Amicus Curiae Brief — Michael H. v. Gerald D.
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5 o No. 87-746
| ill IRIE eo
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM. 1987
MICHAEL H. and VICTORIA D.,
Appellants,
GERALD D.,
Appe llee
ON APPEAL FROM THE
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICI
CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
AND ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS
JOHN A. POWELL PAUL HOFFMAN
HELEN HERSHKOFF (Counsel of Record)
STEVEN R. SHAPIRO STEPHANIE ROSS
ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER JOAN HOWARTH
American Civil Liberties GARY WILLIAMS
Union Foundation PATRICIA ERICKSON
132 W. 43rd Street ACLU Foundation of
New York, NY 10036 Southern California
(212) 944-9800 633 So. Shatto Place
Los Angeles, CA 90005
(213) 487-1720
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Lawyers Brief Service Legal Publishers (213) 383-4457 (714) 720-1510
MOTION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
FOUNDATION AND ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT
The American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation and the ACLU Foundation of
Southern California respectfully move
for leave to file the attached brief
Amici Curiae in support of Appellants
Michael H. and Victoria D.
The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) is a nationwide, non-partisan
organization of over 250,000 members,
dedicated to the protection of the
fundamental rights of the people of the
United States. The ACLU of Southern
California (ACLU/SC) is one of the
affiliates of the ACLU with approximately
25,000 members in the Southern California
area. The ACLU/SC filed an amicus curiae
brief in this case in support of
appellants before the California Court
of Appeal.
This case raises important issues
involving the state's power to regulate
complex relationships between parents--
biological or otherwise--and children
consistent with the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal
protection. The ACLU has long been
involved in litigation and other
activities concerning these issues.
Amici believe that the State of
California has transgressed the
constitutional limits on its authority by
severing the relationship of an unwed
biological father and his daughter,
without affording any opportunity to
assert or defend the strength of the
parental or filial interests involved.
In doing so, through Evidence Code § 621,
in the circumstances of this case, the
State has denied appellants due process
ii
and equal protection of law. This brief
addresses the due process concerns raised
by the State’s determination to sever the
parent-child relationship pursuant to
Evidence Code §621.
Appellants have consented to the
filing of this brief amici curiae.
However, the Appellee has declined to
grant consent.
DATED: May 5, 1988
Respectfully submitted,
»VALY
PAUL L. mu
JOHN A. POWELL PAUL HOFFMAN
HELEN HERSHKOFF (Counsel of Record)
STEVEN R. SHAPIRO STEPHANIE ROSS
ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER JOAN HOWARTH
American Civil GARY WILLIAMS
Liberties Union PATRICIA ERICKSON
Foundation ACLU Foundation of
132 W. 43rd Street Southern California
New York, NY 10036 633 So. Shatto Pl.
(212) 944-9800 Los Angeles, CA
90005
(213) 487-1720
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.
The Application of Evidence
Code Section 621 To Terminate
Completely Any Ongoing
Relationship Between Appellants
Michael and Victoria Denied
Appellants Due Process of Law
A. Appellants Have A
Fundamental Right To
Maintain Their Parent-
Child Relationship
B. The Asserted Interests
Supporting the Conclusive
Presumption in Evidence
Code Section 621 Are
Insufficient To Justify
The Termination of
Appellants' Parent-Child
Relationship —
iv
Page
13
13
25
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
The Irrebuttable
Presumption in § 621
Cannot Be Sustained As A
Constitutional ly
Appropriate Means of
Effectuating Any State
Interest In The
“Integrity of the
Matrimonial Family"
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Citations
Bell v. Burson
402 U.S. 539 (1971) ae a ae ee ae ee ee ee”
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur
VUES) £0, are Pea ee |
Franz v. United States
707 F.2a 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983) . . 20, 33
In the Matter of Baby M
FM-25314-86E (April 6, 1988), at3. . 4
Lehr v. Robertson
463 U.S. 248 (1983) ..... . +. passim
Levy v. Louisiana
JF @ 22 eee eee |
Meyer v. Nebraska
262 U.S. 390 (1923) — «6 2 © 6 2-6 & ee
Michelle W. v. Ronald W.
39 Cal.3dG@ 354 (1986) . «. «© «© © © © «© « Of
Palmore v. Sidoti
466 U.S. 429 (1984) > eetsese#8 « « af
OQuilloin v. Walcott
434 U.S. 246 (1978) o Ade ABDe 229 23, SY
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees
468 U.S. 609 (1984) oe oe a ae a ee
Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte
107 S.Ct. 1940 (1987) SS «4% 3 ee
vi
Santosky v. Kramer
455 U.S. 745 (1982) © © © «© « £4, 419, 34
Stanley v. Illinois
405 U.S. 645 (1972). ....... passim
Turner v. Department of Employment Sec.
423 U.S. 44 (1975) ......4.4.4. 2. 34
U.S. Department of Agriculture Vv. Murry
413 U.S. 508 (1973) ....... 31, 32
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.
Som UB. 2 (A076) 2 wc ee ew ew ee 92
Vlandis v. Kline
412 U.S. 441 (1973) 'e#teéersrtw®wis « 6 2
Weinberger v. Salfi
422 U.S. 749 ?) oy | aa She Dae 3S
Statutes
California Civil Code § 4601. . o « 4, §
Evidence Code § 621 ....... passim
Miscellaneous
Tribe, American Constitutional Law
(2d ed., 1988) at 1618-25 'e@eeerse BF
vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amici adopt the facts as set forth
at pages 11 to 13 of the Appellants'
Jurisdictional Statement. ? Certain key
facts are highlighted below.
There is significant evidence in the
record that appellant Michael H. is the
biological father of appellant Victoria
D. This evidence includes the resuits of
a blood test showing a 98.07 percent
probability that Michael is Victoria's
biological father and statements” from
Carole D., the biological mother, that
Michael is the biological father.
Moreover, Victoria and Michael had
developed a warm, nurturing parent-child
l This case was resolved below in
the context of summary judgment. The
facts, therefore, should be viewed in the
light most favorable to appellants.
Thus, it must be assumed that Michael
would be able to prove that he is the
biological father of Victoria at trial.
1
relationship before the trial court's
order severed their relationship. For a
period of three months in 1982 and a
period of nine months in 1983 and 1984,
Michael, Carole and Victoria lived
together as a family during Carole's
estrangement from her husband, Gerald D.
The =o Victoria thus spent nearly one
year pf the first three years of her life
in on explicit child-parent relationship
with ,Michael. Victoria regarded Michael
as —— father and received from him
parental support and affection. An
expert's report confirmed that Michael
and Victoria established a parent-child
relationship during this important
formative period. Jurisdictional
Statement ("Jur. St.*), at 13, n.2.
Michael maintained a Close bond with
his daughter even after Carole returned
to Gerald in the Spring of 1984.
2
Initially, the parties agreed to maintain
this relationship between Michael and
Victoria through a three-year
unsupervised visitation by Michael with
his daughter that commenced in November
1984. This agreement was entered as an
order of the court. Through her
guardian, Victoria was a party to the
agreement which recognized the sustaining
nature of Michael's relationship with
her. An October 1984 expert's report
found that Michael was "the single adult
in Victoria D.'s life most committed to
caring for her needs on a long term
basiee.+,* (Jur. St., at 13, n.2), and
that continuing the parental relationship
between Michael and Victoria was in the
child's best interests. The record in no
way suggests that continuation of such
unsupervised visitation would unduly
upset the marital family in which
3
Victoria now resides. 2
Nevertheless, on January 28, 1985,
the trial court dismissed Michael's
Petition for Declaration of Paternity and
the Guardian Ad Litem's Declaration of a
Parent-Child Relationship based upon the
conclusive presumption in California
Evidence Code § 621° which operated to
vest parental rights in Gerald to the
complete exclusion of Michael. The
effect of the trial court's Order was
not only to prevent Michael from
establishing paternity but also to
preclude visitation under California
2 As a state court judge noted in
the highly publicized Baby mM case,
"Melissa is a resilient child who is no
less capable than thousands of children
Of broken marriages who Successfully
adjust to complex family relationships
when their parents remarry." In the
Matter of Baby M, FM-25314-86EF (April 6,
1988), at 3.
3 Evidence Code §621 is set forth in
full in the Appendix to this brief.
+
Civil Code § 4601. Michael and Victoria
were thus barred from continuing a
parent-child relationship -- considered
important to Victoria and in the child's
best interest -- even under terms which
did not unduly interfere with the current
relationship between Carole and her
husband.
This decision was affirmed by the
California Court of Appeal on the ground
that the state's interest in the
sanctity of the family outweighed any
4 california Civil Code § 4601
provides:
Reasonable visitation rights
shall be awarded to a parent
unless it is shown that such
visitation would be detrimental
to the best interests of the
child. In the discretion of
the COeouUrts reasonable
visitation rights may be
granted to any person having an
interest in the welfare of the
child.
rights Michael or Victoria had in these
circumstances. The California Supreme
Court declined to review this decision.
Significantly, Michael does not seek
to remove Victoria from her home with
Gerald and Carole. Nor does he seek to
displace Gerald as a father to Victoria.
What Michael has sought is the right to
continue a relationship with Victoria
through court awarded visitation rights
and to provide support for her needs.
Victoria, through her guardian, seeks the
same relief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves the right of an
unwed father to continue a loving,
Supportive relationship with a child who
was born during the marriage and
cohabitation of the mother to another
man. Subsequent to the child's birth,
Michael lived with his daughter Victoria
6
and her mother Carole as a family unit.
During that period, Michael provided
support for Victoria, gave her love and
attention, and acquired a psychologically
and emotionally significant place in her
life. In equal measure, Victoria
provided Michael with meaning and
happiness. She treated him as a father
and benefited from his nurture and care.
The child's mother subsequently returned
to her husband. Even after the non-
marital family dissolved, Michael
maintained a warm, mutually-supportive
relationship with his daughter. Through
unsupervised visitation -- approved by
all parties and entered as an order of
the court -- Michael assumed the role of
non-custodial parent. Subsequently,
Michael sought to formalize his
relationship with his daughter and sought
an adjudication of paternity and rights
5
of visitation.
Without considering the strength of
the parent-filial relationship or the
child's best interests, California
Evidence Code § 621 Simply extinguished
the natural father's parental rights and
barred him from anv continuing
relationship with his daughter. The
statute provided Michael no opportunity
to demonstrate the depth of his parental
commitment to Victoria. Nor did the
statute allow the child's interest in
visitation or support to be meaningfully
heard.
This Court has long recognized that
the "relationship between parent and
child," Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978), is an “intrinsic human
right," Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 845 (1977), and therefore
8
"constitutionally protected." Quilloin
Ws Wolcott, 434 U.S. at 255.
Accordingly, where an unwed father has
demonstrated parental commitment to his
child, only "powerful countervailing
interests" on the part of the State may
justify interference with the fundamental
parental rights that have developed over
time. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972).
Certainly no powerful countervailing
interest is present in this case. To he
sure, the State may have a legitimate
interest, as asserted here, in the
“integrity of the matrimonial family."
Jur. St., at Bl6. However important this
interest may be in the abstract, it
cannot in the circumstances of this case
justify the wholesale termination of the
loving and supportive relationship that
exists between Victoria and her natural
9
father Michael. The California courts
were able to conclude otherwise only by
ignoring the powerful parent-filial
interests at stake and by giving no
weight whatever to the best interests of
the child.
This Court has shown far greater
respect to the rights of an unwed father
and his child where the pair have
developed over time a loving and
Supportive parent-filial relationship.
see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at
645. So fundamental is the parent-child
relation that this Court has subjected
countervailing state interests and the
Statutory schemes that advance those
interests to greater scrutiny than mere
rationality. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979). Such scrutiny is
particularly appropriate where, as here,
the challenged statute does not even
10
achieve the purported state goal. Here,
while claiming to promote the child's
welfare within the marital family, § 621
fails to provide the child with a stable
familial environment. To the contrary,
the challenged statute instead permits
the marital father to avoid his support
obligations by disclaiming paternity,
thus leaving the child in uncertainty.
By contrast, the natural, non-custodial
father is denied any opportunity to
provide love and financial support to his
child.
The challenged statute underscores
the vices of irrebuttable presumptions
when used to resolve sensitive issues
implicating fundamental rights such as
the parent-child relationship. Evidence
Code § 621 makes no attempt to balance
the competing constitutional interests at
stake, thereby ignoring the best
ll
interests of the child in favor of a
theoretical model of the nuclear marital
family.>° Where fundamental rights are at
stake, this Court has strongly disfavored
the use of irrebuttable presumptions. As
a matter of due process, the application
of Evidence Code § 621 to terminate the
Significant parent-child relationship
that exists between Michael and Victoria
cannot stand.
° This case does not involve a
Situation in which no father is willing
to support a child. Here both fathers
offer support to Victoria. The validity
of a conclusive presumption of paternity
in a husband where it was the only means
of guaranteeing support for the child
might be sustained as serving a
compelling state interest. However, this
Statute offers the husband a way of
opting out of this responsibility while
excluding biological fathers who wish to
Support their children.
12
ARGUMENT
a. The Application of Evidence Code
Section 621 To Terminate Completely
Any Ongoing Relationship Between
Appellants Michael and Victoria
Denied Appellants Due _ Process _ of
Law
A. Appellants Have A Fundamental
Right To Maintain Their
Parent-Child Relationship
This Court's decisions have
recognized that the parent-child
relationship -- even in a non-traditional
context -- implicates fundamental
interests worthy of special protection
from state interference. Stanley Vv.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (rights of
unwed father not to be deprived of his
children after death of mother). See
also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978).
In Stanley, this Court struck down
13
as violative of due process an Illinois
statute that deprived an unwed father of
custody of his biological ¢éhildren by
defining the term "parent" to include
only the mother of a child born out-of-
wedlock. This Court described the
fundamental interests at stake in the
following terms:
The private interest here,
that of a man in the children
he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest,
protection. It is plain that
the interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her
children come[s]}] to this Court
with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely
from Shifting economic
arrangements.
405 U.S at 651 (citations omitted). See
eel
also Meyer v,. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
757 (1982) ("Freedom of choice in matters
14
of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest.") Thus, as this Court recently
confirmed in an analogous context,
Family relationships, by their
nature, involve deep
attachments and commitments to
the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one
shares not only 4 special
community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but
also distinctively personal
aspects of one's life.
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
619-20 (1984).
Outside the marital context,
however, “parental rights do not spring
full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child," Lehr Vv.
Robertson, 463 U.S. at 260, quoting
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 397, but
rather require demonstration of the "full
commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. see
also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at
15
256. In determining the strength of an
asserted constitutional liberty interest
to be protected in the non-marital
context, this Court has' therefore
focused on whether the biological parent
has developed a substantial relationship
with the child. Thus, a _ biological
father who lacks any significant
custodial, personal or financial
relationship with his child cannot
belatedly claim a right to establish such
a relationship years after the
Childbirth. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
at 262,
Here, Michael is not only the
natural father of Victoria but also has
contributed to her well-being and
growth. Both as a custodial and non-
custodial parent, Michael has shown love
and affection for his daughter; he has
participated in decisions affecting her
16
development and welfare; and he has
contributed financially to her support.
Victoria, in turn, has come to regard
Michael as a father she loves, a person
whose continued affection and attention
are essential to her growth and
stability. Appellants' interest in
continuing this critical relationship is
thus based on biological connection as
well as affective bonds that have
developed over time. Appellants assert a
right to continue to play an important
role in each other's life: They are
connected through biology, emotion and
mutual support.
As this Court underscored in Lehr v.
Robertson:
When an unwed father
demonstrates full commitment to
the responsibilities of
parenthood by "com[ing] forward
to participate in the rearing
of his child," his interest in
personal contact with his child
17
requires substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause.
At that point it may be said
that he "“act[{s] as a father
toward his children."
463 U.S. at 261 (citation omitted).
Here, Michael's nurturing activities
during the important, early years of
Victoria's life, combined with his
readiness to provide financial Support,
demonstrate a "full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood" that this
Court has found critical in according
constitutional protection to the parent-
child relationship. That this
relationship occurs outside the
traditional marital context does not
extinguish the liberty interests at
stake. To the contrary, this Court's
decisions recognize the fundamental
right of a child to Maintain a
relationship with his or her natural
father in situations departing from the
18
traditional nuclear model. As the Court
observed in Stanley:
Nor has the law refused to
recognize those family
relationships unlegitimized by
a marriage ceremony. The Court
has declared unconstitutional a
state statute denying natural,
but illegitimate, children a
wrongful death action for the
death of their mother,
emphasizing that such children
cannot be denied the right of
other children because familial
bounds in such cases were often
as warm, enduring, and
important as those arising
within a more formally
organized family unit.
405 U.S. at 651-52, citing Levy Vv.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also,
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 754 n. 7
("The fact that important liberty
interests of the child ... may also be
affected..."); Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S.Ct. 1940,
1946 (1987) ("We have not held that
constitutional protection is restricted
to relationships among family
19
members..."). Similarly, this Court has
recognized that an unwed father who
engages in regular visitation with a
biological child "may have a relationship
with his children fully comparable to
that of the mother." Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. at 389.
In Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d
982 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court of
Appeals stressed the reciprocal and
mutually reinforcing interests of a non-
custodial parent and his children in
continuing a parent-child relationship
after this relationship was terminated by
virtue of the federal witness protection
program. The Franz Court's description
of these interests is especially
pertinent to this case:
-a2 parent's right to the
Preservation of his
relationship with his child
derives from the fact that the
parent's achievement of a rich
20
and rewarding life is likely to
depend significantly on his
ability to participate in the
rearing of his offspring. a
child's corresponding right to
protection from interference in
the relationship derives from
the psychic importance to him
in being raised by a loving,
responsible, reliable adult.
x * &
Moreover, there is considerable
evidence that the emotional
Stability of children of
divorced parents is often tied
to the quality of their
continuing relationships with
their non-custodial parent. On
this point, in short, it
appears impossible to say with
any confidence that the
concerns that underlie our
willingness to accord
"fundamental" status to parent-
child bonds are any less
telling when the relationship
in question consists of mere
"visitation."
|H4
d. at 599, 60l. This general
observation in Franz is affirmed in this
case by the expert's opinion that
Victoria's interests would be best served
by continuing her relationship with
Michael through regular visitation. Jur.
St., at 13 n.2.
These principles confirm that
appellants' interests in Sustaining their
arent-child relationshi are
p
fundamenta] anc thus come before the
Court with the me "momentum for
respect" in Stanley and
-
Caban. r Quilloin, where
the bioloc -atners made little, if
any, effort t rter emotional or
financial support to their children,
Michael has consistently provided
Victoria with sustenance and care.
Where the father had only an "inchoate
relationship with a child whom he has
never suppported and rarely seen," Lehr,
463 U.S. at 249, this Court found no
constitutional bar to allowing adoption
of the children by men who evidenced
Willingness to accept parental
22
responsibility.
In Quilloin the biological father
visited the child on "many occasions" and
provided gifts "from time to time" but
provided support only on an irregular
basis. 434 U.S. at 251. Significantly,
the trial court in Quilloin made a
finding after a hearing that the proposed
adoption and severance of the biological
father's legitimation and visitation
rights was in the child's best interests.
Id.
The record here, by contrast, shows
an intensity and commitment in the
relationship between Michael and
Victoria, recognized by a court appointed
expert: Michael was found to be "the
single adult in Victoria's life most
committed to caring for her needs on a
long-term basis...” Jur.
St., at 13,
SF Michael has held himself out to
23
Victoria as a father and has provided and
offered his daughter financial support
for the rest of her life. They have
developed a caring relationship over time
with all the attributes of parent-child
love. The trial court's automatic
application of Evidence Code § 621 has
thwarted Michael's prodigious efforts to
maintain this relationship with a
daughter who loves him and needs his
attention and care.
Not surprisingly, Victoria, through
her guardian, seeks to maintain her
relationship with Michael. This is not a
merely theoretical claim founded on
economic need. Victoria's guardian has
asserted this position based on the
expert's finding that it is in
Victoria's best interests to maintain the
affective bond she has developed with her
biological father. This recommendation
24
is based on the observation of Victoria's
actual interactions with Michael--
interactions which provide “warmth and
comfort" to both of them. Jur. St., at
13, m8.
Genuine, loving bonds between
parents and children are precisely the
kind of relationship to which this Court
has accorded the highest level of
protection. The bond between Michael and
Victoria is especially deserving of their
protection.
B. The Asserted Interests
Supporting the Conclusive
Presumption in Evidence Code
Section 621 Are Insufficient To
Justify The Termination of
Appellants’ Parent-Child
Relationship
In this case Evidence Code § 621 was
found by the California courts to require
the termination of any continuing
relationship between Michael and
Victoria.© The lower courts found that
the state interest in preserving the
family unit of Gerald, Carole and
Victoria outweighed the interests of
appellants in continuing their
relationship, even through visitation
rights alone.
The California Court of Appeal
acknowledged that Michael's interests in
these circumstances were "substantial,"
Jur. te» at B15, and that he had
established an "affectional relationship
with Victoria almost since her birth."
Jur. St.,:' at B16. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeal determined that "the
state's interest in preserving the
integrity of the matrimonial family is so
© The conclusive presumption in §
621 was found to apply based on evidence
adduced by Gerald and Carole that they
were cohabiting at the time of Victoria's
conception and birth and that Gerald was
not impotent or sterile. See § 621l(a).
26
significant that it outweighs most other
interests." Id. at B16. Moreover, the
court held that Michael's "private
interest in establishing 4a biological
relationship in a court of law is
overridden by the substantial state
interests in familial stability and the
welfare of the child." citing Michelle
W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal.3d 354, 216
Cal.Rptr. 748 (1986). Id. at Bl?7. Any
interests Victoria had in continuing her
relationship with Michael were found to
be overridden by this same state
interest. Id. at B17-18./7
7 The Court of Appeal also found
that the state interest in protecting
Victoria from being branded as
"illegitimate" also supports the statute.
Id. at B18. In light of this Court's
decisions in this area this argument
cannot sustain the infringement of
appellants’ substantial interests. Lev
vy. Louisiana, supra; see also, Palmore Vv.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)
("Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly
27
The state may indeed have a
legitimate interest in protecting
families that conform to the traditional
nuclear model. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
This interest, however, would not bar a
biological father from visiting a child
after divorce has dissolved a marital
unit. A biological father in the non-
marital context has a similar
constitutionally-protected right to
maintain a relationship with his child.
This fundamental liberty interest cannot
be overridden by the state's mere
assertion that children are best
protected within the Sanctity of
marriage. Indeed, Evidence Code § 621
does not even promote that state goal.
To the contrary, by permiting the marital
father to escape his Support obligation
or indirectly, give them effect.")
28
by disclaiming paternity within two years
of the birth of the child, the statute
gives no assurance that the mother's
marriage will create a permanent and
stable environment for the child. At the
same time, a biological father who wishes
to love and support his child, while
respecting the mother's marital union, is
prevented from doing so unless the
mother joins in the motion under §
621(da).
The state's interest in giving an
absolute and exclusive preference for the
"matrimonial family" is also compromised
where, as here, the statute works to the
detriment of the child. The effect of §
621 is to deprive Victoria of an
important, sustaining relationship with
Michael -- a relationship regarded by
her guardian to be in the child's best
interests. This Court has repeatedly
29
a
protected the best interests of the
child, whether the decision has been in
favor of the biological parent -- as in
Stanley and Caban -- or against the
biological parent -- as in Lehr and
Quilloin. In this case, by con*rast, the
California courts simply ignored the best
interests of the child -- indeed § 621
does not even permit the child, through a
guardian, to adjudicate paternity, demand
Support, or claim rights of visitation.
Absent from the decision below is any
indication that Victoria sought to
continue her relationship with Michael,
through visitation, even without an
« ,udication of paternity under § 621.
Victoria's claim for continued visitatio:.
under this provision was clearly before
the California courts yet was ignored
altogether in the proceedings below.
30
Cc. The Irrebuttable Presumption in
§ 621 Cannot Be Sustained As A
Constitutionally Appropriate
Means of Effectuating Any State
Interest In The "Tntegrity of
the Matrimonial Family"
Even if the state's interest in the
"integrity of the matrimonial family"
may in certain circumstances overcome 4a
natural father's claim to a continued
parent-child relationship, the use of an
irrebuttable presumption to further this
interest is constitutionally defective.
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
——
414 U.S. 632, 639, 643-647 (1979);
Weinberger Vv. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975);
U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry,
413 U.S. £178 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 442, 446-453 (1973); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. at 649-658; Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 539 (1971).
This case is a perfect illustration
of the vices of irrebuttable
31
presumptions. see cenerally, Tribe,
American Constitutional Law (2d ed.,
1988) at 1618-25. Though the protection
of the traditional family unit is an
important state interest, the weight to
be accorded to this interest in any given
situation varies with the strength of the
countervailing individual interests. The
conclusive presumption in § 621 avoids
these mandatory constitutional balances
by giving an absolute preference to
parents ina family unit sanctified by a
marriage contract.
The individual interests affected in
these circumstances, however, are too
fundamental to be resolved by conclusive
presumption. U.8. Department of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. at 518-
19 (Marshall, . concurring) (The
Constitution sometimes "requires the
Government to act on an individualized
32
basis, with general propositions serving
only as rebuttable presumptions or other
burden-shifting devices").
In considering the constitutionality
of irrebuttable ;resumptions, this Court
has recognized a clear distinction
between statutes "regulating purely
economic matters," Usery V- Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976),
and those affecting interests which enjoy
"constitutionally protected status."
Weinberger v. Salfi 422 U.S. 749, Via
(1975). Where fundamental interests are
at stake, the use of conclusive
presumptions continues to be
constitutionally suspect. See Franz
United States, 707 F.2d at 606 n.102
("The Court has made clear however, that
(the irrebuttable presumpticn] doctrine
remains viable when fundamental rights
are at stake").
In Turner Vv. Department of
Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per
curiam), the Court struck down a
provision of Utah law which makes
pregnant women ineligible for employment
benefits for a period extending from 12
weeks hefore the expected date of
childbirth until a date six weeks after
childbirth. The statute's "incorporation
of a conclusive presumption of incapacity
during so long a period before and after
childbirth is constitutionally
invalid...." Id. at 46.
Evidence Code § 621, as applied,
creates an irrebuttable presumption
against an unwed father in an area that
Clearly implicates the constitutionally
protected right of "freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life,"
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. It is, of
course, easier for the state to make
34
paternity determinations by means of a
conclusive presumption. ® As this Court
emphasized, however, in Stanley v.
Illinois, supra:
Procedure by presumption is
always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination.
But when, as here, the
procedure forecloses the
determinative issues of
competence and care, when it
explicitly disdains present
realities, it needlessly risks
running roughshod over the
important interests of both
parent and child. It therefore
cannot stand.
405 U.S. at 656. See also Vlandis Vv.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451 (1979).
This Court has upheld irrebuttable
presumptions in commercial contexts, see
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 749
(1975). It has not done so, however,
8 Evidence Code § 621 allows the
mother and her husband an individualized
opportunity to adjudicate vaternity,
while denying the biological father and
child a comparable opportunity.
35
where the irrebuttable presumption
curtailed “important liberties cognizable
under the Constitution." Id. at 785.
The liberties asserted by Michael and
Victoria in this case are precisely the
kind of fundamental rights which this
Court has found too important to be
curtailed by irrebuttable presumptions.
The state lacks any basis for assuming
that in all cases the best interests of a
child will be served by barring contact
with a biological father with whom a warm
and loving relationship has already been
established. Appellants should be free
to convince the trial court that Michael
has demonstrated commitment to parental
responsibilities on behalf of Victoria,
and that it is in Victoria's best
interests to maintain a parental
relationship with the biological father
whom she loves.
36
LS
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons,
California Evidence Code § 621 should be
found unconstitutional as applied in the
circumstances of this case. Appellants
should be permitted to maintain their
parent-child relationship on such terms
as the trial court determines are in
Victoria's best interests.
DATED: May 5, 1988
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN A. POWELL
HELEN HERSHKOFF
STEVEN R. SHAPIRO
PAUL HOFFMAN
(Counsel of Record)
STEPHANIE ROSS
ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER JOAN HOWARTH
American Civil
Liberties Union
Foundation
132 W. 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036
(212) 944-9800
GARY WILLIAMS
PATRICIA ERICKSON
ACLU Foundation of
Southern California
633 So. Shatto Pl.
Los Angeles, CA
—
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
California Evidence Code § 521
provides:
(a)
(b)
(d)
Except as provided in
subdivision (b), the issue of a
wife cohabitating with her
husband, who is not impotent or
sterile, is conclusively
presumed to be child of the
marriage.
Notwithstanding the provisions
of subdivision (a), if the
court finds that the
conclusions of all the experts,
as disclosed by the evidence
based upon blood tests
performed pursuant to Chapter
2 (commencing with Section 890)
of Division 7 are that the
husband is not the father of
the child, the question of
paternity of the husband shall
be resolved accordingly.
The notice of motion for blood
tests under subdivision (b) may
be raised by the husband not
later than two years from the
child's date of birth.
The notice of motion for blood
tests under subdivision (b) may
be raised by the mother of the
child not later than two years
from the child's date of birth
if the child's biological
father has filed an affidavit
A- i]
with the court acknowledging
paternity of the child.
The provisions of subdivision
(b) shall not apply to any case
coming within the provisions of
Section 7005 of the Civil Code
or to any case in which the
wife, with the consent of the
husband, conceived by means of
a surgical procedure.
The notice of motion for the
blood tests pursuant to
subdivision (b) shall be
supported by a declaration
under oath submitted by the
moving party stating the
factual basis for placing the
issue of paternity before the
court. This requirement shall
not apply to any case pending
before the court on September
30, 1980.
The provisions of subdivision
(b) shall not apply to any case
which has reached final
judgment of paternity on
September 30, 1980.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.