Amicus Curiae Brief — Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier
Supreme Court brief1991
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Supreme Court, >
FIl&D
FEB 2 8 1991
No. 89-1905 __1 eresoéo THE CLERK
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 89-1905
WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
RALPH MORTIER, et al.,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
BRIEF OF THE CONSERVATION LAW
FOUNDATION OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.
AND THE SIERRA CLUB
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS
E. SUSAN GARSH*
ROBERT E. McCDONNELL
MARIS L. ABBENE
PAULA G. CURRY
150 Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 951-8000
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
*Counsel of Record
i. a a ee ee eeEeESE eee
II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT .
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
ARGUMENT .
EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION DEPENDS UPON
FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL
INVOLVEMENT. .
FEDERAL LAW HAS NOT
PREEMPTED LOCAL REGULATION
OF THE USE OF PESTICIDES
A.
FIFRA Does Not
Explicitly Preempt
Municipal Regulation.
FIFRA Does Not Create
a Pervasive Federal
Regulatory Scheme .
The Town of Casey
Ordinance Does Not
Conflict With FIFRA,
Nor Is It An Obstacle
To FIFRA. — oe
PAGE
10
10
35
36
43
44
Iil.
IV.
ii
PAGE
CONGRESS LEFT IT TO THE
STATES TO DETERMINE WHETHER
LOCALITIES MAY OR MAY NOT
REGULATE PESTICIDE USE .. 48
A. The Six New England
States Have Taken a
Varied Approach to
Local Pesticide Use
Regulation. ..... 48
B. Local Regulation Can
Play An Important Role
In Reducing Pesticide
Demeee. «- «cess e
CONCLUSION ........ 60
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Allway Taxi, Inc. v.
City of New York, 340
F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 468 F.2d 624
(2d Cir. 1972)
Central Maine Power Co.
v. Town of Lebanon,
571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990)
COPARR, Ltd. v. City of
Boulder, 735 F. Supp.
363 (D. Colo. 1989),
appeal docketed,
No. 89-1341 (10th Cir.,
Nov. 1, 1989), appeal
Stayed, Jan. 15., 1991
Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132 (1962).
Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S.
528 (1985)...
PAGE
20
38-39,
40-41,
49-50
40-41
44
22-23 ,
34 n.2,
40 n.5
iv
471 U.S. 707 (1985).
Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519 (1977).
Maryland Pest Control
Ass'n v. Montgomery
County, 646 F. Supp.
109 (D. Md. 1986),
aff'd without opinion,
822 F.2d 55
(4th Cir. 1987).
Mortier v. Town of Casey,
154 Wis. 2d 18, 452
N.W.2d 555 (1990).
National Agricultural
Chemicals Ass'n v.
Rominger, 500 F. Supp.
465 (E.D. Cal. 1980)
New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262
(1982) .
PAGE
s3e Oe
36
35, 36,
39, 44
40-41
37-38
40 n.5
23
New York State Pesticide
Coalition v. Jorling,
874 F.2
(2d Cir.
36 Cal.
683 P.2
Rptr. 8
gd 115
1989)
3d 476,
Gd 1150; 204 Cal.
97 (1984)
Proetta v. Dent,
484 F.2d 1146
(2d Cir.
ASS‘n v.
1973)
Village of
Milford, 909 F.2d 929
(6th Ci
r. 1990),
petition for cert filed,
59 U.S.L.W. 3180
(Aug. 3
(No. 90-
Rice v.
Corp.,
(1947)
1, 1990)
382)
Santa Fe Elevator
331 U.S. 218
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S.
986 (1984).
PAGE
46
40-41,
42
25-26
40-41
35-36
58, 59
vi
PAGE
Sed, Inc. v. City of
Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979
(S.D. Ohio 1981) .... . 25
Town of Salisbury v.
New England Power Co.,
121 N.H. 983, 437 A.2d
i 50
Town of Wendell v.
Attorney General,
394 Mass. 518, 476 N.E.2d
Meee 2 5 6 » © 6 -& ¢ 53-54
Walla Walla v.
Walla Walla Water Co.,
172 U.S. 1 (1898). .... 22,
38-39
Washington v. General
Motors Corp., 406 U.S.
8 | re 20-21
FEDERAL STATUTES AND RULES
The Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act of
1986 ("“AHERA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2641-2655 (1988). .. . 13
The Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)
(recently amended,
Pub. L. No. 101-549,
104 Stat. 2399 (1990)). . 12,
46-47
vii
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)
42 U.S.C. § 7602(d)
The Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
[ae «2 6 ee « 44
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
33 U.S.C. § 1362(3)
40 Code of Federal
Regulations § 116.4,
Table 116.4A (1990).
The Comprehensive
Environmental Response
and Liability Act,
("CERCLA") 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(27).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(i)
42 U.S.C. § 9614(a)
The Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-
Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11052 (1988).
PAGE
20,
37 n.3
38 n.4
12,
46-47
16
38 n.4
27-28
13
viii
42 U.S.C. § 11041(b).
42 U.S.C. § 11049(9).
The Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y (1988)
7 U.S.C. § 136(aa).
7 U.S.C. § 136v
7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).
The National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347
(1988) . :
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)
The Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 33 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2701-2761 oon a.
Dec. 1990)
33 U.S.C.A. § 2718.
36-37,
13
26
13
28-29
iz
The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(1988) ms :
42 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (4).
42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7).
42 U.S.C. § 6903(31).
42 U.S.C. § 6929.
The Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300£ - 3003-26 (1988)
42 U.S.C. § 300£(13).
42 U.S.C.
§ 300h-7(a)(3).
The Toxic Substances
Control Act ("*TOSCA"),
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
+. ae
15 U.S.C. § 2602(13).
PAGE
17
13
38
n
.4
15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1).
15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2).
PAGE
24
24-25
STATE STATUTES AND RULES
The Connecticut Pesticide
Control Act, Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §§ 221- 54(2)
and 54(e)(4)
Maine Rev. Stat. Ann.
title 7, §§ 601-625
title 22, § 1471-M
title 22, § 1471l-uU .
Massachusetts General] L.
ch. 40, § 32; ch. 40A,
§ 5; ch. 111, § 131.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 430:1 - 430:48 (1990)
Pesticide Control Act
of 1976, R.I. Gen. Laws
§§ 23-25-11 - 23-25-36.
52-53
49-50
54 n.7,
54-55
50
51-52
xi
Town of Casey,
Washburn County,
Wisconsin, Ordinance
No. 85-1 (1985).
Vermont Stat. Ann.
title 6, §§ 911-929
title 6, §§ 981-986
title 6, §§ 1021-1025
title 6, §§ 1082-1084
title 6, §§ 1101-1111
title 10, § 1283(g)(2)(8).
OTHER AUTHORITIES
R. Carson, Silent Lease
(1987 ed.) .
Department of Environmental
Quality Engineering,
Pesticide soendastae in
Massachusetts:
and Federal
(February 1988).
Analysis of Local, State.
Controls
PAGE
45, 46,
55, 56,
57
50-51
10, ll,
12 n.l
53, 54,
55
xii
xiii
PAGE PAGE
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 575, ; ;
99th Cong., 2d Sess., L. Tribe, American
reprinted in 1986 Constitutional Law, a 40 n.5
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. (2d ed. 1988)... .
a es 6 6 6 6 ee « 17-18
H.R. Rep. No. 939, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1988
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
mee Deve cece bhesne 12 n.1l
42 n.6
Policy Research Project on
Pesticide Regulation in
Texas, The University of
Texas at Austin,
Research on
in Texas
(September 11, sx a 32-33
Senate Report (Environment
and Public Works Committee)
S. Rep. 94, 10lst Cong., lst
Sess., July 28, 1989 ... 29
Statement by President
Ronald Reagan Upon Signing
S. 124, 22 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 831, (June 23,
1986) reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1566. 18-19
No. 89-1905
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 89-1905
WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR, et al.,
Petitioners,
BRIEF OF THE CONSERVATION LAW
FOUNDATION OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.
AND THE SIERRA CLUB
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS
-2<-
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This brief is submitted by the
Conservation Law Foundation of New
England, Inc. and the Sierra Club as
amici curiae in support of the
Petitioners. Written consents of
all parties have been obtained and
filed with the Clerk of the Court.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Conservation Law Foundation
of New England, Inc. ("CLF") is a
non-profit, public interest, envir-
onmental law organization founded in
1966. CLF is funded by donations
from thousands of private individu-
als and by grants and contributions
from more than 40 public corpora-
tions, charitable foundations and
private trusts. CLF ’s staff
includes ten attorneys and four
scientists who use law, science and
ae
public policy analysis to pursue a
wide range of environmental issues.
Pesticide use in agricultural,
suburban and urban settings is a
major concern. CLF has drafted and
published the Massachusetts
Pesticide Handbook, a primer for
local regulation of pesticide
application. CLF has also negoti-
ated with utilities about pesticide
uses in rights of way; participated
in negotiations regarding mosquito
control; and lobbied the
Massachusetts legislature for pesti-
cide laws.
The Sierra Club is a California
nonprofit membership organization
founded in 1892. The goals of the
Sierra Club's 500,000 members are to
explore, enjoy and protect the wild
~
places of the earth; to practice and
promote responsible use of re-
sources; to educate and enlist
people to protect and restore the
environment; and to use all lawful
means to carry out these objectives.
Both the Sierra Club and CLF are
vitally interested in this case
which presents issues significantly
affecting future regulation of pes-
ticide use.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Effective environmental protec-
tion requires action by federal,
state and local governments.
Congress, while enacting a multitude
of environmental protection laws
during the last three decades, has
consistently and forcefully adhered
to a philosophy of environmental
ofe
federalism. This approach is
evident throughout the federal
environmental protection scheme.
Viewed within that overall context,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988), cannot
sensibly be deemed to be an act that
preempts all local regulation of
pesticide use. (Pp. 10 to 35.)
A three-pronged test determines
whether a federal act preempts state
or local regulation. There must be
an express preemption in the text of
the statute; or there must be such a
pervasive federal occupation of the
field that the Court must infer that
Congress left no room for state or
local activity; or there must be an
actual conflict with the federal
af$@
law. FIFRA fails each of these
three tests.
Despite frequent amendment of
FIFRA during the last 30 years,
Congress has never expressly pre-
empted local pesticide regulation.
Federal preemption should not be
lightly inferred in the absence of
express language. Ambiguous legis-
lative history such as FIFRA's is
not a sound platform from which to
infer preemption. Additionally, it
provides no basis for disregarding
the traditional right of state
legislatures to delegate their
sovereignty to towns, cities and
counties. (Pp. 36 to 43.)
FIFRA does not create a perva-
sive federal occupation of the
pesticide regulation field since it
<~ =
expressly invites more’ stringent
state legislation. 7 U.S.C.
§ 136v(a). Establishment of a fed-
eral floor above which states can
pursue tougher regulation is consis-
tent with other federal environment-
al statutes. Having been expressly
invited to legislate, states should
be free to delegate within their own
State systems. (P. 43.)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did
not discuss whether the Town of
Casey ordinance obstructs FIFRA,
which is essentially a labeling,
packaging and product registration
statute. There is no obstruction
Since the ordinance focuses on the
management of local yse of pesti-
cides only insofar as the use will
affect public property or the public
aG-
itself. While many federal environ-
mental statutes authorize the crea-
tion of federal permit systems,
FIFRA leaves that part of the field
open. The Town of Casey ordinance
effectively fills this gap in the
federal law. (Pp. 44 to 47.)
Congress left it to the states
to determine whether or not local
governments may regulate pesticide
use. The six New England states
reveal the varied approaches that
state governments have chosen.
Maine permits local regulation. New
Hampshire's comprehensive legisla-
tion has preempted the field within
the state. Connecticut and
Massachusetts primarily regulate
from the state level, but both
jurisdictions allow various forms of
Be
local oversight. Rhode Island and
Vermont have each enacted state
pesticide control schemes which
appear to provide room for local
action, but the question of local
preemption has not been addressed by
either state supreme court. (Pp. 48
to 55.)
Local know ledge of water
resources, wildlife habitat, and
sensitive land uses is a critical
aspect of effective environmental
protection. FIFRA develops various
application safety standards through
its product-registration process,
but fails to develop any process to
implement those standards at a sub-
federal level. The Town of Casey
Ordinance is a reasonable vehicle
-10-
for utilizing local knowledge. This
Court should hold that FIFRA does
not preempt the Town of Casey ordi-
nance. (Pp. 55 to 60.)
RB. EFFECIIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION DEPENDS UPON FEDERAL,
STATE AND LOCAL INVOLVEMENT.
Nearly thirty years ago, in her
book Silent Spring, marine biologist
Rachel Carson graphically described
the damage that indiscriminate pes-
ticide spraying can inflict on
people, animals, land and water.
After recounting numerous incidents
of damage caused by pesticides to
farms and forests, suburbs and cit-
ies, Ms. Carson wrote:
publication,
-ll-
And what of human
beings? In California
orchards eee workers
handling foliage that had
been treated a month
earlier collapsed and went
into shock, and escaped
death only through skilled
medical attention. Does
Indiana still raise any
boys who roam through woods
or fields and might even
explore the margins of a
river? If so, who guarded
the poisoned area to k-ep
out any who might wander
in, in misguided search for
unspoiled nature? Who kept
vigilant watch to tell the
innocent stroller that the
fields he was about to
enter were deadly -- all
their vegetation coated
with a lethal film?
Carson, Silent Spring, 126-127
(1987 ed.) (emphasis in original).
Since Silent Spring's
far reaching network of statutes to
curb and, it is hoped, cure damage
caused by pesticides and other
Congress has created a
ol2-
chemicals .+’
Marching to the beat
of the same drummer, and in many
instances even more rapidly, state
governments and many local lawmakers
have added to the fabric of this
environmental regulatory network.
In addition to FIFRA, the fed-
eral environmental safety net
includes the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (19868); the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (1988) (recently amended, Pub.
L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990)); the Comprehensive
Environmental Response and Liability
i/ Notably, Congress iteelf has
credited amendments to FIFRA to the impact
made by Silent Spring. See H.R. Rep. No.
939, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3.74,
3775-76.
el3e
Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988); the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11001-11052 (1988); the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761 (West Supp.
Dec. 1990); the Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TOSCA"), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2629 (1988); the Safe
Dr‘ king Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
300£ - 300)-26 (1988); the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (1988); and the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act of
1986 ("AHERA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-
2655 (1988). Even these eleven
-14-
enactments do not constitute the
full body of federal environmental
law.
There can be little doubt that
federal environmental legislation
has touched every aspect of American
life. The cars we drive adhere to
federal air standards. The water we
Grink must satisfy federal water
standards. The trash we discard is
disposed in accordance with federal
regulations. Legions of biologists,
geologists and engineers work from
coast to coast under the aegis of
the Federal Superfund.
However broad this federal en-
vironmental mantle, though, there
can also be little doubt that the
role of state and local authority in
environmental protection has not
o1Ge
been eliminated. To the contrary,
active state and local involvement
is critical to successful environ-
mental protection. Congress created
its far reaching environmental code
fully cognizant of the fundamental
precept that "the regulation of
health and safety matters is primar-
ily, and historically, a matter of
local concern.” Hillsborough County
v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985). In
keeping with that precept, there
runs throughout the framework of all
federal environmental enactments a
strong and powerful current of
environmental federalism.
Congressional advocacy of
environmental federalism is evident
in the text and legislative history
of numerous statutes.
1972,
Water
Congr
33 U.
o16=
in promulgating the Federal
Pollution Control
ess declared:
It is the policy of the
Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities
and rights of States to
prevent, reduce, and elim-
inate pollution .... It
is further the policy of
the Congress to support
and aid research relating
to the prevention, reduc-
tion, and elimination of
pollution, and to provide
Federal technical services
and financial aid to State
and interstate agencies
and municipalities in con-
nection with the preven-
tion, reduction, and elim-
ination of pollution.
S.C. § 1251(b).
Fourteen years later, in
As early as
Act,
the
enactment of amendments to the Safe
Drinking Water Act, firm adherence
to
again
environmental federalism
evident.
Congress required
oiPo
every state to develop a wellhead
protection program that would “iden-
tify ... all potential anthropogenic
[i.e., man-made] sources of contami-
nants which may have any adverse
effect on the health of persons.”
42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a)(3). The House
Conference Report in support of this
statute forcefully repeated the
federalist theme:
States can be expected
to take a wide variety of
approaches to protection
of wellhead areas within
their jurisdiction, and it
is conceivable that each
State could develop its
own unique approach.
Protection strategies may
also vary for different
protection areas within
one State. The amendment
recognizes that States are
best able to assess spe-
cific problems within
their jurisdictions, and
to develop and implement
necessary protection mea-
sures. As a result, no
groundwater classification
assigned by the
Administrator is to lessen
-18-
the level of protection
assigned to an aquifer by
the State in a wellhead
protection area.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 575, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1566, 1609.
The President, when signing the
Safe Drinking Water Act amendments
into law, concurred in the view that
state and local action forms the
first line of environmental defense:
Although we certainly
agree that groundwater
needs to be protected from
major contaminants, we
believe that States have
the principal role in
protecting this valuable
resource, and that the EPA
has sufficient statutory
authority to assist the
States where appropriate.
In fact, the Federal
government can never hope
adequately to protect the
groundwater resources of
America without the major
participation and indeed
system is necessary for
safety knowledge,
dated the uniform,
-19-
the leadership of State
and local communities, and
Ss. 124 reflects this
important understanding.
Statement by President Ronald Reagan
Upon Signing S. 124, 22 Weekly Comp.
Doc. 831 (June 23, 1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Admin. News 1566, 1615.
Congress has preempted
and local environmental activity
limited and narrow instances.
example, when an _ information
ing and distribution of science and
certain forms. See the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know
42 U.S.C. § 11041(b) (state and
material safety data sheets
Code Cong.
the gather-
Congress has man-
nationwide use of
=20-
shall “be identical in content and
format ...."). Elsewhere, since the
trip from one's home to work or even
to the local convenience store fre-
quently crosses town lines and in
some areas even state lines,
Congress has preempted the estab-
lishment of automobile and_ fuel
emission standards. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7543(a). Even so, the specific
field of emission control has not
been fully occupied, see Allway
Taxi. Inc. v. City of New York, 340
F. Supp. 1120, 1124 £=(S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972),
and the broader field of air pollu-
tion prevention is most certainly a
federal, state and local activity.
See Washington v. General Motors
Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 #£4x(1972)
aZieq
("Congress has not, however, found a
uniform, nationwide solution to all
aspects of [air pollution) and, in-
deed, has declared ‘that the preven-
tion and control of air pollution at
its source is the primary responsi-
bility of States and local govern-
ments.'").
Another consistent characteris-
tic of federal environmental laws is
that Congress does not impose fed-
eral environmental standards as
ceilings beyond which state or local
lawmakers cannot proceed. Rather,
federal health and safety laws act
as floors below which states and
local governments may not set stan-
dards. In FIFRA, see 7 U.S.C.
§ 136v, and in numerous other fed-
eral acts, states are invariably
@23-
free to impose more stringent
environmental protection than
federal law requires.
Having permitted the states to
impose more stringent standards in
the environmental sphere, it follows
from the federalist principles
underlying our constitutional system
that “[s]tate legislatures may not
only exercise their sovereignty
directly, but may delegate such por-
tions of it to inferior legislative
bodies as, in their judgment, is
desirable for local purposes.”
Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water
Co., 172 U.S. 1, 9 (1898). See also
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)
("(W)ithin the realm of authority
left open to them under the
=23~0
Constitution, the States must be
equally free to engage in any
activity that their citizens choose
dt The principle that states
may experiment with different ways
to solve environmental problems and
delegate differing amounts of power
to the local governments within the
states, thus, lies at the heart of
the federal system.
To stay experimentation
in things social and eco-
nomic is a grave responsi-
bility. Denial of the
right to experiment may be
fraught with serious con-
sequences for the Nation.
It is one of the hapry
incidents of the federal
system that a single
courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve
@s a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic
experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting). Examples of Congress’
o24e
carefully cefraining from heavy-
handed preemption and of leaving the
door open for more stringent state
and local environmental action are
myriad.
TOSCA preserves “the authority
of any State or political subdivi-
sion of a State to establish or
continue in effect regulation of any
chemical substance, mixture, or
article containing - chemical
substance or mixture.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 2617(a)(1). There are only two
exceptions. First, states and
localities may not impose duplica-
tion of testing required by the
federal government. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2617(a)(2). Second, states may
mot create rules where the federal
Environmental Protection Agency
-25-
("EPA") has done so unless the State
rule is identical to the federal
version; enacted pursuant to any
other federal law; or, notably, un-
less the State rule “prohibits the
use of such substance or mixture in
such State or political subdivi-
sion.” ld. See also Sed, Inc. v.
City of Dayton, 5:9 F. Supp. 979,
990 (S.D. Ohio 19861) ("Deference to,
Or nonpreemption of state regulation
which serves the purposes of other
existing federal environmental
legislation, even if only remotely
or incidentally, was similarly and
clearly intended.” ) (emphasis in
Original).
NEPA, though not itself applic-
able to the states unless a partner-
ship exists between the federal and
@26-
State governments on ai specific
project, see Proetta v. Dent, 484
F.2d 1146, 1148 (2d Cir. 1973),
expressly recognizes the importance
of cooperation on environmental]
issues among federal, state and
local governments: -
The Congress, recogniz-
ing the profound impact of
man's activity on the
interrelations of all com-
ponents of the natural
environment, ... declares
thet it is the continuing
policy of the Federal
Government, in cooperation
with State and local gov-
ernments, ... to use all
practicable means and mea-
sures, including financial
and technical assistance,
in @ manner calculated to
foster and promote’ the
general welfare, to create
and maintain conditions
under which man and nature
can exist in productive
harmony ....
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
@37e
CERCLA follows the “federal
environmental floor” approach by
declaring that none of its provi-
sions “shall be construed or inter-
preted as preempting any State from
imposing any additional liability or
requirements with respect to the
release of hazardous substances
within such State.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614(a). While excluding app!ica-
tions of registered pesticides from
certain sections, CERCLA also
expressly preserves “obligations or
liability” under any other State or
Federal law for damages resulting
from the release, removal or remedi-
ation of “hazardous substances,” 42
U.S.C. § 9607(i), a@ term which
includes numerous pesticides:
captan, carbaryl (sevin), chlordane,
-28-
DDT, Giazinon, malathion and
parathion. 40 C.F.R. § 116.4, Table
116.4A.
RCRA recognizes that “the
collection and disposal of solid
wastes should continue to be
primarily the function of State,
regional, and local agencies ....”
42 U.S.C. § 6901(8)(4). An objec-
tive of RCRA is the establishment of
"a viable Federal-State partner-
ship....”* 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a8)(7),
and the statute allows state and
local imposition of more stringent
solid waste disposal requirements.
42 U.S.C. § 6929.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
@llows State and local governments
to exceed federal liability and
removal requirements for oil spills.
-29-
33 U.S.C.A. § 2718. Notably, the
legislative history declares:
The issue of Federal pre-
emption of State laws is
one that often erises
during the formulation of
legislation which imposes
Federal environmental
controls. To date,
Federal legislation has
affirmed the rights of
States to protect their
own air, water, and land
resources by permitting
them to establish State
standards which are more
restrictive than Federal
Standards.
Senate Report (Environment and
Public Works Committee) S. Rep. No.
94, l10lst Cong., Ist Sess., July 28,
1989.
Against this panoply of federal
environmental law, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's holding that, by
implication. FIFRA preempts a local
ordinance regulating pesticide use
is aberrational as a matter of
-30-
federal policy as well as a sharp
Geparture from well established pre-
emption principles. The common-
sense reading of FIFRA is
Petitioner's: the statute is a
labeling and licensing law, not a
law that regulates every conceivable
pesticide use in every hamlet in the
United States. Recognizing the fact
that pesticides generally ere
produced by a handful of i iarge
manufacturing corporations, then
Gistributed nationally and even
internationally, Congress has
Gecided it is economic and efficient
to use federal power to centralize
and standardize the registration and
Gescription of pesticides. It
strains credibility, however, to
think thet Congress intended the EPA
aRiq
and the state governments -- without
any local regulatory activity -- to
oversee the proper application of
pesticide’ in every climate, over
every varied topography, or in every
workplace, restaurant, hospital or
apartment building in the United
States.
Safe use of chemicals in the
environment requires 4 detailed
know ledge of local conditions:
prevailing winds at different times
of the day, the presence or absence
of surface water or groundwater, the
directional flow of groundwater, the
local topography, and local _ land
uses, the seasonal habits of local
fish, fowl and other wildlife and in
some instances even their daily
habits. The importance of local
=\™=
knowledge is illustrated by a study
of pesticide use conducted in
Texas:
Weather-related elements
including horizontal and
vertical air movements,
air temperature, and rela-
tive humidity in the imme-
diate application area all
affect drift....
The weather factor most
commonly associated with
Grift is horizontal wind
speed. However, estimat-
ing drift is not a simple
function of knowing wind
speed. Wind speed, and
thus drift, will increase
with height because
objects on the ground
(particularly crops) have
the effect of slowing down
wind speed in the affected
area. The effects of
horizontal wind speed also
depend on the type of
ground surface in the
area -- not just terrain
but crops as well. For
instance, when studying
air movements over two
fields, researchers found
fairly regular increases
in wind speed (with
height) in a wheat field,
but in a beet field there
was substantial turbulence.
@33e
Policy Research Project on Pesticide
Regulation in Texas, The University
of Texas at Austin, Regulating
Pesticides in Texas, A Report of the
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public
Affairs Policy Research Project on
Pesticides in Texas (September 11,
1984) at 118-119.
Surely a local official is more
likely than a federal or state
administrator in a far-away city to
know where local water supplies
exist, what times of day local
weather is likely to imcrease or
decrease pesticide drift, and what
times and places pesticide applica-
tion will subject residents and
-34-
animals to risk.*/ Chemicals dis-
persed into the environment --
whether outdoors in fields or in-
doors in restaurants and nursing
homes -- have their greatest impact
locally. Surely the intent of FIFRA
is to minimize environmental harm.
Achieving that objective requires
that regulators try to calibrate the
use of chemicals as precisely as
possible. That calibration is best
achieved by the involvement of local
2/"The administration and enforce-
ment of federal laws and regulations
necessarily are largely in the hands of
staff and civil service employees. These
employees may have little or no knowledge of
the States and localities that will be
affected by the statutes and regulations for
which they are responsible.” Garcia, 469
U.S. at 576 (Powell, J., dissenting).
=S8e
as well as federal and = state
officials in pesticide use.
Il. FEDERAL LAW HAS NOT PREEMPTED
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF
PESTICIDES.
Application of the test for
federal preemption to the language
and purpose of FIFRA shows that
FIFRA does not preempt municipal
regulation of pesticides. Under the
Supremacy Clause, — federal law may
supercede local law in any of three
ways. Congress may preempt state or
local authority by simply stating so
in express terms. Hillsborough, 471
U.S. at 713; Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). In
the absence of express language,
Congress’ preemptive intent may be
inferred only from a pervasive
scheme of federal regulation that
-36-
leaves no room for supplementary
state or local regulation. E.vg.,
Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713; Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947). Federal legisla-
tion also preempts any state and
local laws that actually conflict
with or present an obstacle to the
federal law. Jones, 430 U.S. at
525-26.
A. FIFRA Does Not Explicitly
Preempt Municipal Regulation.
No language in the text of
FIFRA itself expressly excludes
local governments from regulating
the use of pesticides. See 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y. Congress could easily
have accomplished local preemption
in FIFRA by adding five words --
“but not its political subdivisions”
-- to the text of 7 U.8.C.
<i
§ 136v(a). Despite numerous amend-
ments to FIFRA in the last thirty
years, however, Congress has never
done so.2’
Ignoring the requirement that
express preemption requires there to
be express language, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court incorrectly deduced
that because Congress did not
include the phrase “political
subdivision” in its statutory defi-
nition of “State,” Congress intended
to deprive political subdivisions of
3/For example, the Clean Air Act
expressly preempts state and political
subdivisions with respect to vehicle
emissions and fwel composition. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7543(a) ("No state or political
subdivision thereof shall adopt [any
emissions standards for new motor
vehicles)].") (emphasis added).
236-2
any authority over pesticides. See
Mortier v. Town of Casey. 154 Wis.
246 18, 29, 452 N.W.2d 555, 560
(1990). Congress, however, simply
Gefined the term “State” to mean “a
State.” See 7 U.S.C. § 136(aa). It
has done tr’s on numerous occasions
in other environmental statutes. 4”
Ironically, the oxymoronic
holding that FIFRA expressly, by
implication, preempts local regula-
tion ignores traditional principles
4/See the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1362(3); the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7602(d); TOSCA, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2602(13); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27);
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(31); the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42
U.S.C. § 11049(9); and the Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f(13).
-39-
of state sovereignty that make a
state free to delegate its powers to
its political subdivisions. Walle
Walla, 172 U.S. at 9; Central Maine
Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, 571
A.2d 1189, 1192 (Me. 1990). Given
the historical importance of 4
state's right to delegate its powers
in our federal system, preemption of
that right should not be accom-
plished by the guesswork of implica-
tion or by dependence upon muddled
legislative history.
Contrary to the ruling of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, the legis-
lative history does not demonstrate
a “clear and aanifest purpose of
Congress” to preempt local regula-
tions. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.
It is inappropriate to discern
-40-
“clear and manifest” congressional
purpose from legislative history
alone, especially where the legisla-
tive history itself is inconclu-
S/
sive. The legislative history
2/"The question whether federal
law preempts state action, cannot be reduced
to general formulas, but there does appear
to be an overriding reluctance to infer
preemption in ambiguous cases.... [T)o give
the state-displacing weight of federal law
to mere congressional agmbiguity would evade
the very procedure for lawmaking on which
Garcia (v. San Antonio Metropolitan Iransit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)), relied to
protect states’ interests.” L. Tribe,
Qmericen Constitutional Law, 479-80 (24 ed.
1988) (emphasis in the original).
As the plain language of the statute
is clear, resort to legislative history
would not appear to be proper. National
Sgcicultural Chemicals Ass'n v. Rominger,
500 F. Supp. 465, 469 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
-4]-
of FIFRA *rrived at very different
conclusions. Compare COPARR. Ltd.
v. City of Boulder, 735 F. Supp.
363, 366 (D. Colo. 1989); People ex
rel. Deukmejian v. County of
Mendocino, 36 Cal. 30 476, 492; 683
P.2d 1150, 1160; 204 Cal. Rptr. 897,
907 (19864); Town of Lebanon, 571
A.2d at 1193 with Maryland Pest
Control Ass'n v. Montgomery County,
646 F. Supp. 109, 113 (D. Md. 1986),
aff'd without opinion, 822 F.2d 55
(4th Cir. 19867); Professional Lawn
Care Ass'n v. Village of Milford,
909 F.24 929 (6th Cir. 1990). Given
the views of some, but not all,
legislators in favor of preemption,
Congress adopted a compromise posi-
tion of neutrality that left the
states free to distribute authority
~42-
between themselves and their politi-
cal subdivisions if they choose. ©”
See County of Mendocino, 36 Cal. 34d
at 492, 663 P.2d at 1160, 204 Cal.
Rptr. at 907. In sum, the absence
of express preemption in FIFRA‘s
text, and the ambiguous nature of
the legislative history, combined
&/The legislative history behind
the subsequent 1988 FIFRA amendments reveals
that Congress recognized that localities
engage in regulation of pesticide use:
Concern about the inadequacy of
date that support current
pesticide regulations fuels much
of the controversy surrounding
pesticide use. Such concern, in
turn, reinforces the desire by
States end heir political
Subdivisions to assert greater
control over pesticide use....
(emphasis added)
H.R. Rep. No. 939, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
reprinted ip 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 3474, 3478.
-~43-
with the traditional presusption
against preemption warrants the
reversal of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.
B. FIFRA Does Wot Create a
Pervasive Federal Regulatory
Scheme .
Congress did not create a fed-
eral scheme under FIFRA that is so
pervasive as to preclude supplement -
ation by other levels of government.
In fact, Congress explicitly invited
action by other governments in the
area of pesticide regulation. §ee 7
U.S.C. § 136v. That provision alone
eliminates the need for the Court to
consider whether a pervasive federal
scheme exists or whether Congress
intended to occupy fully the field
of pesticide regulation. The stetu-
tory text expressly proves that
Congress hed no such intention.
-~44-
c. The Town of Casey Ordinance
Does Not Conflict With FIFRA,
aR, It An Obstacle To
A conflict between state and
federal law exists only when the
State law “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of
Congress,.*" Jones. 430 U.S. at 526
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 351, 363 (1941)), or “when conm-
pliance with both federal and state
regulations is ~a physical impossi-
bility.* Fiorida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963). The Wis-onsin
Supreme Court did not rule on
whether the Town of Casey ordinance
conflicts with FIFRA, and the U.s.
government egrees with the
Petitioner that the Ordinance is not
-45-
preempted. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae on Petition
For a Writ of Certiorari at 4. The
Town of Casey ordinance simply fills
in @ gap in federal ard state
pesticide regulations.
FIFRA regulates the labeling
and packaging of pesticides, regis-
tration of products under categories
for general or restricted use and
certification of applicators of pes-
ticides. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y.
The Town of Casey ordinance, on the
other hand, consists of notice
requirements to inform neighbors and
passers-by and permit requirements
to protect the local community, its
inhabitants and the environment.
See Town of Casey ordinance.
Ordinance No. 865-1, § 14.3. It
-46-
governs the time, place and manner
of the actual pesticide application,
@ matter that directly affects the
local community. See id. See also
New York State Pesticide Coalition
Vv. JOrling, 874 F.2d 115, 120 (2d
Cir. 1989) (court held that FIFRA
did not preempt state notification
requirement because "Congress in-
tended to moderate the behavior of
people who sell and apply pesti-
cides,” but “New York provis: $s are
designed to warn the public....*).
Unlike other federal environ-
mental laws, FIFRA does not
establish a permit system for the
application of pesticides. Compare,
for example, the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642, and the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387,
47
which authorize federal emission and
discharge standards as well as the
implementation of federal permit
schemes. The Town of Casey ordi-
nance fills in the use-permit gap in
pesticide regulation.
FIFRA also lacks notice re-
quirements to protect passers-by and
abutters. Nor does it address set-
back distances for surface water and
groundwater supplies. Again, the
Town of Casey ordinance provides a
vehicle for filling these gaps.
Rather than obstruct the federal
packaging and labeling scheme, the
Ordinance assists in fulfilling the
overall federal goal of environmen-
tal protection.
-~48-
III. CONGRESS LEFT IT TO THE
STATES TO DETERMINE WHETHER
LOCALITIES MAY OR MAY NOT
REGULATE PESTICIDE USE.
FIFRA, except for setting a
federal floor below which sale or
use regulation may not dip, does not
tell the fifty states how to regu-
late pesticide use. FIFRA's dictate
is permissive: "A state may regu-
late the sale or use of any federal-
ly registered pesticide ...." 7
U.S.C. § 136v(a) (emphasis added).
Accepting this federalist invita-
tion, different states have pursued
different approaches.
A. The Six New England States Have
Taken a Varied Approach to Local
Pesticide Use Regulation.
Although a fifty-state survey
is beyond the scope of this brief,
the activities of the six New
-49-
England states are indicative of a
varied approach.
Maine provides that municipali-
ties may petition the Board of
Pesticides Control (the “BPC") for
the establishment of “critical
areas” and comment on mandatory
pesticide management plans. Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1471-M
(Supp. 1990). In addition, in
recognition of the existence and
need for local pesticide ordinances,
Maine law requires the BPC to
maintain a centralized listing of
municipal ordinances related to
pesticide storage, distribution or
use. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
22, § 1471-U (Supp. 1990). The
Maine Supreme court has held that
neither the Pesticide Control Act,
-50-
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, §§ 601-
625 (1989), mor the Pesticide Board
Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §
1471-A, preempts local pesticide
ordinances. Town of Lebanon, 571
A.2G 1189 (Me. 1990).
New Hampshire has also enacted
@ number of pesticide laws. See
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 430:1-430:48
(1990). The New Hampshire Supreme
Court has ruled that the state
legislature fully occupied the field
by virtue of its pesticide ensect-
ments. Accordingly, New Hampshire
localities may not enect pesticide
ordinances. Town of SGSelishury v.
New England Power Co., 121 N.H. 983,
437 A.2da 281 (1981).
Vermont regulates the “sale.
use, storage, treatment and disposal)
-5]-
of pesticides and pesticide wastes”
through the Commissioner of
Agriculture, Food and Markets. Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 6 §§ 911-929, 981-
986, 1021-1025, 1082-1084, 1101-1111
(19868 & Supp. 1990). These statutes
do not expressly address local pes-
ticide use control, and the issue
has not been addressed by the
Vermont Supreme Court. Notably,
however, the Vermont Water Pollution
Control Law alludes to “federal,
state and jlocal laws and regula-
tions” (emphasis added) in the
context of herbicide and pesticide
use. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 §
1283(9)(2)(B) (Supp. 1990).
Rhode Island has enacted the
Pesticide Control Act of 1976, R.I.
Gen. Laws §§ 23-25-1 - 23-25-36.
-52—-
The act is administered by the
Director of Environmental
Management. The act does not speak
to local regulation, and the issue
apparently has not been litigated.
Connecticut expressly allows
some local regulation of pesticide
use. The Connecticut Pesticide
Control Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 22a-46 - 22a-66z (West 1985 &
Supp. 1990), gives the Commissioner
of Environmental Protection "exclu-
Sive authority in the regulation of
pesticide spraying,” OOF
§ 22a-54(a), but also declares that
"[plermits for aircraft spraying in
congested areas shall be issued only
with the approval of the director of
health of the municipality in which
afihe
the operation is to be conducted.”
Id., § 22a-54(e)(4).
In the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, as of 1988, over 50
towns had passed regulations relat-
ing to pesticide control. See
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering, Pesticige Regulation in
Massachusetts: An Analysis of
Local, State, and Federal Controls
at 1 (February 1988) [hereinafter
"Pesticide Regulation in
Massachusetts"). Although signifi-
cant portions of local power have
been preempted by state legislation
and regulation, see Town of Wendell]
v. Attorney General, 394 Mass. 518,
476 N.E.2d 585 (1985), localities
may still require pesticide applica-
tors to appear before boards of
site
health to demonstrate that pesti-
cides will only be used in accord-
ance with the law. Jd.
Consequently, Massachusetts
communities have enacted zoning by-
laws, gener. 1] by-laws, board of
health regulations and advisory
resolutions that regulate pesticide-
related activities in specific
sensitive areas. Pesticide
Regulation in Massachusetts at 1, 2,
15. The Attorney General must first
approve the zoning by-laws and the
general by-laws,—’ but local board
of health regulations do not require
1/this approval process involves
all town zoning by-laws and general by-laws,
not just pesticide enactments. See Macs.
Gen. L. ch. 40, § 32 (1988); ch. GOA, § 5
(1988).
afie
such approval. Id. at 4-6; Mass.
Gen. L. ch. 1ll, § 31 (1988 & 1990
Supp.).
B. Local Regulation Can Play An
Important Role In Reducing
Pesticide Damage.
Local ordinances such as the
one promulgated by the Town of Casey
can play an important role in
preventing harm to the community.
The ordinance sets up a_— simple
permit and notification framework
that neither FIFRA nor the Wisconsin
State statutes governing pesticides
address. The ordinance applies only
to pesticide applications directly
affecting the public, either by
application to land owned or used by
the public or by aerially spraying,
which by its very method may drift
onto other lands or into private
iia
residences. See Preamble to Town of
Casey Ordinance 85-1 ("aerial
spraying of pesticides increases the
risk of injury or damage to persons,
property and the environment, due to
the increased likelihood of pesti
cide drift and pesticide overspray”).
A pesticide applicator must
Submit information that describes
the purpose of the pesticide
application, the date and time, a
description of the location, an
identification of the pesticide, the
existence of available pest-control
alternatives, the anticipated impact
of the application, and a descrip-
tion of the precautions the applica-
tor intends to take. Ordinance
85-1, 1.3(2). The ordinance also
Provides for a hearing if the Board
aS7e
initially rejects or restricts the
request. Id., § 1.3(4), (5). The
ordinance also provides for
notification of the impending
application by use of placards at
least 24 hours prior to the
application. JId., § 1.3(7).
Under the terms of the
Ordinance, the Town may deny or
impose conditions on a permit for
reasons “related to the protection
of the health, safety and welfare”
of the town residents. Id.,
§ 1.3(3). The Town may require that
@ pesticide application be confined
to an area that the public does not
use for recreation or that’ the
person utilize a method of ground
application of the pesticide rather
than aeriél spraying. Id.
-58-
Without a system in Place for
review of specific pesticide
applications for areas of public
concern, communities are at a
serious disadvantage in Protecting
themselves -- their residents,
animals, land and water -- from
exposure to potentially hazardous
substances. Although the use of
pesticides to control weeds and
minimize crop damage has led to
improvements in agricultural
Productivity, “it has also led to
increased risk of harm to humans and
the environment.” Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990
(1984).
Communities that bear the
Girect risk of harm should be the
ones to assess “the likelihood of
«99-
individualized risks" and how such
risks could adversely affect their
lives and their environment. See
generally § id. at 1016 ("public
disclosure [of trade-secret data
Pursuant to FIFRA] can provide an
effective check on the decision-
making processes of EPA and allows
members of the public to determine
the likelihood of individualized
risks peculiar to their use of the
product”). Without state and local
participation, protection against
the risks of pesticide use will
remain incomplete.
-60-
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth
above, and for the reasons set forth
in Petitioners' brief, the
Conservation Law Foundation and the
Sierra Club urge the Court to
reverse the Wisconsin Supreme Court
by holding that FIFRA does. not
preempt the Town of Casey ordinance.
Respectfully Submitted,
E. Susan Garsh*
Robert E. McDonnell
Maris L. Abbene
Bingham, Dana & Gould
150 Federal St.
Boston, MA 02119
(617) 951-8000
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
*Counsel of Record
DATED: February 28, 1991
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.