Amicus Curiae Brief — Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier

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Supreme Court, >

FIl&D

FEB 2 8 1991

No. 89-1905 __1 eresoéo THE CLERK

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 89-1905

WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

RALPH MORTIER, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT

BRIEF OF THE CONSERVATION LAW

FOUNDATION OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.

AND THE SIERRA CLUB

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS

E. SUSAN GARSH*

ROBERT E. McCDONNELL

MARIS L. ABBENE

PAULA G. CURRY

150 Federal Street

Boston, MA 02110

(617) 951-8000

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

*Counsel of Record

i. a a ee ee eeEeESE eee

II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT .

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

ARGUMENT .

EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION DEPENDS UPON

FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL

INVOLVEMENT. .

FEDERAL LAW HAS NOT

PREEMPTED LOCAL REGULATION

OF THE USE OF PESTICIDES

A.

FIFRA Does Not

Explicitly Preempt

Municipal Regulation.

FIFRA Does Not Create

a Pervasive Federal

Regulatory Scheme .

The Town of Casey

Ordinance Does Not

Conflict With FIFRA,

Nor Is It An Obstacle

To FIFRA. — oe

PAGE

10

10

35

36

43

44

Iil.

IV.

ii

PAGE

CONGRESS LEFT IT TO THE

STATES TO DETERMINE WHETHER

LOCALITIES MAY OR MAY NOT

REGULATE PESTICIDE USE .. 48

A. The Six New England

States Have Taken a

Varied Approach to

Local Pesticide Use

Regulation. ..... 48

B. Local Regulation Can

Play An Important Role

In Reducing Pesticide

Demeee. «- «cess e

CONCLUSION ........ 60

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Allway Taxi, Inc. v.

City of New York, 340

F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y.),

aff'd, 468 F.2d 624

(2d Cir. 1972)

Central Maine Power Co.

v. Town of Lebanon,

571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990)

COPARR, Ltd. v. City of

Boulder, 735 F. Supp.

363 (D. Colo. 1989),

appeal docketed,

No. 89-1341 (10th Cir.,

Nov. 1, 1989), appeal

Stayed, Jan. 15., 1991

Florida Lime & Avocado

Growers v. Paul, 373

U.S. 132 (1962).

Garcia v. San Antonio

Metropolitan Transit

Authority, 469 U.S.

528 (1985)...

PAGE

20

38-39,

40-41,

49-50

40-41

44

22-23 ,

34 n.2,

40 n.5

iv

471 U.S. 707 (1985).

Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,

430 U.S. 519 (1977).

Maryland Pest Control

Ass'n v. Montgomery

County, 646 F. Supp.

109 (D. Md. 1986),

aff'd without opinion,

822 F.2d 55

(4th Cir. 1987).

Mortier v. Town of Casey,

154 Wis. 2d 18, 452

N.W.2d 555 (1990).

National Agricultural

Chemicals Ass'n v.

Rominger, 500 F. Supp.

465 (E.D. Cal. 1980)

New State Ice Co. v.

Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262

(1982) .

PAGE

s3e Oe

36

35, 36,

39, 44

40-41

37-38

40 n.5

23

New York State Pesticide

Coalition v. Jorling,

874 F.2

(2d Cir.

36 Cal.

683 P.2

Rptr. 8

gd 115

1989)

3d 476,

Gd 1150; 204 Cal.

97 (1984)

Proetta v. Dent,

484 F.2d 1146

(2d Cir.

ASS‘n v.

1973)

Village of

Milford, 909 F.2d 929

(6th Ci

r. 1990),

petition for cert filed,

59 U.S.L.W. 3180

(Aug. 3

(No. 90-

Rice v.

Corp.,

(1947)

1, 1990)

382)

Santa Fe Elevator

331 U.S. 218

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,

467 U.S.

986 (1984).

PAGE

46

40-41,

42

25-26

40-41

35-36

58, 59

vi

PAGE

Sed, Inc. v. City of

Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979

(S.D. Ohio 1981) .... . 25

Town of Salisbury v.

New England Power Co.,

121 N.H. 983, 437 A.2d

i 50

Town of Wendell v.

Attorney General,

394 Mass. 518, 476 N.E.2d

Meee 2 5 6 » © 6 -& ¢ 53-54

Walla Walla v.

Walla Walla Water Co.,

172 U.S. 1 (1898). .... 22,

38-39

Washington v. General

Motors Corp., 406 U.S.

8 | re 20-21

FEDERAL STATUTES AND RULES

The Asbestos Hazard

Emergency Response Act of

1986 ("“AHERA”), 15 U.S.C.

§§ 2641-2655 (1988). .. . 13

The Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)

(recently amended,

Pub. L. No. 101-549,

104 Stat. 2399 (1990)). . 12,

46-47

vii

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)

42 U.S.C. § 7602(d)

The Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387

[ae «2 6 ee « 44

33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)

33 U.S.C. § 1362(3)

40 Code of Federal

Regulations § 116.4,

Table 116.4A (1990).

The Comprehensive

Environmental Response

and Liability Act,

("CERCLA") 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9601-9675 (1988).

42 U.S.C. § 9601(27).

42 U.S.C. § 9607(i)

42 U.S.C. § 9614(a)

The Emergency Planning

and Community Right-To-

Know Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 11001-11052 (1988).

PAGE

20,

37 n.3

38 n.4

12,

46-47

16

38 n.4

27-28

13

viii

42 U.S.C. § 11041(b).

42 U.S.C. § 11049(9).

The Federal Insecticide,

Fungicide and Rodenticide

Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C.

§§ 136-136y (1988)

7 U.S.C. § 136(aa).

7 U.S.C. § 136v

7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).

The National Environmental

Policy Act ("NEPA"),

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347

(1988) . :

42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)

The Oil Pollution Act of

1990, 33 U.S.C.A.

§§ 2701-2761 oon a.

Dec. 1990)

33 U.S.C.A. § 2718.

36-37,

13

26

13

28-29

iz

The Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k

(1988) ms :

42 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (4).

42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7).

42 U.S.C. § 6903(31).

42 U.S.C. § 6929.

The Safe Drinking Water

Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 300£ - 3003-26 (1988)

42 U.S.C. § 300£(13).

42 U.S.C.

§ 300h-7(a)(3).

The Toxic Substances

Control Act ("*TOSCA"),

15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629

+. ae

15 U.S.C. § 2602(13).

PAGE

17

13

38

n

.4

15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1).

15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2).

PAGE

24

24-25

STATE STATUTES AND RULES

The Connecticut Pesticide

Control Act, Conn. Gen.

Stat. Ann. §§ 221- 54(2)

and 54(e)(4)

Maine Rev. Stat. Ann.

title 7, §§ 601-625

title 22, § 1471-M

title 22, § 1471l-uU .

Massachusetts General] L.

ch. 40, § 32; ch. 40A,

§ 5; ch. 111, § 131.

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§§ 430:1 - 430:48 (1990)

Pesticide Control Act

of 1976, R.I. Gen. Laws

§§ 23-25-11 - 23-25-36.

52-53

49-50

54 n.7,

54-55

50

51-52

xi

Town of Casey,

Washburn County,

Wisconsin, Ordinance

No. 85-1 (1985).

Vermont Stat. Ann.

title 6, §§ 911-929

title 6, §§ 981-986

title 6, §§ 1021-1025

title 6, §§ 1082-1084

title 6, §§ 1101-1111

title 10, § 1283(g)(2)(8).

OTHER AUTHORITIES

R. Carson, Silent Lease

(1987 ed.) .

Department of Environmental

Quality Engineering,

Pesticide soendastae in

Massachusetts:

and Federal

(February 1988).

Analysis of Local, State.

Controls

PAGE

45, 46,

55, 56,

57

50-51

10, ll,

12 n.l

53, 54,

55

xii

xiii

PAGE PAGE

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 575, ; ;

99th Cong., 2d Sess., L. Tribe, American

reprinted in 1986 Constitutional Law, a 40 n.5

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. (2d ed. 1988)... .

a es 6 6 6 6 ee « 17-18

H.R. Rep. No. 939, 100th

Cong., 2d Sess.,

reprinted in 1988

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

mee Deve cece bhesne 12 n.1l

42 n.6

Policy Research Project on

Pesticide Regulation in

Texas, The University of

Texas at Austin,

Research on

in Texas

(September 11, sx a 32-33

Senate Report (Environment

and Public Works Committee)

S. Rep. 94, 10lst Cong., lst

Sess., July 28, 1989 ... 29

Statement by President

Ronald Reagan Upon Signing

S. 124, 22 Weekly Comp.

Pres. Doc. 831, (June 23,

1986) reprinted in 1986

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 1566. 18-19

No. 89-1905

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 89-1905

WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR, et al.,

Petitioners,

BRIEF OF THE CONSERVATION LAW

FOUNDATION OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.

AND THE SIERRA CLUB

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS

-2<-

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

This brief is submitted by the

Conservation Law Foundation of New

England, Inc. and the Sierra Club as

amici curiae in support of the

Petitioners. Written consents of

all parties have been obtained and

filed with the Clerk of the Court.

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The Conservation Law Foundation

of New England, Inc. ("CLF") is a

non-profit, public interest, envir-

onmental law organization founded in

1966. CLF is funded by donations

from thousands of private individu-

als and by grants and contributions

from more than 40 public corpora-

tions, charitable foundations and

private trusts. CLF ’s staff

includes ten attorneys and four

scientists who use law, science and

ae

public policy analysis to pursue a

wide range of environmental issues.

Pesticide use in agricultural,

suburban and urban settings is a

major concern. CLF has drafted and

published the Massachusetts

Pesticide Handbook, a primer for

local regulation of pesticide

application. CLF has also negoti-

ated with utilities about pesticide

uses in rights of way; participated

in negotiations regarding mosquito

control; and lobbied the

Massachusetts legislature for pesti-

cide laws.

The Sierra Club is a California

nonprofit membership organization

founded in 1892. The goals of the

Sierra Club's 500,000 members are to

explore, enjoy and protect the wild

~

places of the earth; to practice and

promote responsible use of re-

sources; to educate and enlist

people to protect and restore the

environment; and to use all lawful

means to carry out these objectives.

Both the Sierra Club and CLF are

vitally interested in this case

which presents issues significantly

affecting future regulation of pes-

ticide use.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Effective environmental protec-

tion requires action by federal,

state and local governments.

Congress, while enacting a multitude

of environmental protection laws

during the last three decades, has

consistently and forcefully adhered

to a philosophy of environmental

ofe

federalism. This approach is

evident throughout the federal

environmental protection scheme.

Viewed within that overall context,

the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide

and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7

U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988), cannot

sensibly be deemed to be an act that

preempts all local regulation of

pesticide use. (Pp. 10 to 35.)

A three-pronged test determines

whether a federal act preempts state

or local regulation. There must be

an express preemption in the text of

the statute; or there must be such a

pervasive federal occupation of the

field that the Court must infer that

Congress left no room for state or

local activity; or there must be an

actual conflict with the federal

af$@

law. FIFRA fails each of these

three tests.

Despite frequent amendment of

FIFRA during the last 30 years,

Congress has never expressly pre-

empted local pesticide regulation.

Federal preemption should not be

lightly inferred in the absence of

express language. Ambiguous legis-

lative history such as FIFRA's is

not a sound platform from which to

infer preemption. Additionally, it

provides no basis for disregarding

the traditional right of state

legislatures to delegate their

sovereignty to towns, cities and

counties. (Pp. 36 to 43.)

FIFRA does not create a perva-

sive federal occupation of the

pesticide regulation field since it

<~ =

expressly invites more’ stringent

state legislation. 7 U.S.C.

§ 136v(a). Establishment of a fed-

eral floor above which states can

pursue tougher regulation is consis-

tent with other federal environment-

al statutes. Having been expressly

invited to legislate, states should

be free to delegate within their own

State systems. (P. 43.)

The Wisconsin Supreme Court did

not discuss whether the Town of

Casey ordinance obstructs FIFRA,

which is essentially a labeling,

packaging and product registration

statute. There is no obstruction

Since the ordinance focuses on the

management of local yse of pesti-

cides only insofar as the use will

affect public property or the public

aG-

itself. While many federal environ-

mental statutes authorize the crea-

tion of federal permit systems,

FIFRA leaves that part of the field

open. The Town of Casey ordinance

effectively fills this gap in the

federal law. (Pp. 44 to 47.)

Congress left it to the states

to determine whether or not local

governments may regulate pesticide

use. The six New England states

reveal the varied approaches that

state governments have chosen.

Maine permits local regulation. New

Hampshire's comprehensive legisla-

tion has preempted the field within

the state. Connecticut and

Massachusetts primarily regulate

from the state level, but both

jurisdictions allow various forms of

Be

local oversight. Rhode Island and

Vermont have each enacted state

pesticide control schemes which

appear to provide room for local

action, but the question of local

preemption has not been addressed by

either state supreme court. (Pp. 48

to 55.)

Local know ledge of water

resources, wildlife habitat, and

sensitive land uses is a critical

aspect of effective environmental

protection. FIFRA develops various

application safety standards through

its product-registration process,

but fails to develop any process to

implement those standards at a sub-

federal level. The Town of Casey

Ordinance is a reasonable vehicle

-10-

for utilizing local knowledge. This

Court should hold that FIFRA does

not preempt the Town of Casey ordi-

nance. (Pp. 55 to 60.)

RB. EFFECIIVE ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION DEPENDS UPON FEDERAL,

STATE AND LOCAL INVOLVEMENT.

Nearly thirty years ago, in her

book Silent Spring, marine biologist

Rachel Carson graphically described

the damage that indiscriminate pes-

ticide spraying can inflict on

people, animals, land and water.

After recounting numerous incidents

of damage caused by pesticides to

farms and forests, suburbs and cit-

ies, Ms. Carson wrote:

publication,

-ll-

And what of human

beings? In California

orchards eee workers

handling foliage that had

been treated a month

earlier collapsed and went

into shock, and escaped

death only through skilled

medical attention. Does

Indiana still raise any

boys who roam through woods

or fields and might even

explore the margins of a

river? If so, who guarded

the poisoned area to k-ep

out any who might wander

in, in misguided search for

unspoiled nature? Who kept

vigilant watch to tell the

innocent stroller that the

fields he was about to

enter were deadly -- all

their vegetation coated

with a lethal film?

Carson, Silent Spring, 126-127

(1987 ed.) (emphasis in original).

Since Silent Spring's

far reaching network of statutes to

curb and, it is hoped, cure damage

caused by pesticides and other

Congress has created a

ol2-

chemicals .+’

Marching to the beat

of the same drummer, and in many

instances even more rapidly, state

governments and many local lawmakers

have added to the fabric of this

environmental regulatory network.

In addition to FIFRA, the fed-

eral environmental safety net

includes the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (19868); the

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-

7642 (1988) (recently amended, Pub.

L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399

(1990)); the Comprehensive

Environmental Response and Liability

i/ Notably, Congress iteelf has

credited amendments to FIFRA to the impact

made by Silent Spring. See H.R. Rep. No.

939, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in

1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3.74,

3775-76.

el3e

Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-

9675 (1988); the Emergency Planning

and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 11001-11052 (1988); the

Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33

U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761 (West Supp.

Dec. 1990); the Toxic Substances

Control Act ("TOSCA"), 15 U.S.C.

§§ 2601-2629 (1988); the Safe

Dr‘ king Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§

300£ - 300)-26 (1988); the National

Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988); the

Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-

6992k (1988); and the Asbestos

Hazard Emergency Response Act of

1986 ("AHERA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-

2655 (1988). Even these eleven

-14-

enactments do not constitute the

full body of federal environmental

law.

There can be little doubt that

federal environmental legislation

has touched every aspect of American

life. The cars we drive adhere to

federal air standards. The water we

Grink must satisfy federal water

standards. The trash we discard is

disposed in accordance with federal

regulations. Legions of biologists,

geologists and engineers work from

coast to coast under the aegis of

the Federal Superfund.

However broad this federal en-

vironmental mantle, though, there

can also be little doubt that the

role of state and local authority in

environmental protection has not

o1Ge

been eliminated. To the contrary,

active state and local involvement

is critical to successful environ-

mental protection. Congress created

its far reaching environmental code

fully cognizant of the fundamental

precept that "the regulation of

health and safety matters is primar-

ily, and historically, a matter of

local concern.” Hillsborough County

v. Automated Medical Laboratories,

Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985). In

keeping with that precept, there

runs throughout the framework of all

federal environmental enactments a

strong and powerful current of

environmental federalism.

Congressional advocacy of

environmental federalism is evident

in the text and legislative history

of numerous statutes.

1972,

Water

Congr

33 U.

o16=

in promulgating the Federal

Pollution Control

ess declared:

It is the policy of the

Congress to recognize,

preserve, and protect the

primary responsibilities

and rights of States to

prevent, reduce, and elim-

inate pollution .... It

is further the policy of

the Congress to support

and aid research relating

to the prevention, reduc-

tion, and elimination of

pollution, and to provide

Federal technical services

and financial aid to State

and interstate agencies

and municipalities in con-

nection with the preven-

tion, reduction, and elim-

ination of pollution.

S.C. § 1251(b).

Fourteen years later, in

As early as

Act,

the

enactment of amendments to the Safe

Drinking Water Act, firm adherence

to

again

environmental federalism

evident.

Congress required

oiPo

every state to develop a wellhead

protection program that would “iden-

tify ... all potential anthropogenic

[i.e., man-made] sources of contami-

nants which may have any adverse

effect on the health of persons.”

42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(a)(3). The House

Conference Report in support of this

statute forcefully repeated the

federalist theme:

States can be expected

to take a wide variety of

approaches to protection

of wellhead areas within

their jurisdiction, and it

is conceivable that each

State could develop its

own unique approach.

Protection strategies may

also vary for different

protection areas within

one State. The amendment

recognizes that States are

best able to assess spe-

cific problems within

their jurisdictions, and

to develop and implement

necessary protection mea-

sures. As a result, no

groundwater classification

assigned by the

Administrator is to lessen

-18-

the level of protection

assigned to an aquifer by

the State in a wellhead

protection area.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 575, 99th Cong.,

2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News 1566, 1609.

The President, when signing the

Safe Drinking Water Act amendments

into law, concurred in the view that

state and local action forms the

first line of environmental defense:

Although we certainly

agree that groundwater

needs to be protected from

major contaminants, we

believe that States have

the principal role in

protecting this valuable

resource, and that the EPA

has sufficient statutory

authority to assist the

States where appropriate.

In fact, the Federal

government can never hope

adequately to protect the

groundwater resources of

America without the major

participation and indeed

system is necessary for

safety knowledge,

dated the uniform,

-19-

the leadership of State

and local communities, and

Ss. 124 reflects this

important understanding.

Statement by President Ronald Reagan

Upon Signing S. 124, 22 Weekly Comp.

Doc. 831 (June 23, 1986),

reprinted in 1986 U.S.

Admin. News 1566, 1615.

Congress has preempted

and local environmental activity

limited and narrow instances.

example, when an _ information

ing and distribution of science and

certain forms. See the Emergency

Planning and Community Right-to-Know

42 U.S.C. § 11041(b) (state and

material safety data sheets

Code Cong.

the gather-

Congress has man-

nationwide use of

=20-

shall “be identical in content and

format ...."). Elsewhere, since the

trip from one's home to work or even

to the local convenience store fre-

quently crosses town lines and in

some areas even state lines,

Congress has preempted the estab-

lishment of automobile and_ fuel

emission standards. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 7543(a). Even so, the specific

field of emission control has not

been fully occupied, see Allway

Taxi. Inc. v. City of New York, 340

F. Supp. 1120, 1124 £=(S.D.N.Y.),

aff'd, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972),

and the broader field of air pollu-

tion prevention is most certainly a

federal, state and local activity.

See Washington v. General Motors

Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 #£4x(1972)

aZieq

("Congress has not, however, found a

uniform, nationwide solution to all

aspects of [air pollution) and, in-

deed, has declared ‘that the preven-

tion and control of air pollution at

its source is the primary responsi-

bility of States and local govern-

ments.'").

Another consistent characteris-

tic of federal environmental laws is

that Congress does not impose fed-

eral environmental standards as

ceilings beyond which state or local

lawmakers cannot proceed. Rather,

federal health and safety laws act

as floors below which states and

local governments may not set stan-

dards. In FIFRA, see 7 U.S.C.

§ 136v, and in numerous other fed-

eral acts, states are invariably

@23-

free to impose more stringent

environmental protection than

federal law requires.

Having permitted the states to

impose more stringent standards in

the environmental sphere, it follows

from the federalist principles

underlying our constitutional system

that “[s]tate legislatures may not

only exercise their sovereignty

directly, but may delegate such por-

tions of it to inferior legislative

bodies as, in their judgment, is

desirable for local purposes.”

Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water

Co., 172 U.S. 1, 9 (1898). See also

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit

Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)

("(W)ithin the realm of authority

left open to them under the

=23~0

Constitution, the States must be

equally free to engage in any

activity that their citizens choose

dt The principle that states

may experiment with different ways

to solve environmental problems and

delegate differing amounts of power

to the local governments within the

states, thus, lies at the heart of

the federal system.

To stay experimentation

in things social and eco-

nomic is a grave responsi-

bility. Denial of the

right to experiment may be

fraught with serious con-

sequences for the Nation.

It is one of the hapry

incidents of the federal

system that a single

courageous State may, if

its citizens choose, serve

@s a laboratory; and try

novel social and economic

experiments without risk

to the rest of the country.

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285

U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.

dissenting). Examples of Congress’

o24e

carefully cefraining from heavy-

handed preemption and of leaving the

door open for more stringent state

and local environmental action are

myriad.

TOSCA preserves “the authority

of any State or political subdivi-

sion of a State to establish or

continue in effect regulation of any

chemical substance, mixture, or

article containing - chemical

substance or mixture.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 2617(a)(1). There are only two

exceptions. First, states and

localities may not impose duplica-

tion of testing required by the

federal government. 15 U.S.C.

§ 2617(a)(2). Second, states may

mot create rules where the federal

Environmental Protection Agency

-25-

("EPA") has done so unless the State

rule is identical to the federal

version; enacted pursuant to any

other federal law; or, notably, un-

less the State rule “prohibits the

use of such substance or mixture in

such State or political subdivi-

sion.” ld. See also Sed, Inc. v.

City of Dayton, 5:9 F. Supp. 979,

990 (S.D. Ohio 19861) ("Deference to,

Or nonpreemption of state regulation

which serves the purposes of other

existing federal environmental

legislation, even if only remotely

or incidentally, was similarly and

clearly intended.” ) (emphasis in

Original).

NEPA, though not itself applic-

able to the states unless a partner-

ship exists between the federal and

@26-

State governments on ai specific

project, see Proetta v. Dent, 484

F.2d 1146, 1148 (2d Cir. 1973),

expressly recognizes the importance

of cooperation on environmental]

issues among federal, state and

local governments: -

The Congress, recogniz-

ing the profound impact of

man's activity on the

interrelations of all com-

ponents of the natural

environment, ... declares

thet it is the continuing

policy of the Federal

Government, in cooperation

with State and local gov-

ernments, ... to use all

practicable means and mea-

sures, including financial

and technical assistance,

in @ manner calculated to

foster and promote’ the

general welfare, to create

and maintain conditions

under which man and nature

can exist in productive

harmony ....

42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).

@37e

CERCLA follows the “federal

environmental floor” approach by

declaring that none of its provi-

sions “shall be construed or inter-

preted as preempting any State from

imposing any additional liability or

requirements with respect to the

release of hazardous substances

within such State.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 9614(a). While excluding app!ica-

tions of registered pesticides from

certain sections, CERCLA also

expressly preserves “obligations or

liability” under any other State or

Federal law for damages resulting

from the release, removal or remedi-

ation of “hazardous substances,” 42

U.S.C. § 9607(i), a@ term which

includes numerous pesticides:

captan, carbaryl (sevin), chlordane,

-28-

DDT, Giazinon, malathion and

parathion. 40 C.F.R. § 116.4, Table

116.4A.

RCRA recognizes that “the

collection and disposal of solid

wastes should continue to be

primarily the function of State,

regional, and local agencies ....”

42 U.S.C. § 6901(8)(4). An objec-

tive of RCRA is the establishment of

"a viable Federal-State partner-

ship....”* 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a8)(7),

and the statute allows state and

local imposition of more stringent

solid waste disposal requirements.

42 U.S.C. § 6929.

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990

@llows State and local governments

to exceed federal liability and

removal requirements for oil spills.

-29-

33 U.S.C.A. § 2718. Notably, the

legislative history declares:

The issue of Federal pre-

emption of State laws is

one that often erises

during the formulation of

legislation which imposes

Federal environmental

controls. To date,

Federal legislation has

affirmed the rights of

States to protect their

own air, water, and land

resources by permitting

them to establish State

standards which are more

restrictive than Federal

Standards.

Senate Report (Environment and

Public Works Committee) S. Rep. No.

94, l10lst Cong., Ist Sess., July 28,

1989.

Against this panoply of federal

environmental law, the Wisconsin

Supreme Court's holding that, by

implication. FIFRA preempts a local

ordinance regulating pesticide use

is aberrational as a matter of

-30-

federal policy as well as a sharp

Geparture from well established pre-

emption principles. The common-

sense reading of FIFRA is

Petitioner's: the statute is a

labeling and licensing law, not a

law that regulates every conceivable

pesticide use in every hamlet in the

United States. Recognizing the fact

that pesticides generally ere

produced by a handful of i iarge

manufacturing corporations, then

Gistributed nationally and even

internationally, Congress has

Gecided it is economic and efficient

to use federal power to centralize

and standardize the registration and

Gescription of pesticides. It

strains credibility, however, to

think thet Congress intended the EPA

aRiq

and the state governments -- without

any local regulatory activity -- to

oversee the proper application of

pesticide’ in every climate, over

every varied topography, or in every

workplace, restaurant, hospital or

apartment building in the United

States.

Safe use of chemicals in the

environment requires 4 detailed

know ledge of local conditions:

prevailing winds at different times

of the day, the presence or absence

of surface water or groundwater, the

directional flow of groundwater, the

local topography, and local _ land

uses, the seasonal habits of local

fish, fowl and other wildlife and in

some instances even their daily

habits. The importance of local

=\™=

knowledge is illustrated by a study

of pesticide use conducted in

Texas:

Weather-related elements

including horizontal and

vertical air movements,

air temperature, and rela-

tive humidity in the imme-

diate application area all

affect drift....

The weather factor most

commonly associated with

Grift is horizontal wind

speed. However, estimat-

ing drift is not a simple

function of knowing wind

speed. Wind speed, and

thus drift, will increase

with height because

objects on the ground

(particularly crops) have

the effect of slowing down

wind speed in the affected

area. The effects of

horizontal wind speed also

depend on the type of

ground surface in the

area -- not just terrain

but crops as well. For

instance, when studying

air movements over two

fields, researchers found

fairly regular increases

in wind speed (with

height) in a wheat field,

but in a beet field there

was substantial turbulence.

@33e

Policy Research Project on Pesticide

Regulation in Texas, The University

of Texas at Austin, Regulating

Pesticides in Texas, A Report of the

Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public

Affairs Policy Research Project on

Pesticides in Texas (September 11,

1984) at 118-119.

Surely a local official is more

likely than a federal or state

administrator in a far-away city to

know where local water supplies

exist, what times of day local

weather is likely to imcrease or

decrease pesticide drift, and what

times and places pesticide applica-

tion will subject residents and

-34-

animals to risk.*/ Chemicals dis-

persed into the environment --

whether outdoors in fields or in-

doors in restaurants and nursing

homes -- have their greatest impact

locally. Surely the intent of FIFRA

is to minimize environmental harm.

Achieving that objective requires

that regulators try to calibrate the

use of chemicals as precisely as

possible. That calibration is best

achieved by the involvement of local

2/"The administration and enforce-

ment of federal laws and regulations

necessarily are largely in the hands of

staff and civil service employees. These

employees may have little or no knowledge of

the States and localities that will be

affected by the statutes and regulations for

which they are responsible.” Garcia, 469

U.S. at 576 (Powell, J., dissenting).

=S8e

as well as federal and = state

officials in pesticide use.

Il. FEDERAL LAW HAS NOT PREEMPTED

LOCAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF

PESTICIDES.

Application of the test for

federal preemption to the language

and purpose of FIFRA shows that

FIFRA does not preempt municipal

regulation of pesticides. Under the

Supremacy Clause, — federal law may

supercede local law in any of three

ways. Congress may preempt state or

local authority by simply stating so

in express terms. Hillsborough, 471

U.S. at 713; Jones v. Rath Packing

Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). In

the absence of express language,

Congress’ preemptive intent may be

inferred only from a pervasive

scheme of federal regulation that

-36-

leaves no room for supplementary

state or local regulation. E.vg.,

Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713; Rice

v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.

218, 230 (1947). Federal legisla-

tion also preempts any state and

local laws that actually conflict

with or present an obstacle to the

federal law. Jones, 430 U.S. at

525-26.

A. FIFRA Does Not Explicitly

Preempt Municipal Regulation.

No language in the text of

FIFRA itself expressly excludes

local governments from regulating

the use of pesticides. See 7 U.S.C.

§§ 136-136y. Congress could easily

have accomplished local preemption

in FIFRA by adding five words --

“but not its political subdivisions”

-- to the text of 7 U.8.C.

<i

§ 136v(a). Despite numerous amend-

ments to FIFRA in the last thirty

years, however, Congress has never

done so.2’

Ignoring the requirement that

express preemption requires there to

be express language, the Wisconsin

Supreme Court incorrectly deduced

that because Congress did not

include the phrase “political

subdivision” in its statutory defi-

nition of “State,” Congress intended

to deprive political subdivisions of

3/For example, the Clean Air Act

expressly preempts state and political

subdivisions with respect to vehicle

emissions and fwel composition. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7543(a) ("No state or political

subdivision thereof shall adopt [any

emissions standards for new motor

vehicles)].") (emphasis added).

236-2

any authority over pesticides. See

Mortier v. Town of Casey. 154 Wis.

246 18, 29, 452 N.W.2d 555, 560

(1990). Congress, however, simply

Gefined the term “State” to mean “a

State.” See 7 U.S.C. § 136(aa). It

has done tr’s on numerous occasions

in other environmental statutes. 4”

Ironically, the oxymoronic

holding that FIFRA expressly, by

implication, preempts local regula-

tion ignores traditional principles

4/See the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1362(3); the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. § 7602(d); TOSCA, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2602(13); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27);

RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(31); the Emergency

Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42

U.S.C. § 11049(9); and the Safe Drinking

Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f(13).

-39-

of state sovereignty that make a

state free to delegate its powers to

its political subdivisions. Walle

Walla, 172 U.S. at 9; Central Maine

Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, 571

A.2d 1189, 1192 (Me. 1990). Given

the historical importance of 4

state's right to delegate its powers

in our federal system, preemption of

that right should not be accom-

plished by the guesswork of implica-

tion or by dependence upon muddled

legislative history.

Contrary to the ruling of the

Wisconsin Supreme Court, the legis-

lative history does not demonstrate

a “clear and aanifest purpose of

Congress” to preempt local regula-

tions. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.

It is inappropriate to discern

-40-

“clear and manifest” congressional

purpose from legislative history

alone, especially where the legisla-

tive history itself is inconclu-

S/

sive. The legislative history

2/"The question whether federal

law preempts state action, cannot be reduced

to general formulas, but there does appear

to be an overriding reluctance to infer

preemption in ambiguous cases.... [T)o give

the state-displacing weight of federal law

to mere congressional agmbiguity would evade

the very procedure for lawmaking on which

Garcia (v. San Antonio Metropolitan Iransit

Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)), relied to

protect states’ interests.” L. Tribe,

Qmericen Constitutional Law, 479-80 (24 ed.

1988) (emphasis in the original).

As the plain language of the statute

is clear, resort to legislative history

would not appear to be proper. National

Sgcicultural Chemicals Ass'n v. Rominger,

500 F. Supp. 465, 469 (E.D. Cal. 1980).

-4]-

of FIFRA *rrived at very different

conclusions. Compare COPARR. Ltd.

v. City of Boulder, 735 F. Supp.

363, 366 (D. Colo. 1989); People ex

rel. Deukmejian v. County of

Mendocino, 36 Cal. 30 476, 492; 683

P.2d 1150, 1160; 204 Cal. Rptr. 897,

907 (19864); Town of Lebanon, 571

A.2d at 1193 with Maryland Pest

Control Ass'n v. Montgomery County,

646 F. Supp. 109, 113 (D. Md. 1986),

aff'd without opinion, 822 F.2d 55

(4th Cir. 19867); Professional Lawn

Care Ass'n v. Village of Milford,

909 F.24 929 (6th Cir. 1990). Given

the views of some, but not all,

legislators in favor of preemption,

Congress adopted a compromise posi-

tion of neutrality that left the

states free to distribute authority

~42-

between themselves and their politi-

cal subdivisions if they choose. ©”

See County of Mendocino, 36 Cal. 34d

at 492, 663 P.2d at 1160, 204 Cal.

Rptr. at 907. In sum, the absence

of express preemption in FIFRA‘s

text, and the ambiguous nature of

the legislative history, combined

&/The legislative history behind

the subsequent 1988 FIFRA amendments reveals

that Congress recognized that localities

engage in regulation of pesticide use:

Concern about the inadequacy of

date that support current

pesticide regulations fuels much

of the controversy surrounding

pesticide use. Such concern, in

turn, reinforces the desire by

States end heir political

Subdivisions to assert greater

control over pesticide use....

(emphasis added)

H.R. Rep. No. 939, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.,

reprinted ip 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 3474, 3478.

-~43-

with the traditional presusption

against preemption warrants the

reversal of the Wisconsin Supreme

Court.

B. FIFRA Does Wot Create a

Pervasive Federal Regulatory

Scheme .

Congress did not create a fed-

eral scheme under FIFRA that is so

pervasive as to preclude supplement -

ation by other levels of government.

In fact, Congress explicitly invited

action by other governments in the

area of pesticide regulation. §ee 7

U.S.C. § 136v. That provision alone

eliminates the need for the Court to

consider whether a pervasive federal

scheme exists or whether Congress

intended to occupy fully the field

of pesticide regulation. The stetu-

tory text expressly proves that

Congress hed no such intention.

-~44-

c. The Town of Casey Ordinance

Does Not Conflict With FIFRA,

aR, It An Obstacle To

A conflict between state and

federal law exists only when the

State law “stands as an obstacle to

the accomplishment and execution of

the full purposes and objectives of

Congress,.*" Jones. 430 U.S. at 526

(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312

U.S. 351, 363 (1941)), or “when conm-

pliance with both federal and state

regulations is ~a physical impossi-

bility.* Fiorida Lime & Avocado

Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,

142-43 (1963). The Wis-onsin

Supreme Court did not rule on

whether the Town of Casey ordinance

conflicts with FIFRA, and the U.s.

government egrees with the

Petitioner that the Ordinance is not

-45-

preempted. See Brief for the United

States as Amicus Curiae on Petition

For a Writ of Certiorari at 4. The

Town of Casey ordinance simply fills

in @ gap in federal ard state

pesticide regulations.

FIFRA regulates the labeling

and packaging of pesticides, regis-

tration of products under categories

for general or restricted use and

certification of applicators of pes-

ticides. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y.

The Town of Casey ordinance, on the

other hand, consists of notice

requirements to inform neighbors and

passers-by and permit requirements

to protect the local community, its

inhabitants and the environment.

See Town of Casey ordinance.

Ordinance No. 865-1, § 14.3. It

-46-

governs the time, place and manner

of the actual pesticide application,

@ matter that directly affects the

local community. See id. See also

New York State Pesticide Coalition

Vv. JOrling, 874 F.2d 115, 120 (2d

Cir. 1989) (court held that FIFRA

did not preempt state notification

requirement because "Congress in-

tended to moderate the behavior of

people who sell and apply pesti-

cides,” but “New York provis: $s are

designed to warn the public....*).

Unlike other federal environ-

mental laws, FIFRA does not

establish a permit system for the

application of pesticides. Compare,

for example, the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642, and the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387,

47

which authorize federal emission and

discharge standards as well as the

implementation of federal permit

schemes. The Town of Casey ordi-

nance fills in the use-permit gap in

pesticide regulation.

FIFRA also lacks notice re-

quirements to protect passers-by and

abutters. Nor does it address set-

back distances for surface water and

groundwater supplies. Again, the

Town of Casey ordinance provides a

vehicle for filling these gaps.

Rather than obstruct the federal

packaging and labeling scheme, the

Ordinance assists in fulfilling the

overall federal goal of environmen-

tal protection.

-~48-

III. CONGRESS LEFT IT TO THE

STATES TO DETERMINE WHETHER

LOCALITIES MAY OR MAY NOT

REGULATE PESTICIDE USE.

FIFRA, except for setting a

federal floor below which sale or

use regulation may not dip, does not

tell the fifty states how to regu-

late pesticide use. FIFRA's dictate

is permissive: "A state may regu-

late the sale or use of any federal-

ly registered pesticide ...." 7

U.S.C. § 136v(a) (emphasis added).

Accepting this federalist invita-

tion, different states have pursued

different approaches.

A. The Six New England States Have

Taken a Varied Approach to Local

Pesticide Use Regulation.

Although a fifty-state survey

is beyond the scope of this brief,

the activities of the six New

-49-

England states are indicative of a

varied approach.

Maine provides that municipali-

ties may petition the Board of

Pesticides Control (the “BPC") for

the establishment of “critical

areas” and comment on mandatory

pesticide management plans. Me.

Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1471-M

(Supp. 1990). In addition, in

recognition of the existence and

need for local pesticide ordinances,

Maine law requires the BPC to

maintain a centralized listing of

municipal ordinances related to

pesticide storage, distribution or

use. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.

22, § 1471-U (Supp. 1990). The

Maine Supreme court has held that

neither the Pesticide Control Act,

-50-

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, §§ 601-

625 (1989), mor the Pesticide Board

Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §

1471-A, preempts local pesticide

ordinances. Town of Lebanon, 571

A.2G 1189 (Me. 1990).

New Hampshire has also enacted

@ number of pesticide laws. See

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 430:1-430:48

(1990). The New Hampshire Supreme

Court has ruled that the state

legislature fully occupied the field

by virtue of its pesticide ensect-

ments. Accordingly, New Hampshire

localities may not enect pesticide

ordinances. Town of SGSelishury v.

New England Power Co., 121 N.H. 983,

437 A.2da 281 (1981).

Vermont regulates the “sale.

use, storage, treatment and disposal)

-5]-

of pesticides and pesticide wastes”

through the Commissioner of

Agriculture, Food and Markets. Vt.

Stat. Ann. tit. 6 §§ 911-929, 981-

986, 1021-1025, 1082-1084, 1101-1111

(19868 & Supp. 1990). These statutes

do not expressly address local pes-

ticide use control, and the issue

has not been addressed by the

Vermont Supreme Court. Notably,

however, the Vermont Water Pollution

Control Law alludes to “federal,

state and jlocal laws and regula-

tions” (emphasis added) in the

context of herbicide and pesticide

use. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 §

1283(9)(2)(B) (Supp. 1990).

Rhode Island has enacted the

Pesticide Control Act of 1976, R.I.

Gen. Laws §§ 23-25-1 - 23-25-36.

-52—-

The act is administered by the

Director of Environmental

Management. The act does not speak

to local regulation, and the issue

apparently has not been litigated.

Connecticut expressly allows

some local regulation of pesticide

use. The Connecticut Pesticide

Control Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.

§§ 22a-46 - 22a-66z (West 1985 &

Supp. 1990), gives the Commissioner

of Environmental Protection "exclu-

Sive authority in the regulation of

pesticide spraying,” OOF

§ 22a-54(a), but also declares that

"[plermits for aircraft spraying in

congested areas shall be issued only

with the approval of the director of

health of the municipality in which

afihe

the operation is to be conducted.”

Id., § 22a-54(e)(4).

In the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, as of 1988, over 50

towns had passed regulations relat-

ing to pesticide control. See

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Department of Environmental Quality

Engineering, Pesticige Regulation in

Massachusetts: An Analysis of

Local, State, and Federal Controls

at 1 (February 1988) [hereinafter

"Pesticide Regulation in

Massachusetts"). Although signifi-

cant portions of local power have

been preempted by state legislation

and regulation, see Town of Wendell]

v. Attorney General, 394 Mass. 518,

476 N.E.2d 585 (1985), localities

may still require pesticide applica-

tors to appear before boards of

site

health to demonstrate that pesti-

cides will only be used in accord-

ance with the law. Jd.

Consequently, Massachusetts

communities have enacted zoning by-

laws, gener. 1] by-laws, board of

health regulations and advisory

resolutions that regulate pesticide-

related activities in specific

sensitive areas. Pesticide

Regulation in Massachusetts at 1, 2,

15. The Attorney General must first

approve the zoning by-laws and the

general by-laws,—’ but local board

of health regulations do not require

1/this approval process involves

all town zoning by-laws and general by-laws,

not just pesticide enactments. See Macs.

Gen. L. ch. 40, § 32 (1988); ch. GOA, § 5

(1988).

afie

such approval. Id. at 4-6; Mass.

Gen. L. ch. 1ll, § 31 (1988 & 1990

Supp.).

B. Local Regulation Can Play An

Important Role In Reducing

Pesticide Damage.

Local ordinances such as the

one promulgated by the Town of Casey

can play an important role in

preventing harm to the community.

The ordinance sets up a_— simple

permit and notification framework

that neither FIFRA nor the Wisconsin

State statutes governing pesticides

address. The ordinance applies only

to pesticide applications directly

affecting the public, either by

application to land owned or used by

the public or by aerially spraying,

which by its very method may drift

onto other lands or into private

iia

residences. See Preamble to Town of

Casey Ordinance 85-1 ("aerial

spraying of pesticides increases the

risk of injury or damage to persons,

property and the environment, due to

the increased likelihood of pesti

cide drift and pesticide overspray”).

A pesticide applicator must

Submit information that describes

the purpose of the pesticide

application, the date and time, a

description of the location, an

identification of the pesticide, the

existence of available pest-control

alternatives, the anticipated impact

of the application, and a descrip-

tion of the precautions the applica-

tor intends to take. Ordinance

85-1, 1.3(2). The ordinance also

Provides for a hearing if the Board

aS7e

initially rejects or restricts the

request. Id., § 1.3(4), (5). The

ordinance also provides for

notification of the impending

application by use of placards at

least 24 hours prior to the

application. JId., § 1.3(7).

Under the terms of the

Ordinance, the Town may deny or

impose conditions on a permit for

reasons “related to the protection

of the health, safety and welfare”

of the town residents. Id.,

§ 1.3(3). The Town may require that

@ pesticide application be confined

to an area that the public does not

use for recreation or that’ the

person utilize a method of ground

application of the pesticide rather

than aeriél spraying. Id.

-58-

Without a system in Place for

review of specific pesticide

applications for areas of public

concern, communities are at a

serious disadvantage in Protecting

themselves -- their residents,

animals, land and water -- from

exposure to potentially hazardous

substances. Although the use of

pesticides to control weeds and

minimize crop damage has led to

improvements in agricultural

Productivity, “it has also led to

increased risk of harm to humans and

the environment.” Ruckelshaus v.

Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990

(1984).

Communities that bear the

Girect risk of harm should be the

ones to assess “the likelihood of

«99-

individualized risks" and how such

risks could adversely affect their

lives and their environment. See

generally § id. at 1016 ("public

disclosure [of trade-secret data

Pursuant to FIFRA] can provide an

effective check on the decision-

making processes of EPA and allows

members of the public to determine

the likelihood of individualized

risks peculiar to their use of the

product”). Without state and local

participation, protection against

the risks of pesticide use will

remain incomplete.

-60-

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth

above, and for the reasons set forth

in Petitioners' brief, the

Conservation Law Foundation and the

Sierra Club urge the Court to

reverse the Wisconsin Supreme Court

by holding that FIFRA does. not

preempt the Town of Casey ordinance.

Respectfully Submitted,

E. Susan Garsh*

Robert E. McDonnell

Maris L. Abbene

Bingham, Dana & Gould

150 Federal St.

Boston, MA 02119

(617) 951-8000

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

*Counsel of Record

DATED: February 28, 1991

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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