief. Should a

violation be found, the Secretary is authorized to award

comprehensive injunctive relief and monetary “compen-

sation.” ® Should an employer fail to comply with the

Secretary’s order, the Secretary is authorized “to file

a civil action” in federal district court and has discretion

to seek “all appropriate relief including, but not limited

® See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B) (“the Secretary shall order the

person who committed such violation to (i) take affirmative action

to abate the violation, and (ii) reinstate the complainant to his

former position together with the compensation (including back

pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment, and the

Secretary may order such person to provide compensatory damages

to the complainant”); see also id. (providing for recovery of costs

and attorney’s fees).

18

to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary dam-

ages.” 42 U.S.C. § 5851(d) (emphasis added).

1. The NRC’s regulations implementing Section 210

and other provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act

and Atomic Energy Act confirm that Section 210 is an

integral part of the federal government’s long-established

exclusive authority to regulate the use of special nuclear

materials and the safe operation of nuclear facilities.

42 U.S.C. $$ 2073(b) 2201(b), 2133, 2137, 5841(f).

Pursuant to this authority, the NRC has adopted a com-

prehensive enforcement program, “the purpose” of which

“is to promote and protect the radiological health and

safety of the public, including employees’ health and

safety.” 10 C.F.R. Part 2, App. C at 129-30. The NRC

imposes detailed record-keeping and reporting require-

ments upon licensees such as respondent, and periodically

conducts inspections to monitor compliance.’ To assist

the NRC in this oversight, Congress, in Section 206 of

the Energy Reorganiz tion Act, placed a special obliga-

tion on “any individual director or responsible officer”

of a licensee: such persons must “immediately notify

the Commission” of any failure to comply with any Com-

mission rule or regulation related to certain safety haz-

ards, and failure to report certain specified hazards may

result in civil fines. 42 U.S.C. § 5846; 10 C.F.R. §§ 21.1,

21.21, 21.61; see 10 C.F.R. Part 2, App. C at 132.

The NRC’s regulations also reveal the importance it

places on receiving reports from employees concerning

1 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 70.51 (material balances, inventory and

record-keeping requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.52 (accident, loss and

theft reporting requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.53 (material status

reporting requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.54 (nuclear material trans-

fer reporting requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.55 (NRC inspection

requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 70.56 (licensee and NRC testing re-

quirements) ; 10 C.F.R. § 70.57 (nuclear material measurement con-

trol program) ; 10 C.F.R. § 70.58 (fundamental nuclear material con-

trols); 10 C.F.R. § 70.59 (effluent monitoring reporting require-

ments).

19

possible safety violations. Although employees, unlike

directors and responsible officers, are not subject to civil

penalties for a failure to report safety problems, the

NRC has taken a number of steps to encourage them

to notify the Commission of any violations they dis-

cover. The regulations require, for example, that em-

ployers establish procedures to ensure that responsible

officers and directors in fact réceive employees’ reports of

safety problems (10 C.F.R. § 21.21(a) (2)); in addition,

employees must be “instructed of their responsibility to

report promptly to the licensee any condition which may

lead to or cause a violation of Commission regulations and

licenses” (10 C.F.R. § 19.12) (emphasis added): allowed

“to consult privately” with Commission inspectors dur-

ing facility inspections concerning matters that may

relate to “any violation of the [Atomic Energy] act”

(10 C_.F.R. §§ 19.14, 19.15); and allowed to “request”

that the NRC conduct an inspection (10 C.F.R. § 19.16).

The NRC’s regulations implementing Section 210 dem-

onstrate that this provision, like Section 206, plays an

integral role in ensuring that the NRC receives the in-

formation it needs to ensure safe operation of nuclear

facilities. The Commission itself has explained that “to

effectively fulfill its mandate, [the NRC] requires com-

plete, factual, and current information concerning the

regulated activities of its licensees. Employees are an

important source of such information and should be en-

couraged to come forth with any items of potential sig-

nificance to safety without fear of retribution from their

employers.” 47 Fed. Reg. 30,453 (1982); see also Pet.

App. 4la (“The need to protect channels of information

from being dried up by employer intimidation is the

purpose of the Act”). Accordingly, “to ensure that em-

ployees are aware that employment discrimination for

. contacting the Commission is illegal and that a

remedy exists,” the Commission has developed a stand-

ard form (Form NRC-3) that alerts employees to their

reporting responsibilities and the protection afforded them

by Section 210. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,453. The Commission

20

requires all licensees to keep this form posted ‘at loca-

tions sufficient to permit employees protected by [Sec-

tion 210] to observe a copy on the way to or from

their place of work.” 10 C.F.R. § 70.7(e). Moreover, the

NRC has entered into an agreement with the Secretary

of Labor to ensure that it promptly receives notice of

any Section 210 claim filed with the Secretary and can

“cooperate to the fullest extent possible” in the investi-

gation. 47 Fed. Reg. 54,585 (1982) ."

Most telling, however, is the significance that the NRC

places on retaliation against those who report safety

concerns. Proof of such retaliation by a licensee is itself

a safety concern so serious that it is grounds for, among

other penalties, “denial, revocation, or suspension of the

license.” 10 C.F.R. § 70.7(c). See 10 C.F.R. Part 2, App.

C at V.D and Supp. VII.A.4, B.4, C.4 (retaliation deemed

comparable in severity to other “serious” safety viola-

tions). Accordingly, the NRC has investigated and pun-

ished licensees who retaliate against employees who raise

safety concerns. See, e.g., In re Toledo Edison Co., EA

88-234 (Nov. 10, 1988) (modifying license and imposing

$80,000 fine); Jn re Tennessee Valley Auth., EA 86-93

(July 10, 1986) ($150,000 fine); Jn re Illinois Power

Co., EA 86-143 (Dec. 17, 1986) ($50,000 fine); see also

note 2, supra.

2. The NRC’s integration of Section 210 into its core

safety and licensing responsibility is fully consistent with

Congress’s intent. Indeed, it is apparent from the legisla-

tive history and structure of Section 210 that Congress

intended to integrate this provision into the broader

11 The Secretary of Labor has recognized the employee’s important

role in providing information to the NRC. See, e.g., Nunn v. Duke

Power Co., A.L.J. Dec., Vol. 1, No. 4, 84-ERA-27 (July-Aug. 1987)

(As set out in Form NRC-3, “violations of NRC rules should be

reported immediately to the employee’s supervisor and if adequate

corrective action is not taken, then to N.R.C.”); Wilson v. Bechtel

Constr., Inc., A.L.J. Dec., Vol. 2, No. 1, 86-ERA-34 (Jan.-Feb. 1988)

(same).

21

scheme of nuclear safety regulation over which it had

given the NRC exclusive control. As the Senate Report

accompanying Section 210 explains, ‘“[u]nder this sec-

tion, employees and union officials could help assure that

employers do not violate requirements of the Atomic

Energy Act.” S. Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.

2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News

7303, 7304. Rep. Udall, in alerting his colleagues in the

House to the Senate bill in which the language of Section

210 first appeared, underscored the link between the

NRC’s exclusive responsibility for ensuring nuclear safety

and the role of Section 210:

[T]he other body does have language in its bill deal-

ing with the subject of whistleblower protection,

language which I look upon sympathetically. . . . I,

for one, believe that the NRC must be able to pro-

tect its sources of information to do an effective

job of protecting the health and safety of the Amer-

ican people.

124 Cong. Rec. 33,255 (1978) (emphasis added).'*

Moreover, the structure of Section 210 confirms what

the legislative history makes plain, which is that Con-

gress viewed employee protection in the nuclear context

not simply as an end in itself, but as a means jto the

ultimate end of enhancing nuclear safety.'* For example,

if employee protection were the only significant purpose

for Section 210, then the requirement that any complaint

12 See also 124 Cong. Rec. 29,769 (1978) (statement of Sen.

McClure) (Finally, the Committee has recommended a provision to

protect any worker who is discriminated against by his employer for

providing assistance to the NRC in the discharge of its regulatory

responsibilities”) (emphasis added); Pet. App. 18a-19a (‘‘the legis-

lative history” of Section 210 indicates that safety concerns are

“inextricably intertwined” with employee protection).

13 See DeFord vy. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir.

1983) (“The purpose of the Act is to prevent employers from dis-

couraging cooperation with NRC investigators, and not merely to

prevent employers from inhibiting disclosure of particular facts or

types of information” ).

22

be brought within 30 days of the alleged violation would

seem unnecessarily strict. But this short time-require-

ment makes perfect sense given the broader recognition,

explicit in the NRC regulations, that the fact of em-

ployer retaliation is itself a serious safety concern: The

NRC views retaliation as an independent basis for re-

voking or modifying a license, and as an action which

should be reported to the NRC without delay."* See

page 20, supra.

The structure of Section 210 also reflects Congress’s

awareness that whistleblower protection, while critical to

achieving optimal workplace safety, nevertheless carries

its own threat to safety if abused. This recognition of

the need to balance the provision of employee protection

against the broader concern of ensuring overall work-

place safety is explicit in subsection (g). This provi-

sion denies statutory protection “to any employee who,

acting without direction from his or her employer .. .

deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of this

Act or of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.”

42 U.S.C. § 5851(g). The Senate Report explains that

Congress added subsection (g) “to avoid abuse of the

protection afforded under this section” (S. Rep. No. 848

at 30).

14 Amici National Conference of State Legislatures, et al.

(“NCSL”) relies (Br. 17) upon Congress’s decision to use the Sec-

retary of Labor to administer Section 210 as evidence that Congress

did not intend to use that provision to promote safety concerns.

But the memorandum of understanding between the NRC and the

Secretary (47 Fed. Reg. 54,585) reveals clearly the closeness of the

relationship between Section 210 and the NRC’s plenary authority to

control safety in the operations of a nuclear facility. It seems obvi-

ous that Congress chose the Secretary of Labor to receive these com-

plaints in order to encotrage individuals to file them. Congress

recognized that employees, such as petitioner, who have attempted

without success to bring a safety concern to the attention of the

NRC would be more willing to file a complaint if it would be heard

by a neutral, third party. Thus, the Secretary's role is fully con-

sistent with the provisior’s purpose of promoting safety in the

operation of a nuclear facility.

23

By excluding from coverage those employees who them-

selves have deliberately caused a safety or other viola-

tion, Congress intended subsection (g) to assure employ-

ers that they can take appropriate measures to discipline

employees who deliberately create safety hazards, with-

out running a significant risk of liability. As petitioner’s

own conduct illustrates, the question whether an employee

has deliberately violated safety regulations and thereby

poses a threat to the health and safety of workers and

the public lies at the heart of the safe operation of a

nuclear facility. In the context of four decades of exclu-

sive federal control over nuclear safety, “[i]t is unlikely

—to say the least—that Congress intended” to allow this

vital question to be resolved under “a variety of common-

law rules,” Jnternational Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.

481, 496-97 (1987), or to allow tort actions in state

courts to strip employers of the immunity so carefully

built into subsection (g), when the alleged “whistleblow-

er” is also a safety violator. The inclusion of subsection

(g) alone establishes that Congress intended Section 210

to operate as an integral part of the system of exclusive

federal control over nuclear safety.

Congress’s approach to the controversial and important

subject of punitive damages is also revealing. If Con-

gress’s sole interest was to encourage workers to bring

complaints by deterring retaliation, it would have au-

thorized employees to obtain punitive damages (and

might well have dispensed with administrative review

altogether). Instead, Section 210(b)(2)(B) authorizes

only the Secretary to seek punitive damages, and then

only when the employer has compounded the underlying

violation by flouting the Secretary’s remedial order. 42

U.S.C. $5851(d). It is desirable, for safety reasons,

for employers not to be deterred from taking appropriate

disciplinary action, and the clear limit in Section 210 on

18 Whistleblower-protection provisions in two other statutes ex-

pressly allow the employee to seek punitive damages. See Safe

Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B) (ii); Toxie Sub-

stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b).

24

the use of punitive damages reflects the statute’s over-

all purpose of enhancing the safe operation of nuclear

facilities.'®

As this Court has often observed, “‘[t]he presump-

tion that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a

statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a com-

prehensive legislative scheme including an integrated sys-

tem of procedures for enforcement.’” Massachusetts

Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985),

quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,

Inc., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). Moreover, as with other

statutes providing comprehensive enforcement procedures,

in construing Section 210 the Court may reasonably

conclude that important “policy choices [are] reflected

in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of

others. .. .” Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. DeDeaux, 481 US.

41, 54 (1987). Here, Congress’s decision to allow only

the Secretary, and not employees, to seek punitive dam-

ages makes eminently good sense in light of the overall

safety purposes of Section 210.

Given the long history of exclusive federal control over

nuclear energy, Congress is presumed to have been aware

when it added Section 210 to the Energy Reorganization

Act that it was legislating in an area of exclusive federal

eontrol. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244

(1972). Indeed, Congress could not have chosen simply

to build on existing state remedies because the aspect of

16 See, e.g., Guy Vv. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 812 F.2d 911,

917 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the “danger that the always

uncertain prospects of [wrongful discharge] litigation will deter

employers . . . from legitimate personnel decisions”); Dartey Vv.

Zack Co., 82-ERA-2, slip op. 11 (Secretary’s Decision, April 25,

1983) (employer “may well have been justified in firing’ employee,

but instead suspended him “out of an excess of caution because .. .

it was mindful of the protections of section 5851”); Wood v.

Yeargin Constr. Co., 79-ERA-3, slip op. 8-9 (Secretary’s Decision,

Nov. 8, 1979) (dismissing section 210 claim and noting that “[i]n

view of the risk to the plant and public offered by [employee’s}

propensities, his discharge was overdue when it occurred’’).

25

employee protection at issue here (unlike in Silkwood) is

not a traditional area of state concern. When Congress

enacted Section 210 in 1978, the vast majority of states

did not even recognize a cause of action for wrongful dis-

charge,"’ and state law with regard to “intentional in-

fliction of emotional distress’ was no more clear or

consistent than it is today. See Atchi m, T. & S. F.

Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568-70 & nn. 17-19 (1987)

(discussing at length “the doctrinal divergences” in state

law on intentional infliction of emotional distress).

3. Petitioner and the United States assert, but do not

argue directly, that Section 210 lies outside the field of

nuclear safety regulation. Pet. Br. 22 n.9; S.G. Br. 12.

17 [',,aei the at-will doctrine, terminated employees cannot recover

damages under a cause of action for wrongful, abusive or retaliatory

discharge. By 1978 only ten states had recognized a cause of action

where an employer terminated an employee in clear contravention of

a stror.g public poiicy of the state or in bad faiir See Petermann v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P-2c 25 (Cal. 1959):

Frampton vy. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973);

Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974): Nees v.

Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d

151 (Mich. 1976) ; Jacksoa v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54

(Idaho 1977); Fortune y. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d

1251 (Mass. 1977); O’Suliivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2¢ 149 (N.J. 1978):

Harless vy. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1972):

Reuther v Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. 1978). More-

over, when Section 210 was enacted, eight states had expressly re-

jected such a cause of action. See Raley v. Darling Shop of Green-

ville, Inc., 59 S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 1950); Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil

Co., 300 So.2d 510 (La. App. 1974); Yanta v. Montgomery Ward &

Co., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 389 (Wis. 1974): Hinrichs v. Tranauilaire

Hospital, 352 So.2a 1130 (Ala. 1977); Segal v. Arrow Industries

Corp., 364 So.2d 89 (Fla. App. 1978); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin,

250 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 197°); Seroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d

881 (Ky. App. 1977); Dockery \. Lampart Table Co., 244 S.E.2d

272 (N.C. App. 1978). While today at least 26 states allow common

law exceptions to the at-will doctrine, whether a discharged em-

ployee can recover depends upon the particuler state’s law. Thus,

when Congress enacted Section 210, it did not impose an adminis-

trative scheme upon an area traditionally regulated by the states.

26

They attempt to hide behind the district court’s statement

that the “paramount purpose” of Section 210 is not to

pro.note nuclear safety (Pet. App. 19a), and move on to

argue against preemption on other grounds. But the

district court’s observation provides no real shelter, for

two reasons. First, as the foregoing discussion illustrates,

the district court simply erred in viewing Section 210

apart from its statutory context and history. Second,

the district court asked the wrong question. By stating

that “[t]he question, therefore, is whether Congress put

safety or employee protection first” (Pet. App. 19a), the

district court implied that Section 210 could have only

one significant purpose. Statutes as complex as Section

210 typically have multiple purposes, however, and the

relevant question for preemption purposes is whether

promoting nuclear safety is at least one of Section 210’s

important purposes. The NRC’s regulations alone es-

tablish that Section 210 is an integral part of the NRC’s

exclusive and core responsibility to ensure the safe op-

eration of nuclear facilities.

The Solicitor General’s further argument that Section

210, as a single provision, cannot “occupy a ‘field’”’ (S.G.

Br. 8) is similarly without merit. By asking the Court

to view Section 210 in isolation from the statute it

amended, the Solicitor General arbitrarily compartmen-

talizes the analysis. The Solicitor General’s approach

would have merit if Cor.cess had enacted Section 210

alone as a private, federal cause of action and had not

enacted the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reor-

ganization Act. Compare California v. ARC America

Corp., 109 S.Ct. 1661 (1989) (passage of one remedial

statute does not necessarily preempt complementary state

remedial action). But Congress enacted Section 210 as

an integral part of the entire package of nuclear safety

legislation. A proper field-preemption analysis, no less

than any proper statutory analysis, must take into ac-

count the broader statutory framework of which a par-

ticular provision is simply one part. EF.g., Transcontin-

ental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 474

27

U.S. 409, 422-23 (1986). Section 210’s statutory struc-

ture confirms what is apparent from the legislative his-

tory and from the NRC’s implementing regulations: Con-

gress intended Section 210 to be interpreted as an impor-

tant part of the broader scheme of federal nuclear safety

legislation that defines an area of exclusive federal con-

trol, off limits to all state regulation—that which conflicts

and that which may complement the federal scheme.

C. Section 210 Preempts State Law Claims For Inten-

tional Infliction Of Emotional Distress That Arise

Out Of Retaliatory Employment Action For Whis-

tleblowing At A Nuclear Facility.

1. Because Section 210 falls squarely within “the

entire field of nuclear safety concerns” (Pacific Gas &

Electric, 461 U.S. at 212) over which Congress has given

the federal government exclusive authority, it necessarily

follows that Congress has displaced state law reinedies

for this same conduct. See Silkwood v. Kerr-lIcGee

Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250-51, 256 (1984) (acknowledging

that state tort law remedies can intrude into the feld of

nuclear safety regulation). As the district court cor-

rectly recognized, virtually all of the conduct supporting

petitioner’s claim for intentional infliction of emoticnal

distress is conduct related to the “terms, conditions, ard

privileges of employment” for which Section 210 provide:

a comprehensive compensatory remedy. Pet. App. 18a,

28a; J.A. 7. To determine, as a matter of state law,

whether these changes in the terms of employment con-

stituted “outrageous conduct” or were instead an appro-

priate response, consistent with subsection (g), to an

employee who posed a significant risk to workplace safety,

the jury would necessarily be forced to consider and re-

solve questions of the proper operation of a nuclear

facility that Congress intended the Secretary of Labor,

in consultation with the NRC, to address.'®

18The proceeding before the ALJ in this case illustrates the

overlap between petitioner’s state law claim and the scope of Sec-

tion 210. The ALJ held 11 days of hearings, heard testimony from

petitioner’s psychologist concerning her emotional distress, and

28

It is worth emphasizing that the preemption of state

tort law in this context is not an all-or-nothing proposi-

tion. A proper preemption analysis requires a court to

examine the state law claim against the field that

Congress has occupied. Section 210 provides a safety-

related mechanism for protecting employees in the nu-

clear industry against retaliatory employment action for

their legitimate attempts to report safety concerns. Fed-

eral law preempts this subject, even if the employee char-

acterizes the employer’s employment-related discipline as

a tort. To the extent the employee’s claim arises from

conduct clearly outside the scope of Section 219, however,

state law is not displaced. See note 8, supra.

In this case, the district court performed precisely this

analysis. Although it held that petitioner’s allegations

stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress, it also held that what is left of petitioner’s com-

plaint after removing those allegations that are within

the ambit of Section 210 “would not in and of itself

support a cause of action” under North Carolina law for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pet. App. 28a.

This interpretation of state law by a district judge sitting

in North Carolina, which was affirmed by the court of

appeals, is ordinarily not subject to review by this

Court.’® and has never been challenged by petitioner and

her amici. Nor could it be.”°

awarded petitioner $70,000 damages “as recompense for [her]

humiliation and mental suffering.” Pet. App. 37a-39a, 55a. See

also id. 45a-46a n.& (Secretary “must determine whether Claimant’s

overall conduct was so generally inimical to Employer’s interests

and so excessive as to be beyond the protection of the statute....

fand] balance the setting in which the activity arises and the in-

terests and motivations of both Employer and Employee”).

19 See, e.g., Bowen Vv. Massachusetts, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 2739 (1988) ;

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1985);

Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629-30 (1946).

20 The district court’s interpretation is plainly correct. In inter-

preting a complaint in this area, a court must be guided by the

29

Petitioner therefore is simply wrong in arguing (Pet

Br. 18) that if this Court holds ll saline ~

claim preempted, then it must hold that all tort claims

against an employer are preempted. Petitioner contends

that if respondent “decided to retaliate against Ms. Eng-

lish for her activities by hiring some ‘thugs’ and actually

physically assaulting her, the decision below leaves her

with no remedy for injuries and medical bills.’ Jd.

N onsense. A decision to hire thugs to assault an employee

is hardly a decision to change the “terms, conditions, and

privileges of employment” within the meaning of Section

210. This Court has never had difficulty distinguishing

between claims for “intentional infliction of emotional

distress” arising out of changes in the terms and condi-

tions of employment and similar claims arising out of

other illegal conduct. E.g., Farmer v. United Brother-

hood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 303-07 (1977). Thus

in holding petitioner’s claim preempted in this case be-

cause it is based on the same employment-related conduct

addressed by Section 210, this Court need not and should

not reach out to preempt state law remedies for injuries

inflicted on whistleblowing employees through conduct

ago that Page, within the compass of” Section

, San Diego Bldq. Trades mei 59 U

oe uae aan g Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S

rule that “compliance with the intent of Congress cannot be avoided

by mere artful pleading.” Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. vy Kalo

Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 324 (1981). Here, dismissal of the

complaint is consistent even with petitioner’s broadest allegations.

Her claims of ridicule and’ harassment are allegations which by

definition will exist almost always whenever an employee is subjected

to discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. These allega-

tions are fully cognizable under Section 210. English v Whit field

858 F.2d 957, 963-64 (4th Cir, 1988). . ae hi

; *1 In evaluating the sweep of the preempted field defined by Sec-

tion 210, the Court should employ the same standard embraced for

labor law preemption, viz., there can be no remedy under state law

for conduct that either is prohibited or is “arguable” prohibited

by Section 210. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246. This rule fully protects

the federal interest while allowing the states to provide yemedies

30

2. In Pacific Gas & Electric, this Court affirmed the

principle that when Congress has preempted a field, state

law that intrudes into that field is preempted, regardless

of its purpose or potential for conflict, unless there is

evidence that Congress “expressly ceded to the States”

the authority to act. Jd. at 212. Thus, the appropriate

analytic framework in this case is precisely the opposite

of that put forth by petitioner and her amici. This is

not a situation where the Company must demonstrate

manifest congressional intent to preempt this specific

state tort rule; the “special features” of the congressional

scheme regulating nuclear safety establish Congress’s pre-

emptive intent. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Ter-

minal, 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973). Instead, it is incumbent

upon petitioner to demonstrate that Congress specifically

intended te authorize a tort action that overlaps with a

Section 210 proceeding.

In both Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood v. Kerr-

McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), this Court upheld

state laws that operated in fields where Congress had

expressly ceded the states a role. In Pacific Gas & Elec-

tric, the Court upheld the California moratorium on new

plant construction because Congress had expressly con-

ferred upon the states the right “to determine—as a mat-

ter of economics—whether a nuclear plant . . . should be

built.” 461 U.S. at 222.

In Silkwood, the Court recognized that allowing state

law remedies for those injured by radiation in a nuclear

plant intruded on the exclusive field of nuclear safety.

Id. at 250-51, 256. The Court upheld the state law at

issue in Silkwood against field preemption, however, be-

cause it found express evidence in the legislative history

for conduct that simr’y has nothing to do with Section 210. Thus,

for instance, becau acts of violence are not arguably within Sec-

tion’s 210’s prohiL.cion, state law torts for assault or battery would

not be preempted.

31

of the Atomic Energy Act,”* consistent with the test

established in Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 212,

that “Congress assumed that traditional principles of

State tort law would apply with full force” to compen-

sate those who suffered radiation injuries, and “intended

-. .. to tolerate whatever tension” might result with the

NRC’s exclusive authority over nuclear safety. 464 U.S.

at 255-56. The Court found further support in the fact

that Congress had not provided any comparable remedy

for victims of radiation. Id. at 251. In so holding, the

Court emphasized that its holding was a narrow one lim-

ited to “damages for radiation injuries,” and was not

intended to “suggest that there could never be an instance

in which the federal law would pre-empt the recovery of

damages based on state law.” Jd. at 256.

There has been no showing in this case, nor could

there be a showing, that Congress expressly ceded to the

states the right to regulate the aspect of nuclear safety

otherwise fully regulated by Section 210. Neither pe-

titioner nor the United States is able to point to any-

thing in the language or the legislative history of Section

210, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended,

or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, that

refers in any way to the right of states to regulate the

aspect of nuclear safety addressed by Section 210.%

*2Specifically, the Court looked to the legislative history of the

Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (which

amended the Atomic Energy Act), and to subsequent amendments

of Price-Anderson. 464 U.S. at 251-55.

*3 Petitioner does suggest that in Section 274(k) of the Atomic

Energy Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k), Congress granted

states authority “to regulate activities connected with atomic

energy.” See Pet. Br. 21-22. Subsection (k) provides petitioner

no support, however, for two reasons. First, this Court squarely

foreclosed an expansive reading of subsection (k) in Pacific Gas &

Electric: It held that subsection (k) “does not represent an affirma-

tive grant of power to the States.” 461 U.S. at 210. The Court

explained that subsection (k) simply “underscored the distinction

drawn in 1954 between the spheres of activity left respectively

32

The critical facts on which the Court based its de-

cision not to preempt the state laws in Pacific Gas &

Electric and in Silkwood are therefore absent here. Un-

like Pacific Gas & Electric, phe law ai a

does not operate in the field of economic concern -

pressly aa by Congress to the states. Unlike Silkwood,

there is no legislative history of any kind from which to

draw an inference of congressional intent not to preempt

these state law remedies. More striking still, unlike in

Silkwood, Congress here has enacted a comprehensive

remedial and enforcement scheme, providing not only re-

instatement and back pay, but also full compensatory

relief, costs, and attorney’s fees for those who suffer

injuries of the sort alleged here. E.g., DeF ord v. Secre-

tary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 288-89 (6th Cir. 1983).

Under this Court’s established field preemption doctrine,

as applied in both Pacific Gas & Electric and in Silkwood,

there is no basis for exempting petitioner’s claim from

preemption.

D. State Law That Infringes On A Field Reserved Ex-

clusively For Federal Control Is Preempted Re-

gardless Of Its Purpose.

Because they have no evidence that Congress intended

to allow the States to regulate the “whistleblower” as-

pect of nuclear operations and safety, petitioner and the

United States have resorted to the argument that state

law may invade a field exclusively reserved to the fed-

eral government se long as the state’s purpose in passing

its law is different from the purpose behind the federal

law. See Pet. Br. 10; S.G. Br. 7, 12-14. That argument

to the Federal Government and the States.” Jd. Second, as the

Court also explained in Pacific Gas & Electric, subsection (k) by

its plain terms “limits only the pre-emptive effect of this section,

that is, § 274 [governing federal-state agreements].” Id. It there-

fore does not serve to limit the preemptive scope of other sections,

such as Section 53, 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (under which respondent's

facility is licensed) or Section 210 of the ERA. See International

Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492-94 (1987).

33

fundamentally distorts the doctrine of field preemption

as this Court has consistently applied it.”

In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218

(1947), this Court addressed a federal statutory scheme

giving “exclusive” authority to the Secretary of Agri-

culture to license and regulate warehouses. 331 U.S. at

233. In light of this exclusive authority, the Court es-

tablished the following test for determining questions of

preemption:

The test, therefore, is whether the matter on which

the State asserts the right to act is in any way reg-

ulated by the Federal Act. If it is, the federal

scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less

pervasive regulatory plan than that of the State.

Id. at 236 (emphasis added). Rice squarely forecloses

the Solicitor General’s theory of preemption, because

what matters according to Rice is not the purpose for

the state’s action but “the matter on which the State

asserts the right to act.” Id. As Rice makes plain, once

a court finds that this matter is one that is “in any

way regulated by the Federal Act,” the state law is

preempted. Jd. In subsequent decisions, this Court has

*4 Amici NCSL, et al., are more open in their attempt to undo

the doctrine of field preemption. They argue (Br. 15-16) that in

Silkwood this Court abandoned field preemption in the nuclear

field and held that “preemption analysis in matters nuclear would

henceforth focus on whether ‘there is an irreconcilable conflict be-

tween the federal and state standards or whether the imposition

of a state standard in a damages action would frustrate the ob-

jectives of the federal law’ (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256).

But in the very passage in Silkwood on which NCSL relies, the

Court explains that conflict preemption is relevant only “insofar

as damages for radiation injuries are concerned” because Congress

had expressly indicated that its preemption of the field of nuclear

safety did not extend to state tort law remedies for such injv ‘ies.

Id. Apart from this misreading of Silkwood, neither the NCSL

nor the Solicitor General explains why the Court should overrule

decades of settled preemption law or substitute “conflict” preemp-

tion standards for field preemption standards ‘n an area of un-

questioned federal supremacy.

34

squarely rejected the “suggestjion] that... |preemp-

tion] should depend upon whether the purposes of the

two laws are parallel or divergent.” Florida Lime &

Avocado Growers, Inc. V. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)

(emphasis in original) ; see, e.g., id. (“The test of whether

both federal and state regulations may operate... is

whether both regulations can be enforced without im-

pairing the federal superintendence of the field, not

whether they are aimed at similar or different objec-

tives”); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los An-

geles, 475 U.S. 608, 618-19 (1986) (although city’s pur-

pose is “simply” to exercise ‘a traditional municipal

function,” its action is preempted because it “intrudes

into the collective bargaining process’) ; Perez v. Camp-

bell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) (“such a doctrine would

enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted

federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative com-

mittee report articulating some state interest or policy—

other than frustration of the federal objective—that

would be tangentiaily furthered by the proposed state

law’). Compare Br. for United States at 26-27, Pacific

Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation

and Dev. Comm’n, No. 81-1945 (1983) (“This Court has

long recognized the irrelevance of legislative motives to

questions of preemption”’).

In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court held the preemp-

tion rule announced in Fice fully applicable to the field

of nuclear safety:

25 For example, under the Solicitor General’s view, a state law

prohibiting cable television operators from broadcasting commer-

cials for alcoholic beverages would no longer be subject to field

preemption, despite its invasion of the federal government’s ex-

clusive authority over cable communications, because the state law

“also effectuates a public policy [reducing alcohol abuse] distinct

from [the agency’s purpose of regulating signal carviage].” S.G.

Br. 14 n.8. But that result is flatly inconsistent with this Court’s

decision in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. vy. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 704-05

(1984) (state law prohibiting alcoholic beverage commercials “‘tres-

passes into the exclusive domain of the FCC” and is preempted).

35

When the Federal Government completely occupies

a given field or an identifiable portion of it, as it

has done here, the test of preemption is whether

“the matter on which the State asserts the right to

act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.”

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S., at 236.

461 U.S. at 212-13. The application of this test here is

straightforward. The ‘matter on which the state as-

serts the right to act” is the emotional distress allegedly

suffered by an employee at a nuclear facility because

her employer allegedly retaliated against her for raising

safety concerns about the plant. This is a matter that

is directly regulated by federal law as part of a com-

prehensive scheme of nuclear licensing exclusively re-

served by Congress to the NRC. Under the test estab-

lished in Rice and reaffirmed in Pacific Gas & Electric,

petitioner’s claim is preempted because Congress has

deliberately and carefully occupied this field.

The Solicitor General’s suggestion (S.G. Br. 12-13)

that this Court somehow altered this basic preemption

principle by examining the purpose behind the California

statute in Pacific Gas & Electr: is flatly wrong. Al-

though the Court examined the state’s legislative pur-

pose, it did so solely to determine whether the reguiation

fell within the limited area that Congress explicitly

carved out of the otherwise preempted field.** Not only

did the Court in Pacific Gas & Electric explicitly reaf-

firm the reasoning in Rice (461 U.S. at 212-13), it,ex-

pressly stated that the state legislature’s purpose was

irrelevant to the question of field preemption:

*6 The Court explained that an inquiry into legislative purpose

was essential in order to determine how that law should be ‘“‘con-

strued and classified.” Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 212-13.

As the Court explained, “[a] state moratorium on nuclear construc-

tion grounded in safety concerns falls squarely within the pro-

hibited field,” while a moratorium “aimed at economic problems,”

the resolution of which Congress had expressly ceded to the States,

does not. Jd. at 213.

36

At the outset, we emphasize that the statute does

not seek to regulate the construction or operation of

a nuclear powerplant. It would clearly be imper-

missible for California to attempt to do so, for

such regulation, even if enacted out of nonsafety

concerns, would nevertheless directly conflict with

the NRC’s exclusive authority over plant construc-

tion and operation.

461 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added). That holding lays

to rest petitioner’s and her amici’s heavy reliance upon

the purpose of state law as a legitimate basis for avoid-

ing preemption in this case.

Il. PETITIONER’S STATE LAW CLAIM IS PRE-

EMPTED BECAUSE IT STANDS AS AN OBSTA-

CLE TO THE FULL ACHIEVEMENT OF CON-

GRESS’S OBJECTIVES IN REGULATING THE

SAFETY AND OPERATIONS OF NUCLEAR FA-

CILITIES.

As discussed above, when Congress has reserved a par-

ticular field to the exclusive control of the federal gov-

ernment, state regulation that trespasses on that field is

preempted regardless of whether it conflicts with or even

complements federal law. Petitioner’s claim, however,

also “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and

execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-

gress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67. This frus-

tration of congressional purpose establishes an independ-

ent basis for preemption under this Court’s conflict-

preemption principles. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 US.

725, 747 (1981).

In analyzing conflict preemption, Section 210 should

not be viewed as “merely a single statutory provision

granting a remedy to employees in one industry for one

type of discrimination by employers.” S.G. Br. 17. Sec-

tion 210 is “‘a comprehensive legislative scheme includ-

ing an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.’ 24

Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.

134, 147 (1985), quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. V.

37

Transport Workers, Inc., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). In

examining such schemes, the Court has observed that

the remedies Congress has chosen to provide and to omit

must be presumed to reflect important policy choices

and has preempted state law that would upset the “care-

ful balancing” that these choices reflect. Pilot Life Ins

Co. V. DeDeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).2* Furthermore,

Section 210 must be analyzed not in isolation, or against

employee protection provisions in other statutes.2* but

against the background and purposes of the ERA and

the Atomic Energy Act. International Paper Co. v

Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 498 (1987) (for preemption pur-

poses, statutory provision must be analyzed in the context

of the statute “as a whole, its purposes and its history”).

A. Congress’s Objective In Enacting Section 210 Was

To Create A Balanced Scheme That Would Further

The Goal of Ensuring The Safe Operation Of

Nuclear Facilities.

Section 210 is not concerned with the ordinary terms

of employment in the nuclear industry, but with a dis-

tinct aspect .of the employment relationship: protecting

employees against job-related retaliation based on their

report of possible safety hazards. As we have discussed

the structure, legislative history and regulations imple-

menting Section 210 all reveal the basic point that the

*7 See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles

rage — 619 (1986); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft

oats, Ine., 109 S.Ct. 971, 975 (1989); Hisquierd ] er

439 U.S. 572, 588 (1979). ——

*8 Employee protection provisions in other statutes are of little

relevance here. First, those statutes, which typically adopt a

joint federal/state approach to regulation, differ Sendumantaliy

from the Atomic Energy Act. Train vy. Colorado Pub Retevest

Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). Second the seevi-

sions themselves vary significantly across statutes. For example

two such provisions allow employees to obtain punitive damages.

see note 15, supra, while one does not even provide compensatory

relief. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). Each provision therefore reflects Con-

gress’s attempt “to tailor [employee protection] to the needs of

th[e] bill.” 120 Cong. Rec. 36,393 (1974) (statement of Rep. Heinz).

38

employee protection provided by Section 210 is an impor-

tant means to the fundamental goal of ensuring the safe

operation of nuclear facilities. ~

Allowing state tort claims for injuries that are com-

pensable under Section 210 would frustrate two impor-

tant safety-related purposes of Section 210. First, allow-

ing such claims would significantly delay or eliminate

notification to the NRC that an allegation of retaliation

has been made, an incident that is itself a serious safety

concern. Second, allowing such claims would undermine

Congress’s goal of ensuring that employers are not un-

duly deterred from taking responsible disciplinary action.

Thus, the courts below correctly held that petitioner’s

claim directly impeded the purposes of Section 210 as re-

flected in the various elements of this remedial scheme.

B. Failure To Preempt State Law Claims For Injuries

Arisin, 1+ Of Conduct Regulated By Section 210

Would P:. ‘ude This Statute From Fully Achieving

Its Purposc’

1. Allowing employees to bring state tort claims based

on the same conduct governed by Section 210 would

seriously impair the ability of the NRC to fulfill its

statutory mandate to ensure nuclear workplace safety.

E.q., 47 Fed. Reg. 30,452 (1982). While Section 210

requires employees to file their claims of workplace dis-

crimination within 30 days, and requires the Secretary

to investigate such claims promptly, state tort claims

have statutes of limitations measured in years rather

than days; an employee therefore could delay for years

before bringing her claim. Moreover, even if the claim

is brought in court relatively quickly, such a filing does

not trigger any notice to the NRC.

Petitioner argues that as a practical matter the NRC

will always receive notice because the premise for the

retaliation will necessarily be a complaint to the NRC.

But this argument is flawed in two fundamental re-

spects. First, Section 210 repeatedly has been held to

preclude retaliation not only for complaints made to the

. —e es

39

NRC, but also for threats to complain to the NRC and

for complaints voiced solely to the employer.*’ Second,

and more fundamentally, the NRC views an act of re-

taliation itself as a safety violation of significant concern

—potentially serious enough to warrant revocativn of a

license. 10 C.F.R. § 7 (c); see page 20, supra. State

law remedies that allow employees to bypass the statu-

torily provided complaint procedures and therefore fail

to notify the Secretary (who in ‘urn notifies the NRC)

of retaliatory employment action seriously impede a cen-

tral purpose of the statute.”

2. Allowing state law claims such as petitioner’s to go

forward also would deter employers from taking appro-

priate disciplinary action by creating considerable un-

certainty and inconsistency in the treatment of employ-

*9 All appellate courts (but one) that have reached the issue

have held that Section 210 applies to retaliation for safety com-

plaints voiced only to the employer. See, e.g., Mackowiak v. Uni-

versity Nuclear Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984):

Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1511-13 (10th Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1011 (1986); Consolidated Edison Co.

of N.Y., Inc. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982). But see

Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1031 (5th Cir.

1984). The Secretary has consistently ruled that internal com-

plaints constitute protected activity, Lopez v. West Texas Util.

86-ERA-25 (July 26, 1988) (citing Francis v. Bogan, 86-ERA-2

(April 1, 1988) ), and has expressly rejected Brown & Root. Nunn v.

Duke Power Co., 84-ERA-27 (July 30, 1987).

* The Department of Labor recentiy recognized the potential for

conflict between a state tort remedy and Section 210. During hear-

ings on H.R. 3368, an omnibus whistleblower protection bill cur-

rently pending in Congress, the Solicitor of Labor testified that “in

order to preclude duplicative State law proceedings,” the bill “should

preempt State whistleblower claims premised on State wrongful

discharge statutes and common law.” Whistleblower Protection Act:

Hearing on H.R. 3368 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management

Relations of the House Cow a. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong.,

Ist ‘Sess. 69 (1989). The dministration later explained that a fed-

eral remedial scheme shou preempt state law claims because other-

wise “the federal agency wit substantive health and safety responsi-

bilities” would not be notifie. ‘and an important goal of [the fed-

eral law] would be frustrated.” d. at 246.

40

ment discrimination claims. Subsection (g), which pre-

cludes recovery for an employee who “deliberately causes

a violation of any requirement of [the Energy Reorgani-

zation] Act or of the Atomic Energy Act” (42 U.S.C.

§ 5851(g), reflects Congress’s concern not to deter em-

ployers from taking appropriate disciplinary action

where necessary to protect workplace safety. As the dis-

trict court found, state cort law contains no analogue to

subsection (g).

The Solicitor General suggests that the subsection (g)

exemption could be treated by juries as a federal defense.

S.G. Br. 21. Such an approach does not avoid the conflict

problems, but compounds them. Treating subsection (g)

as a “defense” for the jury merely to weigh against

plaintiff’s claims would still conflict with Congress’s in-

tent, because subsection (g) excludes from coverage em-

ployees who deliberately cause nuclear violations; treat-

ing subsection .g) as an absolute bar to relief under

state law, however, merely begs the question why, if

subsection (g) effectively preempts state law, the balance

of Section 210 does not do so as well. Moreover, the

Solicitor General’s disagreement with the courts below

over the scope and meaning of subsection (g) demon-

strates how employers will be subjected to conflicting de-

terminations of liability even if subsection (g) is trans-

formed into a federal defense.”

31 The Solicitor General’s interpretation that subsection (g) bars

relief only for employees who “have ‘blown the whistle’ on the very

safety violation that they have caused” (S.G. Br. 22 n.14) is unduly

narrow. It authorizes the Secretary of Labor to reinstate (and pro-

vide compensatory relief to) employees who have deliberately

caused numerous violations of the Atomic Energy Act, so long as

they have reported other safety violations to the NRC. Surely Con-

gress intended to foreclose such a dangerous result when it added

subsection (g).

Moreover, as a practical matter the Solicitor General’s interpre-

tation would significantly deter licensed employers from taking

appropriate disciplinary action. Because alerting their supervisors

or the NRC to actual or potential safety violations is one of the

basic responsibilities of all employees in a nuclear facility, vir-

41

This legal inconsistency will be further compounded by

the confusion that will arise as juries are asked to evalu-

ate the facts related to a subsection (g) issue. To de-

termine whether an employer acted retributively or

responsibly in changing an employee’s terms of employ-

ment, juries will be required to resolve technically diffi-

cuit factual questions involving the meaning and signifi-

cance of various provisions of the Atomic Energy Act,

the ERA, and the Commission’s long and complex set

of regulations. In this case, for example, any judgment

whether the Company acted responsibly or reprehensibly

necessarily involves a determination whether petitioner’s

intentional failure to clean up contaminated matter vio-

lated “any requirement” of the ERA or Atomic Energy

Act, and whether and to what degree petitioner’s will-

ingness to violate safety rules (as she concededly did)

in order to d.amatize her safety concerns itself posed a

threat to the health and safety of other employees. Un-

like the Secretary of Labor, however, juries addressing

these issues will not be able to draw upon the “full

cooperation” of the NRC or on prior experience in the

field.

Furthermcre, claims for intentional infliction of emo-

tional distress arising out of allegedly retaliatory employ-

ment actions necessarily require an evaluation whether

the employer’s conduct was “outrageous,” but the stand-

ards for determining what is “outrageous” vary widely

from state to state. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Buell,

480 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1987); Hustler Magazine v. Fal-

well, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). And no matter what stend-

ard applies in a given state, in order to determine

whether an employer acted “outrageously” in retaliating

against a whistleblower, the jury will necessarily have to

tually any employee could claim that disciplinary action was in re-

sponse to an “unrelated” safety complaint to someone. Nothing

in the language of subsection 210(g) requires this odd construc-

tion; indeed, Congress’s express purpose for including subsection

(g) was “to avoid abuse of the protection afforded in this section.”

S. Rep. No. 848 at 30.

42

evaluate whether the employer had valid reasons, includ-

ing reasonable safety-based concerns, to support the

employment-related responses it made. Thus, even apart

from subsection (g), the possibility that the jury’s eval-

uation of the employer’s and employee’s competing safety

interests will differ from that of the Secretary of Labor

and the NRC is obviously real, and the consequent un-

certainty over the scope of liability will inevitably deter

employers from taking appropriate disciplinary action.

Because such deterrence will upset the careful balance

that Congress created in Section 210, such state law

claims should be preempted.

C. Allowing Employees to Seek Punitive Damages Con-

flicts Fundamentally With Congress’s Intent.

By atiowing employees to seek a remedy—punitive

damages—that Congress deliberately withheld from them

under Section 210, state law claims such as petitioner’s

both exacerbate the likelihood that employees will bypass

Section 210 review altogether and further deter em-

ployers from taking the responsible disciplinary action

that Congress intended. This clear conflict with Con-

gress’s purposes requires preemption of petitioner’s

claim.

There is no doubt that Congress’s decision not to allow

employees to obtain punitive damages was deliberate.

“*The presumption that a remedy was deliberately

omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has

enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme ‘in*luding an

integrated system of procedures for enivrcement.’”’

Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,

147 (1985) (citation omitted). Congress knows how to

make punitive damages available to employees when it

wants to, because the whistleblower provisions in two

other statutes expressly grant employees authorization

to obtain them. See note 15, supra. Here, moreover,

Congress did not overlook the question of punitive dam-

ages; it expressly reserved to the Secretary the discre-

tion to determine when to seek them, and even then only

for the separate act of deliberately ignoring the Secre-

43

tary’s remedial order. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5851(b) (2) (B),

5851(d). Replacing the Secretary’s carefully bounded

discretion with the unlimited private interest of an em-

ployee and her attorney flatly conflict’: with Congress’s

intent.

In addition, this Court has previously recognized the

powerful impact that the availability of punitive dam-

ages may have on the balance of incentives inherent in

a statutory scheme. In I/nternational Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979), for

example, this Court refused to allow a discharged rail-

road employee to recover punitive damages for a union’s

breach of the duty o1 fair representation. The Court

L . that punitive damages “could undermine [tie] care-

ful accommodation” of interests reflected in the statute

(id. at 50), and in particular that unions “could be

deterred by the possibility of punitive damages from

taking actions clearly in the interest of union members.”

Id. at 52.

Similarly, to allovy employees in the nuclear industry

to seek enormous punitive damage awards (such as the

$2.3 billion sought here) under shifting state standards

would significantly deter employers from taking any ac-

tion to change the terms, corditions or privileges of a

particular employee’s job. Such a powerful deterrent

would perhaps be consistent with the interest in avoiding

retaliation and might be justified if there were no trade-

offs, that is, if no employee ever violated safety require-

ments or otherwise presented a risk to the safe operation

of a nuclear facility Nonetheless, certain employees do

pose this risk in the workplace, as Corgress’s decision to

include subsection (g) reveals. Decisions of the Secretary

under Section 210 and of courts in analogous contexts

confirm that it is vitally important to allow nuclear in-

dustry employers some room to act in dealing with em-

ployees who are perceived as irresponsible. If the em-

32 See note 16, supra: see also Jowa Elec. Light & Power Co. vy.

Local Union 204, 834 F.2d 1424, 1429 (8th Cir. 1987) (employee

who violated federal safety rule “is no longer to be trusted to work

44

ployer in fact acts in retaliation for safety complaints,

Section 210 provides a remedy. But the decision to pre-

clude a punitive damages claim reflects Congress’s view

of the importance of constructing a careful balance be-

tween competing safety interests.

Finally, permitting state courts to award enormous

punitive damages will directly undermine Congress's

avowed goal to have employees bring Section 210 claims

promptly to the Secretary’s attention. See pages 21-22,

38-39, supra. It is difficult to believe that very many

employees will choose Section 210 as the preferred remedy

if they may pursue multi-million dollar awards in state

court." Indeed, the NRC is unlikely to learn of the most

serious complaints, because these complainants will have

the most incentive to seek a windfall punitive damages

award under state law. The two amici briefs filed on

behalf of petitioner by “plaintiffs’ trial lawyers” are

vivid testimony to a crucial fact of life: Few plaintiffs’

lawyers are likely to recommend that their clients seek

redress from the Secretary of Labor when a pot of gold

—claimed in this case to be $2.3 billion—may lie at the

end of the state court rainbow. In sum, to allow employ-

ees to seek punitive damages in court before a jury would

create a powerful incentive to avoid administrative re-

view altogether, thereby (1) frustrating Congress’s goal

of ensuring prompt investigation of retaliation com-

plaints, (2) overriding the Secretary’s carefully circum-

seribed discretion when to seek punitive damages, and

in such a critical [nuclear power] environment . . . [because he]

will jeopardize the safety of the public”); Ashcraft v. University

of Cincinnati, 83-ERA-7 (Secretary’s Decision, Nov. 1, 1984) (Sec-

tion 210 complaint dismissed because employee suspended for mis-

handling radioactive materials).

33 Although employees would not be barred jurisdictionally from

filing a Section 210 claim as well as a state court suit, they would

have no incentive to do so and good reason not to. An adverse

decision from the Secretary would lead to dismissal of the state

court action by collateral estoppel, see University of Tennessee V.

Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 797-98 (1986), and any damages the Secretary

might award would likely be subtracted from a subsequent jury

award.

45

(3) deterring nuclear employers from taking appro-

priate disciplinary action.

lil. BY ANALOGY TO LABOR PREEMPTION DOC-

TRINES, SECTION 210 PREEMPTS A CLAIM FOR

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING OUT OF

ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN

RETALIATION FOR REPORTING NUCLEAR

SAFETY COMPLAINTS. ~

Petitioner suggests that Section 210 is appropriately

analyzed as a labor relations provision that governs cer-

tain aspects of the employer-employee relationship. Pet.

Br. t 26-31; but see S.G. Br. at 19 n.12. Although in

our view Section 210 is inextricably a part of the field

of nuclear safety regulation, the analogy to labor law

simply underscores the case for preemption, and provides

an independent basis for affirming the judgments below.

This Court has long recoznized the “comprehensive

regulation of incustrial relations by Congress.” San

Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 226

239 i. 1959). Because Congress “entrusted administration

of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized ad-

ministrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and

equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative

experience” (id. at 242), the reasons underlying pre-

emption have their “greatest force” when states attempt

to regulate labor relations. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Car-

penters, 450 U.S. 180. 193 (1978). Section 210 thus lies

at the intersection of two predominant, traditional fed-

eral interests, each of which alone has been held sufficient

to preempt state law. Cf. Boyle v. United Technologies

Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2514-2516 & n.4 (1988) (com-

bination of two uniquely federal interests weighs in favor

of preempting liability under state law).

Federal labor law and its premption doctrines are par-

ticularly significant in two respects. First, as recognized

by petitioner, to the extent that Section 210 may be fairly

characterized as regulating the employment relationship,

its nearest analogy lies in Section 8 of the National Labor

46

Relations Act (“NLRA”).** Like Section 210, the NLRA

prohibits certain discrimination by the employer in re

taliation for protected employee conduct. The point at

which Section 210 and the NLRA diverge—remedies

(limited under the NLRA to back pay and reinstate-

ment)—simply reinforces the conclusion that Section 210

preempts petitioner’s cause of action. Second, federal

labor policy reflects congressional intent to use an ad-

ministrative scheme “to provide an informed and coherent

basis for stabilizing labor relations conflict and for equi-

tably and delicately structuring the balance of power

among competing forces so as to further the common

good.” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.

274, 286 (1971) (footnote omitted); see also Belknap,

Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 511 (1983). Similarly, Con-

gress used Section 210 to create an administrative scheme

that calibrates at the national level the benefits and risks

of affording employee protection to assure the optimum

protection of health and safety in the nuclear workplace

and of the public generally.

A. Under Labor Preemption Principles, Petitioner’s

Claim Is Preempted Because It Arises Out Of Con-

duct Addressed By Section 210.

In holding that Section 210 preempts petitioner’s claim

for emotional distress arising from changes in the terms

and conditions of her employment, the district court cor-

rectly applied the labor preemption analysis enunciated

in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S.

290 (1977). The plaintiff in Farmer alleged that union

officials “had intentionally engaged in outrageous con-

34 Congress indicated that Section 8(a)(4) was one of the pro-

visions on which Section 210 was patterned. S. Rep. No. 848, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 7303, 7303. Section 8(a)(4) provides that it is an unfair labor

practice for an employer or union “to discharge or otherwise dis-

criminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given

testimony under this [Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). The National

Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to hear com-

plaints concerning unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160; see

Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 508-509 (1983).

+ she

47

duct, threats, and intimidation, and had thereby caused

him to suffer grievous emotional distress resulting in

bodily injury.” Jd. at 295. The particular acts constitut-

ing “outrageous conduct” were discrimination in re-

ferrals to employers and “a campaign of personal abuse

and harassment.” Jd. at 292 & n.2.

This Court held that while sqme state tort claims for

intentional infliction of emotional distress would not be

preempted by federal law, “fu]jnion discrimination in

employment opportunities cannot itself form the under-

lying ‘outrageous’ conduct on which the state-court tort

action is based.” Id. at 305. The Court explained that

to avoid preemption:

it is essential that the state tort be either un-

related to employment discrimination or a function

of the particularly abusive manner in which the dis-

crimination is accomplished or threatened rather

than a function of the actual or threatened discrim-

ination itself.

Id. (footnote omitted). A remand was therefore neces-

sary because the “focus of the trial was on employment

discrimination rather than the intentional infliction of

emotional distress.” Jd. at 306 n.14.

Under Farmer, petitioner’s claim is preempted be-

cause petitioner does not allege tortious conduct beyond

the job-related retaliation addressed by Section 210. In-

stead, she complains solely about emotional distress

caused by the circumstances surrounding the changes in

the terms and conditions of her employment following

her safety reports. As already discussed, the district

court here correctly recognized the difference stressed in

Farmer between tort claims that arise out of conduct

subject to exclusive federal regulation and tort claims

that arise out of conduct not subject to federal regula-

tion. Pet. App. 28a. When petitioner’s complaint is

stripped of the impermissible, preempted claims, it fails

to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress under state law. Because both courts

below agreed on that issue of North Carolina law, this

48

Court should defer to that judgment. See supra, page

28 and note 19.”

B. Labor Preemption Principles Require Preemption

Where, As Here, There Is An Imminent Possibility

That State Law Remedies Will Conflict With Fed-

eral Law.

Allowing a state to regulate the conduct alleged in

this case would not merely provide an additional un-

intended remedy to employees but also would seriously

clash with Congress’s carefully tailored administrative

scheme and evoke the very conflicts that the preemption

principles governing employment relations are designed

to prevent. First, this Court has recognized that “ ‘con-

flict is imminent’ whenever ‘two separate remedies are

brought to bear on the same activity.’”” Wisconsin Dept.

of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986) (quot-

ting Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S.

485, 498-499 (1953)); see Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247.

Second, the coexistence of various state court procedures

with a federal administrative scheme inevitably creates

a direct conflict with Congress’s purposes, because

“fejonflict in technique can be fully as disruptive. . . as

35 Petitioner’s reliance upon Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356

U.S. 634 (1958) and United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.

Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) is similarly misplaced. In these cases,

state law was not preempted because “[n]lothing in the federal

labor statutes protects or immunizes from state action violence

or the threat of violence... .” Farmer, 430 U.S. at 299. But peti-

tioner’s claim is not of that kind; it arises solely out of changes

in the customary terms of employment and is—as the Labor De-

partment ALJ already ruled—squarely covered by timely complaint

under Section 210.

Petitioner’s reference to Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,

108 S.Ct. 1877, 1880 (1988), is inapposite. Lingle involves Section

801(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which preempts

state-law claims “if the resolution of a state-law claim depends

upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Jd. at

1881. Although any analogy to Section 301 seems strained, the fact

that petitioner’s state law claim “would depend on the meaning of”

federal statutes and regulations argues once again for preemption.

49

conflict in overt policy.” Motor Coach Employees v.

Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971); Gould, 475 U.S.

at 286, 288 n.5. These concerns about substantial con-

flicts apply with equal force to Section 210. See Part II,

supra.

Even if petitioner’s claim were entirely consistent

with the purposes of Section 210, moreover, the fact re-

mains that a “simple congruity of legal rules does not,

in [the labor relations] area, prove the absence of un-

tenable conflict.” Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 290. For in-

stance, this Court in Gould struck down a state law

barring firms who have violated the NLRA from con-

ducting business in the state because such a remedy

“would interfere with Congress’ ‘integrated scheme of

regulation’ by adding a remedy to those prescribed by

the NLRA.” 475 U.S. at 287 (quoting Garmon, 359

U.S. at 247) (emphasis added). It made no difference

in Gould that the “supplemental” state remedy was “dif-

ferent in kind from those that may be ordered by the

[NLRB].” Jd. (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243): see

Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 292. The proper focus is not

whether the state remedy would be available under fed-

eral law, but rather on the nature of the regulated ac-

tivities. Gould, 475 U.S. at 287. “[T]o allow the State

to grant a remedy ... which has been withheld from

the [NLRB] only accentuates the danger of conflict,”

Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247, “because ‘the range and na-

ture of those remedies that are and are not available is

a fundamental part’ of the comprehensive system estab-

lished by Congress.” Gould, 475 U.S. at 287 (quoting

Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 287)). Thus, the analogy to

labor law underscores the conclusion that Section 210

preempts petitioner’s claim.

* * * *

At bottom, this case calls on the Court to reconcile

the competing interests of the federal and state govern-

ments in an area of extreme sensitivity—nuclear safety.

Unlike petitioner, the Company is not asking the Court

to accord preeminence to either set of interests. We

50

recognize that the State of North Carolina has a sub-

stantial interest in ensuring that victims of extreme and

outrageous conduct are compensated for their emotional

injuries. But there is nothing in the c.clusivity of Sec-

tion 210 that undermines the State’s interest. For em-

ployer conduct prohibited by Section 210, the Secretary

of Labor will provide compensation that serves the

State’s interest. For conduct beyond the bounds of Sec-

tion 210, the State remains free to provide whatever

remedies the State deems appropriate.

On the other side of the ledger, allowing Section 210

to operate free of state law interference will protect the

overriding federal interest in promoting nuclear safety.

Section 210’s role in this regard is critical because the

NRC properly regards employer retaliation itself a ser-

ious nuclear safety hazard. Thus, the Court simply can-

not allow the incentives created by this state tort claim

to interfere with Section 210 and still be faithful to

Congress’s intent to retain exclusive federal control over

safety in the operation of nuclear facilities.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court

of appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

BENJAMIN W. HEINEMAN, JR. REX E. LEE

PHILIP A. LACOVARA CARTER G. PHILLIPS *

BARTON A. SMITH MARK E. HADDAD

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY NANCY A. TEMPLE

3135 Easton Turnpike SIDLEY & AUSTIN

Fairfield, CT 06431 1722 Eye Street, N.W.

(203) 373-2492 Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 429-4000

Counsel for Respondent

April 12, 1990 * Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Respondents Brief — English v. General Elec. Co. · 496 U.S. 72 | Frix