Amicus Curiae Brief — Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier

FILED

FES 28 1991

OFFICE OF THE CLEME

7

a

No. 89-1905

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR, AND

TOWN OF CASEY,

Petitioners,

Vv.

RALPH MORTIER AND WISCONSIN FORESTRY/

RIGHTS-OF-WAY/TURF COALITION,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Wisconsin Supreme Court

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

WILLIAM |. THORNTON, JR. ROBERT J. ALFTON

City Attorney City Attorney

101 City Hall A-1700 Government Center

Durham, NC 27701 300 South Sixth Sureet

Minneapolis, MN 55487-0170

ANALESLIE MUNCY JOSEPH |. MULLIGAN

City Atiorney Corporation Counsel!

1500 Manila Law Depanmeni

Room 7DN 615Cuy Hall!

Dallas, TX 7520) | City Hall Square

Boston, MA 0220)

(Attorneys continued on inside cover)

FRANK B. GUMMEBY, III

City Attorney

P.O. Box 2451

Daytona Beach, FL 32115-2451

MARVA JONES BROOKS

City Attorney of Ochlocknee

Amal! Golden & Gregory

55 Park Place

Auanta, GA 30335

RICHARD A. CASTELLINI

City Solicitor

801 Plum Sweet

Room 214

City Hall

Cincinnati, OH 45202

FREDERICK S. DEAN

City Attorney

P.O. Box 27210

Tucson, AZ 85726-7210

JOSEPH N. de RAISMES

City Attorney

P.O. Box 791

1777 Broadway

Boulder, CO 80306

NEAL M. JANEY

City Solicitor

City Hall

Room 101

100 N. Holliday Sureet

Balumore, MD 21202

VICTOR J. KALETA

City Attorney

City Hall

Room 228

100 North Garfield Avenuc

Pasadena, CA 91109-7215

February 199)

WILLIAM J. KEARNS, JR.

Township Solicitor

215 Sunset Road

Willingboro, NJ 08046-1195

PATRICIA A. LYNCH

City Attorney

City Hall

P.O. Box 1900

Reno, NV 89505

ROBERT J. MANGLER

Corporation Counsel

1200 Wilmette Avenue

Wilmetie, IL 60091

NEAL E. McNEILL

City Attorney

200 Civic Center

Room 316

Tulsa, OK 74103

ROBERT J. WATSON

City Attorney

City Hall

8500 Sania F. Drive

Overland Park, KS 66212

BENJAMIN L. BROWN

Counse! of Record

CHARLES S. RHYNE

Of Counsel

RACHEL S. ULLMAN

1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Sune 902

Washington, D.C. 200%

(202) 466-5424

Attorneys for National Instutase

of Municipal Law Offers

as Amicus Curiae

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ee i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ....2.02.0.......0.0c0cccccccccceseseeseseeeeeee il

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE. ..0..0..0.......0.c00000000. l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. .00.00.00.......0cccccccsccecscseseeseeeeees 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..0000o2o.o o.oo coccccccccccceeeeeeeeeees 3

CS 4

FIFRA DOES NOT PREEMPT LOCAL

REGULATION OF PESTICIDES...........................4.. 4

CC 9

(n) (in)

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | Rice v. Sania Fe Elevator Corp..,

EE RPL ae OC A BE Res eo Durr 4

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.

Cases: I a s

Central Maine Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, Maine, United States v. Bass,

7 ||) | 7 | EE ce a ee ee NE EE EN, 4

COPARR, Lid. v. City of Boulder. Statutes:

73S F. Sugmp. 363 (DD. Colo. 1969)...........c0ccssssssossesesesescssssssensnsseseonenssessnsnsseaes 5

rlonide aaa Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),

orida Avoc rowers v. Paul, I s

(I y————————————————————————————————————————— 3,6

| | Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),

aa mae Packing Co. v. Coyne, - 7U.S.C. Section 136 ct seq., as AMONG .............ccccccececcccsceessesearseseeseseseecsenes passim

4) \

Ordinances:

Hillsborough County v. Aulomaied Medical Laboratories, Inc.,

471 U.S. 707 (1985) eeeeeneeeeeseseeceecesceesececesenenseecececsceceneseneceesenssenanscsesaesseenesesesseeee a Boulder, Colo., Rev. Code § 6-10-1(b) Cees ees, oe 5

J . Rath Packing Co.., he

430US si9(197) - 2 nnn 4 Jacksonville, Fla., Municipal Code § 364.105 (1970) ....c.cseesesenenennrnens 6

Marstand Pest Contvel hesectation v. Uemganary C Los Angles, Cal., Municipal Code § 41.34, $7,101.22 (1936) oooccoccccccccsceceoe 6

po a: spo = —— ———— SE ; Miami, Fla., Charter and Code art.1V, § 23-63 (1980) coccccccccssssosscssssssssees 6

Massachusetts v. Morash Minneapolis, Minn., City Charter and Code of Ordinances § 230.30

lel |, EP 3,8 , mroeneneeneseecesernereeneneeeeemecncene

39)?

etepesstnan tit namanes Co. 0. tamastunete. Portland, Or., Code § 21.24.050 (1984)...ccccccsssecessssceessnsesunseeeinsseesnnseeenseee 5

471 U.S. 724 (19B5).......cccccecceccesceeeseesenees etciacseaesiedabanemsenassite St. Louis, Mo., Rev. Ordinances § 623.040 (1974) 6

Mortier v. Town of Casey. ; ; ; :

154 Wis. 2d 18, 452 N.W.2d 555 (1990).....cccccccsssveessssueesessseseesnneeennnanensnnensssns 7 Town of Casey, Washburn County, Wis., Ordinance No. 85-1 (1985)..... 4

Passi os. tel. Gectmntiian 0. Comte f tanteaies Village of Oak Park, Ill., Code ch. 20, art. JOC981).......... ioc eaceeees eae 5

teenies 4,5,7 . é

3% Cal. 3d 476, 683 P.2d 1150, 204 Cal. Rpu. 897 _— Wilmeuc Village, Il., Code § 5-19 (1967) coocccccccccssssssceccsssesssssssssenmns ©

Professional Lawn Care Association v. Village of Muford, Miscell

909 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1990), petition for cert filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3180 seein

snensiamndaiintin 7

(U.S. Aug. 31, 1990) (No. 90-382) sees eee eee nee ences ceneeeereneeesseseneesseseeenenes Dunning, Pests. Poisons and the Living Law. lac Control of

Pesucides in California’ s Imperial \ alley, 2 Feology LQ 638. 972)....... +

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

No. 89-1905

WISCONSIN PUBLIC INTERVENOR, AND

TOWN OF CASEY,

Petitioners,

Vv.

RALPH MORTIER AND WISCONSIN FORESTRY/

RIGHTS-OF-WAY/TURF COALITION,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Wisconsin Supreme Court

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

This brief amicus curiae is filed pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules

of this Court on behalf of the more than 1700 local governments

that are members of the National Institute of Municipal Law

Officers (NIMLO). :

2

NIMLO is a national organization comprised of municipalities

and local government units, which are political subdivisions of

states. NIMLO is operated by the chief legal officers of its

members, variously called city attorney, county attorney, city or

county solicitor, corporation counsel, director of law, and other

titles. NIMLO has a compelling interest in issues that affect local

governments.

The accompanying brief is signed by the municipal attorneys

constituting the governing body of NIMLO, both on behalf of

NIMLO and for the political subdivision of the state, territory, or

commonwealth of which they are the authorized law officers.

The local government attorneys who operate NIMLO are re-

sponsible for advising local governments on the best methods of

promoting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens through

the regulation of matters which are of genuine local and municipal

concern. These attorneys also represent their governments in

litigation resulting from the enforcement of such regulations.

In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the

Town of Casey’s pesticide ordinance was preempted by the

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).

NIMLO believes that the Wisconsin Supreme Court erred in its

application of the federal test for preemption. This error will

severely curtail the ability of local governments to use their police

powers to foster and protect the health, safety and welfare of their

residents. NIMLO, therefore, urges the reversal of the Wisconsin

Supreme Court’s decision.

Consent to the filing of this brief has been granted by both

parties and copies of these letters have been lodged with the

Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Amicus adopts the statement of the case and the facts as pre-

— by Petitioners, Wisconsin Public Intervenor and Town of

asey.

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act

(FIFRA) is the primary federal law regulating pesticides. The

Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the present case, held that FIFRA

preempts the Town of Casey's pesticide ordinance. Amicus urges

this Court to reverse the Wisconsin Supreme Coun and find that

FIFRA does not totally preempt local government regulation of

pesticides.

Amicus asserts that the Wisconsin Supreme Court erred in its

application of the federal preemption test. Congressional intent to

preempt areas of traditional state regulation may not be presumed.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,

740 (1985). Local governments have a strong interest in protect-

ing their residents from the potentially hazardous effects of pesti-

cides. They are in the best position to guard against problems

associated with pesticide use in their locality.

A congressional intent to preempt should not be inferred

unless ‘‘the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other

conclusion, or [unless]... Congress has unmistakably so ordained.”

Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).

FIFRA, by its own terms, does not require that the sale and use of

pesticides be regulated exclusively by the federal government.

Moreover, based on FIFRA’s ambiguous legislative history, it

cannot be said that ‘“Congress has unmistakably...ordained’’ the

preemption of local government regulation.

Preemption should not be implied where it would both *‘sig-

nificantly interfere with ‘the separate spheres of governmental au-

thority’’’ and have far-reaching consequences not intended by

Congress. Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 1675 (1989)

(quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19

(1987)). A finding that FIFRA was intended to totally preempt

local government regulation of pesticides would significantly

interfere with state sovereignty by preventing states from delegat-

ing their power to act in a matter concerning health, safety and

welfare. The consequences of such a finding would be to elimi-

nate local ordinances which presently serve to safeguard the

ultimate consumers of pesticides. Amicus asserts that these

consequences were neither intended nor envisioned by Con-

gress.

4

ARGUMENT

FIFRA DOES NOT PREEMPT LOCAL REGULATION OF

PESTICIDES.

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act

(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. Section 136 et. seq., is the primary federal

pesticide statute. FIFRA regulates pesticide registration, labeling,

storage, disposal and transportation.

The Wisconsin S$ Court determined, in the present

case, that the Town eiGumy custehioentinaan was preempted

by FIFRA. The ordinance required any person seeking to apply

pesticides in the Town toobta'n a permit and post notices warning

that an area had been treated with pesticides. Town of Casey,

Washourn County, Wis., Ordinance No. 85-1 (1985). Amicus

asserts that the court erred in its application of the federal preemp-

tion test.

Congressional intent to preempt requires a * ‘clear and manifest

purpose of Congress.”’ Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., wo eae

218, 231 (1947). The same analysis is used for the

local laws as is used for the preemption of state laws. > cme

———. 4 Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,

13 (1985).

Federal preemption analysis starts with the presumption *‘that

Congress did not intent to pre-empt areas of traditional state

regulation.”’ Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,

471 U.S.724,740(1985). This presumption ° ‘provides assurance

that “the federal-state balance,’ {citation omitted} will not be

disturbed unintentionally by Con or unnecessarily by the

courts.”’ Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)

(quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).

The regulation of pesticides has traditionally been an area of local

concem.' Spraying crops and grass can have the unfortunate side

‘See, c.g.. People ex. rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, % Cal. 34

476, 683 P.2d 1150, 1152, 204 Cal. Rpw. 897 (1984) (cuimg Dunning, Pesis.

Poisons and the Living Law. The Control of Pestwides in Califorma’s Impe-

rial Valley 2 Ecology L.Q. 633, 643-44, 668 (1972).) (“Pesticide usage was not

regulated by the siate bul was rcgulaicd solcly by the countics until after

World War I."")

5

effect of contaminating food, lakes, streams and recreation areas.

Local governments clearly have a strong interest .a protecting

their residents from the potentially hesmfelcflesmefpentisidouss

and are in the best position to know the particular problems

associated with pesticide use in their locality. A locality's -

phy, previous exposure to chemicals, groundwater hydrology and

climate may determine whether a certain chemical is dangerous.’

Because of these local concerns, many municipalities have en-

acted ordinances to protect the health, safety and welfare of their

residents.

*Boulder, Colo., Rev. Code § 6-10-1(b) (1981) (“The City Council finds that

the umiguc wind conditions im the city cause drift to occur during airborne

applications of pesticides and that absent pre-application notification, airborne

applications of pesticides constitute a nuisance.""); Sce also County of Men-

docino, 683 P.2d at 1152, quoting from a Mendocino County, California

ordinance, ‘We find and declare that it is necessary to prohibit aerial applica-

uon of phenoxy herbicides because of the dangers of drift, contamination of

food and water and irrevocable harm to natural resources. The aerial

application of phenoxy herbicides, in light of said dangers, threatens the right

of the people of Mendocino County to be secure in their homes and enjoy the

peaceful, undisiurbed use of privaic property and public lands.”

*See, ¢.g., Village of Oak Park, Ill. Code ch. 20, an. 10 (1981). The Village

requires pesticide applicators to provide persons, who may be affected by

pesticides, with information concerning pesticides to be applied and safety

precautions which may prudently be taken before, during and after a pesti-

cide application. Applicators musi also provide the name and descripuon of

the pesucides to be applied, the known risks, and appropriaic safety precau-

uions for cach pesticide application. The Village determined that this will

increase public knowledge concerning the safe use of pesticides, and facili-

tate an informed choice concerning pesticide applications. Prior notice of a

pending indoor pesticide application is also required. The Village deter-

mined that this will serve to alert those persons who have the potential to be

exposed to pesticides for an cxiended period of ume as well as serve to alert

those residents who have acute allergic, toxic or otherwise harmful responses

to exposure to certain pesticides. See also, Minneapolis, Minn., City Charter

and Code of Ordinances § 230.30 (1976) (requiring warning Mags, with the

name of the person or company applying the pesticide, the date of application

and a warning to children and pets, posied in areas of pesticide application:

flags to remain in place for forty-cight hours after pesticide application):

Portland, Or., Code § 21.24.050 (1984) (requiring specific

6

In areas that have traditionally been of local concern, such as

pesticide use, federal preemption should not be found ‘‘in the

absence of persuasive reasons--either that the nature of the

regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the

Congress has so ordained.’ Florida Avocado Grow-

ers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).

FIFRA specifically indicates that the sale and use of pesticides

is not subject to exclusive federal regulation. FIFRA expressly

authorizes states to enact laws pertaining to the *‘sale or use of any

federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and

to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use

——e {FIFRA}.”’ 7 U.S.C. § 136 v(a). The only areas that

been specifically preempted by FIFRA are the labeling and

packaging of pesticides. 7 U.S.C. § 136 v(b).

FIFRA, by its own terms, leaves no question ‘‘that the nature of

the regulated subject matter’’ does not require exclusive federal

control. The remaining question, therefore, is whether ‘“Congress

has unmistakably...ordained’’ that local regulation should be

preempted. The law is clear that ‘‘we are not to conclude that

Congress legislated the ouster of {local regulations) .. . in the

absence of an unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect.

Florida Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 146-47.

authorization from Portland Burcau of Water Works prior to connecting to

the public water supply for the purpose of introducing chemicals for use .s

pesticides); Miami, Fla., Charter and Code art.IV, § 23-63 (1980) (prohibiting

the possession of * ‘restricted pesticides’’ set forth in the secuon), Jacksonville,

Fla., Municipal Code § 364.105 (1970) (prohibiting the sale or use of imsecti-

cides with sodium fluoride, live-micro-organisms, sodium fluoracetaie (com-

pound 1080), thallium sulphate or thallium salt unless certain conditions arc

met); St. Louis, Mo., Rev. Ordinances § 623.040 (1974) (prohibiting the sale,

possession or use of a pesticide containing dichlorodipheny! uichloroethane

(DDT)); Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 41.34, $7.101.22 (1936) (requir-

ing thal prior notice be given to the tenants of multi-family dwellings of the pest

to be controlled, the pesticides to be used and their active ingredients; and

regulating the storage, mixing or wansporung of pesticides al any airport), and

Wilmette Village, Ill., Code § 5-19 (1967) (requiring a municipal license prior to

spraying of pesticides, prohibiting the usc of persistent compounds of chlonn-

ated hydrocarbons, prohibiung pesticide application when true wind velocity

exceeds the ten miles per hour, and requiring warning poster signs 300 feet

from the place of application.)

>

It is not disputed that FIFRA, while specifically permitting state

regulation of the sale and use of pesticides, neither expressly

permits nor prohibits local government regulation. The Wisconsin

Supreme Court found, however, that congressional intent to

preempt local government regulation of pesticides was implied

because FIFRA’s definition of ** state’ made noreference to local

government. Mortier v. Town of Casey, 154 Wis. 2d 18, 24, 452

N.W. 2d 555, 557 (1990). While the court conceded that this

omission, by itself, was ambiguous as to congressional intent, it

determined that reference to FIFRA’s legislative history made it

‘abundantly clear’’ that Congress intended todeprive states of the

authority to delegate their power to regulate the sale and use of

pesticides. Mortier, 154 Wis. 2d at 24-25,452 N.W. 2d at $57-5S8.

This analysis is flawed. Lower courts are in conflict as to

whether FIFRA’s legislative history indicates a clear congres-

sional intent to preempt local government regulations. The state

supreme courts in Maine and California have reached the conclu-

sion that FIFRA’s legislative history does not preempt states from

authorizing local governments to regulate pesticides.* The United

State District Court for the District of Colorado also held that

FIFk. .’s legislative history neither authorizes nor prohibits local

regulation.*

Two federal! courts have found that this same history preempts

local governments from regulating pesticide use.

FIFRA’s history has been successfully used to both infer con-

gressional intent to preempt as well as to infer congressional intent

to leave to the states whether to delegate their power to regulate

pesticides. Amicus asserts that this history can hardly be consid-

ered *‘an unambiguous congressional mandate’ to preempt local

regulations. Local governments should not, therefore, be de-

prived of their power to protect their residents’ health, safety and

welfare.

“Central Maine Power Co. v. town of Lebanon. Maine, 87) A.2d 1189 (Me.

1990) and People ex. rel. Deukmejian +. Mende ine County, % Cal. Xd 476,

683 Pld 1150 (Cal. 1984).

*COPARR, Lid v. the Cuy of Boulder, 745 F Supp. 463 (D. Colo, 1989).

* Professional Lawn Care Ass'n Village of Milford. 99 F.2d 929 (Oth Cir.

1990), peuuon for vert filed, 99 SAW. 8000S. Aug. 31, 1990) (No. 90-382)

and Maryland Pest Control \\\ ns Montgomery County 646 F Supp. 109 (D

Md. 1986), aff d withous opinion. S22 F 2d SS (4th Cor, 1987).

Further supporting the conclusion that Congress did not intend

to totally preempt local government regulation of pesticides are

the effects that preemption would have on the sovereignty of state

government and the consequences for the ultimate consumer of

pesticides. In Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S.Ct. 1668 (1989),

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 833, as amended, 29

U.S.C. Section 1002(1), preempted state lation of routine

vacation benefits. The Court determined that the primary concern

Se = eee eS See Sp Cinema of

employee benefit funds. Morash, 109 S.Ct. at 1671. In finding

against preemption, the Court said that state regulation of routine

vacation benefits was not a concern of in enacting

ERISA and that a finding of preemption would place

in a position of receiving less protection than under state regula-

tions. /d. at 1675. According to the Court, ‘Absent any indication

that Congress intended such far-reaching consequences, we are

reluctant to so significantly interfere with ‘the separate spheres of

ne ans 7 a

deere Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19

Amicus asserts that a finding of implied preemption will signifi-

cantly interfere with state sovereignty and have far-reaching

consequences not intended or envisioned by Congress. Congress

enacted, and y revised FIFRA to protect and

their environment unsafe pesticides. See R v.

Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991-92 (1984). FIFRA, by its own

terms, was setting minimum regulations as to the sale and use

of pesticides. have historically had the authority todelegate

matters of health, safety or welfare to local governments. In

response to this state delegation of power, local governments have

enacted ordinances to protect their residents against the inherent

notice of pesticide applications, posting warning notices of pesti-

cide use, authorization from municipal water works departments

Prior to introducing pesticides into the water supply, and have

prohibited the possession or use of certain pesticides.’ A finding

"See, ¢.g., ordinance listed in foomote 3.

9

of implied preemption would have the effect of eliminating these

local ordinances thereby preventing municipal residents from

taking precautions to minimize or eliminate the dangers resulting

from local pesticide use. In light of the congressional concerns

which led to the enactment of FIFRA, Congress cannot be said to

have intended these far-reaching consequences.

FIFRA’s ambiguous history coupled with the strong presump-

implied preemption inexorably leads to the conclusion

that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that FIFRA

totally preempts local government regulation of pesticides.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons it is urged that this Court reverse

the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM |. THORNTON, JR. FRANK B. GUMMEY, Ill

City Auorney City Attorney

101 City Hall P.O. Box 245!

Durham, NC 27701 Daytona Beach, FL 32115-2451

ANALESLIE MUNCY MARVA JONES BROOKS

City Attorney City Auorney of Ochlocknee

1500 Manila Arnal! Golden & Gregory

Room 7DN 55 Park Place

Dallas, TX 75201 Adama, GA ¥335

ROBERT J. ALFTON RICHARD A. CASTELLINI

City Auorncy Cry Solcnor

A-1700 Government Cenicr 801 Plum Sureet

300 South Sixth Sucet Room 214

Minneapolis, MN 554874)! 70 City Hall

JOSEPH |. MULLIGAN

Corporation Counsc!

Cimernnan, OH 45202

FREDERICK S. DEAN

Law Depanmeni City Attorney

615City Hall P.O. Box 27210

1 Cuy Hal! Square Tucson, AZ 85726-7210

Boston, MA 0220!

JOSEPH N. de RAISMES

City Auorney

P.O. Box 791

1777 Broadway

Boulder, CO 80306

NEAL M. JANEY

City Solicitor

City Hall

Room 10!

100 N. Holliday Street

Balumore, MD 21 202

VICTOR J. KALETA

City Attorney

City Hall

Room 228

100 North Garfield Avenue

Pasadena, CA 91109-7215

WILLIAM J. KEARNS, JR.

Township Solicitor

215 Sunset Road

Willingboro, NJ 08046-1195

PATRICIA A. LYNCH

City Attorney

City Hall

P.O. Box 1900

Reno, NV 89505

ROBERT J. MANGLER

February 1991

NEAL E. McNEILL

City Attorney

200 Civic Center

Room 316

Tulsa, OK 74103

ROBERT J. WATSON

Cnty Attorney

City Hall!

8500 Santa Fe Drive

Overiand Park, KS 66212

BENJAMIN L. BROWN

Counse! of Record

CHARLES S. RHYNE

Of Counsel

RACHEL S. ULLMAN

1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Sune 902

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 466-5424

Attorneys for National Insuuse

of Muracipal Law Officers

as Amucus Curiae