Opinion — In re McDonald

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN RE JESSIE McDONALD, PETITIONER

ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

No. 88-5890. Decided February 21, 1989

PER CURIAM,

Pro se petitioner Jessie McDonald requests that this Court

issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§2241(a). He also requests that he be permitted to pro-

ceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 46. We

deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He is

allowed until March 14, 1989, within which to pay the docket-

ing fee required by Rule 45(a) and to submit a petition in

compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. We also

direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions from

petitioner for extraordinary writs pursuant to 28 U. S. C.

§§ 1651(a), 2241 and 2254(a), unless he pays the docketing fee

required by Rule 45(a), and submits his petition in compl -

ance with Rule 33. We explain below our reasons for taking

this step.

Petitioner is no stranger to us. Since 1971, he has made

73 separate filings with the Court, not including this petition,

which is his eighth so far this Term. These include four

appeals,' 32 petitions for certiorari,’ 22 petitions for extra-

‘See McDonald v. Alabama, 479 U. S. 1061 (1987); Jn re McDonald,

466 U.S. 957 (1984); McDonald v. Tennessee, 482 U.S. 91 (1977);

McDonald v. Purity Dairies Employees Federal Credit Union, 431 U. 8.

961 (1977).

*See McDonald v. Tobey, 488 U. 8. —— (1988) (No. 88-5619); McDon-

ald v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davndson County, 481

U. 8. 1058 (1987); McDonald v. Tennessee, 475 U. S. 1088 (1986); McDon-

ald v. Tennessee, 474 U. S. 951 (1985); McDonald v. Leech, 467 U. S. 1208

(1984); McDonald v. Humphries, 461 U. 8. 946 (1983); McDonald v. Met-

ropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 461 U. S. 934

(1983); McDonald v. Draper, 459 U. S. 1112 (1983); McDonald v. Thomp-

son, 456 U. S. 981 (1982); McDonald v. Metropolitan Government of Nash-

yv\>

2 In Re MCDONALD

ordinary writs,’ five applications for stays and other injunc-

tive relief,‘ and 10 petitions for rehearing.’ Without re-

corded dissent, the Court has denied all of his appeals and

ville & Davidson County, 455 U. 8. 957 (1982); McDonald v. Tennessee,

454 U. S. 1088 (1981); McDonald v. Draper, 452 U. §. 965 (1981); McDon-

ald v. Tennessee, 450 U. 8. 983 (1981); McDonald v. Draper, 450 U. 8. 983

(1981); McDonald v. Metropolitan Airport Authority, 450 U.S. 1002

(1981); McDonald v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson

County, 450 U. 8. 983 (1981); McDonald v. United States District Court,

444 U. 8. 900 (1979); McDonald v. Birch, 444 U. 8. 875 (1979); McDonald

v. United States District Court; and McDonald v. Yellow Freight Systems,

Ine., 444 U. 8. 875 (1979); McDonald v. Thompson, 436 U. S. 911 (1978);

McDonald v. Tennessee, 434 U.S. 866 (1977), McDonald v. Davidson

County Election Commission, 431 U. 8. 958 (1977); McDonald v. Tennes-

see, 431 U. 8. 983 (1977); McDonald v, Tennessee, 429 U. S. 1064 (1977);

McDonald v. Tennessee, 425 U. 8. 955 (1976), McDonald v. Tennessee, 423

U. 8. 991 (1975); McDonald v. Tennessee, 416 U. 8. 975 (1974); McDonald

v. Tennessee, 415 U. S. 961 (1974); McDonald v. Wellons, 414 U. S. 1074

(1973); McDonald v. Metro Traffic and Parking Comm'n, 409 U. S. 1117

(1973); McDonald v. Wellons, 405 U. S. 928 (1972); McDonald v. Metro-

politan Traffic and Parking Comm'n, 404 U. S. 843 (1971).

‘In re McDonald, 488 U. 38. —— (1988) (No. 88-5429, mandamus

and/or prohibition); /n re McDonald, 488 U. 8. —— (1988) (No. 88-5428,

mandamus and/or prohibition); /n re McDonald, 488 U. S. —— (1988)

(No. 88-5397, mandamus and/or prohibition); /n re McDonald, 488 U. S.

—— (1988) (No. 88-5006, common law certiorari), /n re McDonald, 488

U. S. —— (1988) (No. 87-7220, common law certiorari); Jn re McDonald,

488 U. S. —— (1988) (No. 87-7183, common law certiorari); Jn re McDon-

ald, 485 U. 8S. —— (No. 87-6420, mandamus); /n re McDonald, 484 U. S.

—— (1987) (No. 87-5008, common law certiorari); /n re McDonald, 484

U. 8. —— (1987) (No. 86-7086, habeas corpus); /n re McDonald, 484 U. 8S.

—— (1987) (No. 86-7052, common law certiorari and habeas corpus), /n re

McDonald, 484 U. S. —— (1987) (No. 86-7086) (habeas corpus); /n re

McDonald, 479 U. 8. 809 (1986) (habeas corpus); /n re McDonald, 470

U. 8. 1082 (1985) (habeas corpus); /n re McDonald, 464 U. S. 811 (1983)

(mandamus and/or prohibition); McDonald v. Draper, 451 U. S. 978 (1981);

McDonald v. Leathers, 439 U. S. 815 (1978) (leave to file petition for writ

of mandamus); McDonald v. Thompson, 434 U. S. 812 (1977) (leave to file

petition for writ of habeas corpus); McDonald v. Tennessee, 430 U. S. 963

(1977) (motion to consolidate No. 76-6507 and for leave to file petition for

[Footnotes 4 and 5 are on page 3/

In Re MCDONALD 3

denied all of his various petitions and motions. We have

never previously denied him leave to proceed in forma

jo @

The instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus arises from

petitioner’s 1974 state conviction for obtaining title to a 1972

Ford LTD automobile under false pretenses, for which he

was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Petitioner ap-

pealed to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, which

reversed his conviction on the ground that there was no evi-

dence that the alleged victim relied on petitioner's false state-

ments. In January 1976, the Supreme Court of Tennessee

reinstated his conviction. State v. McDonald, 534 8. W. 2d

65. We denied certiorari, 425 U. S. 955 (1976), rehearing

denied, 425 U. S. 1000 (1976).

In the 13 years since his conviction became final, petitioner —

has filed numerous petitions and motions for relief in this

writ of habeas corpus); McDonald v. Thompson, 429 U.S. 1088 (1977)

(leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus and other relief). Mc Donaid

v. Tennessee, 429 U. 8. 1012 (1976) (stay and other relief); MeDonaild v.

United States Court of Appeals, 420 U. 8. 922 (1975) (leave to file petition

for writ of mandamus); McDonald v. Mott, 410 U. 8. 907 (1973) (leave to

file petition for writ of mandamus and other relief ).

‘See McDonald v. Metropolitan Government, 487 U. 8. —— (1988)

| A-930, stay): McDonald v. Metropolitan Government of Nashinile and

Davidson County, 481 U. 8. 1010 (1987) (stay); McDonald v. Alerander.

458 U. 8. 1124 (1982) (injunction); McDonald v. Thompson, 432 U. 3. 93

(1977) (application for supersedeas bond); McDonald v. Tennessee. 415

U. 8. 971 (1974) (stay).

‘See McDonald v. Alabama, 480 U. 8. 912 (1987); In re McDonald, 479

U. 3. 966 (1986); McDonald v. Tennessee, 475 U.S. 1151 (1986); In re

McDonald, 471 U. 8. 1062 (1985); McDonald v. Leech, 467 U. 3. 1257

(1984); MeDonaid v. Draper, 459 U. S. 1229 (1983); McDonald v. Thomp-

son, 457 U. 8. 1126 (1982); McDonald v. Draper, 451 U. 8. 933 (1981); Me.

Donald v. Tennessee, 425 U. 8. 1000 (1976), McDonald v. Tennessee. 417

U. 8. 927 (1974).

‘In the affidavit in support of his present motion to proceed in forma

pauperis, petitioner states that he earns approximately $300 per month. is

self-employed, and has less than $25 in his checking or savings account.

He states that he has no dependents.

4 In Re McDONALD

Court and in the Tennessee courts, all of which have been re-

jected. In the instant petition, for example, he requests

that the Court “set aside” his conviction and direct the State

to “expunge” the conviction “from all public records.” He is

not presently incarcerated. He contends that his constitu-

tional rights were violated by the State's failure to prove that

the property to which he obtained title under false pretenses

was valued at over $100, as required by the statute under

which he was convicted. Petitioner has put forward this

same argument — unsuccessfully —in at least four prior filings

with the Court, including a petition for mandamus, which

was filed 13 days before the instant petition and was not dis-

posed of by the Court until more than a month after this peti-

tion was filed.” .

Title 28 U.S.C. $1915 provides that “[ajny court of

the United States may authorize the commencement, pros-

ecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or

criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and

costs or security therefor” (emphasis added). As permitted

under this statute, we have adopted Rule 46.1, which pro-

vides that “[a] party desiring to proceed in this Court in

forma pauperis shall file a motion for leave to so proceed. to-

gether with his affidavit in the form prescribed in Fed. Rules

App. Proc., Form 4. . . setting forth with particularity facts

showing that he comes within the statutory requirements ~

Each year, we permit the vast majority of persons who wish

to proceed in forma pauperis to do so; last Term, we afforded

the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis to about 2.300

persons. Paupers have been an important—and valued—

"See In re McDonald, 488 U. 8. —— (1988) (No. 88-5428, petition for

mandamus and/or prohibition), [In re McDonald, 44 U. 3. —— (1987)

(No. 86-7052, petition for common law certiorari or habeas corpus):

McDonald v. Tennessee, 475 U. S. 1088, rehearing denied, 475 U. S. 1151

(1986) (petition for certiorari), /n re McDonald, 479 U. 3. 309 (1986) (peti-

ven for habeas corpus).

In RE MCDONALD 5

part of the Court’s docket, see, e. g., Gideon v. Wainwright,

372 U. S. 335 (1963), and remain so.

But paupers filing pro se petitions are not subject to the

financial considerations —filing fees and attorneys fees —that

deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions. Every

paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repe-

tieleus or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's

limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is

to see that these resources are allocated in a way that pro-

motes the interests of justice. The continual processing

of petitioner’s frivolous requests for extraordinary writs

does not promote that end. Although we have not done so

previously, lower courts have issued orders intended to curb

serious abuses by persons proceeding in forma pauperis.

Our order here prevents petitioner from proceeding in forma

pauperis when seeking extraordinary writs from the Court.’

It is perhaps worth noting that we have not granted the sort

of extraordinary writ relentlessly sought by petitioner to any

litigant —paid or in forma pauperis—for at least a decade.

We have emphasized that extraordinary writs are, not sur-

prisingly, “drastic and extraordinary remedies,” to be “re-

served for really extraordinary causes,” in which “appeal is

clearly an inadequate remedy.” Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S

258, 259, 260 (1947).

*See, e. g., Procup v. Strickland, 792 F. 2d 1069 (CA11 1986); Peck v.

Hoff, 660 F. 2d 371 (CA8 1981); Green v. Carison, 649 F. 2d 285 CAS

1981); cf. Jn re Martin-Trigona, 737 F. 2d 1254, 1261 (CA2 1984) (“Federal

courts have both the inherent power and constitutional obligation to pro-

tect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out

Article III functions”).

* Petitioner has repeatedly ignored the letter and spirit of this Court's

Rule 26, which provides in part that, “{tJo justify the granting of [an ex-

traordinary writ], it must be shown that the writ will be in aid of the

Court's appellate jurisdiction, that there are present exceptional circum-

stances warranting the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers, and

that adequate relief cannot be had in any other form or from any other

court.”

6 In RE MCDONALD

Petitioner remains free under the present order to file in

forma pauperis requests for relief other than an extraordi-

nary writ, if he qualifies under this Court’s Rule 46 and does

not similarly abuse that privilege.

It is so ordered.

fe,