Amicus Curiae Brief — Oklahoma v. Castleberry

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No. 83-2126 DEC 24 1984

AS.

IN THE SUPREME COURT) apexance® & STEYY

CLERK

OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

Petitioners,

Vv.

TIMOTHY R. CASTLEBERRY AND

NICHOLAS RAINERI,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

BRIEF FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA AS AMICUS CURIAE

-_ ~

~d “4

i

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP,

Attorney General

ROBERT R. GRANUCCI,

Assistant Attorney General

CLIFFORD K. THOMPSON, JR.

Deputy Attorney General

RONALD E. NIVER

Deputy Attorney General

6000 State Building

San Francisco, CA 94102

Telephone: (415) 557-2653

Attorneys for Petitioner

ofa

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3

ARGUMENT

THE CONTAINERS WHICH THE

DEFENDANTS TRIED TO PLACE

BEYOND THE CONTROL OL THE

OFFICERS WERE PROPERLY

SEIZED AND SEARCHED WITH-

OUT A WARRANT 4

CONCLUSION 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Abel v. United States

362 U.S. 217 (1960) 17

Agnello v. United States

269 U.S. 20 (1925) 15

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Powell, J.,

concurring) 11

Arkansas v. Sanders

442 U.S. 753 (1979) 8

Carroll v. United States

267 U.S. 132 (1925) 7

of fe

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Castleberry v. State

678 P.2d 720 (Okla. Ct. Crim.

App. 1984}

Chambers v. Maroney

399 U.S. 42 (1970)

Chimel v. California

Coolidge v. New Hampshire

403 U.S. 443 (1971)

Draper v. United States

385 U.S. 307 (1959)

Illinois v. Gates

462 U.S. 213 (1983)

Illinois v. Lafayette

462 U.S. 640 (1983)

Katz v. United States

389 U.S. 347 (1967)

Mapp v. Ohio

367 U.S. 643 (1961)

Massachusetts v. Upton

466 U.S. , 104 S.Ct.

2085 (1984)

New York v. Belton

453 U.S. 454 (1981)

Robbins v. California

453 u.S. 420 (1981)

-iii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED

United States v. Bradley

455 F.2d 1181 (lst. Cir.

aff'd on other issues,

410 U.S. 605 (1973)

United States v. Chadwick

433 U.S. 1 (1977)

United States v. Edwards

415 U.S. 800 (1974)

United States v. Place

462 U.S. 696 (1983)

United States v. Robinson

414 U.S. 218 (1973)

United States v. Ross

456 U.S. 798 (1982)

United States v. Santana

427 U.S. 38 (1976)

Vale v. Louisiana

399 U.S. 30 (1970)

Warden v. Hayden

387 U.S. 294 (1967)

STATUTE

United States Constitution

Fourth Amendment

Page

16

13

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, when officers arrest a

suspect on probable cause, and_ the

suspect, who is standing next to the

vehicle, is able to place a container

inside the vehicle, the police may

search the container as being a search

incident to arrest.

No. 83-2126

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

Petitioners,

Vv.

TIMOTHY R. CASTLEBERRY AND

NICHOLAS RAINERI,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

BRIEF FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA AS AMICUS CURIAE

INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Since this Court's decision in

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1

(1977), the law governing the search of

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containers has been unsettled and

uncertain. California's peace officers,

like those of Oklahoma, seek “bright

lines" to aid them in determining quickly

and accurately whether a container which

has been lawfully seized may be searched

without a warrant, or whether the primacy

of the warrant requirement necessitates

the approval of a neutral and detached

magistrate. This case presents. an

opportunity to this Court to resolve

unanswered questions concerning the

legality of the search of a container in

the context of a lawful custodial arrest.

Our interest in clarifying this aspect of

search and seizure jurisprudence, which

is vitally relevant to the day-to-day

conduct of police officers, brings the

People of the State of California before

this Honorable Court as amicus curiae.

/

/

ee

o3<

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.

454 (1981), held that a container found

in the immediate control of an arrestee

may be searched as an incident to a

lawful custodial arrest. The question

presented by this case is whether the

legality of such a search may be

defeated by the arrestee's attempt to

Place the object to be searched out of

his reach (and that of the officer) in

response to the officer's lawful

approach. Amicus does not believe that

an arrestee may increase his reasonable

expectation of privacy by a desperate

attempt to discard or lock away an

object which was in his possession, and

the proper subject of a search, before

he encountered the arresting officer.

Where, as here, the arrestee places the

object in a vehicle, which itself is

surrounded by a reduced expectation of

-4- =~ =

"Officer Taylor proceeded

immediately to the location,

observed a vehicle matching the

privacy, the officer may seize the object

and search it as an incident to arrest. informant's description in

front of the specified room,

ARGUMENT and discovered, from the motel

clerk, that a man named

THE CONTAINERS WHICH THE DEFENDANTS Castleberry was registered in

TRIED TO PLACE BEYOND THE CONTROL OF that room. He then returned to

AND SEARCHED WITHOUT A WARRANT.

A

Since each search must

Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720,

(Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1984):

"At approximately noontime

on June 9, 1981, Oklahoma City

Police Officer R. D. Taylor,

received a telephone call from

a previously unknown

confidential informant who told

him that two men, one named

Castleberry, were staying in

Room 113 of a motel in Oklahoma

City, driving a blue

Thunderbird with Florida

license plates and carrying

various narcotics in blue

suitcases. The informant also

gave physical descriptions of

the men to the officer.

be

decided on its own facts, we set forth

the relevant facts which were stated in

722

THE OFFICERS WERE PROPERLY SEIZED his car, positioned some five

parking spaces from the other

vehicle, and waited for back-up

assistance to arrive. After

several minutes, Officer Taylor

observed the appellants emerge

from the room and put several

suitcases that matched the

informant's description into

the trunk of the car. At this

point, Officer Taylor announced

himself as a police officer,

approached the car with his

badge in one hand and his

weapon in the other, and told

the appellants to place their

hands on the car. Raineri did

as ordered, but Castleberry

hastily closed the trunk lid

and threw a small white object

into the car. During a

struggle which ensued between

Officer Taylor and Castleberry,

Castleberry reached up, locked

the car door and shut it.

"At this point, Officer

Citty arrived and opened the

trunk of the car with keys

Officer Taylor had removed from

the door of the car. The

officers opened the suitcases,

found narcotics and placed the

appellants under arrest.

Officer Citty then searched the

interior of the car and

discovered a white Band-Aid box

which contained a substance

later determined to be

cocaine." \

B

To be candid, the law governing

the search of containers has been less

than a seamless web since this Court's

decision in United States v. Chadwick,

433 U.S. 1 (1977). Basically, the law is

as follows:

(1) Chadwick held that a

container which is reasonably believed to

be the repository of criminal evidence

may be seized without a warrant, but that

a warrant must be secured before police

search the receptacle. This base-line

doctrine is subject to the following

major exceptions:

(2) If the container is found

in the immediate possession of an

@Jo

arrestee, it may be searched without a

warrant, either on the spot (New York v.

Belton, 453 U.S. 454 [1981]), or at the

station house (Illinois v. Lafayette,

462 U.S. 640 [1983]; United States v.

Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 [1974]). If the

arrestee is the occupant of an

automobile, “immediate possession" has

been defined to include the passenger

compartment of the car (New York v.

Belton, supra), but not the trunk (id.

at 461 n. 4; See Robbins v. California,

453 U.S. 420 [1981]).

(3) Since a car may be

searched without a warrant if police

have probable cause to believe that it

contains evidence of crime (Carroll v.

United States, 267 U.S. 132 [1925];

Chambers Vv. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42

[1970]), this Court held that probable

cause also “justifies the search of

every part of the vehicle and its

contents that may conceal the object of

the search." United States v. Ross, 456

U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

(4) However, the exception

defined in Ross is itself subject to an

exception: If probable cause focuses

upon a container, its placement in a car

does not justify the warrantless search

of the receptacle. Arkansas v. Sanders,

442 U.S. 753 (1979). The reasoning of

this Court was that the presence of the

car was merely fortuitous. Since

probable cause attached only to. the

container, not to the vehicle, the rule

of Chadwick was dispositive.

Cc

Resolution of the issue posed

by this case depends in the _ first

instance upon an accurate classification

of the search. For the reasons stated by

the Chief Justice in his concurrence in

Sanders, we do not believe that this case

\

-9-

involves the "automobile" exception to

the warrant requirement:

"Here, as in Chadwick, it was

the luggage being transported

by respondent at the time of

the arrest, not the automobile

in which it was being carried,

that was the suspected 1

the contraband. "the _

relationship between the

automobile and the contraband

peed rpg coincidental, as in

wick. The fact that th

Suitcase was resting in the

trunk of the automobile at the

time of respondent's arrest

pmeen 3 turn this into an

omo e exception »”

442 U.S. at 767. . —

However, it does not follow, as

the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

held, that this case is governed by

Sanders. Rather, we believe that this

case may be best understood as involving

a search incident to a valida custodial

arrest.

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(1)

It is clear that if defendants

had been arrested2/ while carrying the

suitcases and Band-Aid box, those

receptacles could have been searched on

the spot. New York v. Belton, supra;

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752

(1969). However, Officer Taylor did not

identify himself until defendants had

Placed the suitcases in the trunk,

presumably because he wanted to verify

that part of the tip regarding the blue

Thunderbird with Florida license plates.

If Castleberry had obeyed the officer's

commands by placing his hands on the car,

the box on his person could have been

seized and searched.

l. The informant's tip, combined

with the officer's observations, provided

probable cause to arrest the defendants.

. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 2

16a 8 ee (Is8ay; Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Draper v.

United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

-ll-

We believe that the suitcases

could also have been searched without a

warrant, for both men were within reach

of the open trunk. It is true that this

Court in Belton declared that its

holding "does not encompass the trunk"

(453 U.S. at 461 n. 4), but that case

presented a significantly different

factual situation. Belton, which

involved the occupants of a car, drew a

"bright line” between the passenger

compartment and the trunk. This

distinction was cogen.ly explained by

Justice Powell:

"The occupants of an automobile

enjoy only a limited

expectation of privacy in the

interior of the automobile

itself. See Almeida-Sanchez v.

United States, 413 U.S. 266,

) (Powell, Jey

concurring). This limited

interest is diminished further

when the occupants are placed

under custodial arrest. Cf.

United States v. Robinson, 414

U.S. 218, 237 (1573) (Powell,

J., concurring). Immediately

preceding the arrest, the

-12-

the passengers have complete

control over the entire

interior of the automobile, and

can place weapons or contraband

into pockets or other

containers as the officer

approaches. Thus, practically

speaking, it is difficult to

justify varying degrees of

protection for the general

interior of the car and for the

various containers found

within. These considerations

do not apply to the trunk of

the car, which is not within

the control of the passengers

either immediately before or

during the process of arrest."

Robbins v. California, supra,

By contrast, defendants were in

Close physical proximity to the trunk;

indeed, they had opened it to place the

Suitcases within it. Unlike the

arrestees in a Belton-type situation, the

Gefendants had direct access to, and

control of, the open trunk. The

suitcases were in their immediate reach

within the meaning of Chimel.

But Castleberry did not do as

he was instructed, choosing instead to

@13-

lock the trunk and place the Band-Aid

box in the passenger compartment, which

he also locked. According to the

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the

act of locking the car and trunk

activated the warrant requirement of the

Fourth Amendment.

In the context of this case, we

can think of no viable social or legal

policy which is advanced by conferring

the highest possible protection of the

Fourth Amendment upon an arrestee for

refusing to obey a lawful order of a

police officer. If Castleberry had

followed the officer's instructions, the

warrantless seizure and search would

have occurred as a matter of course.

But we do not believe that Castleberry's

Gecision to make things difficult

invalidated the officer's conduct. Our

reading of this Court's cases, as

applied to this situation, yields this

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rule. The legality of warrantless search

may not be defeated by the arrestee's

purposeful placement of the object to be

searched out of the reach of the officer

in response to his lawful approach. Just

as the defendant in United States v.

Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), could not

avoid a lawful warrantless arrest by

retreating inside her home when the

police caught to arrest her, so the

defendants in this case could not avoid a

lawful incident search by the expediency

Of locking the car.

We do not mean to. suggest,

however, that if defendants had placed

the suitcases in their motel room and

locked the door as the officers closed in

to make the arrest, the officers could

have entered and searched without a

warrant. It well may be that’ the

sanctity of the dwelling place must, in

the absence of exigent circumstances

-15-

(Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300

[1967]), be given the traditional

protection of the search warrant

requirement. "Belief, however well

founded, that an article sought is

concealed in a dwelling place furnishes

no justification for a search of the

place without a warrant." Agnello v.

v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33

(1925); cf. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.

30 (1970).

But the containers were placed

in a vehicle, which is surrounded by a

reduced expectation of privacy. United

States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. at

12. The officers had the right to enter

the car to remove the receptacles. See

Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. at

761; United States v. Chadwick, supra,

433 U.S. at 13; cf. United States v.

Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). Given the

right of the officers to seize the

-16-

containers before and after the arrest,

and the right to search the receptacles

before the trunk and car door were

closed, there is no reason in law or

common sense why the suitcase and

Band-Aid box could not be searched as an

incident to the arrest after their

removal from the _ car. Cf. United

States v. Bradley, 455 F.2d 1181, 1187

(lst. Cir. 1972), aff'd on other issues,

410 U.S. 605 (1973).

The foregoing position is not

inconsistent with this Court's. prior

Cases. United States v. Chadwick, supra,

did not involve an arguably valid search

incident to a lawful custodial arrest:

"Here the search was conducted more than

an hour after federal agents had gained

exclusive control of the footlocker and

long after respondents were securely in

custody; the search therefore cannot be

viewed as incidental to the arrest or as

a} FJ=

justified by any other exigency." 433

U.S. at 15; see New York v. Belton,

supra, 453 U.S. at 462.

Candidly, we are troubled by

Chadwick's rationale. It would appear

to be inconsistent with this Court's

declaration that “searches and seizures

that could be made oon the spot at

the time of arrest may legally be

conducted later when the accused arrives

at the place of detention." United

States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803

(1974); accord, Abel v. United States,

362 U.S. 217 (1960). It was further

undermined by Illinois v. Lafayette, 462

u.S. 640 (1983), which upheld a booking

search of possessions found on an

arrestee. Finally, it is difficult to

reconcile the Chadwick-Belton

distinction with the holding of Chambers

v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 212 (1970), which

is that a vehicle subject to search on

-18-

the street may be removed and inspected

at the station house. In light of

Edwards, Abel, Lafayette, and Chambers,

we submit that the search in Chadwick

should have been upheld if a search on

the street was proper. Conversely, the

holding in Chadwick was correct if a

search of the trunk at the time of arrest

would have been unlawful.

We think that a warrantless

search of the trunk would have been

unlawful at any time. In Chadwick, it

will be recalled, Government officials

had planned the search for two days, the

period during which two of the defendants

traversed the country by train,

Gisembarking in Boston, where the trunk

was searched hours later. Presumably, a

warrant, whose issuance was “reasonably

predictable" (433 U.S. at 15), could have

been obtained during that period of time.

Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.

-19-

443, 471 (1971) ("we deal here with a

planned warrantless seizure"). Unlike

the typical arrest, involving a suspect

and its probable contents. The use of

the dog in the train station confirmed

what arguably already amounted to

probable cause. Cf. United States v.

Place, supra.

In this case, by contrast,

police were forced to act quickly before

the defendants could drive away from the

motel. Their warrantless arrest and the

incidental search of their effects were

entirely proper.

In Sanders v. Arkansas, supra,

the arrest and search did not occur

until after the defendant had placed the

suitcase containing marijuana in the

trunk of the taxicab and had driven

away. This Court stated that it did not

"consider the constitutionality of

searches of luggage incident to the

arrest of its possessor. [Citation

omitted.) The State has not argued that

respondent's suitcase was searched

incident to his arrest, and it appears

that the bag was not within his

‘immediate control’ at the time of the

search." 442 U.S. at 764 mn. ll. Since

the defendants in this case were arrested

before they entered their car and had

access to their possessions before

Castleberry voluntarily locked the car

door and trunk, Sanders is obviously

distinguishable.

(3)

The position of amicus is thus

consistent with this Court's cases and is

faithful to its admonition that "[t]here

is no war between the Constitution and

common sense." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.

643, 657 (1961). We doubt that “society

is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'"

(Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361

-2l-

[1967] [Harlan, J., concurring])) an

expectation of privacy which is

formulated in the face of an attempt by

police officers to effect a lawful

custodial arrest and valid incidental

search. We therefore submit that the

legality of a warrantless search may not

be defeated by the efforts of the

arrestee who has placed the object of

the search in a place to which police

have otherwise lawful access.

/

eh Se . i. ok a ih

For the foregoing reasons, the

Judgment of the Oklahoma Court of

Criminal Appeals should be reversed.

DATED: December 20, 1984

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP,

Attorney General of

the State of California

ROBERT R. GRANUCCI

Assistant Attorney General

CLIFFORD K. THOMPSON, JR.

Deputy Attorney General

(2.00 Aer

RONALD E. NIVER

Deputy Attorney General

Attorneys for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

Petitioners,

vs.

TIMOTHY R. CASTLEBERRY AND

NICHOLAS RAINERI,

Respondents.

RONALD E. NIVER, a member of the Bar

of the Supreme Court of the United States,

states:

That his business address is 6000

State Building in the City and County of

San Francisco, State of California; that on

December 21, 1984, he served true copies of

the attached Brief for the People of the

State of California as Amicus Curiae on

Writ of Certiorari to the Oklahoma Court of

Criminal Appeals in the above-entitled matter

on counsel for respondents by placing same

No. 83-2126

2.

in envelopes addressed as follows:

Michael C. Turpen

Attorney General of Oklahoma

Hugh A. Manning

Assistant Attorney General

112 State Capitol Bldg.

Oklahoma City, Ok. 73105

C. Kent Eldridge

800 N.W. 13th Street

Oklahoma City, Ok. 93103

Said envelopes were then sealed

and deposited in the United States mail

at San Francisco, California, with the

postage thereon fully prepaid.

deci

Deputy Attorney General