Motion — Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union

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Text

| Supreme Cour.

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(5) 1 8

F. SPANIOL, JR,

No. 89-1416 ae

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA,

* Petitioner,

AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

MOTION OF RESPONDENTS

AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, AND

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS,

AFL-CIO, TO DISMISS THE WRIT FOR

LACK OF JURISDICTION, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

KEITH E. SECULAR ANTON G. HAJJAR

Counsel of Record Counsel of Record

Sopuia E. Davis DIANA ORANTES CERESI

COHEN, WEISS & SIMON Of Counsel

330 West 42nd Street O’DONNELL, SCHWARTZ &

New York, NY 10036 ANDERSON

(212) 563-4100 Suite 200

Attorneys for Respondent 1300 L Street, N.W.

National Association of Washington, D.C. 20005

Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (202) 898-1707

Attorneys for Respondent

American Postal Workers

Union, AFL-CIO

WILSon - Eras Printing Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WasnincTron. D.C. 20001

® ie *

34

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............. ii

ESE . . EE 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............. 3

EEE he ee ae 10

ET .. . 17

APPENDIX:

Order of district court permitting petitioner’s inter-

i ̃è ͤũ k P:: 1a

Petitioner's motion to intervene and memorandum of

points and authorities in support 3a

Letter of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Charles

F. Rule, to Assistant General Counsel Charles D.

Hawley, U.S. Postal Service, May 2, 1986, with at-

r é 11a

Letter of Attorney General Edwin Meese III to

Postmaster General Albert V. Casey, February 26,

1986; and letter of Assistant Attorney General

John R. Bolton to Senator Alfonse D'Amato,

/ TEA TIE SNES 6! Si WE oa 14a

i i i ll | e

ii iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

CASES Page Page

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 787 (1984) 11 EE SE 4,5, 14

American Postal Workers Union, Detroit Local 44 Fed. Reg. 61,181 (19799) - mn 3

v. Independent Postal Systems of America, Inc., 50 Fed. Reg. 41,462 (1985) ))́ eee 3, 8, 9

481 F.2d 90 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 414 US. 51 Fed. Reg. 9652 (1986) 4

1110 (1973), cert. dismissed, 415 U.S. 901 51 Fed. Reg. 21,931 (1986) 5

(1974) CAPR: 15 51 Fed. Reg. 29,636 (19860) 4

American Postal Workers Union v. React Postal 51 Fed. Reg. 29,637 (1986) .............-..-----------------------+- 4,9

Services, Inc., 771 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1985) 15 RULES

Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S.

0 OR 14, 12, 16 Rule 12, Rules of the Supreme Court 8 10

Communist Party of the United States v. Subver- Rule 14.1, Rules of the Supreme Court 15

sive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 Rule 21, Rules of the Supreme Court 1

66 i meester 11 rr 2, 5

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (198) passim

Gladstone, Realtors v. mm

U.S. 91 (1979) 5 2

Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) 11

International Union, UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274

8 .. cise naan 14

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (19833 11

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, —— U.S.

——, 58 USLW 5077 (June 27, 19900)0⸗: 11

Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1989 11

Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 US.

GPP AAA e 11, 15

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (197277 10

U.S. Postal Service v. Brennan, 574 F.2d 712 (2d

„ 8

Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454

or . er 12, 14

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) 11

Whitmore v. Arkansas, — U.S. ——, 110 S. Ct.

1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 185 (199))))0ʒ-;) 11

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

pf FR EL 2

. /! 8

4 ᷣͤ wicrcecinctsecnecensstsctinninmesntnniniemieaniaianataas an 2, 10, 13

. —— 6. 7

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1990

No. 89-1416

AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA,

1 Petitioner,

AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

MOTION OF RESPONDENTS

AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, AND

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS,

AFL-CIO, TO DISMISS THE WRIT FOR

LACK OF JURISDICTION, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION

Respondents American Postal Workers Union, AFL-

CIO (“APWU”) and National Association of Letter Car-

riers, AFL-CIO (“NALC”),’ pursuant to Rule 21 of the

Court, respectfully request the Court to dismiss the writ

of certiorari for lack of jurisdiction, in particular, be-

cause petitioner Air Courier Conference of America

(“ACCA”) lacks standing to petition for the writ.

In Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), the Court

specifically held that where, as here, a defendant de-

1 These respondents are sometimes collectively referred to as “the

Unions” or “Union respondents.”

2

clines to seek review in this Court of an adverse decision

of the court of appeals, a party which had intervened on

the side of the defendant must independently establish

his standing in this Court. ACCA, a trade association

the members of which engage in the practice of inter-

national remailing, was permitted to intervene by the

district court under Rule 24(b), F.R. Civ. P., in support

of the defendant U.S. Postal Service’s final rule suspend-

ing the Private Express Statutes (PES“) for inter-

national remailing. However, as Diamond makes clear,

because the Postal Service has not petitioned for a writ

of certiorari, there is no longer a case or controversy

over the validity of the final rule. Furthermore, ACCA

has never demonstrated that its members “ ‘personally

[have] suffered some actual or threatened injury’” as

required by Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62 (quoting Gladstone,

Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) ).

Rather, ACCA has consistently taken the position that

its members’ activities did not violate the PES under pre-

existing regulations. Moreover, the Department of Jus-

tice—which has the exclusive authority to prosecute vio-

lations of the PES—has assured ACCA members that

they will not be prosecuted or be the subject of other

court actions under existing regulations.* Accordingly,

the Court is without jurisdiction in this case.

2The PES are found at 39 U.S.C. 601-606 and 18 U.S.C. 1693-

1699, 1729. These statutory provisions collectively give the Postal

Service the exclusive right to carry letters over postal routes, unless

such carriage is permitted by a statutory exception, or unless the

operation of the PES is suspended by the Postal Service pursuant

to 39 U.S.C. 601(b).

8 As ACCA stated in its petition: “Before the Postal Service

proposed its 1985 anti-remail rule, it had sought Justice Department

action against remailers. The Justice Department declined to prose-

cute.” Pet. at 9.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A statement of the case appears in the petition, as

well as the joint opposition of the Union respondents and

that of the Acting Solicitor General on behalf of the U.S.

Postal Service. It will not be repeated here except insofar

as it is necessary to explain this motion.

The issues presented to this Court by the petitioner

involve both the validity of the final rule suspending the

PES for so-called “international remailers“ and the ques-

tion whether respondent Unions’ claims fell within the

relevant “zone of interest,” thus permitting them to seek

judicial review of the final rule. The court of appeals

accurately summarized the case as follows (Pet. App.

2a-4a) :

In 1979, the Postal Service exercised its authority

under § 601(b) to suspend the PES for the carriage

of extremely urgent letters, otherwise known as ex-

press mail or overnight service. See 44 Fed. Reg.

61, 181 (Oct. 24, 1979). As a result, private mail

services began to rely on the urgent letter suspen-

sion to support the practice of “international remail-

ing,” or carriage of letters overseas for deposit into

foreign postal systems—thus allowing users of the

service to bypass completely the U.S. Postal Service.

In October of 1985, the USPS announced its inten-

tion to amend the urgent letter suspension to limit

sharply its applicability to international remailing.

See 50 Fed. Reg. 41,462 (October 10, 1985). This

proposal was greeted with massive opposition from

the business community and the disapproval of sev-

eral members of Congress and senior executives in

the Reagan Administration. Opponents argued pri-

marily that preventing private remailers from offer-

ing inexpensive, speedy service would jeopardize the

ability of American companies to compete for busi-

ness abroad.

In March of 1986, the Chairman of the Postal

Service’s Board of Governors, John McKean, an-

4

nounced the USPS’s intention to initiate another

rulemaking proceeding to remove the cloud that now

hangs over the international remail services and pre-

serve the benefits of desirable competition between

the Postal Service and private companies.” The

USPS withdrew its earlier proposal and began con-

sidering whether to suspend the PES to allow inter-

national remailing. See 51 Fed. Reg. 9652 (March

21, 1986). Two rulemaking notices to this effect and

a public meeting produced little additional factual

information.

On August 20, 1986, the USPS published a final

rule suspending the PES to permit unrestricted in-

ternational remailing. See 51 Fed. Reg. 29,636. The

regulation allows private carriers to deliver mail

from the United States directly to foreign postal sys-

tems, bypassing the USPS, without meeting certain

cost conditions that applied under the urgent letter

suspension. See 39 CFR § 320.8 (1988). Responding

to the Unions’ complaint that the record was inade-

quate to support a “public interest” finding, the

USPS stated:

The Postal Service . . . sought. to obtain

precise and detailed information regarding the

level of services provided by remailers, and the

benefits which [their] customers . . . derive. It

may well be, however, that because of the di-

verse character of the remail industry and the

relatively recent development of remailing, the

comprehensive information we had hoped to re-

ceive to supplement the essentially anecdotal in-

formation, which was furnished to us, is not

available. Nonetheless, the Postal Service has

compiled a record which appears to demonstrate

the existence of a public benefit and to support

the suspension.

51 Fed. Reg. 29,637 (Aug. 20, 1986). Indeed, in its

final notice of proposed rulemaking the USPS had

emphasized the sketchy nature of the factual record,

referring to the “anecdotal character” of tables

5

charting relative delivery times, the “imprecision of

the data” on the need of U.S. business for private

international remailing, and the presence of “little

or no reliable information as to the amount of reve-

nues diverted to date by the activities of remailers.”

51 Fed. Reg. 21,931 (June 17, 1986).

The Unions filed suit in the district court, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief against enforce-

ment of the international remailing regulation.

Petitioner ACCA was permitted to intervene in the dis-

trict on the side of defendant U.S. Postal Service pur-

suant to Rule 24(b), F.R. Civ. P. (permissive interven-

tion). Appendix (“App.”) la. ACCA’s interest was

based on those of its members which engage in interna-

tional remailing, some of which formed “an ad hoc group

of certain interested ACCA members which drew finan-

cial support from ACCA.” This group was known as the

International Remail Committee in the rulemaking pro-

ceedings. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Air Courier Conference of America’s Motion

to Intervene, at 2; App. at 3a. ACCA alleged that its

members would suffer “irreparable injury” if the rule

were vacated. Id. at 1-2; App. 3a-4a. It contended that

“trjevocation of 39 C.F.R. § 320.8 [the international

remail suspension] would present ACCA’s members who

engage [in] international remail of letters with the

Hobson’s choice of foregoing $50 million in sales or face

possible civil suits and criminal prosecution under the

Private Express Statutes... .” Id. at 7; App. 7a. It

argued that intervention was warranted because the Pos-

tal Service would not adequately defend the rule. Id. at

10; App. 9a.

ACCA did not participate in any part of the proceed-

ings in the court of appeals. It filed a notice of appear-

ance in that court on February 6, 1990, almost two

6

months after the court entered its judgment. U. Resp.

Opp. at 1-2, n.1.*

The administrative record discloses that international

remailers have contended that they may lawfully operate

under the 1979 “extremely urgent letter” suspension of

the PES. 39 CFR 320.6. That rule contains two tests

for coverage: a “loss of value” test and a “cost” test.

Under the loss of value test, the letter must be delivered

within a short, specified period of time after dispatch

and the value or usefulness of the letter must be greatly

diminished if not delivered within that period. The cost

test is satisfied if the amount paid for private carriage is

at least $3.00 or twice the applicable U.S. postage for

First Class mail, whichever is the greater. The Interna-

tional Remail Committee stated in its comments to the

USPS’s initial proposal to amend the urgent letter rule

that their businesses already met the “cost” and “loss of

value” tests (Ad. Rec. at 32, p. 46):

International remail companies do charge more than

twice what the Postal Service would charge for

transporting shipments containing multiple enve-

lopes. Much of the items carried are, indeed, demon-

strably urgent. As irdicated, the Department of Jus-

tice apparently agrees.

The December 12, 1985, comments filed by the Depart-

ment of Justice during the rulemaking fairly summarize

the arguable “loophole” in these regulations which was

grasped by international remailers to enter this aspect

of the courier business (Ad. Rec. at 28, pp. 5, 9-10 (foot-

notes omitted) ) :

American firms use remailers to send bulk mail-

ings to foreign addresses. These bulk mailings typ-

ically involve such items as bank statements, periodi-

cals, catalogues, and advertisements, but rarely in-

* Because it was a party in the district court, the Solicitor Gen-

eral believes that ACCA “appears to be a proper petitioner.” Fed.

Resp. Opp. at 6, n.1.

7

dividual correspondence. Generally, the remailer

ships the mail to the foreign postal administration

that offers the best combination of speed and price

for delivery to the addressee. The postal administra-

tion in which the remailer deposits the mail is not

necessarily that of the ultimate recipient.

Under the “cost” test, Postal Service regulations

allow carriers to make the comparison with Postal

Service rates based on an entire shipment of letters

if all the letters are “delivered” to the same destina-

tion:

If a single shipment consists of a number of

letters that are picked up together and delivered

together to a single destination, the applicable

U.S. postage may be computed for purposes of

this paragraph as though the shipment consti-

tuted a single letter of the weight of the ship-

ment. (Emphasis added)

39 C.F.R. § 320.6(c). The definition of “delivered”

is the crux of the ambiguity that has permitted re-

mailers to flourish by using airmail shipments as

“urgent” deliveries of arguable “non-urgent” indi-

vidual letter items.

For purposes of the suspension of the Private Ex-

press Statutes for extremely urgent international

mail, the regulations consider letters to be ‘deliv-

ered’ when they are in the custody of the interna-

tional or overseas carrier at its last scheduled point

of departure from the 48 contiguous states.” 39

C.F.R. § 320.6(b) (2). The remailers contend that

under the current regulations, even though mail is

ultimately destined for a number of different foreign

addresses, it is deemed “delivered” when the bundle

of consolidated letters arrives at the overseas carrier.

Under that reading of the regulations, shipments so

delivered meet the cost test if the carrier charges

twice the domestic First Class rate based on the ag-

gregate weight of each shipment. By treating the

consolidated package as a single letter whose postage

is determined by the weight of the entire package,

8

remailers can satisfy the cost test and charge a lower

rate than if the postage payable were calculated sep-

arately for each piece of mail in the package ad-

dressed to a different addressee. The Postal Service

argues that this practice of the remailers is incon-

sistent with both the intent and terms of the suspen-

sion for extremely urgent mail and proposes revis-

ing the regulations to make it clear that the carriers’

current practices are prohibited by the Private Ex-

press Statutes. Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. at 41,462.

Under the Postal Reorganization Act (“PRA”), the

Postal Service may not initiate either civil or criminal

court actions.“ Rather, under 39 U.S.C. 409(d), It] he

Department of Justice . . furnish[es] . .. such legal

representation as [the Postal Service] may require.

The Department of Justice rejected the Postal Service’s

requests to sue the remailers under the PES, refusing

to accept the Postal Service’s view that they failed to

qualify for the “extremely urgent letter” suspension. Pet.

at 9. Furthermore, the Department has repeatedly stated

during the rulemaking proceedings, prior to adoption of

the rule suspending the PES for international remailing,

that “it will not prosecute remailers or their customers

on the basis of current Postal Service regulations.” Let-

ter dated May 2, 1986, to Charles D. Hawley, Assistant

General Counsel, U.S. Postal Service, from Deputy As-

sistant Attorney General Charles F. Rule, Ad. Rec. at

106, p. 2; App. 12a. That letter attached a February

26, 1986, letter from the Attorney General to the Post-

master General stating that remailers constituted “law-

ful private sector competition to the Postal Service,” and

a letter dated April 2, 1986, from an Assistant Attorney

General to a United States Senator stating that “the De-

partment of Justice will not seek to prosecute interna-

5 Although the basic PES prohibitions are found in the criminal

code, the Justice Department sometimes seeks civil injunctions

against those who violate them. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Service v.

Brennan, 574 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115

(1979).

9

tional remailers or their customers on the basis of the

current regulations.” Id.; App. 16a.

In its proposed 1985 regulation, later withdrawn, the

Postal Service attempted to overcome the Department of

Justice’s objections to prosecuting remailers by closing

the perceived loopholes in the existing regu!tions. 50

Fed. Reg. 41,462 (October 10, 1985). The proposed reg-

ulations would have narrowly restricted international re-

mailing by (1) making it clear that letters which travel

over post routes, even though destined for foreign coun-

tries, fell within the monopoly; (2) eliminating the “loss

of value” test altogether for international mail, and (3)

permitting aggregation for the purposes of meeting the

“cost test” only for letters destined for the same ultimate

foreign recipient. See comments of Department of Jus-

tice, supra, at 11-12. It was presumed that, once the

proposed regulation were adopted, the Postal Service

would again “ask the Department of Justice for author-

ity to enjoin remailers from violating the Private Ex-

press Statutes.” Id. at 2.

Ultimately, the Postal Service reversed itself and pro-

posed to suspend the PES for virtually all international

remailing.“ Although the Department of Justice in the

end supported the proposed suspension (Ad. Rec. at 114),

it made it clear in the second phase of rulemaking that

“(t]he Department s{[aw] no need for a new rule” be-

cause the practice of international remailing, as described

above, was legal under current regulations. Letter of

Charles F. Rule, supra, p. 2, Ad. Rec. at 106; App. 12a.

Under this suspension, international remailers would be free to

operate whether or not they fit within the existing “extremely

urgent letter“ suspension, as interpreted by the Department of

Justice. The only prohibition surviving in the final rule was of

remailing of letters abroad which were destined for ultimate de-

livery in the United States. 51 Fed. Reg. at 29,637-638.

10

ARGUMENT

1. Where, as here, a party intervenes on the side of a

government defendant, and the latter declines to seek re-

view in this Court, the intervenor who petitions this

Court to review the decision below must establish his own

standing. Diamond v. Charles, supra, 476 U.S. at 63.

Even though the petitioner, as a party in the district

court, may fall within the class of persons who may seek

review on certiorari under Rule 12 of this Court, this

alone will not suffice for jurisdictional purposes. Id. Al-

though intervenors are considered parties in this Court,

. . . an intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the ab-

sence of the party on whose side intervention was per-

mitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor

that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.“ Id. at 68.

The petitioner cannot do so here.

2. The first reason why the petitioner is precluded

from seeking review is that no case or controversy exists

between it and either Union respondents or the Postal

Service on the validity of the remail regulation. Because

the Postal Service “alone is entitled to create a” regula-

tion suspending the PES, 39 U.S.C. 601(b), only the:

Postal Service has a “direct stake” in defending the reg-

ulation. Id. at 65 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

U.S. 727, 740 (1972)). Had the Postal Service sought

review, a justiciable controversy would have existed be-

tween it and the Unions, and ACCA, as an intervenor

below, would have had the right to be a party in this

Court. However, the Postal Service failed to petition for

a writ of certiorari, thus “indicat[ing] its acceptance of

[the court of appeals’] decision, and its lack of interest

in defending its own [regulation].” Jd. at 63. Accord-

ingly, even though the Service may now choose to sup-

port the position taken by ACCA, and its “interest may

be adverse to the interests of” the Union respondents,

“its failure to invoke [the Court’s] jurisdiction léaves

the Court without a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ between” the

11

Union respondents and the U.S. Postal Service. Id. at

63-64; see Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475

U.S. 534, 544 (1986) (school board member sued in his

official capacity cannot “step into the shoes of the Board“

to petition for certiorari when the Board declined to do

80).

3. In addition, ACCA lacks standing because it is not

able to assert an injury in fact.” 476 U.S. at 65. See

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, —— U.S. ——,

58 USLW 5077, 5080 (June 27, 1990). Here the mem-

bers of ACCA do not face a threat of criminal prosecu-

tion or civil injunctive action, id., because the Depart-

ment of Justice has stated without qualification “that it

will not prosecute remailers or their customers on the

basis of current Postal Service regulations.” Ad. Rec.

at 529, p. 2. The possibility of future injury—for exam-

ple, that officials of the Department of Justice in some

future administration may reconsider its position and

agree with the Postal Service that international remail-

ing is not sanctioned by the “extremely urgent letter”

suspension—will not suffice; such speculative or contin-

gent threats of future harm are not the kind of direct

injury which will sustain Article III jurisdiction. Whit-

more v. Arkansas, —— U.S. ——, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1724,

109 L.Ed. 2d 135 (1990) (petitioner was denied the

right to intervene in state court to appeal the death sen-

tence of another prisoner; Petitioner's alleged injury is

too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III

court.”); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49 (1969) (con-

tingent threat); Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff Co.,

344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952) (same); Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (threat of future injury) ; Com-

munist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activi-

ties Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 81 (1961) (same); Pen-

nell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (same); see gen-

erally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Allen

12

v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984); Valley Forge Col-

lege v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).

4. This case is controlled by Diamond v. Charles.

There, the plaintiffs sued the State of Illinois alleging

the unconstitionality of an Illinois abortion statute. Dr.

Diamond, a pediatrician opposed to abortion, intervened

on the side of the State to defend the statute. The

court of appeals affirmed the grant of a permanent in-

junction against enforcement of certain of the statutory

provisions, and the State did not appeal to this Court.

Dr. Diamond did appeal, and this Court noted probable

jurisdiction. Thereafter, the Attorney General of the

State of Illinois wrote a letter to the Court, stating in

part that the State’s “interest in this proceeding is iden-

tical to that advanced by it in the lower courts and is

essentially co-terminous with the position in the issues

set forth by the appellants.” Jd. at 61. The Court held

that Dr. Diamond had no standing to defend the consti-

tutionality of the statute when the State declined to so do.

The Court noted that, had the State appealed, the inter-

venor would automatically have been a party and could

also seek review. “But this ability to ride ‘piggyback’ on

the State’s undoubted standing exists only if the State

is in fact an appellant before the Court; in the absence

of the State in that capacity, there is no case for Dia-

mond to join.” Id. at 64.

The Unions did not object to ACCA’s intervention in the district

court. (The Postal Service did object to intervention as of right.)

Of course, the standards for permissive intervention are not neces-

sarily the same as the injury requirement of Article III. See

Diamond v. Charles, supra, 476 U.S. at 68. And there was no occa-

sion to raise the issue in the court of appeals against the absent

intervenor. Strictly speaking the standing issue did not become

material until the Federal respondent chose not to petition for a

writ of certiorari. In any event, because the issue is jurisdictional,

it cannot be waived, id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and may

be raised after the writ has been granted. See Bender Williams-

port Area School Dist., supra, 475 U.S. at 450-451 (Court raised

standing issue sua sponte),

13

The same is true in this case. The controversy below

was between the Unions and the Postal Service. ACCA

made no claim in its motion to intervene that its mem-

bers’ business practices would change in any way on ac-

count of the final rule suspending the PES. It inter-

vened for no purpose other than to defend the Postal

Service’s regulation under PRA Section 601(b). It as-

serted the identical defenses, namely, that the Unions

had no standing to assert claims under the PES, and

that the record on “public interest“ under PRA Section

601(b) supported the rule. See ACCA’s Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary

Judgment, and Intervenor’s Memorandum in Opposition

to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in

Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment. Indeed, its principal contention

in intervening was that the Postal Service, as a dmpeti-

tor of ACCA’s members, could not be relied upon vig-

orously to defend a rule suspending its monopoly over

this kind of mail when it was initially intent on im-

posing the monopoly on ACCA’s members. See Memo

randum of Points and Authorities in Support of Air

Courier Conference of America’s Motion to Intervene

at 9-10; App. 9a.“ Obviously ACCA added nothing new

in the court of appeals; it did not even file a brief

there. Undoubtedly, had the Postal Service chosen to

petition for a writ of certiorari, it would have had stand-

ing to do so. But the Postal Service having chosen not

to seek review, Diamond v. Charles teaches that ACCA

cannot use the Postal Service’ dispute with the Unions

as a basis for standing, any more than Dr. Diamond

could defend the constitutionality of the Illinois abor-

8 ACCA stated that “the USPS must be seen as less than an

enthusiastic advocate of the Final Rule it adopted and of the re-

mailers who benefit by it.” Jd. at 10; App. 9a.

14

tion statute—even with the support of the respondent

State —in the absence of an appeal by the State.“

On remand from the court of appeals, on the basis of

a fortified record, the Postal Service may choose to renew

its rule waiving the PES for international remail. This

outcome will, of course, cause the issue of the adequacy

of the current record to support this suspension to be-

come moot. But even though the Postal Service may

choose not to reissue the rule, Diamond still precludes

review because the Postal Service’s failure to adopt a

rule suspending the PES for international remailers does

not threaten ACCA members with immediate injury.“

In its motion to intervene, ACCA stated (at p. 7) that

its members’ annual revenues for international remail

were $50 million, and that “[r]Jevocation of 39 C. F. R.

§ 320.8 [the international remail suspension] would pre-

sent ACCA’s members who engage [in] international

remail of letters with the Hobson’s choice of foregoing

$50 million in sales or force possible civil suits and

criminal prosecution under the Private Express Stat-

utes. But this allegation is meaningless in light

of the Department of Justice’s blanket refusal to sue or

prosecute them or their customers on the basis of exist-

ing regulations. And as we showed above, the fear of

future litigation is simply not a basis for alleging sub-

stantial risk of present harm.”

We are informed that the Acting Solicitor General now intends

to defend the suspension of the PES in this Court.

10 Although Diamond involved a direct appeal, and not a petition,

for a writ of certiorari, there is no difference in the application

of the controlling principles. Standing is an Article III requirement

as applicable to certiorari review as to appeals.

11 ACCA, an association alleging no injury to itself, has standing

only insofar as its current members do. See Valley Forge College

v. Americans United, supra, 454 U.S. at 476-477 n.11, and cases cited

there. See also International Union, UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274

(1986). e

12 This would be the case even were the Department of Justice

totally neutral on the matter. International remailers belonxing to

15

5. While there might seem to be an inconsistency be-

tween the Unions’ position that they have standing and

ACCA does not, any inconsistency is more apparent than

real. The deficiency in ACCA’s standing is its inability

to demonstrate injury in fact, a jurisdictional require-

ment of Article III. While ACCA did question whether

the Unions themselves suffered an injury in fact, both

the district court and court of appeals found that this

“irreducible minimum” standing requirement was met.

Pet. App. at 5a-6a, 30a-31a. Neither ACCA nor the Pos-

tal Service appealed from the district court’s findings

on this point. And the Court granted a writ of certiorari

only on the single standing issue presented by the peti-

tioner: “Are postal employees within the ‘zone of -in-

terest’ of the statutes that establish and allow the United

States Postal Service to suspend the postal monopoly

when ‘the public interest requires?’” Pet. at i. See

Rule 14.1(a) of this Court (“Only the question set forth

in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be con-

sidered by this Court.“).

More importantly, however, unlike ACCA members,

the Unions are faced with a threat of immediate injury

by the total suspension of the PES for international re-

mailing. If adopted, any and all firms may engage in

ACCA contended throughout the rulemaking that they currently

comply with the requirements of the “extremely urgent letter”

suspension. If this is so, they each have a dispositive defense if

they are ever sued.

It may be that ACCA fears a private civil action by the Unions

to enjoin their businesses. See American Postal Workers Union v.

React Postal Services, Inc., 771 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1985) (unions

have a private right of action under the PES); but see American

Postal Workers Union, Detroit Local v. Independent Postal Systems

of America, Inc., 481 F.2d 90 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S.

1110 (1973), cert. dismissed, 415 U.S. 901 (1974) (contra). But

even this fear does not constitute a threat of immediate harm,

because these companies may advance their assertedly meritorious

defenses there. See Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., supra,

344 U.S. at 245 (stating that the plaintiff there wanted to “win any

such case before it is commenced.” ).

16

this business, whether or not the letters they carry meet

existing conditions for carriage out of the mails, as

ACCA members (with Department of Justice support)

insist that they do. Clearly ACCA does not claim to, and

cannot, represent in this litigation those future, potential

members of this trade association which may enter the

remail industry without complying with cost and urgency

restrictions. See authorities on associational standing

cited at p. 11 and 14 n.11, above.“

Because the record does not disclose that any current

ACCA members fail to qualify under the urgent letter

rule, or are otherwise threatened with prosecution, we

respectfully submit the writ should be dismissed. See

Diamond v. Charles, supra, 476 U.S. at 67 (facts sup-

porting standing must appear in the record); Bender v.

Williamsport Area School Dist., supra, 475 U.S. at 546

(same). Alternatively, “[g]jiven the interlocutory posture

of the case“, and the Postal Service’s willingness to ac-

cept the remand of the court of appeals (Fed. Resp.

Opp. at 9), we ask that the writ be dismissed as im-

providently granted.“

18 As we stated earlier, ACCA never asserted in its motion to

intervene that its present members had an interest in being liberated

from the “cost” and “loss of value“ tests of the “urgent letter“

rule.

14 We offer as an alternative ground for dismissal that ACCA was

not a proper intervenor in the district court, for the reasons ex-

plained in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Diamond v.

Charles, 476 U.S. at 71.

17

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we ask the Court to grant this

motion.

Respectfully submitted,

KEITH E. SECULAR ANTON G. HAJJAR

Counsel of Record Counsel of Record

SopHA E. Davis DIANA ORANTES CERESI

COHEN, WEISS & SIMON Of Counsel

330 West 42nd Street O’DONNELL, SCHWARTZ &

New York, NY 10036 ANDERSON

(212) 563-4100 Suite 200

Attorneys for Respondent 1300 L Street, N.W.

National Association of Washington, D.C. 20005

Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (202) 898-1707

Attorneys for Respondent

American Postal Workers

Union, AFL-CIO

July 1990

APPENDIX

E

2

8

i

5

8

f

to Rule 24 (b).

s, Charles R. Richey

United States Distriet Judge

ORDERED that ACC A's

is hereby granted pursuant

ny

2a

AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA’S

MOTION TO INTERVENE

The Air Courier Conference of America (ACCA)

hereby moves pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene as a matter of

right. 1

The bases and reasons for ACCA’s motion are set

forth in the attached Supporting Memorandum of Points

aud Authorities. A Proposed Order is also attached.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ L. Peter Farkas

L. PETER FARKAS

LYON & LYON

1200 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-9600

D.C. Bar No. 099673

Counsel for Air Courier

Conference of America

Dated: January 29, 1988

Of Counsel:

JAMES I. CAMPBELL, JR.

AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA

Fifth Floor

2011 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 223-7080

8a

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

IN SUPPORT OF AIR COURIER CONFERENCE

OF AMERCIA’S MOTION TO INTERVENE

I. INTRODUCTION

The Air Courier Conference of America (ACCA) has

moved under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure to intervene in this proceeding. ACCA’s mo-

tion is grounded on the facts that: (1) ACCA and its

members’ rights may be adversely affected by this law-

suit and (2) the United States Postal Service (USPS

or Postal Service) will not adequately protect those

rights.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

ACCA is a trade association including private over-

night couriers, which deliver extremely urgent letters

domestically and internationally, and international re-

mailers, which pick up foreign bound mail and transport

it in bulk to foreign post offices for remailing to foreign

destinations. Of ACCA’s 180 members, 120 are carriers

and those of which engage in remail account for vir-

tually all the private remail business in the United

States.

During the two 1985-1986 rulemaking proceedings con-

ducted by the USPS which culminated in the issuance

of 39 C.F.R. § 320.8, comments were submitted by the

International Remail Committee (Remail Committee) in

support of an exemption for international remail of

letters from the postal monopoly and the Private Express

Statutes. See Comments on the International Remail

Committee (December 12, 1985) attached as Exhibit A.

The Remail Committee was an ad hoc group of certain

interested ACCA members which drew financial support

from ACCA. Many of the Remail Committee members

are still members of ACCA. In addition, Federal Ex-

press, DHL, Purolator, Airborne, and United Parcel

Service all current ACCA members, and ACCA itself

4a

submitted comments in opposition to the originally pro-

posed rule declaring remail outside the scope of the ex-

tremely urgent letter exemption of 39 C.F.R. § 320.6

These comments are attached as Exhibit B.

The members of ACCA engaged in remailing have sub-

stantial rights at issue in this proceeding, inasmuch as

revocation of 39 C.F.R. § 320.8 as sought by plaintiffs

would cause irreparable injury to such remailers. More-

over, because the USPS only grudingly adopted 39 C. F. R.

320.8 after Congressional and Executive Branch pres-

sure on it to do so, the USPS will not adequately protect

the remailers rights.

III. DISCUSSION

Rule 24(a) provides that:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted

to intervene in an action . . when the applicant

claims an interest relating to the property or trans-

action which is the subject of the action and he is so

situated that the disposition of the action may as a

practical matter impair or impede his ability to pro-

tect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is

adequately represented by existing parties.

Judge Flannery in Grumman v. Flexible Corp., 102

F.R.D. 36, 38 (D.C. D.C. 1983) recently repeated the

legal premise of intervention under Rule 24:

The right of intervention conferred by Rule 24 im-

plements the basic jurisprudential assumption that

the interest of justice is best served when all the

parties with a real stake in a controversy are af-

forded an opportunity to be heard.

Grumman, supra, quoting Hodgson v. United Mine Work-

ers, 473 F.2d 118, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

The Courts have held that motions to intervene as a

matter of right under Rule 24(a) will be granted if they

F ˙ ee m ̃ * ee ee eae ee . — Ee eee el Te le ee.

5a

satisfy the following four requirements: (1) application

for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must

show an interest in the property or transaction that is

the subject of the action; (3) disposition of the action

may impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect

that interest; (4) the existing parties to the litigation do

not adequately represent the intervenor’s interests. Nat-

ural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904

(D.C. Cir. 1977) (Natural Resources).

1. ACCA’s Application For Intervention is Timely

The key to determining timeliness is whether the ap-

plicant delayed its Motion to Intervene pursuant to Rule

24(a) sufficiently to prejudice the existing parties to the

litigation. McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065,

1073 (5th Cir. 1970). Intervention will not be denied if

it will not substantially delay trial. Moreover timeliness

is to be determined by all the circumstances. Natural

Resources, supra 561 F.2d at 907.

ACCA’s intervention would not delay or prejudice the

adjudication of the right of the other parties to this law-

suit. USPS’s answer was filed on January 25, 1988. The

discovery and pretrial practice to date has been minimal.'

No trial date has been set. Accordingly, ACCA’s instant

Motion to Intervene is timely.

2. ACCA And Its Members Have An Interest

in the Subject Matter of This Action

As J udge Gasch stated in Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection

Agency, 99 F.R.D. 607 (D.C. D.C. 1983) (NRDC):

1 Apart from the answer to the complaint, the sum and substance

of the activities in this case have been the service of a set of as yet

unanswered interrogatories and document requests by plaintiffs on

December 18, 1988 and the filing of defendant’s Motion for a Pro-

tective Order against plaintiffs’ discovery on January 15, 1988.

6a

The first consideration the interest requirement has

been interpreted in broad terms, and the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

has stated that “the ‘interest test’ is primarily a

practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving

as many apparently concerned persons as is com-

patible with efficiency and due process.”

99 F.R.D. at 609, quoting Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d

1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

ACCA and those of its members which engage in in-

ternational remail of letters pursuant to the exemption

to the Private Express Statutes embodied in 39 C. F. R.

§ 320.8 have a direct interest in the subject matter of

this lawsuit. That interest is of record in the Postal

Services’s rulemaking which resulted in promulgation of

the § 320.8 exemption. See Exhibit A. These comments

by the Remail Committee, ACCA and its current mem-

bers were solicited in the originally proposed rulemaking

to “clarify” (narrow) the suspension for extremely ur-

gent letters on October 10, 1985, 50 Federal Register

41462. It is the comments in opposition to USPS orig-

inal October 10, 1985 proposal that the Postal Service

adoption in support of the Final Rule issued on August 20,

1986, 51 Federal Register 29636.

Judge Gasch’s finding in NRDC, where trade associa-

tions sought to intervene in support of certain EPA reg-

ulations, is equally apt here:

If plaintiffs succeed in this case, these regulatory

decisions, which are obviously in the intervenor’s in-

terests, will be set aside. Thus the intervenors can

be said to have a substantial and direct interest in

the subject of this litigation.

NRDC, supra, 49 F.R.D. at 609.

Clearly ACCA’s members’ support of the rule adopted

and embodied by 39 C.F.R. § 320.8 reflect no less a sub-

stantial and direct interest in this action seeking revoca-

F — B ͤ PS

Ta

tion of the Rule 320.8 adopted by the Postal Service than

those of the intervenors in NRDC.

3. Disposition of This Action May Adversely Affect

ACCA’s Interests : ig ht

ACCA and its remail members have a direct interest in

the outcome of this action. ACCA’s remail members

conduct a substantial volume of business pursuant to the

39 C.F.R. § 320.8 the rule at issue. Indeed, ACCA esti-

mates roughly that its members account for virtually all

private international remail of letters under the Rule.

ACCA’s counsel’s rough estimate is that its members

total international remail of letters amounts to approx-

imately 3500 tons which amount to estimated total sales

of over $50 million. Although substantial in terms of

sales by ACCA members and even as a percentage of

USPS’s outbound international letter traffic (roughly one

third) these figures pale in the context of USPS’s total

revenues of $29 billion in fiscal year 1986.

Revocation of 39 C.F.R. § 320.8 would present ACCA’s

members who engage international remail of letters with

the Hobson’s choice of foregoing $50 million in sales or

face possible civil suits and criminal prosecution under

the Private Express Statutes, 39 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 and

18 U.S.C. 88 1693-1699, 1724.

ACCA’s intervention as a representative of the inter-

ests of the remail industry is appropriate. See NRDC,

supra. In that case a number of trade associations were

permitted to intervene as defendants as a matter of

right.

In short, ACCA and its members have no less an in-

terest in the subject matter of this action than the plain-

tiffs who seek revocation of § 320.8. Indeed revocation

of § 320.8 would cause immediate and irreparable in-

jury to the international remail industry.

8a

4. ACCA And Its Members’ Interests Are Not Repre-

sented By Any of the Parties

As Judge Gasch said in NRDC:

The. . final part of the test for intervention as

of right concerns the adequacy of representation of

the intervenors interests by existing parties. Inter-

venors have only the minimal burden of showing

that representation of their interest by existing par-

ties may be inadequate.

NRDC, supra 99 F.R.D. at 610 (emphasis added).

The interests of ACCA and its international remail

members who operate pursuant to Rule 320.8 are not

adequately represented by any of the parties of this law-

suit. Obviously, the plaintiffs, who seek revocation of

Rule 320.8 which ACCA and its members support and

pursuant to which such members engage in international

remail of letters, have interests directly at odds with

ACCA and its members.

The Postal Service also does not adequately represent

ACCA and its members’ interests. In NRDC the court

recognized that although “facially, it would seem that the

EPA and the intervenors have the same interest” the in-

terests of the intervenors and the government agency

whose actions they sought to uphold “cannot always be

expected to coincide.” NRDC, supra 99 F.R.D. at 610.

Judge Gasch noted that the intervenors represented a

narrower interest than the agency and it was sufficient

that their interests might at some stage of the proceed-

ings; that they would differ on procedures; or, citing

Natural Resources, supra, that they might disagree on

the timing of the promulgation of regulations pursuant

to a settlement. Id. The potential problems that were

found to meet the “minimal burden” in NRDC are far

more immediate in this case.

First, as originally proposed by the Postal Service on

October 10, 1985, the proposed rule would have narrowed

9a

the existing administrative exception to the postal mo-

nopoly so as to explicitly prohibit International Remail.

It was only after substantial pressure was brought to

bear on the Postal Service by the executive branch that

USPS issued the Final Rule on August 20, 1986 specifi-

cally suspending the operation of 39 U.S.C. § 601 (a) (1)-

(6) and 39 C.F.R. § 310.2 (b) (1)-(6). That pressure

included comments from the United States Department

of J ustice (December 12, 1985), attached hereto as Ex-

hibit C. The substance of the Postal Service’s original

— and — degree a * of participation that

as necessary to reverse that proposal to result in the

Final Rule bespeaks the Postal Service's reluetance to

adopt the Final Rule it now finds itself defending.

Second, this case involves the unusual situation where

the rulemaking authority lies with a governmental

agency which is an actual competitor of the industry

affected by its rules. The Postal Service competes head-

to-head with the remailers. Quite apart from the compe-

tition policy and antitrust concerns that are inherent

where a competitor seeks to regulate its competition, the

competition between the remailers and the Postal Service

makes their respective interests self-evidently divergent.

Under the circumstances, the USPS must be seen as

less than an enthusiastic advocate of the Final Rule it

adopted and of the remailers who benefit by it. Accord-

ingly, ACCA and its members, who are the most di-

rectly affected by the Final Rule challenged by the plain-

tiff unions, cannot rely upon the Postal Service to ade-

quately represent their interests and should therefore be

permitted to intervene.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated ACCA respectfull i

y requests this

court to permit ACCA to intervene in this proceeding.

Dated: January 29, 1988

10a

— Respectfully submitted,

/s/ L. Peter Farkas

L. PETER FARKAS

LYon & LYON

1200 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 2003

(202) 296-9600 :

D.C. Bar No. 0% 673

Counisel for Air Courier

: Conference of America

Of Counsel:

JAMES I. CAMPBELL, JR.

AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA

2011 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 223-7080

Note: Exhibits are omitted from this appendix. ]

lla

[SEAL]

U.S. Department of Justice

Antitrust Division

Office of the Assistant Actorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

May 2, 1986

Charles D. Hawley, Esquire

Assistant General Counsel

United States Postal Service

475 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20260-1100

Re: Restrictions on Private Carriage of Letters; With-

drawal of Proposed Rules; Advance Notice of Pro-

posed Rulemaking and Request for Information

Dear Mr. Hawley:

I am writing in response to your March 18, 1986 letter

to the Department of Justice (“Department”) requesting

information that might be considered by the Postal Serv-

ice in fashioning a suspension of the Private Express

Statutes for international remail services. I understand

that an identical letter has been sent to all parties that

filed comments in the remail rulemaking.!

Pursuant to the March 4, 1986 statement by John

McKean, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the

Postal Service (“McKean Statement”), the Postal Serv-

ice was ordered to withdraw the previously proposed

1 Restrictions on Private Carriage of Letters; Withdrawal of Pro-

posed Rules; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request

for Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 9852 (March 21, 1986) (“Notice”).

12a

rules on which we and others commented,’ and to initiate

a new rulemaking to “preserve the benefits of desirable

competition between the Postal Service and private cora-

panies.” * The letter and Notice represent that the in-

formation requested is needed “as a basis for proposing

a new suspension of the [Private Express] Statutes” and

solicit “views as to the scope of a suspension which will

best serve the relevant interests” and “specific language

for implementing regulations.” *

The Department sees no need for a new rule. As the

Attorney General has stated, international remail repre-

sents “lawful private sector competition to the Postal

Service.“ Moreover, the Department has indicated that

it will not prosecute remailers or their customers on the

basis of current Postal Service regulations.“ Under these

circumstances, a protracted rulemaking will only serve

to raise uncertainty as to the legal status of lawful pri-

vate sector services that numerous executive agencies

and the Board of Governors of the Postal Service find

beneficial to consumers.

Furthermore, even if a new rule were necessary to

clarify that international remail is lawful, the com-

2 Restrictions on Private Carriage of Letters; Proposed Clarifica-

tion and Modification of Definition and of Regulations on Extremely

Urgent Letters; 50 Fed Reg. 41462 (October 10, 1985); See also

Comments of the United States Department of Justice. In the

Matter of Restrictions on Private Carriage of Letters; Proposed

Clarification and Modification of Definition and of Regulations on

Extremely Urgent Letters, December 12, 1985 (Department Com-

ments“).

Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. at 9853.

4 Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. at 9852.

5 See Letter from Attorney General Edwin Meese to Postmaser

General Albert V. Casey, February 26, 1986 (copy attached).

6 See Letter from Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton to

Senator Alfonse D’Amato, April 2, 1986 (copy attached).

13a

ments filed in the earlier remail proceeding and the Pos-

tal Service’s own internal reports provide an ample rec-

ord on which to base any rule that the Postal Service

deems necessary to “remove the cloud” over remail that

it sees under current regulations.“ The information re-

quest and the accompanying procedural schedule will

only delay resolution of this matter.

In sum, the Postal Service’s conduct of the remail

proceeding may reflect a fundamental reluctance to ac-

cept the benefits of marketplace competition, contrary to

the expressed mandate of the Board of Governors:

The Board of Governors does not believe that any

attempt to suppress this kind of competition would

advance the long-term objectives of the Postal Re-

organization Act or otherwise enhance the welfare

of our customers and the American people.“

Consistent with this policy pronouncement, and the policy

of this Administration to foster and promote private

sector competition in international mail, we strongly

urge the Postal Service to abandon the remail proceed-

ing. Alternatively, the Postal Service should resolve the

proceeding expeditiously on the basis of the existing

record so that the benefits of private sector competition

may continue to be enjoyed by consumers of interna-

tional mail services.

Please include this document in the public file of this

proceeding.

Sincerely,

/s/ Charles F. Rule

CHARLES F. RuLE

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Antitrust Division

Enclosures

Id. at 51 Fed. Reg. 9853. See generally Department Comments

at 19-22.

See Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. at 9853. See also Department Com-

ments at 19-22.

14a

[SEAL]

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Washington, D.C. 20530

26 February 1986

The Honorable Albert V. Casey

Postmaster General

United States Postal Service

475 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Room 10022

Washington, D.C. 20260-1000

Dear Mr. Postmaster:

I understand that on 3 March 1986, the Board of

Governors of the United States Postal Service will con-

sider proposed rules that, if adopted, will materially and

adversely affect the ability of remail services to compete

for international mail traffic. Our Antitrust Division

filed comments with you on 12 December 1985, opposing

these proposed rules. I would like to reiterate the con-

cerns of this Department about the effect of the proposed

rules on competition and consumer welfare.

As the Antitrust Division has explained, there are

significant public benefits from lawful private sector

competition in the provision of international postal serv-

ices. Remailers have been able to offer service to United

States businesses competing abroad at costs and terms

that are apparently viewed by users as better than those

offered by the Postal Service. I understand that compe-

tition from remailers has forced the Postal Service to in-

troduce new international services. By stifling lawful

private sector competition, the proposed regulations will

undermine economic efficiency and will inhibit Postal

Service incentives to innovate and to price its interna-

tional services competitively—all to the detriment of con-

sumer welfare.

Given the Administration’s policy in favor of competi-

tion and against unnecessary regulation, I urge you to

15a

follow the recommendation filed by our Antitru ivi

8 st Divi-

sion and not promulgate the proposed rules. I under-

stand that these same issues will be relevant to Admin-

istration review of the 1984 Universal ostal Union Con-

vention, and 1 hope the Convention will be submitted

shortly for Administrative review. By copy of this let-

ter, I am informing the remaining membe

of our position on this matter. 8 —

Sincerely,

/s/ Edwin Meese III

EDWIN MEESE III

Attorney General

cc: Members of the Board of Governors,

United States Postal Service

—_—

[SEAL]

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental

Affairs 4

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

02 Apr 1986

Honorable Alfonse D’Amato

United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator D’Amato:

I am writing in response to your February 13, 1986

letter to Attorney General Meese. Your letter seeks writ-

ten confirmation from the Department of Justice that

international remailers “are not acting illegally” under

current Postal Service regulations.

I am enclosing for your information a letter from the

Attorney General to Postmaster General Casey that in-

dicates our view that remailers currently provide “lawful

private sector competition” to the Postal Service. I also

enclose a March 4, 1985 Statement of John R. McKean,

who is the chairman of the Postal Service Board of Gov-

ernors. That statement indicates that the Board of Gov-

ernors views competition from remailers as being in the

public interest. That statement also indicates that the

Board of Governors has ordered the Postal Service to

commence a rulemaking proceeding to “remove the cloud”

over remailing that, in their opinion, is created by cur-

rent Postal Service regulations.

Under these circumstances, you may be assured that

the Department of Justice will not seek to prosecute in-

ternational remailers or their customers on the basis of

the current regulations.

„ r ͤ—l OW’. *•m Y ote ee

17a

We hope that you find this information useful in

clarifying the lawfulness of international remail and

in minimizing the adverse effects that the current situa-

tion has had on your remailer constituents.

Sincerely,

/s/ John R. Bolton

JOHN R. BOLTON

Assistant Atto

Enclosures ** —

ec: Louis A. Cox, Esquire

General Counsel

U.S. Postal Service

475 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20260-1100

N

R rng

.

.

.

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