Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Wilson v. Seiter
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39-7376 (keeves
HAND DELIVERED
No. __ may 2- 1980
IN THE OFFICE OF
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED SUPAEWECOOKT, Uy
.\
OCTOBER TERM, 198
(2)
PEARLY L. WILSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD SEITER, et al.,
Respondents .
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ELIZABETH ALEXANDER
(Counsel of Record)
ALVIN J. BRONSTEIN
MARK J. LOPEZ
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT
OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
1616 P Street N.W., Suite 340
Washington, DC 20036
(202)331-0500
GORDON J. BEGGS
ELINOR R. ALGER
ACLU OF OHIO FOUNDATION
1223 West 6th street
Cleveland, OH 44113
(216) 781-6278
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in failing
to follow the holdings of the Fourth, Fifth,
and District of Columbia Circuits that the
malicious and sadistic intent requirements
of Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) do
not apply to Eighth Amendment challenges to
continuing conditions of confinement that do
not involve the use of force.
2. Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in
affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in view of the factual conflicts in
the record.
ii
LIST OF PARTIES
The petitioner Pearly L. Wilson is a
prisoner at the Hocking Correctional Facility
(hereafter HCF) in Nelsonville, Ohio.
Everett Hunt, Jr., a second plaintiff in the
lower courts, is no longer confined at the
HCF. The respondents are Richard P. Seiter,
Director of the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections in Columbus,
Ohio, and Carl Humphreys, Gupeirishendent of
the HCF.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED...... jndéacecheen oocnee
LIST OF PARTIES....... pGcuaencweccad eee ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS............... nooees . iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ........ccccecccees iv
OPINIONS BELOW............. saanenbe 6 osm
JURISDICTION. .........000. eeenjenctees _
STATUTES INVOLVED.......... ranauanee oon
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.........+2+-+eseeeeed
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT......... eo |
I. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT CREATES AN IMPORTANT
CONFLICT. WITH THE FOURTH,
FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF |
COLUMBIA CIRCUITS...........++++-14
II. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MISAPPLIES THIS COURT'S DECISION
IN WHITLEYV.ALBERS........++++++-+25
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
109 S.Ct. 1197(19B89) .....-- eee eocccce 29
Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship,
842 F.2d 556 (lst Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 68 (1988)........23, 24
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
(1986) .2 cere cere reeeeseesesss eenene eee eee 30
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976) 2. cc ccccceecccveseeselddD, 26, 30, 35
Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52
(5th Cir. 1987) e*eeneeeeenteeneeeeeeeee 16, 17
Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47
(5th cir. 1987) “eee ee @©eeeeeeeeeeneeeeeee 18
Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101
(Sth Cir. 1988) (en banc).......+-+++++- 19
‘Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237
(9th Cir. 19B2) 2. eeeececes eeevwe#e#eee#ee 31, 32
Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134
(8th Cir. 1989) .ccweveceeecee eee#ee5u5x+nrteeee 22
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).....- 34
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v.
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir. 1979),
on remand, 487 F.Supp. 638
(W.D. Pa. 1980) ....ccsccccccccceccccces 32
LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389
(4th Cir. 1987) ...--eeceeeeeees 19, 20, 21
Morgan v. District of Columbia
824 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987)..... 21, 22
Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446
(9th Cir. BPee Pp oceceecsases oe eeeeeeee «+24
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1041 I errrrrTTTTT rr.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337
CSBGR) occcecccceeses ecoecccecs --28, 34, 36
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)....29, 30
Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48
(2d Cir. BV UCR 6600600606600 cébeecesebeul
Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269
(7th Cir. BE 6096600008 06666680600 000
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312
(1986)... cee cece ee eeeeecececceees Passim
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974) ne ff © re |. 37
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975) ne neneeneeee ee ef ee @eeeeeeeeeeeeee Trrr :.
State Statutes
GP Weare Do 050660656 6606000 4008080 «+1
ae Weoe Mesccccedscesous cevcececes 2, 3, 4
42 3.8.€. Bees scbere ne © fe @ © coccccsccceay 4
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution,
Eighth Amendment................... passim
vs
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit entered on January 16,
1990, is reported at 893 F.2d 861 and is
reprinted in the appendix separately filed
(hereafter "App."). The unreported trial
court opinion is also reprinted in the
Appendix.
JURISDICTION
The opinion and judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
were issued on January 16, 1990. On April
3, 1990, the Honorable Antonin Scalia,
Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit,
granted an application to extend the time of
filing this petition for writ of certiorari
until May 2, 1990. App. at 21. This Court
has jurisdiction to review the judgment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
This case involves 42 U.S.C. §1983 and its
jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. §1343.
42
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person
within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party
injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for
redress.
(a) The district courts
shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to
be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the
deprivation, under
color of state law,
§1983 provides in pertinent
§1343 provides in pertinent
3
statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom
or usage of any
right, privilege
or immmity secured
by the Constitution
of the United
FI en or by any
of Congress
providing for equal
rights of citizens
or of all persons
within the
jurisdiction of the
United States;
(4) To recover
damages or to
secure equitable
or other relief
under any Act of
Congress providing
for the protection
of civil rights,
including the right
to vote.
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was filed by the petitioner
and another prisoner, acting without counsel,
in 1986.* The amended complaint alleged that
prisoners were double bunked in dormitories
at the HCF with less than fifty square feet
per person; that noise levels .<re excessive;
that the dormitory was “nearly frigid” in the
winter and that the clothing provided was
inadequate to keep prisoners warm. The
amended complaint also claimed that
temperatures were excessively high in the
summer because of a lack of ventilation,
resulting in prisoners experiencing heat-
related rashes and prisoners with respiratory
problems experiencing difficulty breathing.
The complaint further stated that the
restrooms were dirty and slippery, and
retained offensive odors and that the food
1 The trial court had jurisdiction of
the complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and
28 U.S.C. §1343.
5
services were a serious threat to the well-
being of the prisoners because of inadequate
sanitation, ventilation and sewage drainage.
In addition, the complaint alleged that the
presence of physically and mentally ill
prisoners in the dormitories created a
dangerous and stressful environment and that
classification was not based on the factors
provided. by regulation. The prisoner |
plaintiffs requested injunctive and
declaratory relief, as well as damages.
The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment with supporting affidavits.’
Although the opinion of the Sixth Circuit
ultimately turned on a state of mind question
not directly related to the actual conditions
at HCF, petitioner summarizes the parties'
affidavits below in order to demonstrate that
\
? The petitioner did not cross-appeal
the denial of his motion f
judgment. i
6
the record presents a factual conflict.*
* The petitioner has reorganized the
allegations of the affidavits and countering
affidavits to clarify the parties'
allegations. The unrepresented petitioner
submitted seven affidavits from prisoners
living in the dormitory. These affidavits
were countered by several affidavits from
staff and a visitor to the HCF.
Ventilation
Petitioner's Allegations
The air is stagnant and foul from toilets,
urinals and colcstomy bags in the dormitory.
It is difficult to sleep at night because of
this foul air. In summer, the temperature
goes up to 95°, and this heat is compounded
by the lack of ventilation and the fact that
fire exits are locked at all times. The fans
in the dormitories are inadequate to move the
foul air out of the dormitory. As a result
of the heat some prisoners “[(fall) out."
Prisoners with respiratory problems have
trouble breathing; other prisoners develop
heat rash.
Respondents’ Allegations
The dormitories contain two large exhaust
fans to increase ventilation and keep down
the heat in summer. The majority of the
windows are in working order, and they are
opened in summer. No prisoners have been
overcome by heat.
(continued...)
°(.. .continued)
Petitioner's Allegations
Urine accumulates around the toilets and
urinals and is inadequately cleaned,
resulting in offensive odor; floors are
filthy because of a lack of proper cleaning
supplies. The dormitory is infested with a
variety of insects and mice, and
extermination is totally inadequate. The
dining hall is filthy and the food is,
prepared by diseased, unsupervised prisoners.
As a result, petitioner fears to eat in the
dining hall.
Respondents’ Allegations
The restrooms are completely cleaned twice
a day, and throughout the day as necessary.
The kitchen area and dining room are cleaned
after every meal and kept very clean.
Prisoner food workers are required to wear
hats and plastic gloves. HCF has contracted
with an exterminator which services the
facility twice a month. There have been no
known cases of food poisoning.
Overcrowding
Petitioner's Allecations
There are 143 beds in the dormitory; all
but twenty eight of the beds are double
bunked. Prisoners have less than 50 square
feet per person. The beds are spaced so
closely that, with the inadequate
ventilation, prisoners smell the body odors
of other prisoners. The general noise level
is high, even during sleeping hours.
(continued...)
3’. ..continued)
Respondents’ Allegations
The amount of storage space “appears to
be adequate" for most prisoners. There are
regulations to control noise. Prisoners have
a variety of activities available to then,
including television, exercise in the
gymnasium or yard, a pool table, a weight
room, a prison library, and continuing
education classes that involve approximately
100 prisoners.
Lack of Heat
Petitioner's Allegations
The dormitory is "frigid" in winter.
There are cracks in the walls that can be
seen through. Most of the windows cannot be
closed completely, so that some bunks get wet
during the rain. The clothing is ragged and
inadequate to keep prisoners warm in winter;
no underwear is distributed.
Respondents' Allegations
The dormitories are adequately heated.
Prisoners are not given special winter
clothes unless they have jobs that require
them to work outside, but they are permitted
to buy clothing such as winter underwear.
Prisoners are given an extra blanket in
winter.
(continued...)
9
Ultimately, the issue that the Sixth
Circuit considered critical to the case was
the respondents' state of mind. On this
issue, petitioner contended in his affidavit
“(cv eontinueay
Safety and Protection from
Communicable Diseases
Petitioner's Allegations
Psychotic prisoners are placed in the
dormitories. This causes stress to other
prisoners, who cannot predict the behavior
of the mentally ill prisoners. Following
surgery, prisoners with open sores are housed
in the dormitory because of a lack of space
in the prison infirmary. One named prisoner
housed in the dormitory was repeatedly
hospitalized for pneumonia.
Respondents' Allegations
Prisoners with mental problems are sent
from HCF to other facilities. Some prisoners
have age-related physical health problems.
There is an initial medical screening that
includes checking prisoners for infectious
diseases such as tuberculosis and hepatitis.
Based on the health screening there are no
prisoners at HCF with active contagious
diseases. There has been no outbreak of
contagious diseases at HCF since it was
converted to a prison four years earlier.
The number of illnesses such as colds is
normal in view of the relatively advanced age
of the population.
10
that he had forwarded a three-page letter
complaining of the conditions of confinement
to the two respondents on July 6, 1986.‘
Respondent Seiter, petitioner alleged, never
responded to that ietter. Respondent
Humphreys responded but, according to
petitioner, failed to take any action to
correct the violations other than to forward
a copy of the letter to the HCF unit manager
and his staff. Petitioner alleged that the
Unit Manager and his staff did not take any
action to remedy the conditions and that, in
fact, they had no power to do so.
Respondents’ alleged attempts to remedy
conditions included such matters as the
regulations to control noise, the employment
of an exterminator, the installation of the
two fans, and the provisions for cleaning the
* The affidavit was submitted as part
of petitioner's motion for summary judgment,
which was filed on November 10, 1986.
11
dormitory and food service areas.‘
The trial court granted the respondents’
motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the prisoners' affidavits did not
demonstrate obduracy and wantonness on the
part of the prison officials. In granting
summary judgment on the claims of lack of
sanitation and ventilation, and housing the
petitioner with prisoners with communicable
diseases, the trial court relied on the
factual allegations in the affidavits of the
respondents. App. at 20.
Petitioner appealed to the Sixth Circuit.®
The court held that petitioner's affidavits
were more than colorable and that several
* petitioner continued to proceed pro
se until the Sixth Circuit appointed counsel.
The counsel indicated in the published
opinion withdrew prior to briefing and
argument because of the discovery of a
conflict of interest. The subsequently-
appointed counsel withdrew after the decision
of the Sixth Circuit.
See respondents’ allegations inn.3,
12
circuits had found Eighth # Amendment
violations arising from conditions similar
to those alleged by the petitioner. App. at
5. Accordingly, the court held that to the
extent that the district judge had adopted
the factual allegations in the respondents’
affidavits to find that conditions at the HCP
did not violate the Eighth Amendment, the
district court committed error. App. at 5-
6.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit held that
the allegations of mixing mentally ill
prisoners with others in the dormitory, the
allegations of excessive heat, and the
allegations of overcrowding did not rise to
a constitutional level. With respect to the
other claims, the Sixth Circuit held that the
respondents' state of mind was the critical
issue, as evidenced by respondents'
allegations suggesting an attempt to improve
conditions. As to these latter allegations,
the Sixth Circuit stated that:
13
At least in this circuit, the
Whitley [v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312 (1986)]} standard is not
confined to the facts of that
case; that is, to suits
alleging use of excessive
force in an effort to restore
prison order.
App. at 10.
Although the Sixth Circuit noted that
state of mind is typically not a proper issue
for resolution on summary judgment, it held
that petitioner's affidavits raised no
genuine issue as to the respondents’ state
of mind. Because the petitioner did not
directly dispute the respondents' claims of
affirmative efforts to improve conditions,
the respondents could not be acting with
"obduracy and wantonness...marked by
persistent malicious cruelty." App. at 11-
12. Accordingly the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was
entered on January 16, 1990. On April 3,
1990, the Honorable Antonin Scalia granted
14
petitioner's application for an extension of
time to file a petition for writ of
certiorari to May 2, 1990. App. at 21.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT CREATES
AN IMPORTANT CONFLICT WITH THE FOURTH, FIFTH,
AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS
In this case, as noted in the Statement
of the Case, the Sixth Circuit found that the
affidavits filed in the trial court on behalf
of petitioner were "more than colorable" and
that several circuits iad found Eighth
Amendment violations arising from conditions
similar to those alleged by the petitioner.
App. at 5. For that reason, the Sixth
Circuit indicated, the trial court had erred
in dismissing the complaint on the basis of
controverted claims in affidavits filed on
behalf of respondents.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit held, the
petitioner's allegations regarding unsanitary
eating conditions, housing with physically
ill inmates, inadequate ventilation,
15
excessive noise, and vermin infestation could
not survive summary judgment. The Sixth
Circuit held that the affidavits of
respondents, indicating that they had
attempted to remedy these conditions,
demonstrated that respondents could not
possess the state of mind consistent with
a violation of the Eighth Amendment, even
though petitioner disputed the xesults of
these efforts. App. at 11-12. The Sixth
Circuit, purporting to apply Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), held that
efforts to maintain decent conditions, even
if unsuccessful, demonstrated that the
respondents lacked an obdurate and willful
state of mind "marked by persistent malicious
cruelty." App. at 12.
A survey of federal Court of Appeals
decisions citing Whitley demonstrates that
this is the only case in which a Court of
Appeals has relied upon the state of mind
requirements of Whitley to dismiss a case
16
challenging continuing conditions not
involving the use of force. In contrast, the
other circuits that have considered this
issue have explicitly rejected the
application of the "malicious cruelty" state
of mind test to such cases.
In Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.
1987), the Court of Appeals reviewed the
trial court's dismissal of a prisoner's
complaint as frivolous. The prisoner raised
due process and Eighth Amendment claims. The
latter involved allegations that the solitary
confinement cell was very cold and infested
with rats and that the prisoner had to sleep
on the floor. The Fifth Circuit held that
if the prisoner proved his Eighth Amendment
allegations, he would be entitled to relief.
‘In the course of doing so, the court
explicitly rejected the analysis of the
district court, which was precisely the same
analysis as the Sixth Circuit employed in
this case:
17
The district court relied on
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.
2d 251 (1986), to require a
showing that the deputies
acted with malicious and
sadistic intent in subjecting
Foulds to the above-described
conditions. This reliance
was in error.
involved the shooting of an
inmate during a prison riot.
In that setting, involving
essential prison security,
the Supreme Court required
a showing of “malicious and
sadistic intent" by prison
officials to support a claim
under the eighth amendment.
, 475 U.S. at 320, 106
S.Ct. at 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d at
261. The facts of the
instant case markedly differ.
There was no imminent danger.
We decline the invitation to
extend the rule of Whitley
to cover all prison
disciplinary actions,
ostensibly under the guise
of achieving prison security.
We do not see Whitley as the
harbinger of such, gee 475
U.S. at 319, 106 S.Ct. at
1084, 89 L.Ed.2d at 260
(recognizing the general
“unnecessary and wanton"
standard of review).
Id. at 54.
A different panel of the Fifth Circuit
reached precisely the same conclusion in
18
reversing another dismissal of a prisoner
complaint alleging that the prisoners
contracted tuberculosis as a result of
confinement in a dirty, overcrowded cellblock
that had inadequate ventilation and lighting
as well as insect infestation. In the course
of reversing the trial court, the Fifth
Circuit made clear that the Whitley intent
requirements did nct apply to continuing
conditions of confinement:
But unlike "conduct that does
not purport to be punishment
at all" as was involved in
Gamble and Whitley, the Court
has not made intent an
element of a cause of action
alleging unconstitutional
conditions of confinement.
Prison conditions may violate
the eighth amendment even if
they are not imposed
malicicusly or with the
conscious desire to inflict
gratuitous pain.
Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47 at 50 (5th
Cir. 1987). Although the Fifth Circuit en
banc vacated other portions of the panel's
opinion on unrelated procedural grounds, this
19
portion of the decision was reinstated.
Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101 at 1103
(5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
In LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.
.19°7), former Justice Powell, sitting by
designation, found that the deprivation of
basic necessities of personal hygiene to a
handicapped prisoner violated the Eighth
Amendment. In soto, the defendant prison
officials had been aware of the special
hygiene needs of the prisoner and had made
some belated, ineffectual attempts to respond
to them. Jd. at 392-393. The court held
that the case could be characterized as
either a conditions of confinement or a
medical care case. In either event, the
court held, in such circumstances Whitley
required no more than a "deliberate
indifference" standard, and the prison
officials' conduct demonstrated the requisite
deliberate indifference:
Although in
Albers, the Court held that
20
the "deliberate indifference"
standard does not adequately
capture the importance of
the competing obligations
that exist in making and
carrying out decisions
involving the use of force
to restore order in the face
of a prison disturbance, id.,
106 §.Cct. at 1085, the
instant case does not involve
such concerns. Whether one
characterizes the treatment
received by LaFaut' as
inhumane conditions of
confinement, failure to
attend to his medical needs
or a combination of both, it
is appropriate to apply the
“deliberate indifference"
standard articulated in
Estelle to this case. In the
context of this case there
is no clash between LaFaut's
treatment and "equally
important governmental
responsibilities." cfr.
, 475 U.S.
at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 1084.‘
‘ To the extent the
district court's
memorandum and
order can be
construed as
requiring appellant
to demonstrate that
Hambrick "acted
intentionally to
deprive LaFaut of
medical care,"
(App.. at 102-03)
this is erroneous.
21
Appellant need only
show that Hambrick |
was deliberately
indifferent to his
needs, not that she
affirmatively
of satisfying his
needs.
834 F.2d at 391-392.
In Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824
F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court upheld
a jury verdict finding that the correctional
officials acted with deliberate indifference
in failing to protect the plaintiff from
assault by a fellow prisoner. In the course
of that affirmance, the Court of Appeals
analyzed Whitley and held that the jury
instruction based on deliberate indifference
was sufficient:
The exigencies and competing
obligations facing prison
officials while attempting
to regain control of a
riotous cellblock, which led
the Court to conclude that
the "deliberate indifference"
standard was inadequate in
Whitley, are not present in
this case. The gravamen of
Morgan's claim is the
22
District's overcrowding of
the Jail; the conduct Morgan
challenges is the
municipality's operation of
the Jail generally. In this
context, unlike in the prison
riot setting, there can be
no legitizate concern that
liability will improperly be
based on "decisions
necessarily made in haste,
under pressure, and
frequently without the luxury
of a second chance.*
Whitley, 106 S.ct. at 1085.
The District's practice of
overcrowding has endured
since at least 1971. we
therefore conclude that
“deliberate indifference" was
the appropriate standard by
which to judge the District's '
conduct in this case.
Id. at 1057-1058.
The First, Eighth and Winth Circuits have
also rendered decisions that, while not in
Girect conflict with this case, apply the
deliberate indifference standard, rather than
the malicious cruelty standard, to prisoner
challenges to conditions of confinement.
In Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134 (8th
Cir. 1989), in a decision not discussing
Whitley, the Eighth Circuit applied the
23
deliberate indifference ‘ standard to
supervisor liability to affirm a jury verdict
against correctional officials based on a
failure to maintain sanitation in the
plaintiff's cell. The officials claimed that
there was no evidence that they actually knew
about the plaintiff's conditions of
confinement. The Eighth Circuit, relying on
earlier precedent from that circuit, held
that actual knowledge was not required.
Rather, the standard was more than negligence
but less than malicious or actual intent.
The Eighth Circuit held that the pattern of
events over a period of two years in a unit
supervised by the correctional officials
allowed the jury to find tacit authorization
or reckless disregard. The court thus upheld
the jury instruction, which employed the
deliberate indifference standard.
Similarly, in Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez~-
Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556 (ist Cir. 1988), ©
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 68 (1988) the Court
24
of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict finding
that prison officials had acted with
deliberate indifference in failing to protect
the prisoners’ lives in a prison
characterized by “severe overcrowding (a
system-wide average of twenty square feet per
prisoner), squalor, maltreatment, gang
warfare, killings, lack of proper medical
care, failure to segregate mentally disturbed
prisoners, guards unable to control entire
cellblocks, and other horrors." Jd. at 558.
See also Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 at
1449, n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Whitley and
reversing the dismissal of a pro se complaint
because the prisoner might be able to
establish that the alleged failure to protect
him canstituted deliberate indifference) .
Because the decision of the Sixth Circuit
creates a conflict among the circuits,
petitioner requests that the Court grant
certiorari.
25
II. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MISAPPLIES THIS COURT'S DECISION IN WHITLEY
V. ALBERS
In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986),
this Court considered the standard for
determining whether a prison security measure
undertaken to resolve a disturbance violates
the Eighth Amendment. The Court stated that,
while all Eighth Amendment violations must
involve “obduracy and wantonness," these
terms encompass more than one possible state
of mind. When the Eighth Amendment issue
involves the use of force to resolve a prison
disturbance, defendants are liable only if
their state of mind manifests a “malicious
or sadistic" intent.
By contrast, the Court in Whitley
indicated, in the context of prisoner medical
care, the Eighth Amendment is violated if the
prison official's state of mind is one of
"deliberate indifference." Thus, Whitley
reaffirmed the holding in Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976) that deliberate
= \
26
indifference to a prisoner's serious medical
needs violates the Eighth Amendment. The
Court in Whitley noted that the Estelle
deliberate indifference standard was
appropriate in medical care cases “because
the State's responsibility to attend to the
medical needs of prisoners , does not
ordinarily clash with other equally important
governmental responsibilities." Whitley at
320.
The decisions from the Fourth, Fifth, and
District of Columbia Circuits correctly apply
this Court's decision in Whitley by
recognizing that Whitley formulated the
Eighth Amendment standard of liability for
damages in the context of an emergency
involving the use of force to end a prison
disturbance. Continuing prison conditions
of confinement not involving the use of force
differ from the situation in Whitley in
several ways. First, and most obviously, the
interest in avoiding second-guessing prison
27
officials is greatest when prison officials
make decisions during an emergency. In
contrast, continuing conditions of
confinement allow prison officials the
opportunity for reflection. Second,
deference to official judgment is at its
greatest when prison officials make security
judgments with regard to the use of force.
Where conditions of confinement are at issue,
the rationale for deference is less
persuasive. Finally, a prison official's
state of mind in imposing a particular
deprivation is more important if the issue
is one of liability for damages than if the
issue is whether continuing conditions should
be enjoined.’
’ For similar reasons, public officials
charged with violations of the Constitution
enjoy a qualified good faith defense in
damages but not in injunctive actions. See
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 at 314, n.6
(1975). Here, the petitioner sought
injunctive relief as well as damages, and it
was particularly inappropriate to apply
“malicious or sadistic intent" test to the
claims for injunctive relief.
28
When prisoners are subjected to continuing
conditions that deprive them of the basic
necessities of life such as adequate food,
clothing and shelter’, such practices rarely
result from a malicious intent to inflict
pain. Rather, such conditions typically
result from neglect and failure to remedy
obvious conditions, the textbook examples of
deliberate indifference. It is inappropriate
to require prisoners to prove that the state
of mind of prison officials constituted
malicious cruelty rather than simply
deliberate indifference. Such a test for
state of mind would ignore the distinction
between use of force cases and medical care
cases drawn in Whitley, and would also
inappropriately focus judicial attention on
officials' state of mind rather than on the
harm caused by the challenged conditions.
If a condition bad enough to violate the
* See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337
at 348 (1981).
29 ;
Eighth Amendment continues to exist for a
period of time, prison staff obviously know
of its existence. If, knowing of the
condition, officials do not act, they are
deliberately indifferent, and a “deliberately
indifferent" state of mind saticiies
constitutional stendards for injunctive
relief. Cf. City pf Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
109 S.Ct. 1197 at 1205 (1989):°
® In smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983),
plaintiff complained that during a stay in
administrative segregation he was placed in
a cell with another prisoner who sexually
assaulted him. The district judge instructed
the jury that the prisoner plaintiff could
recover damages if the prison staff were
guilty of gross negligence or egregicus
failure to protect. The district judge
further instructed the jury that it could
award punitive damages if it found that the
staff acted with reckless or callous
disregard or indifference to the prisoner's
rights. The Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury
award for compensatory and punitive damages
based on these instructions.
In this Court, the prison staff argued
that the proper standard for punitive damages
was “actual malicious intent." This Court
held that the instructions were proper, and
rejected any requirement that the plaintiff
show actual malicious intent. The standard
for constitutional liability was not before
(continued...)
30
The lower federal courts have routinely
applied this Court's decision in Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), that deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of
prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment, in
a manner consistent with the above analysis.
When a case focuses on cantinuing conditions
of medical care, rather than on the factual
*(...continued)
the Court. Jd. at 51. However, in view of
the Court's holding that punitive damages
required only recklessness or callous
indifference, a fortiori, the Court could not
have approved an actual malice standard for
initial liability. Accordingly, the Sixth
Circuit's decision is inconsistent with Smith
Vv. Wade because it attempts to apply a
standard for liability higher than the
standard this Court has applied for punitive
damages for violatirns of Eighth Amendment
rights not involving official use of force.
See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
at 347 (1986), holding that negligence in
preventing an attack by a fellow prisoner
does not violate the Due Process clause and
noting that the prisoner did not challenge
the trial court finding that prison officials
were not deliberately indifferent. Again,
the Court's reference to deliberate
indifference implies that a finding of
deliberate indifference would have been
sufficient to impose liability.
31
circumstances of an individual instance of
alleged failure to treat, the federal courts
have routinely held that systemic failures
to make adequate provision for medical care,
including obvious failures to provide
adequate staffing or equipment, demonstrate
deliberate indifference justifying injunctive
relief. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
559 at 575 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1041 (1981):
In class actions challenging
the entire system of health
care, deliberate indifference
to inmates’ health needs may
be shown by proving repeated
examples of negligent acts »
which disclose a pattern of
conduct by prison medical
staff, or by proving there
are such systemic and gross
deficiencies in staffing,
facilities, equipment or
procedures that the inmate
population is effectively
denied access to adequate
medical care.
(Citations omitted) See also Wellman v.
Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 at 272 (7th Cir.
1983); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 at 1253
32
(9th Cir. 1982); Inmates of Allegheny County
Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir. 1979),
on remand, 487 F.Supp. 638 (W.D. Pa. 1980);
and Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1977).
An analysis of Whitley tuus demonstrates
that in cases challenging continuing
conditions, ovtside of the use of force area,
meeting the “wanton and obdurate" standard
to show Eighth Amendment violations requires
no more than a demonstration of deliberate
indifference. In turn, the existence of
obvious continuing conditions intrinsically
demonstrates deliberate indifference if the
conditions impose sufficient harm to violate
the Eighth Amendment .
In this case, the Sixth Circuit failed to
apply Whitley correctly. The Sixth Circuit
‘failed to recognize that the "obdurate and
wanton" state of mind requirements of Whitley
for all Eighth Amendment violations encompass
both the "deliberate indifference" and the
33
"malicious and sadistic" intent standards.
Which of the two “obdurate and wanton" state
of mind requirements applies depends on the
circumstances. Accordingly, the Sixth
Circuit erroneously equated “obdurate and
wanton" simply with “malicious and sadistic".
intent. Petitioner had alleged obvious
continuing conditions. The respondents, it
is trie, had claimed that certain remedial
steps had been taken, but petitioner
specifically charged that he notified the
respondents about the challenged conditions,
and the respondents' only action was to pass
on the complaint to staff who did not act
and, in fact, had no power to act. Given
that the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the
conditions claimed in petitioner's affidavits
were sufficiently severe to raise Eighth
Amendment claims and that disputed factual
issues could not be resolved on summary
judgment, the court could not have resolved
the case .n summary judgment if it had
’
34
applied the correct standard for judging
Eighth Amendment claims involving continuing
conditions. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
should have held that, because the existence
of obvious continuing conditions that may
violate the Eighth Amendment had been put in
contention by petitioner, summary judgment
was inappropriate.” Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit compounded its error by holding that
© As noted, the Sixth Circuit dismissed
tne Claims regarding overcrowding, excessive
heat, and the mixing of the mentally ill with
other prisoners in the dormitory as not
_@lleging deprivations serious enough to
violate the Eighth Amendment. This dismissal
was error because the claims should have been
considered as part of the overall conditions
challenged in the dcrmitory. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347, noting that
conditione of confinement alone or in
combination may deprive prisoners of the
minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678 at 687-688 (1978), affirming the
trial court's conclusion that the conditions
of confinement, taken as a whole, continved
to violate the Eighth Amendment, and
therefore justified an order that might not
be appropriate if the particular order
challenged were considered in isolation from
the totality of conditions sought to be
remedied.
35
the petitioner's affidavits failed to show
that respondents acted with “persistent
malicious cruelty." App. at 12. This
holding by the Court of Appeais demonstrates
that it was applying the use of force
standard from Whitley, not: the Estelle
standard of deliberate indifference.
Since applying the use of force standard
was error, this Court should grant certiorari
to clarify the Eighth Amendment state of mind
requirements in continuing conditions cases
that do not involve the use of force. It is
important for the Court to review the
decision of the Sixth Circuit because the
Sixth Circuit's decision has extraordinarily
far-reaching implications for prison law.
If this case is followed, almost all prison
conditions will be shielded from review under
the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons given
above, continuing prison conditions do not
typically result from the malicious cruelty
of prison officials. When such conditions
36
are intrinsically bad enough to violate the
Eighth Amendment, imposition of a separate
state of mind requirement as a barrier to
relief is inconsistent with the admonition
in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 352:
Courts certainly have a
responsibility to scrutinize
claims of cruel and unusual
confinement, and conditions
in a number of prisons,
especially older ones, have .
justly been described as
"deplorable" and "sordid."
When conditions of
confinement amount to cruel
and unusual punishment,
“federal courts will
discharge their duty to
protect constitutional
rights."
(Citations and footnote omitted).
Failure to reverse the Sixth Circuit decision
will once again draw an iron curtain between
the Constitution and the nation's prisons.”
1 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
at 555-556 (1974):
But though his
rights may be
diminished by the
needs and
exigencies of the
(continued...)
37
Accordingly, the petitioner urges that the
Court grant certiorari.
"0... continued)
institutional
envirorment, e
prisoner is not
wholly stripped of
- constitutional
protections when
he is imprisoned
for crime. There
is no iron curtain
drawn between the
Constitution and
the prisons of this
country.
ie
38
Respectfuliy submitted,
ELIZABETH ALEXANDER
(Counsel of Record)
ALVIN J. BRONSTEIN
MARK J. LOPEZ
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT
OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
1616 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
GORDON J. BEGGS
ELINOR R. ALGER
ACLU OF OHIO FOUNDATION
1223 West 6th Stree:
Cleveland, OH 44113
(216) 781-6278
Attorneys for Petitioner
May 2, 1990
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.