Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Wilson v. Seiter

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39-7376 (keeves

HAND DELIVERED

No. __ may 2- 1980

IN THE OFFICE OF

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED SUPAEWECOOKT, Uy

.\

OCTOBER TERM, 198

(2)

PEARLY L. WILSON,

Petitioner,

vs.

RICHARD SEITER, et al.,

Respondents .

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ELIZABETH ALEXANDER

(Counsel of Record)

ALVIN J. BRONSTEIN

MARK J. LOPEZ

NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT

OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION

1616 P Street N.W., Suite 340

Washington, DC 20036

(202)331-0500

GORDON J. BEGGS

ELINOR R. ALGER

ACLU OF OHIO FOUNDATION

1223 West 6th street

Cleveland, OH 44113

(216) 781-6278

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in failing

to follow the holdings of the Fourth, Fifth,

and District of Columbia Circuits that the

malicious and sadistic intent requirements

of Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) do

not apply to Eighth Amendment challenges to

continuing conditions of confinement that do

not involve the use of force.

2. Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in

affirming the trial court's grant of summary

judgment in view of the factual conflicts in

the record.

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

The petitioner Pearly L. Wilson is a

prisoner at the Hocking Correctional Facility

(hereafter HCF) in Nelsonville, Ohio.

Everett Hunt, Jr., a second plaintiff in the

lower courts, is no longer confined at the

HCF. The respondents are Richard P. Seiter,

Director of the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Corrections in Columbus,

Ohio, and Carl Humphreys, Gupeirishendent of

the HCF.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED...... jndéacecheen oocnee

LIST OF PARTIES....... pGcuaencweccad eee ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS............... nooees . iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ........ccccecccees iv

OPINIONS BELOW............. saanenbe 6 osm

JURISDICTION. .........000. eeenjenctees _

STATUTES INVOLVED.......... ranauanee oon

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.........+2+-+eseeeeed

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT......... eo |

I. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH

CIRCUIT CREATES AN IMPORTANT

CONFLICT. WITH THE FOURTH,

FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF |

COLUMBIA CIRCUITS...........++++-14

II. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MISAPPLIES THIS COURT'S DECISION

IN WHITLEYV.ALBERS........++++++-+25

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

109 S.Ct. 1197(19B89) .....-- eee eocccce 29

Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship,

842 F.2d 556 (lst Cir. 1988), cert.

denied, 109 S.Ct. 68 (1988)........23, 24

Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344

(1986) .2 cere cere reeeeseesesss eenene eee eee 30

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97

(1976) 2. cc ccccceecccveseeselddD, 26, 30, 35

Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52

(5th Cir. 1987) e*eeneeeeenteeneeeeeeeee 16, 17

Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47

(5th cir. 1987) “eee ee @©eeeeeeeeeeneeeeeee 18

Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101

(Sth Cir. 1988) (en banc).......+-+++++- 19

‘Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237

(9th Cir. 19B2) 2. eeeececes eeevwe#e#eee#ee 31, 32

Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134

(8th Cir. 1989) .ccweveceeecee eee#ee5u5x+nrteeee 22

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).....- 34

Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v.

Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir. 1979),

on remand, 487 F.Supp. 638

(W.D. Pa. 1980) ....ccsccccccccceccccces 32

LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389

(4th Cir. 1987) ...--eeceeeeeees 19, 20, 21

Morgan v. District of Columbia

824 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987)..... 21, 22

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446

(9th Cir. BPee Pp oceceecsases oe eeeeeeee «+24

Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559

(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,

450 U.S. 1041 I errrrrTTTTT rr.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337

CSBGR) occcecccceeses ecoecccecs --28, 34, 36

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)....29, 30

Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48

(2d Cir. BV UCR 6600600606600 cébeecesebeul

Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269

(7th Cir. BE 6096600008 06666680600 000

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312

(1986)... cee cece ee eeeeecececceees Passim

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539

(1974) ne ff © re |. 37

Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308

(1975) ne neneeneeee ee ef ee @eeeeeeeeeeeeee Trrr :.

State Statutes

GP Weare Do 050660656 6606000 4008080 «+1

ae Weoe Mesccccedscesous cevcececes 2, 3, 4

42 3.8.€. Bees scbere ne © fe @ © coccccsccceay 4

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Constitution,

Eighth Amendment................... passim

vs

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit entered on January 16,

1990, is reported at 893 F.2d 861 and is

reprinted in the appendix separately filed

(hereafter "App."). The unreported trial

court opinion is also reprinted in the

Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

were issued on January 16, 1990. On April

3, 1990, the Honorable Antonin Scalia,

Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit,

granted an application to extend the time of

filing this petition for writ of certiorari

until May 2, 1990. App. at 21. This Court

has jurisdiction to review the judgment

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

This case involves 42 U.S.C. §1983 and its

jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. §1343.

42

U.S.C.

U.S.C.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Every person who, under color

of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage,

of any State or Territory,

subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person

within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party

injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for

redress.

(a) The district courts

shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil

action authorized by law to

be commenced by any person:

(3) To redress the

deprivation, under

color of state law,

§1983 provides in pertinent

§1343 provides in pertinent

3

statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom

or usage of any

right, privilege

or immmity secured

by the Constitution

of the United

FI en or by any

of Congress

providing for equal

rights of citizens

or of all persons

within the

jurisdiction of the

United States;

(4) To recover

damages or to

secure equitable

or other relief

under any Act of

Congress providing

for the protection

of civil rights,

including the right

to vote.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was filed by the petitioner

and another prisoner, acting without counsel,

in 1986.* The amended complaint alleged that

prisoners were double bunked in dormitories

at the HCF with less than fifty square feet

per person; that noise levels .<re excessive;

that the dormitory was “nearly frigid” in the

winter and that the clothing provided was

inadequate to keep prisoners warm. The

amended complaint also claimed that

temperatures were excessively high in the

summer because of a lack of ventilation,

resulting in prisoners experiencing heat-

related rashes and prisoners with respiratory

problems experiencing difficulty breathing.

The complaint further stated that the

restrooms were dirty and slippery, and

retained offensive odors and that the food

1 The trial court had jurisdiction of

the complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and

28 U.S.C. §1343.

5

services were a serious threat to the well-

being of the prisoners because of inadequate

sanitation, ventilation and sewage drainage.

In addition, the complaint alleged that the

presence of physically and mentally ill

prisoners in the dormitories created a

dangerous and stressful environment and that

classification was not based on the factors

provided. by regulation. The prisoner |

plaintiffs requested injunctive and

declaratory relief, as well as damages.

The parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment with supporting affidavits.’

Although the opinion of the Sixth Circuit

ultimately turned on a state of mind question

not directly related to the actual conditions

at HCF, petitioner summarizes the parties'

affidavits below in order to demonstrate that

\

? The petitioner did not cross-appeal

the denial of his motion f

judgment. i

6

the record presents a factual conflict.*

* The petitioner has reorganized the

allegations of the affidavits and countering

affidavits to clarify the parties'

allegations. The unrepresented petitioner

submitted seven affidavits from prisoners

living in the dormitory. These affidavits

were countered by several affidavits from

staff and a visitor to the HCF.

Ventilation

Petitioner's Allegations

The air is stagnant and foul from toilets,

urinals and colcstomy bags in the dormitory.

It is difficult to sleep at night because of

this foul air. In summer, the temperature

goes up to 95°, and this heat is compounded

by the lack of ventilation and the fact that

fire exits are locked at all times. The fans

in the dormitories are inadequate to move the

foul air out of the dormitory. As a result

of the heat some prisoners “[(fall) out."

Prisoners with respiratory problems have

trouble breathing; other prisoners develop

heat rash.

Respondents’ Allegations

The dormitories contain two large exhaust

fans to increase ventilation and keep down

the heat in summer. The majority of the

windows are in working order, and they are

opened in summer. No prisoners have been

overcome by heat.

(continued...)

°(.. .continued)

Petitioner's Allegations

Urine accumulates around the toilets and

urinals and is inadequately cleaned,

resulting in offensive odor; floors are

filthy because of a lack of proper cleaning

supplies. The dormitory is infested with a

variety of insects and mice, and

extermination is totally inadequate. The

dining hall is filthy and the food is,

prepared by diseased, unsupervised prisoners.

As a result, petitioner fears to eat in the

dining hall.

Respondents’ Allegations

The restrooms are completely cleaned twice

a day, and throughout the day as necessary.

The kitchen area and dining room are cleaned

after every meal and kept very clean.

Prisoner food workers are required to wear

hats and plastic gloves. HCF has contracted

with an exterminator which services the

facility twice a month. There have been no

known cases of food poisoning.

Overcrowding

Petitioner's Allecations

There are 143 beds in the dormitory; all

but twenty eight of the beds are double

bunked. Prisoners have less than 50 square

feet per person. The beds are spaced so

closely that, with the inadequate

ventilation, prisoners smell the body odors

of other prisoners. The general noise level

is high, even during sleeping hours.

(continued...)

3’. ..continued)

Respondents’ Allegations

The amount of storage space “appears to

be adequate" for most prisoners. There are

regulations to control noise. Prisoners have

a variety of activities available to then,

including television, exercise in the

gymnasium or yard, a pool table, a weight

room, a prison library, and continuing

education classes that involve approximately

100 prisoners.

Lack of Heat

Petitioner's Allegations

The dormitory is "frigid" in winter.

There are cracks in the walls that can be

seen through. Most of the windows cannot be

closed completely, so that some bunks get wet

during the rain. The clothing is ragged and

inadequate to keep prisoners warm in winter;

no underwear is distributed.

Respondents' Allegations

The dormitories are adequately heated.

Prisoners are not given special winter

clothes unless they have jobs that require

them to work outside, but they are permitted

to buy clothing such as winter underwear.

Prisoners are given an extra blanket in

winter.

(continued...)

9

Ultimately, the issue that the Sixth

Circuit considered critical to the case was

the respondents' state of mind. On this

issue, petitioner contended in his affidavit

“(cv eontinueay

Safety and Protection from

Communicable Diseases

Petitioner's Allegations

Psychotic prisoners are placed in the

dormitories. This causes stress to other

prisoners, who cannot predict the behavior

of the mentally ill prisoners. Following

surgery, prisoners with open sores are housed

in the dormitory because of a lack of space

in the prison infirmary. One named prisoner

housed in the dormitory was repeatedly

hospitalized for pneumonia.

Respondents' Allegations

Prisoners with mental problems are sent

from HCF to other facilities. Some prisoners

have age-related physical health problems.

There is an initial medical screening that

includes checking prisoners for infectious

diseases such as tuberculosis and hepatitis.

Based on the health screening there are no

prisoners at HCF with active contagious

diseases. There has been no outbreak of

contagious diseases at HCF since it was

converted to a prison four years earlier.

The number of illnesses such as colds is

normal in view of the relatively advanced age

of the population.

10

that he had forwarded a three-page letter

complaining of the conditions of confinement

to the two respondents on July 6, 1986.‘

Respondent Seiter, petitioner alleged, never

responded to that ietter. Respondent

Humphreys responded but, according to

petitioner, failed to take any action to

correct the violations other than to forward

a copy of the letter to the HCF unit manager

and his staff. Petitioner alleged that the

Unit Manager and his staff did not take any

action to remedy the conditions and that, in

fact, they had no power to do so.

Respondents’ alleged attempts to remedy

conditions included such matters as the

regulations to control noise, the employment

of an exterminator, the installation of the

two fans, and the provisions for cleaning the

* The affidavit was submitted as part

of petitioner's motion for summary judgment,

which was filed on November 10, 1986.

11

dormitory and food service areas.‘

The trial court granted the respondents’

motion for summary judgment on the ground

that the prisoners' affidavits did not

demonstrate obduracy and wantonness on the

part of the prison officials. In granting

summary judgment on the claims of lack of

sanitation and ventilation, and housing the

petitioner with prisoners with communicable

diseases, the trial court relied on the

factual allegations in the affidavits of the

respondents. App. at 20.

Petitioner appealed to the Sixth Circuit.®

The court held that petitioner's affidavits

were more than colorable and that several

* petitioner continued to proceed pro

se until the Sixth Circuit appointed counsel.

The counsel indicated in the published

opinion withdrew prior to briefing and

argument because of the discovery of a

conflict of interest. The subsequently-

appointed counsel withdrew after the decision

of the Sixth Circuit.

See respondents’ allegations inn.3,

12

circuits had found Eighth # Amendment

violations arising from conditions similar

to those alleged by the petitioner. App. at

5. Accordingly, the court held that to the

extent that the district judge had adopted

the factual allegations in the respondents’

affidavits to find that conditions at the HCP

did not violate the Eighth Amendment, the

district court committed error. App. at 5-

6.

Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit held that

the allegations of mixing mentally ill

prisoners with others in the dormitory, the

allegations of excessive heat, and the

allegations of overcrowding did not rise to

a constitutional level. With respect to the

other claims, the Sixth Circuit held that the

respondents' state of mind was the critical

issue, as evidenced by respondents'

allegations suggesting an attempt to improve

conditions. As to these latter allegations,

the Sixth Circuit stated that:

13

At least in this circuit, the

Whitley [v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312 (1986)]} standard is not

confined to the facts of that

case; that is, to suits

alleging use of excessive

force in an effort to restore

prison order.

App. at 10.

Although the Sixth Circuit noted that

state of mind is typically not a proper issue

for resolution on summary judgment, it held

that petitioner's affidavits raised no

genuine issue as to the respondents’ state

of mind. Because the petitioner did not

directly dispute the respondents' claims of

affirmative efforts to improve conditions,

the respondents could not be acting with

"obduracy and wantonness...marked by

persistent malicious cruelty." App. at 11-

12. Accordingly the Sixth Circuit affirmed

the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was

entered on January 16, 1990. On April 3,

1990, the Honorable Antonin Scalia granted

14

petitioner's application for an extension of

time to file a petition for writ of

certiorari to May 2, 1990. App. at 21.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT CREATES

AN IMPORTANT CONFLICT WITH THE FOURTH, FIFTH,

AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS

In this case, as noted in the Statement

of the Case, the Sixth Circuit found that the

affidavits filed in the trial court on behalf

of petitioner were "more than colorable" and

that several circuits iad found Eighth

Amendment violations arising from conditions

similar to those alleged by the petitioner.

App. at 5. For that reason, the Sixth

Circuit indicated, the trial court had erred

in dismissing the complaint on the basis of

controverted claims in affidavits filed on

behalf of respondents.

Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit held, the

petitioner's allegations regarding unsanitary

eating conditions, housing with physically

ill inmates, inadequate ventilation,

15

excessive noise, and vermin infestation could

not survive summary judgment. The Sixth

Circuit held that the affidavits of

respondents, indicating that they had

attempted to remedy these conditions,

demonstrated that respondents could not

possess the state of mind consistent with

a violation of the Eighth Amendment, even

though petitioner disputed the xesults of

these efforts. App. at 11-12. The Sixth

Circuit, purporting to apply Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), held that

efforts to maintain decent conditions, even

if unsuccessful, demonstrated that the

respondents lacked an obdurate and willful

state of mind "marked by persistent malicious

cruelty." App. at 12.

A survey of federal Court of Appeals

decisions citing Whitley demonstrates that

this is the only case in which a Court of

Appeals has relied upon the state of mind

requirements of Whitley to dismiss a case

16

challenging continuing conditions not

involving the use of force. In contrast, the

other circuits that have considered this

issue have explicitly rejected the

application of the "malicious cruelty" state

of mind test to such cases.

In Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.

1987), the Court of Appeals reviewed the

trial court's dismissal of a prisoner's

complaint as frivolous. The prisoner raised

due process and Eighth Amendment claims. The

latter involved allegations that the solitary

confinement cell was very cold and infested

with rats and that the prisoner had to sleep

on the floor. The Fifth Circuit held that

if the prisoner proved his Eighth Amendment

allegations, he would be entitled to relief.

‘In the course of doing so, the court

explicitly rejected the analysis of the

district court, which was precisely the same

analysis as the Sixth Circuit employed in

this case:

17

The district court relied on

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.

2d 251 (1986), to require a

showing that the deputies

acted with malicious and

sadistic intent in subjecting

Foulds to the above-described

conditions. This reliance

was in error.

involved the shooting of an

inmate during a prison riot.

In that setting, involving

essential prison security,

the Supreme Court required

a showing of “malicious and

sadistic intent" by prison

officials to support a claim

under the eighth amendment.

, 475 U.S. at 320, 106

S.Ct. at 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d at

261. The facts of the

instant case markedly differ.

There was no imminent danger.

We decline the invitation to

extend the rule of Whitley

to cover all prison

disciplinary actions,

ostensibly under the guise

of achieving prison security.

We do not see Whitley as the

harbinger of such, gee 475

U.S. at 319, 106 S.Ct. at

1084, 89 L.Ed.2d at 260

(recognizing the general

“unnecessary and wanton"

standard of review).

Id. at 54.

A different panel of the Fifth Circuit

reached precisely the same conclusion in

18

reversing another dismissal of a prisoner

complaint alleging that the prisoners

contracted tuberculosis as a result of

confinement in a dirty, overcrowded cellblock

that had inadequate ventilation and lighting

as well as insect infestation. In the course

of reversing the trial court, the Fifth

Circuit made clear that the Whitley intent

requirements did nct apply to continuing

conditions of confinement:

But unlike "conduct that does

not purport to be punishment

at all" as was involved in

Gamble and Whitley, the Court

has not made intent an

element of a cause of action

alleging unconstitutional

conditions of confinement.

Prison conditions may violate

the eighth amendment even if

they are not imposed

malicicusly or with the

conscious desire to inflict

gratuitous pain.

Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47 at 50 (5th

Cir. 1987). Although the Fifth Circuit en

banc vacated other portions of the panel's

opinion on unrelated procedural grounds, this

19

portion of the decision was reinstated.

Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101 at 1103

(5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).

In LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.

.19°7), former Justice Powell, sitting by

designation, found that the deprivation of

basic necessities of personal hygiene to a

handicapped prisoner violated the Eighth

Amendment. In soto, the defendant prison

officials had been aware of the special

hygiene needs of the prisoner and had made

some belated, ineffectual attempts to respond

to them. Jd. at 392-393. The court held

that the case could be characterized as

either a conditions of confinement or a

medical care case. In either event, the

court held, in such circumstances Whitley

required no more than a "deliberate

indifference" standard, and the prison

officials' conduct demonstrated the requisite

deliberate indifference:

Although in

Albers, the Court held that

20

the "deliberate indifference"

standard does not adequately

capture the importance of

the competing obligations

that exist in making and

carrying out decisions

involving the use of force

to restore order in the face

of a prison disturbance, id.,

106 §.Cct. at 1085, the

instant case does not involve

such concerns. Whether one

characterizes the treatment

received by LaFaut' as

inhumane conditions of

confinement, failure to

attend to his medical needs

or a combination of both, it

is appropriate to apply the

“deliberate indifference"

standard articulated in

Estelle to this case. In the

context of this case there

is no clash between LaFaut's

treatment and "equally

important governmental

responsibilities." cfr.

, 475 U.S.

at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 1084.‘

‘ To the extent the

district court's

memorandum and

order can be

construed as

requiring appellant

to demonstrate that

Hambrick "acted

intentionally to

deprive LaFaut of

medical care,"

(App.. at 102-03)

this is erroneous.

21

Appellant need only

show that Hambrick |

was deliberately

indifferent to his

needs, not that she

affirmatively

of satisfying his

needs.

834 F.2d at 391-392.

In Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824

F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court upheld

a jury verdict finding that the correctional

officials acted with deliberate indifference

in failing to protect the plaintiff from

assault by a fellow prisoner. In the course

of that affirmance, the Court of Appeals

analyzed Whitley and held that the jury

instruction based on deliberate indifference

was sufficient:

The exigencies and competing

obligations facing prison

officials while attempting

to regain control of a

riotous cellblock, which led

the Court to conclude that

the "deliberate indifference"

standard was inadequate in

Whitley, are not present in

this case. The gravamen of

Morgan's claim is the

22

District's overcrowding of

the Jail; the conduct Morgan

challenges is the

municipality's operation of

the Jail generally. In this

context, unlike in the prison

riot setting, there can be

no legitizate concern that

liability will improperly be

based on "decisions

necessarily made in haste,

under pressure, and

frequently without the luxury

of a second chance.*

Whitley, 106 S.ct. at 1085.

The District's practice of

overcrowding has endured

since at least 1971. we

therefore conclude that

“deliberate indifference" was

the appropriate standard by

which to judge the District's '

conduct in this case.

Id. at 1057-1058.

The First, Eighth and Winth Circuits have

also rendered decisions that, while not in

Girect conflict with this case, apply the

deliberate indifference standard, rather than

the malicious cruelty standard, to prisoner

challenges to conditions of confinement.

In Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134 (8th

Cir. 1989), in a decision not discussing

Whitley, the Eighth Circuit applied the

23

deliberate indifference ‘ standard to

supervisor liability to affirm a jury verdict

against correctional officials based on a

failure to maintain sanitation in the

plaintiff's cell. The officials claimed that

there was no evidence that they actually knew

about the plaintiff's conditions of

confinement. The Eighth Circuit, relying on

earlier precedent from that circuit, held

that actual knowledge was not required.

Rather, the standard was more than negligence

but less than malicious or actual intent.

The Eighth Circuit held that the pattern of

events over a period of two years in a unit

supervised by the correctional officials

allowed the jury to find tacit authorization

or reckless disregard. The court thus upheld

the jury instruction, which employed the

deliberate indifference standard.

Similarly, in Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez~-

Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556 (ist Cir. 1988), ©

cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 68 (1988) the Court

24

of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict finding

that prison officials had acted with

deliberate indifference in failing to protect

the prisoners’ lives in a prison

characterized by “severe overcrowding (a

system-wide average of twenty square feet per

prisoner), squalor, maltreatment, gang

warfare, killings, lack of proper medical

care, failure to segregate mentally disturbed

prisoners, guards unable to control entire

cellblocks, and other horrors." Jd. at 558.

See also Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 at

1449, n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Whitley and

reversing the dismissal of a pro se complaint

because the prisoner might be able to

establish that the alleged failure to protect

him canstituted deliberate indifference) .

Because the decision of the Sixth Circuit

creates a conflict among the circuits,

petitioner requests that the Court grant

certiorari.

25

II. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MISAPPLIES THIS COURT'S DECISION IN WHITLEY

V. ALBERS

In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986),

this Court considered the standard for

determining whether a prison security measure

undertaken to resolve a disturbance violates

the Eighth Amendment. The Court stated that,

while all Eighth Amendment violations must

involve “obduracy and wantonness," these

terms encompass more than one possible state

of mind. When the Eighth Amendment issue

involves the use of force to resolve a prison

disturbance, defendants are liable only if

their state of mind manifests a “malicious

or sadistic" intent.

By contrast, the Court in Whitley

indicated, in the context of prisoner medical

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated if the

prison official's state of mind is one of

"deliberate indifference." Thus, Whitley

reaffirmed the holding in Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97 (1976) that deliberate

= \

26

indifference to a prisoner's serious medical

needs violates the Eighth Amendment. The

Court in Whitley noted that the Estelle

deliberate indifference standard was

appropriate in medical care cases “because

the State's responsibility to attend to the

medical needs of prisoners , does not

ordinarily clash with other equally important

governmental responsibilities." Whitley at

320.

The decisions from the Fourth, Fifth, and

District of Columbia Circuits correctly apply

this Court's decision in Whitley by

recognizing that Whitley formulated the

Eighth Amendment standard of liability for

damages in the context of an emergency

involving the use of force to end a prison

disturbance. Continuing prison conditions

of confinement not involving the use of force

differ from the situation in Whitley in

several ways. First, and most obviously, the

interest in avoiding second-guessing prison

27

officials is greatest when prison officials

make decisions during an emergency. In

contrast, continuing conditions of

confinement allow prison officials the

opportunity for reflection. Second,

deference to official judgment is at its

greatest when prison officials make security

judgments with regard to the use of force.

Where conditions of confinement are at issue,

the rationale for deference is less

persuasive. Finally, a prison official's

state of mind in imposing a particular

deprivation is more important if the issue

is one of liability for damages than if the

issue is whether continuing conditions should

be enjoined.’

’ For similar reasons, public officials

charged with violations of the Constitution

enjoy a qualified good faith defense in

damages but not in injunctive actions. See

Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 at 314, n.6

(1975). Here, the petitioner sought

injunctive relief as well as damages, and it

was particularly inappropriate to apply

“malicious or sadistic intent" test to the

claims for injunctive relief.

28

When prisoners are subjected to continuing

conditions that deprive them of the basic

necessities of life such as adequate food,

clothing and shelter’, such practices rarely

result from a malicious intent to inflict

pain. Rather, such conditions typically

result from neglect and failure to remedy

obvious conditions, the textbook examples of

deliberate indifference. It is inappropriate

to require prisoners to prove that the state

of mind of prison officials constituted

malicious cruelty rather than simply

deliberate indifference. Such a test for

state of mind would ignore the distinction

between use of force cases and medical care

cases drawn in Whitley, and would also

inappropriately focus judicial attention on

officials' state of mind rather than on the

harm caused by the challenged conditions.

If a condition bad enough to violate the

* See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337

at 348 (1981).

29 ;

Eighth Amendment continues to exist for a

period of time, prison staff obviously know

of its existence. If, knowing of the

condition, officials do not act, they are

deliberately indifferent, and a “deliberately

indifferent" state of mind saticiies

constitutional stendards for injunctive

relief. Cf. City pf Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

109 S.Ct. 1197 at 1205 (1989):°

® In smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983),

plaintiff complained that during a stay in

administrative segregation he was placed in

a cell with another prisoner who sexually

assaulted him. The district judge instructed

the jury that the prisoner plaintiff could

recover damages if the prison staff were

guilty of gross negligence or egregicus

failure to protect. The district judge

further instructed the jury that it could

award punitive damages if it found that the

staff acted with reckless or callous

disregard or indifference to the prisoner's

rights. The Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury

award for compensatory and punitive damages

based on these instructions.

In this Court, the prison staff argued

that the proper standard for punitive damages

was “actual malicious intent." This Court

held that the instructions were proper, and

rejected any requirement that the plaintiff

show actual malicious intent. The standard

for constitutional liability was not before

(continued...)

30

The lower federal courts have routinely

applied this Court's decision in Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), that deliberate

indifference to the serious medical needs of

prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment, in

a manner consistent with the above analysis.

When a case focuses on cantinuing conditions

of medical care, rather than on the factual

*(...continued)

the Court. Jd. at 51. However, in view of

the Court's holding that punitive damages

required only recklessness or callous

indifference, a fortiori, the Court could not

have approved an actual malice standard for

initial liability. Accordingly, the Sixth

Circuit's decision is inconsistent with Smith

Vv. Wade because it attempts to apply a

standard for liability higher than the

standard this Court has applied for punitive

damages for violatirns of Eighth Amendment

rights not involving official use of force.

See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344

at 347 (1986), holding that negligence in

preventing an attack by a fellow prisoner

does not violate the Due Process clause and

noting that the prisoner did not challenge

the trial court finding that prison officials

were not deliberately indifferent. Again,

the Court's reference to deliberate

indifference implies that a finding of

deliberate indifference would have been

sufficient to impose liability.

31

circumstances of an individual instance of

alleged failure to treat, the federal courts

have routinely held that systemic failures

to make adequate provision for medical care,

including obvious failures to provide

adequate staffing or equipment, demonstrate

deliberate indifference justifying injunctive

relief. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d

559 at 575 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,

450 U.S. 1041 (1981):

In class actions challenging

the entire system of health

care, deliberate indifference

to inmates’ health needs may

be shown by proving repeated

examples of negligent acts »

which disclose a pattern of

conduct by prison medical

staff, or by proving there

are such systemic and gross

deficiencies in staffing,

facilities, equipment or

procedures that the inmate

population is effectively

denied access to adequate

medical care.

(Citations omitted) See also Wellman v.

Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 at 272 (7th Cir.

1983); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 at 1253

32

(9th Cir. 1982); Inmates of Allegheny County

Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir. 1979),

on remand, 487 F.Supp. 638 (W.D. Pa. 1980);

and Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.

1977).

An analysis of Whitley tuus demonstrates

that in cases challenging continuing

conditions, ovtside of the use of force area,

meeting the “wanton and obdurate" standard

to show Eighth Amendment violations requires

no more than a demonstration of deliberate

indifference. In turn, the existence of

obvious continuing conditions intrinsically

demonstrates deliberate indifference if the

conditions impose sufficient harm to violate

the Eighth Amendment .

In this case, the Sixth Circuit failed to

apply Whitley correctly. The Sixth Circuit

‘failed to recognize that the "obdurate and

wanton" state of mind requirements of Whitley

for all Eighth Amendment violations encompass

both the "deliberate indifference" and the

33

"malicious and sadistic" intent standards.

Which of the two “obdurate and wanton" state

of mind requirements applies depends on the

circumstances. Accordingly, the Sixth

Circuit erroneously equated “obdurate and

wanton" simply with “malicious and sadistic".

intent. Petitioner had alleged obvious

continuing conditions. The respondents, it

is trie, had claimed that certain remedial

steps had been taken, but petitioner

specifically charged that he notified the

respondents about the challenged conditions,

and the respondents' only action was to pass

on the complaint to staff who did not act

and, in fact, had no power to act. Given

that the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the

conditions claimed in petitioner's affidavits

were sufficiently severe to raise Eighth

Amendment claims and that disputed factual

issues could not be resolved on summary

judgment, the court could not have resolved

the case .n summary judgment if it had

’

34

applied the correct standard for judging

Eighth Amendment claims involving continuing

conditions. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit

should have held that, because the existence

of obvious continuing conditions that may

violate the Eighth Amendment had been put in

contention by petitioner, summary judgment

was inappropriate.” Moreover, the Sixth

Circuit compounded its error by holding that

© As noted, the Sixth Circuit dismissed

tne Claims regarding overcrowding, excessive

heat, and the mixing of the mentally ill with

other prisoners in the dormitory as not

_@lleging deprivations serious enough to

violate the Eighth Amendment. This dismissal

was error because the claims should have been

considered as part of the overall conditions

challenged in the dcrmitory. See Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347, noting that

conditione of confinement alone or in

combination may deprive prisoners of the

minimal civilized measure of life's

necessities. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437

U.S. 678 at 687-688 (1978), affirming the

trial court's conclusion that the conditions

of confinement, taken as a whole, continved

to violate the Eighth Amendment, and

therefore justified an order that might not

be appropriate if the particular order

challenged were considered in isolation from

the totality of conditions sought to be

remedied.

35

the petitioner's affidavits failed to show

that respondents acted with “persistent

malicious cruelty." App. at 12. This

holding by the Court of Appeais demonstrates

that it was applying the use of force

standard from Whitley, not: the Estelle

standard of deliberate indifference.

Since applying the use of force standard

was error, this Court should grant certiorari

to clarify the Eighth Amendment state of mind

requirements in continuing conditions cases

that do not involve the use of force. It is

important for the Court to review the

decision of the Sixth Circuit because the

Sixth Circuit's decision has extraordinarily

far-reaching implications for prison law.

If this case is followed, almost all prison

conditions will be shielded from review under

the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons given

above, continuing prison conditions do not

typically result from the malicious cruelty

of prison officials. When such conditions

36

are intrinsically bad enough to violate the

Eighth Amendment, imposition of a separate

state of mind requirement as a barrier to

relief is inconsistent with the admonition

in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 352:

Courts certainly have a

responsibility to scrutinize

claims of cruel and unusual

confinement, and conditions

in a number of prisons,

especially older ones, have .

justly been described as

"deplorable" and "sordid."

When conditions of

confinement amount to cruel

and unusual punishment,

“federal courts will

discharge their duty to

protect constitutional

rights."

(Citations and footnote omitted).

Failure to reverse the Sixth Circuit decision

will once again draw an iron curtain between

the Constitution and the nation's prisons.”

1 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539

at 555-556 (1974):

But though his

rights may be

diminished by the

needs and

exigencies of the

(continued...)

37

Accordingly, the petitioner urges that the

Court grant certiorari.

"0... continued)

institutional

envirorment, e

prisoner is not

wholly stripped of

- constitutional

protections when

he is imprisoned

for crime. There

is no iron curtain

drawn between the

Constitution and

the prisons of this

country.

ie

38

Respectfuliy submitted,

ELIZABETH ALEXANDER

(Counsel of Record)

ALVIN J. BRONSTEIN

MARK J. LOPEZ

NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT

OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION

1616 P Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

GORDON J. BEGGS

ELINOR R. ALGER

ACLU OF OHIO FOUNDATION

1223 West 6th Stree:

Cleveland, OH 44113

(216) 781-6278

Attorneys for Petitioner

May 2, 1990

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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