Respondents Brief — Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.

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OCTOBER TERM, 1987

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Petitioner

vs.

UNION GAS COMPANY, Respondent

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

Robert A. Swift

(Counsel of Record)

R. Goodman

KOHN, SAVETT, KLEIN & GRAF, PC.

2400 One Reading Center

1101 Market Street

PA 19107

(215) 238-1700

Lawrence Demase

ROSE, SCHMIDT, CHAPMAN,

DUFF & HASLEY

900 Oliver Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

(412) 434-8610

7

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether CERCLA’ language unmistakably expresses

Congress’ intention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immu-

nity?

2. Whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal

courts from asserting jurisdiction only in diversity of citizen-

ship cases between a defendant state and a citizen of a differ-

ent state’?

3. Whether Article I of the Constitution empowers Con-

gress to abrogate state immunity to private lawsuits?

4. Whether state consent to suit is a prerequisite to con-

gressional abrogation?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... ..

PRARSREER GE GRD GUED « ok cc cv cscctceeseseasneuneane

CERCLA’ Language Unmistakably Expresses

Congress’ Intention to Abrogate Eleventh

Amendment Immunity ....................

A. The Purpose of CERCLA Is To Redress a

Festering National Environmental Prob-

B. CERCLA’ Language Satisfies the Clear

DREGE GHD. «0 04 cc cacenuacdanenenee

C. Construing CERCLA To Permit Persons To

Sue States Promotes the Purposes of the

GMB .cccceccescecsencasesuennneeee

The Eleventh Amendment Precludes Federal

Courts From Asserting Jurisdiction Only in

Diversity of Citizenship Cases Between a

Defendant State and a Citizen of a Different

BREED . ccccccncscccecescenueane

A. As Drafted in 1787, the Constitution Did

Not Provide for State Sovereign Immunity

im PEE CARNE .. . « ccnnedeaseuuseueas

B. The Eleventh Amendment Precludes

Federal Court Jurisdiction Only in Actions

Brought by Individuals Against States

Based on Diversity of Citizenship .......

Hans v. Louisiana Should Be Overturned

D. Overturning Hans v. Louisiana Will Have a

Salutary Effect on Eleventh Amendment

PEED. oo 6 cccacnsceesanueeeee

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14

16

III. Article I of the Constitution Empowers Con-

gress to Abrogate State Immunity to Private

ek ceca wcecccsoccce ce

A. Prior Decisions of This Court Have Ac-

knowledged the Constitutionality of Article

CLE. Se uewdeecscuscccees

B. Principles of Federalism Require That Con-

gress’ Plenary Power Under Article I Not

Be Dismissed By a Judicial Inability to En-

force Its Enactments ..................

IV. State Consent Is Not a Prerequisite to Congres-

ees cece concciceces

I Ee

25

25

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Page

Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,

473 U.S. 234 (1985) .......... 9, 11, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 20, 22, 23

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) 17, 21, 22

County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.

1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1104 (1983) ......... 25

Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare

v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.

SD Miincisevoisesanetess 9, 10, 11, 16, 23, 27

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ................ 23

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445

Ss cick Golwhutekbusasesecune’ 11, 23, 27, 28, 29

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,

ak Gf rere 17, 30

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1980)......... 6, 20-25, 27

Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 ........ 22

Mayle v. Pennsylvania, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709

CD ingas cd 666s Konsened OSEN ENS oneeets 20, 24

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316

CD é nha khives's dnd él bealesad eee as 20

In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987) cert.

denied sub-nom Edgar v. McVey Trucking, 108 S.Ct.

Ns «ct iss dn 9 wining eekine et Seeeieiee 25-27

Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of

Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, reh. denied,

Se : ES 5 io cd csv dwacddienae neces 7

Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.

E+ cthGucand ss denis dud eee eens ean 26

Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)........... 22

New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 164 (1812)... 20

iv

TABLE OF CITATIONS—(Continued )

Cases Page

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)

ET En Serre yee Ween BMC Ata. 21

Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks

Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) ............. 26, 30

Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d

I ncaa ok dee es a 26

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465

I ii nk on cues cae eeaaw veswadcivds 9, 23

Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903) .................. 29

Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 286 (1810) .... 20

South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S.Ct. 1355 (1988) ........ 30

United States v. Union Gas Company, (Union Gas 1), 792

F.2d at 383 (3rd Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded

sub nom. Union Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 107 S.Ct.

aNd de pba dideeds vans 10, 11, 12, 13, 14

United States v. Union Gas Company, (Union Gas I), 832

EEE Re tee 9, 12, 26, 31

United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) ...... 10

United States v. Freeman, 680 F.Supp. 73 (W.D.N_Y.

SEE occu bay Gecasaieninyexmbeewieb bese cess 10

United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem-

ical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ........ 3]

Welch v. State Department of Highways and Public Trans-

portation, 107 S.Ct. 2941 (1987) .. 9, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27

Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 654 F.Supp. 955

SIS ode dig ded coc eclcen clewuh badue 10

CITATIONS—(Continued )

eons TABLE OF CITATIONS—(Continued )

Statut Page

Coneaean ae <i ' Constitution and Statutes Page

United States Constitution ao.

Ne einen noeccscecawks 6, 21, 25, 27-30 ery Act ,

TEARS pees ete es oe 17, 19, 21 EL 45 Sesh Gh ni bbn esd peeves idvenssd

TPP TTT TT TTT TT eter 28 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,

ns on cducnsendsnanbes saeeene 31 ik bis isc mkek i bua x dois dee 7

ID gk occcccccecesevcetsvacees I 7 EIS Ss Shes ee ea tea 7

Eleventh Amendment....................... passim Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of

Fourteenth Amendment ..................... 28, 29 1986,

Fifteenth Amendment ......................55. 27 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(D) ................ 000. 2, 12

United States Code A See i 15

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII i he cae ch acaue wae od 2, 12,14

nv eneiebanakea bald 11 |) Pe ee 14

Clean Water Act, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes

33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(3) and (f)(2) ke sean s ememnmaee 4 JARA Continuation Act of 1980

2) See 7 sean sneacenees 24

§1365 rrr ee rT TTT LT TT ete. ee 7 Legislative and Agency Materials

Clean Air Act, Delays and Inefficiencies in the Superfund Program:

33 U.S.C. §7401 pe eeeeeseeeeoeereeeseresenacee : Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Superfund

ia eet ebteceiedebkendiwns'sy

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation & Liability Act of 1980,

| BO eee rer er 1, 8, 10

Ss nid canceocksy bt schent passim

NS Sc od baviddesune vasa wee 11,12

EE hos os oodnd beadewenaeaneet 7

CE ci Sd accdyctacuedeunaneeas 24

Fair Labor Standards Act

ee As occ ckvckncenesh sane aun 11

Judiciary Act of 1789

- ff ei eo & ReePerrerre Terr ry 18, 20

Judiciary Act of 1875

EEE ad vea ca tidscbenedsseuves eccweeehes 21

vi

ee ee ee

and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Commit-

tee on Environmental and Public Works, 100th

Sn, DUM occ cencnconsnccncscceses 15

Descriptions of Sites on Current National Priorities

MOR, TERWR, GPU, BEG oes e cc cccescccnccesees 9

Descriptions of Sites on Update No. 2 to National

Priorities List, EPA, Oct. 1984 .................. i)

H.Rep. No. 96-1016, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.

SE Sabie Adeethole wins ee eeniewerderacee«s 7

H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ......... 1]

H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ......... }]

Interim Report on the Surveys and Investigations

Staff, House Committee on Appropriations (1988) .. 8

TABLE OF CITATIONS—(Continued )

Legislative and Agency Materials Page

National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous

Waste Sites—Update 7, 53 F.R. 23, 987 (to be cod-

ified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300, App. B) .............. 14

Report of Audit No. E5E26-05-0101-61508, EPA,

OUD ocanec éeevinwweusssévueesenusses 15

Report on Status of Environmental Protection

Agency’s Superfund Program, Staff of House Com-

mittee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.

SE tc ddd vd Sake inde Raeeeeenegshs bs sess 14

Books, Periodicals and Other Sources

Amar, “Of Sovereignty and Federalism,” 96 Yale

RRR ere eee 17,19

Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1987,

oo nein e occa an SR oie cted 16

K. C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1980) .. 24

The Federalist Papers (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).. 17, 18, 22

Field, “The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sov-

ereign Immunity Doctrines,” 126 U. Pa. L.Rev.

he acces hacen beasenetséeoes 28

Fletcher, “A Historical Interpretation of the Elev-

enth Amendment,” 35 Stan. L.Rev. 1033

| Pree eerrr Tr re Ty CTT errr Tee 17, 18, 19

Gibbons, “The Eleventh Amendment and State Sov-

ereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,” 83 Colum.

Dh IN so can kuddccdebicensces 19, 21

I J. Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the

United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801

I irs cues iin dads ities whidiged nk wastiy 22

Jackson, “The Supreme Court, the 11th Amend-

ment and State Sovereign Immunity,” 98 Yale L.J. !

(forthcoming Oct. 1988) .................665. 18, 24

TABLE. OF CITATIONS—(Continued )

Books, Periodicals and Other Sources

I Legislative History of the Comprehensive En-

vironmental Response Compensation and Liability

SUS hdbuanusekoNadneetecedatonces es

Mackerron, “Superfund: Uncle Sam Picks Up the

Tab,” Chemical Week, June 8, 1988 .............

Schneider, “Energy Department Faulted on Dealing

With Nuclear Waste,” N.Y. Times, June 7, 1988 ..

Tribe, “Intergovernmental Immunities in Litiga-

tion, Taxation and Regulation,” 89 Harv. L.Rev. 682

(1976)

eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeseeeeeeeeeeeeeee ese ee 6

No. 87-1241

yy hay

of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Petitioner

VS.

UNION GAS COMPANY, Respondent

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. United States Constitution, Amendment XI:

The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-

menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any

Foreign State.

2. United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §§9601(21) and

9607(a), P.L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 |Comprehensive En-

vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability (“Super-

fund”) Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”)}:

9601(21) ‘person’ means an individual, firm, corpora-

tion, association, partnership, consortium,

joint venture, commercial entity, United States

Government, State, municipality, commission,

political subdivision of a State or any interstate

body;

9607(a) ...any person who at the time of disposal of

any hazardous substance owned or operated

any facility at which such hazardous sub-

stances were disposed of,...shall be liable

for...any other necessary costs of response

incurred by any other person consistent with

the national contingency plan. ...

3. United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §9601(20\D) and

9620(a\(1), PL. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 |Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”)|:

9601(20\D) The term “owner or operator” does not in-

clude a unit of State or local government

which acquired ownership or control invol-

untarily through bankruptcy, tax delin-

quency, abandonment, or other circum-

stances in which the government

involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its

function as sovereign. The exclusion pro-

vided under this paragraph shall not apply

to any State or local government which has

caused or contributed to the release or

threatened release of a hazardous substance

from the facility, and such a State or local

government shall be subject to the provi-

sions of this Act in the same manner and to

the same extent, both procedurally and sub-

stantively, as any nongovernmental entity,

including liability under section 107.

9620(ay1) In general.--Each department, agency,

and instrumentality of the United States

(including the executive, legislative, and

judicial branches of government) shall be

subject to, and comply with, this Act in the

same manner and to the same extent, both

procedurally and substantively, as any non-

governmental entity, including liability un-

der section 107 of this Act. Nothing in this

section shall be construed to affect the lia-

bility of any person or entity under sections

106 and 107.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The sudden release of coal tar into Brodhead Creek in

Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania in October 1980 caused the

United States to declare the site the nation’s first emergency

Superfund site. A map of the site is contained in the Joint

Appendix at J.A. 108. Adjacent to the stream from 1890 to

1948 in an industrial section of Stroudsburg had been a

carburetted water gas plant which produced coal gas as well

as its by-product, coal tar. While some constituents of coal tar

are now defined as hazardous substances under CERCLA

(J.A. 51), the EPA regards in-ground disposal of coal tar as

state of the art technology during the first part of this century

(see EPA Amended Fund Authorization Report). The plant

was dismantled in 1948 and replaced successively by propane

and natural gas distribution systems. The Company operating

the plant changed ownership several times before being

merged into respondent in 1978.

Between 1960 and 1962 the State rechanneled, narrowed

and deepened Brodhead Creek and erected a dike on its sides.

The Borough of Stroudsburg and later the State obtained a

permanent easement or fee title to much of the site. (J.A.

98-99) The rechannelization of this fast flowing stream

started a process of downcutting of the stream bed and erosion

of the toe of the dike that led to the release of coal tar during

the period that the State was an owner and operator of the

site. It was during repairs to the toe of the dike that coal tar

was first discovered. Between April 1981 and January 1982,

the United States did a cleanup of the site at an alleged

expense of $967,000.00. The United States contended that

there was a continuing release and threat of release of coal tar

which was not abated until the cleanup was complete. (J.A.

50) In 1984, Pennsylvania entered into a Multi-Site Cooper-

ative Agreement with the United States covering the

Brodhead Creek site whereby Pennsylvania agreed to take the

lead in continuing remedial activities under the authority and

funding of CERCLA. (J.A. 100-107)

The United States commenced this lawsuit on May 23,

1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania to recover its cleanup costs pursuant

to CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1321(b)(3)

and (f)(2), naming respondent as the sole defendant. (J.A. 5)

Respondent filed a third-party complaint naming the Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania and the Borough of Stroudsburg

as third party defendants alleging that they were owners and

operators of a facility at the site within the meaning of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A), and, together with others,

negligently caused or contributed to the release of coal tar.

(J.A. 37)

The State moved to dismiss the third-party complaint

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) alleging that it was

immune to suit under CERCLA pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted

the State's motion. (J.A. 45) Thereafter, the United States filed

an amended complaint revising its damage claim, and re-

spondent filed an amended third-party complaint. (J.A. 46

and 81) The State again moved to dismiss, and the district

court granted the motion for the reasons set forth in its earlier

opinion. (J.A. 95)

As a result of a settlement reached among the United

States, respondent and the Borough of Stroudsburg whereby

respondent paid a major portion of the cost of cleanup, the

district Court dismissed the action. (J.A. 96) Respondent then

appealed the district court's dismissal of Pennsylvania as a

defendant to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit. A two member majority of the Third Circuit affirmed

the district court's order, with the Honorable A. Leon Higgin-

botham filing a vigorous dissent concluding that CERCLA

clearly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.

(Pet. App. 74a)

On October 17, 1986, shortly after respondent filed a

petition for certiorari with this Court, the President signed

into law SARA, which amended CERCLA. At the urging of

respondent herein and the United States, which as amicus

contended SARA “authorizes suits against states or local gov-

ernments for liability or contribution when such entries

caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a

hazardous substance,” (Amicus Br. at 5-6) this Court granted

certiorari, vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, and re-

manded for consideration in light of SARA.

On remand, the court of appeals unanimously reversed

the district court holding that the Eleventh Amendment does

not bar suit against Pennsylvania. (Pet App. 1a) The court of

appeals further held that (1) the language of CERCLA, as

amended by SARA, clearly and explicitly abrogated state im-

munity, (2) Congress may, consistent with the Constitution,

abrogate state immunity in an Article | enactment, and (3)

CERCLA, as amended by SARA, applies retroactively to re-

spondent'’s cause of action.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. CERCLA, as amended by SARA, satisfies the clear

statement rule by providing in unmistakable language Con-

gress’ intention to render states liable for damages to private

parties. When Congress defines a “person” liable under sec-

tion 107(a) to include a “state” and then provides that a state

“shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same

manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and sub-

stantively, as any nongevernmental entity, including liability

under section {107]|,” « gress’ intention to abrogate states’

immunity is unmistakably clear. A contrary interpretation

would frustrate the carefully devised legislative scheme of

this “comprehensive” legislation and hinder voluntary clean-

6

ups at a significant number of hazardous waste sites through-

out the nation.

2. This Court should overturn Hans v. Louisiana. The

Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdiction preclusion provision

that prohibits federal courts from asserting jurisdiction only

in diversity of citizenship cases between a defendant state

and a citizen of a different state. State sovereign immunity is

not embodied in the Eleventh Amendment or any other part of

the Constitution. Hans’ prohibition of federal court jurisdic-

tion as to all private party actions against states is founded on

misinterpretation of precedent and has led to a befuddling

progeny of cases creating rules and exceptions. Overturning

Hans will simplify Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence while

causing only minor change in the results of past decisions of

this Court.

3. Congress may abrogate state immunity from private

suits for money damages pursuant to its Article | powers.

Intrinsic to the design of the Constitution, the federal courts

possess jurisdiction coextensive in scope with Congress

power to enact Article I legislation such as CERCLA. Tex-

tually, the Eleventh Amendment places no restriction on Con-

gress. To secure enforcement of its enactments, Congress may

properly abrogate state immunity from private lawsuits. A

contrary result would force private parties like Respondent

herein to pay for a state's wrongdoing.

4. State consent to suit is superfluous where, as in

CERCLA, Congress abrogates state immunity to suit.

ARGUMENT

I. CERCLA’S LANGUAGE UNMISTAKABLY EX-

PRESSES CONGRESS’ INTENTION TO ABROGATE

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

A. The Purpose of CERCLA Is To Redress a Fester-

ing National Environmental Problem

Following a decade or more of piecemeal environmental

legislation that engendered more disputes and rulemaking

than cleanups, Congress in 1980 enacted CERCLA to provide

a thorough-going framework for the cleanup of hazardous

waste contamination. Earlier attempts to cleanup the en-

vironment proved difficult to enforce, were laced with stat-

utory and regulatory exceptions, lacked sufficient funding

and only controlled current, not past, contamination. The

patchwork quilt of hazardous waste regulation in the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq., the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. §1251 et seq., and the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §3251 et seq., lent neither focus nor

muscle to a national cleanup policy. Importantly, each ex-

pressly preserved the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.

See 42 U.S.C. §7604; 33 U.S.C. §1365; 42 U.S.C. §6967.

CERCLA, by imposition of strict liability on the basis of

past and present status and application to releases of haz-

ardous substances no matter how small the quantities, repre-

sented a radical departure from prior law. CERCLA was

intended as a comprehensive approach to the cleanup of the

nation’s pollution sites amid congressional apprehension of a

pollution crisis. See Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 506

(1986).

A major objective of CERCLA was to encourage the vol-

untary cleanup of contamination sites. The statute and its

legislative history emphasize the need for voluntary cleanup.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §9612(a); H. Rep. No. 96-1016, Part I,

96th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &

Admin. News 6119, 6120 (purpose of bill is to “induce such

persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental re-

sponse actions”). Congress recognized in 1980, as well as

when CERCLA was amended by SARA in 1986, that the trust

fund created by CERCLA to fund cleanups was grossly insuf-

ficient to pay the cost of all cleanups.! Both the cost of cleanup

1. See, e.g. Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental

Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, PL. 96-510, Vol. 1, p.

101 (Statement of Thomas C. Jorling, Assistant Administrator Water and

and the number of potentially responsible parties made volun-

tary cleanups difficult. To encourage voluntary cleanups,

Congress provided a statutory incentive: the right to obtain

restitution from responsible parties.

Congress authorized, in section 107(a) of CERCLA, a

“person” to recover necessary costs of response from any other

“person.” Congress defined person in the broadest sense possi-

ble: ,

“person” means an individual, firm, corporation, associa-

tion, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial

entity, United States Government, State, municipality,

commission, political subdivision of a State or any inter-

state body. 42 U.S.C. §9601(21) (emphasis added)

The inclusion of states in the definition of person was no

accident. Congress intentionally departed from the format of

its three prior environmental enactments where it immu-

nized states from liability. Under CERCLA all political en-

tities, even the federal government, were potentially liable to

any other person who incurred cleanup costs.

Congress was well aware of state ownership and opera-

tion of contamination sites when it enacted CERCLA. States

and local governments have for decades played a major role in

managing the disposal of hazardous substances and have

often been owners and operators of such sites. Indeed, the

EPA has estimated that over 16% of all contamination sites on

the National Priorities List are currently owned or controlled

by states and local governments. (Estimate provided by EPA

Waste Management, June 20, 1979), Vol. 2, p. 252 (Statement of Represent-

ative Rostenkowski; H. Rep. 99-253, Part 1, dated August 1, 1985, prepared

to accompany H. Rep. 2817) (“EPA will never have adequate monies or

manpower to address the problem itself... Congress must facilitate clean-

ups of hazardous substances by the responsible parties”); and Interim Re-

port of the Surveys and Investigations Staff of House Committee on Appro-

priations, March 14, 1988 (SARA legislative history makes evident that

Congress recognized that without a highly successful enforcement pro-

gram, EPA would never achieve the objectives of SARA because EPA by

itself could never secure the financial and human resources required to

resolve the problems ).

9

Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, July 1, 1988.)

Some of these sites are infamous. For example, in Mason

County, West Virginia, the West Virginia Ordnance site, origi-

nally a 8,000-acre ordnance works run by the U.S. Army

during World War II, is currently owned and operated by West

Virginia as a wildlife refuge and for hunting and fishing. Land

and water in the refuge has been contaminated with chem-

icals used in the manufacture of trinitrotoluene (TNT). EPA,

Descriptions of Sites on Current National Priorities Lists,

October 1984, 548 (Dec. 1984). In Pennsylvania, a foul-smell-

ing sulfurous black liquid discharging from an abandoned gas

well is threatening use of the Presque Isle State Park, a major

recreational area on Lake Erie. Id. at 459. In Hillsboro, Ken-

tucky, there is an estimated 4.8 million cubic feet of waste

containing radioactive material at a state owned 279-acre site.

EPA, Descriptions of Sites on Update No. 2 to National Pri-

orities List, Oct. 1984.

Thus, the inclusion of states within the definition of

persons liable under CERCLA was essential to Congress’ bold

and innovative plan to rid the nation of hazardous waste

contamination.

B. CERCLA’s Language Satisfies the Clear State-

ment Rule

Beginning with the decision in Employees v. Department

of Public Health, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), this Court has con-

structed what has come to be known as the “clear statement

rule” for testing congressional abrogation of state immunity.

The clear statement rule requires that Congress express its

intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment “in unmistak-

able language in the statute itself” Atascadero State Hospital

v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). See also Welch v. State

Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 107 S.Ct.

2941 (1987); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-

man, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). A unanimous court of appeals in

Union Gas II correctly applied this standard when it held that

CERCLA, as amended by SARA, possesses “the requisite un-

10

mistakably clear language needed to abrogate the states’ elev-

enth amendment immunity.”2 832 F.2d at 1345 (Pet. App. 7)

In CERCLA, Congress abrogated state immunity in the

most direct and logical manner: it defined a “person”-liable

under section 107(a) to include a state. 42 U.S.C. §9601(21).

Judge Higginbotham, dissenting in Union Gas I, explained:

When a statute in its definitional section declares un-

equivocally that the term “person” includes a “State, mu-

nicipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or

any interstate body” 42 U.S.C. §9601(21) (emphasis

added), the explicit language of Congress should not be

disregarded where there is no legislative history suggest-

ing that Congress did not mean what they said when they

used the word “state.” 792 F.2d at 383 (Pet. App. 119)

Judge Higginbotham went on to observe that courts should

not assume that they have a better mastery of the English

language than does Congress. Not to acknowledge that Con-

gress meant to include states in the definition of “person”

would require Congress to engage in unprecedented redun-

dancy and repetition within the definition. As this Court

observed in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 186-187

(1936): “Language and objectives so plain are not to be

thwarted by resort to a rule of construction whose purpose is

but to resolve doubts and whose application in the circum-

stances would be highly artificial.”

This Court's decision in Employees is not, as contended

by Pennsylvania, dispositive of whether inclusion of “state”

within the statutory definition satisfies the clear statement

rule. At issue in Employees was whether a 1966 amendment

to the definition of “employer” in the 1938 Fair Labor Stan-

dards Act (FLSA) sufficiently evidenced congressional intent

to abrogate state immunity which the states had enjoyed for

over 35 years. Since Congress had not made a coordinate

2. All other lower courts that have considered this issue have reached

the same result as the Third Circuit: Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc.,

654 F.Supp. 955 (N_D.Cal. 1987); United States v. Freeman, 680 F.Supp. 73

(W.D.N.Y. 1988).

1]

change in the FLSA's liability section and there was no other

evidence in the statute or legislative history, this Court held

the clear statement rule was not satisfied. CERCLA, by con-

trast, has other statutory indicia of congressional intent to

render states liable. Furthermore, the definition of “person” in

CERCLA closely resembles the definition of “person” in Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act which this Court did find sufficient

to show congressional intent to render states liable in

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (“the ‘threshold

fact of congressional authorization’ to sue the State as em-

ployer is clearly present”).

Congress’ intent to subject states to liability to private

parties under section 107(a) is further evident in the inclu-

sion of the federal and local governments in the definition of

“person.” Section 107(g) of CERCLA expressly waives the

federal government's sovereign immunity. Thus, it is unimag-

inable that by enacting a “comprehensive” environmental law

to clean up all the nation’s waste sites which renders every

private individual and legal entity potentially liable, including

the federal government, Congress intended to omit states

when it expressly included them.

At the time a divided panel of the court of appeals in

Union Gas I found CERCLA’ original language did not meet

the clear statement rule, a Congressional conference commit-

tee was meeting to reconcile and compromise two substan-

tially different versions of SARA that had been passed by the

House and Senate in December 1985. See, H. R. 2817, 99th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) and H. R. 2005 (1985). SARA was

signed into law by the President on October 17, 1986. Just as

Congress had legislatively changed the outcome in Employees

and Atascadero,’ through SARA Congress amended CERCLA

to show with more specificity its intention that states were

potentially liable to private parties under section 197(a) of

3. Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §216(b),

was amended in 1974 by Pub.L. 93-259, §6(d)(1), 88 Stat. 61. Section 504

of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794, was amended by Pub.L. No.

99-506, §1003, 100 Stat. 1807 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §200 d-7) (West

Supp. 1987).

12

CERCLA. As stated by the identical, but now unanimous,

panel that had decided Union Gas |: “In SARA, however,

Congress enacted the unmistakably clear statutory language

that demonstrates its intent to abrogate the states’ eleventh

amendment immunity.” 832 F.2d at 1348 (Pet. App. 21-22)

In particular, SARA amended the definition of “owner or

operator” to provide that states would not be liable if they

acquired ownership or control of a contaminated site involun-

tarily through bankruptcy, abandonment, tax delinquency or

other similar circumstance unless they caused or contributed

to a release. But otherwise, “... such a State or local govern-

ment shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same

manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and sub-

stantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability

under section 9607 of this title.” This language not only af-

firms that Congress always intended states to be liable to all

other persons for cleanup costs, but replicates the language

Congress used in waiving federal liability for cleanup costs.‘

The federal waiver was recodified by SARA from section

107(g) to section 120(a)(1) and provides:

Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the

United States (including the executive, legislative, and

4. As the court of appeals in Union Gas I! explained:

Originally, neither the Senate nor House version of SARA §101(b)(1)

copied the waiver language of 49607(g) to abrogate state eleventh

amendment immunity. However, the conference committee inserted

language that replicated the federal waiver into the definition section,

stating that its purpose was “to clarify that if the unit of government

caused or contributed to the release or threatened release in question,

then such unit is subject to the provisions of CERCLA, both pro-

cedurally and substantively, as any non-governmental entity, including

liability under section 107 and contribution under section 113”

H.R.Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185-86, reprinted in 1986

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2835, 3276, 3278-79. To the extent

that the added language serves to “clarify” CERCLA, it amounts to a

subsequent declaration of congressional intent that deserves great

weight. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FC.C., 395 U.S. 367, 380-82, 89 S.Ct.

1794, 1801-02, 23 L.Ed. 2d 371 (1969). 832 F.2d at 1350 (Pet. App.

32-33)

13

judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and

comply with, this Act in the same manner and to the

same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any

nongovernmental entity, including liability under section

107 of this Act.

Although Pennsylvania chides the court of appeals for

misinterpreting SARA’s amendment to “owner or operator,” its

alternative explanation is illogical. Pennsylvania contends

that the amendment was to clarify only that states are not

liable to private parties when states involuntarily acquire a

site unless they cause or contribute to a release. There are two

fallacies to this contention. First, an exclusion of liability

would have meaning only so long as Congress understood

section 107(a) to render states liable. Second, under this

contention states would not be liable for cleanup at sites they

acquired voluntarily where they caused releases of hazardous

substances. Thus, a state could purchase a site voluntarily,

pollute it, and not be liable for a private party's (perhaps a

neighboring land owner's) cleanup costs, but would be liable

if the site were acquired through abandonment. Such a con-

struction is neither logical nor equitable.

To overcome the court of appeals’ decision, the confer-

ence committee surgically grafted language to several sec-

tions to overcome the deficiencies cited in the court of ap-

peals’ analysis.° The above-quoted language was added to the

definition of “owner or operator” Local governments were

referenced in the language because of a footnote in Union Gas

I that suggested that local governments may be able to derive

immunity through the Eleventh Amendment. 792 F.2d at

375, n. 3 (Pet. App. 80). Because the court of appeals had

5. Because Union Gas | was not a decision of this Court, the joint com-

mittee may not have felt the urgency of addressing it in a separate section as

opposed to the changes it did make. Returning to Judge Higginbotham, he

observed “we must never forget the complexity and the time constraints of

the federal legislative process. Legislators do not have the time or the capac-

ity to anticipate every possible argument that might be made subsequently

by creative and clever counsel.” Union Gas |, 792 F.2d at 386 (dissenting)

(Pet. App. 135)

14

relied in Union Gas I on the federal government's explicit

waiver of immunity to distinguish state immunity, the confer-

ence committee added a sentence to the federal waiver.

“Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the lia-

bility of any person or entity under sections 106 and 107” 42

U.S.C. §9620(a\1)

Another indication of congressional intent to make states

liable for cleanup costs to private parties under section 107(a)

is that Congress preserved states’ immunity to citizen suits in

SARA. See 42 U.S.C. §9659(a\(1). Unlike section 107(a)

which requires a plaintiff to have incurred cleanup costs prior

to initiating suit, the citizen suit provision permits anyone to

commence an action as a private attorney general to obtain an

order correcting a violation of CERCLA. Congress’ express

preservation of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from

citizen suits thus stands in sharp contrast to section 107(a)

liability where there is no such preservation of immunity.

C. Construing CERCLA to Permit Persons to Sue

States Promotes the Purposes of the Act

The above construction of CERCLA is not only true to the

text of the statute and congressional intent, but it promotes

the goals of the Act. Even the expanded funding of the trust

fund by SARA will fall far short of providing enough money to

cleanup just those contamination sites listed on the NPL. See,

Staff of House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2nd

Sess. Report on Status of Environmenial Protection Agency's

Superfund Program (March 14, 1988); Mackerron, “Super-

fund: Uncle Sam Picks Up the Tab,” Chemical Week, June 8.

1988, at 22-25. Since its first publication, the NPL has grown

threefold and is still increasing. See, National Priorities List

for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites— Update 7, 53 Fed.

Reg. 23,987, 23,989 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. Part

300, Appendix B) (proposed June 23, 1988). Absent voluntary

cleanup by persons willing to expend substantial funds and

other resources, most of the nation’s contamination sites will

15

not be cleaned and we will pass, with barely a genuflection,

our chemical and health problems to another generation .°

The principal incentive to a voluntary cleanup is the

right to recover the necessary costs of cleanup from responsi-

ble parties under section 107(a). If states were eliminated

from “persons” that could be sued to recover such costs, there

would be a powerful disincentive to any cleanup efforts by

private parties. Since CERCLA gives the federal courts ex-

clusive jurisdiction over CERCLA causes of action, a private

party cannot go into state court to recover from a state. Under

Pennsylvania's view, whenever a state is arguably responsible

for some portion of the cleanup costs under the statute, a

private party is better off taking no action at all in the hope

that the United States will cleanup the site and seek reim-

bursement from the state. In that way, a private party will not

be left, as Union Gas was here, paying the state's share of

cleanup costs. By the same token, states will have every

incentive to resist participating in any voluntary cleanup in

the hope that private parties will do the job and be unable to

recoup any part of the cost from the state. Thus, Pennsylva-

nia’s view would frustrate the “comprehensive” plan of

cleanup underlying CERCLA and leave private parties, such

as Union Gas, to pay for contamination caused by states.

Inclusion of states among potentially responsible parties

serves an additional salutary, if less obvious, purpose. The

United States EPA has been criticized by its own inspector

general for paying excessive amounts for emergency clean-

ups.’ If states have a direct monetary interest in wanting to

6. See, “Delays and Inefficiencies in the Superfund Program. ‘earings

Before the Subcomm on Superfund and Environmental Oversight of the

Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,” 100th Cong., Ist Sess.

(1987) (testimony and statement of James W. Moorman, Esq, former As-

sistant Attorney General for Land & Natural Resources, U.S. Dept. of Jus-

tice: remarks for Sen. Lautenberg) (Dec. 10, 1987), Assistant Attorney Gen-

eral for Land & Natural Resources, U.S. Department of Justice, Decembes

10. 1987, and written testimony of Natural Resources Defense Council,

December 10, 1987.

7. See EPA, Report of Audit, No. E5E.26-05-0101-61508, Sept. 23, 1986.

16

reduce costs at sites for which they are responsible are

in a stronger position to encourage a cost-effective —

Cost effectiveness has many facets, from defining the scope of

testing and evaluation, to the selection of a cleanup meth-

odology, to the selection of a contractor. All these are areas

that can be improved upon by direct state involvement to

— wane sore | interest.

nsylvania and the amici states raise the spectre

potential burgeoning liability for waste sites. Ung ‘

the cost of cleanup of all sites throughout the nation is expen-

sive. The Department of Energy, for example, estimates its

liability for cleanup of contamination at $100 billion.’ The

Department of Defense estimates its cost at $14.8 billion?

The cost of the cleanups to private parties has also been

enormous. This Court has already answered the states’ argu-

ment in Employees where it acknowledged that Congress

acting under Article I could “place new or even enormous

fiscal burdens on the States.” Supra., 411 U.S. at 284. States

however, have the same right as other “persons” liable under

CERCLA to seek contribution from other responsible parties

and have the court equitably allocate cleanup costs among all

responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)\(1).

When submitted to the states for ratification, the Con-

8. K. Schneider, “Energy Department Faulted Dealing

clear Waste", N.Y. Times, June 7, 1988 at A22. es i

9. See 2 Tox. Tort Rep. (BNA) 756-57 (1987) c

testimon

Department of Defense before Congress. DOD. Scheme teens

Restoration Program: Annual Report to C :

March 1, 1988 at 14. © Congress for Fiscal Year 1987,

17

stitution lacked any provision granting states sovereign im-

munity in the federal courts. Nor was there any reason to

provide such immunity. The Constitution was a compact

among the people of the United States to create a federal form

of government.!° See, Amar, “Of Sovereignty and Federalism,”

96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1439 (1987). The Constitution was ratified,

not by state legislatures, but by constitutional conventions

whose delegates were selected by the people.

State sovereignty that existed prior to 1787 was revoked

and bestowed on a new federal sovereign to the extent neces-

sary for the federal sovereign to exercise its powers. See

Fletcher, “A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-

ment,” 35 Stanford L.Rev. 1033, 1069 (1983) As James

Madison stated in The Federalist, “as far as the sovereignty of

the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people,

the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be

sacrificed to the latter” The Federalist, No. 45 at 289 (C.

Rossiter ed. 1961). The states, thus, were stripped of sov-

ereign immunity—in the then-prevalent international

sense—that they enjoyed prior to ratification of the Constitu-

tion Though not expressed in the Constitution until adoption

of the Tenth Amendment, states remained sovereign within

their borders as to matters not bestowed on the federal gov-

ernment. See, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit

Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1985).

The limitation on states’ sovereign immunity was essen-

tial to the effectiveness of the federal sovereign. The three

branches of the federal government were roughly co-exten-

sive in order to provide the requisite checks and balances. To

resolve disputes effectively, the judicial branch had to possess

jurisdiction over the entire federal domain to be “capable of

deciding every judicial question which grows out of the con-

stitution and laws.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)

264. 384 (1821). Article III of the Constitution provided for

two basic types of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction and

10. By contrast, the failed Articles of Confederation » ‘re a compact of

the states and operated only on the states, not citizens

party jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction extended to“. . .

all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution,

the laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which

shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases

of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ..” Party jurisdiction

was more specific and, as relevant hereto, extended “... to

controversies between two or more states; between a state and

citizens of another state; ... and between a state, or the

citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.” Noth-

ing in Article III or other parts of the Constitution, as origi-

nally ratified, expressed or implied that states were immune

from suit in the federal sphere.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 codified Article III's grant of

jurisdiction in state-citizen diversity actions. Ch. 20, §13, 1

Stat. 73, 80. As one scholar has pointed out, the Judiciary Act

was passed only a month after the House of Representatives

killed a proposed amendment to eliminate the state-citizen

diversity clause from Article III of the Constitution. Fletcher.

supra., 35 Stan. L.Rev. at 1052-53.

The States’ amici brief incorrectly contends that state

immunity from suit brought by citizens in federal court was

embodied in the Constitution as ratified. Ignoring the precise

words of Article III] which give the judiciary jurisdiction over

such suits in diversity cases as well as the more general grant

of jurisdiction in federal subject matter cases, the states’ rely

on isolated remarks of Madison, Marshall and Hamilton made

in The Federalist and the Virginia debates.'! However, schol-

ars who have recently researched the historical records of the

Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates sug-

gest that the cited remarks of Madison, Marshall and Hamil-

ton addressed federal diversity jurisdiction, not federal sub-

ject matter jurisdiction.'? Four members of this Court have

11. A plurality of this Court recently concluded that “at most” “the in-

tentions of the Framers and Ratifiers were ambiguous.” Welch, 107 S.Ct. at

2951

12. See, e.g, Jackson, “The Supreme Court, the 11th Amendment and

observed that important delegates at ratification conventions

such as Mason, Henry, Pendleton, Randolph, and Wilson “did

not believe that state sovereign immunity provided protection

against suits initiated by citizens of other states” Welch, 107

S.Ct. at 2962-63 (dissent); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 264-80

(dissent). Two of these individuals, Randolph and Wilson, had

served as members of the Committee of Detail at the Con-

stitutional Convention.

Thus, as drafted, the Constitution lacked any substantive

grant of state sovereign immunity and specifically opened the

federal courts to certain types of suits against states.

The Eleventh Amendment is not a broad grant of state

sovereign immunity but a narrow jurisdiction preclusion pro-

vision. The Amendment makes no mention of substantive

sovereign immunity. It provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-

menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State.

congruence between the language of the Amendment

wed pamie enstten 9 ef dee Conmtioatien to agparent (TNs

judicial power shall extend . . . to controversies .. . between a

barred from federal jurisdiction.

we We know. of course, that the Eleventh Amendment was

¥ ing, Oct. 1988), Amar.

State Sovereign Immunity,” 98 Yale Lj. | (forthcoming,

supra., 96 Yale LJ. at 1475; Gibbons, “The Eleventh Amendment and State

Sovereign Immunity A Reinterpretation.” 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 191

(1983); Fletcher, supra, 35 Stan. L.Rev. at 1063

20

added to the Constitution to reverse this Court's decision in

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) Chisholm

involved an action in assumpsit to recover for goods sold by a

South Carolina merchant to Georgia during the Revolutionary

War. In a 4-1 decision, this Court held that the state-citizen

diversity clause of Article III of the Constitution conferred

original jurisdiction on this Court. James Wilson and Ed-

mund Randolph participated in the case, respectively, as a

justice of this Court and the Attorney General of the United

States representing the plaintiff

_ The decision in Chisholm is free of any doubt that the

majority and lone dissenter understood that jurisdiction was

based on the state-citizen diversity clauses of Article III of the

Constitution and section 13 of the Judiciary Act. See 2 US.

(Dall.) at 466 (J. Wilson) and 431 (J. Iredell, dissenting)

Jusuce Iredell, a proponent of state sovereign immunity ac-

knowledged that the United States was sovereign as to all

powers surrendered by the states, with state sovereignty lim-

ited to the powers reserved to the states. 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 435

(dissent) Implicit in his opinion is that states did not sur-

render their sovereignty to be sued in federal court for breach

of contract ten santice Wendell did net contend Ghat states

were immune suit in federal court in all circumstances

See, also, Atascadero, 473 US. at 283 (dissent) |

__ After ratification of the Eleventh Amendment," but be-

fore Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. | (1890), the Supreme Court

interpreted the Amendment literally and narrowly as preclud-

ing only federal court jurisdiction in state-citizen diversity

cases The states did not even raise the Eleventh Amendment

as a jurisdictional bar in three cases brought between 1810

and 1819 where the appellate jurisdiction of this Court was

invoked by individuals suing states. See McCulloch v. Mary-

land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11

U.S. (7 Cranch.) 164 (1812); Smith » Maryland, 10 US.

1% lromcally. Pennsvivamia’s legislature refused to ratify the Eleventh

ey See Mayle v Pennsylvania, 479 Pa 384. 402. 388 A 2d 709.

21

(6 Cranch.) 286 (1810). Eventually when the Eleventh

Amendment was raised as a defense, this Court found the

Eleventh Amendment did not preclude federal appellate juris-

diction in an action by a citizen against his own state, Cohens

v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), or original jurisdic-

tion in an action against a state official based on federal law to

recover money deposited in a state treasury. Osborn v. Bank of

the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Cohens,

Chief Justice Marshall addressed the conflict between Article

III jurisdiction and state sovereign immunity as follows:

_.. are we at liberty to insert in this [Article III| general

grant, an exception of those cases in which a State may

be a party? Will the spirit of the constitution justify this

attempt to control its words? We think it will not. We

think a case arising under the constitution or laws of the

United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union,

whoever may be the parties to that case. Id., at 382-383.

C. Hans v. Louisiana Should Be Overturned

Ninety-five years after ratification of the Eleventh

Amendment, this Court extended the Amendment’ coverage

in a way never intended by Congress or the state legislatures

that ratified it. Hans v. Louisiana was the culmination of a line

of lawsuits that had reached the Supreme Court seeking pay-

ment on bonds which certain states, predominantly in the

post-Civil War South, had repudiated. See Gibbons, supra. , 83

Colum. L.Rev. at 1968-2002. Hans, a citizen of Louisiana,

sought to enforce payment of interest on a bond issued by

Louisiana in 1874 where payment had been guaranteed by an

amendment to Louisiana's constitution. In 1879, Louisiana

amended its constitution to repudiate the bond. Hans claimed

that the 1879 amendment to Louisiana’ constitution im-

paired his contract in violation of Article 1, section 10 of the

United States Constitution. Federal court jurisdiction was

premised on the “arising under” clause of Article II! and the

1875 Act of Congress which codified general original federal

question jurisdiction. 18 Stat. 470.

22

This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment precludes

federal court jurisdiction over suits by individuals against

States irrespective of whether jurisdiction is founded on a

federal question or state-citizen diversity. Though legitimate

doubts have been raised as to whether the decision in Hans

was grounded in the Constitution or merely upon the absence

of a federal cause of action, Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 299-300

(dissent), this Court has recognized the former to be the case.

Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934). As a

constitutional decision, the reasoning in Hans is insubstantial

and the precedent relied upon flawed. Recognizing the textual

limitation of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Bradley relied

in the opinion on the 1798 decision of this Court in Hol-

lingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, and an ante-

constitutional view of sovereign immunity as expressed in

Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm and Alexander Hamil-

ton'’s view in The Federalist, No. 81.

Justice Bradley contended that Hollingsworth showed

the understanding of the Supreme Court in 1798, just after

ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, that the Amendment

applied to federal question as well as state-citizen diversity

suits. The per curiam opinion in Hollingsworth is a single line

stating “there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any

case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens

of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”

Id. at 382. Hollingsworth was an action in equity to quiet title

to disputed lands, so that no federal question was involved. |

J.Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, 725 (1971). Indeed, the

sole issue in Hollingsworth was whether the Eleventh

Amendment applied prospectively or retroactively. It would

seem a leap of logic, therefore, for Justice Bradley to contend

in Hans that the words “in any case” referred to both federal

question and state-citizen diversity cases when quite appar-

ently they refer to “past or future” cases. Furthermore, if

Justice Bradley were correct in his interpretation, it is nothing

less than astounding that Chief Justice Marshall and counsel

for the parties in Cohens v. Virginia failed to cite or allude to

23

Hollingsworth which was then one of the few Supreme Court

cases mentioning the Eleventh Amendment. — |

Justice Bradley's reliance on an ante-constitutional view

of state sovereign immunity has been almost universally criti-

cized in recent years. The dissenting opinions in Employees,

Atascadero, Pennhurst and Welch digest the recent scholarly

research and point out that Justice Bradley reached the wrong

conclusions from his quotations from Justice Iredell and Alex-

ander Hamilton. It bears emphasizing that the central prem-

ise in Justice Bradley's argumeni was that Chisholm was

wrongly decided. Yet an adverse popular reaction to Chisholm

does not require the conclusion that the case was wrongly

decided. Rather, as contended above, Chisholm was a correct

constitutional decision that was overturned by the political

act of amending the Constitution.

rturning Hans v. Louisiana Will Have a

7 ee Effect on Eleventh Amendment Juris-

» .

The holding in Hans has spawned a raft of legal fictions

that would otherwise be unnecessary. For example, indi-

viduals may sue state officials to obtain injunctive relief so

long as the state is not named as a defendant. Ex Parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1908). Another example, individuals may sue

states for monetary relief where Congress has abrogated

states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity or the states have

consented to suit. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra.; Welch v. State

Dept. of Highways, supra. While born of pragmatism, these

fictions support an erroneous principle that should be cast

a peded question jurisdiction has grown exponentially in

the past 100 years with Congress regulating an ever growing

list of fields. With that growth has come an increasing

number of affirmative rights individuals may exercise. Sev-

eral of these fields necessarily involve states. In many in-

stances, individual rights cannot be vindicated unless indi-

viduals are able to sue states for wrongdoing, not just to —

injunctive relief, but for monetary awards. That is especially

24

true in connection with CERCLA where Congress has legisla-

ted a solution to a festering environmental problem that is

dependent on all individuals and legal entities, corporate and

politic, voluntarily contributing to cleanups which the federal

government alone cannot afford. To achieve a uniformity of

enforcement, Congress gave the federal district courts ex-

clusive original jurisdiction over CERCLA cases. 42 US.

§9613(b). CERCLA is a program that is ill-suited to frustra-

tion by individual states jealous of their turf. yet that will be

the result if individuals cannot sue states in federal court.

If the true underpinning of Hans is an ante-Constitu-

tional concept of state sovereign immunity, that concept is

itself outmoded. States have themselves largely dismantled

the trappings of state sovereign immunity. The courts of over

30 states have partially or completely abolished sovereign

immunity. See, K. C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise.

§25.00 (1980 Supp.). Pennsylvania's Supreme Court abol-

ished the doctrine in that state in 1978. Mayle v. Pennsylva-

nia, supra. Two years later, Pennsylvania's legislature enacted

sovereign immunity as substantive law but created numerous

exceptions. 42 Pa.C.S. §8521 et seq.

If, as Union Gas contends, Hans was wrongly decided,

then the doctrine of stare decisis alone cannot support its

continuation. But see, Welsh, 107 S.Ct. at 2956. While stare

decisis is an important element in the fabric of the law, it is

not of constitutional stature. To perpetuate a misinterpretation

of the Constitution on the ground that wooden adherence to

stare decisis demands it—is itself unconstitutional since it

undermines the Supremacy Clause.

Furthermore, overturning Hans will not lead to chaos.

There will be no change in the result in this case since

CERCLA satisfies the clear statement rule. A current schol-

arly article analyzed the 17 Eleventh Amendment cases cited

in the plurality decision in Welch and concluded there would

be little change in the outcome of those cases so long as a less

stringent version of the clear statement rule is retained. See.

Jackson, supra., note 12. Under that analysis, there would be

no change in this Court's decisions involving federal question

25

claims brought under federal statutes. Jurisdiction of en

claims involving state taxation can be resolved under tradi-

tional doctrines of comity and abstention as can pendent state

law claims. The result would be different, however, in on

ralty and this Court's original jurisdiction cases, but suc

cases are relatively few and the need for uniformity of law in

A

ag ions was a wrong turn for this Court and has

spawned a progeny of cases that befuddle an otherwise

straightforward interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.

As is especially evident in this case, its doctrine “intrudes “

the ideal of liberty under law by protecting the States “ory

consequences of their illegal conduct.” Atascadero, 473 U. 5. at

302 (dissent). Now is the time to sweep away this pernicious

precedent.

ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION EMPOWERS

” probed TO ABROGATE STATE IMMUNITY TO

PRIVATE LAWSUITS

The anomalies in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence

caused by this Court's wrong turn in Hans now force this

Court to consider whether Congress has authority to —

the Eleventh Amendment’ jurisdictional preclusion in ;

cle I enactments. A decision on this issue is unnecessary

Hans is overturned.

Acknowl-

Prior Decisions of This Court Have

" edged the Constitutionality of Article I Abroga-

tion

The Eleventh Amendment does not embody a —

tive rule of state sovereign immunity. Indeed, the cena

ment is simply a jurisdiction preclusion clause. To the ext

that states enjoy sovereign immunity within their borders on

matters of state law, that immunity derives from the common

law or state constitutional or legislative enactment. It follows,

then. that the Eleventh Amendment imposes no limitation on

Congress plenary power under Article | to enact laws declar-

26

ing that persons may recover damages from states for vio-

lation of federal law.

This Court has recognized the above rule in its Eleventh

Amendment jurisprudence.!4 In Parden v. Terminal Railway

of the Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964),

where this Court held that Congress had abrogated state

immunity in a commerce clause enactment, this Court de-

clared:

While a State's immunity from suit by a citizen with-

out its consent has been said to be rooted in “the inherent

nature of sovereignty,” Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v.

Read, supra, 322 U.S. 47, 51, 88 L.Ed. 1121, 1125, 64

S.Ct. 873, the States surrendered a portion of their sov-

ereignty when they granted Congress the power to regu-

late commerce

“This power, like all others vested in congress, is

complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,

and acknowledges no limitation other than are prescribed

in the constitution. . . . If, as has always been understood,

the sovereignty of congress, though limited to specified

objects is plenary as to those objects, the power over

commerce with foreign nations, and among the several

States, is vested in congress as absolutely as it would be

in a single government, having in its constitution the

same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are

found in the constitution of the United States.” Gibbons v.

Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 196-197, 6 L.ed. 23, 70.

The sovereign power of the states is necessarily dimin-

ished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal

14. So too has every court of appeal addressing the issue: Union Gas Il,

832 F.2d at 1356 (Pet. App. 64-65a); In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311,

328 (7th Cir. 1987) cert. denied 108 S.Ct. 227 (1987): County of Monroe v.

Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1128-35 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104

(1983); Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070,

1074-82 (Sth Cir 1979); Mills Music. Inc. v Arizona, 591 F 2d 1278, 1285

(9th Cir 1979),

27

in the Constitution ... [T)}here is no such

limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce

|as there is upon the federal power to tax state instru-

mentalities}. The state can no more deny the power if its

exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an

individual.

empowering Congress to regulate commerce,

aes, tin teat cee eee any portion of

their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such

regulation. Id. at 191-92.

Court followed the above rule in Employe.’s, a case

ween amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act

enacted pursuant to Article I's commerce clause. Although

this Court held that Congress had not satisfied the clear

gress was authorized to abrogate state immunity from suit in

Article | enactments stating: “

Where employees in state institutions not conducted

profit have such a relation to interstate commerce that

national policy, of which Congress is the keeper, indicates

that their status should be raised, Congress can act.

when Congress does act, it may place new or even enor-

mous fiscal burdens on the States. Id. 411 U.S. at 284.

inued validity

of this rule, Welch at 2946 (plurality opinion), and declines An

review it. See, e.g., Edgar v. McVey Trucking, 108 S.Ct.

(1987). . —_ this

Pennsylvania and amici contend that decisions by

Court in Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment cases under

mine the rule's vitality. In particular, they contend this ourt’s

statements in Fitzpatrick support their argument: as

Bt we tk the Ered Aen, cl er

Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 33 L.Ed. 842, 10 S.Ct. 504 (1890)

are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of

§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

28

We think that Congress may, in determining what is

“appropriate legislation” for the purpose of enforcing the

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for

private suits against States or state officials which are

constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. 427

U.S. 445 at 457.

The “other contexts” adverted to in the above quote are

not Article I enactments as suggested by Pennsylvania. Peti-

tioners Brief at 40. The narrow issue in Fitzpatrick was

whether the Eleventh Amendment restricted Congress in

rendering states liable to individuals in Fourteenth Amend-

ment enactments. The Fourteenth Amendment, after all, be-

stowed on Congress the power to legislate in areas such as the

States’ justice systems that traditionally had been wholly in

the states’ sphere. But for the Amendment, Congress had no

authority to invade the states’ sphere and render them liable

to private parties. The Court's vague reference to “other con-

texts,” then, suggests that the Court will carefully examine

intrusions into the states’ central government activities in

Fourteenth Amendment enactments which render the states’

liable to private parties.!>

B. Principles of Federalism Require that Congress’

Plenary Power Under Article I Not Be Dimin-

ished By A Judicial Inability to Enforce Its En-

actments

Congress’ powe” under Article I to subject states to suit in

federal court manifests itself in the interplay among Article I,

the Supremacy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment. If, as

the Constituiion declares, the Constitution and laws made by

Congress are to be the supreme law of the land, Congress

must have authority to regulate the conduct of the states

under Article |, and the judiciary must have authority to

15. See Field. “The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immu-

nity Doctrines,” 126 U. Pa. L._Rev. 1203, 1233 (1978)

29

enforce Congress’ laws.'© Sovereignty cannot inhere in au-

thority bereft of the means of enforcement. Only if construed

as a narrow jurisdiction preclusion clause is the Eleventh

Amendment consistent with this concept.

The Constitution cannot be read on a timeline with the

Eleventh Amendment as a watershed controlling under

which provision of the Constitution Congress can regulate

states by making them subject to private suits for money

damages. To do so would impinge on Congress’ ability to

establish uniform federal policy and regulate the states re-

garding its primary governmental functions specified in Arti-

cle | yet permit Congress to regulate the states in areas tradi-

tionally peripheral to Congress’ role. Such an interpretation

would be illogical. As this Court stated in Prout v. Starr, 188

U.S. 537, 543 (1903):

The Constitution o the United States, with the several

amendments thereof, must be regarded as one instru-

ment, all of whose provisions are to be deemed of equal

validity. It would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the

immunity of the individual states from suits by citizens

of other states, provided for in the Eleventh, were to be

interpreted as nullifying those other provisions which

confer power on Congress to regulate commerce among

the several states, which forbid the states from entering

into any treaty, alliance or confederation, from passing

any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the

obligation of contracts ... —all of which provisions ex-

isted before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment,

which still exist, and which would be nullified and made

of no effect, if the judicial power of the United States

could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the

passage of state laws disregarding these constitutional

Sateations

16 See Tribe. “Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation

and Regulation.” 89 Harv. L Rev. 682, 694 (1976).

30

The non-unitary concept of the Constitution espoused by

Pennsylvania and amici has its basis in a misreading of

Fitzpatrick. While Fitzpatrick drew upon the fact that the

Fourteenth Amendment post-dated the Eleventh, it did so

only to make the point that the states willingly surrendered to

Congress broad powers traditionally within the states’ sphere

notwithstanding the existence of the Eleventh Amendment.

Fitzpatrick did not eviscerate the Necessary and Proper

Clause of Article 1, §8, by limiting judicial enforcement of

otherwise proper congressional enactments. The Eleventh

Amendment, by its own terms, cannot limit congressional

power since it is directed solely at judicial power

Again, this case illustrates the harm that would be

wrought by a limitation on Congress’ power to render states

liable to private parties for cleanup costs. Because the federal

courts have exclusive jurisdiction over CERCLA causes of

action, private parties like Union Gas are limited to suing in

federal court. If a state cannot be sued by private parties,

private parties will resist or delay voluntary cleanup of a site

in hopes that the EPA will undertake the cleanup and sue the

state. Likewise, a state will have an incentive to avoid funding

a cleanup in hopes that private parties will do so. The result-

ing standoff frustrates the congressional scheme and unduly

strains the limited resources of the Superfund trust fund.

The states’ protection from congressional abuse of its

Article | power is found in the structure of the Constitution

itself. South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988) As this

Court observed in Garcia, Congress consists of senators and

representatives elected in each of the fifty states, and they are

responsive to states concerns. Supra, 469 U.S. at 550. “It is no

novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Govern-

ment was designed in large part to protect the States from

overreacting by Congress.” Id. at 551. States’ direct linkage to

federal lawmakers insures that the states interests will be

considered. Furthermore, federal law-making does not occur

in a vacuum—states frequently take a direct role in lobbving

congressmen and presenting testimony supportive of their

position, as they did when CERCLA and SARA were enacted.

The framers of the Constitution properly envisioned a

3]

judiciary whose jurisdiction was coextensive with Congress’

Article | powers, and the Eleventh Amendment should not be

construed to distort that vision.

IV. STATE CONSENT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO

CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION

State consent to suit is superfluous where, as in

CERCLA, Congress abrogated state immunity to suit. Unlike

Parden, it is unnecessary to imply Pennsylvania's consent to

suit for participating in a federally regulated area since Con-

gress unmistakably expressed its intention to subject states to

liability under section 107(a) of CERCLA.

The clear statement rule is a standard of judicial inter-

pretation—it was not intended as a general notice provision.

CERCLA, as originally enacted, put states as well as other

individuals and entities on notice that they were “persons”

who could sue and be sued under section 107(a). Thus, Penn-

sylvania received as much notice as Union Gas and all other

“persons” of their rights under CERCLA.'’ The mere fact that

CERCLA imposes liability based on a person's status creates

no unfairness to states that is not visited on all other persons.

If, as numerous lower courts have held, CERCLA'’s imposition

of retroactive liability is constitutional under the Fifth

Amendment Due Process Clause,'* notice is irrelevant and no

Eleventh Amendment issue is even implicated.

17. The notice issue raised by Pennsylvania is also irrelevant since

both before and after passage of CERCLA, the seepage of coal tar from the

Brodhead Creek site continued while Pennsylvania was an owner and oper-

ator of the site.

18. See US. w Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810

F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir 1986) and cases cited therein.

32

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of

appeals in Union Gas II should be affirmed and the case

remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

July 11, 1988

Respectfully submitted,

Robert A. Swift"

Marguerite R. Goodman

KOHN, SAVETT, KLEIN & GRAF, PC.

1101 Market Street, Suite 2400

Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 238-1700

Lawrence Demase

ROSE, SCHMIDT, CHAPMAN.

DUFF & HASLEY

900 Oliver Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

(412) 434-8610

Attorneys for Respondent

Union Gas Company

“Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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