Respondents Brief — Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
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OCTOBER TERM, 1987
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Petitioner
vs.
UNION GAS COMPANY, Respondent
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
Robert A. Swift
(Counsel of Record)
R. Goodman
KOHN, SAVETT, KLEIN & GRAF, PC.
2400 One Reading Center
1101 Market Street
PA 19107
(215) 238-1700
Lawrence Demase
ROSE, SCHMIDT, CHAPMAN,
DUFF & HASLEY
900 Oliver Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
(412) 434-8610
7
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ee i i es i , i ee
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether CERCLA’ language unmistakably expresses
Congress’ intention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity?
2. Whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal
courts from asserting jurisdiction only in diversity of citizen-
ship cases between a defendant state and a citizen of a differ-
ent state’?
3. Whether Article I of the Constitution empowers Con-
gress to abrogate state immunity to private lawsuits?
4. Whether state consent to suit is a prerequisite to con-
gressional abrogation?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... ..
PRARSREER GE GRD GUED « ok cc cv cscctceeseseasneuneane
CERCLA’ Language Unmistakably Expresses
Congress’ Intention to Abrogate Eleventh
Amendment Immunity ....................
A. The Purpose of CERCLA Is To Redress a
Festering National Environmental Prob-
B. CERCLA’ Language Satisfies the Clear
DREGE GHD. «0 04 cc cacenuacdanenenee
C. Construing CERCLA To Permit Persons To
Sue States Promotes the Purposes of the
GMB .cccceccescecsencasesuennneeee
The Eleventh Amendment Precludes Federal
Courts From Asserting Jurisdiction Only in
Diversity of Citizenship Cases Between a
Defendant State and a Citizen of a Different
BREED . ccccccncscccecescenueane
A. As Drafted in 1787, the Constitution Did
Not Provide for State Sovereign Immunity
im PEE CARNE .. . « ccnnedeaseuuseueas
B. The Eleventh Amendment Precludes
Federal Court Jurisdiction Only in Actions
Brought by Individuals Against States
Based on Diversity of Citizenship .......
Hans v. Louisiana Should Be Overturned
D. Overturning Hans v. Louisiana Will Have a
Salutary Effect on Eleventh Amendment
PEED. oo 6 cccacnsceesanueeeee
o
14
16
III. Article I of the Constitution Empowers Con-
gress to Abrogate State Immunity to Private
ek ceca wcecccsoccce ce
A. Prior Decisions of This Court Have Ac-
knowledged the Constitutionality of Article
CLE. Se uewdeecscuscccees
B. Principles of Federalism Require That Con-
gress’ Plenary Power Under Article I Not
Be Dismissed By a Judicial Inability to En-
force Its Enactments ..................
IV. State Consent Is Not a Prerequisite to Congres-
ees cece concciceces
I Ee
25
25
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases Page
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234 (1985) .......... 9, 11, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 20, 22, 23
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) 17, 21, 22
County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.
1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1104 (1983) ......... 25
Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare
v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
SD Miincisevoisesanetess 9, 10, 11, 16, 23, 27
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ................ 23
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
Ss cick Golwhutekbusasesecune’ 11, 23, 27, 28, 29
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
ak Gf rere 17, 30
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1980)......... 6, 20-25, 27
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 ........ 22
Mayle v. Pennsylvania, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709
CD ingas cd 666s Konsened OSEN ENS oneeets 20, 24
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
CD é nha khives's dnd él bealesad eee as 20
In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987) cert.
denied sub-nom Edgar v. McVey Trucking, 108 S.Ct.
Ns «ct iss dn 9 wining eekine et Seeeieiee 25-27
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, reh. denied,
Se : ES 5 io cd csv dwacddienae neces 7
Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.
E+ cthGucand ss denis dud eee eens ean 26
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)........... 22
New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 164 (1812)... 20
iv
TABLE OF CITATIONS—(Continued )
Cases Page
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
ET En Serre yee Ween BMC Ata. 21
Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks
Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) ............. 26, 30
Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d
I ncaa ok dee es a 26
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465
I ii nk on cues cae eeaaw veswadcivds 9, 23
Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903) .................. 29
Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 286 (1810) .... 20
South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (1988) ........ 30
United States v. Union Gas Company, (Union Gas 1), 792
F.2d at 383 (3rd Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 107 S.Ct.
aNd de pba dideeds vans 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
United States v. Union Gas Company, (Union Gas I), 832
EEE Re tee 9, 12, 26, 31
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) ...... 10
United States v. Freeman, 680 F.Supp. 73 (W.D.N_Y.
SEE occu bay Gecasaieninyexmbeewieb bese cess 10
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem-
ical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ........ 3]
Welch v. State Department of Highways and Public Trans-
portation, 107 S.Ct. 2941 (1987) .. 9, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 654 F.Supp. 955
SIS ode dig ded coc eclcen clewuh badue 10
CITATIONS—(Continued )
eons TABLE OF CITATIONS—(Continued )
Statut Page
Coneaean ae <i ' Constitution and Statutes Page
United States Constitution ao.
Ne einen noeccscecawks 6, 21, 25, 27-30 ery Act ,
TEARS pees ete es oe 17, 19, 21 EL 45 Sesh Gh ni bbn esd peeves idvenssd
TPP TTT TT TTT TT eter 28 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
ns on cducnsendsnanbes saeeene 31 ik bis isc mkek i bua x dois dee 7
ID gk occcccccecesevcetsvacees I 7 EIS Ss Shes ee ea tea 7
Eleventh Amendment....................... passim Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of
Fourteenth Amendment ..................... 28, 29 1986,
Fifteenth Amendment ......................55. 27 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(D) ................ 000. 2, 12
United States Code A See i 15
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII i he cae ch acaue wae od 2, 12,14
nv eneiebanakea bald 11 |) Pe ee 14
Clean Water Act, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(3) and (f)(2) ke sean s ememnmaee 4 JARA Continuation Act of 1980
2) See 7 sean sneacenees 24
§1365 rrr ee rT TTT LT TT ete. ee 7 Legislative and Agency Materials
Clean Air Act, Delays and Inefficiencies in the Superfund Program:
33 U.S.C. §7401 pe eeeeeseeeeoeereeeseresenacee : Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Superfund
ia eet ebteceiedebkendiwns'sy
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation & Liability Act of 1980,
| BO eee rer er 1, 8, 10
Ss nid canceocksy bt schent passim
NS Sc od baviddesune vasa wee 11,12
EE hos os oodnd beadewenaeaneet 7
CE ci Sd accdyctacuedeunaneeas 24
Fair Labor Standards Act
ee As occ ckvckncenesh sane aun 11
Judiciary Act of 1789
- ff ei eo & ReePerrerre Terr ry 18, 20
Judiciary Act of 1875
EEE ad vea ca tidscbenedsseuves eccweeehes 21
vi
ee ee ee
and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Commit-
tee on Environmental and Public Works, 100th
Sn, DUM occ cencnconsnccncscceses 15
Descriptions of Sites on Current National Priorities
MOR, TERWR, GPU, BEG oes e cc cccescccnccesees 9
Descriptions of Sites on Update No. 2 to National
Priorities List, EPA, Oct. 1984 .................. i)
H.Rep. No. 96-1016, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
SE Sabie Adeethole wins ee eeniewerderacee«s 7
H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ......... 1]
H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ......... }]
Interim Report on the Surveys and Investigations
Staff, House Committee on Appropriations (1988) .. 8
TABLE OF CITATIONS—(Continued )
Legislative and Agency Materials Page
National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous
Waste Sites—Update 7, 53 F.R. 23, 987 (to be cod-
ified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300, App. B) .............. 14
Report of Audit No. E5E26-05-0101-61508, EPA,
OUD ocanec éeevinwweusssévueesenusses 15
Report on Status of Environmental Protection
Agency’s Superfund Program, Staff of House Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
SE tc ddd vd Sake inde Raeeeeenegshs bs sess 14
Books, Periodicals and Other Sources
Amar, “Of Sovereignty and Federalism,” 96 Yale
RRR ere eee 17,19
Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1987,
oo nein e occa an SR oie cted 16
K. C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1980) .. 24
The Federalist Papers (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).. 17, 18, 22
Field, “The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sov-
ereign Immunity Doctrines,” 126 U. Pa. L.Rev.
he acces hacen beasenetséeoes 28
Fletcher, “A Historical Interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment,” 35 Stan. L.Rev. 1033
| Pree eerrr Tr re Ty CTT errr Tee 17, 18, 19
Gibbons, “The Eleventh Amendment and State Sov-
ereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,” 83 Colum.
Dh IN so can kuddccdebicensces 19, 21
I J. Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801
I irs cues iin dads ities whidiged nk wastiy 22
Jackson, “The Supreme Court, the 11th Amend-
ment and State Sovereign Immunity,” 98 Yale L.J. !
(forthcoming Oct. 1988) .................665. 18, 24
TABLE. OF CITATIONS—(Continued )
Books, Periodicals and Other Sources
I Legislative History of the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response Compensation and Liability
SUS hdbuanusekoNadneetecedatonces es
Mackerron, “Superfund: Uncle Sam Picks Up the
Tab,” Chemical Week, June 8, 1988 .............
Schneider, “Energy Department Faulted on Dealing
With Nuclear Waste,” N.Y. Times, June 7, 1988 ..
Tribe, “Intergovernmental Immunities in Litiga-
tion, Taxation and Regulation,” 89 Harv. L.Rev. 682
(1976)
eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeseeeeeeeeeeeeeee ese ee 6
No. 87-1241
yy hay
of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Petitioner
VS.
UNION GAS COMPANY, Respondent
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
1. United States Constitution, Amendment XI:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any
Foreign State.
2. United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §§9601(21) and
9607(a), P.L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 |Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability (“Super-
fund”) Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”)}:
9601(21) ‘person’ means an individual, firm, corpora-
tion, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, United States
Government, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State or any interstate
body;
9607(a) ...any person who at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,...shall be liable
for...any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan. ...
3. United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §9601(20\D) and
9620(a\(1), PL. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 |Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”)|:
9601(20\D) The term “owner or operator” does not in-
clude a unit of State or local government
which acquired ownership or control invol-
untarily through bankruptcy, tax delin-
quency, abandonment, or other circum-
stances in which the government
involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its
function as sovereign. The exclusion pro-
vided under this paragraph shall not apply
to any State or local government which has
caused or contributed to the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance
from the facility, and such a State or local
government shall be subject to the provi-
sions of this Act in the same manner and to
the same extent, both procedurally and sub-
stantively, as any nongovernmental entity,
including liability under section 107.
9620(ay1) In general.--Each department, agency,
and instrumentality of the United States
(including the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government) shall be
subject to, and comply with, this Act in the
same manner and to the same extent, both
procedurally and substantively, as any non-
governmental entity, including liability un-
der section 107 of this Act. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to affect the lia-
bility of any person or entity under sections
106 and 107.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The sudden release of coal tar into Brodhead Creek in
Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania in October 1980 caused the
United States to declare the site the nation’s first emergency
Superfund site. A map of the site is contained in the Joint
Appendix at J.A. 108. Adjacent to the stream from 1890 to
1948 in an industrial section of Stroudsburg had been a
carburetted water gas plant which produced coal gas as well
as its by-product, coal tar. While some constituents of coal tar
are now defined as hazardous substances under CERCLA
(J.A. 51), the EPA regards in-ground disposal of coal tar as
state of the art technology during the first part of this century
(see EPA Amended Fund Authorization Report). The plant
was dismantled in 1948 and replaced successively by propane
and natural gas distribution systems. The Company operating
the plant changed ownership several times before being
merged into respondent in 1978.
Between 1960 and 1962 the State rechanneled, narrowed
and deepened Brodhead Creek and erected a dike on its sides.
The Borough of Stroudsburg and later the State obtained a
permanent easement or fee title to much of the site. (J.A.
98-99) The rechannelization of this fast flowing stream
started a process of downcutting of the stream bed and erosion
of the toe of the dike that led to the release of coal tar during
the period that the State was an owner and operator of the
site. It was during repairs to the toe of the dike that coal tar
was first discovered. Between April 1981 and January 1982,
the United States did a cleanup of the site at an alleged
expense of $967,000.00. The United States contended that
there was a continuing release and threat of release of coal tar
which was not abated until the cleanup was complete. (J.A.
50) In 1984, Pennsylvania entered into a Multi-Site Cooper-
ative Agreement with the United States covering the
Brodhead Creek site whereby Pennsylvania agreed to take the
lead in continuing remedial activities under the authority and
funding of CERCLA. (J.A. 100-107)
The United States commenced this lawsuit on May 23,
1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania to recover its cleanup costs pursuant
to CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1321(b)(3)
and (f)(2), naming respondent as the sole defendant. (J.A. 5)
Respondent filed a third-party complaint naming the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania and the Borough of Stroudsburg
as third party defendants alleging that they were owners and
operators of a facility at the site within the meaning of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A), and, together with others,
negligently caused or contributed to the release of coal tar.
(J.A. 37)
The State moved to dismiss the third-party complaint
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) alleging that it was
immune to suit under CERCLA pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted
the State's motion. (J.A. 45) Thereafter, the United States filed
an amended complaint revising its damage claim, and re-
spondent filed an amended third-party complaint. (J.A. 46
and 81) The State again moved to dismiss, and the district
court granted the motion for the reasons set forth in its earlier
opinion. (J.A. 95)
As a result of a settlement reached among the United
States, respondent and the Borough of Stroudsburg whereby
respondent paid a major portion of the cost of cleanup, the
district Court dismissed the action. (J.A. 96) Respondent then
appealed the district court's dismissal of Pennsylvania as a
defendant to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. A two member majority of the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's order, with the Honorable A. Leon Higgin-
botham filing a vigorous dissent concluding that CERCLA
clearly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
(Pet. App. 74a)
On October 17, 1986, shortly after respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court, the President signed
into law SARA, which amended CERCLA. At the urging of
respondent herein and the United States, which as amicus
contended SARA “authorizes suits against states or local gov-
ernments for liability or contribution when such entries
caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance,” (Amicus Br. at 5-6) this Court granted
certiorari, vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, and re-
manded for consideration in light of SARA.
On remand, the court of appeals unanimously reversed
the district court holding that the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suit against Pennsylvania. (Pet App. 1a) The court of
appeals further held that (1) the language of CERCLA, as
amended by SARA, clearly and explicitly abrogated state im-
munity, (2) Congress may, consistent with the Constitution,
abrogate state immunity in an Article | enactment, and (3)
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, applies retroactively to re-
spondent'’s cause of action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. CERCLA, as amended by SARA, satisfies the clear
statement rule by providing in unmistakable language Con-
gress’ intention to render states liable for damages to private
parties. When Congress defines a “person” liable under sec-
tion 107(a) to include a “state” and then provides that a state
“shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same
manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and sub-
stantively, as any nongevernmental entity, including liability
under section {107]|,” « gress’ intention to abrogate states’
immunity is unmistakably clear. A contrary interpretation
would frustrate the carefully devised legislative scheme of
this “comprehensive” legislation and hinder voluntary clean-
6
ups at a significant number of hazardous waste sites through-
out the nation.
2. This Court should overturn Hans v. Louisiana. The
Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdiction preclusion provision
that prohibits federal courts from asserting jurisdiction only
in diversity of citizenship cases between a defendant state
and a citizen of a different state. State sovereign immunity is
not embodied in the Eleventh Amendment or any other part of
the Constitution. Hans’ prohibition of federal court jurisdic-
tion as to all private party actions against states is founded on
misinterpretation of precedent and has led to a befuddling
progeny of cases creating rules and exceptions. Overturning
Hans will simplify Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence while
causing only minor change in the results of past decisions of
this Court.
3. Congress may abrogate state immunity from private
suits for money damages pursuant to its Article | powers.
Intrinsic to the design of the Constitution, the federal courts
possess jurisdiction coextensive in scope with Congress
power to enact Article I legislation such as CERCLA. Tex-
tually, the Eleventh Amendment places no restriction on Con-
gress. To secure enforcement of its enactments, Congress may
properly abrogate state immunity from private lawsuits. A
contrary result would force private parties like Respondent
herein to pay for a state's wrongdoing.
4. State consent to suit is superfluous where, as in
CERCLA, Congress abrogates state immunity to suit.
ARGUMENT
I. CERCLA’S LANGUAGE UNMISTAKABLY EX-
PRESSES CONGRESS’ INTENTION TO ABROGATE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
A. The Purpose of CERCLA Is To Redress a Fester-
ing National Environmental Problem
Following a decade or more of piecemeal environmental
legislation that engendered more disputes and rulemaking
than cleanups, Congress in 1980 enacted CERCLA to provide
a thorough-going framework for the cleanup of hazardous
waste contamination. Earlier attempts to cleanup the en-
vironment proved difficult to enforce, were laced with stat-
utory and regulatory exceptions, lacked sufficient funding
and only controlled current, not past, contamination. The
patchwork quilt of hazardous waste regulation in the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq., the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §1251 et seq., and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §3251 et seq., lent neither focus nor
muscle to a national cleanup policy. Importantly, each ex-
pressly preserved the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
See 42 U.S.C. §7604; 33 U.S.C. §1365; 42 U.S.C. §6967.
CERCLA, by imposition of strict liability on the basis of
past and present status and application to releases of haz-
ardous substances no matter how small the quantities, repre-
sented a radical departure from prior law. CERCLA was
intended as a comprehensive approach to the cleanup of the
nation’s pollution sites amid congressional apprehension of a
pollution crisis. See Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 506
(1986).
A major objective of CERCLA was to encourage the vol-
untary cleanup of contamination sites. The statute and its
legislative history emphasize the need for voluntary cleanup.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §9612(a); H. Rep. No. 96-1016, Part I,
96th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 6119, 6120 (purpose of bill is to “induce such
persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental re-
sponse actions”). Congress recognized in 1980, as well as
when CERCLA was amended by SARA in 1986, that the trust
fund created by CERCLA to fund cleanups was grossly insuf-
ficient to pay the cost of all cleanups.! Both the cost of cleanup
1. See, e.g. Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, PL. 96-510, Vol. 1, p.
101 (Statement of Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Administrator Water and
and the number of potentially responsible parties made volun-
tary cleanups difficult. To encourage voluntary cleanups,
Congress provided a statutory incentive: the right to obtain
restitution from responsible parties.
Congress authorized, in section 107(a) of CERCLA, a
“person” to recover necessary costs of response from any other
“person.” Congress defined person in the broadest sense possi-
ble: ,
“person” means an individual, firm, corporation, associa-
tion, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial
entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State or any inter-
state body. 42 U.S.C. §9601(21) (emphasis added)
The inclusion of states in the definition of person was no
accident. Congress intentionally departed from the format of
its three prior environmental enactments where it immu-
nized states from liability. Under CERCLA all political en-
tities, even the federal government, were potentially liable to
any other person who incurred cleanup costs.
Congress was well aware of state ownership and opera-
tion of contamination sites when it enacted CERCLA. States
and local governments have for decades played a major role in
managing the disposal of hazardous substances and have
often been owners and operators of such sites. Indeed, the
EPA has estimated that over 16% of all contamination sites on
the National Priorities List are currently owned or controlled
by states and local governments. (Estimate provided by EPA
Waste Management, June 20, 1979), Vol. 2, p. 252 (Statement of Represent-
ative Rostenkowski; H. Rep. 99-253, Part 1, dated August 1, 1985, prepared
to accompany H. Rep. 2817) (“EPA will never have adequate monies or
manpower to address the problem itself... Congress must facilitate clean-
ups of hazardous substances by the responsible parties”); and Interim Re-
port of the Surveys and Investigations Staff of House Committee on Appro-
priations, March 14, 1988 (SARA legislative history makes evident that
Congress recognized that without a highly successful enforcement pro-
gram, EPA would never achieve the objectives of SARA because EPA by
itself could never secure the financial and human resources required to
resolve the problems ).
9
Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, July 1, 1988.)
Some of these sites are infamous. For example, in Mason
County, West Virginia, the West Virginia Ordnance site, origi-
nally a 8,000-acre ordnance works run by the U.S. Army
during World War II, is currently owned and operated by West
Virginia as a wildlife refuge and for hunting and fishing. Land
and water in the refuge has been contaminated with chem-
icals used in the manufacture of trinitrotoluene (TNT). EPA,
Descriptions of Sites on Current National Priorities Lists,
October 1984, 548 (Dec. 1984). In Pennsylvania, a foul-smell-
ing sulfurous black liquid discharging from an abandoned gas
well is threatening use of the Presque Isle State Park, a major
recreational area on Lake Erie. Id. at 459. In Hillsboro, Ken-
tucky, there is an estimated 4.8 million cubic feet of waste
containing radioactive material at a state owned 279-acre site.
EPA, Descriptions of Sites on Update No. 2 to National Pri-
orities List, Oct. 1984.
Thus, the inclusion of states within the definition of
persons liable under CERCLA was essential to Congress’ bold
and innovative plan to rid the nation of hazardous waste
contamination.
B. CERCLA’s Language Satisfies the Clear State-
ment Rule
Beginning with the decision in Employees v. Department
of Public Health, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), this Court has con-
structed what has come to be known as the “clear statement
rule” for testing congressional abrogation of state immunity.
The clear statement rule requires that Congress express its
intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment “in unmistak-
able language in the statute itself” Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). See also Welch v. State
Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 107 S.Ct.
2941 (1987); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). A unanimous court of appeals in
Union Gas II correctly applied this standard when it held that
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, possesses “the requisite un-
10
mistakably clear language needed to abrogate the states’ elev-
enth amendment immunity.”2 832 F.2d at 1345 (Pet. App. 7)
In CERCLA, Congress abrogated state immunity in the
most direct and logical manner: it defined a “person”-liable
under section 107(a) to include a state. 42 U.S.C. §9601(21).
Judge Higginbotham, dissenting in Union Gas I, explained:
When a statute in its definitional section declares un-
equivocally that the term “person” includes a “State, mu-
nicipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or
any interstate body” 42 U.S.C. §9601(21) (emphasis
added), the explicit language of Congress should not be
disregarded where there is no legislative history suggest-
ing that Congress did not mean what they said when they
used the word “state.” 792 F.2d at 383 (Pet. App. 119)
Judge Higginbotham went on to observe that courts should
not assume that they have a better mastery of the English
language than does Congress. Not to acknowledge that Con-
gress meant to include states in the definition of “person”
would require Congress to engage in unprecedented redun-
dancy and repetition within the definition. As this Court
observed in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 186-187
(1936): “Language and objectives so plain are not to be
thwarted by resort to a rule of construction whose purpose is
but to resolve doubts and whose application in the circum-
stances would be highly artificial.”
This Court's decision in Employees is not, as contended
by Pennsylvania, dispositive of whether inclusion of “state”
within the statutory definition satisfies the clear statement
rule. At issue in Employees was whether a 1966 amendment
to the definition of “employer” in the 1938 Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) sufficiently evidenced congressional intent
to abrogate state immunity which the states had enjoyed for
over 35 years. Since Congress had not made a coordinate
2. All other lower courts that have considered this issue have reached
the same result as the Third Circuit: Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc.,
654 F.Supp. 955 (N_D.Cal. 1987); United States v. Freeman, 680 F.Supp. 73
(W.D.N.Y. 1988).
1]
change in the FLSA's liability section and there was no other
evidence in the statute or legislative history, this Court held
the clear statement rule was not satisfied. CERCLA, by con-
trast, has other statutory indicia of congressional intent to
render states liable. Furthermore, the definition of “person” in
CERCLA closely resembles the definition of “person” in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act which this Court did find sufficient
to show congressional intent to render states liable in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (“the ‘threshold
fact of congressional authorization’ to sue the State as em-
ployer is clearly present”).
Congress’ intent to subject states to liability to private
parties under section 107(a) is further evident in the inclu-
sion of the federal and local governments in the definition of
“person.” Section 107(g) of CERCLA expressly waives the
federal government's sovereign immunity. Thus, it is unimag-
inable that by enacting a “comprehensive” environmental law
to clean up all the nation’s waste sites which renders every
private individual and legal entity potentially liable, including
the federal government, Congress intended to omit states
when it expressly included them.
At the time a divided panel of the court of appeals in
Union Gas I found CERCLA’ original language did not meet
the clear statement rule, a Congressional conference commit-
tee was meeting to reconcile and compromise two substan-
tially different versions of SARA that had been passed by the
House and Senate in December 1985. See, H. R. 2817, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) and H. R. 2005 (1985). SARA was
signed into law by the President on October 17, 1986. Just as
Congress had legislatively changed the outcome in Employees
and Atascadero,’ through SARA Congress amended CERCLA
to show with more specificity its intention that states were
potentially liable to private parties under section 197(a) of
3. Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §216(b),
was amended in 1974 by Pub.L. 93-259, §6(d)(1), 88 Stat. 61. Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794, was amended by Pub.L. No.
99-506, §1003, 100 Stat. 1807 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §200 d-7) (West
Supp. 1987).
12
CERCLA. As stated by the identical, but now unanimous,
panel that had decided Union Gas |: “In SARA, however,
Congress enacted the unmistakably clear statutory language
that demonstrates its intent to abrogate the states’ eleventh
amendment immunity.” 832 F.2d at 1348 (Pet. App. 21-22)
In particular, SARA amended the definition of “owner or
operator” to provide that states would not be liable if they
acquired ownership or control of a contaminated site involun-
tarily through bankruptcy, abandonment, tax delinquency or
other similar circumstance unless they caused or contributed
to a release. But otherwise, “... such a State or local govern-
ment shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same
manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and sub-
stantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability
under section 9607 of this title.” This language not only af-
firms that Congress always intended states to be liable to all
other persons for cleanup costs, but replicates the language
Congress used in waiving federal liability for cleanup costs.‘
The federal waiver was recodified by SARA from section
107(g) to section 120(a)(1) and provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the
United States (including the executive, legislative, and
4. As the court of appeals in Union Gas I! explained:
Originally, neither the Senate nor House version of SARA §101(b)(1)
copied the waiver language of 49607(g) to abrogate state eleventh
amendment immunity. However, the conference committee inserted
language that replicated the federal waiver into the definition section,
stating that its purpose was “to clarify that if the unit of government
caused or contributed to the release or threatened release in question,
then such unit is subject to the provisions of CERCLA, both pro-
cedurally and substantively, as any non-governmental entity, including
liability under section 107 and contribution under section 113”
H.R.Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185-86, reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2835, 3276, 3278-79. To the extent
that the added language serves to “clarify” CERCLA, it amounts to a
subsequent declaration of congressional intent that deserves great
weight. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FC.C., 395 U.S. 367, 380-82, 89 S.Ct.
1794, 1801-02, 23 L.Ed. 2d 371 (1969). 832 F.2d at 1350 (Pet. App.
32-33)
13
judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and
comply with, this Act in the same manner and to the
same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any
nongovernmental entity, including liability under section
107 of this Act.
Although Pennsylvania chides the court of appeals for
misinterpreting SARA’s amendment to “owner or operator,” its
alternative explanation is illogical. Pennsylvania contends
that the amendment was to clarify only that states are not
liable to private parties when states involuntarily acquire a
site unless they cause or contribute to a release. There are two
fallacies to this contention. First, an exclusion of liability
would have meaning only so long as Congress understood
section 107(a) to render states liable. Second, under this
contention states would not be liable for cleanup at sites they
acquired voluntarily where they caused releases of hazardous
substances. Thus, a state could purchase a site voluntarily,
pollute it, and not be liable for a private party's (perhaps a
neighboring land owner's) cleanup costs, but would be liable
if the site were acquired through abandonment. Such a con-
struction is neither logical nor equitable.
To overcome the court of appeals’ decision, the confer-
ence committee surgically grafted language to several sec-
tions to overcome the deficiencies cited in the court of ap-
peals’ analysis.° The above-quoted language was added to the
definition of “owner or operator” Local governments were
referenced in the language because of a footnote in Union Gas
I that suggested that local governments may be able to derive
immunity through the Eleventh Amendment. 792 F.2d at
375, n. 3 (Pet. App. 80). Because the court of appeals had
5. Because Union Gas | was not a decision of this Court, the joint com-
mittee may not have felt the urgency of addressing it in a separate section as
opposed to the changes it did make. Returning to Judge Higginbotham, he
observed “we must never forget the complexity and the time constraints of
the federal legislative process. Legislators do not have the time or the capac-
ity to anticipate every possible argument that might be made subsequently
by creative and clever counsel.” Union Gas |, 792 F.2d at 386 (dissenting)
(Pet. App. 135)
14
relied in Union Gas I on the federal government's explicit
waiver of immunity to distinguish state immunity, the confer-
ence committee added a sentence to the federal waiver.
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the lia-
bility of any person or entity under sections 106 and 107” 42
U.S.C. §9620(a\1)
Another indication of congressional intent to make states
liable for cleanup costs to private parties under section 107(a)
is that Congress preserved states’ immunity to citizen suits in
SARA. See 42 U.S.C. §9659(a\(1). Unlike section 107(a)
which requires a plaintiff to have incurred cleanup costs prior
to initiating suit, the citizen suit provision permits anyone to
commence an action as a private attorney general to obtain an
order correcting a violation of CERCLA. Congress’ express
preservation of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from
citizen suits thus stands in sharp contrast to section 107(a)
liability where there is no such preservation of immunity.
C. Construing CERCLA to Permit Persons to Sue
States Promotes the Purposes of the Act
The above construction of CERCLA is not only true to the
text of the statute and congressional intent, but it promotes
the goals of the Act. Even the expanded funding of the trust
fund by SARA will fall far short of providing enough money to
cleanup just those contamination sites listed on the NPL. See,
Staff of House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2nd
Sess. Report on Status of Environmenial Protection Agency's
Superfund Program (March 14, 1988); Mackerron, “Super-
fund: Uncle Sam Picks Up the Tab,” Chemical Week, June 8.
1988, at 22-25. Since its first publication, the NPL has grown
threefold and is still increasing. See, National Priorities List
for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites— Update 7, 53 Fed.
Reg. 23,987, 23,989 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. Part
300, Appendix B) (proposed June 23, 1988). Absent voluntary
cleanup by persons willing to expend substantial funds and
other resources, most of the nation’s contamination sites will
15
not be cleaned and we will pass, with barely a genuflection,
our chemical and health problems to another generation .°
The principal incentive to a voluntary cleanup is the
right to recover the necessary costs of cleanup from responsi-
ble parties under section 107(a). If states were eliminated
from “persons” that could be sued to recover such costs, there
would be a powerful disincentive to any cleanup efforts by
private parties. Since CERCLA gives the federal courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction over CERCLA causes of action, a private
party cannot go into state court to recover from a state. Under
Pennsylvania's view, whenever a state is arguably responsible
for some portion of the cleanup costs under the statute, a
private party is better off taking no action at all in the hope
that the United States will cleanup the site and seek reim-
bursement from the state. In that way, a private party will not
be left, as Union Gas was here, paying the state's share of
cleanup costs. By the same token, states will have every
incentive to resist participating in any voluntary cleanup in
the hope that private parties will do the job and be unable to
recoup any part of the cost from the state. Thus, Pennsylva-
nia’s view would frustrate the “comprehensive” plan of
cleanup underlying CERCLA and leave private parties, such
as Union Gas, to pay for contamination caused by states.
Inclusion of states among potentially responsible parties
serves an additional salutary, if less obvious, purpose. The
United States EPA has been criticized by its own inspector
general for paying excessive amounts for emergency clean-
ups.’ If states have a direct monetary interest in wanting to
6. See, “Delays and Inefficiencies in the Superfund Program. ‘earings
Before the Subcomm on Superfund and Environmental Oversight of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,” 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1987) (testimony and statement of James W. Moorman, Esq, former As-
sistant Attorney General for Land & Natural Resources, U.S. Dept. of Jus-
tice: remarks for Sen. Lautenberg) (Dec. 10, 1987), Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Land & Natural Resources, U.S. Department of Justice, Decembes
10. 1987, and written testimony of Natural Resources Defense Council,
December 10, 1987.
7. See EPA, Report of Audit, No. E5E.26-05-0101-61508, Sept. 23, 1986.
16
reduce costs at sites for which they are responsible are
in a stronger position to encourage a cost-effective —
Cost effectiveness has many facets, from defining the scope of
testing and evaluation, to the selection of a cleanup meth-
odology, to the selection of a contractor. All these are areas
that can be improved upon by direct state involvement to
— wane sore | interest.
nsylvania and the amici states raise the spectre
potential burgeoning liability for waste sites. Ung ‘
the cost of cleanup of all sites throughout the nation is expen-
sive. The Department of Energy, for example, estimates its
liability for cleanup of contamination at $100 billion.’ The
Department of Defense estimates its cost at $14.8 billion?
The cost of the cleanups to private parties has also been
enormous. This Court has already answered the states’ argu-
ment in Employees where it acknowledged that Congress
acting under Article I could “place new or even enormous
fiscal burdens on the States.” Supra., 411 U.S. at 284. States
however, have the same right as other “persons” liable under
CERCLA to seek contribution from other responsible parties
and have the court equitably allocate cleanup costs among all
responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)\(1).
When submitted to the states for ratification, the Con-
8. K. Schneider, “Energy Department Faulted Dealing
clear Waste", N.Y. Times, June 7, 1988 at A22. es i
9. See 2 Tox. Tort Rep. (BNA) 756-57 (1987) c
testimon
Department of Defense before Congress. DOD. Scheme teens
Restoration Program: Annual Report to C :
March 1, 1988 at 14. © Congress for Fiscal Year 1987,
17
stitution lacked any provision granting states sovereign im-
munity in the federal courts. Nor was there any reason to
provide such immunity. The Constitution was a compact
among the people of the United States to create a federal form
of government.!° See, Amar, “Of Sovereignty and Federalism,”
96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1439 (1987). The Constitution was ratified,
not by state legislatures, but by constitutional conventions
whose delegates were selected by the people.
State sovereignty that existed prior to 1787 was revoked
and bestowed on a new federal sovereign to the extent neces-
sary for the federal sovereign to exercise its powers. See
Fletcher, “A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment,” 35 Stanford L.Rev. 1033, 1069 (1983) As James
Madison stated in The Federalist, “as far as the sovereignty of
the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people,
the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be
sacrificed to the latter” The Federalist, No. 45 at 289 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). The states, thus, were stripped of sov-
ereign immunity—in the then-prevalent international
sense—that they enjoyed prior to ratification of the Constitu-
tion Though not expressed in the Constitution until adoption
of the Tenth Amendment, states remained sovereign within
their borders as to matters not bestowed on the federal gov-
ernment. See, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1985).
The limitation on states’ sovereign immunity was essen-
tial to the effectiveness of the federal sovereign. The three
branches of the federal government were roughly co-exten-
sive in order to provide the requisite checks and balances. To
resolve disputes effectively, the judicial branch had to possess
jurisdiction over the entire federal domain to be “capable of
deciding every judicial question which grows out of the con-
stitution and laws.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264. 384 (1821). Article III of the Constitution provided for
two basic types of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction and
10. By contrast, the failed Articles of Confederation » ‘re a compact of
the states and operated only on the states, not citizens
party jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction extended to“. . .
all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ..” Party jurisdiction
was more specific and, as relevant hereto, extended “... to
controversies between two or more states; between a state and
citizens of another state; ... and between a state, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.” Noth-
ing in Article III or other parts of the Constitution, as origi-
nally ratified, expressed or implied that states were immune
from suit in the federal sphere.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 codified Article III's grant of
jurisdiction in state-citizen diversity actions. Ch. 20, §13, 1
Stat. 73, 80. As one scholar has pointed out, the Judiciary Act
was passed only a month after the House of Representatives
killed a proposed amendment to eliminate the state-citizen
diversity clause from Article III of the Constitution. Fletcher.
supra., 35 Stan. L.Rev. at 1052-53.
The States’ amici brief incorrectly contends that state
immunity from suit brought by citizens in federal court was
embodied in the Constitution as ratified. Ignoring the precise
words of Article III] which give the judiciary jurisdiction over
such suits in diversity cases as well as the more general grant
of jurisdiction in federal subject matter cases, the states’ rely
on isolated remarks of Madison, Marshall and Hamilton made
in The Federalist and the Virginia debates.'! However, schol-
ars who have recently researched the historical records of the
Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates sug-
gest that the cited remarks of Madison, Marshall and Hamil-
ton addressed federal diversity jurisdiction, not federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.'? Four members of this Court have
11. A plurality of this Court recently concluded that “at most” “the in-
tentions of the Framers and Ratifiers were ambiguous.” Welch, 107 S.Ct. at
2951
12. See, e.g, Jackson, “The Supreme Court, the 11th Amendment and
observed that important delegates at ratification conventions
such as Mason, Henry, Pendleton, Randolph, and Wilson “did
not believe that state sovereign immunity provided protection
against suits initiated by citizens of other states” Welch, 107
S.Ct. at 2962-63 (dissent); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 264-80
(dissent). Two of these individuals, Randolph and Wilson, had
served as members of the Committee of Detail at the Con-
stitutional Convention.
Thus, as drafted, the Constitution lacked any substantive
grant of state sovereign immunity and specifically opened the
federal courts to certain types of suits against states.
The Eleventh Amendment is not a broad grant of state
sovereign immunity but a narrow jurisdiction preclusion pro-
vision. The Amendment makes no mention of substantive
sovereign immunity. It provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
congruence between the language of the Amendment
wed pamie enstten 9 ef dee Conmtioatien to agparent (TNs
judicial power shall extend . . . to controversies .. . between a
barred from federal jurisdiction.
we We know. of course, that the Eleventh Amendment was
¥ ing, Oct. 1988), Amar.
State Sovereign Immunity,” 98 Yale Lj. | (forthcoming,
supra., 96 Yale LJ. at 1475; Gibbons, “The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity A Reinterpretation.” 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 191
(1983); Fletcher, supra, 35 Stan. L.Rev. at 1063
20
added to the Constitution to reverse this Court's decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) Chisholm
involved an action in assumpsit to recover for goods sold by a
South Carolina merchant to Georgia during the Revolutionary
War. In a 4-1 decision, this Court held that the state-citizen
diversity clause of Article III of the Constitution conferred
original jurisdiction on this Court. James Wilson and Ed-
mund Randolph participated in the case, respectively, as a
justice of this Court and the Attorney General of the United
States representing the plaintiff
_ The decision in Chisholm is free of any doubt that the
majority and lone dissenter understood that jurisdiction was
based on the state-citizen diversity clauses of Article III of the
Constitution and section 13 of the Judiciary Act. See 2 US.
(Dall.) at 466 (J. Wilson) and 431 (J. Iredell, dissenting)
Jusuce Iredell, a proponent of state sovereign immunity ac-
knowledged that the United States was sovereign as to all
powers surrendered by the states, with state sovereignty lim-
ited to the powers reserved to the states. 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 435
(dissent) Implicit in his opinion is that states did not sur-
render their sovereignty to be sued in federal court for breach
of contract ten santice Wendell did net contend Ghat states
were immune suit in federal court in all circumstances
See, also, Atascadero, 473 US. at 283 (dissent) |
__ After ratification of the Eleventh Amendment," but be-
fore Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. | (1890), the Supreme Court
interpreted the Amendment literally and narrowly as preclud-
ing only federal court jurisdiction in state-citizen diversity
cases The states did not even raise the Eleventh Amendment
as a jurisdictional bar in three cases brought between 1810
and 1819 where the appellate jurisdiction of this Court was
invoked by individuals suing states. See McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch.) 164 (1812); Smith » Maryland, 10 US.
1% lromcally. Pennsvivamia’s legislature refused to ratify the Eleventh
ey See Mayle v Pennsylvania, 479 Pa 384. 402. 388 A 2d 709.
21
(6 Cranch.) 286 (1810). Eventually when the Eleventh
Amendment was raised as a defense, this Court found the
Eleventh Amendment did not preclude federal appellate juris-
diction in an action by a citizen against his own state, Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), or original jurisdic-
tion in an action against a state official based on federal law to
recover money deposited in a state treasury. Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Cohens,
Chief Justice Marshall addressed the conflict between Article
III jurisdiction and state sovereign immunity as follows:
_.. are we at liberty to insert in this [Article III| general
grant, an exception of those cases in which a State may
be a party? Will the spirit of the constitution justify this
attempt to control its words? We think it will not. We
think a case arising under the constitution or laws of the
United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union,
whoever may be the parties to that case. Id., at 382-383.
C. Hans v. Louisiana Should Be Overturned
Ninety-five years after ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment, this Court extended the Amendment’ coverage
in a way never intended by Congress or the state legislatures
that ratified it. Hans v. Louisiana was the culmination of a line
of lawsuits that had reached the Supreme Court seeking pay-
ment on bonds which certain states, predominantly in the
post-Civil War South, had repudiated. See Gibbons, supra. , 83
Colum. L.Rev. at 1968-2002. Hans, a citizen of Louisiana,
sought to enforce payment of interest on a bond issued by
Louisiana in 1874 where payment had been guaranteed by an
amendment to Louisiana's constitution. In 1879, Louisiana
amended its constitution to repudiate the bond. Hans claimed
that the 1879 amendment to Louisiana’ constitution im-
paired his contract in violation of Article 1, section 10 of the
United States Constitution. Federal court jurisdiction was
premised on the “arising under” clause of Article II! and the
1875 Act of Congress which codified general original federal
question jurisdiction. 18 Stat. 470.
22
This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment precludes
federal court jurisdiction over suits by individuals against
States irrespective of whether jurisdiction is founded on a
federal question or state-citizen diversity. Though legitimate
doubts have been raised as to whether the decision in Hans
was grounded in the Constitution or merely upon the absence
of a federal cause of action, Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 299-300
(dissent), this Court has recognized the former to be the case.
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934). As a
constitutional decision, the reasoning in Hans is insubstantial
and the precedent relied upon flawed. Recognizing the textual
limitation of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Bradley relied
in the opinion on the 1798 decision of this Court in Hol-
lingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, and an ante-
constitutional view of sovereign immunity as expressed in
Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm and Alexander Hamil-
ton'’s view in The Federalist, No. 81.
Justice Bradley contended that Hollingsworth showed
the understanding of the Supreme Court in 1798, just after
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, that the Amendment
applied to federal question as well as state-citizen diversity
suits. The per curiam opinion in Hollingsworth is a single line
stating “there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any
case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens
of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”
Id. at 382. Hollingsworth was an action in equity to quiet title
to disputed lands, so that no federal question was involved. |
J.Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, 725 (1971). Indeed, the
sole issue in Hollingsworth was whether the Eleventh
Amendment applied prospectively or retroactively. It would
seem a leap of logic, therefore, for Justice Bradley to contend
in Hans that the words “in any case” referred to both federal
question and state-citizen diversity cases when quite appar-
ently they refer to “past or future” cases. Furthermore, if
Justice Bradley were correct in his interpretation, it is nothing
less than astounding that Chief Justice Marshall and counsel
for the parties in Cohens v. Virginia failed to cite or allude to
23
Hollingsworth which was then one of the few Supreme Court
cases mentioning the Eleventh Amendment. — |
Justice Bradley's reliance on an ante-constitutional view
of state sovereign immunity has been almost universally criti-
cized in recent years. The dissenting opinions in Employees,
Atascadero, Pennhurst and Welch digest the recent scholarly
research and point out that Justice Bradley reached the wrong
conclusions from his quotations from Justice Iredell and Alex-
ander Hamilton. It bears emphasizing that the central prem-
ise in Justice Bradley's argumeni was that Chisholm was
wrongly decided. Yet an adverse popular reaction to Chisholm
does not require the conclusion that the case was wrongly
decided. Rather, as contended above, Chisholm was a correct
constitutional decision that was overturned by the political
act of amending the Constitution.
rturning Hans v. Louisiana Will Have a
7 ee Effect on Eleventh Amendment Juris-
» .
The holding in Hans has spawned a raft of legal fictions
that would otherwise be unnecessary. For example, indi-
viduals may sue state officials to obtain injunctive relief so
long as the state is not named as a defendant. Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). Another example, individuals may sue
states for monetary relief where Congress has abrogated
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity or the states have
consented to suit. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra.; Welch v. State
Dept. of Highways, supra. While born of pragmatism, these
fictions support an erroneous principle that should be cast
a peded question jurisdiction has grown exponentially in
the past 100 years with Congress regulating an ever growing
list of fields. With that growth has come an increasing
number of affirmative rights individuals may exercise. Sev-
eral of these fields necessarily involve states. In many in-
stances, individual rights cannot be vindicated unless indi-
viduals are able to sue states for wrongdoing, not just to —
injunctive relief, but for monetary awards. That is especially
24
true in connection with CERCLA where Congress has legisla-
ted a solution to a festering environmental problem that is
dependent on all individuals and legal entities, corporate and
politic, voluntarily contributing to cleanups which the federal
government alone cannot afford. To achieve a uniformity of
enforcement, Congress gave the federal district courts ex-
clusive original jurisdiction over CERCLA cases. 42 US.
§9613(b). CERCLA is a program that is ill-suited to frustra-
tion by individual states jealous of their turf. yet that will be
the result if individuals cannot sue states in federal court.
If the true underpinning of Hans is an ante-Constitu-
tional concept of state sovereign immunity, that concept is
itself outmoded. States have themselves largely dismantled
the trappings of state sovereign immunity. The courts of over
30 states have partially or completely abolished sovereign
immunity. See, K. C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise.
§25.00 (1980 Supp.). Pennsylvania's Supreme Court abol-
ished the doctrine in that state in 1978. Mayle v. Pennsylva-
nia, supra. Two years later, Pennsylvania's legislature enacted
sovereign immunity as substantive law but created numerous
exceptions. 42 Pa.C.S. §8521 et seq.
If, as Union Gas contends, Hans was wrongly decided,
then the doctrine of stare decisis alone cannot support its
continuation. But see, Welsh, 107 S.Ct. at 2956. While stare
decisis is an important element in the fabric of the law, it is
not of constitutional stature. To perpetuate a misinterpretation
of the Constitution on the ground that wooden adherence to
stare decisis demands it—is itself unconstitutional since it
undermines the Supremacy Clause.
Furthermore, overturning Hans will not lead to chaos.
There will be no change in the result in this case since
CERCLA satisfies the clear statement rule. A current schol-
arly article analyzed the 17 Eleventh Amendment cases cited
in the plurality decision in Welch and concluded there would
be little change in the outcome of those cases so long as a less
stringent version of the clear statement rule is retained. See.
Jackson, supra., note 12. Under that analysis, there would be
no change in this Court's decisions involving federal question
25
claims brought under federal statutes. Jurisdiction of en
claims involving state taxation can be resolved under tradi-
tional doctrines of comity and abstention as can pendent state
law claims. The result would be different, however, in on
ralty and this Court's original jurisdiction cases, but suc
cases are relatively few and the need for uniformity of law in
A
ag ions was a wrong turn for this Court and has
spawned a progeny of cases that befuddle an otherwise
straightforward interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.
As is especially evident in this case, its doctrine “intrudes “
the ideal of liberty under law by protecting the States “ory
consequences of their illegal conduct.” Atascadero, 473 U. 5. at
302 (dissent). Now is the time to sweep away this pernicious
precedent.
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION EMPOWERS
” probed TO ABROGATE STATE IMMUNITY TO
PRIVATE LAWSUITS
The anomalies in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
caused by this Court's wrong turn in Hans now force this
Court to consider whether Congress has authority to —
the Eleventh Amendment’ jurisdictional preclusion in ;
cle I enactments. A decision on this issue is unnecessary
Hans is overturned.
Acknowl-
Prior Decisions of This Court Have
" edged the Constitutionality of Article I Abroga-
tion
The Eleventh Amendment does not embody a —
tive rule of state sovereign immunity. Indeed, the cena
ment is simply a jurisdiction preclusion clause. To the ext
that states enjoy sovereign immunity within their borders on
matters of state law, that immunity derives from the common
law or state constitutional or legislative enactment. It follows,
then. that the Eleventh Amendment imposes no limitation on
Congress plenary power under Article | to enact laws declar-
26
ing that persons may recover damages from states for vio-
lation of federal law.
This Court has recognized the above rule in its Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence.!4 In Parden v. Terminal Railway
of the Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964),
where this Court held that Congress had abrogated state
immunity in a commerce clause enactment, this Court de-
clared:
While a State's immunity from suit by a citizen with-
out its consent has been said to be rooted in “the inherent
nature of sovereignty,” Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, supra, 322 U.S. 47, 51, 88 L.Ed. 1121, 1125, 64
S.Ct. 873, the States surrendered a portion of their sov-
ereignty when they granted Congress the power to regu-
late commerce
“This power, like all others vested in congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitation other than are prescribed
in the constitution. . . . If, as has always been understood,
the sovereignty of congress, though limited to specified
objects is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, is vested in congress as absolutely as it would be
in a single government, having in its constitution the
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are
found in the constitution of the United States.” Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 196-197, 6 L.ed. 23, 70.
The sovereign power of the states is necessarily dimin-
ished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal
14. So too has every court of appeal addressing the issue: Union Gas Il,
832 F.2d at 1356 (Pet. App. 64-65a); In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311,
328 (7th Cir. 1987) cert. denied 108 S.Ct. 227 (1987): County of Monroe v.
Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1128-35 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104
(1983); Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070,
1074-82 (Sth Cir 1979); Mills Music. Inc. v Arizona, 591 F 2d 1278, 1285
(9th Cir 1979),
27
in the Constitution ... [T)}here is no such
limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce
|as there is upon the federal power to tax state instru-
mentalities}. The state can no more deny the power if its
exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an
individual.
empowering Congress to regulate commerce,
aes, tin teat cee eee any portion of
their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such
regulation. Id. at 191-92.
Court followed the above rule in Employe.’s, a case
ween amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act
enacted pursuant to Article I's commerce clause. Although
this Court held that Congress had not satisfied the clear
gress was authorized to abrogate state immunity from suit in
Article | enactments stating: “
Where employees in state institutions not conducted
profit have such a relation to interstate commerce that
national policy, of which Congress is the keeper, indicates
that their status should be raised, Congress can act.
when Congress does act, it may place new or even enor-
mous fiscal burdens on the States. Id. 411 U.S. at 284.
inued validity
of this rule, Welch at 2946 (plurality opinion), and declines An
review it. See, e.g., Edgar v. McVey Trucking, 108 S.Ct.
(1987). . —_ this
Pennsylvania and amici contend that decisions by
Court in Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment cases under
mine the rule's vitality. In particular, they contend this ourt’s
statements in Fitzpatrick support their argument: as
Bt we tk the Ered Aen, cl er
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 33 L.Ed. 842, 10 S.Ct. 504 (1890)
are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of
§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
28
We think that Congress may, in determining what is
“appropriate legislation” for the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for
private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. 427
U.S. 445 at 457.
The “other contexts” adverted to in the above quote are
not Article I enactments as suggested by Pennsylvania. Peti-
tioners Brief at 40. The narrow issue in Fitzpatrick was
whether the Eleventh Amendment restricted Congress in
rendering states liable to individuals in Fourteenth Amend-
ment enactments. The Fourteenth Amendment, after all, be-
stowed on Congress the power to legislate in areas such as the
States’ justice systems that traditionally had been wholly in
the states’ sphere. But for the Amendment, Congress had no
authority to invade the states’ sphere and render them liable
to private parties. The Court's vague reference to “other con-
texts,” then, suggests that the Court will carefully examine
intrusions into the states’ central government activities in
Fourteenth Amendment enactments which render the states’
liable to private parties.!>
B. Principles of Federalism Require that Congress’
Plenary Power Under Article I Not Be Dimin-
ished By A Judicial Inability to Enforce Its En-
actments
Congress’ powe” under Article I to subject states to suit in
federal court manifests itself in the interplay among Article I,
the Supremacy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment. If, as
the Constituiion declares, the Constitution and laws made by
Congress are to be the supreme law of the land, Congress
must have authority to regulate the conduct of the states
under Article |, and the judiciary must have authority to
15. See Field. “The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immu-
nity Doctrines,” 126 U. Pa. L._Rev. 1203, 1233 (1978)
29
enforce Congress’ laws.'© Sovereignty cannot inhere in au-
thority bereft of the means of enforcement. Only if construed
as a narrow jurisdiction preclusion clause is the Eleventh
Amendment consistent with this concept.
The Constitution cannot be read on a timeline with the
Eleventh Amendment as a watershed controlling under
which provision of the Constitution Congress can regulate
states by making them subject to private suits for money
damages. To do so would impinge on Congress’ ability to
establish uniform federal policy and regulate the states re-
garding its primary governmental functions specified in Arti-
cle | yet permit Congress to regulate the states in areas tradi-
tionally peripheral to Congress’ role. Such an interpretation
would be illogical. As this Court stated in Prout v. Starr, 188
U.S. 537, 543 (1903):
The Constitution o the United States, with the several
amendments thereof, must be regarded as one instru-
ment, all of whose provisions are to be deemed of equal
validity. It would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the
immunity of the individual states from suits by citizens
of other states, provided for in the Eleventh, were to be
interpreted as nullifying those other provisions which
confer power on Congress to regulate commerce among
the several states, which forbid the states from entering
into any treaty, alliance or confederation, from passing
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the
obligation of contracts ... —all of which provisions ex-
isted before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment,
which still exist, and which would be nullified and made
of no effect, if the judicial power of the United States
could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the
passage of state laws disregarding these constitutional
Sateations
16 See Tribe. “Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation
and Regulation.” 89 Harv. L Rev. 682, 694 (1976).
30
The non-unitary concept of the Constitution espoused by
Pennsylvania and amici has its basis in a misreading of
Fitzpatrick. While Fitzpatrick drew upon the fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment post-dated the Eleventh, it did so
only to make the point that the states willingly surrendered to
Congress broad powers traditionally within the states’ sphere
notwithstanding the existence of the Eleventh Amendment.
Fitzpatrick did not eviscerate the Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article 1, §8, by limiting judicial enforcement of
otherwise proper congressional enactments. The Eleventh
Amendment, by its own terms, cannot limit congressional
power since it is directed solely at judicial power
Again, this case illustrates the harm that would be
wrought by a limitation on Congress’ power to render states
liable to private parties for cleanup costs. Because the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over CERCLA causes of
action, private parties like Union Gas are limited to suing in
federal court. If a state cannot be sued by private parties,
private parties will resist or delay voluntary cleanup of a site
in hopes that the EPA will undertake the cleanup and sue the
state. Likewise, a state will have an incentive to avoid funding
a cleanup in hopes that private parties will do so. The result-
ing standoff frustrates the congressional scheme and unduly
strains the limited resources of the Superfund trust fund.
The states’ protection from congressional abuse of its
Article | power is found in the structure of the Constitution
itself. South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988) As this
Court observed in Garcia, Congress consists of senators and
representatives elected in each of the fifty states, and they are
responsive to states concerns. Supra, 469 U.S. at 550. “It is no
novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Govern-
ment was designed in large part to protect the States from
overreacting by Congress.” Id. at 551. States’ direct linkage to
federal lawmakers insures that the states interests will be
considered. Furthermore, federal law-making does not occur
in a vacuum—states frequently take a direct role in lobbving
congressmen and presenting testimony supportive of their
position, as they did when CERCLA and SARA were enacted.
The framers of the Constitution properly envisioned a
3]
judiciary whose jurisdiction was coextensive with Congress’
Article | powers, and the Eleventh Amendment should not be
construed to distort that vision.
IV. STATE CONSENT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO
CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION
State consent to suit is superfluous where, as in
CERCLA, Congress abrogated state immunity to suit. Unlike
Parden, it is unnecessary to imply Pennsylvania's consent to
suit for participating in a federally regulated area since Con-
gress unmistakably expressed its intention to subject states to
liability under section 107(a) of CERCLA.
The clear statement rule is a standard of judicial inter-
pretation—it was not intended as a general notice provision.
CERCLA, as originally enacted, put states as well as other
individuals and entities on notice that they were “persons”
who could sue and be sued under section 107(a). Thus, Penn-
sylvania received as much notice as Union Gas and all other
“persons” of their rights under CERCLA.'’ The mere fact that
CERCLA imposes liability based on a person's status creates
no unfairness to states that is not visited on all other persons.
If, as numerous lower courts have held, CERCLA'’s imposition
of retroactive liability is constitutional under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause,'* notice is irrelevant and no
Eleventh Amendment issue is even implicated.
17. The notice issue raised by Pennsylvania is also irrelevant since
both before and after passage of CERCLA, the seepage of coal tar from the
Brodhead Creek site continued while Pennsylvania was an owner and oper-
ator of the site.
18. See US. w Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810
F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir 1986) and cases cited therein.
32
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of
appeals in Union Gas II should be affirmed and the case
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
July 11, 1988
Respectfully submitted,
Robert A. Swift"
Marguerite R. Goodman
KOHN, SAVETT, KLEIN & GRAF, PC.
1101 Market Street, Suite 2400
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 238-1700
Lawrence Demase
ROSE, SCHMIDT, CHAPMAN.
DUFF & HASLEY
900 Oliver Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
(412) 434-8610
Attorneys for Respondent
Union Gas Company
“Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.