Supplemental Brief — Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital

Supreme Court brief1988

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

-~"

Supreme Court, U.S. .

FILED

Ci) SEP 7 1988

No. 87-1097

| JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

Otis R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER

Vv.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE_UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

DONALD B. AYER

Acting Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607

EEE ee ROR ER, Boa are a 5

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 838 F.2d

ee ee eT a eb eae ees 6

Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935) ............ 5

Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

cs habe ve duhibene dees 6

United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U.S. 424

ee DEERE GEL cece eee bu eeK du dGseve 3

Statute and rules:

Administrative Procedure Act § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. (1964 ed.)

cs beeen eee e eee e nee se sneneeesneeees

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 ef seg. ..............45. 7

Sup. Ct. R.:

Re ee eee i lad tee we ee l

a I a a as Suites l

A din d dnd ons oe beea bisa Cad ks 66.60% l

Miscellaneous:

Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality

of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692

Mees. ce eek es dead bibes see ee de ees 4

H.R. Rep. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) ........... 6

Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 Tex. L.

i cea cn CoC le ee. oby's sce 44a 4

(I)

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 87-1097

Oris R. BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER

Vv.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

This brief is filed pursuant to Rule 35.5 of the Rules of

this Court to respond to an amicus brief that was submit-

ted by the Ohio Power Company (OPC) in this case. Our

submission of this supplemental brief is contingent on this

Court’s disposition of OPC’s motion for leave to file its

brief, which was filed both outside the time allowed by this

Court’s Rules and after we filed our reply brief, and which

OPC acknowledges (Mot. 2) presents arguments that “are

not presented in any other brief.”' It is no mere happen-

' Like all other amicus briefs in this case, OPC’s brief had to be

filed pursuant to Rule 36.2 of the Rules of this Court “within the time

allowed for the filing of the brief of the party supported.” Hence,

because OPC is supporting respondents, its brief was due on June 27,

1988. OPC, however, filed its brief more than five weeks later on

August 4, 1988, which was more than one week after our reply brief

was due and timely filed with the Court. Contrary to OPC’s assertion

(Mot. 2), the government did not have under Sup. Ct. R. 35.3 “until a

week before argument” to file its reply. Rule 35.3 provides quite clear-

(1)

2

stance, moreover, that neither respondents nor any of

their supporting amici presented the arguments now of-

fered by OPC. Not only are OPC’s arguments totally lack-

ing in merit but they further underscore the dangers of

respondents’ position.

1. The thrust of OPC’s position is, oddly enough, that

the District of Columbia Circuit did not go far enough in

this case in banning all retroactive rules. Unlike

respondents, which readily acknowledge (Br. 19) that the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not restrict

rules of “secondary retroactive effect” (rules that apply to

ongoing activities that commenced prior to the rule’s effec-

tive date), OPC argues (Br. 6-7) that the APA’s prohibi-

tion On retroactivity bars an agency from promulgating a

rule that applies to future conduct if that conduct com-

menced before the rule’s promulgation and was not then

barred by the agency’s prior rule. The only exception from

this sweeping prohibition that OPC would admit is where

Congress has elsewhere provided advance notice of the

possibility of “subsequent regulatory developments,” thus

defeating “an expectation that the party has rights that

may not be disturbed by subsequent administrative pro-

ceedings” (ibid. (footnote omitted)).

OPC’s novel proposition of administrative law is only

that: novel. It has never been adopted by this Court or, as

far as we can discern from examining the cases cited by

OPC, by any other court. In particular, this Court has

never held that an agency is always barred from regulating

ly that “{a}] reply brief will be received within 30 days after the filing of

the brief for the appellee or respondent, or not later than one week

before the date of oral argument, whichever is earlier, and only by

leave of Court thereafter” (emphasis added). OPC therefore is also

wrong in asserting that we would “have ample time to reply to [OPC’s]

brief” in our reply brief (Mot. 2-3). We can do so only by way of this

supplemental brief.

3

the future conduct of a party whenever it has previously

approved (or presumably failed to disapprove) of the par-

ty’s same conduct in the past. The only decision of this

Court cited by OPC (Br. 6-7 & n.11, 19-20 n.57) is United

States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U.S. 424 (1947), in

which the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission (ICC) could not revoke a previously-issued cer-

tificate of public convenience and necessity “except as

specifically authorized by Congress.” But that ruling pro-

vides no support for OPC’s thesis because it was based on

the Court’s determination that Congress had denied that

very power to the ICC in the Interstate Commerce Act (see

id. at 430). The Court’s holding in no sense announced a

generally-applicable principle of administrative law bar-

ring retroactive agency lawmaking.

2. OPC’s historical evidence for its thesis that the

“common law of this nation” supports its proffered con-

struction of the APA is even less persuasive (see OPC Br.

10-14). We do not deny the obvious tensions resulting

from the application of a law to past conduct or even, as in

OPC’s case, to future conduct in a manner that affects

past investments. Those tensions, however, are not now

and have never been resolved by the application of an

unbending principle of common law or natural justice

remotely resembling the one invented by OPC, which

would effectively bar any law with the slightest retroactive

impact. Instead, as the very cases relied upon by OPC

demonstrate (see OPC Br. 10-14), those tensions have

historically, as they are today, been resolved by the ap-

plication of familiar, but discrete principles of constitu-

tional law, grounded principally in the Ex Post Facto,

Contract, Due Process, and Takings Clauses, and in prin-

ciples of administrative law barring arbitrary and

4

capricious action.? Contrary to OPC’s “historical”

evidence, however, the sum of these restrictions and the

policies they further within their own discrete areas has

not and does not produce a broader overarching common

law ban on retroactive laws. See generally Hochman, The

Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive

Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 693-694 (1960) (foot-

note omitted) (“[T]his natural law theory never attained

widespread acceptance in the opinions of the Supreme

Court, and it has long been accepted that retroactivity is a

ground for holding a statute void only if it contravenes a

specific provision of the Constitution.”); see also Smith,

Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 Texas L. Rev. 409,

411 (1928) (“American authorities denounce retroactivity

in the abstract but frequently sustain it in the particular

case.””).

3. For this reason, moreover, OPC’s further conten-

tion (Br. 14-18) that the APA “codified” the “common law

principle that legislative pronouncements have prospective

effect” likewise fails. There was no common law principle

barring retroactive legislation to be codified. Instead, as

we explained in our opening brief (at 21-23), retroactive

rules were generally valid before the APA was enacted, as

they are today, so long as their retroactive effect was

reasonable and not otherwise barred by law.

Nor is there any merit in OPC’s related suggestion (Br.

18-21) that the APA “require[s} that statutory grants of

rulemaking authority be construed as authorizing only

prospective regulation, absent an explicit statutory

authorization to adopt legislative rules affecting past

transactions.” Certainly, the language in the APA upon

? We have, of course, readily acknowledged (Pet. Br. 20-21, 37-38

n.29; Rep. Br. 10) that these discrete principles of constitutional and

administrative law may render unlawful certain governmental efforts

to impose retroactive laws.

~ - os

5

which OPC relies (id. at 15 (emphasis in original; footnote

omitted))—the words “future effect” in the APA’s defini-

tion of “rule” — provides no hint that the APA embodies

such a canon of construction. OPC, notably, makes no ef-

fort to reconcile that canon with its claim that “future ef-

fect” amounts to a ban on retroactive rules.

OPC’s proposed canon is also not aided by either the

Court’s decision in Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435,

439 (1935) or what “several Justices observed in Addison

v. Holly Hill Fruit Products [322 U.S. 607 (1944)} shortly

before enactment of the APA” (see OPC Br. 18 n.55, 19).

Miller stands only for the proposition that a regulation

will not be read to operate retroactively unless the inten-

tion to have that effect unequivocally appears (see 294

U.S. at 439) Here, there is no question that the Secretary’s

curative rule was intended to apply retroactively. The

observations of several Justices in Addison are likewise

unavailing to OPC, because those views were expressed in

dissent. In addition, as we pointed out in our opening brief

(at 28-29 n.20), both the majority and dissenting opinions

in that case agreed that an agency needs on occasion to

promulgate curative retroactive rules, which is the very

type of rule challenged in this case (see 322 U.S. at 619,

621; id. at 641 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).

4. Finally, OPC’s argument illustrates both the

dangers of the District of Columbia Circuit’s ruling and

why a flat ban on retroactive rules is an unnecessary and

inappropriate mechanism for addressing the problems

sometimes associated with retroactive lawmaking. For if,

as OPC argues, the APA’s “future effect” language means

that a rule can have no impact on past conduct and not, as

we contend, that a rule is legally effective in the future,’

> OPC argues (Br. 16 n.49) that “future effect” could not refer only

to the timing of a rule’s legal effectiveness because, given the explicit

6

then well established, essential agency regulatory activities

would become unlawful. Many ongoing activities of

regulated entities would be immune from more stringent

agency regulation in the future.‘ }

Somewhat ironically, the decision of the District of Co-

lumbia Circuit that prompted OPC’s filing in this case

demonstrates precisely why such a total ban on retroactive

rules is not necessary to address the harsh consequences

sometimes associated with retroactive rules.’ The court of

language of Section 4(c) of the Act, “a clarification of this nature

would have been unnecessary and hardly worth the special effort an

amendment required.” As described in our opening brief (at 30-34),

however, the APA’s legislative history does not support OPC’s

assumption that Congress intended a major substantive change by

adding the words “future effect.” It instead suggests that the language

was principally added to conform the definition of rule to the opera-

tional provisions of the APA, including Section 4(c). The statements

in the legislative history upon which OPC relies (Br. 16) do not,

moreover, overcome the specific language in both ithe House Report

and the authoritative Attorney’s General Manual on the APA that,

speaking directly to the retroactivity issue, deny that the APA was in-

tended to proscribe retroactive rules (see Pet. Br. 31-32, 33-34; Rep.

Br. 4). Indeed, the House Report, in a passage quoted in our opening

brief (at 32), but never acknowledged by OPC, directly refutes OPC’s

extreme view that the APA’s “future effect” language was intended to

preclude agencies from “dealing with past transactions in prescribing

rules for the future” (H.R. Rep. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 n.1

(1946)).

* For instance, an agency that once required auto manufacturers to

include seatbelts would, under OPC’s reading of the APA,

presumably be prevented by the APA from requiring the same

manufacturer to include air bags in the future (Motor Vehicles Mfrs.

Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)).

* OPC’s filing in this case was prompted by the District of Co-

lumbia Circuit’s decision in Natural Resources Defense Council v.

Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224 (1988), petitions for a writ of certiorari pend-

ing, Nos. 87-2068, 88-60 and 88-61. The court of appeals rejected

|

~~

7

appeals rejected OPC’s claim based on a careful analysis

of the competing public and private interests implicated by

the EPA’s decision not to exempt OPC’s future conduct

from its rules. All we seek in this case is that the

Secretary’s retroactive curative rule likewise not be re-

jected on the basis of an automatic ban and instead be

reviewed under the traditional arbitrary and capricious

standard.

OPC’s contention that that court’s construction of the APA in the

present case meant that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

was precluded from promulgating a rule under the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. 7401 et seqg., requiring more stringent reductions of OPC’s

future emissions at plants that previously had conducted demonstra-

tions conforming entirely to then-applicable EPA rules (838 F.2d at

1243-1244, 1249-1251). We will soon be filing our response to OPC’s

petition (No. 88-60) in that case, which raises the retroactivity issue,

and hence will not address here the merits of that dispute.

6 OPC mischaracterizes the District of Columbia Circuit’s ruling in

its amicus brief in this case. Contrary to OPC’s intimation (Br. 9), the

court of appeals did not find that EPA’s rule was outside the APA's

general ban on retroactive rules because it “would not affect [OPC’s]

‘past transactions’ ” and would “impose only ‘future burdens.’ ” The

court instead stressed that EPA’s rule was not automatically barred

because it regulated only OPC’s future conduct, i.e., its “future emis-

sions” (838 F.2d at 1244 (emphasis in original)). The court, moreover,

freely acknowledged that the regulation of future conduct would im-

pose burdens on OPC because of its prior investment (ibid.) and, as

described above, the court determined that those burdens did not

render EPA’s rule an abuse of discretion only after undertaking a

careful inquiry into the full panoply of concerns implicated by EPA’s

decision (id. at 1249-1251).

8

For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in our open-

ing brief and in our reply brief, the judgment of the court

of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

DONALD B. AYER

Acting Solicitor General*

SEPTEMBER 1988

* The Solicitor General is disqualified in this case.

w U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1988—202-037/60641

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.